Team doubleE - Task 1 Report

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CSCE585 - Machine Learning Systems

Fall 2020 Adversarial ML Project

This report provides insight and analysis into Task 1, in which we create adversarial examples using the Athena framework and test the adversarial examples against several defenses to compare performance.

```
clear variables %reset workspace
close all; %close plots from previous runs
```

Set Project Directory

```
projectdir = 'C:\Users\andre\CSCE585_local\project-athena'

projectdir =
'C:\Users\andre\CSCE585_local\project-athena'
```

Import Project Data and Analyze Composition

All data from the Task 1 assignment was dumped into a single file [\data\predictionData.mat] which contains the following variables:

- 1. labels: an array of the correct values associated with each training example
- 2. predictionData: a 3-dimensional array of predicted digits, in which each row (1st dim) corresponds to an image in the test set, each column (2nd dim) corresponds to a tested attack, each layer (3rd dim) corresponds to tested defense.

Load labels and raw prediction data


```
predictions = predictionData.predictions;
predictions(:,:,5:6) = predictionData2.predictions(:,:,2:3); %add layers for AVEP-20 and MV-20
num_images = size(predictions,1); % rows
num_attacks = size(predictions,2); % columns
num_defenses = size(predictions,3); % layers

if(length(labels) ~= num_images)
    error('Number of labels not equal to number of images. Please check dimensions.')
end
```

Analyze Composition by Labels

```
digits = unique(labels);
digitCounts = zeros(size(digits));
for i = 1:length(labels)
    for j = 1:length(digits)
        if(labels(i) == digits(j))
            digitCounts(j) = digitCounts(j) + 1;
            break;
    end
end
end
pie(digitCounts); title('Distribution of Image Classes in Reduced-Size Testing Dataset');
legend(string(digits), 'Position', [0.85 0.45 0.1 0.2]);
```

Distribution of Image Classes in Reduced-Size Testing Dataset



Details About Attacks


This task includes 15 attacks, featuring 3 attack types, each at 5 different intensities. Below we plot a few examples of images from the MNIST dataset modified using the following attacks:

Spatial transformation

w/ max roation:

- 10 degrees
- 20 degrees
- 30 degrees
- 40 degrees
- 50 degrees

The spatial transormation attack can shift and rotate the image. In this case, the attack was configured to use minimal shift but to induce significant rotation:




More information about the spatial transformation attack is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02612.

PGD

with epsilon:

- 0.03
- 0.07
- 0.10
- 0.20
- 0.30




More information about the PGD attack is available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06083.pdf.

BIM

with epsilon:

- 0.1
- 0.2
- 0.3
- 0.4
- 0.5



More information about the BIM attack is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02533.

Details about Defenses

This work uses the following defense models:

1. UM: The undefended model (a single CNN with no special defenses)

- 2. AVEP-3: "Vanilla Athena" with the Average Probability ensemble strategy, using 3 weak defenses
- 3. MV-3: "Vanilla Athena" with the Majority Voting ensemble strategy, using 3 weak defenses
- 4. PGD-ADT: PGD Adversarial Training, a state-of-the-art Adversarial Defense
- 5. AVEP-20: "Vanilla Athena" with the Average Probability ensemble strategy, using 20 weak defenses
- 6. MV-20: "Vanilla Athena" with the Majority Voting ensemble strategy, using 20 weak defenses

In the ensemble methods, the weak defenses were chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but we made sure to choose a diverse set of weak defenses, especially in the case of the 20-WD ensembles.

Analyzing Error Rates


For each defense, we ran 15,000 perturbed images (15 attack variants * 1,000 of the 10,000 test images in MNIST) and obtained predictions for each. We stored the 1,000 correct values (labels) and stored the 15,000 predicted values for each adversarial example vs each defense in a 3D array, from which we can calculate error rates and plot relevant variables.

Calculate Error Rates

Plot Error Rates by Attack for Each Defense


For Undefended Model:

```
bar(categorical(attacks), all_err_rates(:,1)*100); ylabel('Error Rate [%]');
title('Error Rates for Each Attack vs Undefended Model');
```




For AVEP-3 Ensemble Defense:

```
bar(categorical(attacks), all_err_rates(:,2)*100); ylabel('Error Rate [%]');
title('Error Rates for Each Attack vs AVEP-3 Ensemble Model');
```




For MV-3 Ensemble Defense:

```
bar(categorical(attacks), all_err_rates(:,3)*100); ylabel('Error Rate [%]');
title('Error Rates for Each Attack vs MV-3 Model');
```




For PGD-ADT Defense:

```
bar(categorical(attacks), all_err_rates(:,4)*100); ylabel('Error Rate [%]');
title('Error Rates for Each Attack vs PGD-ADT Model');
```




For AVEP-20 Ensemble Defense:

```
bar(categorical(attacks), all_err_rates(:,5)*100); ylabel('Error Rate [%]');
title('Error Rates for Each Attack vs AVEP-20 Ensemble Model');
```



For MV-20 Ensemble Defense:

```
bar(categorical(attacks), all_err_rates(:,6)*100); ylabel('Error Rate [%]');
title('Error Rates for Each Attack vs MV-20 Model');
```




Plot Error Rates by Defense for Each Attack

```
defenses = {'Undefended' 'AVEP-3' 'MV-3' 'PGD-ADT' 'AVEP-20', 'MV-20'};
```

For BIM attack:


```
figure;
s1 = subplot(1,5,1);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(1,:)*100);
ylabel('Error Rate [%] vs BIM Attack');
title('\epsilon = 0.1');
s2 = subplot(1,5,2);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(2,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.2');
s3 = subplot(1,5,3);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(3,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.3');
s4 = subplot(1,5,4);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(4,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.4');
s5 = subplot(1,5,5);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(5,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.5');
linkaxes([s1, s2, s3, s4 ,s5],'y'); %force identical y-scaling on each subplot
```



For the BIM attack, all defenses fair siginificantly better than the undefended model. The 20-weak-defense ensembles are comparable to PGD-ADT, while the 3-weak-defense ensembles quickly suffer as the attack strength increases.

For PGD attack:

```
figure;
s1 = subplot(1,5,1);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(6,:)*100);
ylabel('Error Rate [%] vs PGD Attack');
title('\epsilon = 0.03');
s2 = subplot(1,5,2);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(7,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.07');
s3 = subplot(1,5,3);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(8,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.10');
s4 = subplot(1,5,4);
bar(categorical(defenses), all err rates(9,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.20');
s5 = subplot(1,5,5);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(10,:)*100);
title('\epsilon = 0.30');
linkaxes([s1, s2, s3, s4 ,s5],'y'); %force identical y-scaling on each subplot
```



For the PGD attack, the defended models outperform the undefended model at all attacks with epsilon > 0.07. The difference is most pronounced around the range $0.1 < \epsilon < 0.2$, where the undefended model misclassifies more than two thirds of the attacked images, but the defended models all still classify them with >90% accuracy.


The PGD-ADT strong defense outperforms the 3-weak-defense ensemble methods at higher attack strengths in this case, but performs very similarly to the 20-weak-defense ensembles.

Interestingly, the 20-weak-defense ensemble defenses perform poorly for the weakest attack case, with error rates of >10% for epsilon = 0.03. This is very unexpected, as they perform far better (<1% error) when epsilon is increased to 0.07.

Spatial Transformation attack:

```
figure;
s1 = subplot(1,5,1);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(11,:)*100);
ylabel('Error Rate [%] vs Spatial Transformation Attack');
title('10 deg');
s2 = subplot(1,5,2);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(12,:)*100);
title('20 Deg');
s3 = subplot(1,5,3);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(13,:)*100);
title('30 Deg');
s4 = subplot(1,5,4);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(14,:)*100);
title('40 Deg');
```

```
s5 = subplot(1,5,5);
bar(categorical(defenses), all_err_rates(15,:)*100);
title('50 Deg');
linkaxes([s1, s2, s3, s4,s5],'y'); %force identical y-scaling on each subplot
```



Interestingly, all defenses do very little to protect against spatial transformation attacks, with the undefended model frequently performing as well or better than the defended models. Also, for low values of rotation (<20 degrees), the 20-weak-defense ensembles perform extremely poorly (far worse than the undefended model!) misclassifying over half of the examples. The reason for this is unclear. We may consider choosing different weak defenses for the ensembles and explore if performance improves based on the weak-defense selection.

For low intensity sptial transformation attacks, low error rates are expected due to the spatial invariance properties of convolutional neural networks. With higher values of rotation, the models perform worse, with each model misclassifying at least half of the test examples for 50 degree rotation. We note here that it is impossible for any classifier to perform well for arbitrarily high values of rotation, considering that the picture orientation is one of the ways that the digit is properly discerned. Indeed, a rotated '6' is indistinguishable from a '9', even for human beings. We should also note that rotation by more than 30 degrees is visibly apparent, so rotational attacks of that strength would be clearly evident, not subtle.

A Note about Team Member Contributions

The difficulties in installing packages and dependencies made it impossible to have a deeply collaborative effort on Task 1, as Miles and Jay were unable to resolve dependencies until after Andrew had already made significant progress towards a solution. Additionally, being new to GitHub and other tools which are needed to properly collaborate on a common code repository, Andrew was also comfortable taking responsibility for

many of the tasks by himself to avoid problems with collaboration generating additional conflicts and new errors.

Despite this, all team members communicated and demonstrated willingness to help out, and we plan to have a more collaborative team solution for upcoming project tasks.