

# Andrey Minaev

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Department of Economics, CB 3305

The University of North Carolina,

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA	2021 Expected
M.A. in Economics, New Economic School, Moscow, Russia	2015
M.S. in Mathematics and Physics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia	2011
B.S. in Mathematics and Physics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia	2009

## RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary	Industrial Organization, Empirical Microeconomics
Secondary	Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2018	Research Assistant for <a href="#">Yunzhi Hu</a> , Kenan-Flagler Business School <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Helped formulate and solve the model of Bank Lending, Covenants and Investment Control</li><li>Illustrated the model by the computational exercise coded using Wolfram Mathematica</li></ul>
2017	Research Assistant for <a href="#">Jonathan W Williams</a> , The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Scraped and cleaned data using R</li></ul>
2014	Research Assistant for <a href="#">Ruben Enikolopov</a> , New Economic School <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Scraped and cleaned data using Python with Selenium library</li><li>Used econometric techniques to generate preliminary results</li></ul>

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2017 – Present	Instructor, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, (10 semesters in total), <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Microeconomic Theory for nonmajors, 100 students. <a href="#">Latest evaluation</a> Fall 2018, 2019, 2020, Spring 2019, 2020, 2021</li><li>Microeconomic Theory for majors, 30 students. <a href="#">Latest evaluation</a> Summer 2017, 2018, 2019</li><li>Statistics and Econometrics for majors, 30 students. <a href="#">Latest evaluation</a> Summer 2020</li></ul>
2016 – 2018	Undegraduate Head Teaching Assistant, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Microeconomic Theory for majors, 500 students Fall 2016, 2017, Spring 2017, 2018</li></ul>
2014 – 2015	Graduate Teaching Assistant, New Economic School, <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Game theory, Ph.D. level, 20 students</li><li>Optimization Methods in Economics, Ph.D. level, 20 students</li></ul>

## WORKING EXPERIENCE

2010 – 2012	Air conditioners online store, CEO <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Company strategy development</li><li>Building business processes</li><li>Team management (four employees and freelancers)</li><li>Negotiations with corporate customers</li></ul>
2009 – 2010	Strategy Consulting, Analyst <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Business process analysis</li><li>Market research</li><li>Presenting the results to other team members and clients</li></ul>
2008	Microsoft, Marketing Department, Summer Intern <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Market research</li><li>Data collection and analysis</li></ul>

## PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Python, R, Stata, Wolfram Mathematica, Git, ~~Blat~~TeX, Excel VBA

## PRESENTATIONS

2020	SEA 90th Annual Meeting, New Orleans, US
2020	OLIGO Workshop, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2019	OLIGO Workshop, Nottingham, UK
2017	OLIGO Workshop, Moscow, Russia
2015	35th NES Research Conference, Moscow, Russia

## AWARDS

2019 – 2021	The Buono Family Grant for Excellence in Economics and Teaching
2017, 2019	The Graduate Student Transportation Grant, UNC
2016 – 2017	The Joseph M. Kampf and the Elizabeth and Harry Brainard families scholarship, UNC
2015 – 2021	UNC Graduate Fellowship
2014 – 2015	Vladimir Potanin Foundation Academic Excellence Fellowship
2013 – 2015	NES Academic Fellowship
2007 – 2009	Alexander Abramov Foundation Academic Excellence Fellowship

## LANGUAGES

English – fluent, Russian – native

## WORKING PAPERS

- **Consumer Data and Consumer Welfare: Evidence from the Hotel Booking Market (Job Market Paper)**

Abstract. I study how the information a search intermediary has about consumer preferences impacts the market. Consumers participate in costly search among different sellers' products, relying on the rankings order provided by the intermediary based on their preferences. Better product targeting affects consumer search and purchases, which, in turn, changes the seller pricing incentives. I considered these aspects by modeling both sides of the market under various ranking algorithms used by the intermediary. On the demand side, I developed a joint model of consumer costly search and purchase. On the supply side, I considered the sellers' pricing competition. To estimate the demand and supply models, I utilized a rich dataset provided by Expedia, which includes consumer search and purchase data and information on the hotels and prices they charge. I find that if the intermediary uses data on consumers' preferences to provide them personalized rankings of products, consumers, on average, experience a 3.6% (\$4.9) utility decrease due to increased transaction prices, a 0.8% (\$1.1) utility gain due to a reduction in search spending, and 0.5% (\$0.7) utility gain due to finding a better-fitted hotel.

- **Markets with Search Frictions and Partially Informed Intermediary**

Abstract. The paper discusses markets with consumer's search frictions and partial information. The main finding is the better information the platform provides can decrease the average quality of the product consumers purchase and decline in the total economic welfare and consumer surplus. The mechanism is if the platform makes better advise to consumers in average what product to explore first, all consumers have lower expectations about the next products and explore them less often, which decreases the quality of purchased good for consumers who got the wrong recommendation and might lead to reduction of the average quality of purchased products. The effect appears in the case of low search cost, which makes it especially important in the analysis of online search platforms.

- **Firms Entrance and Market Power. The Case of Ranking Platforms with Ordered Consumer Search**

Abstract. The paper shows that the entrance of new firms on ranking platforms with ordered consumer's search (e.g., Amazon and Google) can lead to an increase in the price charged by firms already presented on the market, despite increased market competition. The mechanism is as follows: an entrance of a new firm increases the chances of all other firms on the market to take low positions in the ranking, which, according to standard results of ordered search literature, leads to an increase in firms' prices.

## REFERENCES

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