# **Andrey Minaev**

♠ minaev.io

☑ andrey@unc.edu

⑤ +1 (984) 234 8538

Department of Economics, CB 3305 The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA

## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA

M.A. in Economics, New Economic School, Moscow, Russia

M.S. in Mathematics and Physics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia

B.S. in Mathematics and Physics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia

2001

#### RESEARCH INTERESTS

Industrial Organization, Information Economics, Market Power, Platforms, Consumer's Search, Ranking Mechanisms

### **WORKING PAPERS**

## · Markets with Search Frictions and Partially Informed Intermediary

Abstract. The paper discusses markets with consumer's search frictions and partial information. The main finding is the better information the platform provides can decrease the average quality of the product consumers purchase and decline in the total economic welfare and consumer surplus. The mechanism is if the platform makes better advise to consumers in average what product to explore first, all consumers have lower expectations about the next products and explore them less often, which decreases the quality of purchased good for consumers who got the wrong recommendation and might lead to reduction of the average quality of purchased products. The effect appears in the case of low search cost, which makes it especially important in the analysis of online search platforms.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

### Platform Switching: Steering of Consumers by Exclusive Content

Abstract. The paper explores consumer switching between platforms in seeking access to the content provided by the platforms. The platforms manage consumer switching by providing access to the exclusive content not available on other platforms. The steering has a long-term effect, making consumers to stay on the new platform, even if they no longer have access to this exclusive content. Using rich and unique panel data from an internet service provider, I estimate the mechanism described above.

## Dynamic self-competition: the evidence of ride-share platforms

Abstract. I model dynamic self-competition, and test model predictions using the rich data of all shared rides in the City of Chicago in 2018-2020. Rideshare platforms face self-competition for drivers in neighbor locations and use surge-pricing to steer drivers to work in the area the platform needs. In turn, a price increase may force consumers to choose a competitor's rideshare platform, and therefore affect cross-platform competition. Using data on local weather conditions as exogenous demand shifters, I study the interaction between self- and cross-platform competitions.

## Firms entrance on ranking platforms with ordered consumer search and firms' market power

Abstract. The paper shows that the entrance of new firms on ranking platforms with ordered consumer's search (e.g., Amazon and Google) can lead to an increase in the price charged by firms already presented on the market, despite increased market competition. The mechanism is as follows: an entrance of a new firm increases the chances of all other firms on the market to take low positions in the ranking, which, according to standard results of ordered search literature, leads to an increase in firms' prices.

Updated: April 2020 1/2

### SOFTWARE SKILLS

Python, R, Wolfram Mathematica, Git, KIEX, Stata

### RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Yunzhi Hu, Kenan-Flagler Business School 2018

Research Assistant for Jonathan W Williams, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2017

Research Assistant for Ruben Enikolopov, New Economic School 2014

#### WORKING EXPERIENCE

Tutor: Math, Physics, Statistics, Economics, Computer Science 2012 - 2015

Air conditioners online store, CEO 2010 - 2012

2009 - 2010 Strategy Consulting, Analyst

2008 Microsoft, Marketing Department, Summer Intern

## **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

2018 – Present Instructor, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,

> Microeconomic Theory for nonmajors, 100 students Microeconomic Theory for majors, 30 students Statistics and Econometrics for majors, 30 students

2016 - 2018 Undegraduate Head Teaching Assistant, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,

Microeconomic Theory for majors, 500 students

Graduate Teaching Assistant, New Economic School, 2014 - 2015

Game theory, 20 students

Optimization Methods in Economics, 20 students

### **PRESENTATIONS**

shop, Maastricht, The Netherlands
shop, Maastricht, The Netherland

OLIGO Workshop, Nottingham, UK 2019 OLIGO Workshop, Moscow, Russia 2017

35th NES Research Conference, Moscow, Russia 2015

## **AWARDS**

2019 – 2021	The Buono Family Grant for Excellence in Economics and Teaching
2017, 2019	The Graduate Student Transportation Grant, UNC
2016 – 2017	The Joseph M. Kampf and the Elizabeth and Harry Brainard families scholarship, UNC

The Buono Family Grant for Excellence in Economics and Teaching

**UNC Graduate Fellowship** 2015 - 2021

Vladimir Potanin Foundation Academic Excellence Fellowship 2014 - 2015

**NES Academic Fellowship** 2013 - 2015

Alexander Abramov Foundation Academic Excellence Fellowship 2007 - 2009

Updated: April 2020 2/2