
San Jose State University


ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT


EE 282/CMPE209


SECURE CLIENT-SERVER FILE TRANSFER PART - 2


Andrew Wong 010782772 Venkat Babu Manchikalapudi 010747698 1. Wireshark Traces of messages exchanged between the client during the a successful session. [Upper Screen is wireshare communication, upper of Lower screen is Server and lower of Lower screen is Client]











 Snaps of your output sample for the experiment in Step 2 (successful authentication), as well as Step 6 (Error Response) <u>[upper of Lower screen is Server and lower of Lower screen is Client]</u>

a. Successful Authentication

```
. .
                                   transmission — python tcp_server.py — 100×24
ndrews-MacBook-Pro-2:transmission andrewwong$ python tcp_server.py
Socket is passively listening in port number 8000 for incoming client connections
Passively listening for incoming client connections...
step 1 Attempt- 0
step 2 Attempt- 1
 _Xa^pass: 41564040465e4252494f434a4a4d424e4f4c4a4f4a4a494a4a434b4e4f4d4a434c424b434e4848
• • •
                                     transmission — python tcp_client.py — 101×28
inter Username(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-1):admin
inter Password(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-1):password
inter secret of Alice(Xa): 2772
 ********
ClientID: admin
Request: Secure DH
P= 197221152031991558322935568090317202983
 .
Xa^Pass(Hex) 41564040465e4252494f434a4a4d424e4f4c4a4f4a4a494a4a434b4e4f4d4a434c424b434e4848
```

```
••
                        transmission — python tcp_server.py — 100×24
_xa^pass: 41564040465e4252494f434a4a4d424e4f4c4a4f4a4a494a4a434b4e4f4d4a434c424b434e4848
ndrews-MacBook-Pro-2:transmission andrewwong$ python tcp_client.py
reparing to send DH Message1
nter Password(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-1):password
nter secret of Alice(Xa): 2772
lientID: admin
equest: Secure DH
 .
Xa^Pass(Hex) 41564040465e4252494f434a4a4d424e4f4c4a4f4a4a49494a4a434b4e4f4d4a434c424b434e4848
eceived "AP@ABXEWBBJJLMKIBBLKLIHMJLOJKNLIMICOJNN||m`?R?g???*?G????5??f???>R?!??]?j???"
Xb^Pass(In Hex): 415040414258455742424a4a4c4d4b4942424c4b4c49484d4a4c4f4a4b4e4c494d49434f4a4e4e
omputed Symmetric Key K_AS(In Hex): 0x4625e6cd3bf7271e0c41561f10366062L
ecrypted Ns: 19666910924720329128327978380283067402
```

```
. . .
           transmission — python tcp_server.py — 100×24
step 4 Attempt- 1
• • •
                transmission — python tcp_client.py — 101×28
ecrypted Ns: 19666910924720329128327978380283067402
sending "admin||Z`GYp?K????s7)m?zTv?1??_?*?,C2X??a?<mark>I</mark>+?#m?P"
eceived "?@¿??$\?T:??tRa"
```

b. Error Responses

```
transmission — python
step 1 Attempt- 1
step 2 Attempt- 2
/alue of p chosen : 197221152031991558322935568090317202983
Xb = g^Xb \mod p = 161049218417163768896398823192136538956
Request: Secure DH
g_Xa_313631303439323138343137313633373638383936333938383233313<u>932313336353338393536</u>
g_Xa^Pass(Hex) 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4e4843424e4d
Enter Username(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-2):admin
Enter Password(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-2):admin
g_Xa 313631303439323138343137313633373638383936333938383233313<u>932313336353338393536</u>
g_Xa^Pass(Hex) 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4e4843424e4d
Enter Username(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-3):[
```

```
• •
                                                                                     transmission — python
 /alue of g chosen : 2
3_Xa^pass: 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4e4843424e4d
_Xa^pass: 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4e4843424e4d
Enter Password(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-1):admin
Enter secret of Alice(Xa): 1234
**********************
g_Xa_313631303439323138343137313633373638383936333938383233313<u>932313336353338393536</u>
g_Xa^Pass(Hex) 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484<u>a42494a484d4e4843424e4d</u>
Enter Username(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-2):admin
Enter Password(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-2):admin
Enter secret of Alice(Xa): 1234
g_Xa_31363130343932313834313731363337363838393633393<u>8383233313932313336353338393536</u>
g_Xa^Pass(Hex) 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4e4843424e4d
```

Enter Username(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-3):∏

```
transmission — python tcp.
Xa^pass: 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d4343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4e4843424e4d
z_Xa^Pass(Hex) 50525c595a42494a434f4a4c4a4d484c4d434343424d4842434349484a42494a484d4<u>e4843424e4d</u>
Enter Username(e.g:Alice): (Attempt-3):admin
Enter secret of Alice(Xa): 1234
Request: Secure DH
g Xa 313631303439323138343137313633373638383936333938383233313932313336353338393536
Andrews-MacBook-Pro-2:transmission andrewwong$ 🔲
```

3.

Encrypted Key Exchange (also known as **EKE**) is a family of password authenticated key agreement methods described by Steven M bellovin and Michael Merritt. Although several of the forms of EKE in this paper were later found to be flawed, the surviving, refined, and enhanced forms of EKE effectively make this the first method to amplify a shared password into a shared key, where the shared key may subsequently be used to provide a zero knowledge password proof or other functions.

In the most general form of EKE, at least one party encrypts an ephemeral (one-time) public key using a password, and sends it to a second party, who decrypts it and uses it to negotiate a shared key with the first party.

Augmented-EKE, introduced the concept of **augmented** password authenticated key agreement for client/server scenarios. Augmented methods have the added goal of ensuring that password verification data stolen from a server cannot be used by an attacker to masquerade as the client, unless the attacker first determines the password (e.g. by performing a brute force attack on the stolen data).

A version of EKE based on Diffie hellman(DH), known as DH-EKE, has survived attack and has led to improved variations, such as the PAK family of methods in IEEE P1363.2. With the US patent on EKE expiring in late 2011, an EAP authentication method using EKE was published as an IETF RFC. The EAP method uses the Diffie-Hellman variant of EKE.

This code advantages:

In our experiment compared to Diffie hellman, EKE has and advantage of mutual authentication and Data integrity as we have included Nonces(Na,Ns) in client and server and after three messages are exchanged in the EKE process in our code, the nonce Na, of the client is transferred to the server and both sided Na is checked after the fourth step or the fourth message where the server sends the encrypted nonce Na with Kas and client decrypts it with Kas it has and it gets the Na which is send by server and at this stage it compares both the Na's and if the Na initially chosen by client and Na at the end of 4th step send by server is the same then the client is authenticated by the server and if not client detects the fault and server detects the Ns which is wrong from the server and it also stops the connection. Plus it is also possible to unable to compute the Kas by exponentially computing "server's computed Xa Client's Nonce" and "Xs Server's Nonce" that resulting in authentication failure.

So the man in the middle or trudy which wants to connect to the server obviously will have the incorrect Na which it sends and so client detects it first identifying that it is intruder and then with the incorrect Na it has it will also send incorrect Ns back to the server which will eventually detects it after the fourth step. So the server declines the connection