



# Do ‘creative cities’ have a dark side? Cultural scenes and socioeconomic status in Barcelona and Madrid (1991–2001)



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## ABSTRACT

Studies of culture and creativity have shown that they can play an effective role in promoting local development. However, cultural projects and strategies oriented to promote creativity may also promote inequalities inside the city. According to the gentrification thesis, the result of these strategies could be segregation processes and the generation of “tourist bubbles”. Thus, “creative cities” may have a “dark side”, which becomes apparent when the analysis compares differences within instead of among cities. This article aims to examine this issue in two large Spanish cities (Barcelona and Madrid) by analyzing the change in socioeconomic status and cultural scenes between 1991 and 2001 at the city and neighborhoods levels. This analysis will attempt to answer two main questions: is localization of cultural scenes in the city associated with socioeconomic status?, does this relationship vary between cities? The main results indicate a positive answer for these questions. First, there is a strong relationship between socioeconomic status and non-conventional cultural scenes. Nevertheless, cross-lagged regression analyses show that change in cultural scenes depends on socioeconomic status, whereas the effect of cultural scenes on socioeconomic change is weaker. Second, this pattern is stronger in Madrid than in Barcelona: a stronger relationship between cultural scenes and socioeconomic status exists in Madrid, and socioeconomic status had a stronger effect on changes in cultural scenes between 1991 and 2001. This difference may be explained by the urban policies developed in these cities. More comparative analyses are needed to confirm this potential dark side of creative cities.

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## Creativity and cities: cultural consumption, economic development and social inequalities

The literatures on the creative city and creative class have attracted a lot of attention from the academic world and among public actors because both provide arguments and strategies to promote economic development in cities. In both cases the provision of opportunities for cultural consumption in the city to meet the demands of creative sectors or visitors plays a vital role. In fact, these arguments fit into a broader perspective that emphasizes the importance of culture as a factor in development, independent of other classic factors (such as human capital or technology). This new development factor implies the existence of an amenities premium, the idea that economic activity related to culture and creativity, as well as the density of opportunities for cultural consumption, constitutes a competitive advantage for cities (Clark, 2003; Clark, Lloyd, Wong, & Pushpam, 2002; Florida, Mellander, & Stolarick, 2008; Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2001; Pratt, 2008; Sasaki, 2010).

From the point of view of the public authorities these approaches have involved the adoption of an instrumental strategy with regard to culture (Griffiths, 1995; Vanolo, 2008). As opposed to a strategy of planning centered on the provision of facilities and programs designed to disseminate culture and bring it closer to the public, the instrumental strategy involves the organizing of large cultural events or big cultural spaces in order to attract visitors because of the uniqueness of a tourist experience that includes opportunities for innovative forms of cultural consumption (García, 2004). More specifically, the planning strategy sees culture as a welfare policy aimed at the inhabitants of the city, whereas the instrumental strategy sees culture as an economic development policy (Navarro, 2012a, 2012b; Navarro and Clark, 2012).

The latter is the perspective from which the effects of creativity and cultural consumption on the economic growth of the city are usually studied, showing a positive relationship between the character and density of cultural markets and the socio-economic growth of cities (Boschma & Frisch, 2009; Florida et al., 2008; Markusen, 2006). Nevertheless, the adoption of these initiatives could also promote segregation processes and inequalities between different areas and social groups in the city. The process of urban renewal linked to this strategy involves the use of new urban space, as well as the renewal of central spaces in the city. This

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**Table 1**

Cultural markets and cities: two perspectives on the impact of instrumental strategies based on cultural markets.

	The creative city	Gentrification and tourist bubble
Analyses centered on city	Urban growth	Urban inequalities
Main interest	The economic interest of the city	The social interest of the city
Relationship between instrumental strategy and socio-economic status	Positive: local development by attracting creative class or visitors	Positive: to fight segregation processes caused by renewal projects
Main thesis: instrumental strategy improves...	Local development (more economic growth)	Inequality processes (less social cohesion)
Territorial focus	The city	The neighborhoods
Comparisons between...	Cities	Neighborhoods

could promote the substitution of old inhabitants by new residents with higher socio-economic status (Fox, 2001).

This is the main argument of the tourist bubble thesis, as well. Cities initiate processes of urban renewal in their central and older areas to attract tourists. However, the new cultural market based on museums, the promotion of commercial areas, and spaces for entertainment, generates “islands of affluence that are sharply differentiated and segregated from the surrounding urban landscape” (Judd, 1999: 53). Thus, the tourist bubble effect could be understood as a specific process of gentrification due to the improvement of tourist activity. In general, gentrification processes suppose the conversion of socially marginal and working-class areas of the central city to middle-class residential use (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005). This implies a concentration of professional and cultural markets in the urban core, where these new inhabitants have markedly non-traditional life styles (Zukin, 2008). By contrast, pre-gentrification residents are more likely to have a lower social status and cultural consumption patterns near to the classical idea of community; against the innovation, expressiveness, glamour or transgressivity of the gentrifiers. The new inhabitants are attracted by the historical and local authenticity of buildings and neighborhoods, but they change neighbourhoods' social composition, patterns of cultural consumption and lifestyles. From this perspective, “the gentrification frontier is a boundary of socially legitimised taste of the new middle class” (Bridge, 2003: 722).

This could also be the case of the most innovative and transgressive sector of the creative class: the neo-bohemians. This group is the most important sector of cultural consumption in the city because they create new tastes that expand to the other sectors of the creative class, generating opportunities for cultural innovation and consumption (Florida, 2002, 2008; Lloyd, 2006). One of the main attributes neo-bohemians value is the esthetic of the local authenticity, and thus, the old buildings that represent the connection to the history of the city. In this way, neo-bohemians are usually identified as the main actors in the first stage of gentrification processes. They give new value to neighborhoods by creating economic activities (small scale commerce, arts and crafts) and spaces for cultural consumption that contrast with the esthetic and communitarian values of the pre-gentrification working class residents. Neo-bohemian and old residents can coexist until the neo-bohemian style attracts other people coming from the core and professionals sectors of the creative class generating the expulsion of the old residents (Cameron & Coaffe, 2005; Ley, 2003). Thus, while the bohemians may play an important role in urban development and innovation, they also promote processes of gentrification and the generation of social inequalities between neighborhoods in the city (see Table 1).

In other words, the creative city approach, as well as the instrumental strategy around cultural amenities that this approach normally employs, may succeed in promoting the economic development of a city in comparison with others, but it may also generate new inequalities in the heart of the city itself, such as gentrification processes. Thus, both the creative city and gentrification approaches have their focus on the effects of the instrumental strategy on the development of cultural markets in the city. However, they differ in the aspects and scales they study. The first

analyzes the economic development of the city, while the second studies the social cohesion inside the city. The first tries to analyze the positive effect of creativity and cultural consumption, while the second studies the inequalities processes promoted by the improvement of cultural markets. Thus, gentrification processes should be understood as the dark side of the creative city.

In fact both approaches assume a relationship between the cultural market and socio-economic status, but of different sorts and scales. From the perspective of the creative city, the cultural market involves economic development through the attraction of high status (creative class) groups and/or visitors. From the gentrification perspective these strategies involve new segregation processes that occur when creative and high socio-economic level groups are attracted to neighborhood cultural markets and supplant less-favoured ones. However, this relationship could vary in different cities as a result, for example, of the specific kind of strategy applied, the starting situation of the city concerned, or different orientations in urban policies developed by them. However, empirical analyses do not usually use these perspectives in a joint or complementary manner: they tend to focus either on a comparison between cities (creativity perspective) or between different neighborhoods in the same city (gentrification perspective).

This study seeks to use these two perspectives together to analyze the changes brought about by implementing the instrumental strategy in two Spanish cities: Madrid and Barcelona. What effects has this strategy had on these cities and their neighborhoods? What role do their neo-bohemian neighborhoods play in these cities? Are the effects produced by them similar in both cities?

### Cultural scenes and socio-economic status in two Spanish cities (1991–2001)

As well as being the two largest and most important cities in the country, Madrid and Barcelona are international tourism centers and their activities are clearly focused on the creative and knowledge economy (Méndez & Sánchez, 2010). In 1992 both hosted large cultural events which may serve to illustrate the importance of the instrumental strategy and its impacts: the European Capital of Culture in Madrid, and the Olympic Games in Barcelona. However, there are key differences between their urban policies. Very briefly, since the 1990s Madrid has developed a strategy with a clear orientation towards the development of large infrastructure projects and cultural spaces with the aim of attracting tourists and businesses, a departure from its more balanced urban planning policies of the 1980s (Alan, 2003; Alguacil, de la Fuente, Martínez, Ubrich, & Velasco, 2012; Díaz Orueta, 2007; Larson, 2003). Barcelona has also focused on creativity and tourism but its strategy has focused on more specific urban interventions in different parts of the city with the objective of dealing with socio-spatial inequalities (Borja, 2010; Martí-Costa, Iglesias, Subirats, & Tomàs, 2012). These differences between the orientation of their urban policies provide the contexts in which these large cultural events were held, and it could also explain the differences in the effects of these events in each city. What exactly were these effects?

**Table 2**

A basic profile of changes in Barcelona and Madrid (1991–2001). Source: Census (INE) and DCC Data Base Project.

Indices		Barcelona Olympic Games (1992)		Madrid European Capital of Culture (1992)	
		1991	2001	1991	2001
Demographic and socio-economic traits in cities	Population (millions)	1.6	1.5	3.0	2.9
	Unemployment (%)	13.7	10.9	14.8	12.3
	Population with third-level education (%)	11.72	21.25	13.94	24.37
	Socio-economic Status Index (0–100)	37.15	42.62	47.20	41.60
	Cultural market density	6.54	18.44	5.60	17.63
	Cultural Scenes index	90.39	97.01	90.71	96.56
Status and scenes in neighborhoods	Status in central neighborhoods	38.05	44.14	44.63	49.52
	Status in non-central neighborhoods	36.58	41.68	35.48	39.82
	Scenes in central neighborhoods	90.89	97.54	90.75	98.23
	Scenes in central neighborhoods	90.04	96.66	90.70	96.17
	Status and scenes (correlations)	0.025	0.152	0.036	0.286
Number of neighborhoods	Number of census tracts	1282		1721	

Note: ANOVA analyses show that differences between central and non-central neighborhoods are significant ( $p < 0.05$ ), with the exception of cultural scenes in Madrid in 1991.

### Socio-economic and cultural changes at the city level

In order to examine the changes in the socio-economic features of the two cities some classic indicators from the 1991 and 2001 censuses have been selected (age groups, unemployment level, educational level and socio-economic status of inhabitants). With regard to the cultural dimension, two indicators were utilized: the density of the cultural market, in terms of the number of cultural installations per capita, and the orientation of their cultural scenes. The latter allows the type of cultural opportunities for cultural consumption that exist in each area on the basis of the types of cultural practices which can be carried in the cultural installations located there. These are usually orientated around two poles: conventional cultural practices related to tradition, local and community values (historical sites, archeological museums, folk music and small-scale commerce) and, by contrast, those involving non-conventional practices related to innovation, transgression and artistic expression (live performances, art galleries, tattoos, piercing, fashion, and fine dining). This latter pole is related to the attracting of tourists, the creative class and economic development (Navarro, Mateos, & Rodríguez, 2012; Rodríguez, Mateos, & Navarro, 2012; Silver, 2011; Silver, Clark, & Graizul, 2011). Bearing in mind that the instrumental strategy seeks above all to encourage non-conventional cultural scenes, in this study the ratio between conventional and non-conventional scenes has been calculated in such a way that highest values would take account of the prevalence of non-conventional scenes.<sup>1</sup>

As can be seen in Table 2 the two cities underwent significant changes in their socio-economic and cultural dimensions, though these were greater in Barcelona. In both cases the neighborhoods located in the center of each city had higher socioeconomic status and a stronger orientation towards non-conventional scenes, a difference which was accentuated between 1991 and 2011. More specifically, the non-conventional scenes in Madrid were located around the large cultural installations that sprung up in 1992 in the center of the city (for example the Thyssen Bornemisza and Reina Sofia museums). In Barcelona this occurred in central neighborhoods (Ciutat Vella and Sarrià) and in the area of the Olympic Village. These areas combined the new and large cultural installations such as music venues and theaters as well as the entertainment and commercial facilities (restaurants, bars, specialized

shops etc.) that constitute the main attraction for the high status population but also for tourists. These amenities make up the typical urban landscape of contemporary large cities (Gospodini, 2006), and they represent basic features of the “standard central-district tourist bubble” (Judd, 1999).<sup>2</sup>

In fact, socioeconomic status and cultural scenes seem fairly related in the neighborhoods of the cities, though to a much greater degree after the large cultural events is held in them (see status and scenes' correlations in Table 2). Thus although the big cultural events and the orientation of urban policies towards the creative city model generated important socio-economic and cultural changes in the cities they also generated a closer relationship between the two aspects as well as a greater degree of centralization in their spatial distribution. It would seem therefore, that at the same time as cultural events produce socio-economic growth and a non-conventional orientation in the cultural market, they also produce greater internal imbalances.

This pattern is more sharply marked in Madrid than Barcelona. The difference between central and outlying neighborhoods is more noticeable in Madrid than in Barcelona, and specially in the relationship between status and scenes (correlations in Table 2). These differences may be explained by the nature of their respective urban policies, as well as by the character of the two great cultural events. In the case of Madrid, being designated the Cultural Capital of Europe involved the provision of new cultural installations (the museums mentioned above) and the renovation of existing ones (such as the city's theatres) in central areas of the city. It also involved new development in the northeastern area of the city surrounding the new Congress Bureau (in the ‘Campo de las Naciones’ district) (COM92, 1993). In Barcelona, by contrast, the Olympic Games required abroad process of urban renewal in the south east of the city (the Olympic Village) but also in specific areas of the historic center of the city (Raval and Ciutat Vella, for instance), as well as in other areas, leading to a significant change in the city as a whole (Arbaci & Tapada-Berteli, 2012; Selfa, 2005).

### Explaining socio-economic status and cultural scenes changes at the neighborhood level

Thus the effects of the instrumental strategy were different in the two cities but also had different effects among their neighborhoods. In what neighborhoods did changes in status and cultural scenes occur between 1991 and 2001? What socio-economic and

<sup>1</sup> The definition and sources for the indices can be found in the Annex. The territorial level used to analyze differences inside cities is the minimal statistical unit in the Spanish Census: the census track. Nevertheless, the word ‘neighborhood’ is used in the text for stylistic reasons. More details on the cultural scenes perspective and measuring it can be found in Silver et al. (2001) and Navarro (2012a).

<sup>2</sup> In order to examine the changes between 1991 and 2001 only the census tracts that existed in those two years are included. Thus some 2001 tracts are not included because they did not exist in 1991.

**Table 3**

The change in socio-economic status and unconventional scenes (1991–2001). Source: Census (INE) and DCC Data Base Project.

Cities Dependent variables	Barcelona				Madrid			
	Scenes 2001		Status (2001)		Scenes 2001		Status (2001)	
	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)
<i>OLS regression</i>								
Intercept	75.214*	(2.633)	0.178**	(0.018)	79.666**	(2.152)	0.228**	(0.015)
Young adult (1991)	0.058	(0.042)	0.000	(0.000)	0.055	(0.035)	–0.001**	(0.000)
Old people (1991)	0.029	(0.025)	0.001**	(0.000)	0.036*	(0.019)	–0.001**	(0.000)
Population with third-level education(1991)	0.096**	(0.057)	0.006**	(0.000)	0.058	(0.040)	0.004**	(0.000)
Unemployment (1991)	0.064	(0.090)	–0.003**	(0.001)	–0.199**	(0.091)	–0.003**	(0.001)
Immigrants (1991)	0.067	(0.114)	–0.001*	(0.001)	0.307**	(0.104)	0.003**	(0.001)
Cultural market (1991)	0.015	(0.009)	0.001*	(0.000)	0.014	(0.011)	0.000	(0.000)
Scenes (1991)	0.201**	(0.018)	0.001**	(0.000)	0.144**	(0.015)	0.000	(0.000)
Status (1991)	–0.365	(4.942)	0.425**	(0.034)	4.793	(4.009)	0.468**	(0.028)
Central location	0.364	(0.297)	–0.004*	(0.002)	0.655**	(0.311)	0.021**	(0.002)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.124		0.896		0.170		0.902	

\*  $p < 0.01$ .\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

cultural features explain them? And, more specifically, did the change in cultural scenes involve changes in the socio-economic status of the neighborhoods?

To respond to these questions two regression models were developed for each city, with their dependent variables being the cultural scenes and socio-economic status of their neighborhoods in 2001. In the two models the independent variables included the value of these indicators in 1991, as well as other indicators dealing with the social composition of the neighborhoods, and two territorial characteristics: the density of their cultural markets and whether they were in the central district of the city (Table 3). The results show that in both cities the most non-conventional scenes in 2001 were also the most non-conventional scenes in 1991, without a significant influence of the neighborhoods' socio-economic status in 1991. In Madrid the spread of non-conventional scenes in 2001 also depend on the central location of the neighborhood, a greater presence of immigrants and a lower unemployment rate in 1991. In Barcelona, by contrast, the presence of people with third-level education was more influential on the spread of non-conventional scenes.

The socio-economic level of the neighborhoods in both cities in 2001 depended, above all, on their socio-economic level in 1991, as well as a larger population with third-level education and a lower unemployment rate. In Madrid, the neighborhoods with the highest status in 2001 were also those with the highest number of immigrants and middle-aged residents in 1991 and they are located in the center of the city. In Barcelona, by contrast, the presence of older people and fewer immigrants, the density of the cultural market and the non-conventional orientation of its cultural scenes in 1991 explain a higher socio-economic status of the neighborhoods in 2001.

Thus similar patterns of change exist in the two cities, as do some differences. In both cases there is a strong reproduction effect; the character of the cultural scenes and the socio-economic status of the neighborhoods derive from those of 1991. However, in Madrid, the status and central location of the neighborhoods were of greater importance, while in Barcelona, the orientation of the cultural markets in the neighborhoods accounted for more influence, as it explained not only the change in the orientation of the cultural scenes but also the change in the socio-economic status of the neighborhoods.

In short, the increased strength in the relationship between status and non-conventional scenes in the two cities seems to have occurred more on the basis of a process of reproduction than on one of gentrification derived from the attractiveness of cultural scenes for high socio-economic status people, or because in neighborhoods where there was already a high status population there existed a demand for a certain type of cultural consumption which generates non-conventional scenes.


What is the importance of these three dynamics in each city? In order to find out, a cross-lagged model between status and cultural scenes was used, the results of which are shown in Fig. 1.<sup>3</sup> As might be expected, the stabilizing effects between the same indicators in 1991 and 2001 are stronger than the cross-lagged effects. Furthermore, the cross-lagged effect of status on cultural scenes is greater than that of the opposite direction, particularly in Madrid. And finally, although it was not very strong, it seems that in both cities there existed a 'cultural attraction model' as an influence of the cultural scenes that existed in 1991 on the socio-economic of 2001, an effect that was stronger in Barcelona. In Madrid the reproductive effect related to status was more intense, as was also a 'status demand model', which resulted in cultural scenes being generated where there was demand from groups with status (the cross-lagged effect of status on cultural scenes).

#### On neo-bohemian neighborhoods and their role in change: unconventional scenes in spaces of low socio-economic status

Thus, though only in a minority of cases, there seems to be a cultural attraction effect that could account for gentrification processes. This effect might be evidence of the existence of neo-bohemian neighborhoods, which are normally identified as the initial phases of gentrification. These are neighborhoods with a strong orientation towards non-conventional scenes even though, on average, their inhabitants have low economic status. Furthermore, such neighborhoods have diverse and innovative cultural markets as the result of the presence of small groups of artists, other creative people and new spaces for cultural consumption. Did such neighborhoods exist in both cities? Did they have the features that normally characterize neo-bohemian neighborhoods? Do they represent a pre-gentrification phase?

To answer the first question, four types of neighborhood were created based on levels of socio-economic status and non-conventional cultural scenes. To do this the averages of these indicators for each city in each year were used as segmentation criteria. The neighborhood types were the following: "communitarian blue collar neighborhood" (CBN) with a low socio-economic status level and conventional scenes, "unconventional white collar neighborhood" (UWN), with a high status levels and unconventional scenes, "communitarian white collar neighborhood" (CWN), with a high status but conventional scenes and finally "unconventional blue collar neighborhood" (UBN), with a low status level and non-conventional scenes. These UBN neighborhoods would be neo-

<sup>3</sup> The full results of the model can be found in the Annex.



**Fig. 1.** Socio-economic status and cultural scene changes in neighborhoods (1991–2001).

**Table 4**

Neighborhood typology: distribution in Barcelona and Madrid (1991 and 2001). Source: Census (INE) and DCC Data Base Project.

Types of neighborhoods	Traits		Cities			
	Scenes	Status	Barcelona		Madrid	
			1991	2001	1991	2001
<i>Row percentages</i>						
Communitarian Blue Collar	Conventional	Low	26.2	30.5	24.5	33.7
Unconventional Blue Collar (Neo-bohemian)	Unconventional	Low	26.4	24.3	23.8	22.4
Communitarian White Collar	Conventional	High	23.7	16.1	25.3	13.6
Unconventional White Collar	Unconventional	High	23.4	29.0	25.5	30.3
Total ( <i>n</i> )			100 (1819)	100 (1819)	100 (2430)	100 (2430)

bohemian. The number of such neighborhoods is more or less the same in the two cities, and their relative weight, about 25% of the whole city, remained stable between 1991 and 2001 (Table 4).

#### What are the neo-bohemian neighborhoods like?

As indicated by the literature, the neo-bohemian lifestyle seeks centrally located urban spaces which are notable for their authenticity, where there are old buildings and traditional neighborhoods, regardless of poor housing options and/or the existence of crime problems, because those who practice this lifestyle prefer transgressive and innovative social contexts (Brooks, 2000; Cameron & Coaffe, 2005; Ley, 2003; Lloyd, 2002; Silver, Clark, & Navarro, 2010). Although this population group increases the density of the cultural markets of these neighborhoods and orients them towards unconventional scenes, they do so in contexts where low socioeconomic status groups predominate. This would imply that the social features of the neo-bohemian neighborhoods should be similar to those of low socio-economic status. To examine this a multi-nominal regression was carried out in which the characteris-

tics of the CBN neighborhoods were compared with those of the other three types of neighborhood in each city and for each year. This regression also included a dummy variable to identify possible differences between the cities (Table 5). The results show that the CBN neighborhoods differ from high status ones in all the variables that relate to social composition both in 1991 and 2001, as well as being somewhat less numerous in Barcelona than in Madrid. By contrast, the CBN and UBN (neo-bohemian) neighborhoods are fairly similar in their social composition, with the exception that in the latter there were more young adults, immigrants and unemployed residents, both in 1991 and 2001. In both cities in 2001, the UBN neighborhoods continued to have a larger immigrant population and a cultural market of greater density.

#### Are neo-bohemian neighborhoods pre-gentrification spaces?

Given that these UBN neighborhoods' cultural markets attract new high status residents, are these neo-bohemian neighborhoods at a pre-gentrification stage? If this is the case, some of the neighborhoods that were neo-bohemian (UBN) in 1991 should have



**Table 5**

Neo-bohemian neighborhoods: social and territorial traits (1991 and 2001). Source: Census (INE) and DCC Data Base Project.

	1991 Communitarian Blue Collar vs.						2001 Communitarian Blue Collar vs.					
	Unconventional Blue Collar		Communitarian White Collar		Unconventional White Collar		Unconventional Blue Collar		Communitarian White Collar		Unconventional White Collar	
	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)	Coeff.	(error)
<i>Multi-nominal regression</i>												
Intercept	0.081	(0.125)	−0.275**	(0.156)	−0.180	(0.154)	−0.227**	(0.116)	−0.714**	(0.176)	−0.864**	(0.179)
Young adult	0.104**	(0.052)	−0.323**	(0.091)	−0.269**	(0.090)	0.057	(0.062)	−0.332**	(0.105)	−0.297**	(0.106)
Old people	0.044	(0.064)	−0.279**	(0.104)	−0.316**	(0.103)	0.053	(0.051)	0.327	(0.100)	0.304**	(0.103)
Population with third-level education	0.119	(0.179)	6.570	(0.321)	6.504**	(0.320)	0.166	(0.131)	7.894	(0.396)	8.842**	(0.400)
Unemployment	−0.153**	(0.073)	−0.565**	(0.157)	−0.490**	(0.155)	0.000	(0.056)	0.203	(0.138)	0.288	(0.138)
Immigrants	0.148**	(0.068)	0.009	(0.121)	0.037	(0.120)	0.097**	(0.051)	−0.343**	(0.119)	−0.224**	(0.115)
Cultural market	−0.065	(0.086)	0.018	(0.110)	0.042	(0.109)	0.183**	(0.096)	−0.276	(0.189)	0.094	(0.186)
Central	−0.191	(0.158)	0.287	(0.212)	0.302	(0.211)	0.184	(0.178)	0.010	(0.251)	0.636**	(0.250)
City (Barcelona)	0.177	(0.113)	1.253**	(0.192)	1.213**	(0.191)	−0.122	(0.218)	1.751**	(0.372)	1.491**	(0.369)
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>				0.688						0.735		

\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .**Table 6**

Neighborhood typology: patterns of change (1991–2001). Source: Census (INE) and DCC Data Base Project

Row percentages	2001				Total
1991					
	Communitarian blue collar	Unconventional blue collar	Communitarian white collar	Unconventional white collar	
<i>Barcelona</i>					
Communitarian blue collar	54.9	32.7	7.1	5.3	100.0 (339)
Unconventional blue collar	41.2	43.2	6.4	9.3	100.0 (345)
Communitarian white collar	7.0	5.3	35.2	52.5	100.0 (301)
Unconventional white collar	4.7	5.4	24.6	65.3	100.0 (297)
Total	28.3	22.8	17.6	31.4	100.0 (1282)
Chi square = 755.675 (significant at $p < 0.05$ ).					
<i>Madrid</i>					
Communitarian blue collar	63.5	27.4	5.7	3.4	100.0 (441)
Unconventional blue collar	51.7	41.7	3.4	3.2	100.0 (412)
Communitarian white collar	5.6	4.4	29.1	60.9	100.0 (430)
Unconventional white collar	4.5	5.7	21.4	68.4	100.0 (440)
Total	31.2	19.6	15.0	34.3	100.0 (1723)
Chi square = 1214.200 (significant at $p < 0.05$ ).					

moved in the direction of becoming UWN districts by 2001. Moreover, the change would have had to have occurred in two stages at three points in time: first a change from CBN to UBN and later from UBN to UWN. In this study we have just two moments in time, so will attempt to analyze these two trajectories of changes based on the supposition that they would be the same if we had access to another point in time prior to 1991. How many neighborhoods went through this process of change in each city? As can be seen in Table 6 the number of neighborhoods that went from being neo-bohemian (UBC) in 1991 to being UWN in 2001 is very small: 9.3% in Barcelona and 3.2% in Madrid. The majority of neighborhoods remained UBN (43% and 41.7%, respectively). Somewhat larger is the percentage that underwent the logical preceding shift, from CBN to UBN: 32.7% in Barcelona and 27.4% Madrid. However, looking at the overall change between 1991 and 2001, about half of UBN in 1991 had become CBN by 2001: 41.2% in Barcelona and 51.7% in Madrid.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> This implies a process of 'conventionalization' of these neighborhoods. Creative strategies are localized in central places of cities promoting the centralization of non-conventional scenes (for instance, attracting non-conventional amenities that are previously situated in those more peripheral neighborhoods). In fact, the 54.1% and the 45.5% of peripheral UBN change to CBN in Madrid and Barcelona, respectively. However, only the 27.0% and the 33.1% of central UBN neighborhoods change to CBN between 1991 and 2001.

Another way to see the extent of the phenomenon is to look at what type of neighborhoods those that were UWN in 2001 had been in 1991. About 80% of 2001 UWN in Barcelona and 95% in Madrid were high status neighborhoods in 1991.<sup>5</sup> Only 4.46% in Barcelona and 2.54% in Madrid were formerly CBN, that is, they followed the trajectory that would represent a clear process of gentrification through the substitution of their inhabitants without a significant change in their cultural scenes. Finally, only 7.9% of these neighborhoods in Barcelona and 2.20% in Madrid were neo-bohemian in 1991. Thus the process of gentrification was very minor in scale but happened to a greater extent in neo-bohemian neighborhoods than in classic working class ones. This would suggest that neo-bohemians appeared as pre-gentrification spaces; their cultural scenes in 1991 seemed to have attracted a higher socio-economic status population by 2001, to the detriment of their traditional residents.

In spite of these findings, the most common process that occurred is that half of the neighborhoods did not change their category between 1991 and 2001 (49.5% and 51.1% of the total in Barcelona and Madrid, respectively). Furthermore, the majority of changes had occurred because cultural scenes, neighborhoods

<sup>5</sup> Specifically: 39.1% were of the CWN type and 48% of the UWN type in Barcelona, and 44.3% and 50.9%, respectively, in Madrid.

socio-economic statuses remained the same: CWN became UWN and CBN became WBN. Cross-trajectories, those that involved only a change in socio-economic status, either a gentrification trajectory (such as from CBN to CWC or UWN), or the opposite trajectory, involving a decline in the socio-economic status of the neighborhood, made up only a minority of cases.

In short, the reproduction of socio-economic status is the most noted effect. There occurred more changes in the character of the cultural scenes of the neighborhoods of the same status than trajectories of change which would indicate a strong effect of cultural scenes as a factor that produces gentrification (increases in socio-economic status). This is known to be a small scale phenomenon that occurs in only a few neighborhoods, as has been shown in other studies (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005). Nevertheless, the extent of the phenomenon was greater in Barcelona than in Madrid. In this regard it would be appropriate to look at the different logics of location (more or less central) of the new cultural installations for the large cultural events and the processes of urban renewal linked to them in each city.

## Conclusions

This comparative analysis of two cities obviously does not allow generalizations to be made to other cities. However, the results of this study are similar to those produced by comparative analyses between cities based on the creative cities hypothesis and case studies in certain cities, which are the types of analysis combined in this present study. The main findings are as follows:

1. After a major cultural event, as an example of the instrumental strategy, the cities show not only evidence of socio-economic growth and a change towards non-conventional scenes, but also evidence of greater internal imbalance between their neighborhoods with regard to these two dimensions.
2. The changes in socioeconomic status and cultural scenes in the neighborhoods are based overall on a dynamic of reproduction in both cities. The socio-economic levels and cultural scenes of the neighborhoods after their respective large cultural event are closely related to those that existed prior to it. There is a 'status demand model' (high-status neighborhoods generate non-conventional scenes), and a less important 'cultural attraction model' (non-conventional scenes attract high-status inhabitants to the neighborhood) that show trajectories of gentrification.
3. There exist a small number of neighborhoods with neo-bohemian features, similar to classic low socio-economic status neighborhoods but with younger and more diverse populations as well as denser cultural markets and non-conventional cultural scenes. A small percentage of these neighborhoods constitute pre-gentrification spaces to the extent that their cultural scenes (in 1991) seem to have attracted high-status groups (in 2001) to the detriment of their pre-existing residents.
4. Although these processes are similar in both cities, in the case of Barcelona there was a greater permeability between neighborhoods, and cultural scenes had a stronger influence on the change in neighborhoods' socioeconomic status. In the case of Madrid there is a greater reproduction effect through socio-economic status, as well as a process of change which more clearly combines growth in the city with imbalances between its neighborhoods.

Overall, the results show that the initiatives and instrumental strategies aimed at improving cultural markets and generating unconventional consumption opportunities have a common effect; they produce economic growth in the city, but also inequality among its neighborhoods. Creative cities may have a dark side: the distribution of cultural markets reproduces socio-spatial inequalities within cities, causing economic and cultural boundaries to overlap. The same logic that governs the impact of the innovative and creative cultural climate in attracting certain population groups to different cities also works within the cities themselves. The 'cultural attraction model' exist producing gentrification, but reproduction effects are the main rule.

Nevertheless, this study has also found that differences in cities' urban policies and the logic behind their large cultural events produced differences between the cities. Thus the cities had different trade-offs between city growth and city inequalities depending on their urban policies, and the character and implementation of their instrumental strategies. Policies aimed at more balanced urban planning and large events that are not concentrated in one place or in central areas (where there is already a dense cultural market) can improve this trade-off, alleviating the potential negative effects of instrumental strategies aimed at promoting the creative city model.

Here these processes were only analyzed in only two cities. The differences found between them show certain patterns and processes which should be investigated in other cases to see whether they can be generalised. This would mean not only looking at other cities but would also call for a more in-depth examination of their markets and cultural scenes and the creative and instrumental strategies implemented in each city. For instance, analyses show that a change in socioeconomic status is much better explained by the demographic and socioeconomic variables used here than a change in cultural scenes is. A closer analysis of creative city initiatives and their localization in the cities, as 'policy variables', could improve our explanation of cultural scenes changes because these initiatives generate 'cultural clusters' in specific areas of the cities. However, this present study, despite its limitations, shows that research on culture in cities could advance by using simultaneously creative and gentrification perspectives. Additional research would involve comparing socio-economic and cultural change in different cities, as well as within their neighborhoods, as there would appear to exist a dark side to creative cities. This dark side may, take different forms and have different intensities due to the variety of urban policies adopted and instrumental strategies used in cities.

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## Appendix A

See Tables A1 and A2.

**Table A1**

Indices, definition and sources.

Indices	Definition	Source
Population	Number of inhabitants	Population Census, <i>Instituto Nacional de Estadística</i>
Young people-adults (%)	Population 25–39 years old/total population	
Old people (%)	Population > 65 years old/total Population	
Third-level education (%)	Population with a degree/population over 16 years old	
Unemployment (%)	Unemployment population/active population	
Immigrants (%)	Immigrant population/total population	
Socio-economic status	An index weighted according to the percentage of different occupational groups: from managers and professionals to manual workers.	
Central neighborhoods	Those tracts localized in the historic center of the city	
Cultural market density	Total number of cultural facilities/population	DCC Data Base
Cultural scenes (1)	Unconventional scene score/conventional scenes score	

See Navarro et al. (2012).

DCC Bata Base: 'Dinámica Cultural de las Ciudades' Data Base Project.

**Table A2**

Socio-economic status and cultural scenes: cross-lagged model.

Cities	Dependent variable	Independent variables			R <sup>2</sup>
		Status (1991)	Scenes (1991)	Error	
Standardized solution					
Barcelona	Status (2001)=	0.926	+0.300	+0.374	0.860
Madrid	Status (2001)=	0.939	+0.100	+0.343	0.882
Barcelona	Scenes (2001)=	0.303	+0.152	+0.118	0.118
Madrid	Scenes (2001)=	0.212	+0.319	+0.921	0.152

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