
## Automating Almost All Application Security Things with CI/CD

Even Honeypots!

Mick Douglas and Andy Douglas



Where is application security?



Continuous Integration

## Continuous Integration

```
🔃 ua-parser-js@0.7.5 - Regular Expres...
                                                       const mime = require('mime');
                                                                                                                                Code flow
                                                        function sendFile(filename, response) {
                                                          response.setHeader('Content-Type', mime.lookup(filenam
                                                                                                                                        scripts/bench/server.js
                                                                                                                                                                                            line #24

✓ app.js - 2 issues

                                                          response.writeHead(200);
         Timing Attack
                                                          const fileStream = createReadStream(filename);
                                                                                                                                        scripts/bench/server.js
                                                                                                                                                                                             line 20

☐ Cross-Site Scripting attack

                                                          fileStream.pipe(response);
                                                                                                                                        scripts/bench/server.js
                                                          fileStream.on('finish', response.end);

✓ server.is - 1 issue

         H Path Transversal Vulnerability
function createHTTP2Server(benchmark) {
                                                                                                                                External example fixes
                                                          const server = http2Server.createServer({}), (request,
                                                                                                                                This issue was fixed by 708 projects. Here are 3 example fixes.
                                                             const filename = join(
                                                                dirname.
                                                                                                                                 georgi/grant

✓ standalone.is - 2 issues

                                                                benchmarks'.
         Using component state to comput ...
                                                               benchmark,
                                                                                                                                    function static_file(route, p, req, res) {
         http (used in require) is an insecure..
                                                               request.url
                                                                                                                                       var uri = url.parse(req.url).pathname

	✓ Header.is - 1 issue

                                                                                                                                     function dump static file(route, p, req, res) {
                                                             ) replace(/\?.*/g, '');
                                                                                                                                      var uri = url.parse(this.reg.url).pathname;
         Unsanitized input flows from the H...
                                                                                                                                      var filename = path.join(process.cwd(), 'public', uri);
                                                             if (existsSync(filename) && statSync(filename).isFil


		✓ Code.js - 1 issue

                                                                                                                                      fs.exists(filename, function(exists) {
                                                               sendFile(filename, response);
         Testing a collection size for >= 0 wi...
                                                                                                                                        if(!exists) {
                                                             } else {
                                                                                                                                      var fileStream = fs.createReadStream(filename);

✓ contentScript.is - 1 issue

                                                               const indexHtmlPath = join(filename, 'index.html')
                                                                                                                                      fileStream.pipe(res);
         Setting targetOrigin to "*" in postM.
                                                                                                                                      fileStream.pipe(this.res);
                                                               if (existsSync(indexHtmlPath))
      ➤ standalone.js - 1 issue
                                                                  sendFile(indexHtmlPath, response);
         III Signature mismatch: the implement...
                                                                } else {
                                                                  response.writeHead(404);
                                                                                                                                                                                          Feedback
                                                                                                                                  Share issue
                                                                                                                                                 Ignore issue
                                                                  response.end();
```

Continuous Integration



## Continuous Integration

```
PS C:\Users\AndyDouglas> docker run --rm -t --network host owasp/zap2docker-stable:2.12.0
zap-baseline.py -t http://localhost:3000 -s_
```

The hardest thing in the world is to change the minds of people who keep saying, 'But we've always done it this way.' These are days of fast changes and if we don't change with them, we can get hurt or lost.

Grace M. Hopper



## 2022 IBM report: Average time to detect data breach is 287 days

https://www.ibm.com/reports/data-breach

Continuous Integration

Continuous Delivery or Deployment

## **Active Defense**

## Automate Application Security with CI/CD



## Part 2: Active Defense for <u>detection</u>

# Goal: Actionable Security Improvement

## Hi, my name is Andy Douglas

- Long-time CodeMash attendee, first-time speaking
- Full Stack Web Dev/Engineer > Architect > Engineering Manager
- Security...meh

## Hi, my name is Mick Douglas


- First time CodeMash attendee
- Passionate about security
- Infosec Innovations, SANS Principle Instructor, IANS Research Faculty


## Part 1: Static and Dynamic Scans for <u>prevention</u>





Static Application Security Testing (SAST)





## SAST Strengths

## SAST Weaknesses

mendati

## Integrate SAST w/ IDE + CI

Popular Tools: Snyk, Checkmarx, SonarQube/SonarCloud

# Software Composition Analysis (SCA)

npm , Maven, NuGet, pip, etc.



amendation

## SCA: CI or scheduled

Popular Tools: Dependabot, Prisma Cloud, Snyk, Xray

# Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)

Merge into main

CI build runs
(hopefully with SAST)

CD build runs
to deploy to env X

and DAST

## DAST Strengths

## DAST Weaknesses

## DAST Demo: ZAP

```
on: [push]
jobs:
  zap scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    name: Scan the webapplication
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@v2
        with:
          ref: master
      - name: ZAP Scan
        uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@v0.7.0
        with:
          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB TOKEN }}
          docker name: 'owasp/zap2docker-stable'
          target: 'https://www.zaproxy.org'
          rules file name: '.zap/rules.tsv'
          cmd options: '-a'
```

nendatio.

## DAST: CD and/or scheduled

Popular Tools: ZAP, StackHawk, Burp Suite, Astra Pentest, etc.

## Part 2: Active Defense for detection





## Part 2: Active Defense for detection FTW!!





Traditional Defense == Passive

Traditional Defense == KNOWN

Active Defense == Passive & Active

## Still need to do "basics"

## Once you're OK...

# Shift focus/effort to higher reward

## Honey Pots!

Attackers have predictable paths

#### TTPs

#### MITRE ATT&CK matrix


MITRE   AT	T&CK°			Matrices Ta	ctics ▼ Techr	iques ▼ Data Sour	ces Mitigatio	ons ▼ Groups	Software Ca	mpaigns Res	sources ▼ Blo	g ☑ Contri	ibute Search Q
Reconnaissand	ce Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and	Exfiltration	Impact
10 techniques	7 techniques	9 techniques	13 techniques	19 techniques	13 techniques	42 techniques	17 techniques	30 techniques	9 techniques	17 techniques	16 techniques	9 techniques	13 techniques
Active Scanning (3)	Acquire Infrastructure (7)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting	Account Manipulation (5)	Abuse Elevation Control	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)	Adversary-in- the-Middle (3)	Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of Remote	Adversary-in- the-Middle (3)	Application Layer	Automated Exfiltration (1)	Account Access Removal
Gather Victim Host Information (4)	Compromise Accounts (3)	Exploit Public- Facing	Interpreter (8)  Container	BITS Jobs	Mechanism (4)  Access Token	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Brute Force (4)	Application Window Discovery	Services	Archive Collected	Protocol (4)  Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Identit Information (3)	Compromise	Application	Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart	Manipulation (5)	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password I	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Spearphishing	Data (3)	Through Removable	Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Gather Victim Network Information (6)	Infrastructure (7)  Develop Capabilities (4)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container Exploitation for	Boot or Logon Initialization	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	Build Image on Host  Debugger Evasion	Stores (5)  Exploitation for Credential	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer Remote	Automated Collection	Media  Data Encoding (2)	Over Alternative Protocol (3)	Data Manipulation (3)
Gather Victim Org	Establish	Hardware Additions	Client Execution	Scripts (5)	Boot or Logon Initialization	Deobfuscate/Decode	Access	Cloud Service Dashboard	Service Session	II Browser	Data .	Exfiltration Over C2	Defacement (2)
Information (4) Phishing for	Accounts (3) Obtain	Phishing (3)	Inter-Process Communication (3)	Browser Extensions	Scripts (5)	Files or Information  Deploy Container	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Discovery	Hijacking (2)	Session Hijacking	Obfuscation (3)	Channel Exfiltration	Disk Wipe (2)
Information (3)	Capabilities (6)	Replication Through	Native API	Compromise Client Software	Modify System Process (4)	Direct Volume Access	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Storage Object	Services (6)	Clipboard Data	Resolution (3)	Over Other Network	Service (4)
Search Closed Sources (2)	Stage Capabilities (6)	Removable Media	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Binary	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Input Capture (4)	Discovery  Container and	Replication Through Removable	Data from Cloud Storage	Encrypted Channel (2)	Medium (1) Exfiltration	Firmware Corruption
Search Open Technical	п	Supply Chain Compromise (3)	Serverless Execution	Account (3)	Escape to Host	Execution Guardrails (1)	Modify	Resource Discovery	Media	Data from Configuration	Fallback Channels	Over Physical I Medium (1)	Inhibit System Recovery
Databases (5) Search Open		Trusted Relationship	Shared Modules	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Authentication Process (7)	Debugger Evasion  Domain Trust	Software Deployment Tools	Repository (2)  Data from	Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over Web	Network Denial of Service (2)
Websites/Domains (	0)	Valid	Software Deployment Tools	Event Triggered	Exploitation for	File and Directory Permissions	Multi-Factor Authentication	Discovery	Taint Shared	Information Repositories (3)	Multi-Stage Channels	Service (2)	Resource
Websites	d	Accounts (4)	System Services (2)	Execution (16)  External Remote	Privilege Escalation	Modification (2)	Interception  Multi-Factor	File and Directory Discovery	Content Use Alternate	Data from Local System	Non-Application	Transfer	Hijacking Service Stop
			User Execution (3)	Services	Hijack Execution	Hide Artifacts (10)	Authentication Request	Group Policy Discovery		Data from	Layer Protocol	Transfer Data to Cloud	System
			Windows Management Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Flow (12)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Generation	Network Service Discovery	(4)	Network Shared Drive	Non-Standard Port	Account	Shutdown/Reboot
			institutientation	Implant Internal	Injection (12)	Impair Defenses (9)	Sniffing	Network Share Discovery		Data from Removable	Protocol Tunneling		
				Image Modify	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Indicator Removal (9)	OS Credential Dumping (8)	Network Sniffing		Media  Data Staged (2)	Proxy (4)		
				Authentication Process (7)	Valid Accounts (4)	Execution  Masquerading (7)	Steal Application Access Token	Password Policy Discovery		Email Collection (3)	Remote Access Software		
				Office Application Startup (6)		Modify Authentication Process (7)	Steal or Forge	Peripheral Device Discovery		Input Capture (4)	Traffic Signaling (2)		
				Pre-OS Boot (5)		Modify Cloud Compute	Certificates	Permission Groups Discovery (3)	n .	Screen Capture	Web Service (3)		
				Scheduled Task/Job (5)		Infrastructure (4)  Modify Registry	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (4)	Process Discovery		Video Capture			
				Server Software		Modify System	Steal Web	Query Registry					
				Component (5)		Image (2)	Session Cookie	Remote System Discovery					
				Traffic Signaling (2)	11	Network Boundary Bridging (1)	Unsecured Credentials (7)	Software Discovery (1)	п				
				Valid Accounts (4)	"	Obfuscated Files or Information (9)	1	System Information Discovery					
						Plist File Modification		System Location Discovery (1)					

Active Defence at each phase




## Honey Port

#### DEMO: Honey Port



## Honey Admin Login

#### Demo: Honey Admin Login



**Honey Session Tokens** 

#### Demo: Honey Session Tokens

#### Strategy: Post Detection

Watch and learn?

# Random error response?

#### Firewall

## QoS

## Demo response options

## Security != Hard/Expensive

## Security as Functional Requirement

## Security + CI/CD is good

## Challenge - Join Us!

Building a secure-by-default system is a choice.

Building an expensive, insecure, and inefficient one is also a choice.

Choose wisely.

-Mick Douglas

#### Resources

#### Presentation and related labs:

- GitHub repo with slides, demos, and labs: →
- OWASP SAST Recommendations
- OWASP SCA Recommendations
- OWASP ZAP
- (YouTube) ZAP Automation in CI/CD
- ModSecurity

#### Misc related resources:

Offensive Countermeasures: The Art of Active Defense by John Strand



Mick Douglas https://www.infosecinnovations.com/ Andy Douglas https://www.linkedin.com/in/andy-douglas-8187557/