

Answers for HW2:

1. (a) The offer will be accepted if and only if  $2\theta * \frac{2}{3} + p \geq \frac{4}{3}\theta$ , or  $p \geq 0$ . That is, any offer of non-negative payment to agent 2 is accepted. The probability of acceptance is 1.

(b) From (a), we know that any charge will be refused. Therefore only the probability of acceptance is 0 if  $f > 0$ . When  $f = 0$ , it is accepted with probability 1.

(c) Since the offer is accepted whenever  $p \geq 0$ , the optimal  $p$  is 0.

(d) The optimal profit for agent 1 is the expected value of  $\frac{2}{3}\theta$  or  $\frac{a+b}{3}$ .

(e) The optimal profit in the original sharing arrangement is  $\frac{1}{2}(a + \frac{b}{3}) = \frac{1}{2}a + \frac{1}{6}b$ . Since the difference of profits is  $\frac{1}{6}(b - a) > 0$ , the profit in (d) is higher.

(f) The intuition you get higher profit in (d) is that agent 1 extracts all the surplus from agent 2, and while agent 2 keeps some surplus in the original sharing contract.

2. (a) In the first step, agent 2 accepts the offer if and only if  $\theta + p \geq \mu(\theta) = \frac{3}{4}\theta$ , or  $\theta \geq -4p$ . Clearly  $p$  needs to be negative, and we let  $f = -p$  represent the fee that needs to be paid by agent 2. So agent 2 accepts the offer if and only if  $\theta \geq 4f$ . The probability of the offer being accepted is  $\frac{b-4f}{b-a}$ .

In the second step, the profit of agent 1 after the offer is accepted is  $\frac{b+4f}{2} + f = \frac{b+6f}{2}$ .

In the third step, the expected profit of agent 1 is  $\frac{b-4f}{b-a} \frac{b+6f}{2}$ .

To find the optimal fee, we take the first-order condition with respect to  $f$ , and gets

$$2b - 48f = 0,$$

or  $f = \frac{b}{24} = \frac{1}{24}$ . The optimal  $p = -\frac{1}{24}$ .

(b) The optimal  $p$  is negative.

(c) The equilibrium profit for agent 1 is

$$\frac{b-4f}{b-a} \frac{b+6f}{2} = (1 - \frac{1}{6}) \frac{1.25}{2} = \frac{25}{48} = 0.52083$$

(d) yes, higher option leads to lower  $f$  or higher  $p$ .

3. (a) The conditional probability of winning without removal when the original choice was wrong, and you switch is  $\frac{1}{5}$ .

(b) The probability of winning is  $\frac{5}{6} * \frac{1}{5} = \frac{1}{6}$ .

(c) The conditional probability of winning without removal when the original choice was wrong, and you switch is  $\frac{1}{4}$ .

(d) The probability of winning is  $\frac{5}{6} * \frac{1}{4} = \frac{5}{24}$ .

(e) You should switch because it improves your chance of winning from  $\frac{1}{6}$  to  $\frac{5}{24}$ .

(f) If you don't switch, the probability of winning is  $\frac{1}{n}$ . If you switch, the probability of winning is  $\frac{n-1}{n} * \frac{1}{n-2} = \frac{1}{n} * \frac{n-1}{n-2} > \frac{1}{n}$  because  $n-1 > n-2$ . Hence it is always better to switch.