Flat Fee Compensation, Lawyer Incentives, and Case

Outcomes in Indigent Criminal Defense

Andrew J. Lee *

University of Texas at Austin

October 28, 2021

Link to Most Recent Version

Abstract

This paper examines whether paying court-appointed attorneys a flat fee per case instead of an hourly

rate impacts the quality of legal representation for poor criminal defendants. I study this question in the context of a pilot program in North Carolina where six counties were mandated to change compensation

for assigned counsel from statewide hourly rates to a flat fee for each case disposed. Using administra-

tive data from North Carolina, I find that defendants represented by lawyers paid under flat fees were 4.3

percentage points (10%) more likely to be convicted, 4.2 percentage points (10%) more likely to resolve a

case through a guilty plea before trial, and 4.6 percentage points (35%) more likely to be incarcerated. I

then explore two potential mechanisms for this result: an intensive margin response on lawyer effort and

selection of lawyers on the extensive margin. On the intensive margin, lawyers in the treated counties

report spending 11% fewer hours on indigent cases, disposed cases 42% sooner on average, and were

3.8 percentage points (34%) more likely to dispose a case on the same day as their first meeting with

the defendant. I do not find evidence of changes in lawyer composition following the switch to flat fees.

This paper informs policy questions on funding and compensation for the provision of publicly financed

criminal defense.

JEL Classification: H₇6, K₁₄, K₄₁, M₅₂

Keywords: Indigent Defense, Crime, Poverty, Personnel Economics

*Email: ajlee@utexas.edu. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Manuela Angelucci, Sam Arenberg, Scott Cunning-

ham, Nir Eilam, Mike Geruso, Dan Hamermesh, Bokyung Kim, Leigh Linden, Rich Murphy, Seth Neller, Gerald Oettinger, Sam Stripling, Steve Trejo, Cody Tuttle, and seminar participants at Claremont Graduate University and the University of Texas at Austin.

I also thank Mary Pollard, Margaret Gresens, and Stephen Lich-Tyler of the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services for

generously sharing data and providing insight into indigent defense in North Carolina. All remaining errors are my own.

1