

The Theory of Monopoly

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First Guest Lecture
Price Theory
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Introduction

Much of course will focus on price-taking

- Keep in mind what happens when not from start
- Models with market power useful for three reasons
 - 1 More detailed understanding of pricing behavior
 - 2 Allows study of policies (antitrust, regulation, IP)
 - 3 Government impacts prices: tool in optimal policy
- Foundational model focuses on one firm (“monopoly”)
 - 1 Quantity reduction incentive
 - 2 Lerner’s elasticity pricing rule
 - 3 Deadweight loss and measurement
 - 4 Pass-through rate and comparative statics
 - 5 Connections of pass-through to other concepts
 - Division of surplus, strategic effects
 - 6 Evidence on pass-through

Quantity reduction and marginal revenue



Basic idea: monopolies reduce quantity to raise price

- To sell more, price must fall on all *infra-marginal* units
- ⇒ Trade-off between selling more and higher price
- Maximize $\pi(q) = P(q)q - C(q)$; but don't set $P = MC$
- Instead set $MR = MC$: MR formula?

$$MR(q) = \underbrace{P(q)}_{\text{good, competitive}} + \underbrace{P'(q)q}_{\text{market power/Cournot distortion}}$$

- Distortion is proportional to:
 - 1 The number of units you sell
 - If you are small part of industry, small impact
 - 2 The amount you move the price
 - If industry impact on price is small, distortion small
- Distortion proportional to “bigness”, elasticity (soon)

Graphical examples of marginal revenue



Lerner's mark-up pricing rule

Another way to write MR is $P(q) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon(q)}\right)$; why?

- $\epsilon = -\frac{dQ}{dP} \frac{P}{Q}$ so $-\frac{1}{\epsilon} = \frac{dP}{dQ} \frac{Q}{P}$
- So $-\frac{P}{\epsilon} = P'Q = MR - P$

⇒ Marginal revenue is negative if $\epsilon < 1$

⇒ Elasticity of demand determines level of prices

- Summarizes “bigness” in market, substitution to other goods
- Rearranging yields canonical formula:

Lerner's elasticity pricing rule

$$\frac{P - MC}{P} = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$$

- Can be problematic measure when price negative
 - Credit cards have market power, but negative cost
- ⇒ Subsidies consumers to profit from merchants
- Better to use absolute mark-up $P'Q$ in this case

The monopoly wedge

Monopoly raises prices above costs; two effects:

- ① *Transfers* wealth from consumer to monopoly
 - Distributive problems, but no net social loss
- ② *Reduces quantity* of goods consumed
 - Some generate net surplus, but don't because of price
 - ⇒ *Deadweight loss from monopoly*
 - Monopolist raises prices on all to charge *infra-marginal*
 - If could tell who is who, price discriminate, no distortion
 - ⇒ Monopolist doesn't like, tries to avoid with discrimination
 - ⇒ Consumer purchases create externality, firm profits
 - Could internalize in Pigouvian manner
 - Could also mandate higher quantity, lower price
 - These solutions rarely used...why not?
 - Information problems are a major issue
 - Incentives for best products to be created

Deadweight loss from monopoly

Like any externality/tax, value of production $Md q \equiv (p - MC)dq$


⇒ Measure with standard *deadweight loss* “triangle”

- Only difference is size determined by monopoly's optimum

⇒ Particular size, relationship to monopoly profits

- We'll explore this in a bit
- Note: assumes 0 mark-up on all substitutes
 - Real formula $(M - \bar{M}) dq$, \bar{M} avg mark-up switched into
 - Thus it is not really market power, but *heterogeneity* thereof
 - One firm competitive and others monopolies bad
- Sticking with standard version, measure graphically
- DWL: triangle between supply, demand, eq. quantity
- Profits: between demand or MR and MC
- CS: between demand and price or MR
- Gain from monopoly: profit square -firm half of DWL

Graphical examples of deadweight loss triangle



When does monopoly apply?

Monopoly sounds like “this is the only company”

- But basic mechanism applies to *any non-price-taker*
- More or less severe depending on size of distortion
- So when do we use monopoly v. oligopoly?
 - 1 Monopoly focuses on *direct effects of interventions*
 - Effects through changes in other eq. behavior ignored
 - Monopoly takes these as fixed, changes small
 - 2 Monopoly ignores welfare effects on other firms
 - Cannot be used to think about cross-firm externalities
 - Ignores other firms mark-ups: often overstates DWL
 - 3 Monopoly model cannot study changes in structure
 - Useless for topics like merger analysis, effect of competition
 - 4 Even with problems, many intuitions from monopoly
 - Teaches focus on elasticity: substitutes can *raise* production

⇒ Focus on incentives of one firm, input to other analysis

Pass-through under monopoly v. competition

Prominent example is tax incidence, classic comparative static

- Competition: $P = MC$ so $\rho_C \equiv \frac{dp}{dt} = \frac{P'}{P' - MC'}$ or $\frac{dp}{dt} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_S}}$
- Classical incidence formula
- Under monopoly $MR = MC$ so $\rho \equiv \frac{dp}{dt} = \frac{P'}{MR' - MC'}$ or

$$\rho = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_S} + \frac{\bar{\epsilon}_D}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_S} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D}}$$

- Always positive (bottom is second-order condition)
- $\bar{\epsilon}_D \equiv \frac{d\epsilon_D}{dp} \frac{p}{\epsilon_D}$ is *super-elasticity*: what intuitive property?
 - Curvature of demand function; new element from monopoly
 - When demand v. elastic (almost competitive) doesn't matter
 - Large the more concave demand is; negative if very convex
- ⇒ More convex demand has higher pass-through
 - If MR slopes up, may be infinite
 - We'll see real-world example below; meantime made-up

Pass-through and consumer surplus

Raising taxes enough eliminates market

- Thus use pass-through to trace out surplus of market
- How much does raising taxes reduce profits?
 - Envelope theorem on price, just current quantity: $\frac{d\pi}{dt} = -q$
- How much does it reduce CS ?
 - Consumer surplus formula: $\frac{dCS}{dt} = -q \frac{dp}{dt} = -q\rho$

$\Rightarrow \frac{CS}{\pi} = \text{average pass-through rate}$

$$\frac{CS}{\pi} = \bar{\rho} \equiv \frac{\int_{t=0}^{\bar{t}} \rho q dt}{\int_{t=0}^{\bar{t}} q dt}$$

- Similar argument under competition
- Profits fall by $1 - \rho$, so $\frac{CS}{\pi} = \frac{\bar{\rho}}{1-\bar{\rho}}$
- More general ($\lambda = 1$ competition, 0 monopoly): $\frac{CS}{\pi} = \frac{\bar{\rho}}{1-\lambda\bar{\rho}}$

Pass-through and price strategic effects

Pass-through also determines response to demand; why?





- Subsidy s to consumers: *demand pass-through* $\rho_d \equiv \frac{dP}{ds}$
 - Consumer subsidy and producer tax of \$1 has no effect
 - If firm raises price \$1, everything exactly the same
 - Fundamental result on neutrality of physical incidence
- ⇒ Quantity does not change, price rises by \$1

Theorem

$$\rho + \rho_d = 1$$

- $\rho > 0$, but may be > 1 so ρ_d may be negative
 - May seem counter-intuitive, but monopolist follows demand
- Tight link to strategic complements v. substitutes in prices
 - Others changing prices shifts willingness to pay
 - Direct with perfect complements

Graphical representation of pass-through results



Einav et al. (2011) analysis of seller experiments

Easy to measure demand curves on internet

- Einav et al. collect data from seller experiments on EBay
 - Many seller try identical items at different prices
 - Trying to figure out what price to charge, terms to use
 - Just like they should do to learn
 - Use to construct “demand curve” in auctions?
 - Higher reserve price set \implies higher price if sale
 - If higher than bid of second highest, raises price
 - Also reduces probability of sale
 - If no one bids above, no sale occurs
- \implies Just like a demand curve
- Draw out average price, probability of sale relationship
 - Marginal cost always constant (probability of sale)
 - Basic shape very similar across products
 - Interestingly, has non-monotone MR, requires ironing

Einav et al. data

