

Structural Semantics Management: an Application of the Chase in Networking

*Anduo Wang**, Mubashir Anwar \checkmark , Fangping Lan*, Matthew Caesar \checkmark
*Temple University \checkmark UIUC

networking: a wonderful success

for everyday life


- Web, VoIP, social networking, content providers ...




networking: a wonderful success

(Internet) a remarkable story

-from research experiment to global infrastructure



ARPANET, 1977



source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet>

today

networking: a wonderful success

innovations take rapid transitions

Ahmed Khurshid., et al. “*VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time*”
[https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi13/
technical-sessions/presentation/khurshid](https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi13/technical-sessions/presentation/khurshid)
NSDI 2013



3 years, \$8.2 million

Veriflow Nabs \$8.2 Million For Clever Ideas About Network Outage Prevention

JULY 19, 2016 BY DREW CONRY-MURRAY

Startup [Veriflow Networks](#) has landed \$8.2 million in series A funding. The A round was led by Menlo Ventures, along with its existing investor New Enterprise Associates.

<http://packetpushers.net/veriflow-nabs-8-2-million-clever-ideas-network-outage-prevention/>


inside the ‘Net’: a different story



network systems
– increasingly complex

network management
– *a black art*

software-defined networking (SDN)



The Future of Networking, and the Past of Protocols - Scott Shenker



Open Networking Summit
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formal analysis

[NSDI 20] Tiramisu: Fast Multilayer Network Verification.

[SIGCOMM'02] Route oscillations in I-BGP route reflection.

[HotNets'20] Solver-Aided Multi-Party Configuration.

[NSDI'15] General Approach to Network Configuration Analysis.

[SIGCOMM'16] Fast Control Plane Analysis Using an Abstract Representation.

[TON'02] The Stable Paths Problem and Interdomain Routing.

[SIGCOMM'19] Validating Datacenters at Scale.

[CoNEXT 20] AalWiNes: A Fast and Quantitative What-If Analysis Tool for MPLS Networks.

[NSDI 13] Real Time Network Policy Checking Using Header Space Analysis

[HotSDN 12] VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide Invariants in Real Time

[NSDI 15] Checking Beliefs in Dynamic Networks.

[POPL 16] Scaling Network Verification Using Symmetry and Surgery

[NSDI 20] Plankton: Scalable network configuration verification through model checking

[IEEE Networks 05] Modeling the routing of an autonomous system with C-BGP.

[INFOCOM 18] Polynomial-Time What-If Analysis for Prefix-Manipulating MPLS Networks

[SIGCOMM 19] Safely and Automatically Updating In-Network ACL Configurations with Intent Language.

[INFOCOM 05] On static reachability analysis of IP networks

[SIGCOMM 20] Accuracy, Scalability, Coverage: A Practical Configuration Verifier on a Global WAN

[HotNets 20] Incremental Network Configuration Verification

[NSDI 20] APKeep: Realtime Verification for Real Networks


... ...

with


The collage includes:

- A Microsoft blog post titled "NETWORK VERIFICATION WITH VERIFLOW" by Peter Welcher, dated 05/12/17. It discusses Forward Networks and their announcement at NFD13.
- A "Network Verification" section from a SIGCOMM 2015 page.
- A "Half-Day Tutorial: Network Verification" section for Monday 17th August, Afternoon Session, with a "Presenters" link.
- An "ACM SIGCOMM 2021 TUTORIAL: Introduction to Network Verification" page.
- A "Tutorial Program" section with a link to the "Tutorial Slack channel".
- A search bar with the placeholder "Filter items...".
- A red footer bar with the text "Friday, August 27th 13:00-17:00 (UTC-4, New York), 19:00-23:00 (UTC+2, Paris)" and "1:00 pm - 2:15 pm Session I".
- A sidebar titled "RELATED TOPICS" with links to various network-related blogs.


network management, an anatomy




network management, an anatomy




network management, this work



network management, this work



an example




is the firewall effectively installed?

i.e., can hosts belong to B still send traffic to those in C?



an example




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an example



is the firewall effectively installed?


i.e., can hosts belong to B still send traffic to those in C?



existing approach

- inject input traffic into B, and observe output at C

semantics-based network transformation



is the firewall effectively installed?
i.e., can hosts belong to B still send traffic to those in C?



plain forwarding program

P

a set of policies,
characterizing
legitimate packets


Σ

structural rewrite

P'

P' reflects Σ ,
renders the
security hole

a formulation with the chase



a formulation with the chase



the chase

- given a data dependency $\sigma (\in \Sigma)$
- eliminates “useless” evaluation in P by an intuitive structural rewrite (adding/collapsing/updating elements in the query)

the chase

```
/* P: reachability (forwarding) along  
R1R2R3 */  
R(x,y) :- F(f,x,y1,x,1), F(f,x2,y2,1,2),  
  F(f,x3,y3,2,3), F(f,x4,y4,3,4),  
  F(f,x5,y5,4,5), F(f,x6,y6,5,6),  
  F(f,x7,y,6,y).  
%% permitting header modifications  
%% F(Flow, Source, Destination, Location, Next-hop)
```

k: a key dependency

```
y=y' :- F(f,x,y,u,w),  
       F(f,x',y',u',w').
```



tableau query

| P | F | S | D | L | N |
|------|---|----------------|----------------|---|---|
| | f | x | y ₁ | x | 1 |
| | f | x ₂ | y ₂ | 1 | 2 |
| body | f | x ₃ | y ₃ | 2 | 3 |
| | f | x ₄ | y ₄ | 3 | 4 |
| | f | x ₅ | y ₅ | 4 | 5 |
| | f | x ₆ | y ₆ | 5 | 6 |
| | f | x ₇ | y | 6 | 7 |
| | | x | y | | |

the chase

```
/* P: reachability (forwarding) along  
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


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


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the chase

```

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```

k: a key dependency

```

y=y' :- F(f,x,y,u,w),
  F(f,x',y',u',w').

```



```

/* P': the result of chasing r with k */
R(x,y1) :- F(f,x,y1,x,1), F(f,x2,y1,1,2),
  F(f,x3,y1,2,3), F(f,x4,y1,3,4),
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tableau query

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the chase

```
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y=y' :- F(f,x,y,u,w),
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```

the chase, limitation

```
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%% permitting header modifications
%% F(flow, source, destination, location, next-hop)
```

k: a key dependency

```
y=y' :- F(f,x,y,u,w),
  F(f,x',y',u',w').
```



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/* P': the result of chasing r with k */

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  F(f,x5,y1,4,5), F(f,x6,y1,5,6),
  F(f,x7,y1,6,y1).
```

k': k restricted to $R2$ and source other than $1.2.3.4$

```
y=y' :- F(f,x,y,2,3),
  F(f,x',y',3,4),
  x ≠ 1.2.3.4.
```



the chase, limitation

```
/* P: reachability (forwarding) along
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R(x,y) :- F(f,x,y1,x,1), F(f,x2,y2,1,2),
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```

%% permitting header modifications
%% *F(flow, source, destination, location, next-hop)*

k: a key dependency

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y=y' :- F(f,x,y,u,w),
F(f,x',y',u',w').
```

```
/* P': the result of chasing r with k */
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| P | F | S | D | L | N |
|------|---|----------------|----------------|---|---------------------------|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | ... |
| body | f | x ₃ | y ₃ | 2 | 3 |
| | f | x ₄ | y ₄ | 2 | 4 |
| | | | | | x ₃ ≠ 1.2.3.4? |
| head | | | | | ... |
| | | x | y | | |

k': *k* restricted to R2 and source other than 1.2.3.4

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y=y' :- F(f,x,y,2,3),
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x≠1.2.3.4.
```



the chase, strength

dependency σ ($\in \Sigma$) as general implication

- $\neg \phi(X, Y) \rightarrow \exists Z. \psi(Y, Z)$
- X, Y, Z are vectors of variables, ϕ and ψ are conjunction of predicates (including equations)
- subsume all common (integrity) constraints in database applications

chasing with a set Σ is *Church-Rosser*

- terminates with a unique result
- the order of applying σ ($\in \Sigma$) is insignificant

the chase, strength & limitation

dependency $\sigma (\in \Sigma)$ as general implication

- $\phi(X, Y) \rightarrow \exists Z. \psi(Y, Z)$
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- subsume all common (integrity) constraints in database applications

too limited for network policies

chasing with a set Σ is *Church-Rosser*

- terminates with a unique result
- the order of applying $\sigma (\in \Sigma)$ is insignificant

extend the chase to networking

dependency σ ($\in \Sigma$) as general implication

- $\phi(X, Y) \rightarrow \exists Z. \psi(Y, Z)$
- X, Y, Z are vectors of variables, ϕ and ψ are conjunction of predicates (including equations)
- subsume all common (integrity) constraints in database applications

our
contribution

richer
dependencies
(of network
policies)

chasing with a set Σ is *Church-Rosser*

- terminates with a unique result
- the order of applying σ ($\in \Sigma$) is insignificant

retain the
Church-Rosser
property

extend the chase, insight

```
/* P: reachability (forwarding) along
R1R2R3 */
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| | f | x ₄ | y ₄ | 2 | 4 |
| head | x | y | | | |

$x_3 \neq 1.2.3.4?$

k' : k restricted to $R2$ and source other than $1.2.3.4$

```
y=y' :- F(f,x,y,2,3),
        F(f,x',y',3,4),
        x $\neq$ 1.2.3.4.
```

view P (body) as an incomplete database instance,
evaluate k' on D

fauré-log

a datalog variant for incomplete information

```
/* network query on symbolic state */
H(u) [C(u)] :- B1(u1), ..., Bn(un), [C1(u1), ..., Cn(un)].
%% u,u1,...,un are tuples with constants and variables (conditioned by
constraints C,C1,...,Cn)
```

fauré-log, richer dependencies

a datalog variant for incomplete information

```
/* network query on symbolic state */
H(u) [C(u)] :- B1(u1), ..., Bn(un), [C1(u1), ..., Cn(un)].
%% u,u1,...,un are tuples with constants and variables (conditioned by
constraints C,C1,...,Cn)
```

fauré-log dependencies, for network policies

```
/* network dependencies chasable on symbolic states */
H(u) :- B1(u1), ..., Bn(un), [C1(u1), ..., Cn(un)]. %% tgd: the presence
of Bi's under the conditions Ci's implies H

[x/y, C(u)] :- B1(u1), ..., Bn(un), [C1(u1), ..., Cn(un)]. %% egd:
substitute symbol x for y, Ci's are conjunction of (in)equality and
auxiliary predicates
```

generalize the chase step

generalize the substitution of the chase to fauré-log evaluation

Algorithm 1: The chase with *fauré*-dependency

input : *fauré-log* rule $r : H_r : -B_r[\phi_r]$,
 fauré-dependency $\sigma : H_\sigma[x/y, \psi_\sigma] : -B_\sigma[\phi_\sigma]$

output: $r \rightarrow_\sigma r'$

1 instantiate $B_r[\phi_r]$ into c-tables D ;

2 let q be $H_\sigma[\psi_\sigma] : -B_\sigma[\phi_\sigma]$;

3 let $H'_\sigma[\psi'_\sigma] = q(D)$ by *fauré-log* evaluation ;

4 **if** $H'_\sigma[\psi_\sigma]$ is empty;

5 **then** halt

6 **else**

7 let $\phi'_r = \phi_r\{x/y\}$, $\phi'_\sigma = \phi_\sigma\{x/y\}$;

8 **if** $\phi'_r \wedge \phi'_\sigma \wedge \psi'_\sigma$ is UNSAT **then** halt;

9 **else** let r' be $H_r\{x/y\} : -B_r\{x/y\}, H'_\sigma, [\phi'_r, \phi'_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma]$
 return r' ;

10 **end**

11 **end**

equality generation dependency (egd)

collapsing atoms in the rule

generalize the chase step

generalize the substitution of the chase to fauré-log evaluation

Algorithm 1: The chase with *fauré*-dependency

input : *fauré-log* rule $r : H_r : -B_r[\phi_r]$,
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7 let $\phi'_r = \phi_r\{x/y\}$, $\phi'_\sigma = \phi_\sigma\{x/y\}$;

8 if $\phi'_r \wedge \phi'_\sigma \wedge \psi'_\sigma$ is UNSAT then halt;

9 else let r' be $H_r\{x/y\} : -B_r\{x/y\}, H'_\sigma, [\phi'_r, \phi'_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma]$

10 return r' ;

11 end

11 end

tuple generation dependency (tgd)

generate the new (implied) atoms by fauré-log

add new atoms in the rule

generalize the chase step

generalize the substitution of the chase to fauré-log evaluation

Algorithm 1: The chase with *fauré*-dependency

input : *fauré-log* rule $r : H_r : -B_r[\phi_r]$,
 fauré-dependency $\sigma : H_\sigma[x/\bar{y}, \psi_\sigma] : -B_\sigma[\phi_\sigma]$
output: $r \rightarrow_\sigma r'$

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2 let q be $H_\sigma[\psi_\sigma] : -B_\sigma[\phi_\sigma]$;
3 let $H'_\sigma[\psi'_\sigma] = q(D)$ by *fauré-log* evaluation ;
4 **if** $H'_\sigma[\psi'_\sigma]$ is empty;
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 return r' ;
10 **end**
11 **end**

systematic
management of
semantic constraints
in the conditional
tables (c-tables)

generalize the chase step

incompatible σ leads to invalid output rule (halt)

Algorithm 1: The chase with *fauré*-dependency

```
input : fauré-log rule  $r : H_r : -B_r[\phi_r]$ ,  
        fauré-dependency  $\sigma : H_\sigma[x/y, \psi_\sigma] : -B_\sigma[\phi_\sigma]$   
output:  $r \rightarrow_\sigma r'$   
  
1 instantiate  $B_r[\phi_r]$  into c-tables  $D$  ;  
2 let  $q$  be  $H_\sigma[\psi_\sigma] : -B_\sigma[\phi_\sigma]$  ;  
3 let  $H'_\sigma[\psi'_\sigma] = q(D)$  by fauré-log evaluation ;  
4 if  $H'_\sigma[\psi'_\sigma]$  is empty;  
5 then halt  
6 else  
7   let  $\phi'_r = \phi_r\{x/y\}, \phi'_\sigma = \phi_\sigma\{x/y\}$  ;  
8   if  $\phi'_r \wedge \phi'_\sigma \wedge \psi'_\sigma$  is UNSAT then halt;  
9   else let  $r'$  be  $H_r\{x/y\} : -B_r\{x/y\}, H'_\sigma, [\phi'_r, \phi'_\sigma, \psi'_\sigma]$   
    return  $r'$ ;  
10 end  
11 end
```

(application of)
incompatible policies
renders an *impossible*
network behavior
that cannot be
described any *fauré-log*
rule

the new chase

given a set of fauré-log dependencies


$\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n\}, n \geq 1$, chase a program P with Σ by

- repeatedly chase each rule $r \in P$ with a randomly selected fauré-log dependency $\sigma \in \Sigma$

preserving Church-Rosser

Church-Rosser: regardless of the order of applying σ ($\in \Sigma$), the chase of Σ yields a unique result


the classic
chase (of Σ)



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
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
the classic
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a compatible sequence of
policies

fauré-log dependency


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preserving Church-Rosser


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an incompatible sequence
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
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
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another compatible
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
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
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
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
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the new
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moving forward

formalization

- formalize fauré-log based chase

recursion

- extend the new chase to recursive fauré-log?

termination analysis

- non-deterministic / deterministic variants
- domain-specific notion of compatibility (of network policies)

empirical study

- benchmarking performance of the new chase on network policies

conclusion

