SEVEN Security

➤ SYNOPSIS

How policy makers and citizens define security depends upon how they perceive particular threats, the historical context in which they live, and whether they focus on dangers to the nation-state or to the individual. As such, our understanding of the notion of security is framed by our membership in particular communities and ideologies. Some modern scholars have been particularly influential in determining how Western nations define their security. Flash points around the world may cause individual nation-states and global organizations to respond in particular ways to fears of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and invasion. At the same time, technology is changing security issues, forcing societies to make judgments about privacy, intelligence gathering, and drone strikes.

➤ SCAFFOLDING

As you read through this chapter, think about how you would answer each of the questions below.

Are you familiar with the terms "Realism" or "human security"? In what context did you learn about them?

What do you remember about the development of the nation-state from chapter 2 ("History")?

Why has this chapter incorporated perspectives about the U.S. war with Iraq from Middle East sources? Where would you go to find European, Latin American, Asian, or African perspectives on this issue?



Are you willing to trade your privacy online or during phone calls in return for greater security?

What do you think is the greatest security threat that concerns you personally?

➤ CORE CONCEPTS

How do differing perspectives on the ways nation-states and international governing bodies can keep individuals safe affect policy decisions in times of terror or insecurity?

How have new technologies and globalization changed the threats we face?

How do we balance the need for security against the right to privacy?

The first task of every government is to ensure the security of its citizens from outside threats. Any government that fails in this task faces not only the risk of external takeover but also the loss of legitimacy among its people. But which threats are so important that they are security issues? In France in 1938 or Kuwait in the 1990s, it was easy to define the threat. In other periods, however, nations might discern the danger differently. People in Angola might be extremely concerned about the threat of landmines laid decades before, while someone in Caracas, Venezuela, might be frightened of crime or hunger. Europeans might worry that the National Security Agency of the United States is monitoring their phone calls or e-mail; if they live in the Baltic states or Georgia, they may fear a Russian invasion and believe that the United States is the ally most likely to preserve their independence. For people living on a small Pacific island, the greatest threat to national security might be a rising sea level. For other nations, it might be climate refugees fleeing from environmental change. How people perceive security is defined by the historical and national context. For many years after September 11, 2001, the primary U.S. security threat was terrorism. But with Russian aggression in Ukraine, North Korea's nuclear development, and potential conflicts in the South China Sea, this may no longer be the case. Ultimately, what people fear determines how they define security, and a number of related issues follow from this axiom. Where do citizens look to obtain security? How has the definition of security changed through time? And how do you balance the reality of threats against the importance of human rights?

Security from the Emergence of the Nation-State to Realism

Some scholars would argue that security represents the most basic international issue. It was the central theme of the Greek historian Thucydides, who sought to understand the Peloponnesian War, the greatest conflict of his era. He argued that the war began because of the rising power of Athens, which caused Sparta to act before it could be overwhelmed. His account shaped Western interpretations of international relations for 2,400 years (Monten 2006). In the millennia that followed, a series of thinkers, such as Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, wrestled with the same issues, and their work continues to underpin modern scholarship on international affairs (Sobek 2005). When Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers in Europe tried to understand the origins of the state, they concluded that its most fundamental reason for existence was to provide security for its citizens from outside threats. People came together and gave up certain freedoms in order to have security from both internal threats, such as criminals, and external threats, such as invasion (Hobbes [1651] 1982). At the same time, these European thinkers lived in a world in which the nation-state system was relatively new. Their work represented an effort to understand an emerging kind of state.

Security was not always defined solely in terms of threats to the nation-state and its sovereignty. In the Middle Ages, political units were defined by dynasties, which meant that people's allegiances could change with a royal marriage. Whether in Angevin England or medieval Italy, political boundaries often did not align with ethnic groups. Authority was frequently fractured or divided. Under the feudal system, a powerful leader could be bound to more than one overlord. People owed political allegiance to their king (or kings), but moral and religious authority was bestowed in a pope. Additionally, there was an ideal of chivalry in which the bond of knighthood appeared more important than those of language or homeland. An English knight probably believed that he had more in common with a Spanish lord than an English peasant. Nationhood did not determine political authority or the role of the state (Rapley 2006, 96–99; see also Ganshof 1971).

This reality began to change in 1648. In that year, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe while giving rise to the modern nation-state. As Enlightenment authors sought to explain this new state of affairs, they established ideas that have shaped much subsequent writing on security, which has focused both on the nation-state and issues relevant

to the developed world. There are good reasons for this fact. The nation-state system has proved to be an enormously successful construct. As formal empires waned after World War II, all newly freed regions adopted the nation-state system. For this reason, security was defined in terms of the survival of the nation-state and its ability to maintain its sovereignty rather than in terms of the security of its people from violence or death. Internal conflicts and economic issues consequently received little attention as security issues because they rarely threatened the nation-state at the systemic level.

Europe was also the center of global political power for the latter half of the millennium, which meant that security was perceived through the lens of the Great Power competitions, with a focus on armed conflict. When power shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union with the onset of the Cold War, the two parties viewed all security issues in terms of their contest. Because even local conflicts could draw in either power (consider Vietnam or Afghanistan) and potentially escalate to nuclear war, Great Power competition remained the key issue. Security continued to be thought of as a question defined by relationships between states. Scholarship in the field was dominated by a theory called Realism, which reflected this context and remains the dominant paradigm in the field.

Realism

Realism is a complex and rich theoretical perspective that traces its roots back to the work of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes (Jackson and Sorenson 1999, 72–76). But the British author E. H. Carr first articulated the theory in the twentieth century, as he sought to explain why Europe was again sliding into a world war in his book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (Jackson and Sorenson 1999, 41–42). Because of the complexity and depth of this literature, it is difficult to briefly summarize the meaning of Realism, which has developed and evolved over time. Despite its many interpretations, however, Realism as a worldview generally has certain characteristics (68–70). Its proponents typically view security as the key issue in international affairs. They often share a pessimistic view of both human nature and the inevitability of war. Within this theoretical framework, the key factor in international politics is the state. And one of the axioms of Realism is that the international system is anarchic, in the sense that there is no superior power to which an aggrieved nation can appeal. Realists tend to doubt the power of international law or the international community to

limit conflict. Although nations may cloak their actions in moral rhetoric, they act based on their national interests, and it is unrealistic to expect them to do otherwise. Realists argue that states therefore have no choice but to engage in the strategies of realpolitik, an approach to diplomacy that emphasizes pragmatic methods to advance national interests, such as alliance formation and power balancing. Any state that fails to do so may be moral, but it may not survive. (For a brief description of Realism, see Sheehan 2005, 5–23.) This theory has evolved considerably through the work of such authors as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, but most of its key ideas have remained intact (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1959; Jackson and Sorenson 1999, 51–53, 76–80, 84–89).

This doctrine had been challenged by other theories, such as liberalism, which stresses the importance of international institutions and international law in shaping behavior. This more optimistic vision argues that organizations such as the United Nations could create a new global framework to avoid the devastating warfare of the twentieth century. Progress is possible (Jackson and Sorenson 1999, 108–11). Constructivists, in contrast, argue that the international order is defined by identities that result from history and experience. The international order is not given but rather historically contingent; that is, it could change (238–40). Both theories are more complex than this thumbnail sketch can capture. But they each seek to mount a challenge to Realism, which they argue focuses excessively on conflict and oversimplifies a complex reality.

Other political scientists—such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye—have mounted sophisticated critiques of Realism as a doctrine because actors other than states are important in international affairs, nations are interdependent in complex ways, and military force is not always the key factor in international relations (Keohane and Nye 2001, 20–32). But during the Cold War, most policy makers drew heavily on Realism because its emphasis on Great Power politics—the balance of power, alliances, and military strategy—seemed to accord with an era defined by global tension (Sheehan 2005, 6, 23). Then, almost overnight, the Soviet Union collapsed. Some scholars argued that in an era defined by globalization, the meaning of security needed to be rethought. It is not clear, however, that Realism has been superseded as a doctrine.

The End of the Cold War

In the early 1980s, it was difficult to imagine that the Cold War might end. As Philip Gordon notes, the Reagan administration had warned that the United States and its allies were falling behind in the military competition with the Soviets and that vast resources were needed to keep up (2007, 56). Even after the fact, many people could not believe that the Cold War had actually ended (56). The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a period of euphoria in the West. Because global security threats had been viewed in this context, it seemed that the end of this period would eliminate not only the risk of nuclear annihilation but also many of the conflicts between client states. During this time, there was also a wave of democratization, as military regimes collapsed throughout Latin America—in part because the United States no longer bolstered authoritarian governments based on their anti-Communism. But there was also a larger process of democratization taking place, as South Africa ended apartheid and Eastern Europe adopted democracy, as did the Philippines. All of these factors, combined with the rise of the European Union, created a sense of optimism. Francis Fukuyama wrote a much-cited article titled "The End of History?," which proposed that the era of global competition was over, as no great ideological questions remained to be addressed: "We may be witnessing the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (1989, 4). There was a great deal of discussion of the peace dividend. Military spending fell across the globe.

There was no theoretical framework in place to shape how policy makers interpreted this new era. A new mood of isolationism washed over the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada and Europe. While developed countries appeared to be transitioning into a more stable future, this was not the case for nations in the Global South, some of which seemed to be sliding into anarchy. There was little concern in rich countries about this, however, because it appeared that Western nations had the security to disengage from poor regions of the world, which might be chaotic or dangerous. In the future, it seemed that the world might divide into two areas, which Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky called "zones of peace" and "zones of turmoil" (1993, 8). In practice, these zones were defined by their wealth. In the developed world, few ideological questions divided the Great Powers, and ties of democracy mitigated conflict. Political scientists spoke of the democratic peace hypothesis, which states that democracies are less

likely to go to war; that if they do go to war, they are less likely to fight other democracies; and that a world with more democracies likely would see less conflict (paraphrasing Mitchell et al. 1999, 771–72; see also Gleditsch and Ward 2000; O'Neal and Russett 1999; and Sheehan 2005, 32–42). In contrast, in the developing world, there appeared to be frequent conflicts over ethnic, nationalist, and resource issues, which had little meaning to key global actors: "While Europe enjoyed what John Gaddis (1986) termed the 'long peace' (the longest period in the post-Westphalia era without a major war among the major powers), conflicts in the Third World inflicted all but 176,000 of the 22 million battle deaths that occurred between 1945 and 1989" (Mason 2003, 19). In the developed world, there was a sense that combat in these areas might entail moral issues but no longer security questions.

The Challenge of Terrorism

Western nations, however, were not impervious to turmoil or violence. In conventional military terms, wealthy nations were untouchable, but rational opponents would not choose to launch a conventional attack. With new technologies such as the Internet, distance seemed to provide less security than in the past. The rise of globalization was fracturing the power of the state and empowering small substate actors—from Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult that launched the sarin nerve gas attacks in Tokyo's subway, to Middle Eastern groups such as Al-Qaida and Hezbollah. While no state was likely to attack the United States, terrorists and other groups were not deterred. Throughout the 1990s and into the new century a series of attacks by terrorists foreshadowed the threat to the United States and Europe, from the failed effort to destroy the World Trade Center in 1992, to the bombing of the USS *Cole* in 2000 off the coast of Yemen. Several large-scale attacks were intercepted before they could be launched against the United States and its allies (9/11 Commission 2004, 59–73, 145–60).

The U.S. government responded to these strikes by using the legal apparatus, working with its partners in the developed world, and launching cruise missiles against terrorist training sites (9/11 Commission 2004, 73–86, 108–43; for why the United States turned from using a legal approach to dealing with terrorism militarily after September 11, 2001, see Shapiro 2007, 10–14). The legal approach was sometimes effective in leading to the arrest and imprisonment of people who carried out attacks. But the perpetrators were often willing to sacrifice their lives, and those who

planned, financed, and supported the attacks often remained free overseas. The second attack on New York's World Trade Center took place less than a decade after the first. The United States and other Western nations might have overwhelming military power, but that alone did not isolate them from violence.

Human Security

As scholars, diplomats, and nation-states sought to grapple with this new security context, a new vision of security emerged. At the core of this approach was a new answer to the question "What is security?" The traditional response had been that security came from the nation-state, which held a monopoly on violence that it used not only to maintain internal order but also to protect its citizens from external threats. In this respect, security threats needed to be dealt with through the traditional tools of statecraft, such as alliances, deterrence, and war. But this argument appeared outdated to some scholars, who advanced an ideal called "human security" by arguing that threats should be defined by what endangers not only the state but also the individual. An example might be pandemic flu. A pandemic is an outbreak of an infectious disease that is not confined to a single region of the globe. Such an outbreak could not threaten the state, which would survive even the most devastating pandemic imaginable, but it could take the lives of hundreds of millions of people globally. It needed to be treated with the same seriousness as a potential bioterrorism attack. This represented a different way of looking at international security and how thinkers since the Enlightenment have defined it.

Although its intellectual roots may be traced to before the Cold War, human security first came to prominence after the United Nations Development Programme released a 1994 document titled the *Human Development Report* (Paris 2001, 89; MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 23–142). The document reflected the end of the Cold War and a new international environment in which the rising power of globalization seemed to decrease the importance of nation-states while also increasing the threat posed by nonstate actors such as Al-Qaida (Ripsman and Paul 2004). The growing importance of failed states, organized crime, environmental problems, and infectious disease also led to a reassessment of the security environment (Newman 2001; Axworthy 2004, 348). By shifting the focus from the state to the individual, a new perspective could concentrate resources on the threats killing the most people.

This argument gained traction in part because many small states were dissatisfied with the traditional military approach to security problems. These nations seized upon the idea of human security as a means to not only alleviate human suffering but also create an alternative political order. Their patronage gave great impetus to this new approach: "Among the most vocal promoters of human security are the governments of Canada and Norway, which have taken the lead in establishing a 'human security network' of states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that endorse the concept" (Paris 2001, 87; Owen 2004, 378). Policy makers in these nations (as well as in Japan, Australia, and other Scandinavian nations) often felt that social and economic issues, especially poverty, underlay conflict (Thomas 2001; Kacowicz 2005, 123). An approach that dealt with crises only when they reached the level of open conflict was doomed to a reactive response; it could never take the initiative to prevent emergencies by resolving ethnic disputes, ending political grievances, or preventing economic conflicts (Monaghan 2008, B-8).

Proponents of this approach also argued that traditional Realism was irrelevant to the kind of violence faced by many people living in developing countries. For example, since 1945, most global conflicts had been civil wars, which accounted for most of the world's combat deaths (Mason 2003, 19). Yet traditional Realism gave little thought at all to civil wars or to the state's role as an agent of internal violence (Owen 2004, 375). There seemed to be a split between the widespread violence in the developing world and the focus on Great Power contests. From this perspective, Realism ignored key issues in developing nations, such as land mines, which represented both a security threat and an economic cost in many countries. For this reason, scholars began to question the utility of Realism: "To many, there is little doubt that (in and of itself) the traditional state-based security paradigm is failing in its primary objective—to protect people. Millions a year are killed by communicable disease, civil war, environmental disasters, and famine, none of which fall under the mandate of current security thinking" (374). By the 1990s, the idea of human security emerged as a major challenge to Realism.

One of the strengths of human security is that it recognizes that there can be a linkage between different forms of insecurity, so that threats can spill over from even the most remote regions to the global level. For example, in August 2018 an Ebola outbreak began in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even though a highly effective vaccine was available and health workers made Herculean efforts, over 1,700 people had died by July 2019.

Local authorities in the region, riven by warring factions, could not guarantee health workers' safety—the spread of conspiracy theories provoked attacks upon the very people working to vaccinate and protect the populace. Some NGOs even had to withdraw workers for a time, because staff had been killed or wounded. The end result was that many local people were not vaccinated, and some became sick and died. On July 17, 2019, the World Health Organization declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, after a case of Ebola appeared in the city of Goma. This particular experience shows that just as health cannot be separated from security, so too security impacts health. The strength of human security as an approach is that it posits that security threats are interrelated, so that one cannot focus only upon nation-states or military forces in isolation.

This new framework did not go unchallenged by realist authors, who argued that globalization had not fundamentally changed security issues and that states remained the key actors in security affairs (Ripsman and Paul 2004). Scholars such as Barry Buzan (2004, 369–70) suggested that the term "human security" was so broad that the phrase had little meaning and practically made every issue a security issue. Roland Paris similarly argued that the term was too vague to be useful to policy makers facing competing demands: "Human security is like 'sustainable development'—everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea what it means" (Paris 2001, 88). He further suggested that the very vagueness of the concept allows it to unite people with widely different ideas: "The term, in short, appears to be slippery by design" (88; for an overview of the field, see Newman 2001).

Critics argued that this vagueness could be dangerous. For example, AIDS has been depicted as a security threat because it tends to undermine African militaries (which have high rates of HIV infection), which could lead to failed states (Elbe 2006, 121–22). This argument may have been intended to persuade the U.S. government to act by suggesting that this health question had security implications. But this hypothesis also presented a danger, according to Stefan Elbe: if HIV/AIDS became viewed as a military threat, it could then be fought according to the extent the disease impacted U.S. interests (119, 120, 128; see also Peterson 2002–3). This might warp the response to HIV, so that only those aspects of the pandemic that influenced "security" issues would receive attention and funding. What Elbe contended is that HIV was a serious moral issue in itself, regardless of how it impacted the United States.

Critics argue that human security needs boundaries; without them, all issues could become securitized (Shapiro 2007, 113; Owen 2004, 379).

These critics are also concerned that if poverty and development come to be defined as security issues, then militaries from developed nations will become involved in addressing them, which would expand their role in developing countries. If failed or failing states foster terrorism, should the armed forces of developed nations help with state making, or do other agencies have more expertise?

Partly for this reason, the perception of human security has been mixed within developing countries. Some leaders have welcomed a reframing of global priorities to give greater weight to their concerns and justify their requests for more resources. In other nations, leaders have worried that this framework might give European and North American nations the means to involve themselves in issues of national sovereignty: "Even some intended beneficiaries of the approach are skeptical of it. The Group of 77—the coalition of developing countries at the United Nations—tend to be deeply suspicious of human security, seeing it as part of a 'West against the rest' ideological push by countries of the North to impose alien values on the developing world" (Monaghan 2008, B-8). Human security is a concept that is viewed by some developing countries as a potential means of neocolonialism—that is, the maintenance of colonial relations after formal connections are severed. Despite these criticisms, human security has been an innovative area that has led to fresh work on security issues. It is also true that all emerging fields tend to face such ideological debates. Human security continues to attract attention because of rising concerns about organized crime, infectious disease, and the environment.

September 11 and Its Aftermath

These debates about the nature of security became critical after September 11, 2001. In the 1990s political scientist Samuel Huntington had argued that most conflicts took place along the "fault lines" between civilizations. Huntington claimed that wars could take place within a civilization (such as the struggle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) but that these struggles do not threaten wider conflict. In contrast, conflicts between two civilizations—such as the West and Islam—have far greater potential for violence (Huntington 1996, 254–65). In the aftermath of the September 11 terror attack, the United States found itself in a clash of civilizations as widely debated as it was troubling. How should the United States understand the motivation of the people who attacked it? One study found that "55 percent of Jordanians and 65 percent of Pakistanis held favorable views

of Bin Laden," the mastermind of the 9/11 attack (Shore 2006, 5; see also 9/11 Commission 2004, 375). This perspective confused many Americans. Was the United States' position in the Arab-Israeli conflict the determining factor in how the country was perceived abroad? Or did people lash out because the United States supported authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, while the Central Intelligence Agency had a sad history that included the overthrow of Iran's prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953? Did Islamic extremists associate the United States with globalization, Western secularism, and modernity, which they viewed as threatening? (For the association between the United States and globalization, see Keohane and Nye 2001, 234–35, 250.) Every scholar seemed to have a different opinion. At root was the question of whether it was U.S. actions or U.S. values that caused hostility toward the United States (Holsti 2008, 64). It was critical for U.S. citizens to understand how their nation was viewed in the Middle East.

Despite these debates and questions there was consensus in the West that the main base of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan had to be eliminated. Al-Qaida had found safety under the rule of the Taliban, a fundamentalist movement that had begun among students who promised to end the violence that followed the Soviet-Afghan war. The Taliban sheltered Osama Bin Laden and refused to give him up as the United States demanded in September 2001. In response, the United States joined with the Northern Alliance, whose leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, had been assassinated by a suicide bomber on September 9, 2001, as Al-Qaida prepared to attack the United States. With support from both British and U.S. airpower, the Northern Alliance overran Taliban forces by December 2001, although Osama Bin Laden escaped U.S. and Afghan troops at the Battle of Tora Bora that same month.

After this invasion, there was a larger debate within the United States about the best means to respond to terrorism. One argument favored a defensive strategy, the broad outlines of which were articulated by the September 11 Commission (9/11 Commission 2004, 380–98; for a summary of the offensive/defensive debate, see Sloan 2005, 6–12). Ian Shapiro (2007), for example, argued that the West should adopt the same strategy of containment that it had followed during the Cold War. Countless authors have written that the "war on terror" is not winnable in a conventional sense. But as Philip Gordon notes, terrorism will not last forever (2007, 54). He suggested investing resources into strengthening the nation's defenses, much as the United States did against the Soviet Union. By securing their

ports, tightening airport security, rebuilding public-health infrastructure, and improving intelligence, Western nations could address this threat. The funds needed would be a fraction of what the United States spent on the Iraq invasion: "As one analyst noted in *Mother Jones*, delayed security upgrades for subway and commuter rail systems could be paid for by twenty days' worth of Iraq war spending. Missing explosives screening for all U.S. passenger airlines could be covered by ten days' worth. Overdue security upgrades for 361 American airports could be covered by four days' worth" (Shapiro 2007, 58). The United States and its allies also needed to ensure that the focus on security neither bankrupted the nation nor caused the West to abandon its fundamental values (120).

The counterargument to this position came from neoconservatives such as David Frum (who wrote President George W. Bush's 2002 speech that coined the term "axis of evil") and Richard Perle (2003), as expressed in their book *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*. It is important to note that the arguments of the neoconservatives were diverse, as there were many different strands within this movement. But some key ideas stand out. The United States was the world's main military power, and conventional force still mattered. The United States needed to use this advantage to change the culture of the Middle East and to foster democracy in the region. At a time of extraordinary threats, neoconservatives suggested, the United States could not be bound by conventional rules. The government could not know when an attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was imminent (Frum and Perle 2003, 34). WMDs were biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons that were capable of causing immense casualties and could target civilians as readily as soldiers. Given the scale of this threat, old ideas of security did not apply (see Vice President Dick Cheney's comments in Shapiro 2007, 16). Failed states could not be ignored: "There are places where law truly has collapsed and evil has moved to exploit the void: Yemen, Somalia, Sierra Leone" (Frum and Perle 2003, 118). It was better to fight the terrorists abroad rather than face them in the United States' own territory. (For a critique of the "Bush Doctrine," see Shapiro 2007, 15–31.)

These politicians argued that the key was not to try to win an ideological contest but rather to promote democracy—except in places where "Islamists" might win, as in Algeria in 1995 (Frum and Perle 2003, 158–63). Terrorists could not survive without the support of states (231). From this perspective, the war on terror entailed a war on states. And it had to be fought, even if it angered the United Nations or caused the United States

to lose support among naive allies (243–50, 270–71). Neoconservative arguments shaped the U.S. government's decision to attack Iraq in the face of widespread international opposition. (For neoconservative arguments regarding Iraq, see Bollyn 2004; and Project for the New American Century 1998.)

The U.S. invasion of Iraq took place without either a UN mandate or the support of the majority of the population of the United States' traditional allies. For example, even though Britain sent troops to fight alongside U.S. soldiers, most British people opposed their country's involvement. Before the invasion, more than 1 million people turned out for an antiwar rally in London (British Broadcasting Corporation 2003). And two contemporaneous polls found, first, that only 9 percent of the Britons polled favored invading Iraq without a supporting UN resolution and, second, that no more than 29 percent of respondents favored the invasion even with UN support (ICM Research 2003a and 2003b). These numbers would probably have been lower in almost any other European country and not dissimilar in many key U.S. ally nations in Asia and the Pacific. The outcome of the war was widely perceived to be a disaster. Although the U.S. quickly overthrew Saddam Hussein, it found no WMDs, and Iraqi society fractured into ethnic conflict. In Britain a subsequent government instituted the Chilcot Inquiry into Britain's involvement in the war, which found that there was no immediate threat from Saddam Hussein and that the invasion was not a last resort (Allen 2016).

In 2014 the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, also known as Daesh) captured much of western Iraq, including major cities such as Mosul. This city was not retaken by the central Iraqi government until 2017. In 2015 the situation appeared so serious in Iraq that one expert wrote a paper suggesting that the United States might want to permit the country to be decentralized and possibly partitioned into different nations (Khedery 2015). The Iraqi government, at the time of this writing, has managed to beat back ISIS. The caliphate has been defeated on the battlefield, but whether it will survive as a guerrilla movement and terrorist organization is uncertain.

If anything, the situation in Afghanistan is worse. In August 2018 the Taliban launched a major offensive in Afghanistan and temporarily gained control of most of the strategic eastern city of Ghazni. They were soon pushed out, but the government is having difficulty controlling territory, even in major urban areas. As Douglas Wissing has pointed out (Reuters 2017), this is true despite the fact that the United States has committed

more development funds to Afghanistan than it did to Europe after World War II through the Marshall Plan, and that in a country with a fraction of Western Europe's postwar population. In March 2018, approximately 15,000 U.S. troops remained in Afghanistan, seventeen years after September 11 (Burns 2018). The neoconservative plan has resulted in an endless war, with no clear exit plan after a generation. Kenneth Pollack (2016, 62) has even stated that the last time the Middle East had seen such turmoil was during the Mongol invasions. While perhaps exaggerated, it captures the sense that the region has faced exceptional turmoil since the millennium.

The Return of a Great Power War?

These regional conflicts continue to draw in outside nations and actors, as has been the case with the Syrian Civil War. This conflict began in 2011 as Arab populations throughout the region rose up against authoritarian rulers. In Syria the government sought to repress these protests with military force, which quickly pushed the country into its most devastating war of the modern era. The conflict quickly became a proxy war, in which the United States, Saudi Arabia, and some Gulf states supported the rebels, while Iran, Russia, and the nonstate actor Hezbollah supported the Syrian regime. By 2015 it appeared that the Syrian government might collapse, but substantial Russian involvement turned the tide of the war. The result has been a conflict that has destroyed cities, killed hundreds of thousands, and displaced millions. It has also led to a massive wave of refugees outside of Syria, seeking safety in Europe. This migration, in turn, has fed populist and nationalist movements within the European Union.

The conflict itself had many roots, including a terrible drought in the countryside. Still, this was perhaps less important than political factors that created an agrarian crisis (Selby 2018). But what was important about this crisis was that it provided a window into the nature of the current global order, in much the same manner that the Spanish Civil War did in the 1930s. At many points it has seemed—such as with the recent Turkish invasion of Kurdish territory in Syria's north—that a broader conflict could emerge from a political miscalculation.

The events in Syria point to the ongoing threat of a war involving Great Powers, but they have been perhaps less surprising than the Russian invasion of Crimea and involvement in eastern Ukraine. During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in developing countries, but neither engaged in fighting within Europe itself.

It seemed that in Europe, at least, a new liberal order was limiting conflict, with the exception of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. In 2014, however, Russia annexed Crimea, which was only one part of a larger military engagement by Russia in the region. Despite European sanctions and pressure, the low-intensity contest has not ended. This struggle has raised serious questions within Europe about its relative military weaknesses and its belief that war would no longer involve major European states within the continent itself. The old liberal order in international affairs appears to be crumbling. Similarly, new technologies and the fear of terrorism have challenged old liberal beliefs, such as the right to privacy.

Surveillance and Privacy

In the aftermath of September 11, and with the further development of digital globalization, deep concerns about personal-privacy issues began to emerge. Modern technology has made it possible to monitor almost all aspects of a person's life. While most people are familiar with the CIA, before 9/11 far fewer Americans were aware of the National Security Agency (NSA), even though its budget was larger even then (Todd and Bloch 2003, 75). This organization is charged with monitoring communications and electronic surveillance. The scope of its activities is impressive, as Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch describe. For instance, it routinely monitors international e-mails (43). But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Through a system called Echelon, the United States and its allies "intercept nonencrypted e-mail, fax, and telephone calls carried over the world's telecommunication systems" (44). Software designed in the United States allegedly contains openings that permit intelligence services to view the contents of computers (52). Legislative changes have also increased concerns that oversight over U.S. intelligence agencies has eroded. While there is always a balance between citizen's privacy and national security, the balance has swung decisively away from security.

All of these issues came to a head after Edward Snowden, a contractor for the American corporation Booz Allen Hamilton who had worked for the NSA, leaked information on U.S. intelligence activities in 2013. In particular, Snowden revealed information about the NSA's monitoring of both telephone calls and Internet traffic. Snowden contacted England's *Guardian* newspaper late in 2012 and continued leaking information through his departure from his job in May 2013. When the revelations became public, they created a media firestorm, and Snowden fled abroad to Hong Kong

seeking political shelter. He ultimately received asylum in Russia, where he found work as a security official for a Russian social media company. Throughout his extended fight to seek asylum, Snowdon found support from the organization Wikileaks. For the United States, Snowden's revelations were a diplomatic disaster, as Germany was infuriated that President Angela Merkel's phone was monitored, while Brazil was equally angry about the tapping of then president Dilma Rousseff's calls. One of the disturbing aspects about Snowden's revelations was the extent to which people in the private sector have acquired security clearances that allow them access to critical information, seemingly with little oversight. Allegedly, Snowden had misinformation on his résumé, but Booz Allen Hamilton decided to hire him regardless (Reuters 2013). The fact that Snowden, a high school dropout who later acquired a GED, was able to obtain this level of access raised red flags (Reuters 2013). Who else was able to acquire information without proper vetting? To what extent has the privatization of security operations undermined the firewall protection of people's personal information? How has metadata on phone calls and communications been used and why (Landau 2013, 58)?

Snowden's experience also points to the power of nonstate organizations such as Wikileaks, which challenge states' ability to conceal security information. While digital globalization has given the U.S. government unprecedented tools for espionage, it has also allowed individuals within the government—or those who have hacked it—to release stunning amounts of information (Farrell and Finnemore 2013). As a result, not only has the U.S. government lost legitimacy globally, but also its operational effectiveness has diminished. Ultimately, public opinion on Snowden has been divided; a German organization awarded him a "whistleblower" prize, while some Americans view him as a traitor. What is clear is that Snowden has changed the conversation about the balance between security and privacy.

Traditional Security Concerns

Although the war on terror currently shapes most scholarly discussions concerning the meaning of security, traditional security issues have not disappeared. Indeed, it is not clear that Al-Qaida is the main security threat to Western nations. As Thérèse Delpech (2007, 111–75) has outlined, there are multiple flash points around the world and several security threats to world order. A renascent China now threatens to invade Taiwan should the island nation officially declare its independence, a step that would likely

lead China into conflict with both the United States and Japan. Recently, China has come into conflict with a number of Southeast Asian states as well as Japan over land claims and sea-rights issues in Pacific waters. In South Asia, India and Pakistan continue their standoff over Kashmir, which brought the two nuclear powers to the brink of conflict in 2001 and 2002 (see Margolis 2002) and caused aerial skirmishes in March 2019. Finally, there now exist a number of "rogue states," which are generally thought of as being countries that fail to adhere to certain key international standards of behavior, of which the most important is probably nuclear nonproliferation (Nincic 2005, 56–58).

The nation that perhaps most embodies this latter security concern is North Korea, which frequently ignores international law and accords. In October 2006 North Korea also declared that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. This nuclear test created major concern throughout the region and caused intensive diplomatic pressure. Still, at this writing it appears unlikely that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weaponry. As Lankov has argued, the North Korean regime is made up of "hyper-realists" who are largely immune to popular pressure within the country (2017, 104). North Korea has faced both an economic crisis and a mass famine in the mid-1990s that likely killed "between 600,000 and 1 million" people (Goodkind and West 2001, 220). If such factors did not lead North Korea to change its policies then, diplomatic pressure is unlikely to do so now (Lankov 2017, 106). Indeed, North Korea has perceived its nuclear weapons and arms sales to be key means to ensure the resources that the nation needs to survive.

As Andrei Lankov points out, the Koreans watched how Libya gave up its nuclear program in exchange for better relations with the West, only to be overthrown in 2011; similarly, Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons in return for territorial guarantees in the Budapest Protocol of 1994, yet in March 2014 Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula (2017, 105–6). The North Korean regime also watched the invasion of Iraq—which to their eyes seemed to lack any real connection to 9/11—and believed that this would not have happened if Iraq had nuclear weapons (Chartrand et al. 2017, 36). According to Lankov (2017), the North Korean regime has adopted a realist perspective, which has driven the country's rapid development of both ballistic weapons and nuclear warheads. Despite many U.S. efforts—including by President Donald Trump—to pressure North Korea, many scholars argue that it is highly unlikely that the country will ever give

up its nuclear capability (Chartrand et al. 2017, 38), at least as long as U.S. troops remain on the Korean Peninsula (Anderson 2017).

Another country driven by a realist approach to international relations is Russia, which has increasingly preoccupied Western security officials since the annexation of Ukraine. As Niall Ferguson (2017, 76) has noted, Russia has become more aggressive militarily as its economic power has declined. Ferguson has also suggested that Russia has increasingly relied on its cyberforces (78). With the current focus on nonstate actors such as Wikileaks, the hacking group Anonymous, or Snowden's supporters, it is important to remember that cyber-conflict remains firmly part of the traditional realm of interstate conflict. Indeed, Russia has come to adopt hybrid warfare in a manner that blurs many of the old divisions between conventional and nonconventional military action. In this manner, these new tools do not undermine the old international order but rather provide a new venue for security contests. Still, if the most dangerous conflicts—such as in Syria or Ukraine—involve traditional military operations, then as Michael McFaul (2016) has argued the West must focus on long-standing efforts to balance Russian power by policies such as strengthening NATO and countering propaganda. The United States must also strengthen its skills in conventional military areas, which have languished during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this manner, Realism continues to dominate many discussions about current security issues.

From a European perspective, perhaps the greatest concern is not the rise of Russia but a relative decline in the power and security of the West. As Daniela Schwarzer (2017) has argued, a number of factors have driven this concern. Compared to Asia, Europe has suffered from decades of slow growth, which has meant that its economic power has been in steady decline relative to Asian states such as China, India, and Indonesia (18–19). These trends seem destined to continue for another generation. This economic decline is accompanied by a parallel demographic decline. As a whole, European mothers are having fewer babies, so the population is rapidly aging at the same time that there is a dramatic demographic boom in some Asian states, and above all else in Africa (21–22). Interestingly, China itself will face a demographic decline, which scholars now suggest will have serious economic and social implications by midcentury (Myers, Wu, and Fu 2019). Still, it is Europe that is facing this demographic burden now, with all that entails for its security and economy.

Equally important, with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, Europe began to question the United States' commitment to the region's security. Trump started to pressure European states to increase their military spending and appeared to question the viability of NATO at a time when Europe was divided from within (Brexit) and was facing a resurgent Russia and mass migration (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria) from without. Combined, these factors have led to a sense in Europe that the region has to focus on traditional security threats in a manner that it has not since the end of the Cold War. Realism has regained power as an ideological framework.

From an Asian perspective, for some states the main issue is the rise of China. This concern is exacerbated by China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. For a long time, U.S. influence ensured that an invasion of Taiwan remained unlikely and that China could not assert its authority over the sea-lanes of the South China Sea. Based on purchased parity power, however, China has surpassed the United States as the world's largest economy (Desjardins 2015). China also has other strengths, such as its financial reserves, which dwarf those of the United States (Desjardins 2015). While the United States' military remains more powerful than that of China, the Chinese armed forces are rapidly growing in strength. The result is that some of China's neighbors are nervous, which has sparked a maritime arms race as far away as Australia, which is making major investments in its navy.

One measure to judge the extent to which China's neighbors are concerned is the number of nations currently investing in diesel electric submarines, a highly cost-effective and survivable means to ensure sea denial. The combination of competing territorial claims, major military investments by multiple states, and a rapidly rising global power has precedents in global affairs, which make Realism a useful tool to interpret trends in the region. At the same time, Asian nations find China to be a critical trading partner, an important source of development funding and a useful counterbalance to the United States, particularly after the United States decided not to move forward with a trade agreement with the region (Fisher and Carlson 2018). Great Power conflict remains a real possibility, as does the danger of miscalculations leading to the rapid escalation of a seemingly minor skirmish between Great Powers. All security issues ultimately raise the question of fear. On the one hand, there are serious threats to global security, and people are right to be afraid. But how dangerous are these threats to individuals in comparison to the other dangers of daily life? Are security fears manipulated for political ends? And how

Map 3 South China Sea

do we weigh our fear of possible enemy attacks against concerns that we may lose our liberties?

In part, your vision of how you choose to view security will depend on the extent to which you believe new technologies and globalizations have changed the threats that we face. The September 11, 2001, attacks could not have taken place without globalization, which permitted the flow of money, people, and ideologies that underpinned the attack. Similarly, new technologies, some argue, have put unprecedented power into the hands of small groups rather than states. From this perspective, the war against terrorism is the defining security issue of our age. But if you look globally at the security threats that we face, you might argue that the greatest danger remains traditional military conflict between states. In this case, it may be that the older theory of Realism still represents the best framework to understand global affairs. In contrast, proponents of human security might argue that their theory represents the best lens through which to view a multiplicity of security issues, given the complexity of current world affairs. But all of these approaches will need to address how technology is reshaping security issues.

Conclusion

Debates about security may seem abstract or distant from your life. This chapter may seem less accessible than later chapters in this book, in that it is harder to make an emotional connection to this topic. There is a "psychic numbing" that comes with security concerns (Lifton 1993, 82, 208). The threats seem so large, the possibilities so horrific, and the danger so beyond the capacity of ordinary people to absorb that there is a tendency to tune such concerns out. When North Korea tests a nuclear missile, must people in Japan, Guam, or Hawaii fear that they may be on the front line of a potential nuclear war over which they have no power? For someone of Middle Eastern descent, they may experience anxiety every time they pass through the security line at a U.S. airport. But this issue affects everyone, from people who choose not to fly because they are always selected for a search to citizens making judgments about their government's policies during elections.

In times of fear, people turn to the state to protect them. Who defines security issues? Who decides how to respond and how to balance legitimate security needs against human rights? What threats are real, and what responses are excessive? The United States began to use torture (such

as waterboarding) on non-American prisoners after 9/11 (Sanos 2009). The United States also has used rendition (a process through which prisoners who are not citizens are sent to other nations for torture) to create a globalized network of terror. We often associate torture with nondemocratic and premodern states, but after 9/11 it was linked to the world's richest democratic country. But there is no legislative framework to define the United States' use of state terror and extrajudicial killing, such as through drone strikes in Middle Eastern countries. Many other Western states have greatly increased the resources and power of their intelligence agencies since 9/11, from New Zealand to Britain. Some Western nations tolerate other countries spying on their own citizens because by sharing information with one another, countries can gain intelligence on domestic targets that their own national intelligence services would be prohibited from targeting. New technologies allow the NSA and equivalent intelligence services to monitor entire populations' texting, Facebook usage, e-mail, and phone calls to create comprehensive information (metadata) on a nation's electronic activities. The United States is not unique in this surveillance.

Countries ceded these powers to their intelligence services—and created a globalized network of intelligence sharing—because there is a real threat from terrorism, as events both before and after 9/11 demonstrated. And terrorism is not the only threat that people face, a fact used by countries to justify such intelligence gathering. For example, technology allows states or criminals to launch cyberattacks on everything from the cloud to financial systems. Of course, people in developing countries might fear other threats. As a citizen, it is important for you to be informed and to be aware of the government's actions. Otherwise, we are working only with the government's definition of security and hoping that it will always make the best choices for us. Every security decision entails high-stakes ethical choices that are so complex that security has remained the most difficult international and moral issue since the time of Thucydides. As such, we all need to be informed about security issues and to think about how these questions affect us. What are you afraid of? How do you want your government to make you more secure? What liberties are you willing to trade in order to have more security? You may or may not agree with the perspective presented in this chapter. How do you think about security in a way that reflects your own values? And how do some approaches to security—such as Realism and human security—highlight or conceal certain issues?

➤ VOCABULARY

psychic numbing
NSA
rogue states
WMDs
liberalism
pandemic
Realism
neoconservatives
human security
realpolitik
zones of peace and zones of turmoil

➤ DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION QUESTIONS

1 *How would you define Realism, the theory that dominated security scholarship from the 1940s until 1991?*

2 *What is a failed state?*

3 *What do some members of the humanitarian-relief community fear will happen if foreign aid is allocated according to security issues?*

4 *What are two central tenets of neoconservative views on the United States and the world?*

5 *What is the relationship between electronic surveillance, human rights, and security?*

6 *What does Delpech mean when she uses the phrase "multiple flash points" regarding threats to world order?*

7 *Why does demography matter when discussing security issues? What demographic trends will shape security issues in the future?*

ACTIVITY 1: ANALYZE The World Economic Forum identified the top ten risks of 2019 in terms of likelihood (Myers and Whiting 2019). In order they are (1) extreme weather, (2) failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation, (3) major or natural disasters, (4) massive incident of data fraud/theft, (5) large-scale cyberattacks, (6) man-made environmental damage, (7) large-scale involuntary migration, (8) major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, (9) water crises, and (10) asset bubbles in major economy. Make a chart with what you believe are the top five risks listed. Then go to the World Economic Forum website and examine two other lists: "Risks by impact" and "Risks by interconnections." Identify the top five risks in your mind for each of these lists. Finally, add two more columns with five rows each to your original table and fill in your choices. Now that you have

listed all these risks and contexts, identify one risk you can help ameliorate or decrease in your lifetime.

ACTIVITY 2: REFLECT Think about contrasts between Realism and human security perspectives. Identify one aspect of each. Stephen Legomsky (2005) suggests that recent U.S. security strategies have increasingly targeted or singled out aliens—immigrants or undocumented workers—through the process of profiling. Does this process strike you as being linked more to the Realism perspective or the human security perspective? Why?

ACTIVITY 3: EXTEND Use the following questions as prompts to help you begin to articulate your personal views on security. What are you afraid of? How do you want your government to make you more secure? What security issues matter most to you? How have you come to hold these beliefs? Write for about twenty minutes, answering each of the four questions.

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