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Personal Information:

Date of birth: July 31st, 1994
Citizenship: U.S.

Undergraduate Studies:

B.S. in Mathematics, *Summa cum laude*, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2017
B.S. in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics, *Summa cum laude*, University of Alabama at
Birmingham, 2017

Master Level Work:

M.S. in Mathematics, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2017

Graduate Studies:

University of Pennsylvania, 2017 to present
Thesis Title: “*Essays in Empirical Microeconomics*”
Expected Completion Date: May 2023

Thesis Committee and References:

Professor Holger Sieg (Advisor)
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Research Fields: Empirical Industrial Organization, Political Economy, Public Economics

Teaching Experience:

Fall, 2022	Urban Fiscal Policy, Teaching Assistant for Professor Holger Sieg
Spring, 2022	Market Design, Teaching Assistant for Professor Rakesh Vohra
Fall, 2021	Introduction to Microeconomics, Course Instructor
Spring, 2021	Public Finance, Teaching Assistant for Professor Margaux Luflade
Fall, 2020	Urban Fiscal Policy, Teaching Assistant for Professor Holger Sieg
Fall, 2018 – Spring, 2020	Introduction to Microeconomics, Teaching Assistant for Professor Anne Duchene

Research Papers:

“Estimating a Dynamic Game of Political Advertising” ([Job Market Paper](#))

Abstract: Political candidates in the United States spend billions of dollars airing millions of TV ads each election cycle. This paper studies the effect of political advertising on the outcomes of competitive elections to the U.S. Senate between 2000 and 2018. Using time-stamped data on candidates' ad spending and content, I provide descriptive evidence that candidates' advertising choices are driven by their own ideologies and political experience, as well as by their opponent's advertising. To gain further insights, I develop and estimate a dynamic game of political advertising with endogenous ad content, namely whether an ad is positive or negative. Parameter estimates show that incumbents have a substantial fundraising advantage over challengers. Positive advertising reinforces this incumbency advantage, while negative advertising works against it. A counterfactual public campaign financing policy that eliminates the incumbent's fundraising advantage decreases the incumbent reelection rate by 3.6 percentage points. Hypothetical temporary bans on negative advertising increase the incumbent reelection rate, but decrease ideological extremism among the challengers who replace them.

“Estimating the Benefits of Policy Decentralization”, with Holger Sieg

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to develop and implement a new framework for estimating the benefits of policy decentralization. To accomplish this task, we consider a probabilistic voting model. We show how to identify and estimate this model using a combination of roll call data from state legislators and local votes in policy referenda. We study the most famous natural experiment ever conducted with respect to policy decentralization in the U.S., namely the decentralization of liquor policies at the end of the Prohibition Era. Compared to the Prohibition Era status quo, we find that aggregate welfare increases by 1 percent under the optimal uniform centralized policy. Decentralized policies offer opportunities to account for heterogeneity in preferences and increase welfare even further. Compared to the optimal uniform centralized policy, the optimal decentralized policy increases aggregate welfare by 36 percent.

Research Papers in Progress:

“Strategic Product Positioning: Evidence from Political Advertising”, with Lucie L’Heudé

Computational Skills: C, C++, CUDA, Python, R, SQL