

The Dissident File System

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Introduction and Background

- Protect data: Encryption
- Hide data: Steganography

Both?

Dissident in a totalitarian state?

- File encryption?
- Disk encryption?
- Steganography? Files in files?

Must also have plausible deniability.

Overview

Innocent files already on native file system. Sensitive files will be XORed with these.

Innocent files specific to dissident. Preferably compressed data like media files.

Cryptographically secure random number generator for offsets. `'/dev/random'` on FreeBSD, Linux and OS X.

Offsets stored in a file-based database (BerkeleyDB)

DB file also XORed the same way. DB's offset determined from SHA512 of a passphrase.

Written using FUSE, for most Unix-like/Unix-based system (OS X, Linux and FreeBSD)

Must not change underlying native file system.

Evaluation


Performance

- dd & sync
- Bonnie++ (Preliminary results)

Analysis of Adversary and Threats

Some attack vectors

Tradeoffs



Adversary and Threats

Adversary? Government:

- Highly motivated
- Unlimited resources

Most powerful attack: Rubber hose.

- File on your computer I cannot read? Hit you until you give me a satisfactory explanation.

Reverse-engineer passphrase? Break SHA512.

Reverse-engineer offsets? Break Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generators (/dev/random)

Brute-force offsets? Maybe... depends on how many innocent files and how many sensitive files there are.

Tradeoffs and Future Work

- XORed sensitive files still stored as files on the native file system.
- Data XORed with random data is also random, no matter what it is.
- Innocent files may not be truly random.

What could be done?

- Store sensitive data in free space? Error correcting codes to prevent native file system from destroying data.
- Mark bad sectors, underlying file system won't touch those.
- Generate random data on the fly?

Thank you

Questions?

