

Adapting VBASBS Queueing Model for Proof-of-Stake Consensus Algorithm

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Abstract—Our main goal with this work is to establish a theoretical model that can simulate more accurately how blockchain transactions are grouped, validated, processed, and purged from a network based on a proof-of-stake consensus algorithm. With the switch from proof-of-work consensus algorithm to the newer proof-of-stake with cryptocurrencies, most notably Ethereum, there is a need to update the theoretical models that are used to define efficiency metrics. Further we took it upon ourselves to move beyond that and quantify the optimal time window to decrease waiting time for the average owner of each transaction, while not significantly deteriorating throughput for the network as a whole.

Index Terms—Blockchain, Optimization, Queueing

I. INTRODUCTION

The blockchain, a distributed ledger utilizing records linked together via cryptographic hashes, has within the last decade captivated the industry. Having been utilized in the development of a decentralized economic transfer scheme with the adoption of Bitcoin [4], the original proof-of-work concept had established a means of validating incoming transactions through a distributed network of participants. This led to the development of other crypto-currency applications, most notably Ethereum. These solutions implemented methods with a focus on accuracy and redundancy of the various transactions with minimal effort given to reduce individual transactional waiting time and increase efficiency of processing transactions.

This approach remains true for Bitcoin; however, Ethereum changed this consensus mechanism in 2022 with the update to proof-of-stake [5]. This changed the blockchain to be more efficient in reducing complexity in the work computations while decreasing the barrier to entry hence providing reduced centralized risk with the potential of more nodes securing the network. Where under the proof-of-work consensus algorithm, the timing of blocks was determined by the mining difficulty, the new approach, proof-of-stake, the timing is fixed. Time in the Ethereum proof-of-stake consensus algorithm is divided into slots of 12 seconds and epochs of 32 slots.

While the proof-of-stake greatly improved the efficiency of transactions, there remains room for improvements in the validation of transactions. In this paper, we propose an algorithm to decrease waiting time while maintaining a high level of throughput. To begin the optimization process, we must first choose a performance model that analytically describes the relationship between the number of transactions, the fixed time for those transactions to be processed, and the total

number of transactions that are processed (throughput). Once a representative performance model has been chosen, an optimal time window can be selected that balances out the throughput.

Our paper is organized as follows. In section two we conduct a brief literature review and then focus on the performance model that will underly our own work. Section three is dedicated to the methodology we used to optimize the block size with details of our approach theorized via mathematical models. Section four, we discuss the results recorded from our early attempts at simulating our proposed model. Then we conclude in section five with remarks and discuss potential future areas to continue expanding upon the model.

II. RELATED WORK

One of the main detriments of the concept of cryptocurrencies has been the slow transaction rates with proof-of-work consensus algorithm validation of transactions. The main focus to rectify this problem while maintaining the original consensus algorithm can be seen in previous work such as Fu [1]. This work states that when considering blockchain optimization, the throughput, or number of transactions processed by a blockchain system in a given amount of time, are key indicators of its performance. Mechkaroska [3] explores some of the methods tried up to that point. They include increasing the block size to increase the number of transactions being processed, which is increasing throughput, and a technique called "sharding" that is similar to parallel processing of transactions. This showed up in an alt-coin named Zilliqa [8] which is mentioned in the paper. While sharding is on the docket of potential changes to the Ethereum network, it has not been given the green light yet, and might not be necessary considering the changes made to the consensus algorithm, discussed later.

The prevalence of articles that called for an increase to the block size to a naïve larger size shows a lack of creativity to solve this issue of slow transaction validation as can be seen in Gobel, Thakkar, and Mechkaroska [2], [3], [9]. The hard fork in Bitcoin to create Bitcoin Cash was chiefly designed to make this change, with the increase in block size from 1MB on Bitcoin to 8MB on Bitcoin Cash.

Proof-of-work consensus algorithms take such a long time to calculate as a safety precaution against Sybil attacks. This methodology is no longer required for large market cap cryptocurrencies, and a shift to a proof-of-stake consensus

algorithm facilitates a precipitous drop in energy consumption as seen in Platt [6]. The large pool of staked validators means that the requirement for a validator can switch from access to raw compute power to capital. As stated in Sec. I this change for Ethereum happened in 2022, and therefore a new theoretical model must be considered to take into account the eccentricities of this new consensus algorithm.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. Original Performance Model

Our algorithm will expand on the performance model proposed by Seol, Kancharla, Ke, Kim and Park - A Variable Bulk Arrival and Static Bulk Service Queuing Model for Blockchain [7]. In the initial model, the arrival rate of the individual blockchain transactions is variable, but not unpredictable. The arrival rate is assumed to vary with the size of the incoming transaction and the rate is denoted by the symbol λ .

The variable μ is defined to be the processing time of a block to be posted and purged as noted in Seol [7], and is assumed to be fairly static as stated in the model. The variable n is defined to be the total number of slots in the block. P_i denotes the states with P_n denoting the maximum state before the block is processed.

This model was based off of a proof-of-work concept as can primarily be seen with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, as stated in Sec. I. The crux of the argument for this balance set of equations lies in Eq. 1 in Seol [7], and also here, and thus will be the basis for our new model.

$$P_n = \frac{\lambda n(n+1)}{\mu} P_0 \quad (1)$$

B. New Performance Model

Due to the ethereum network switching from the proof-of-work to proof-of-stake concept for their consensus algorithm, as discussed in Sec. II, we have decided to update the base model in Seol [7] to reflect this new regime. This new proof-of-stake methodology essentially flips the previous base model on its head, where the time between blocks being pushed out to validators is set at twelve seconds, and because of this, the block size (in terms of gas) can then fluctuate based on the number of transactions that have arrived in the latest block window of time.

The subsequently updated variables and assumptions are given below.

$P_{0,0}$: The state at which no time has passed in the block window of time.

$P_{t,0}$: The state at all of the time has passed in the block window of time, and the block is ready to be sent to the validator community, with no slow transactions.

$P_{t-j,j}$: The state at all of the time has passed in the block window of time, and the block is ready to be sent to the validator community, with j slow transactions.

$P_{i,0}$: The state at which i fast transactions have arrived in the block window of time with 0 slow transactions.

$P_{i,j}$: The state at which i fast transactions have arrived in the block window of time with j slow transactions.

τ : The minimum time increment that can pass between the fast transaction arrivals.

T : The total time that will pass between each block creation and is initially static.

t : The total number of fast transactions that can be seen in one block window of time. This is calculated as $\frac{T}{\tau}$, therefore if T is fixed at twelve seconds and $\tau = \frac{1}{32}$ then $t = \frac{12}{\frac{1}{32}} = 384$.

Ω : The rate for the entire block to be posted and purged. This is assumed to balance the new form of equations as μ did in the original base model.

n : The number of transactions in the block. This is now dependent on j which is the number of slow transactions that has been seen in the current block window. Here, $n = t - j$ or the total possible fast transactions, minus the slow transactions seen in the block window of time

1) $P_{0,0}$:

Incoming from $P_{t,0}, P_{t-1,1}, P_{t-2,2}, \dots, P_{2,t-2}, P_{1,t-1}$
Outgoing to $P_{1,0}, P_{1,1}, P_{1,2}, \dots, P_{1,t-2}, P_{1,t-1}$

$$\Omega(P_{t,0} + P_{t-1,1} + P_{t-2,2} + \dots + P_{2,t-2} + P_{1,t-1}) = \tau(1 + 2 + 3 + \dots + t - 1 + t)P_{0,0} \quad (2)$$

Here we have the summation from 1 to t which can be rewritten as $\frac{t(t+1)}{2}$ and the other summation is all of the possible ending states before we return to $P_{0,0}$. This can then be rewritten in Eq. 3.

$$\Omega \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} P_{t-j,j} = \tau \frac{t(t+1)}{2} P_{0,0} \quad (3)$$

As can be seen here, our added parameter j for the slow transactions has the effect of splitting the final state, P_t from the base model in Seol [7] into various states from 0 slow transactions up to $t - 1$ slow transactions.

It is with this addition, along chopping a fixed amount of time to minimum time increments, τ , that we can approximate the proof of stake workflow in blockchain networks, like Ethereum.

2) $P_{1,j}$:

Incoming from $P_{0,0}$ only (with time $(j+1)\tau$)

Outgoing to $P_{2,j}, P_{2,j+1}, P_{2,j+2}, \dots, P_{2,t-3}, P_{2,t-2}$

$$\chi(j+1)P_{0,0} = \chi(1 + 2 + 3 + \dots + (t-j-2) + (t-j-1))P_{1,j} \quad (4)$$

$$P_{0,0} = \frac{(t-j-1)(t-j)}{2(j+1)} P_{1,j} \quad (5)$$




Fig. 1. Flow Diagram of new model.

3) Combining Eq. 3 and Eq. 5:

$$\frac{2\Omega}{\tau(t(t+1))}(P_{t,0} + P_{t-1,1} + P_{t-2,2} + \dots + P_{2,t-2} + P_{1,t-1}) = \frac{(t-j-1)(t-j)}{2(j+1)}P_{1,j} \quad (6)$$

$$P_{1,j} = \frac{(j+1)\Omega}{\tau(t(t+1))((t-j-1)(t-j))} (P_{t,0} + P_{t-1,1} + \dots + P_{1,t-1}) \quad (7)$$

*****STOPPING HERE - A LOT OF THESE EQUATIONS MIGHT BE REPLACED TOMORROW - GOING TO

BED*****

4) $P_{n-j,j}$:

Incoming from $P_{n-j-1,j}, P_{n-j-1,j-1}, \dots, P_{n-j-1,1}, P_{n-j-1,0}$
Outgoing to $P_{0,0}$

$$\tau(P_{n-j-1,j} + 2P_{n-j-1,j-1} + 3P_{n-j-1,j-2} + \dots + jP_{n-j-1,1} + (j+1)P_{n-j-1,0}) = \Omega P_{n-j,j} \quad (8)$$




Fig. 2. State Transition Diagram of $P_{0,0}$




Fig. 3. State Transition Diagram of $P_{n-j,j}$

$$P_{n-j,j} = \frac{\tau}{\Omega} (P_{n-j-1,j} + 2P_{n-j-1,j-1} + \dots + (j+1)P_{n-j-1,0}) \quad (9)$$

5) $P_{i,j}$:

Incoming from $P_{i-1,j}, P_{i-1,j-1}, \dots, P_{i-1,0}$

Outgoing to $P_{i+1,j}, P_{i+1,j+1}, P_{i+1,j+2}, \dots, P_{i+1,n-i-1}$

$$\chi(P_{i-1,j} + 2P_{i-1,j-1} + 3P_{i-1,j-2} + \dots + jP_{i-1,1} + (j+1)P_{i-1,0}) = \chi(1 + 2 + 3 + \dots + (n-i-j-1) + (n-i-j))P_{i,j} \quad (10)$$




Fig. 4. State Transition Diagram of $P_{i,j}$

$$P_{i,j} = \frac{2}{(n-i-j)(n-i-j+1)} (P_{i-1,j} + 2P_{i-1,j-1} + \dots + (j+1)P_{i-1,0}) \quad (11)$$

6) Constraint: Markovian Queueing Assumption:

$$P_{0,0} + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=0}^{n-i} P_{i,j} = 1.0 \quad (12)$$

7) Remarks:

- Each $P_{i,j}$ depends on the previous $(i-1)$ column and its preceding $(0 \dots j)$ rows. This $P_{i,j}$ in turn, affects $P_{i+1,j}$ through $P_{i+1,n-i-1}$.
- The $i=0$ column has only $P_{0,0}$ (no arrivals and no time elapsed).

C. Optimization

The main point left to discuss is the optimization problem to set n to an optimum level given what the new expectation is for the coming λ . The new expectation for the coming λ will be the average of all λ that we have seen up until that point, which is an unbiased estimator of the random variable λ since our model will not have any prior knowledge of the range of values to be passed in.

The derivatives of the γ and W_Q are difficult to calculate for these purposes, so to approximate the derivatives we will use the first differences. This calculation is given by:

$$\Delta\gamma = \gamma[2:n] - \gamma[1:n-1] \quad (13)$$

$$\Delta W_Q = W_Q[2:n] - W_Q[1:n-1] \quad (14)$$

Since the functions are evaluated at small, discrete, and uniformly spaced time steps the approximation should be accurate for our purposes.

$$\text{opt}N = \text{argmin}f(n) := \{-n \lg(n) \cdot \frac{\Delta\gamma}{\Delta W_Q}\} \quad (15)$$

D. Closed Form Optimization

In this semester, we can start by removing the iterative, numerical process described above with a closed form solution to get the optimal n . The first thing then is that we have to look at the metric. In the iterative process we had the ratio of throughput over waiting time multiplied by a plug of $nlg(n)$.

Let's then look at the equations of throughput and waiting time to see how the ratio looks when reducing it down. W_Q is given in eq. ?? as simply L_Q divided by λ , so let's write that out and show that λ cancels out in that equation.

$$W_Q = \frac{n * \frac{\lambda}{\mu} \frac{n(n+1)}{2} P_0}{\lambda} = n * \frac{\cancel{\lambda} \frac{n(n+1)}{2} P_0}{\mu} * \frac{1}{\cancel{\lambda}} \quad (16)$$

Eq. ?? gives the equation for γ , so if we look at the equation for the ratio of throughput over waiting time we get eq. 17.

$$\frac{\gamma}{W_Q} = \frac{\lambda \frac{n(n+1)}{2} \cancel{P_0}}{\frac{n}{\mu} \frac{n(n+1)}{2} \cancel{P_0}} = \frac{\lambda}{\frac{n}{\mu}} = \frac{\mu}{n} * \lambda \quad (17)$$

Now, this ratio when reduced shows that throughput over waiting time is a monotonically increasing function, with μ being fixed this means that n is directly dependent on λ . This would not lead to an optimal level of n , but rather as λ became smaller (or quicker), n would should become smaller. In practice, batching was necessary to process transactions more efficiently, so there should be some penalty for having blocks that are too small. The particular network or application would probably have a direct impact on this number, but for our case in an arbitrary blockchain, let's set this to $\frac{1}{3n^3}$. In this way, when n gets very small, the penalty gets larger. A maximum can also be determined based on network processing speeds as a cap to n . So, now we have eq. 18 which we can denote M for metric.

$$M = \frac{\gamma}{W_Q} - \text{penalty} = \frac{\mu\lambda}{n} - \frac{1}{3n^3} \quad (18)$$

To find the maximum/minimum of this equation we need to take the first derivative with respect to n and set it equal to zero.

$$\frac{\delta M}{\delta n} = -\frac{\mu\lambda}{n^2} + \frac{1}{n^4} = 0 \quad (19)$$

Then solving for n we have eqs. 20, 21, 22.

$$-\frac{\mu\lambda}{n^2} = -\frac{1}{n^4} \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{n^4}{n^2} = \frac{1}{\mu\lambda} \quad (21)$$

$$n = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\mu\lambda}} \quad (22)$$

We now have the closed form solution that the optimal block size (n) is inversely related to the square root of the

cost of creating a block (μ) times the speed with which the transactions are coming into the network(λ).

Using this same equation, λ can also be projected based on the cyclical nature of how transaction speeds progress throughout the day and the optimal n can be calculated before each block is created to predetermine the next block size to be created.

IV. RESULTS

TODO: Redo this later

V. CONCLUSION

TODO: Redo this later

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