

BUAN 6312.003: Applied Econometrics & Time Series Analysis
Final Project Report

Do more guns reduce crime?

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I. Introduction & Problem Statement

From 1976-1999, a wave of states passed shall-issue laws that mandated the state to grant licenses to carry a concealed handgun, provided the licensee meets certain criteria. This contrasts with may-issue laws, which do not require the state to grant licenses, even if the licensee meets certain criteria. In recent years, several states have converted to unrestricted carry, where no permit is required to carry a handgun.

While there are many contributing factors to this increased leniency in carrying of a concealed weapon (CCW) laws, a major one is the lobbying presence of the National Rifle Association (NRA) since 1975. The NRA is a proponent of the motto “More Guns, Less Crime” and has asserted that the “only way to stop a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.” Proponents of shall-issue laws claim that, from a criminal’s perspective, allowing law-abiding citizens to carry concealed handguns increases the risk associated with engaging in unlawful activities, and therefore is a deterrent for criminals. However, if we restrain law-abiding citizens from owning and carrying handguns, criminals (who will find access to arms regardless) will have less fear of encountering armed resistance, and thus more incentive to engage in crime.

Shall-issue law opponents argue that more guns leads to more crime. Even when crime is not intended, armed citizens may be more likely to escalate an angry dispute into a criminal homicide or wounding. A second argument is that allowing law-abiding citizens to carry concealed weapons may initiate an “arms race,” where criminals arm themselves with higher-powered weapons and will shoot more quickly when feeling threatened. Third, opponents of shall-issue laws argue that since as many as one million guns are stolen each year, wider access to guns for the law-abiding population will undoubtedly lead to more guns getting into the hands of criminals.

CCW laws are a topic of hot debate. In this report, we explore which side of thought is supported by historical data. We use econometric theory to study what effect shall-issue laws have on state crime.

Our hypothesis is that states that shall-issue laws reduce crime. We explore this hypothesis by modeling the data set in the following ways: 1) pooled ordinary least squares regression, 2) entity-fixed effects, 3) time-fixed effects, and 4) time and entity-fixed effects.

II. Data Description

This dataset is a balanced panel, with data on all 50 US states, plus the District of Columbia, giving us 51 ‘states.’ We have data on each year from 1977 to 1999 for every state. In other words, there are no missing values. Each observation is for a given state for a given year. There are a total of 51 states × 23 years = 1173 observations.

The index/identifier columns are: *year* and *stateid*. The dependent variables of interest are: *vio*, *rob*, and *mur*. The rest of the variables are the independent variables. Below is a table that outlines each of the variables in the dataset and their descriptions. It is important to note that the violent crime rate includes robbery and murder, as well as other types of violent crime.

Variable	Definition
<i>vio</i>	violent crime rate (incidents per 100,000 members of the population)
<i>rob</i>	robbery rate (incidents per 100,000)
<i>mur</i>	murder rate (incidents per 100,000)
<i>shall</i>	= 1 if the state has a shall-carry law in effect in that year = 0 otherwise
<i>incarc_rate</i>	incarceration rate in the state in the previous year (sentenced prisoners per 100,000 residents; value for the previous year)
<i>density</i>	population per square mile of land area, divided by 1000
<i>avginc</i>	real per capita personal income in the state, in thousands of dollars
<i>pop</i>	state population, in millions of people
<i>pm1029</i>	percent of state population that is male, ages 10 to 29
<i>pw1064</i>	percent of state population that is white, ages 10 to 64
<i>pb1064</i>	percent of state population that is black, ages 10 to 64
<i>stateid</i>	ID number of states (Alabama = 1, Alaska = 2, etc.)
<i>year</i>	Year (1977-1999)

III. Data Preprocessing

In our initial exploratory data analysis, we found that the dependent variable *vio*, violent crime rate, was right-skewed, as shown in the histogram on the left (**Figure 1**). In order to normalize the distribution we generated the variable *lnvio*, which is the natural log of *vio*. As shown in the histogram on the right (**Figure 2**), the distribution of *lnvio* more closely approximates a normal distribution.

By running our regressions on *lnvio*, we improve the interpretability of our models. For example, if a state has a shall-issue law in place (*shall* = 1), we can estimate the percentage change in violent crime rate per 100,000 population as $(100 * \beta_{\text{shall}})\%$. A percentage change is more useful than the number of incidents, as we try to understand the effect *shall* has on crime.

Fig 1: Distribution of *vio*





Fig 2: Distribution of *lnvio*



Similarly, we found that *pop* has a right skew (**Figure 3**). We took the natural log, forming a new variable *lnpop* in order to normalize and improve interpretability (**Figure 4**). Now we can estimate that for every 1% increase in population, violent crime rate is expected to change by $\beta_{\text{lnpop}}\%$.

Fig 3: Distribution of *pop*





Fig 4: Distribution of *lnpop*



We also considered transforming *density* due to its right skew. However, as discussed in **Section IV: Exploratory Data Analysis**, we found that the skew is caused by a single 'state' - D.C. We decided not to transform *density* for this outlier 'state'.

For the remaining independent variables, there was either no extreme skew found, or there was a skew but it did not make sense to transform the variable by natural log. For example, *pb1064* measures the percent of the population that is black, ages 10 to 64. By taking the natural log of a percentage, we would lose interpretability of the estimate - a percentage change of a percentage is not meaningful.

IV. Exploratory Data Analysis

After reviewing basic summary statistics, we took note of each variable's distribution. Though income data are typically skewed right, the distribution in this dataset is fairly normal (**Figure 5**) and does not need to be log-transformed. This is likely because *avginc* is a statewide average. Population density is also interesting: while all other observations were clustered around 1,000 people or fewer per square mile, Washington, D.C. has a population density that is 10 times higher (**Figure 6**). This is not surprising, as it is the only 'state' that consists of a single, urban city. As discussed previously, we treated D.C. as an outlier 'state'. Rather than transform *density* for all the observations, we decided to allow our fixed effects (FE) models discussed in **Section V: Data Modeling** to address D.C.'s heterogeneity.

Fig 5: Distribution of *avginc*






Fig 6: Distribution of *density*



Each of the crime variables (*vio*, *mur*, and *rob*) were particularly right skewed. See discussion of log transformation in **Section III: Data Preprocessing**.

The percentage of states with shall-issue laws trended sharply upward from 1985 to 1997, going from 5 to 29 states (**Figure 7**). This trend indicates that time is an important factor to consider.

Fig 7: Number of states with shall-issue law




We also generated a correlation matrix (**Figure 8**) to observe the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the variables and note any relationships that stood out. The correlation between *vio* and the *pm1029* was negative, which was unexpected since young men are typically associated with higher crime rates. Additionally, a positive correlation between *vio* and *avginc* was unexpected since it does not fit with the common idea that violent crime is more common in impoverished areas; however, it is important to note that the observations are state-wide averages and do not capture county- or city-level nuances within a state.

Fig 8: Correlation matrix

	vio	mur	rob	incarc-r	pb1064	pw1064	pm1029	pop	avginc	density	shall
vio	1.0000										
mur	0.8265	1.0000									
rob	0.9071	0.7976	1.0000								
incarc_rate	0.7027	0.7096	0.5668	1.0000							
pb1064	0.5698	0.6018	0.5812	0.5308	1.0000						
pw1064	-0.5730	-0.6154	-0.5842	-0.5271	-0.9820	1.0000					
pm1029	-0.1696	0.0150	-0.0860	-0.4463	0.0162	-0.0126	1.0000				
pop	0.3190	0.0999	0.3172	0.0953	0.0581	-0.0654	-0.0975	1.0000			
avginc	0.4080	0.2206	0.4148	0.4615	0.2627	-0.1912	-0.5279	0.2152	1.0000		
density	0.6647	0.7486	0.7818	0.5593	0.5432	-0.5551	-0.0637	-0.0780	0.3433	1.0000	
shall	-0.2069	-0.1794	-0.2125	0.0424	-0.1839	0.2123	-0.2772	-0.1244	-0.0000	-0.1126	1.0000

Though *shall* shows a negative correlation with all three crime variables (*vio*, *mur*, and *rob*), this is misleading since *shall* is a categorical variable thus should be visualized via a box plot. The box plot shows that states with shall-issue laws have a lower median violent crime rate, as well as a lower upper-bound (**Figure 9**).

Fig 9: Box plot of *vio* grouped by *shall*



V. Data Modeling

Before modeling, we considered which models are most appropriate for this data set. We have a panel data set, consisting of observations for 51 states across 23 time periods. Because we do not have randomly selected data from a larger population, but rather complete data on all 51 states, we decided that a random effects model is not appropriate. We also decided that a time series model is not appropriate since we are looking at multiple entities, rather than a single entity, across time.

Below are the signs we expect for the effect each explanatory variable has on the violent crime rate:

- *shall* - negative sign; our hypothesis is that states that do have a shall-issue law in place have lower crimes rates.
- *incarc_rate* - negative or positive sign. Since higher incarceration rates are thought to act as a deterrent for criminals, this sign could be negative. However, there is also a possibility of simultaneous causality bias where if there is higher crime and police are doing their job well, there will be higher incarceration rates. This relationship could cause the sign to be positive. Regardless, we believe this variable to have a high magnitude.
- *density* - positive sign; the more densely populated an area is, the higher the violent crime rate. We know from general knowledge that crime is more prevalent in large urban cities, as compared to suburban or rural areas.
- *avginc* - negative sign; in higher income areas, we expect violent crime rates to be lower.
- *Inpop* - positive sign; similar to *density*, the higher the population, the higher the crime rate.
- *pm1029* - positive sign; a higher percentage of young males is associated with higher crime rates.
- *pw1064* - negative sign; we see from the correlation matrix that a higher percentage of whites is associated with lower crime rates.
- *pb1064* - positive sign; we see from the correlation matrix that a higher percentage of blacks is associated with higher crime rates.

A. Pooled OLS

For our first regression, we used pooled OLS with cluster robust standard errors and regressed *lnvio* on all explanatory variables except *stateid* and *year*. With this initial model, we see the effect of each variable on violent crime rate as if the data were cross-sectional data.

```
. reg lnvio shall incarc_rate density avginc lnpop pml029 pw1064 pb1064, vce(cluster stateid)
```

```
Linear regression               Number of obs   =    1,173
                                F(8, 50)         =    68.00
                                Prob > F          =    0.0000
                                R-squared         =    0.6260
                                Root MSE      =    .39623
```

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
shall	-.30425	.096395	-3.16	0.003	-.497865	-.110635
incarc_rate	.001628	.0005319	3.06	0.004	.0005597	.0026963
density	.0555991	.0413974	1.34	0.185	-.02755	.1387482
avginc	.0121265	.0239426	0.51	0.615	-.0359636	.0602166
lnpop	.2798641	.0555205	5.04	0.000	.1683479	.3913803
pml029	.0357077	.0324059	1.10	0.276	-.0293815	.1007969
pw1064	.0359886	.0326003	1.10	0.275	-.0294911	.1014683
pb1064	.086114	.0671312	1.28	0.205	-.048723	.2209509
_cons	1.945559	2.171736	0.90	0.375	-2.4165	6.307618

In this model, *shall*, *incarc_rate*, and *lnpop* are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. If a state has a shall-issue law, the state's violent crime rate is estimated to be 30.42% lower. A one unit increase in the *incarc_rate* results in an estimated 0.16% increase in violent crime rate. When the state population increases by 1%, the violent crime rate increases by an estimated 0.27%.

incarc_rate, *avginc*, and *pw1064* have positive signs, which are the opposite of what we expect.

Incarceration rate can be a deterrent effect which should decrease violent crime. If the average income is higher or increasing, we should see violent crime decreasing, and we expect that a higher percentage of whites would lead to lower violent crime rates. However, *avginc* and *pw1064* are not statistically significant. Other variables (*density*, *pm1029*, and *pb1064*) have expected signs, but they aren't statistically significant.

Dropping the variables that are not significant in the first regression model, we get the following result:

```
. reg lnvio shall incarc_rate lnpop, vce(cluster stateid)
```

```
Linear regression               Number of obs   =    1,173
                                F(3, 50)       =    41.41
                                Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                R-squared       =    0.5753
                                Root MSE    =    .42133
```



(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)


lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
shall	-.3889561	.0768116	-5.06	0.000	-.5432367	-.2346756
incarc_rate	.0020202	.0002054	9.83	0.000	.0016076	.0024327
lnpop	.2480144	.0517969	4.79	0.000	.1439773	.3520516
_cons	5.39668	.1161965	46.44	0.000	5.163293	5.630068

All variables are significantly different from zero at a 1% significance level. The robust standard error didn't change much for all variables: *shall* (0.096 - 0.077 = 0.019), *incarc_rate* (0.000532 - 0.000205 = 0.000327), and *lnpop* (0.0555 - 0.0518 = 0.0037). The coefficients did not change much either. If a state has a shall-issue law, the state's violent crime rate is estimated to decrease by 38.89% (compared with 30.42% in the previous model). A one unit increase in the incarceration rate results in an estimated increase of 0.20% in violent crime rate (compared with 0.16% in the previous model). When the state population increases by 1%, the violent crime rate is estimated to increase by 0.25% (compared with 0.27% in the previous model).

To test for heteroskedasticity, we created residual charts and conducted a White Test.

Residual Charts:





White Test:

First, we run pooled OLS without cluster robust standard errors.

```
. reg lnvio shall incarc_rate density avginc lnpop pml029 pwl064 pbl064
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,173
Model	305.883905	8	38.2354881	F(8, 1164)	=	243.54
Residual	182.747654	1,164	.156999702	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.6260
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6234
Total	488.631558	1,172	.416921125	Root MSE	=	.39623

lnvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
shall	-.30425	.0304518	-9.99	0.000	-.3639966	-.2445034
incarc_rate	.001628	.0000991	16.43	0.000	.0014336	.0018224
density	.0555991	.0123738	4.49	0.000	.0313217	.0798765
avginc	.0121265	.0070198	1.73	0.084	-.0016465	.0258994
lnpop	.2798641	.0123112	22.73	0.000	.2557094	.3040188
pml029	.0357077	.0099492	3.59	0.000	.0161873	.055228
pwl064	.0359886	.007747	4.65	0.000	.020789	.0511882
pbl064	.086114	.0153761	5.60	0.000	.055946	.1162819
_cons	1.945559	.508716	3.82	0.000	.947456	2.943662

Then we perform a White Test:

```
. estat imtest, white
```

White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity

```
chi2(43)      =    426.29
Prob > chi2    =    0.0000
```

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test

Source	chi2	df	p
Heteroskedasticity	426.29	43	0.0000
Skewness	138.36	8	0.0000
Kurtosis	3.00	1	0.0831
Total	567.65	52	0.0000

$X^2 = N \times R^2 = 426.29$, p-value = 0.0000. Null hypothesis: no heteroskedasticity, against the alternative hypothesis: there is heteroskedasticity. P-value (0.000) is less than the alpha value (0.05 or 0.01), so we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that heteroskedasticity exists.

Although we know that heteroskedasticity exists, we decided to use cluster robust standard errors instead of weighted least squares (WLS) for all of our models. Even though we understand that we can develop more efficient estimators by performing WLS, we still chose to use the latter because we do not know the correct form of the variance. If we used WLS, and the assumption about the form of the variance turned out to be incorrect, the estimator would be inefficient and the standard errors would

still be incorrect. With the cluster robust standard error method, our estimators are still not efficient, but the standard errors are correct so we can use them for our analysis of significance.

Using the full pooled OLS with cluster robust standard errors, we obtain the AIC and BIC shown below. For comparison purposes, these values have been included in **Section VI: Model Comparisons & Conclusions**.

```
. estat ic
```

Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion

Model	Obs	ll(null)	ll(model)	df	AIC	BIC
.	1,173	-1150.81	-573.9861	9	1165.972	1211.578

Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [\[R\] BIC note](#).

In conclusion, in these pooled OLS models, we found that *shall* has a significant effect on reducing crime rate (by a whopping 30-39%). However, given that our data consists of observations across 51 states, we acknowledge that there is significant risk of heterogeneity between the states due to unobserved characteristics. If these unobserved characteristics are correlated with the current explanatory variables, then the pooled OLS would have an endogeneity problem. The effect of the unobserved characteristics would be hidden in the error, causing the existing explanatory variables to be correlated with the error. This results in estimators that are biased and inconsistent. In order to control for state heterogeneity and obtain unbiased and consistent estimators, we move to a FE model.

B. Entity Fixed Effects

When we include entity FE and regress on all other independent variables, excluding *year*, we obtain the results below.

```
. xtreg lnvio shall incarc_rate density avginc lnpop pm1029 pw1064 pb1064, fe cluster(stateid)
```

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =      1,173
Group variable: stateid              Number of groups =       51

R-sq:                                Obs per group:
    within = 0.2182                      min =      23
    between = 0.0801                     avg =     23.0
    overall = 0.0380                     max =      23

                                F(8,50)      =     22.09
                                Prob > F       =     0.0000
```

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
shall	-.0382424	.0435764	-0.88	0.384	-.1257682	.0492834
incarc_rate	-.0000187	.0002277	-0.08	0.935	-.000476	.0004387
density	-.1248095	.12807	-0.97	0.334	-.3820456	.1324266
avginc	-.0094166	.0129973	-0.72	0.472	-.0355223	.0166892
lnpop	-.1213744	.1626941	-0.75	0.459	-.4481551	.2054063
pm1029	-.0524998	.0215528	-2.44	0.018	-.0957898	-.0092097
pw1064	.0386326	.0131093	2.95	0.005	.0123019	.0649634
pb1064	.1069708	.0310826	3.44	0.001	.0445395	.1694021
_cons	4.186536	.8159469	5.13	0.000	2.547658	5.825413
sigma_u	.7017062					
sigma_e	.16068174					
rho	.95017732	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

We see that the *shall* coefficient dropped significantly, as compared to the pooled OLS. When a state has shall-issue laws in place, violent crime is estimated to decrease by 3.8%, versus 30.4% in the pooled OLS. However, it is important to note that *shall* is no longer a significant predictor in the model. A more detailed comparison between the pooled OLS and entity FE model is included in **Section VI: Model Comparisons & Conclusions**.

pm1029, *pw1064*, and *pb1064* are significant at the 5% level. *shall*, *incarc_rate*, *density*, *avginc*, and *lnpop* are not significant even at the 10% level. If we remove these variables from the model, we obtain the results below.

```
. xtreg lnvio pm1029 pw1064 pb1064, fe cluster(stateid)
```

Fixed-effects (within) regression

Group variable: stateid

R-sq:

within = 0.2080

between = 0.0537

overall = 0.0523

Number of obs = 1,173

Number of groups = 51

Obs per group:

min = 23

avg = 23.0

max = 23

F(3,50) = 9.35

Prob > F = 0.0001

corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0819

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pm1029	-.042295	.0108692	-3.89	0.000	-.0641265	-.0204636
pw1064	.0337201	.0114407	2.95	0.005	.0107409	.0566994
pb1064	.0707776	.023732	2.98	0.004	.0231104	.1184448
_cons	4.207231	.7103743	5.92	0.000	2.780402	5.63406
sigma_u	.61635506					
sigma_e	.16136709					
rho	.9358531	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

In this reduced model, we do not see much difference in the coefficients of *pm1029*, *pw1064*, and *pb1064*. This suggests that by excluding the variables, we do not have an omitted variable bias problem in the current model.

For further testing of the significance of *shall* and the other variables, we can conduct an F-test for joint significance. Results are as follows.

```
test shall incarc_rate density avginc lnpop
```

(1) shall = 0

(2) incarc_rate = 0

(3) density = 0

(4) avginc = 0

(5) lnpop = 0

F(5, 50) = 1.02

Prob > F = 0.4182

The null hypothesis of this test is that the coefficients of *shall*, *incarc_rate*, *density*, *avginc*, and *lnpop* equal zero. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the above coefficients does not equal zero. Based on these results (p-value = 0.4182), we do not reject the null hypothesis. We conclude that the variables are *not* jointly significant to the model.

Using the full entity FE model, we obtain the AIC and BIC shown below. For comparative purposes, these values have been included in **Section VI: Model Comparisons & Conclusions**.

```
. estat ic
```

Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion

Model	Obs	ll(null)	ll(model)	df	AIC	BIC
.	1,173	366.1193	510.4836	8	-1004.967	-964.4286

Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [\[R\] BIC note](#).

C. Time Fixed Effects

Because we suspect *year* to be a relevant variable, we ran a time FE model, a snapshot of which is shown below.

```
. reg lnvio shall incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 lnpop avginc density year#year, vce(cluster stateid)
> d)
```

```
Linear regression               Number of obs   =       1,173
                                F(30, 50)       =       160.20
                                Prob > F        =       0.0000
                                R-squared        =       0.6513
                                Root MSE     =       .38625
```

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
shall	-.2412168	.1095221	-2.20	0.032	-.4611985	-.0212352
incarc_rate	.0018676	.0006825	2.74	0.009	.0004967	.0032385
pb1064	.0950553	.0755011	1.26	0.214	-.0565932	.2467037
pw1064	.0404511	.0365714	1.11	0.274	-.0330049	.113907
pm1029	.0151246	.0654313	0.23	0.818	-.116298	.1465472
lnpop	.274411	.0546357	5.02	0.000	.164672	.3841501
avginc	.0225757	.0276327	0.82	0.418	-.0329262	.0780776
density	.0309668	.0564043	0.55	0.585	-.0823246	.1442582
year						
78	.0258548	.0202565	1.28	0.208	-.0148316	.0665413
79	.104411	.0334644	3.12	0.003	.0371958	.1716262
80	.1488321	.0452328	3.29	0.002	.0579793	.2396849
81	.1280385	.056752	2.26	0.028	.0140488	.2420282
82	.0724924	.0732327	0.99	0.327	-.0745997	.2195845
83	-.0120522	.0968413	-0.12	0.901	-.2065636	.1824593

Some years are individually significant at the 1% level, while others are not significant at all. In an F-test, we find that the years are jointly significant with a p-value of 0, and thus conclude that the years are jointly significant in this regression.

```
. testparm year#year
```

```
( 1) 78.year = 0
( 2) 79.year = 0
( 3) 80.year = 0
( 4) 81.year = 0
( 5) 82.year = 0
( 6) 83.year = 0
( 7) 84.year = 0
( 8) 85.year = 0
( 9) 86.year = 0
(10) 87.year = 0
(11) 88.year = 0
(12) 89.year = 0
(13) 90.year = 0
(14) 91.year = 0
(15) 92.year = 0
(16) 93.year = 0
(17) 94.year = 0
(18) 95.year = 0
(19) 96.year = 0
(20) 97.year = 0
(21) 98.year = 0
(22) 99.year = 0
```

```
F( 22, 50) = 21.23
Prob > F = 0.0000
```

This time FE regression (which is essentially a least squares regression with time indicator variables) demonstrates that time is significant in our research question. Additionally, it shows that *shall* is significant at the 5% significance level. A state with a shall-issue law is expected to have 24% lower violent crime rate. However, expanding further upon time-only FE was disregarded since it is not able to control for state heterogeneity like the entity FE model does. As such, we next perform a time and entity FE model.

Using the above time FE model, we obtain the AIC and BIC shown below. For comparative purposes, these values have been included in **Section VI: Model Comparisons & Conclusions**.

Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion

Model	Obs	ll (null)	ll (model)	df	AIC	BIC
.	1,173	-1150.81	-532.8638	31	1127.728	1284.815

D. Time & Entity Fixed Effects

In the first variation of this model, we regress *lnvio* on all the other independent variables, besides *rob* and *mur*, since those are already accounted for within *lnvio*.

The results indicate that all the years besides '98 and '99 are significant at the 5% level, and that none of the other independent variables are significant. Specifically, *shall* has a p-value of 0.564 indicating that it does not have a significant effect on violent crime.

```
. xtreg lnvio i.year incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 lnpop avginc density shall, fe
> cluster(stateid)
```

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =    1,173
Group variable: stateid                Number of groups =     51
```

```
R-sq:                                Obs per group:
    within = 0.4200                      min =      23
    between = 0.1963                     avg =     23.0
    overall = 0.0685                     max =      23
```

```
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5307                F(30,50)         =    54.66
                                          Prob > F          =    0.0000
```

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
year						
78	.0610252	.0162737	3.75	0.000	.0283385	.093712
79	.1684788	.0252812	6.66	0.000	.1177001	.2192576
80	.2233543	.0355171	6.29	0.000	.1520162	.2946925
81	.2252249	.0397057	5.67	0.000	.1454737	.3049762
82	.2038194	.04721	4.32	0.000	.1089953	.2986435
83	.1690077	.0595131	2.84	0.007	.049472	.2885433
84	.2046856	.0758315	2.70	0.009	.0523735	.3569976
85	.2570377	.0909181	2.83	0.007	.0744233	.4396521
86	.3371815	.1070551	3.15	0.003	.122155	.5522081
87	.3381137	.1225613	2.76	0.008	.0919421	.5842853
88	.4015654	.1366376	2.94	0.005	.1271208	.67601
89	.458197	.1497486	3.06	0.004	.157418	.758976
90	.5654111	.1920148	2.94	0.005	.1797381	.9510841
91	.6195228	.199944	3.10	0.003	.2179234	1.021122
92	.6529918	.2128637	3.07	0.003	.2254425	1.080541
93	.677034	.2210682	3.06	0.004	.2330055	1.121062
94	.6647518	.2302025	2.89	0.006	.2023766	1.127127
95	.6587298	.2400649	2.74	0.008	.1765453	1.140914
96	.6039256	.2513635	2.40	0.020	.099047	1.108804
97	.5843769	.2598807	2.25	0.029	.0623911	1.106363
98	.5296452	.272907	1.94	0.058	-.0185046	1.077795
99	.4712289	.2841429	1.66	0.103	-.0994889	1.041947
incarc_rate	.0000686	.0002022	0.34	0.736	-.0003375	.0004747
pb1064	.021379	.0507923	0.42	0.676	-.0806403	.1233984
pw1064	.0063205	.0235785	0.27	0.790	-.0410382	.0536792
pm1029	.0740327	.0501517	1.48	0.146	-.0267	.1747654
lnpop	-.1479153	.1811246	-0.82	0.418	-.5117147	.2158841
avginc	.0001695	.0164174	0.01	0.992	-.0328058	.0331447
density	-.0622844	.1217831	-0.51	0.611	-.3068929	.1823242
shall	-.0233172	.0401109	-0.58	0.564	-.1038824	.0572479
_cons	4.099443	1.241867	3.30	0.002	1.60508	6.593807
sigma_u	.72465232					
sigma_e	.13978463					
rho	.96412493	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

Using the above model, we obtain the AIC and BIC shown below. For comparison purposes, these values have been included in **Section VI: Model Comparisons & Conclusions**.

```
. estat ic
```

Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion

Model	Obs	ll(null)	ll(model)	df	AIC	BIC
.	1,173	366.1193	685.6076	30	-1311.215	-1159.196

Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [\[R\] BIC note](#).

We then ran a second iteration by dropping *lnpop*, thinking that it might be somewhat captured by *density*. We also dropped *pw1064*, since it might be considered a collinear variable with *pb1064* - the total of these variables cannot exceed 1 (though, the total is likely not near 1).

We see in this model that now even the years '98 and '99 are significant. In addition, now the *pm1029* variable is significant and also has a positive coefficient. This aligns with our expectations - as the percentage of young males increases, the violent crime rate also increases.

```
. xtreg lnvio i.year incarc_rate pb1064 pm1029 avginc density shall, fe cluster(stateid)
> eid)
```

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	1,173
Group variable: stateid	Number of groups	=	51

R-sq:	Obs per group:		
within = 0.4167	min =		23
between = 0.0858	avg =		23.0
overall = 0.0157	max =		23

corr(u i, Xb) = -0.4042	F(28,50)	=	58.77
	Prob > F	=	0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
year						
78	.0618034	.0119651	5.17	0.000	.0377708	.0858361
79	.1694205	.0175883	9.63	0.000	.1340934	.2047477
80	.2238535	.0264812	8.45	0.000	.1706645	.2770425
81	.2265677	.0304326	7.44	0.000	.165442	.2876934
82	.2065383	.0356288	5.80	0.000	.1349758	.2781008
83	.1733954	.0444172	3.90	0.000	.0841808	.2626101
84	.2113716	.0570631	3.70	0.001	.096757	.3259862
85	.2658494	.0686255	3.87	0.000	.1280111	.4036877
86	.3484153	.0839946	4.15	0.000	.1797072	.5171235
87	.3519821	.096904	3.63	0.001	.1573447	.5466195
88	.418224	.1073795	3.89	0.000	.2025458	.6339021
89	.4771882	.118806	4.02	0.000	.2385594	.715817
90	.5987609	.1285733	4.66	0.000	.3405139	.8570079
91	.6546192	.1359641	4.81	0.000	.3815273	.927711
92	.6896927	.1453154	4.75	0.000	.3978181	.9815674
93	.7146689	.1509334	4.73	0.000	.4115104	1.017828
94	.7038881	.1581106	4.45	0.000	.3863137	1.021463
95	.699747	.1613415	4.34	0.000	.375683	1.023811
96	.6465539	.1671505	3.87	0.000	.3108223	.9822855
97	.6283703	.1734131	3.62	0.001	.2800599	.9766807
98	.5752984	.1806568	3.18	0.002	.2124386	.9381582
99	.518767	.1873149	2.77	0.008	.1425339	.8950001
incarc_rate	.0000256	.0002276	0.11	0.911	-.0004314	.0004827
pb1064	.0050607	.0331714	0.15	0.879	-.061566	.0716875
pml029	.0855713	.032301	2.65	0.011	.0206929	.1504497
avginc	-.0006475	.0153054	-0.04	0.966	-.0313893	.0300944
density	-.1092415	.1272317	-0.86	0.395	-.3647938	.1463109
shall	-.0266708	.0414689	-0.64	0.523	-.1099634	.0566219
_cons	4.256356	.6014034	7.08	0.000	3.048402	5.46431
sigma_u	.69108033					
sigma_e	.14005341					
rho	.96054971	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

We believe this time and entity FE model to be the most appropriate model for this data set. An entity-fixed component is necessary for this model, since we want to account for the individual-specific, time-invariant characteristics for each state. This also means that the coefficient estimates in the resulting model “depend only on the variation of the dependent and explanatory variables within entities” (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2011), rather than between entities.

We also wanted to include a time-fixed component (where time dummies are added) because time could be an important factor in determining the violence rates. There could be a particular national event, movement, or sentiment that impacts violent crime rates for all states.

Including both time and entity FE also allows us to control for omitted variable bias for 1) variables that vary over time, but not across entities, and 2) variables that vary across entities, but not over time. The time and entity FE model helps account for the issue of endogeneity due to omitted variable bias.

Since we felt the time and entity FE model was most apt for this data set, we decided to explore further models with this type. We regressed *lnmur* (natural log of murder) and *lnrob* (natural log of

robbery) on the indicator variables. We did so because we were interested in what effects, if any, the independent variables have on fatal (murders) vs. non-fatal (robberies) types of violence.

When *lnmur* is the variable of interest, the only years that were statistically significant were '80 and '84, and *avginc* was the only other significant independent variable (all at 5% significance levels). This led us to speculate that maybe a particular event occurred in the year 1980 or 1984 that caused murder rates to become significant. However, even though *avginc* is significant, it has a small magnitude (0.05), and is positive, which is inconsistent with our expectations. When we look only at murder crime rates, *shall* is still not a significant predictor.

```
. xtreg lnmur i.year incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 lnpop avginc density shall,
> fe cluster(stateid)
```

```
Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =      1,173
Group variable: stateid                Number of groups =       51

R-sq:                                Obs per group:
    within = 0.2870                      min =          23
    between = 0.2504                     avg =         23.0
    overall = 0.1861                      max =          23

                                F(30,50)      =      87.74
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8506                Prob > F       =      0.0000
```

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnmur	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
year						
78	-.002145	.0320298	-0.07	0.947	-.0664788	.0621889
79	.0576725	.0304028	1.90	0.064	-.0033933	.1187383
80	.0890074	.0400011	2.23	0.031	.0086629	.1693519
81	.0994839	.0503528	1.98	0.054	-.0016527	.2006205
82	.018787	.0550126	0.34	0.734	-.0917091	.129283
83	-.0364706	.0608085	-0.60	0.551	-.1586081	.0856668
84	-.1439343	.0665481	-2.16	0.035	-.2776	-.0102685
85	-.0972829	.0792617	-1.23	0.225	-.2564847	.0619189
86	-.0257576	.0854281	-0.30	0.764	-.197345	.1458298
87	-.0452569	.0919265	-0.49	0.625	-.2298967	.1393828
88	-.0364231	.1112468	-0.33	0.745	-.2598688	.1870227
89	-.0356584	.12044	-0.30	0.768	-.2775692	.2062524
90	.028451	.1507706	0.19	0.851	-.2743807	.3312827
91	.0723395	.1617765	0.45	0.657	-.2525981	.3972772
92	.033796	.1682934	0.20	0.842	-.3042313	.3718233
93	.1193491	.1749053	0.68	0.498	-.2319585	.4706567
94	.0082818	.1808722	0.05	0.964	-.3550106	.3715742
95	.0192433	.1835702	0.10	0.917	-.3494682	.3879549
96	-.052902	.197402	-0.27	0.790	-.4493955	.3435916
97	-.160131	.2007901	-0.80	0.429	-.5634298	.2431678
98	-.224861	.2163674	-1.04	0.304	-.6594478	.2097258
99	-.2945008	.2246274	-1.31	0.196	-.7456781	.1566766
incarc_rate	-.0001702	.0003726	-0.46	0.650	-.0009185	.0005781
pb1064	.0215073	.0772697	0.28	0.782	-.1336935	.1767081
pw1064	.0044116	.0191851	0.23	0.819	-.0341229	.0429461
pm1029	.0566797	.0394504	1.44	0.157	-.0225587	.1359182
lnpop	-.1688479	.1673388	-1.01	0.318	-.5049579	.167262
avginc	.0581811	.0165401	3.52	0.001	.0249593	.0914029
density	-.5332878	.3345633	-1.59	0.117	-1.205278	.1387025
shall	-.0120109	.0388632	-0.31	0.759	-.0900698	.0660481
_cons	.1178213	1.074993	0.11	0.913	-2.041366	2.277009
sigma_u	1.1587646					
sigma_e	.2033168					
rho	.97013328	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

With *lnrob* as the variable of interest, the years '79 - '82 are significant, with no other independent variables of significance. This is consistent with expectations, since we know there was a recession in the early 1980's, which could have led to more robberies nationwide. *shall*, again, is not a significant predictor of robbery crime rate.

```
. xtreg lnrob i.year incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 lnpop avginc density shall,
> fe cluster(stateid)
```

Fixed-effects (within) regression

Group variable: stateid

R-sq:

within = 0.2377

between = 0.3568

overall = 0.3383

Number of obs = 1,173

Number of groups = 51

Obs per group:

min = 23

avg = 23.0

max = 23

F(30,50) = 42.61

Prob > F = 0.0000

corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.3383

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnrob	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
year						
78	.0292667	.0210036	1.39	0.170	-.0129203	.0714536
79	.1312937	.0322186	4.08	0.000	.0665807	.1960066
80	.234877	.0457162	5.14	0.000	.1430532	.3267007
81	.262649	.0492086	5.34	0.000	.1638107	.3614873
82	.2031351	.062168	3.27	0.002	.078267	.3280032
83	.1061304	.0840325	1.26	0.212	-.0626539	.2749147
84	.0617979	.1027058	0.60	0.550	-.1444928	.2680886
85	.0944552	.1236982	0.76	0.449	-.1539999	.3429103
86	.169623	.1483687	1.14	0.258	-.1283843	.4676303
87	.1358651	.1651514	0.82	0.415	-.1958512	.4675814
88	.1694519	.1837637	0.92	0.361	-.1996484	.5385522
89	.2234748	.2087315	1.07	0.289	-.1957747	.6427242
90	.3152448	.2587538	1.22	0.229	-.2044775	.8349671
91	.4292352	.2711989	1.58	0.120	-.1154837	.9739541
92	.4229334	.2869947	1.47	0.147	-.1535125	.9993793
93	.4367543	.2992575	1.46	0.151	-.1643221	1.037831
94	.4485569	.3145637	1.43	0.160	-.1832628	1.080377
95	.4458481	.3248582	1.37	0.176	-.2066489	1.098345
96	.3838101	.341616	1.12	0.267	-.3023459	1.069966
97	.31252	.349837	0.89	0.376	-.3901483	1.015188
98	.2121152	.3606396	0.59	0.559	-.5122508	.9364812
99	.1311218	.3758586	0.35	0.729	-.6238123	.886056
incarc_rate	.0000306	.0003344	0.09	0.927	-.0006412	.0007024
pb1064	.0243376	.0826121	0.29	0.770	-.1415937	.1902689
pw1064	-.0080006	.0328335	-0.24	0.808	-.0739487	.0579475
pm1029	.1012235	.07095	1.43	0.160	-.0412837	.2437307
lnpop	.1625726	.2577405	0.63	0.531	-.3551144	.6802596
avginc	.0156998	.024058	0.65	0.517	-.0326221	.0640217
density	-.0813018	.2025748	-0.40	0.690	-.4881852	.3255816
shall	.0212216	.0514885	0.41	0.682	-.082196	.1246393
_cons	2.823837	1.840882	1.53	0.131	-.873684	6.521357
sigma_u	.80861137					
sigma_e	.19329572					
rho	.94594561	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

VI. Model Comparisons & Conclusion

In the table below we compare the estimates for pooled OLS and entity FE. It is apparent that the two sets of coefficient estimates are very different from each other. As noted in **Section V: Data Modeling, Subsection B: Entity Fixed Effects**, the magnitude of *shall*'s effect on violent crime rate decreases tremendously in the entity FE model. We see a 30.4% decrease in violent crime for having shall-issue law in the pooled OLS, as compared to a 3.8% decrease in the FE model. More importantly, *shall* is no longer a significant predictor in the entity FE model. Additionally, the signs for all the variables besides *shall* (*incarc_rate*, *density*, *avginc*, *lnpop*, *pm1029*, *pw1064*, and *pb1064*) are reversed. These differences suggest that endogeneity is present in the pooled OLS, and that ignoring state effects can lead to misleading conclusions.

Variable	Estimates		Robust Standard Errors	
	Pooled OLS	Entity Fixed Effects	Pooled OLS	Entity Fixed Effects
<i>shall</i>	-0.304250	-0.038242	0.096395	0.043576
<i>incarc_rate</i>	0.001628	-0.000019	0.000532	0.000228
<i>density</i>	0.055599	-0.124810	0.041397	0.128070
<i>avginc</i>	0.012127	-0.009417	0.023943	0.012997
<i>lnpop</i>	0.279864	-0.121374	0.055521	0.162694
<i>pm1029</i>	0.035708	-0.052500	0.032406	0.021554
<i>pw1064</i>	0.035989	-0.038633	0.032600	0.013109
<i>pb1064</i>	0.086114	-0.106971	0.067131	0.031083
<i>_cons</i>	1.945559	4.186536	2.171736	0.815947

Throughout this analysis, we moved from model to model based on theory and critical analysis of the dataset itself. We started with the pooled OLS model, which upheld our hypothesis that shall-issue laws reduce violent crime rates; however, we concluded that the model was not sufficiently dynamic to capture the individual heterogeneity of the states, laws, and circumstances. The pooled OLS model was found to have an AIC of 1,166.

We then moved to the entity FE model in order to account for those individual-specific, time-invariant factors so that the coefficient estimates in the resulting model “depend only on the variation of the dependent and explanatory variables within entities” (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2011), rather than between entities. This approach seemed to provide a more reliable result based on the AIC that dropped to -1,005. In this model, *shall* becomes insignificant, which directs us to reject our hypothesis. However, we suspect there are time-related trends that should be accounted for, such as national trends or national political or economic events that influence crime rates.

To check for these time effects, we ran a time FE model. Although the AIC increased to a level similar to the pooled OLS regression, several of the *year* dummy variables became significant. In an F test, they were found to be jointly significant and deemed relevant to the study.

To combine both the state and time variations, we ran a time and entity FE model. This model had the lowest AIC and BIC values of all the previously run models, with an AIC of -1,311, indicating it as our best model and the one that best captures the true relationship between the explanatory variables and violent crime. In addition, this model is also unbiased (does not suffer from omitted variables, simultaneity, or measurement error) and consistent (converging to a true parameter), although not the best (most efficient). Using time and entity FE, the *shall* variable is not significantly different from 0, and therefore does not support our hypothesis. We conclude that there is no evidence to support the assertion that shall-issue laws reduce crime, whether murders, robberies, or overall violent crimes. Neither is there evidence to support the opposing assertion that shall-issue laws increase crime.

One possible further extension of this analysis is including an Instrumental Variables (IV) for any endogenous regressors. We know from comparing the pooled OLS and entity FE models that endogeneity is likely present in the pooled OLS model, since the pooled OLS model greatly overestimated some of the independent variable coefficients. It is possible there is endogeneity due to simultaneous causality bias between *incarc_rate* (independent variable) and *lnvio* (dependent variable). When the incarceration rate goes up, criminals are deterred from committing violent crimes. When the violent crime rate goes up, that leads to a higher incarceration rate. An IV for *incarc_rate* would have to meet three conditions: 1) have a high correlation with *incarc_rate*, 2) not have a direct impact on *lnvio*, and 3) not be correlated with the error term.

One possible IV for *incarc_rate* is drug usage. We know from general knowledge that many incarcerated individuals are drug users, and vice versa. However, drug usage can also lead to increased rates of violent crime, which could potentially violate the second condition outlined above. We would need data on drug usage from a reputable source in order to determine whether it is a suitable IV.

Below are tables that organize all of the above model results for easy visual comparison.

	<u>Model Type</u>	<u>Variables Included</u>	<u>AIC</u>	<u>BIC</u>
1	Pooled OLS	$\ln(\text{vio}) \sim \text{shall} + \text{incarc_rate} + \text{density} + \text{avginc} + \ln(\text{pop}) + \text{pm1029} + \text{pw1064} + \text{pb1064}$	1165.972	1211.578
2	Entity-Fixed	$\ln(\text{vio}) \sim \text{shall} + \text{incarc_rate} + \text{density} + \text{avginc} + \ln(\text{pop}) + \text{pm1029} + \text{pw1064} + \text{pb1064}$	-1004.967	-964.4286
3	Time-Fixed	$\ln(\text{vio}) \sim \text{shall} + \text{incarc_rate} + \text{pb1064} + \text{pw1064} + \text{pm1029} + \ln(\text{pop}) + \text{avginc} + \text{density} + \text{year\#year}$	1127.728	1284.815
4	Time & Entity Fixed	$\ln(\text{vio}) \sim \text{shall} + \text{incarc_rate} + \text{density} + \text{avginc} + \ln(\text{pop}) + \text{pm1029} + \text{pw1064} + \text{pb1064} + \text{i.year}$	-1311.215	-1159.196

VII. References

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