

Paravirtualized Honeypot Deployment for the Analysis of Malicious Activity

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Presentation Outline

1. Introduction to Honeypots
2. System Implementation
3. Data Analysis
4. Results
5. Future Work

whoami

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1.Introduction to Honeypots



“If you know the enemy
and know yourself, you
need not fear the result
of a hundred battles.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War



Sergio Caltagirone

@cnoanalysis

Following



TTST (Time to Sun Tzu) - the amount of time
passed from the start of an [#Infosec](#)
conference to the first Sun Tzu quote in a
presentation

7:03 PM - 12 Sep 2016

Honeypot Fundamentals


“A security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked or compromised” - Lance Spitzner

Detect & Learn from Attacks



History of Honeypots

- 1990-91: Clifford Stoll's "The Cuckoo's Egg"
- 1997: Fred Cohen's Deception Toolkit
- 1999: Formation of the HoneyNet Project



THE HONEYNET PROJECT

Why use a Honeypot?

- ◇ Mean Time to Detect ~ 206 days
- ◇ Mean Time to Respond ~ 55 days
- ◇ Production vs Research Honeypots
- ◇ Complementary to Intrusion Detection Systems & Firewalls

Categorization based on level of interaction

Low Interaction

Easy to install & configure

Emulation of services

Response in predetermined manner

Limited amount of information

Medium Interaction

Emulation of applications

Ability to capture malware and attack techniques

High Interaction

Real OS, nothing restricted

No production value

Cowrie

- ◇ Medium Interaction SSH & Telnet Honeypot
- ◇ Developed by Michel Oosterhof, successor of Kippo Honeypot
- ◇ Written in Python
- ◇ Fake filesystem and shell
- ◇ SFTP support – Downloads files using wget for later examination
- ◇ Logging to JSON
- ◇ <https://github.com/micheloosterhof/cowrie>



Replay of Attack – gweerwe323f

```
andronikos:~/Desktop/Backup Server$ python playlog.py 20180420-025136-44f2fdc095f2-0i.log
```

Dionaea – *catches bugs*

- ◇ Low interaction honeypot
- ◇ Protocols: SMB, ftp, http, https, mssql, mysql, sip, upnp, tftp and others
- ◇ Nepenthes successor, initially developed @ GSoC 2009 by The HoneyNet Project
- ◇ Python as scripting language
- ◇ Uses Libemu to detect shellcode
- ◇ Logs to JSON & SQLite db
- ◇ <https://github.com/DinoTools/dionaea>



Glastopf



- ◇ Low Interaction Web Application Honeypot by Lukas Rist
- ◇ Written in Python
- ◇ Vulnerability type emulation
- ◇ Attack type emulation included: Remote file inclusion.
Local file inclusion, HTML injection via POST
- ◇ Logging to SQLite db
- ◇ <https://github.com/mushorg/glastopf>



2. System Implementation



Docker



Source: https://www.docker.com/what-container#/package_software

Docker-compose

```
glastopf:
  container_name: glastopf
  restart: always
  image: glastopf:latest
  networks:
    - glastopf_net
  ports:
    - "80:80"
  volumes:
    - /data/glastopf:/opt/myhoneypot
```


Docker-compose

```
user@snf-813372: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
user@snf-813372:~$ sudo docker-compose -f honeypot.yaml ps
```

Name	Command	State	Ports
cowrie	/cowrie/cowrie-git/bin/cowrie	Up	0.0.0.0:22->2222/tcp, 0.0.0.0:2223->2223/tcp
dionaea	/opt/dionaea/bin/dionaea	Up	0.0.0.0:11211->11211/tcp, 0.0.0.0:135->135/tcp, 0.0.0.0:1433->1433/tcp, 0.0.0.0:1723->1723/tcp, 0.0.0.0:1883->1883/tcp, 0.0.0.0:1900->1900/udp, 0.0.0.0:21->21/tcp, 0.0.0.0:3306->3306/tcp, 0.0.0.0:42->42/tcp, 0.0.0.0:443->443/tcp, 0.0.0.0:445->445/tcp, 0.0.0.0:5060->5060/tcp, 0.0.0.0:5060->5060/udp, 0.0.0.0:5061->5061/tcp, 0.0.0.0:69->69/udp, 0.0.0.0:8081->80/tcp
glastopf	glastopf-runner	Up	0.0.0.0:80->80/tcp

```
user@snf-813372:~$
```

Load Balance

```
1 [|||||||] 18.0% Tasks: 72, 161 thr; 3 running
2 [|||||||] 99.3% Load average: 1.12 1.20 1.22
Mem[|||||||] 1.16G/3.86G Uptime: 33 days, 07:25:33
Swp[|||||||] 0K/0K
```

PID	USER	PRI	NI	VIRT	RES	SHR	S	CPU%	MEM%	TIME+	Command
7046	root	20	0	1054M	687M	19488	R	113	17.4	10:17.07	/opt/dionaea/bin/dionaea
7140	root	20	0	1054M	687M	19488	S	12.5	17.4	0:20.17	/opt/dionaea/bin/dionaea
7267	user	20	0	26296	4036	3140	R	1.3	0.1	0:00.34	htop
1103	root	20	0	539M	65916	13540	S	1.3	1.6	15h57:43	/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd://
7141	root	20	0	1054M	687M	19488	S	1.3	17.4	0:22.45	/opt/dionaea/bin/dionaea
1115	root	20	0	539M	65916	13540	S	0.7	1.6	3h40:46	/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd://
7038	root	20	0	7520	4556	3220	S	0.7	0.1	0:00.95	docker-containerd-shim -namespace moby -workdir /var/lib/docker/containerd/daemon/io.co
2781	root	20	0	539M	65916	13540	S	0.0	1.6	53:05.75	/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd://
1945	root	20	0	398M	22884	4188	S	0.0	0.6	2h52:44	docker-containerd --config /var/run/docker/containerd/containerd.toml
1954	root	20	0	398M	22884	4188	S	0.0	0.6	15:19.18	docker-containerd --config /var/run/docker/containerd/containerd.toml
7031	root	20	0	7520	4556	3220	S	0.0	0.1	0:01.34	docker-containerd-shim -namespace moby -workdir /var/lib/docker/containerd/daemon/io.co
1118	root	20	0	539M	65916	13540	S	0.0	1.6	57:39.78	/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd://
3125	root	20	0	539M	65916	13540	S	0.0	1.6	49:01.44	/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd://
1946	root	20	0	539M	65916	13540	S	0.0	1.6	1h05:20	/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd://
1950	root	20	0	398M	22884	4188	S	0.0	0.6	15:18.97	docker-containerd --config /var/run/docker/containerd/containerd.toml
7268	postfix	20	0	85404	8652	7720	S	0.0	0.2	0:00.03	smtpd -n smtp -t inet -u -c -o stress= -s 2
7269	postfix	20	0	67476	4428	3964	S	0.0	0.1	0:00.01	proxymap -t unix -u
1948	root	20	0	398M	22884	4188	S	0.0	0.6	24:48.80	docker-containerd --config /var/run/docker/containerd/containerd.toml
7254	user	20	0	92828	3528	2600	S	0.0	0.1	0:00.01	sshd: user@pts/0
7032	root	20	0	7520	4556	3220	S	0.0	0.1	0:00.36	docker-containerd-shim -namespace moby -workdir /var/lib/docker/containerd/daemon/io.co
6797	user	20	0	109M	61048	9372	S	0.0	1.5	0:04.46	/cowrie/cowrie-git/cowrie-env/bin/python2 /cowrie/cowrie-git/cowrie-env/bin/twistd --um
1	root	20	0	117M	5524	3196	S	0.0	0.1	5:02.19	/sbin/init
350	root	20	0	40876	7980	3208	S	0.0	0.2	2:53.36	/lib/systemd/systemd-journald
375	root	20	0	100M	960	776	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	/sbin/lvmtool -f
391	root	20	0	44780	4000	2728	S	0.0	0.1	2:28.07	/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
653	root	20	0	4396	1308	1220	S	0.0	0.0	0:00.00	/usr/sbin/acpid
713	root	20	0	280M	5076	3996	S	0.0	0.1	2:06.72	/usr/lib/accounts-service/accounts-daemon

F1 Help F2 Setup F3 Search F4 Filter F5 Tree F6 Sort By F7 Nice F8 Nice F9 Kill F10 Quit

Looks Like a Real System!

```
andronikos:~$ nmap 193.232.244.48
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-06-12 19:39 EEST  
Nmap scan report for 193.232.244.48  
Host is up (0.040s latency).
```

Not shown: 985 closed ports

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
21/tcp	open	ftp
22/tcp	open	ssh
25/tcp	open	smtp
42/tcp	open	nameserver
80/tcp	open	http
135/tcp	open	msrpc
443/tcp	open	https
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds
1433/tcp	open	ms-sql-s
1723/tcp	open	pptp
3306/tcp	open	mysql
5060/tcp	open	sip
5061/tcp	open	sip-tls
8081/tcp	open	blackice-icecap
8090/tcp	open	opsmessaging

```
root:~# nmap -sS -sV 193.232.244.48
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-06-12 19:39 EEST  
Nmap scan report for 193.232.244.48  
Host is up (0.038s latency).
```

Not shown: 985 closed ports


PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
21/tcp	open	ftp	Synology DiskStation NAS ftpd
22/tcp	open	ssh	OpenSSH 6.0p1 Debian 4+deb7u2 (protocol 2.0)
25/tcp	open	smtp	Postfix smtpd
42/tcp	open	nameserver?	
80/tcp	open	http	Apache httpd 2.0.48
135/tcp	open	msrpc?	
443/tcp	open	ssl/https?	
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	Dionaea honeypot smb
1433/tcp	open	ms-sql-s	Dionaea honeypot MS-SQL server
1723/tcp	open	pptp	(Firmware: 1)
3306/tcp	open	mysql	MySQL 5.7.16
5060/tcp	open	sip	(SIP end point; Status: 200 OK)
5061/tcp	open	ssl/sip-tls?	
8081/tcp	open	http	nginx
8090/tcp	open	http	nginx 1.10.3 (Ubuntu)



3. Data Analysis



Elastic Stack




E Elasticsearch

L Logstash

K Kibana

System Overview



Malware Analysis

- ◇ Access to Academic API
- ◇ 20k API requests per day at 1k requests per minute



4. Results




Event Captured

1,537,588 - Dionaea


1,255,283 - Cowrie

7,944 - Glastopf


Cowrie – Events By Day




Dionaea – Events By Day




Glastopf – Events By Day




Cowrie – Attack Sources




Cowrie – Events By Country



Dionaea – Events By Country



Glastopf – Events By Country





Cowrie – Common Commands

Common Commands ↕	Count ↕
cat /proc/cpuinfo	696
free -m	693
uname	693
ps -x	692
uname -a	534
help	131
uname -a & lscpu	69
unset HISTORY HISTFILE HISTSAVE HISTZONE HISTORY HISTLOG WATCH ; history -n ; export HISTFILE=/dev/null ; export HISTSIZE=0; export HISTFILESIZE=0;	61
uname -n -s -r -v	32
	20

Glastopf – Requested URL


URL ↕	Count ↕
/	2,305
/admin/index.php	149
/mysql-admin/index.php	149
/pmd/index.php	149
/claroline/phpMyAdmin/index.php	148
/typo3/phpmyadmin/index.php	147
/phpadmin/index.php	146
/xampp/phpmyadmin/index.php	146
/admin/mysql/index.php	145
/myadmin2/index.php	145

Dionaea – Connection Protocol

Connection Protocol ▾	Count ▾
smbd	1,461,560
upnpd	50,923
SipSession	7,943
mssqld	5,112
SipCall	5,088

Malware Analysis

9,248
Unique Samples



Magic Info

Type ▾	Count ▾
PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit	9,100
PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit	56
ASCII text	18
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.9, not stripped	13
HTML document text	9


Malware - Tags

Tag ▾	Count ▾
pedll	9,113
exploit	9,084
cve-2017-0147	9,082
overlay	9,069
honeypot	3,225
peexe	59
elf	30
text	20
corrupt	13
upx	11

CVE-2017-0147

CVE-ID	
CVE-2017-0147	Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD) • CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information
Description	
The SMBv1 server in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2; Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1; Windows 7 SP1; Windows 8.1; Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2; Windows RT 8.1; and Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607; and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via a crafted packets, aka "Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability."	
References	
Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">EXPLOIT-DB:41891URL:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41891/EXPLOIT-DB:41987URL:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41987/EXPLOIT-DB:43970URL:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43970/MISC:https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-058-02CONFIRM:https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-0147CONFIRM:https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-701903.pdfCONFIRM:https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-966341.pdfBID:96709URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96709SECTrack:1037991URL:http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037991	
Assigning CNA	
Microsoft Corporation	
Date Entry Created	
20160909	Disclaimer: The entry creation date may reflect when the CVE ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE.

Scans




SHA256: 2988273e3c7b09a8ec04c0a4d18891a5165ec35bd8ef2bb6647742861bbb2afb

File name: 2871db9f799e63904a37425ade6438d6

Detection ratio: 55 / 65

Analysis date: 2018-05-31 23:54:14 UTC (3 εβδομάδες ago)



Analysis

File detail

Additional information

Comments 1

Votes

Antivirus	Result	Update
Ad-Aware	Trojan.GenericKD.40267082	20180601
AegisLab	Troj_Ransom.W32.Wanna.toPO	20180531
AhnLab-V3	Trojan/Win32.WannaCryptor.R200894	20180531
ALYac	Trojan.GenericKD.40267082	20180531
Antiy-AVL	Trojan[Ransom]/Win32.Wanna	20180601
Arcabit	Trojan.Generic.D2666D4A	20180601
Avast	Win32:WannaCry-C [Trj]	20180601
AVG	Win32:WannaCry-C [Trj]	20180601
Avira (no cloud)	TR/Wanna.jrevh	20180531
AVware	Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT	20180601

5. Future Work



Future Work

- Deployment of a sensor to different country
- Malware Analysis

Closing Remarks

- Honeypots
- Our approach
- Generated Insights

References

- [1] L. Spitzner, Honeypots: Tracking Hackers, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2002
- [2] DTAG Community Honeypot Project, Deutsche Telekom,
<http://dtag-dev-sec.github.io/>

Special Thanks

- Dr. Nicolas Sklavos
- Michel Oosterhof
- Lukas Rist
- The Honeynet Project
- VirusTotal

Thank you!

Any questions?

Please send me your feedback and suggestions:

- @andronkyr
- andronkyr@outlook.com