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Global migration, by the numbers: who migrates, where they go and why



Migrants make up 3.5% of the world's population.

Image: Unsplash/Jordan Sanchez

10 Jan 2020

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The World Economic Forum COVID Action Platform

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Migration

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- There are an estimated 272 million international migrants – 3.5% of the world's population.
- While most people leave their home countries for work, millions have been driven away due to conflict, violence and climate change.
- Most migrants come from India; the United States is the primary destination.

There are an estimated 272 million international migrants around the world. And while that equals just 3.5% of the world's population, it already surpasses some projections for 2050. Since 1970, the number of people living in a country other than where they were born has tripled.

The scale and speed of migration – [defined by the International Organization for Migration](#) (IOM) as the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a state – is notoriously difficult to predict given it can go hand in hand with events such as severe instability, economic crisis or conflict.

Have you read?

- [Why we need a global understanding of migration](#)

- [How migrants who send money home have become a global economic force](#)
- [Migration can support economic development if we let it. Here's how](#)

While the overall figure has remained relatively stable as a proportion of the global population, the numbers from the [World Migration Report 2020](#), published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), clearly demonstrate the impact that events of the past two years have had on the movement of people around the world.

International migration around the world, by the numbers
Image: IOM World Migration Report 2020

Conflict in countries including Syria, Yemen, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, as well as the kind of extreme violence that forced Rohingya to seek safety in Bangladesh, have led to the displacement of millions of people.

Although refugees and internally displaced persons make up a relatively small portion of the total number of migrants, they are often most in need of help.

How is the World Economic Forum helping to improve humanitarian assistance?

With more than 132 million people worldwide requiring humanitarian assistance, humanitarian responses must become more efficient and effective at delivering aid to those who need it most.

Cash assistance has been recognized as a faster and more effective form of humanitarian aid compared to in-kind assistance such as food, clothing or education. Cash transfers give more control to their beneficiaries, allowing them to prioritize their own needs. They also have a proven track record of fostering entrepreneurialism and boosting local economies.

When the UN Secretary-General issued a call for innovative ways to improve cash-based humanitarian assistance, the World Economic Forum responded by bringing together 18 organizations to create guidelines for public-private cooperation on humanitarian cash transfers.

The guidelines are outlined in the [Principles on Public-Private Cooperation in Humanitarian Payments](#) and show how the public and private sectors can work together to deliver digital cash payments quickly and securely to crisis-affected populations. Since its publication in 2016, the report has served as a valuable resource for organizations, humanitarian agencies and government leaders seeking to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and advance financial inclusion.

[Learn more](#) about this project and find out how you can [join the Forum](#) to get involved in initiatives that are helping millions of lives every day.

Show

Climate change and weather-related hazards have also driven many people away from their homes, particularly in Mozambique, the Philippines, China, India and the United States.

But the overwhelming reasons most migrants leave their home are related to work, family or study.

Migrants' primary destinations

India continues to be the main origin of international migrants, with 17.5 million Indian-born people living abroad. Mexico and China both also have more than 10 million former residents spread around the world.

More than 40% of all international migrants worldwide in 2019 were born in Asia.
Image: World Migration Report 2020

The United States is the primary destination for migrants, though as a proportion of its population, the United Arab Emirates has the largest migrant contingent.

Migration has been a key contributor to population change in some countries, such as Equatorial Guinea, where the proportion of international migrants as a percentage of the country's population has increased sharply in recent years. Nearly 17% of people now living in Equatorial Guinea are migrants, compared to less than 1% as recently as 2005.

Gulf Cooperation Council states also have seen significant population changes as a result of migration. With many people moving to the region for work, migrants make up the majority of the population in GCC countries with the exception of Oman and Saudi Arabia.

With the total number of refugees the highest on record, Turkey was the biggest host nation for the fifth consecutive year, taking in millions of refugees, particularly from Syria.

The number of refugees and internally displaced persons has doubled in the past 10 years.
Image: World Migration Report 2020

Dangerous journeys

In the wake of the death of hundreds of people when two boats sank near the Italian island of Lampedusa in 2013, the International Organization for Migration started tracking the numbers of people dying on migratory routes worldwide.

In the five years since, more than 30,900 people have lost their lives trying to reach other countries. The Mediterranean sea remains the deadliest route, claiming the lives of nearly 18,000 people in that time. Since 2014, over 1,800 deaths have been recorded along the border between the United States and Mexico.

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Written by

[Charlotte Edmond](#), Senior Writer, Formative Content

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GLOBAL TRENDS

FORCED
DISPLACEMENT
IN 2019




2019 IN REVIEW

Trends at a Glance

79.5 MILLION

FORCIBLY DISPLACED WORLDWIDE

at the end of 2019 as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order.



26.0 million refugees

20.4 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate

5.6 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate

45.7 million internally displaced people¹

4.2 million asylum-seekers

3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad

40% CHILDREN

An estimated 30 – 34 million of the 79.5 million forcibly displaced persons were children below 18 years of age.

85% HOSTED IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Developing countries hosted 85 per cent of the world's refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad. The Least Developed Countries provided asylum to 27 per cent of the total.

2.0 MILLION NEW CLAIMS

Asylum-seekers submitted 2.0 million new claims. The United States of America was the world's largest recipient of new individual applications (301,000), followed by Peru (259,800), Germany (142,500), France (123,900) and Spain (118,300).

73% HOSTED IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

73 per cent of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad lived in countries neighbouring their countries of origin.

5.6 MILLION DISPLACED PEOPLE RETURNED

5.6 million displaced people returned to their areas or countries of origin, including 5.3 million internally displaced persons and 317,200 refugees.

107,800 REFUGEES RESETTLED

UNHCR submitted 81,600 refugees to States for resettlement. According to government statistics, 26 countries admitted 107,800 refugees for resettlement during the year, with or without UNHCR's assistance.

68% ORIGINATED FROM JUST FIVE COUNTRIES

More than two thirds (68 per cent) of all refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad came from just five countries.

Syrian Arab Republic

6.6 million

Venezuela

3.7 million

Afghanistan

2.7 million

South Sudan

2.2 million

Myanmar

1.1 million

3.6 MILLION REFUGEES HOSTED IN TURKEY

Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide, with 3.6 million people. Colombia was second with 1.8 million, including Venezuelans displaced abroad.

Turkey

3.6 million

Colombia

1.8 million

Pakistan

1.4 million

Uganda

1.4 million

Germany

1.1 million

1 IN 6 ARE DISPLACED

Relative to their national populations, the island of Aruba hosted the largest number of Venezuelans displaced abroad (1 in 6) while Lebanon² hosted the largest number of refugees (1 in 7).

Aruba

1 in 6

Lebanon

1 in 7

Curaçao

1 in 10

Jordan


1 in 15

Turkey

1 in 23

4.5 MILLION DISPLACED VENEZUELANS

93,300 refugees, 794,500 asylum-seekers and 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad.



¹ Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

² In addition, Lebanon hosted 476,000 and Jordan 2.3 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate.

2010 - 2019

A Decade of Displacement

AT LEAST
100
MILLION
PEOPLE FORCIBLY
DISPLACED

16.2 MILLION
ASYLUM APPLICATIONS REGISTERED
[11% BY UNHCR]

400,000
ASYLUM APPLICATIONS REGISTERED BY
UNACCOMPANIED AND SEPARATED CHILDREN

5.0 MILLION
ASYLUM-SEEKERS GRANTED
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
[67% RECOGNIZED UNDER THE 1951
REFUGEE CONVENTION]

15.0 MILLION
PEOPLE NEWLY RECOGNIZED AS REFUGEES
OUTSIDE THE ASYLUM PROCESS
(PRIMA FACIE, TEMPORARY PROTECTION)

79.0 MILLION
NEW INTERNAL DISPLACEMENTS
[SOURCE: IDMC]

Changes in population statistics can have multiple reasons in addition to the ones listed. These can include but are not limited to administrative corrections, adjustments as a result of registration, verification exercises conducted as well deaths and births. Additional reasons may include new estimates as a result of revised or improved methodologies, physical access to populations previously non-accessible and thus unaccounted for or changes in statistical classification of populations.

ONLY A FRACTION
OF THE MILLIONS
DISPLACED FOUND
A SOLUTION

3.9 MILLION
REFUGEES RETURNING
TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

1.1 MILLION
REFUGEES RESETTLED BY STATES
[70% WITH UNHCR'S ASSISTANCE]

322,400
REFUGEES NATURALIZED IN
THEIR COUNTRY OF ASYLUM

128,600
REFUGEES WHOSE STATUS ENDED
AS A RESULT OF CESSATION

31.0 MILLION
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS RETURNING
TO THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE [SOURCE: UNHCR]

754,500
STATELESS PERSONS OBTAINING
OR CONFIRMING NATIONALITY

BURKINA FASO. Malian refugees in Goudoubo camp on their way to receive new dignity kits at a distribution point in the camp. With no prospects for return as the conflict continues at home, these refugees are now exposed to rising insecurity in their new host country. Following attacks and ultimatums by armed groups, the Goudoubo refugee camp, recently home to 9,000 refugees, is now effectively empty as they have fled to seek safety elsewhere.

© UNHCR/SYLVAIN CHERKAOUI

For detailed information on UNHCR's protection and assistance activities in support of forcibly displaced populations, see the [2019 Global Report](#)



CHAPTER 1

Global forced displacement

Almost 80 million people are forcibly displaced

“ We are witnessing a changed reality in that forced displacement nowadays is not only vastly more widespread but is simply no longer a short-term and temporary phenomenon. **”**


Filippo Grandi
UN High Commissioner for Refugees

At least 100 million people were forced to flee their homes during the last 10 years, seeking refuge either within or outside the borders of their country. Forced displacement and statelessness remained high on the international agenda in recent years and continued to generate dramatic headlines in every part of the world. As we approach two important anniversary years in 2021, the 70th anniversary of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 60th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, it is clear these legal instruments have never been more relevant.

Several major crises contributed to the massive displacement over the past decade, and the numbers include people who were displaced multiple times. These crises included but are not limited to the ones listed here:

- the outbreak of the Syrian conflict early in the decade, which continues today
- South Sudan's displacement crisis, which followed its independence
- the conflict in Ukraine
- the arrival of refugees and migrants in Europe by sea
- the massive flow of stateless refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh
- the outflow of Venezuelans across Latin America and the Caribbean
- the crisis in Africa's Sahel region, where conflict and climate change are endangering many communities
- renewed conflict and security concerns in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Somalia
- conflict in the Central African Republic
- internal displacement in Ethiopia
- renewed outbreaks of fighting and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- the large humanitarian and displacement crisis in Yemen.

Figure 1 | Global forced displacement | end-year



Tens of millions of people were able to return to their places of residence or find other solutions, such as voluntary repatriation or resettlement to third countries, but many more were not and joined the numbers of displaced from previous decades. By the end of 2019, the number of people forcibly displaced due to war, conflict, persecution, human rights violations and events seriously disturbing public order had grown to 79.5 million, the highest number on record according to available data.³ The number of displaced people was nearly double the 2010 number of 41 million (see **FIGURE 1**) and an increase from the 2018 number of 70.8 million. The most recent annual increase is due to both new displacement and the inclusion in this year's report of 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad who face protection risks, irrespective of their status – a category that was not included in the broader global forced displacement total in previous versions of the Global Trends report.⁴


The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso, the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela) and Yemen represent just a few of the many hotspots in 2019 driving people to seek refuge and safety within their country or flee abroad to seek protection.

The proportion of the world's population who were displaced continued to rise. One per cent of the world's population – or 1 in 97 people – is now forcibly displaced. This compares with 1:159 in 2010 and 1:174 in 2005 as the increase in the world's forcibly displaced population continued to outpace global population growth.⁵

During 2019, an estimated 11.0 million people were newly displaced. While 2.4 million sought protection outside their country,⁶ 8.6 million were newly displaced within the borders of their countries.⁷ Many displaced populations failed to find long-lasting solutions for rebuilding their lives. Only 317,200 refugees were able to return to their country of origin, and only 107,800 were resettled to third countries. Some 5.3 million internally displaced people returned to their place of residence during the year, including 2.1 million

Figure 2 | Top international displacement situations by country of origin | end-2019*



³ These included 26.0 million refugees: 20.4 million under UNHCR's mandate and 5.6 million Palestine refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The global figure also included 45.7 million internally displaced persons (source: IDMC), 4.2 million individuals whose asylum applications had not yet been adjudicated by the end of the reporting period, and 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad.

⁴ For details on the Venezuela situation, see page 10.

⁵ National population data are from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, "World population prospects: The 2019 revision", New York, 2019. See: <https://population.un.org/wpp/>

⁶ Consisting of more than 2.0 million new individual asylum claims and 382,200 refugees recognized on a *prima facie* or group basis. Some of these people may have arrived prior to 2019.

⁷ Based on a global estimate from IDMC.

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo⁸ and 1.3 million in Ethiopia. In many cases, however, refugees and IDPs returned under adverse circumstances in which the sustainability of returns could not be assured.

At the end of 2019, Syrians continued to be by far the largest forcibly displaced population worldwide (13.2 million, including 6.6 million refugees and more than six million internally displaced people). When considering only international displacement situations, Syrians also topped the list with 6.7 million persons, followed by Venezuelans with 4.5 million. Afghanistan and South Sudan had 3.0 and 2.2 million, respectively (see [FIGURE 2](#)).⁹

Turkey hosted the highest number of people displaced across borders, 3.9 million, most of whom were Syrian refugees (92%). Colombia followed, hosting nearly 1.8 million displaced Venezuelans. Germany hosted the third largest number, almost 1.5 million, with Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers constituting the largest groups (42%). Pakistan and Uganda hosted the 4th and 5th largest number, with about 1.4 million each (see [FIGURE 3](#)).


NOTE:

The main focus of this report is the analysis of statistical trends and changes in global displacement from January to December 2019 among populations for whom UNHCR has been entrusted with a responsibility by the international community.¹⁰ The data presented are based on information received as of 15 May 2020 unless otherwise indicated.

The figures in this report are based on data reported by governments, non-governmental organizations and UNHCR. Numbers are rounded to the closest hundred or thousand. As some adjustments may appear later in the year in the Refugee Population Statistics online database,¹¹ figures contained in this report should be considered as provisional and subject to change. Unless otherwise specified, the report does not refer to events occurring after 31 December 2019.

During crises and displacement, children, adolescents and youth are at risk of exploitation and abuse, especially when they are unaccompanied or separated from their families (these children are referred to as UASC). In 2019, UASC lodged around 25,000 new asylum applications. In addition, 153,300 unaccompanied and separated children were reported among the refugee population at the end of 2019. Both figures, however, are significant underestimates due to the limited number of countries reporting data.

Figure 3 | Top international displacement situations by host country | end-2019*



⁸ This figure was released by the “Commissions de mouvements de population”, an inter-organizational mechanism which is held by provincial authorities and humanitarian actors. It covers the period from April 2018 to September 2019.

⁹ Excluding Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate.

¹⁰ See Chapter 7 for a definition of each population group.

¹¹ <http://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics>

PERU. "I arrived today at the border with my husband and two children," says Daniela, 29, with her 10-month-old baby at the Ecuador-Peru border. "We left Venezuela five days ago by bus. We want to go to Lima where we can stay with friends. It is impossible to remain in Venezuela, there is no medicine, [and] little food."

© UNHCR/HÉLÈNE CAUX



VENEZUELA SITUATION

By the end of 2019, some 4.5 million Venezuelans had left their country, travelling mainly to other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is the largest exodus in the region's recent history and one of the biggest displacement crises in the world. More than 900,000 Venezuelans have sought asylum in the last three years, including 430,000 in 2019 alone. Some countries in the region, such as Brazil, have taken steps to apply the extended refugee definition under the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and national legislation, while other countries have gradually scaled up their capacity to process asylum claims and are developing simplified or accelerated refugee status determination case processing modalities. In addition, Latin American countries granted over 2.4 million residence permits and other forms of legal stay to Venezuelans by the end of 2019, which allow them to access some basic services. New visa requirements in many States along the Andean Corridor have left those on the move facing increased protection risks. Furthermore, the number of Venezuelans in an irregular situation continues to increase. At the end of 2019, over 50 per cent of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Colombia were in an irregular situation. Based on reports received by UNHCR and its partners, as well as reliable information in the public domain from a wide range of sources about the situation in Venezuela, protection-sensitive arrangements are required, in particular protection against forced returns and access

to basic services, and are thus promoted for all Venezuelans displaced abroad – irrespective of their status – to reinforce the protection dimension and consistent responses across the region.¹²

With the objective of ensuring an accountable, coherent, coordinated and protection-sensitive operational response for refugees and migrants from Venezuela across the region, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) lead the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform (R4V).¹³ In 2019, through its Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP), partners' activities benefited over 1.6 million people in 16 countries. For the 2020 Response Plan,¹⁴ 151 partners throughout the region aim to support 4.1 million people, including vulnerable host community members, including through targeted COVID-19 response activities. The Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform is complemented by eight UNHCR and IOM co-led national and sub-regional platforms in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (at national levels) and in the Caribbean, Central America, Mexico and Southern Cone (at sub-regional levels).

¹² UNHCR, Guidance Note on International Protection Considerations for Venezuelans – Update I, May 2019, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cd1950f4.html>

¹³ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/platform>

¹⁴ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/72254>

Can we predict forced
displacement for the next
10 years?

It is very difficult to predict global forced displacement, or its impact on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Such predictions typically rely on historical population trends and anticipate future events, which is sometimes impossible. Based on the displacement trajectory in the 1990s and 2000s, few people could have foreseen the rapidly growing number of displaced people we have seen over the last decade.

From the mid-1990s until around 2010, the number of displaced people remained relatively stable because even though new displacement continued, at the same time many displaced people eventually repatriated, built permanent homes in their host communities or resettled in third countries. In the aftermath of the early Balkan wars and the Rwandan genocide, for example, global displacement figures remained well below 40 million, and as low as 34 million in 1997, according to estimates. Between 2000 and 2009, the numbers of displaced generally ranged between 37 and 42 million.


The last decade, however, brought a major shift. More people sought refuge, but those who had

A SIGN OF SOLIDARITY

On 10 September 2019, the Government of Rwanda signed an agreement with the African Union (AU) and UNHCR to provide urgent and lifesaving assistance to African refugees and asylum-seekers currently being held in detention centers in Libya. This agreement followed a generous offer from Rwanda to host up to 30,000 vulnerable people at risk and stranded in Libya. Under the memorandum of understanding, UNHCR in partnership with the Government of Rwanda and the AU has established an Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), to facilitate the relocation of up to 500 people of concern at any given time from the conflict zones in Libya to safety in Rwanda, while continuing to seek durable solutions options in and outside the country. The ETM in Rwanda complements the Emergency Evacuation Transit Mechanism established in Niger in 2017.

been displaced had fewer options for rebuilding their lives. As wars and conflicts dragged on, fewer refugees and internally displaced people were able to return home, countries accepted a limited number of refugees for resettlement and host countries struggled to integrate displaced populations. For instance, only 3.9 million

Figure 4 | Refugee returns by decade



refugees were able to return to their country of origin between 2010 and 2019. This compares to almost 10 million refugees who returned home during the previous decade and more than 15 million two decades prior (see **FIGURE 4**). With more people becoming displaced and fewer being able to return, an increasing number find themselves in protracted and long-lasting displacement situations. The world has clearly shifted from a decade of solutions to a decade of new and protracted displacement.

Climate change and natural disasters can exacerbate threats that force people to flee within their country or across international borders. The interplay between climate, conflict, hunger, poverty and persecution creates increasingly complex emergencies. For example, food insecurity may become a major driver of conflicts and displacement. An international alliance of the United Nations, governmental and non-governmental agencies working to address the root causes of extreme hunger reported that conflict, weather extremes and economic turbulence contributed to several disturbing trends. The group reported that at the end of 2019, 135 million people across 55 countries and territories experienced acute food insecurity.¹⁵ In addition, 75 million children had stunted growth and 17 million suffered from wasting. These findings represented the highest level of acute food insecurity and malnutrition documented since the group's first report in 2017. Eighty per cent of the world's displaced populations were residing in these 55 countries or territories.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how unexpected events can affect forced displacement predictions. Although the novel

coronavirus had just emerged in late 2019, the subsequent pandemic has had, and at the time of this writing continues to have, an unprecedented global social and economic impact, also affecting asylum systems. For instance, the number of asylum applications registered in the European Union in March 2020 dropped by 43 per cent compared to February as asylum systems slowed or came to a halt with countries closing borders or implementing strict border restrictions in response to COVID-19.¹⁶ In other parts of the world, refugee registration, an essential protection activity at the core of refugee statistics,¹⁷ also dropped significantly despite efforts by some countries to resort to remote registration and documentation. As a result, global refugee and asylum statistics may under-represent the true magnitude of the number of people seeking international protection during the pandemic. This could increase the uncertainty for predicting global forced displacement in the future.

Whatever the predictions are for future global displacement, we must reverse the current trend and massively expand pathways for the forcibly displaced to rebuild their lives – whether in their home countries, in third countries or in their host communities. In 2019, UNHCR and its partners launched the *Three-Year Strategy on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways*.¹⁸ The strategy foresees resettlement of one million refugees and admission of two million refugees through complementary pathways such as family reunification or labour mobility schemes by 2028. For it to succeed, States need to offer more avenues to solutions for refugees in line with the objective of greater shared responsibility set out in the Global Compact on Refugees.

¹⁵ Global Report on Food Crises 2020, Global Network against Food Crises, April 2020, at <https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises>

¹⁶ See <https://easo.europa.eu/news-events/covid-19-asylum-applications-down-march>

¹⁷ See Chapter 7 for more details on sources and basis of refugee statistics.

¹⁸ To work towards increasing the number of resettlement places and admissions, as well as expanding the number of countries offering these programmes, the Three-Year Strategy on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways was launched in 2019 by governments, non-governmental organizations, civil society and UNHCR. The strategy's target of 60,000 resettlement departures to 29 States in 2019 has been achieved. In 2020, the goal is for 31 countries to resettle up to 70,000 refugees referred by UNHCR. See <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/5d15db254/three-year-strategy-resettlement-complementary-pathways.html>

SUDAN. A 59 year old South Sudanese refugee, waiting for the distribution of food and goods such as plastic sheeting. Nivasha is one of several refugee settlements in the outskirts of the Sudanese capital Khartoum. It is temporary home to some 25,000 refugees, mainly from South Sudan.

© UNHCR/ROLAND SCHÖNBAUER



DEMOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT


Demographic data is crucial to understand the impact of displacement on different population groups. It is also essential to guide effective and efficient policy responses and programmatic interventions that address the needs of vulnerable groups. Sex- and age-disaggregated information is unfortunately not always available for all forcibly displaced populations. Statistical models or estimations can be used to fill these data gaps.

Based on a combination of different data sources (e.g. registration, surveys) and statistical models, UNHCR estimates that between 30 – 34 million of the 79.5 million forcibly displaced people are children (between 38 – 43 per cent). The three age pyramids present the demographic profile of the different populations.¹⁹

¹⁹ Demographic data is available for 80 per cent of refugees, 33 per cent of asylum-seekers and 1 per cent of Venezuelans displaced abroad. Within a 90 per cent posterior prediction interval, between 9.3 and 13.2 million (33 – 47%) of all refugees, asylum-seekers and Venezuelans displaced abroad combined are children under the age of 18. IDMC is the source of IDP data on children (www.internal-displacement.org). UNRWA is the source of data on Palestine refugee children (www.unrwa.org).



Figure 5 | Sex and age structure of forcibly displaced populations



COLOMBIA. Venezuelans continue to make perilous journeys in search of refuge. “We did not have anything to eat back home. It was becoming too problematic, especially with the kids.” This family of 17 people has been walking for five days. They are trying to warm up in the sun after leaving their shelter early in the morning.

© UNHCR/HÉLÈNE CAUX

CHAPTER 2

Refugees

20 million people granted international protection in the last decade

Refugee protection is at the heart of UNHCR's mandate. It includes providing safety for refugees so that they are not forced to return to dangerous situations, providing them access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and ensuring their human rights are protected while they secure a long-term solution for a safe future.

Over the last decade, refugee protection work has faced increasingly complex challenges, as the number of refugee situations worldwide has increased. The number of refugees²⁰ has doubled from about 10 million in 2010 to 20.4 million at the end of 2019.²¹ In addition, there were 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad at year-end.²² Unless otherwise stated, all references in this chapter to "people displaced across borders" refer to these two populations.

Between 2010 and 2019, 20 million people were granted international protection either on an individual or group basis. This includes close to one million people in 2019: 321,500 recognized on a group or *prima facie* basis, 60,700 granted a form of temporary protection²³ and 570,600 recognized as a result of their asylum application. In addition, millions of Venezuelans left their country in recent years and lodged asylum claims or were granted residence permits and other forms of legal stay in Latin America and the Caribbean.

²⁰ Includes people in refugee-like situations.

²¹ Excludes 5.6 million registered Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate.

²² For more details on the Venezuela situation, see page 10.

²³ The number of Syrians newly registered in Turkey in 2019 and thus granted temporary protection by the Government is not publicly available.

TURKEY. Sidra looks out across the water from the Galata Bridge in Istanbul. “It is my favourite city in the whole of Turkey. It is big and busy, and despite being crowded and the travelling I have to do get to university, I still love it.” The Syrian refugee from Aleppo has been living here since 2014 and is studying dentistry thanks to a *Turkiye Burslari* scholarship.

© UNHCR/DIEGO IBARRA SÁNCHEZ




For detailed information on UNHCR's work to support hosting countries, see the [2019 Global Report](#)



By regions of asylum

Figure 6 | Refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad by UNHCR region | end-year



The number of refugees increased in every region over the last decade. The Middle East, North Africa and Europe all felt the impact of the war in Syria, which left 6.6 million people living in displacement at the end of 2019. The majority were hosted in Turkey (3.6 million), Lebanon (910,600) and Jordan (654,700). The rising number of refugees in the Middle East and North Africa was partly offset by a drop in the number of Iraqi refugees (from 1.6 million to 63,000), many of whom were forced to flee the conflict in Syria and return to Iraq or seek protection in other countries further afield.

In Europe, the outbreak of large-scale armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 led to a large outflow of refugees in the region. At the end of 2019, there were 60,000 Ukrainian refugees worldwide.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of refugees residing across the region nearly tripled in the course of the decade, increasing from 2.2 to 6.3 million. Conflict and violence in South Sudan, the DRC, Central African Republic, Somalia and

Burundi forced millions of people to flee, but other crises contributed to the rise in refugees as well.

In the Americas, there was a fourfold increase in the number of people displaced across borders during the decade, primarily due to the exodus from Venezuela, and the inclusion of 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad in the 2019 global displacement statistics. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Central Americans fled deteriorating security conditions and violence and sought shelter across the region.

The Asia and Pacific region experienced a three per cent overall increase in the number of refugees over the decade, mostly due to the outflow of 700,000 stateless refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh beginning in August 2017. While the increase has been limited, the overall figures reflect the protracted plight of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has lasted for more than 40 years. Voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan continued through the decade, but at low levels.

Table 1 | Refugees, people in refugee-like situations and Venezuelans displaced abroad by UNHCR regions | 2019

UNHCR regions	Start-2019				End-2019				Change (total)	
	Refugees	People in refugee-like situations	Venezuelans displaced abroad	Total	Refugees	People in refugee-like situations	Venezuelans displaced abroad	Total	Absolute	%
- East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes	4,388,900	3,700	-	4,392,600	4,388,700	-	-	4,388,700	-3,900	-0.1%
- Southern Africa	777,500	-	-	777,500	755,300	-	-	755,300	-22,200	-2.9%
- West and Central Africa	1,164,100	-	-	1,164,100	1,204,700	-	-	1,204,700	40,600	3.5%
Total Africa*	6,330,500	3,700	-	6,334,200	6,348,700	-	-	6,348,700	14,500	0.2%
Americas	534,800	108,800	2,606,500	3,250,100	592,800	108,800	3,582,200	4,283,800	1,033,700	31.8%
Asia and Pacific	4,141,600	54,600	-	4,196,200	4,133,700	48,700	-	4,182,400	-13,800	-0.3%
Europe	6,402,500	28,100	-	6,430,600	6,543,500	27,000	-	6,570,500	139,900	2.2%
Middle East and North Africa	2,649,800	42,900	-	2,692,700	2,602,400	40,300	-	2,642,700	-50,000	-1.9%
Total	20,059,200	238,100	2,606,500	22,903,800	20,221,100	224,800	3,582,200	24,028,100	1,124,300	4.9%

*Excluding North Africa.


Demographics of people displaced across borders

The demographic structure of the people displaced across borders differs from the population of the 272 million international migrants²⁴ and the 7.7 billion world population.²⁵ Children represent a larger proportion of the displaced population than they do in the international migrant population, for example. At the end of 2019, around half of refugees were children,²⁶ compared to an estimated 31 per cent of the world population and just 10 per cent of the international migrant population.²⁷ Refugee children face particular challenges,

such as access to education. An estimated 3.7 million refugee children were out of school in 2018. Enrolment rates of refugee children at primary and secondary level have improved in recent years, but only three per cent were able to access higher education in 2018.²⁸

Young adults between the ages of 18 and 24 also represent a greater proportion of refugees (13%) when compared to 11 per cent of the world population and 9 per cent of international migrants. In contrast, older persons make up a smaller proportion of the refugee population (4%) compared to the world population (12%) and international migrants (17%).

Figure 7 | Demographic breakdown of refugees, international migrants and world population | end-2019



DISCLAIMER: figures do not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

²⁴ The international migrant dataset includes refugees and asylum-seekers in specific countries. Source: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockByAgeAndSex_2019.xlsx


²⁵ Source: <https://population.un.org/wpp2019/Download/Standard/Population/>

²⁶ Demographic data is available for 80 per cent of refugees globally. For the remainder, UNHCR has estimated the demographics based on the refugee data available in host countries and other countries in the same region. This figure excludes Venezuelans displaced abroad.

²⁷ To enable the comparison, data for the 5-19 and 20-24 age ranges in the world population and international migrant data was apportioned to UNHCR's 5-11, 12-17 and 18-24 ranges.

²⁸ <https://www.unhcr.org/steppingup/>

Figure 8 | People displaced across borders by country of origin | end-year



* South Sudan gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan in 2011.

By country of origin

At the end of the decade, 8 out of 10 people displaced across borders originated from just 10 countries (83%). This means international displacement is heavily concentrated around these 10 countries. Five of them – Afghanistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Eritrea – remained in the top 10 list of source countries for cross-border displacement throughout the decade, highlighting the unresolved refugee crises in those places.

Syria has been the main country of origin for refugees since 2014. At the end of 2019, there were 6.6 million Syrian refugees hosted by 126 countries worldwide. The vast majority (83%) remained in neighbouring countries or in the region. Turkey continued to host the largest number of Syrian refugees (3.6 million), followed by Lebanon (910,600), Jordan (654,700), Iraq (245,800) and Egypt (129,200). Outside the immediate region, Germany (572,800) and Sweden (113,400) continued to host the largest Syrian refugee populations.

At the start of the decade, there were just 6,700 Venezuelan refugees. But in recent years, following deteriorating political, socioeconomic and human rights conditions in the country, the

number of Venezuelans displaced abroad has surged. At the end of the decade, Venezuelans made up the second largest group, with 93,300 recognized refugees and a further 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad. In addition, there were 794,500 Venezuelan asylum-seekers at the end of 2019.

Since the early 1980s, the number of Afghan refugees has remained sizeable. At times, the number exceeded six million. During the last decade, it dropped by 11 per cent from some 3.1 million to 2.7 million, primarily due to an increase in returns to Afghanistan from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran and verification exercises²⁹ conducted in Pakistan. The Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan continue to host 87 per cent of Afghan refugees. This represents a decrease from 96 per cent at the start of the decade, as a number of countries, especially in Europe, now host Afghan refugees (Germany hosts 140,000, for example).


²⁹ Verifications are a time-bound registration activity conducted in a specific area and/or for a specific population and consist of verifying and updating individual registration records and collecting additional information, as necessary. Verifications typically lead to more accurate population figures.

UNITED REP. OF TANZANIA. Burundian refugee Nyamoza Rachel, 24, sits with her husband and children outside her kitchen that was built to house a new stove design for refugees in Nyarugusu camp. The stoves are made by refugees themselves and use 50 per cent less firewood with less indoor smoke pollution. The project has reduced sexual and gender-based violence risks for the women who have to leave the camp to collect firewood. The United Rep. of Tanzania hosts some 192,000 Burundian refugees of which at least 58,000 live in Nyarugusu camp.

© UNHCR/GEORGINA GOODWIN



Figure 9 | People displaced across borders by host country | end-year



By country of asylum

At the end of the decade, as at the start, just ten countries hosted nearly 3 in 5 of those displaced across borders. However, only Pakistan, Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran held a position in the top 10 at both the beginning and the end of the decade. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, it is due to the protracted situation of Afghan refugees in their country. The refugee population in Germany has been influenced by the refugee crises in Europe in 2015 and 2016, when more than one million people applied for asylum, many of who were recognized as refugees or granted complementary forms of protection.

Developing regions³⁰ continued to shoulder a disproportionately large responsibility for hosting displaced populations. Nine of the ten countries hosting the largest populations of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad were in developing regions. Some 85 per cent of these populations lived in these countries.

The Least Developed Countries³¹ – including Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen – were home to 13 per cent of the world's population. Accounting for just 1.2 per cent of the global Gross Domestic Product,³² they had the least amount of resources available to meet the needs of people seeking refuge. Yet together they hosted 6.6 million, 27 per cent of the global total of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad.

The three most common countries of asylum hosted people almost exclusively from one single country: Turkey, with 3.6 million Syrians; Colombia, with 1.8 million Venezuelans; and Pakistan, with 1.4 million Afghans.


Geographic proximity is an important factor for people fleeing conflict and persecution. Over the last decade, the vast majority of refugees remained close to their country of origin. In any given year, three-quarters of refugees or more were hosted by countries neighbouring their countries of origin (see FIGURE 10). For Venezuelans displaced abroad, just over half (53%) remained in neighbouring countries, with others moving onwards to other countries in the region, including Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina and Panama.

³⁰ See: unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ for a list of countries included under each region.


³¹ See: unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ for a list of Least Developed Countries.

³² Source: <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>

Figure 10 | People displaced across borders fleeing to neighbouring countries | end-year



Map 2 | Refugees, people in refugee-like situations and Venezuelans displaced abroad | end-2019



A country is named if it features among the five largest per population group.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS


UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given host country.³³ This method, while useful for advocacy and monitoring purposes, carries some important statistical limitations. As long as a group of refugees from the same nationality does not reach or exceed the threshold of 25,000 for five consecutive years, it will not feature as protracted irrespective of the group's duration in exile. In addition, returns or new arrivals of individuals from the same nationality within the same period may remain unaccounted for in this method as they may offset each other. Therefore, the circumstances of individual refugees are not captured in this definition.

These limitations notwithstanding, estimating the number of refugees remaining in long-term exile is crucial from a protection and solutions perspective. Based on this definition, it is estimated that some 15.7 million refugees (77%) were in a protracted situation by the end of 2019, slightly fewer than a year earlier (15.9 million). These 15.7 million refugees were living in 32 host countries, constituting an overall total of 51 protracted situations. Figures include the long-lasting refugee situation of Afghans in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran as well more recent situations like that of South Sudanese refugees in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda.

In 2019, the situation of Burundian refugees in Rwanda and Uganda also became protracted. Unfortunately, no protracted situations were resolved during 2019.

³³ Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate.

Figure 11 | Hosting people displaced across borders by income level | end-year



Comparing host country situations

Responsibility-sharing among States in the provision of protection and solutions for refugees can take many forms, including providing funds for relevant programmes in other, less prosperous, host countries.


When it comes to hosting refugees, however, the burden is not equally shared. Comparing the number of people displaced across borders to national income levels according to World Bank classification,³⁴ it is clear that in the last decade, high-income countries never hosted more than 19 per cent of this population. In 2019, they hosted 17 per cent. Low-income countries, on the other hand, consistently hosted around 20 per cent per year.

In 2010, upper-middle income countries – including Turkey, Colombia, the Islamic Republic

of Iran, Lebanon and Jordan – hosted 16 per cent of refugees. By the end of 2019, they hosted 44 per cent of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad. The share hosted by lower middle-income countries fell during the same period.

Comparing the size of a refugee population with that of a host country can help measure the impact of hosting that population. FIGURE 12 helps to shed light on some of the major displacement situations of our time. Five of the 10 countries in the figure are directly affected by the Venezuela crisis and three by the Syria crisis. Taking into account Venezuelans displaced abroad, the Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curaçao rank 1st and 3rd on the list, with 156 and 99 displaced persons per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively.³⁵ Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey rank 2nd, 4th and 5th when comparing the number of refugees they host in relation to their national population size.³⁶ The only countries appearing in the top-10 list per 1,000 inhabitants yet not affected by the Syria or Venezuela crisis are Uganda and Chad.

Figure 12 | People displaced across borders per 1,000 host country inhabitants | end-2019



*Limited to countries hosting at least 1,000 people. Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate.

³⁴ Income groupings are from the World Bank: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/OGHIST.xls>

³⁵ National population data are from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, "World population prospects: The 2019 revision", New York, 2019. See: <https://population.un.org/wpp/>

³⁶ Figures for Lebanon and Jordan exclude Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate. Lebanon hosted 476,000 and Jordan almost 2.3 million registered Palestine refugees at the end of 2019.

THE NEW REFUGEE INDICATOR IN THE 2030 SDG AGENDA

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development makes an ambitious commitment of “leaving no one behind” in its implementation. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution³⁷ that adopted the Agenda recognized the importance of addressing the needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants.


However, out of the 231 indicators in the global indicator framework designed to measure progress towards meeting the 169 SDG targets, which was developed by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) and adopted by the General Assembly in 2017,³⁸ none specifically mentioned refugees or displacement. This had an unintended consequence of lowering the visibility of some of the most vulnerable populations in the 2030 Agenda, and therefore also making it more difficult for UNHCR to advocate for improved disaggregation of data in national statistical systems.

UNHCR worked within the IAEG-SDGs to ensure that the “leave no one behind” commitment included forcibly displaced persons. This advocacy, together with the high levels of displacement during the following years, created momentum for the recognition of an additional indicator on refugees. The indicator was approved by the UN Statistical Commission at its 51st session in March 2020.³⁹ The new indicator is: 10.7.4 “Proportion of population who are refugees, by country of origin” and is computed as follows:

[Number of refugees by country of origin at end-year/(End-year population in country of origin+ number of refugees by country of origin at end-year)]*100,000

UNHCR is the custodian agency of this indicator and has commenced regular monitoring and biannual reporting. As shown in FIGURE 13, Syria, South Sudan and Eritrea have the greatest proportion of the national population who are refugees, with 27,900, 16,800 and 12,500 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively.

Figure 13 | SDG Indicator 10.7.4



*Includes Venezuelans displaced abroad

³⁷ <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/1>

³⁸ <https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/313>

³⁹ <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/51st-session/documents/>



PAKISTAN. "I feel so lucky. In my community many girls do not get this opportunity." Saleema is in her final year of training at the Holy Family Hospital in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. As an Afghan refugee growing up in a Turkmen community in Pakistan, 28-year-old Saleema has faced a lifetime of barriers in her quest to get an education. Now, after nearly three decades of study, she is beating the odds and is set to become a doctor.

© UNHCR/ROGER ARNOLD

CHAPTER 3

Internal Displacement

79 million new internal displacements in the last decade

In the past decade, internal displacement surged to levels never before seen, requiring more engagement from UNHCR around the world as it used its expertise to help more internally displaced persons (IDPs) in more countries. In 2005, when the cluster approach and other aspects of the humanitarian reform process were introduced,⁴⁰ UNHCR was working in 15 countries with internally displaced populations.

By 2010 the number of countries had increased to 26, and it now stands at 33. In 2005, UNHCR worked with 6.6 million IDPs, a number that grew to about 15 million by 2010 and stood at more than 43.5 million at the end of 2019 – representing an almost 7-fold increase in only 15 years.

40 In December 2005, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee endorsed the cluster approach for humanitarian emergencies, including for situations of internal displacement. Under this arrangement, UNHCR assumes leadership responsibility and accountability for three clusters: protection, shelter, and camp coordination and camp management.

NIGERIA. A young mother arrives in a camp for internally displaced persons in Maiduguri, after fleeing the violence in Borno. She had to hide in the bush during an attack from insurgents for days without food or water. She gave birth to her son in the camp and is still looking for her husband.


© UNHCR/ROMAIN DESCLOUS



For detailed information on UNHCR's protection and assistance activities, see the *Overview on UNHCR's engagement in situations of internal displacement in the 2019 Global Report*



Figure 14 | IDPs of concern to UNHCR by region | end-year




As shown in **FIGURE 14**, UNHCR has engaged with internally displaced populations all over the world. It has worked continually in all seven regions, with varying degrees of involvement. Over time, with changing operational realities and emerging solutions, investments in local government and community capacities have allowed UNHCR to move its focus to more immediate IDP needs in other locations.

In countries where UNHCR was called upon to protect or assist people within national borders during the past decade, an estimated 59 million people were newly displaced due to conflict. In some countries, people were displaced multiple

times as a result of renewed conflict, violence or human rights violations. Yet, this figure does not constitute the global number. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that 79 million new internal displacements took place between 2010 and 2019 due to conflict and violence.⁴¹

At the end of 2019, Colombia continued to report the highest number of internally displaced people, with close to eight million according to Government statistics. The large number of registered IDPs comes from the total cumulative figure from the Victim's Registry which commenced in 1985.⁴²


Figure 15 | IDPs of concern to UNHCR | end-2019



41 Source: Internal-displacement.org. In the case of conflict- and violence-induced displacement, IDMC conducts situational monitoring in certain countries after learning of the occurrence of displacement, and reports the country-wide estimates of new displacement during the year and the total number of people displaced at year's end.

42 See: <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/en>

Map 3 | IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR | end-2019



A country is named if it features among the five largest per population group.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Escalation of the conflict in Syria meant that the number of IDPs remained high, estimated at more than six million at the end of 2019. The intensifying conflict led to almost half a million people being newly displaced during the year.

Widespread conflict and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo led to five million people being internally displaced by year-end, the highest number reported by UNHCR to date. Other countries with major IDP populations at the end of 2019 were Yemen (3.6 million), Somalia (2.6 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million) and Nigeria (2.2 million).

Protection and solutions for IDPs

Protection remained the most fundamental challenge. The outbreak of war in Syria in 2011 generated one of the largest displacement crises in recent history. Conflicts which occurred after the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya, Yemen and elsewhere created massive protection needs and displacement that have lasted throughout the decade. The dynamics of conflict, ongoing hostilities and protection risks, with large parts of the displaced and conflict-affected populations in

hard-to-reach areas, reaffirmed the need to ensure that humanitarian actors place protection at the centre of their work, which UNHCR led, in support of UN Country Teams, governments and local stakeholders. At the same time, the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 and decreases in the internally displaced population in Syria around the same time were reminders of the continuum between internal displacement and refugee outflows. The protection of displaced people and those affected by conflict became paramount as escalating and renewed conflict also affected the Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali and Nigeria, with UNHCR engaged in operational response and coordination leadership. The conflict in Iraq, including the fall of Mosul, led to large-scale displacement and acute protection needs, particularly for ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Yazidis and presented challenges of a massive scale.

In some countries, large-scale displacement was offset by a relatively large number of IDPs returning to their places of origin. In countries where UNHCR was operationally active, an estimated 31 million or more internally displaced persons were able to return or find a solution during the decade, although many more continued to live in protracted displacement. The largest IDP return movements between 2010 and 2019 took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Iraq, presenting some of the largest UNHCR operations globally. In the DRC, more than six million people returned to their place of residence, one third of them during 2018 and 2019. In Iraq, more than five million IDPs returned to their place of residence during the decade, some 85 per cent of them in the past four years.

Working on solutions for IDPs required increasing collaboration with development partners, such as the UN Development Programme and the World Bank in countries such as Colombia and Sudan, and with peacebuilding actors as UNHCR was designated the focal point within the Secretary-General's Framework on Ending Displacement in the Aftermath of Conflict.⁴³ Nevertheless, more needs to be done to build on these partnerships

between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors and to live up to the pledge in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to 'leave no one behind', including IDPs.

Throughout the decade, UNHCR worked to find solutions for IDPs, building upon its experience in facilitating solutions for refugees and within the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs,⁴⁴ introduced in 2010. In some countries, such as Uganda, returns brought to a close displacement that had peaked years before in 2005 – 2006. In Libya, Mali and South Sudan, returns occurred more quickly as changing conflict dynamics made it possible for some to return home, albeit sometimes in adverse conditions. In Yemen, UNHCR worked with authorities to help thousands to return in 2012, paving the way for the approval in 2013 of a national policy on IDPs. In Somalia, UNHCR worked through the decade to provide a solutions framework, and this led to displacement solutions being included in National Development Plans and the establishment of relevant governance structures.

In a major breakthrough for the protection of IDPs in Africa, the African Union Convention on the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (known as the Kampala Convention) became effective in 2012. With new and protracted displacement in Africa constituting an estimated 43 per cent of global conflict-related internal displacement at the end of 2019,⁴⁵ there is an evident and critical need for national legislation, policies and measures to implement the Kampala Convention. In the last decade, 30 members have become party to the Kampala Convention and seven have adopted relevant implementing legislation and policies. Along with its partners, UNHCR is promoting further ratifications and assisting Governments in Africa to domesticate the Convention, and those outside Africa to develop laws and policies on internal displacement. Since the development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1998, more than 88 national laws and policies on internal displacement have been adopted, according to a global database maintained by UNHCR as part of the Global Protection Cluster.

⁴³ UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Decision No.2011/20 - Durable Solutions: Follow up to the Secretary-General's 2009 report on peacebuilding, 4 October 2011, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5242d12b7.html>.

⁴⁴ See https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/iasc_framework_on_durable_solutions_for_idps_april_2010.pdf

⁴⁵ Source: internal-displacement.org



The urbanization of internal displacement

Displacement in and to urban areas continued throughout the decade. The limited geographic information available confirms that IDPs were predominantly located in rural areas at the start of the decade. By the end of the decade, the trend had reversed. Available data on IDPs indicates that the ratio of urban versus non-urban internally displaced populations was 2:1 at the end of 2019. In other words, where UNHCR was involved in situations of internal displacement in 2019, two out of three IDPs were in urban or semi-urban areas.

From Mosul, Iraq to Mogadishu, Somalia, internal displacement was increasingly happening among urban populations in cities rather than in camps. In countries with ongoing conflict in urban areas – such as in Aleppo, Syria or Bangui, Central African Republic – protecting civilians was a major challenge. In addition, IDPs in urban environments are often dispersed and struggle to find accommodation, staying in collective centres and

public buildings. Rapid urbanization has increased protection risks posed by overcrowded or substandard living conditions, particularly where IDPs are forced to live in informal settlements, among the urban poor, or where access to safe water and sanitation is limited. Security of tenure and risk of evictions are also greater in urban settings, often resulting in further displacement. Maintaining livelihoods is also a struggle for displaced people, due to many reasons, such as undeveloped local economies, job competition or the need for a new skill set.

Engagement in disaster situations

In 2010, the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Gaps and Responses noted that disasters and climate change could be a driver of displacement. Over the following decade, UNHCR continued to engage with people displaced internally by disasters and climate, in more than 25 operations. These included a limited role following the earthquake in Haiti, response to floods in



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO. Three Congolese girls play in the grounds of a church being used as a temporary site for internally displaced persons in Drodro, Ituri province. Some 1.3 million people have been displaced across eastern DRC during 2019 due to inter-ethnic violence between the Hema and Lendu.
© UNHCR/JOHN WESSELS

Pakistan, typhoons in the Philippines and at the end of the decade, hurricanes in the Bahamas and cyclones in Mozambique and southern Africa. Millions of people displaced by natural disasters were assisted by UNHCR during this decade. UNHCR's updated Policy on Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement⁴⁶ confirms that it will contribute to any inter-agency response to disaster-induced internal displacement where it is present, taking the lead on protection, and in agreement with the government and coordination arrangements.

The demographics of internal displacement

Displacement creates specific needs and vulnerabilities, especially where it exacerbates pre-existing vulnerabilities, discrimination, marginalization or barriers to access, such as for internally displaced children, older persons, persons with disabilities and persons with intersecting identities. Specific protection considerations, such as safeguarding from gender-based violence, abuse or exploitation of children, and issues of inclusion remained key due to the demographics of internal displacement. In 16 out of the 20 operations where demographic data is available at the end of 2019, women constituted on average 52 per cent of all IDPs. The highest values were

⁴⁶ See: <https://www.unhcr.org/50f951df9>

reported in Burundi (65%), Sudan (57%), Chad and Ukraine (both 56%). The data confirmed that the overall male-female ratio of IDPs has not changed significantly since 2010, when women constituted about half of IDPs in 2010 (with some countries being an exception).

Children continued to be heavily affected by internal displacement in some of the worst humanitarian crises of the decade, and their situation remains dire today. In Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Burkina Faso, for instance, children constituted more than 60 per cent of IDPs at the end of 2019. In the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, Pakistan and Yemen, their proportion ranged between 53 and 57 per cent. Comparing these figures to IDP situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and Somalia in 2010, the proportion of children increased by a few percentage points.

Insufficient data on persons with disabilities still hinders a better understanding of the risks they face in displacement, although population surveys reveal that the prevalence and negative impacts of living with a disability are more pervasive in crisis-affected countries, such as Syria, where 27 per cent of the total population above 12 years of age have a disability.⁴⁷

UNHCR and the future of internal displacement

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its commitment to ‘leave no one behind’ provide a powerful basis for the inclusion of internally displaced people in economic development planning, as well as in all other measures taken by States to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

At the World Humanitarian Summit held in May 2016, far-reaching commitments were made, including an ambitious target of reducing the number of people in protracted or new displacement by 50 per cent by the year 2030.

Over the course of the upcoming decade, UNHCR will continue to work with national governments in supporting efforts by States to adopt inclusive policies that better integrate internally displaced people into society and social safety nets; recognize them as socio-economic assets and contributors (including through better data); and strengthen the laws that ensure their protection and human rights.

In 2019, UNHCR released an updated IDP Policy, which recommitted UNHCR to be a predictable and effective stakeholder in situations of internal displacement both operationally and within inter-agency response mechanisms, in support of affected States and communities. As an operational agency and in its capacity as lead of the Shelter, CCCM⁴⁸ and Protection Clusters, UNHCR will continue to work with its partners in addressing both immediate and longer-term needs of internally displaced people and host communities, and in supporting them to become resilient and self-reliant. UNHCR will, in particular, promote an active role by IDPs in decisions affecting their lives, and their communities, including through participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes.

UNHCR will also make prevention a priority, as it recognized many situations of internal displacement could be avoided, or their impact minimized, if compliance with human rights standards and international humanitarian law was maintained. UNHCR will consistently embed protection considerations in the various steps of agency and inter-agency preparedness efforts and will contribute to scenario-based contingency planning within its shelters and settlements, and camp/site coordination and management areas of expertise.

By 2030, many gains will be realized, though internal displacement situations are likely to continue due to conflict, violence or disaster, including health pandemics. UNHCR will continue to engage across the entire spectrum of forced displacement, with refugees, internally displaced, and stateless people, ensuring access to protection, addressing factors that may contribute to further displacement or onward movement, and emphasizing both solutions and prevention.

⁴⁷ https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Disability_Prevalence-and-Impact_FINAL-2.pdf

⁴⁸ Camp Coordination and Camp Management

CHAPTER 4

Asylum Trends

16 million new asylum-seekers in the last decade

Governments or UNHCR determine whether to confer refugee status through a process called Refugee Status Determination (RSD). The determination – made on the basis of international, regional or national law – represents a crucial step in ensuring refugees receive protection and long-lasting solutions, whether that means repatriation, building new lives in their host communities or resettlement in third countries.

Asylum applications are on the rise. Between 2010 and 2019, States or UNHCR registered more than 16.2 million individual asylum applications globally, an estimated 88 per cent of them at the first instance⁴⁹ and the remainder at the second instance, including with courts or other appellate

bodies.⁵⁰ Two-thirds of these asylum-seekers registered their claims in the last five years. In 2019, two million new asylum applications were registered, making up 14 per cent of the total for the entire decade.⁵¹ In the last decade, roughly five million individuals received refugee or other protected status in 183 countries or territories as a result of their asylum claim, and about 15 million more people received refugee or temporary protection status through group procedures – for a total of 20 million people.

49 The data for some countries may include a significant number of repeat claims, i.e. the applicant has submitted at least one previous application in the same or another country.

50 Statistical information on outcomes of asylum appeals and court proceedings is under-reported in UNHCR's statistics, particularly in industrialized countries, because this type of data is often either not collected by States or not published.

51 As some countries have not yet released all of their national asylum data at the time of writing, this figure is likely to be revised later this year.



MEXICO. *"I walked and walked, day and night. I was terrified. The journey was not safe, but at least I was not alone. Discrimination here is not as bad as in Honduras. People seem more open-minded, and people from my community have given me support." When your own identity puts you at risk, the stark choice is to leave or die. This was the decision Estefania*, a transgender woman, made. Staying in Honduras meant either to deny her identity or face harassment, violence or worse.*


© UNHCR/DIANA DIAZ

*Name changed for protection reasons



For detailed information on UNHCR's protection and assistance activities in support of forcibly displaced populations, see the [2019 Global Report](#)

Figure 16 | Asylum applications registered by region



Given the vast numbers of individuals fleeing violence and persecution who seek international protection, the process of determining whether a person receives protective status is crucial. Under the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), an Asylum Capacity Support Group (ACSG) mechanism is to be established to provide support to the concerned national authorities to strengthen their asylum systems with a view of increasing their efficiency, fairness, adaptability and integrity. This special initiative introduced in the GCR will bring more coherence and consistency to asylum capacity support by matching support offers with needs. This mechanism will help States adapt their asylum systems to major changes in the world, from climate change to COVID-19.

More than 16.2 million asylum applications were registered in the last decade. However, they do not represent the totality of persons who fled their country, neither were they equally distributed across

the seven major regions, as seen in FIGURE 16. Europe registered 9.2 million asylum claims, the Americas 3.4 million and the three regions in sub-Saharan Africa a combined two million. Asia and Pacific recorded almost one million claims and the Middle East and North Africa region about 633,000 individual asylum applications.

AFRICA

From 2008 until 2012, South Africa received the largest number of new asylum applications worldwide, registering 800,000 new asylum claims, mostly from Zimbabweans. The three regions in sub-Saharan Africa registered a total of two million individual asylum claims during the past decade – representing only a fraction of the overall number of refugees who sought international protection across the continent as many more were granted refugee status on a *prima facie* basis.

EUROPE

Europe saw a spike in the number of new asylum-seekers in 2014, largely because of the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine. It experienced another spike in new asylum requests in 2015. As the war in Syria intensified and conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan worsened, an increasing number of people risked their lives to cross the Mediterranean Sea in search of safety and protection. More than one million people arrived in Europe by boat – the vast majority from these three refugee-producing countries. More than 1.5 million new asylum claims were lodged in the major European destination countries, including Germany and Sweden. Arrivals in Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy and Spain continued in subsequent years but remained below 200,000 between 2017 and 2019.⁵²

AMERICAS

The deteriorating situation in Venezuela and increased violence and insecurity in parts of Central America led to a significant increase in the number of new asylum applications registered in the Americas. Between 2016 and 2019, nationals from Central America and Venezuela lodged 1.6 million asylum applications across the continent. This compares to 220,000 between 2010 and 2015. Almost one million asylum claims were recorded in 2019 alone, notably in the United States of America, Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico, Canada and Brazil. The Americas became the largest recipient of asylum applications worldwide in 2019.

ASIA AND PACIFIC

The Asia and Pacific region witnessed a steady increase in the number of new asylum-seekers. Almost one million new asylum applications were submitted during the last decade. Malaysia, where UNHCR conducts RSD under its mandate recorded more than one quarter of them (257,000). Australia was the second largest recipient with 188,600 new asylum claims, two-thirds in the last four years.

Table 2 | New asylum claims registered | 2019

United States ⁵³	301,000
Peru	259,800
Germany	142,500
France	123,900
Spain	118,300
Brazil	82,500
Greece	74,900
Mexico	70,400
Costa Rica	59,200
Canada	58,400


MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Across most of the Middle East and North Africa, UNHCR conducts RSD under its mandate. As such, it registered about 600,000 new asylum applications during the last decade. Four out of ten asylum claims were registered with UNHCR either in Egypt (159,000) or Jordan (99,200). It is mainly Sudanese (in Egypt) and Iraqis (in Jordan) who undergo RSD.

⁵² See: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>

⁵³ 2019 figure: estimated number of individuals based on the number of new affirmative asylum cases (89,500) and multiplied by 1.501 to reflect the average number of individuals per case (Source: US Department of Homeland Security) and the number of defensive asylum applications (166,700 individuals) (Source: US Department of Justice).

Figure 17 | Major destination countries for new asylum-seekers | 2010-2019



By country of asylum

Germany received the highest number of new asylum applications overall for the decade, with more than 2.1 million new asylum applications registered between 2010 and 2019. One-third of these claims were submitted by Syrians (619,000), while Afghans (232,000) and Iraqis (204,000) accounted for many of the other applications. In 2019, Germany had 142,500 new applications, its lowest in six years, placing Germany third worldwide.

The United States of America registered an estimated 1.7 million new asylum claims during the past decade, including 301,000 in 2019, reflecting the deteriorating security, violence and socio-

economic situations in parts of Venezuela and Central America. Citizens from these countries constituted the largest group seeking international protection in the US. The United States of America remained the largest destination for asylum-seekers in 2019 for the third consecutive year.

The Venezuela crisis led to a sharp increase in the number of asylum applications registered in Peru in 2018 (192,500), which continued into 2019 (259,800). Peru was the second largest recipient of asylum applications globally in 2019, with nearly all claims submitted by Venezuelans.

Other countries registering a substantial number of new asylum applications in 2019 were France (123,900), Spain (118,300), Brazil (82,500) and Greece (74,900).

By country of origin


In the last decade, Syrians submitted the largest number of asylum applications, lodging nearly 1.4 million new claims all over the world, highlighting the global scale of this ongoing tragedy. Half of the claims were registered in 2015 and 2016.

Afghans accounted for the second highest number of applications – 1.1 million worldwide. As in the case of Syrian asylum-seekers, half were lodged in 2015 and 2016, mostly in Europe.

In recent years, Venezuela has become the largest source country of new asylum claims. An average of one thousand Venezuelans applied for refugee status annually in the early years of the last decade. This number rose in the past 2-3 years to exceed 341,000 in 2018 and 430,000 in 2019. Venezuelans are leaving their country due to several factors, including violence, persecution, and the political and economic crises.

Other major source countries of new asylum applications over the last decade include Iraq, Ukraine, the DRC and Eritrea.


Figure 18 | Major source countries of new asylum applications | 2010-2019*



* Based on reporting by individuals and cases. One asylum case may include more than one individual.

█ 2010-2018 █ 2019

Figure 19 | Key flows of new asylum applications registered in 2019



*Based on the number of new affirmative asylum cases (89,500 cases; Source: US Department of Homeland Security) and the number of defensive asylum applications (166,700 individuals) (Source: US Department of Justice).

Total protection rates


Worldwide, the Total Protection Rate (TPR) – or percentage of substantive decisions that resulted in any form of international protection – was 46 per cent, up from 44 per cent the previous year.⁵⁴ The TPR has fluctuated throughout the decade. It was highest between 2014 and 2016, stabilizing at

around 60 per cent, before dropping to pre-2014 levels of below 50 per cent.

Among the major source countries of asylum-seekers, the TPR varied substantially in 2019. For Syrians, Congolese (DRC), Eritreans, Somalis and Venezuelans, the TPR was close to or exceeded 80 per cent, confirming the high protection needs of these populations.

⁵⁴ UNHCR uses two rates to compute the proportion of refugee claims accepted. The Refugee Recognition Rate is the proportion of asylum-seekers accorded refugee status out of the total number of substantive decisions (Convention status, complementary protection and rejected cases). The Total Protection Rate is the proportion of asylum-seekers accorded refugee status or a complementary form of protection by the total number of substantive decisions. Non-substantive decisions are, to the extent possible, excluded from both calculations. For the purposes of global comparability, UNHCR uses only these two rates and does not report rates calculated by national authorities.

Figure 20 | Total protection rates | 2010 – 2019



Responsibility for refugee status determination

Only States can ensure comprehensive refugee protection and robust and long-lasting solutions for refugees. Therefore, supporting the assumption of State responsibility for RSD remained a top priority for UNHCR during the last decade. Despite some successes, many States have yet to establish national RSD systems or have systems that are not fully accessible. In such situations, UNHCR may conduct RSD under its mandate, either in the absence of a national system or, more rarely, in parallel with one. In some countries, UNHCR conducts RSD jointly with the government.

In the last decade, the number of States and territories implementing national asylum procedures rose from 108 in 2010 to 116 in 2019. Some of the States that hosted the largest number of refugees implemented State asylum procedures during this period, including Kenya and, more recently, Turkey. This welcome assumption of responsibility by States is also evident in the proportion of the world's individual applications for refugee status received by UNHCR. In 2010, UNHCR received 11 per cent of the world's individual applications for refugee status and in 2013, 19 per cent. By 2019, the percentage fell to five per cent.

Although these trends are encouraging, the number of States in which UNHCR conducted RSD continued to remain stable (with some yearly variation). In 2019, UNHCR was registering new asylum-seekers in the same number of countries, 53, as it had in 2010. This could be explained in part by RSD applications made in small (often island) countries that rarely received asylum applications. But UNHCR also continued to conduct RSD in countries with national asylum systems characterized by persistent protection gaps.

There is reason to be optimistic that in the coming years more States will assume responsibility for RSD and/or improve their asylum systems as the global community works to implement the GCR. At the first Global Refugee Forum, over 55 States made pledges either to improve their own asylum systems or to support other national systems, including in some instances through the ACSG which was officially launched at the Forum. A large number of civil society organizations and other actors pledged to support this process, including through advocacy for using the ACSG mechanism.

Increasing efficiency and fairness in RSD procedures

As the number of asylum applications made in the last decade continued to rise – due to new and ongoing displacement situations in Syria,

Table 3 | New and appeal applications registered

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019*	Total
States	747,600	755,400	796,700	877,800	1,401,700	2,050,000	1,914,200	1,617,200	1,902,500	2,170,400	14,233,500
UNHCR	96,800	98,800	125,500	203,200	245,700	269,400	208,400	263,400	227,800	120,400	1,859,400
Jointly**	5,900	28,600	20,100	800	12,900	17,800	26,300	24,300	11,400	1,300	149,400
Total	850,300	882,800	942,300	1,081,800	1,660,300	2,337,200	2,148,900	1,904,900	2,141,700	2,292,100	16,242,300
UNHCR only	11%	11%	13%	19%	15%	12%	10%	14%	11%	5%	11%

* Provisional figure

** Refers to refugee status determination conducted jointly by UNHCR and governments.

Venezuela, Afghanistan, Iraq and other places – ensuring efficient status determination processes became critical. The number of individual RSD applications (including appeal and reopened applications) rose from 850,300 in 2010 to 2.3 million in 2019. In 2019, close to 1.3 million substantive decisions were made globally. But despite investments by States and UNHCR in decision-making capacity, the end of 2019 saw more than 4.1 million cases pending (350,400 in UNHCR mandate RSD procedures, 1,900 in joint procedures and 3.8 million in government procedures).

The number of new applications made to UNHCR also increased throughout the decade, from 96,800 in 2010 to 227,800 in 2018, with UNHCR conducting the most RSD in Turkey. In 2019, the number dropped to 120,400 after UNHCR's phase-out from RSD in Turkey following the assumption of full responsibility by the Government of Turkey in September 2018. Over the past decade, UNHCR issued over 723,000 substantive (positive or negative) decisions globally and closed 602,900 administratively. In addition to Turkey, the other countries where UNHCR processed the highest number of RSD applications included Malaysia, Jordan, Egypt, India and Kenya (prior to the government assuming responsibility). Between 2010 and 2019, UNHCR and States operating joint procedures received 149,400 applications and issued 55,000 substantive decisions.

In response to such high numbers and in acknowledgement that, unlike recognition by a State, UNHCR's recognition of refugee status does not automatically give an individual access to protection or solutions, UNHCR emphasized two key elements in its 2016 RSD strategy, in addition

to supporting the assumption of responsibility by States: (1) focusing RSD interventions to situations in which they will have maximum protection impact (e.g. facilitating access to protection and solutions for the most vulnerable individuals or improve the protection space for entire populations) and (2) reducing the time spent on cases while maintaining the quality of decisions.


Due to this rationalization of when UNHCR conducts RSD under its mandate, the number of decisions made by UNHCR has varied over the last decade. Rather than increasing each year, it peaked in the years 2014-2017, in part because of the high number of Iraqi and Syrian cases processed for RSD for resettlement purposes in the Middle East during this period.

When conducting RSD under its mandate is necessary, UNHCR has increasingly used differentiated case processing modalities, including various types of simplified RSD, merged registration and RSD and, in a process unique to UNHCR, a combination of RSD and resettlement processing. In the past decade, UNHCR has systematized the use of these procedures, and issued publicly available documentation about its processes to ensure transparency and accountability.

Wrongful rejections could have dire consequences for applicants. Therefore, it is essential to have fair asylum procedures. In 2003, the first version of the Procedural Standards for RSD under UNHCR's mandate standardized due process requirements.⁵⁵ Since then, UNHCR has continued working to improve the fairness

⁵⁵ See: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/42d66dd84.html>

Map 4 | Asylum-seekers (with pending cases) | end-2019



A country is named if it features among the five largest per population group.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

and quality of its procedures. In 2017, it began issuing updated chapters of the RSD Procedural Standards, including an important chapter on legal representation.⁵⁶ UNHCR plans to release a complete revised RSD Procedural Standards in 2020 and will implement it gradually. It has also encouraged and supported States to adopt differentiated case processing strategies where appropriate and to make their procedures fair and adaptable.

The number of refugee recognitions over the last decade through group procedures (7.4 million) and temporary protection group procedures (7.6 million), as well as the number of States now processing using simplified and/or accelerated procedures shows that many States are already implementing diversified modalities. Positive developments include:


- Mexico applying simplified determined procedures for certain case profiles with high recognition rates
- Brazil recognizing thousands of Venezuelans as refugees on a *prima facie* basis after the application of the Cartagena Declaration
- Malawi declaring certain groups of Congolese (DRC) as refugees on a *prima facie* basis

These examples show there are still opportunities within the asylum system to increase efficiency and reduce the time that people spend waiting for a decision on their status. As these new processes are introduced, it will be important that States adhere to procedural safeguards and use fair, high-quality procedures as they implement their GCR pledges so that all asylum-seekers can access procedures and articulate their claims within a system that prioritizes international protection needs.

⁵⁶ See: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/56baf2c84.html>

UNACCOMPANIED AND SEPARATED CHILDREN

Figure 21 | Unaccompanied and separated children seeking asylum | 2010-2019



ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

Between 2010 and 2019, around 400,000 unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) lodged asylum applications in 117 countries or territories; about three per cent of the global number of new asylum applications. UASC applications peaked in the middle of the decade, when thousands of minors crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. The number has dropped in recent years, reaching 25,000 in 2019, based on provisional data.

Germany registered 87,000 or one fifth of the 400,000 UASC asylum applications. Sweden (60,600), Italy (30,000) and the United Kingdom (22,000) were other main destinations. These four countries together registered half of all UASC asylum claims worldwide, mainly by unaccompanied children from Afghanistan, Eritrea and Syria.

It is important to note that data on UASC seeking asylum is an underestimate because many countries registering asylum-seekers do not report on unaccompanied and separated children separately.

REGISTERED REFUGEES

In 2017, UNHCR began to report on the number of unaccompanied and separated children in the refugee population from UNHCR refugee registers and in 2018 requested governments to do the same. In response, 53 countries reported a total of 111,000 unaccompanied and separated child refugees in 2018. This number increased to 153,300 in 2019. However, similar to UASC seeking asylum, many countries with large registered refugee populations do not report on unaccompanied and separated children in the population.

The largest number of registered UASC refugees was reported in Ethiopia (41,500), where UASC represent six per cent of the refugee population. In Uganda (40,000 UASC), Kenya (10,700 UASC) and Cameroon (9,000 UASC) the proportion of UASC ranged between two and three per cent of the refugee population.

Almost half of the 153,300 registered UASC refugees were South Sudanese. This finding shows how essential it is that data are collected to identify these children, protect and assist them.

DENMARK. Elisha grew up in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the sound of gunshots - that's how he remembers it. At age 14, he was resettled with his father in Denmark, where he has found stability, time for contemplation, and the opportunity to pursue his dream of a career in music.

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CHAPTER 5

Finding Solutions

Five million refugees found a solution through resettlement or voluntary repatriation in the last decade

Finding durable solutions that enable displaced people to rebuild their lives and live in safety and dignity is at the core of UNHCR's work. Planning for solutions from the outset of displacement is one of the primary objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).

This chapter focuses primarily on durable solutions for refugees. Traditionally, durable solutions include voluntary repatriation, resettlement to a third country and local integration. However, a growing number of people of concern to UNHCR remain in precarious protection situations with little hope of a durable solution.

Over the last decade, the world recognized that governments, humanitarian actors and development partners must come together with refugees to find durable solutions for those in need. This recognition for comprehensive and situation-specific solutions is at the heart of the GCR and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The GCR seeks to strengthen solutions in two main ways:

1) to expand access to resettlement and other complementary pathways in third countries; 2) to foster conditions that enable refugees to return voluntarily to their home countries.

Despite these initiatives, solutions for refugees are in decline. Resettlement benefits only a fraction of the world's refugees. In 2019, only half a per cent of the world's refugees were resettled. Over the past 10 years, just over one million refugees were resettled, compared to 3.9 million refugees who returned to their country. Thus, for every refugee resettled since 2010, approximately 4 have repatriated. This is in stark contrast to one for every 12 during the prior decade when almost 10 million refugees repatriated and 810,400 refugees were resettled – a strong sign that as conflicts rage on without end, voluntary repatriation as a solution for refugees is diminishing over time.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ By comparison, between 1990 and 1999 more than 15 million refugees voluntarily repatriated while more than 1.3 million were resettled.



TUNISIA. A six-year-old Syrian refugee takes part in an interactive theatre activity in Tunis. The workshops take place once a month with Tunisian and other refugee children. The games and theatre workshops help the children meet, get to know each other and accept diversity in their community.


Some 42 per cent of the 3,300 refugees and asylum-seekers currently hosted in Tunisia come from Syria.

© UNHCR/JOHN WESSELS

For detailed information on UNHCR's work to secure solutions for refugees and other people of concern, see the chapter on *Building better futures* in the [2019 Global Report](#)



Figure 22 | Resettled and returning refugees | 2010 – 2019



Returns

Returning home in safety and dignity remains the preferred solution for the majority of the world's refugees. Over the last decade, some 3.9 million refugees returned to their country of origin. Voluntary return was at its lowest in 2014, when only 126,800 people were able to go home. The peak came in 2018, when 593,800 were able to return. Nearly one quarter of returnees during the decade (875,800 or 23 per cent) were Afghan. Afghanistan today has a population of about 38 million people⁵⁸ and about one fifth are former refugees who have returned home in the last two decades. Nevertheless, only 8,400 Afghans returned in 2019, one of the lowest levels recorded in many years. Almost three-quarters of all refugee returns during the last decade were to one of the ten countries shown in FIGURE 23.


In 2019, 317,200 refugees returned to 34 countries, most commonly to South Sudan (99,800 or 31%), Syria (95,000 or 30%) and the Central African Republic (46,500 or 15%).

Close to 383,100 Syrians returned to their country between 2017 and 2019. UNHCR does not promote refugee returns to Syria. Returns have been spontaneous or organized by host countries or other humanitarian actors assisting returnees through ongoing programmes. Since 2017, UNHCR has conducted five return perception and intention surveys among Syrians, the latest of which was published in March 2019.⁵⁹ Conducted in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, the survey canvassed more than 13,000 Syrian refugees, out of a total of 1.9 million. From late 2017 to early 2019, the estimated percentage of Syrian refugees hoping to return increased from 51 to 75 per cent. Nevertheless, only 6 per cent of those surveyed intended to return during the following 12 months. Of the remainder, only 1 in 5 intended to move to a third country, highlighting that return remains the preferred solution for the vast majority of Syrians surveyed. Some 47,800 Syrians from these four countries (3 per cent of the refugees hosted) have been resettled to a third country with UNHCR's assistance during the same period.

⁵⁸ Source: <https://population.un.org/wpp2019/Download/Standard/Population/>

⁵⁹ See <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68443>

Figure 23 | Refugee returns | 2010 – 2019



Resettlement

Resettlement is a critical tool for the protection of the most vulnerable refugees. It is also a tangible mechanism for responsibility-sharing and a demonstration of solidarity, allowing States to help share each other's burdens and reduce the impact of large refugee populations on host countries.


Over the last decade, over one million refugees were resettled by States with or without UNHCR's assistance. During this period, the number of States providing resettlement places increased from 24 in 2010 to a high of 35 in 2016 and 2017, only to drop again to 29 in both 2018 and 2019.

Over the last decade, the number of refugees in need of resettlement has increased dramatically. UNHCR estimates that more than 1.4 million refugees need to be resettled,⁶⁰ an 80 per cent

increase since 2011 (see FIGURE 24). At the end of this tumultuous decade, there was only one resettlement spot available for every 20 vulnerable refugees in need. While the number of refugees increased over time, the number of resettlement places offered by States remained well below 100,000 between 2011 and 2013. It increased gradually to a peak of 163,000 UNHCR resettlement submissions in 2016 to drop to almost half of that at about 81,000 in both 2018 and 2019.

Resettlement is used to assist refugees in countries that cannot provide them with appropriate protection and support. Of all cases submitted by UNHCR in 2019, 76 per cent were for survivors of torture and/or violence, people with legal and physical protection needs, and particularly vulnerable women and girls. Just over half (52%) of all resettlement submissions concerned children.

Figure 24 | Gap between resettlement needs and UNHCR's annual submissions



⁶⁰ <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/5d1384047/projected-global-resettlement-needs-2020.html>



According to official government statistics provided to UNHCR over the last ten years, 55 per cent of all resettled refugees were welcomed in the United States of America (575,600), 20 per cent to Canada (210,600) and 11 per cent to Australia (114,500). European countries have increased the number of resettlement places made available to refugees from an average of about 6,000 per year during the initial part of the decade to more than 30,000 in 2019. Overall, more than 144,000 refugees were admitted by European countries between 2010 and 2019.

In 2019, 107,800 refugees were resettled to 26 countries with or without UNHCR's assistance, including 30,100 to Canada. The United States of America admitted 27,500 and Australia 18,200.

Resettlement is primarily facilitated by UNHCR in most countries around the world. However, in Canada, almost 3 in 5 (58%) resettlement arrivals during the decade were conducted through private sponsorship resettlement schemes.

A similar community-led approach commenced in Ireland in 2019.⁶¹

Predictable, efficient and effective resettlement schemes do benefit host States. Several studies published over the last decade proved that resettled refugees contribute significantly to the economic and social fabric of communities. Research commissioned in 2019 by UNHCR in Canada⁶² shows that refugees are creating jobs for themselves and other Canadians, with almost 1 in 7 refugees self-employed or business owners. Refugees are on average just over 11 years younger than those born in Canada, which means they are more likely to be of working-age, with many years to contribute. Notably, the research proved that 20 years after being resettled to Canada, refugees were contributing more in income tax than they received in public benefits and services.

61 <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2019/3/5c7ea7cb4/irish-woman-sets-community-programme-help-refugees.html>

62 <https://www.unhcr.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Are-Refugees-Good-for-Canada-A-Look-at-Canadian-Refugee-Integration-November-2019.pdf>

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE KAREN RESETTLEMENT IN BENDIGO, AUSTRALIA

A series of reports by Deloitte Access Economics, including one published in August 2018 about Bendigo, Australia, highlights the benefits of resettlement to both the host and the resettlement community.⁶³

Bendigo is a regional Australian city in Central Victoria with approximately 110,000 inhabitants where at least 800 Karen refugees settled between 2007 and 2018. Almost 21,000 Karen refugees have been resettled to Australia during the same time period.

In Bendigo, the local community identified that resettlement had "an unexpected and positive impact on the broader community and, as a result, contributing to an appreciation of the contribution new settlers can make in other ways".

In addition to the social contribution, economic modelling undertaken by the report's authors estimated that over a 10-year period, the total economic impact from the regional resettlement of the Karen population on the Bendigo economy was just more than 67 million Australian dollars (in net present value terms),

with an associated impact on employment of 177 full-time-equivalent jobs. In common with refugee populations globally, the Karen population currently comprises a disproportionately high share of children. The report predicts that, all things being equal, the Karen labour force will continue to grow over time, adding to the productive capacity of the region in years to come.

The research indicates that several conditions led to the success of resettlement in Bendigo, including strong leadership from both the host and the settling communities as well as the availability of opportunities for employment and affordable housing. In addition, the support provided in the transition from school to work or further training in Bendigo for Karen youth encourages their aspirations to study and to find 'good' jobs and provides opportunities for high levels of participation in the community, education and workplaces. Lastly, the report highlights the responsiveness of the services in the region and the natural advantages of relatively small regional cities such as Bendigo in terms of lifestyle and as a safe place to raise a family.

⁶³ <https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/economics/articles/economic-social-impact-karen-resettlement.html>

Local integration

Millions of refugees around the world live with little hope of ever returning home. When resettlement or repatriation are not options, building a new life in the country of asylum offers a durable solution to their plight.

Local integration of refugees can include the provision of legal status and naturalization. It is a dynamic and two-way process. Refugees must be prepared to adapt to their new country, while host communities and public institutions who welcome refugees must strive to meet the needs of a diverse population. To effectively integrate refugees, institutions at national and local levels,

as well as local communities and civil society, should proactively foster social cohesion and ensure refugees can access the job market.

Globally, the integration of refugees in the countries' labour markets remains challenging. For example, in Uganda, a 2018 survey by the World Bank estimated that 4 in 5 refugees were unemployed and refugees earn wages that are 35 to 45 per cent lower than the host population.⁶⁴ Refugees have a lower employment rate than compared to the native-born population and other migrants, making refugees one of the most vulnerable groups in the labour market.

⁶⁴ <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32511>



YEMEN. A ten-year-old Somali refugee arrives on a bus at the port of Aden, ready to board the boat that will take him home.

Yemen hosts the world's second largest Somali refugee population, some 253,000 people, and refugee movements from Somalia to Yemen have been taking place since the 1980s, triggered by violence, the civil war, fear of persecution, drought and a lack of livelihood opportunities. In 2019, more than 3,600 Somali refugees have returned home from Yemen.

© UNHCR/MARIE-JOËLLE JEAN-CHARLES

Data from a 2014 European Labour Force Survey⁶⁵ shows that approximately 50 per cent of refugees in Europe had jobs. More recent data for Germany show that while only some 40 per cent of the working-age refugee population were employed by the third quarter of 2019, the integration of refugees in the labour market is progressing faster than expected compared to previous arrivals of refugees,⁶⁶ according to the Institute for Labour Market and Occupational Research (IAB).

The *International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics*⁶⁷ make several recommendations on appropriate indicators for measuring and quantifying local integration in a way that is comparable and consistent across different contexts. However, throughout the decade, the availability of data about refugees has remained very poor. Naturalization – the legal act or process by which a non-citizen in a country may acquire citizenship or nationality of that country – is therefore used as a proxy measure of local integration. However, even this proxy is limited by the uneven availability of data and poor coverage

as well as policy and legal changes over time. In particular, it can be difficult to distinguish between the naturalization of refugees and non-refugees. Therefore, the data are only indicative at best and provide an underestimate of the extent to which refugees are naturalized. In view of the current challenges with the availability of relevant statistics on naturalization, UNHCR continues to explore opportunities with governments to address these gaps.

During the last decade, based on available statistics, nearly 322,400 refugees from 185 countries naturalized in 65 countries. The number of countries reporting at least one naturalized refugee has decreased from 31 in 2010 to 25 in 2019. However, the number of naturalized refugees in absolute terms has increased by almost five times from 11,600 in 2010 to 55,000 in 2019. This is due both to increases in the number of naturalizations as well as better reporting. For example, 79,000 Syrians naturalized in Turkey between 2017 and 2018,⁶⁸ and in Canada reporting commenced in 2013 where the annual number of refugees who have naturalized has doubled from 14,800 in 2013 to 31,200 in 2019. Similarly, in the Netherlands reporting commenced recently and between 2017 and 2019, 26,800 refugees obtained Dutch nationality, 12,300 of them in 2019.

⁶⁵ How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe?, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (European Commission), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016: <https://op.europa.eu/s/n6zq>

⁶⁶ https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/arbeitsmarktforscher-zufrieden-integration-von-fluechtlingen-geht-ein-jahr-schneller-als-gedacht_id_11000535.html

⁶⁷ See https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/Standards-and-Methods/files/Principles_and_Recommendations/International-Migration/2018_1746_EN_08-E.pdf

⁶⁸ No data available for 2019.

HOW DO REFUGEES ACCESS THE NORWEGIAN LABOUR MARKET? *


Trends in refugee employment in Europe are consistent with those observed in Norway. By the end of the fourth quarter 2018, 51 per cent of refugees in Norway were employed, compared to around 64 per cent among immigrants in general and 73 per cent in the population as a whole.

These overall figures do, however, conceal big differences. Employment rates vary by factors such as sex, age, education level, years of residence and language proficiency (as well as combinations of these).

It takes time for refugees to access the labour market, and as Figure 25 shows, employment is almost three times higher among those with the longest period of stay (20+ years) compared to the groups that have recently arrived (0-4 years).

Refugees who have been in Norway for a long period of time (e.g. from Sri Lanka and Myanmar) have employment rates almost at the same level as the general Norwegian population. Among those who have arrived relatively recently in Norway (e.g. Syrians), many are still enrolled in mandatory introductory programmes and are thus not yet available for the labour market.⁶⁹

Figure 25 | Employment rate by immigration background (15-66 years), 4th quarter 2018 (in %)



*Contributed by Statistics Norway. The views and opinions expressed are those of Statistics Norway and do not necessarily represent the views of UNHCR.

⁶⁹ Throughout most of Europe, the Labour Force Survey (LFS), an interview-based survey, is used to measure the overall employment and unemployment rate. It is also used to measure how refugees and immigrants integrate into the European labour market. The LFS is, however, not an ideal tool to measure participation rates of smaller groups in the society as the sample size is often too small for detailed analysis. Immigrants, in particular, will also have a significant selective non-response. In Norway, in addition to the LFS, a combination of administrative registers is used to measure the employment and unemployment rates. Data from these registers open up for detailed analysis broken down by important variables such as sex, age, years of residence and country background. See <https://www.ssb.no/en/arbeid-og-lonn/statistikker/innvregsys>. For more information about Statistics Norway's definition of persons with a refugee background, see: <https://www.ssb.no/en/befolking/statistikker/flykninger>.

CHAPTER 6


Stateless People

754,500 stateless persons acquired nationality in the last decade

According to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, a stateless person is a “person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” Millions of people across the world who do not possess a nationality are stateless and consequently are often denied basic rights. UNHCR reported on a global number of 4.2 million stateless persons including those of undetermined nationality in 76 countries at the end of 2019.⁷⁰ The true extent of

statelessness is estimated to be much higher, as fewer than half of all countries in the world submit any data and some of the most populous countries in the world with large suspected stateless populations do not report on statelessness at all. FIGURE 26 displays the number of countries that reported stateless populations at the end of each year. Approximately half of all countries either report or are known to have stateless populations.

Figure 26 | Number of countries reporting on stateless populations



⁷⁰ Based on information provided by governments and other sources.



BANGLADESH. Rohingya children participate in learning activities in a child-friendly space in Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh.

In these safe spaces, children can express themselves and access the support they need to continue their emotional and cognitive development. Bangladesh is host to just under one million stateless Rohingya refugees who have fled violence and persecution in neighbouring Myanmar; 56 per cent of that number are children.

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For detailed information on UNHCR's work in support of stateless persons, see the chapter on *Safeguarding fundamental rights* in the **2019 Global Report**




FIGURE 27 shows the trend in reported statelessness figures over the past decade. The global number remains between approximately 3.2 and 4.2 million stateless persons in any given year. These figures mask some notable increases and decreases between years due to countries that began or stopped reporting on statelessness each year, and because of changes in estimation and data collection methods. For instance, five countries that reported at the end of 2018 did not submit data for 2019, leaving 3,200 stateless persons unaccounted

for. On the other hand, newly reporting countries in 2019 submitted data on 18,300 stateless persons that had never been reported on before.

A 2019 study on statelessness in Côte d'Ivoire jointly undertaken by the Ivorian Government and UNHCR accounts for an increase of 263,400 stateless persons from 692,000 in 2018 to 955,400 in 2019. This increase reflects improved methodology used in the study compared to previous years rather than an actual increase in the number of stateless persons.

Figure 27 | **Reported global number of stateless persons | 2010 – 2019**




In line with the objectives of the #IBelong Campaign to End Statelessness,⁷¹ a reported 81,100 stateless people in 28 countries were able to acquire or confirm their nationality in 2019. This is the highest number of stateless persons finding a nationality solution in a single year since the start of the #IBelong campaign in 2014. Significant numbers of people had their nationality confirmed in Thailand, Tajikistan, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Sweden, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Malaysia. Furthermore, in 2019, Colombia granted nationality by birth to 28,500 children born in Colombia of Venezuelan parents displaced abroad.

Many of these increases are part of multi-year initiatives to end statelessness. **FIGURE 28** shows that 754,500 stateless persons were reported to have acquired nationality from 2010 to 2019. From 2014 to 2019, particularly large numbers of persons had their nationality confirmed in Thailand, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Sweden. Kyrgyzstan ended all known cases of statelessness in 2019, having found solutions for more than 13,000 stateless persons in the last five years. Overall, 341,000 formerly stateless persons are known to have acquired nationality since the start of the #IBelong Campaign.


⁷¹ <https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/>

Map 5 | Statelessness | end-2019



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 28 | Number of formerly stateless persons who acquired nationality per year




Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of stateless populations

Data availability for stateless populations is scarce in most countries when it comes to disaggregation by demographic characteristics. In 2019, sex-disaggregated data was available for 28 of the 76 countries reporting on stateless populations, covering 73 per cent of the reported stateless population. According to available data, 51 per cent of the stateless population in 2019 were women, and 48 per cent were children. Demographically disaggregated data was most available in the West and Central Africa and the Asia-Pacific regions. Stateless Rohingya refugees hosted in Bangladesh make up the majority of the stateless population in the Asia-Pacific region, and there is solid demographic coverage available about them because they are individually registered as refugees in UNHCR's case management system (proGres). This is not the case for Rohingya remaining in Myanmar for whom the availability of demographic data is very low.

The results from the study on statelessness in Côte d'Ivoire mentioned above allow for

age- and sex-disaggregation of data on close to one million stateless persons and are an important step in improving the evidence base on statelessness in the region. [FIGURE 29](#) shows the demographic profile of displaced stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and of non-displaced stateless persons in Côte d'Ivoire. Fifty-six per cent of Rohingya in Bangladesh are children under the age of 18, considerably more than in the general population in Myanmar, their country of origin, where 31 per cent are underage. Women constitute 52 per cent of displaced stateless Rohingya in Bangladesh. While the stateless population in Côte d'Ivoire has slightly more women than men overall, with 53 per cent being female, this imbalance is very distinct for adult age groups from 18 to 59 as visible from the demographic profile. Qualitative evidence suggests that proportionally fewer girls are enrolled in school and registered at birth compared to boys. This lack of documentation can persist into adulthood and significantly impede access to citizenship for women. Children make up 54 per cent of stateless persons in Côte d'Ivoire, slightly higher than in the general population with 48 per cent.

Figure 29 | Demographic profile of stateless Rohingya refugees displaced in Bangladesh and stateless persons in Côte d'Ivoire





Stateless persons often have limited recourse to basic rights and are not able to access a range of services such as education and medical care. They may not be able to legally work, own property, or travel domestically and overseas. A socio-economic study in Kenya conducted jointly by UNHCR and the World Bank in 2019 showed that the incidence of poverty is significantly higher among the Shona stateless community when compared to the Kenyan national average. In addition, the study showed significant differences in educational enrolment between stateless and Kenyan children: the gross enrolment rate at secondary level for stateless children was 50 per cent compared to 78 per cent for nationals. Stateless girls were even less likely to receive secondary education, with a secondary gross enrolment rate of only 37 per cent compared to 65 per cent for stateless boys. While these results are from one study alone and further research is required and planned, the study results are notable in terms of the specific inequalities in access to education as one basic service stateless persons and stateless girls in particular face.

Some displaced people are also stateless. While UNHCR has historically not reported on multiple statuses, in 2017 it was decided that it was important to report on the displaced stateless Rohingya population as having both refugee and stateless status. Therefore, this population is included in both the displaced and statelessness counts. In addition to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who have been reported under UNHCR's statelessness figures since 2017, displaced Rohingya in India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are included in the number of stateless persons for the first time in 2019. This led to significant increases in statelessness figures in India (17,730 displaced stateless persons), Indonesia (580) and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the inclusion of displaced stateless persons led to an increase in the total number by almost 100,000 in 2019, consisting of Rohingya refugees and asylum-seekers displaced from Myanmar. Notwithstanding the increase in the overall reported figure, the Government of Malaysia has made significant progress in addressing the nationality situation of *in situ* stateless populations. In 2019 alone, 930 previous stateless persons were granted Malaysian nationality.



Recognizing the problem: Better statistics on statelessness

In line with SDG 17⁷² and Target 17.18,⁷³ increasing the availability of high-quality, reliable and disaggregated data is critical in any effort to impact development. Identifying stateless people is the first step towards addressing the difficulties they face, as well as enabling governments, UNHCR and others to prevent

and reduce statelessness. Recognition of statelessness and gathering data about the problem are key elements in UNHCR's Global Action Plan to End Statelessness (Global Action Plan), which accompanies the #IBelong Campaign. To improve quantitative and qualitative data on stateless populations, UNHCR works with States to undertake targeted surveys and studies and to incorporate questions allowing for the identification of stateless persons in population and housing censuses. The Global Action Plan also calls for the strengthening of civil registration and vital statistics systems and UNHCR works with others to provide technical support to this end.

Many countries have made strong commitments to address and end statelessness. Over 350 pledges were made to address statelessness at the High-Level Segment on Statelessness, held in October 2019 to mark the midpoint of the

72 SDG 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

73 Target 17.18: By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

#IBelong Campaign.⁷⁴ These include pledges to improve qualitative and quantitative data on stateless populations by 34 States. A total of 29 States submitted pledges to conduct quantitative or qualitative studies and nine States committed to include statelessness in upcoming census exercises (see map).


In 2019, an Expert Group on Statelessness Statistics made up of experts from national statistical offices and several UN agencies including UNHCR, UNFPA and UN Regional Commissions was established to work on developing and implementing common standards and definitions on statelessness statistics. The group aims to submit international recommendations on statelessness statistics

to the United Nations Statistical Commission by 2022. In parallel, an inter-agency group of international agencies and academic experts is developing statistical and demographic estimation methods to secure valid, reliable and comparable statistics on stateless populations. This work will be instrumental in developing a clearer global picture of statelessness over time. Improved data will in turn strengthen UNHCR's advocacy work and help realize the overarching Sustainable Development Goal of 'Leaving no one behind.' It will also support States' commitments to provide legal identity for all by 2030 as stipulated in SDG 16.9.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ <https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/results-of-the-high-level-segment-on-statelessness/>

⁷⁵ Target 16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.

Map 6 | Countries that submitted data pledges at the 2019 High-Level Segment on Statelessness



CHAPTER 7

Who Is Included In UNHCR Statistics?

REFUGEES include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection. The refugee population also includes people in refugee-like situations.

PEOPLE IN REFUGEE-LIKE SITUATION refers to a category which is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

ASYLUM-SEEKERS (with pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this report refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2019, irrespective of when those claims may have been lodged.

VENEZUELAN DISPLACED ABROAD refers to persons of Venezuelan origin who are likely to be in need of international protection under the criteria contained in the Cartagena Declaration, but who have not applied for asylum in the country in which they are present. Regardless of status, Venezuelans displaced abroad require protection against forced returns, and access to basic services. UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration work together with this population by leading the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, which is aimed

UGANDA. Dramani is studying Medical Laboratory Science at Clarke International University in Kampala, Uganda, on a DAFI Scholarship. “I was born here in Uganda. Our family tried to return to South Sudan in 2009 but we had to flee once again in 2016 due to the conflict there. I came back to Uganda with two of my siblings. The rest of our family are still there as internally displaced persons. When I was young, I had the dream of becoming a medical doctor. Eventually, I managed to push through and today, I am quite close to achieving my dream.” In Uganda, all refugees have access to higher education as long as they meet the basic admission requirements. According to UNHCR’s statistics, by the end of October 2019, less than 1 per cent of refugee youths between 18-35 years of age are accessing Tertiary Education.

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at strengthening the protection dimensions and consistent responses across the region in line with human rights standards.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population includes only conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. The IDP population also includes people in an IDP-like situation.

PEOPLE IN AN IDP-LIKE SITUATION refers to a category which is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are inside their country of nationality or habitual residence and who face protection risks similar to those of IDPs but who, for practical or other reasons, could not be reported as such.

RETURNED REFUGEES are former refugees who have returned to their countries of origin, either spontaneously or in an organized fashion, but are yet to be fully integrated. Such returns would ideally take place only under conditions of safety and dignity. For the purposes of this report, only refugees who returned between January and December 2019 are included, although in practice, operations may assist returnees for longer periods.

RETURNED IDPs refers to those IDPs who were beneficiaries of UNHCR's protection and assistance activities, and who returned to their areas of origin or habitual residence between January and December 2019. In practice, however, operations may assist IDP returnees for longer periods.

INDIVIDUALS UNDER UNHCR'S STATELESSNESS MANDATE are defined under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons as those not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any State. UNHCR statistics refer to people who fall under the organization's statelessness mandate as those who are stateless according to this international definition. Data from some countries may also include people with undetermined nationality. These are people who lack proof of possession of any nationality and at the same time have or are regarded as having important links to more than one State. UNHCR also works with populations at risk of statelessness, but persons at risk of statelessness are not reported on under the statistical category of individuals under UNHCR's statelessness mandate.

OTHER GROUPS OR PERSONS OF CONCERN refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups above but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.



Measuring forced displacement and statelessness

Established in 2016 by the UN Statistical Commission (UNSC), the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS) is tasked with addressing challenges associated with the collection, compilation and dissemination of statistics on refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs, including the lack of consistent terminology and difficulties in comparing statistics internationally. In 2018, the *International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics*⁷⁶ (IRRS) were endorsed by the UNSC and constitute an internationally accepted framework for statistics on refugee and refugee-related populations. EGRIS also developed a refugee statistics compilers' manual⁷⁷ with operational instructions established in compliance with the IRRS. In addition, the *International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics*⁷⁸ were adopted by

the UNSC in March 2020. For the first time, a comprehensive statistical framework exists for refugees and internally displaced persons. The Expert Group on Statelessness Statistics and the Inter-agency Group on Statelessness Estimation were established in 2019 with a view to support countries in improving statelessness statistics and to submit international recommendations on statelessness statistics to the UNSC in 2022.


FIGURE 30 shows the population groups referred to as refugee and refugee-related based on the definitions and concepts contained in the International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics. Persons in need of international protection comprises recognized refugees and persons with complementary, subsidiary and temporary forms of protection, and others in refugee-like situations. It can also include prospective asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers whose asylum claim is under consideration. It also includes children of refugees or asylum-seekers who may have been born in the country of asylum but did not acquire citizenship of that country and are therefore in need of international protection. These groups, normally excluding prospective asylum-seekers, are counted in UNHCR's asylum-seeker and refugee statistics, and they are counted under the numbers of forcibly displaced persons.

⁷⁶ See https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/Standards-and-Methods/files/Principles_and_Recommendations/International-Migration/2018_1746_EN_08-E.pdf

⁷⁷ See <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/51st-session/documents/BG-item-3n-compilers-manual-E.pdf>

⁷⁸ See <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/51st-session/documents/BG-item-3n-international-recommendations-on-IDP-statistics-E.pdf>

Figure 30 | Scope of the population of refugee and refugee-related populations




Persons with a refugee background includes naturalized former refugees, family members of refugees such as children born to refugees who acquired or are entitled to citizenship of the country of asylum, and reunified family members from abroad who are important groups but not considered as in need of international protection. They are, however, often of relevance to UNHCR. These groups are not counted among the figures on forcibly displaced persons.

Persons returned from abroad after seeking international protection, often called returnees, comprise repatriating refugees, repatriating asylum-seekers whose asylum application has been rejected, and other groups who sought or received forms of international protection and returned to their former country of habitual residence.

FIGURE 31 shows the percentage of refugees by data collection method used in each UNHCR region. UNHCR registration refers to refugees

who have been registered by the organization. Surveys, census data and other estimates are mostly obtained from governments and in few cases from NGOs. Government registration refers to data from administrative registers maintained by governments. The type of method used to obtain population data on refugees varies significantly across the regions. While registration data is used for the majority of refugees for which data was compiled in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, estimation methods using government data play a bigger role for refugee statistics in the Americas and the Southern Africa region. Combining UNHCR and government registration highlights the importance of establishing proper registration procedures not only for refugee statistics but more importantly for protecting and assisting refugees. This underscores the importance of ongoing coordination, cooperation and capacity building between UNHCR, national statistical offices and other relevant government agencies.

Figure 31 | **Data collection/compilation method for refugees, by UNHCR region | end-2019**



Internally displaced persons

IDPs are people who have been forced to leave or abandon their homes, and have not crossed an internationally recognized border. People flee within their own countries to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural- and human-made disasters. UNHCR compiles data only on conflict-generated IDPs to whom the organization extends protection and/or assistance. As such, UNHCR statistics do not provide a complete overview of global internal displacement. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) maintains a database on IDPs displaced due to violence and conflict, as well as due to disasters, providing a more comprehensive picture of global internal displacement. For the purpose of analysing global forced displacement, figures quoted in this report match the numbers on IDPs displaced by conflict or violence as reported in IDMC's Global Report on Forced Displacement 2020.⁷⁹ Data on IDPs comes from a wide range of methods and data compilers from NGOs to government offices, with methods including among others displacement tracking, household surveys, censuses and profiling exercises.

Stateless persons

UNHCR compiles figures on persons under its statelessness mandate for two population groups. The first are persons who meet the statelessness definition in the 1954 Convention because they are not considered as nationals of any State. The second group are persons with undetermined nationality, a population group for which UNHCR collects data in response to

Executive Committee Conclusion No. 106 from 2006.⁸⁰ While a formal definition of a person with undetermined nationality does not exist, UNHCR uses the working definition of a person who lacks proof of possession of any nationality and who at the same time has or is perceived as having important links to more than one State. Persons with undetermined nationality have in many cases a migratory history that leads to an unresolved nationality status. UNHCR previously also reported on de facto stateless populations but discontinued doing so in mid-2019 based on an assessment that de facto statelessness was often incorrectly used to refer to people who meet the statelessness definition in the 1954 Convention and who should therefore be reported as such. Over the past decade, these concepts and definitions have sometimes been applied inconsistently by UNHCR country operations for the annual statistical reporting process.⁸¹ It is therefore challenging to compare statelessness figures across different countries or even to compare figures in the same country for different years.

To identify stateless persons and develop reliable methods for statelessness estimation, it is important to recognize the different causes of statelessness. Nationality laws that are inconsistent with international standards and state succession are responsible for a significant proportion of today's known global stateless population. Migration, nomadism and forced displacement are additional potential causes of statelessness. Data on stateless persons is collected and compiled using a wide variety of methods including demographic and statistical estimates derived from survey and census data, administrative registers and data from statelessness determination procedures.

⁷⁹ <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/>

⁸⁰ UNHCR Executive Committee 56th session, Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons No. 106 (LVII) – 2006, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/453497302/conclusion-identification-prevention-reduction-statelessness-protection.html>

⁸¹ See technical paper "UNHCR Statistical Reporting on Statelessness" for details. <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5d9e182e7/unhcr-statistical-reporting-statelessness.html>



SUDAN. Returnees unable to return to their villages are stranded in an IDP camp.

"I saw [returning home] as a new beginning, but when we arrived in Sudan I was informed by neighbours in my village that my land was occupied by other people," explains Rawday.

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TABLE 1 | Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, others of concern to UNHCR and Venezuelans displaced abroad, by country/territory of asylum | end-2019

All data are provisional and subject to change.

Data is available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics>

A dash ("") indicates that the value is zero, not available or not applicable.

Country/territory of asylum ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Afghanistan	72,228	-	72,228	251	8,402	2,553,390	-	-	447,093	-	3,081,364
Albania ¹¹	128	-	128	3	-	-	-	3,687	155	-	3,973
Algeria ¹²	98,604	-	98,604	1,666	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,270
Angola	25,802	-	25,802	30,192	-	-	-	-	62	-	56,056
Anguilla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	11
Antigua and Barbuda	2	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Argentina	3,881	-	3,881	8,044	-	-	-	-	443	173,343	185,711
Armenia	3,412	14,573	17,985	173	-	-	-	961	-	-	19,119
Aruba	-	-	-	406	-	-	-	-	-	16,602	17,008
Australia ¹³	76,764	-	76,764	77,365	-	-	-	-	-	-	154,129
Austria	135,955	-	135,955	26,725	-	-	-	1,132	-	-	163,812
Azerbaijan	1,108	-	1,108	180	-	652,326	-	3,585	-	-	657,199
Bahamas	12	-	12	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Bahrain	255	-	255	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	312
Bangladesh ¹⁴	854,782	-	854,782	38	-	-	-	854,704	-	-	854,820
Barbados	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Belarus	2,734	-	2,734	143	-	-	-	6,466	-	-	9,343
Belgium	61,677	-	61,677	10,893	-	-	-	10,933	-	-	83,503
Belize	28	-	28	2,151	-	-	-	-	3,390	-	5,569
Benin	1,244	-	1,244	380	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,624
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	878	-	878	244	-	-	-	-	-	5,472	6,594
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5,248	-	5,248	726	-	96,421	-	75	53,725	-	156,195
Botswana	1,115	-	1,115	153	-	-	-	-	7	-	1,275
Brazil	32,860	-	32,860	207,309	-	-	-	7	-	123,507	363,683
British Virgin Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brunei Darussalam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,863	-	-	20,863
Bulgaria	20,451	-	20,451	1,070	-	-	-	116	-	-	21,637
Burkina Faso	25,868	-	25,868	34	-	560,033	-	-	-	-	585,935
Burundi	78,473	-	78,473	9,003	21,181	33,256	-	974	1,904	-	144,791
Cabo Verde	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	-	-	115
Cambodia	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	57,444	-	-	57,471
Cameroon	406,260	-	406,260	9,948	1	950,263	347,923	-	20	-	1,714,415
Canada	101,760	-	101,760	97,012	-	-	-	3,790	-	-	202,562
Cayman Islands	36	-	36	13	-	-	-	-	-	52	101
Central African Rep.	7,175	-	7,175	311	46,523	669,906	90,672	-	-	-	814,587
Chad	442,672	-	442,672	3,759	308	170,278	-	-	122,359	-	739,376
Chile	2,053	-	2,053	8,545	-	-	-	-	2,073	452,712	465,383
China, Hong Kong SAR	130	-	130	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	130

Country/territory of asylum ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
China, Macao SAR	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
China ¹⁵	303,381	-	303,381	660	-	-	-	-	-	-	304,041
Colombia ¹⁶	646	-	646	9,119	31	7,976,412	-	11	400,000	1,771,237	10,157,456
Congo, Republic of	25,670	-	25,670	14,416	4	134,430	5,312	-	11,773	-	191,605
Costa Rica	6,217	-	6,217	87,190	-	-	-	231	69	20,828	114,535
Côte d'Ivoire ¹⁷	2,021	-	2,021	169	3,252	-	-	955,399	69	-	960,910
Croatia	916	-	916	467	13	-	-	2,886	4,030	-	8,312
Cuba	237	-	237	33	-	-	-	-	3	-	273
Curaçao	47	-	47	348	-	-	-	-	-	16,190	16,585
Cyprus	12,325	-	12,325	18,843	-	-	-	-	4,000	-	35,168
Czechia	2,058	-	2,058	1,657	-	-	-	1,394	413	-	5,522
Dem. Rep. of the Congo ¹⁸	523,734	-	523,734	3,197	23,861	5,014,253	2,134,349	-	-	-	7,699,394
Denmark	37,540	-	37,540	1,452	-	-	-	8,672	-	-	47,664
Djibouti	19,641	-	19,641	11,153	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,794
Dominican Rep. ¹⁹	171	-	171	562	-	-	-	-	-	33,816	34,549
Ecuador	54,624	49,950	104,574	25,025	-	-	-	-	-	374,045	503,644
Egypt	258,401	-	258,401	66,335	-	-	-	4	-	-	324,740
El Salvador	52	-	52	33	-	71,500	-	-	6,800	-	78,385
Eritrea	199	-	199	-	434	-	-	-	17	-	650
Estonia ²⁰	334	-	334	39	-	-	-	75,599	-	-	75,972
Eswatini	945	-	945	976	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,921
Ethiopia	733,125	-	733,125	1,687	144	1,733,628	1,303,736	-	392	-	3,772,712
Fiji	13	-	13	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
Finland	23,473	-	23,473	8,335	-	-	-	2,801	-	-	34,609
France	407,923	-	407,923	102,157	-	-	-	1,521	-	-	511,601
Gabon	459	-	459	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	537
Gambia	4,308	-	4,308	209	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,517
Georgia	1,360	-	1,360	1,126	-	286,216	-	559	593	-	289,854
Germany	1,146,685	-	1,146,685	309,262	-	-	-	14,947	-	-	1,470,894
Ghana	11,948	-	11,948	1,515	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,463
Greece	68,219	12,249	80,468	105,698	-	-	-	4,734	-	-	190,900
Grenada	3	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Guatemala	416	-	416	632	-	-	-	-	110,600	-	111,648
Guinea	4,965	-	4,965	1,991	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,956
Guinea-Bissau	1,852	-	1,852	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,888
Guyana	17	-	17	62	-	-	-	-	1	22,000	22,080
Haiti	2	-	2	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
Honduras	76	-	76	110	-	247,090	-	6,000	-	-	253,276
Hungary	5,772	-	5,772	234	-	-	-	76	-	-	6,082
Iceland	916	-	916	407	-	-	-	48	-	-	1,371
India ²¹	195,105	-	195,105	12,229	-	-	-	17,730	-	-	207,334
Indonesia ²²	10,295	-	10,295	3,362	-	-	-	582	-	-	13,657
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	979,435	-	979,435	33	4	-	-	-	-	-	979,472
Iraq ²³	273,992	-	273,992	12,938	101	1,414,632	431,130	47,253	16	-	2,180,062

ANNEX TABLE 1

Country/territory of asylum ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Ireland	7,800	-	7,800	7,880	-	-	-	99	-	-	15,779
Israel	1,789	14,332	16,121	38,490	-	-	-	42	-	-	54,653
Italy	207,619	-	207,619	47,046	-	-	-	15,822	-	-	270,487
Jamaica	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	121	126
Japan ²⁴	1,465	-	1,465	29,123	-	-	-	687	-	-	31,275
Jordan ²⁵	693,684	-	693,684	51,305	-	-	-	-	2,127	-	747,116
Kazakhstan	524	-	524	218	-	-	-	8,386	-	-	9,128
Kenya	438,901	-	438,901	50,846	-	-	-	18,500	-	-	508,247
Kuwait	692	-	692	1,073	-	-	-	92,020	-	-	93,785
Kyrgyzstan ²⁶	353	-	353	164	-	-	-	58	-	-	575
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Latvia ²⁷	672	-	672	52	-	-	-	216,851	-	-	217,575
Lebanon	916,156	-	916,156	12,123	-	-	-	-	7,885	-	936,164
Lesotho	147	-	147	79	-	-	-	-	-	-	226
Liberia	8,238	-	8,238	16	6	-	-	-	-	-	8,260
Libya	4,739	-	4,739	40,719	-	355,672	4,369	-	-	-	405,499
Liechtenstein	132	-	132	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	162
Lithuania	1,826	-	1,826	424	-	-	-	2,904	-	-	5,154
Luxembourg	2,572	-	2,572	1,785	-	-	-	83	-	-	4,440
Madagascar	116	-	116	133	-	-	-	-	-	-	249
Malawi	14,086	-	14,086	30,299	-	-	-	-	237	-	44,622
Malaysia ²⁸	127,940	1,155	129,095	50,649	-	-	-	108,332	55,000	-	243,784
Mali	26,670	-	26,670	1,008	5,249	207,751	35,101	-	-	-	275,779
Malta	8,911	-	8,911	3,690	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,601
Mauritania	58,909	26,000	84,909	1,549	-	-	-	-	-	-	86,458
Mauritius	20	-	20	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	27
Mexico	28,533	-	28,533	69,470	-	-	-	13	140,710	52,982	291,708
Monaco	22	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
Mongolia	6	-	6	4	-	-	-	17	10	-	37
Montenegro	662	-	662	489	-	-	-	142	12,275	-	13,568
Morocco	6,656	-	6,656	3,100	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,756
Mozambique	4,708	-	4,708	20,983	-	180,516	-	-	-	-	206,207
Myanmar ²⁹	-	-	-	-	879	312,018	1,641	600,000	-	-	773,652
Namibia	3,188	-	3,188	1,909	14	-	-	-	9	-	5,120
Nauru	763	-	763	416	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,179
Nepal ³⁰	19,574	-	19,574	60	-	-	-	-	534	-	20,168
Netherlands	94,430	-	94,430	15,622	-	-	-	1,951	-	-	112,003
New Zealand	2,747	-	2,747	579	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,326
Nicaragua	327	-	327	131	-	-	-	-	514	1	973
Niger	180,006	-	180,006	37,919	-	191,902	-	-	32,072	-	441,899
Nigeria	54,166	-	54,166	1,033	134	2,195,779	18,356	-	-	-	2,269,468
North Macedonia	208	145	353	80	-	-	-	567	-	-	1,000
Norway	53,888	-	53,888	1,538	-	-	-	2,272	-	-	57,698
Oman	307	-	307	256	-	-	-	-	-	-	563
Pakistan	1419,606	-	1,419,606	8,541	7	100,680	18	-	-	-	1,528,852

Country/territory of asylum ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Panama	2,557	-	2,557	17,682	-	-	-	-	-	115,768	136,007
Papua New Guinea	9,707	-	9,707	133	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,840
Paraguay	1,016	-	1,016	694	-	-	-	-	-	3,588	5,298
Peru	2,879	-	2,879	487,078	-	-	-	-	-	377,864	867,821
Philippines ³¹	690	-	690	333	-	178,897	115,106	383	129,734	-	425,143
Poland	12,673	-	12,673	4,791	-	-	-	1,328	-	-	18,792
Portugal	2,387	-	2,387	1,079	-	-	-	14	-	-	3,480
Qatar	203	-	203	100	-	-	-	1,200	-	-	1,503
Rep. of Korea	3,215	-	3,215	25,577	-	-	-	197	-	-	28,989
Rep. of Moldova	423	-	423	107	-	-	-	3,500	-	-	4,030
Romania	3,882	-	3,882	922	-	-	-	192	-	-	4,996
Russian Federation	42,433	-	42,433	1,462	5	-	-	68,209	-	-	112,109
Rwanda	145,057	-	145,057	495	2,149	-	-	-	5,324	-	153,025
Saint Kitts and Nevis	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Saint Lucia	2	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	38
Samoa	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Saudi Arabia ³²	320	-	320	2,331	-	-	-	70,000	-	-	72,651
Senegal	14,469	-	14,469	1,804	-	-	-	-	-	-	16,273
Serbia and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)	26,433	-	26,433	282	39	214,696	165	1,951	5,833	-	249,399
Sierra Leone	443	-	443	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	443
Singapore	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	1,303	1	-	1,306
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	6	-	6	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	10
Slovakia	977	-	977	10	-	-	-	1,523	-	-	2,510
Slovenia	751	-	751	329	-	-	-	4	-	-	1,084
Solomon Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	17,883	-	17,883	17,789	6,243	2,648,000	22,555	-	152	-	2,712,622
South Africa ³³	89,285	-	89,285	188,296	-	-	-	-	-	-	277,581
South Sudan	298,313	-	298,313	3,682	99,817	1,665,815	276,463	-	10,000	-	2,354,090
Spain	57,761	-	57,761	133,030	-	-	-	4,246	-	-	195,037
Sri Lanka	1,045	-	1,045	361	1,068	25,110	10,363	-	-	-	37,947
Sudan	1,055,489	-	1,055,489	15,545	2,191	1,885,782	-	-	3,694	-	2,962,701
Suriname	52	-	52	1,429	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,481
Sweden	253,794	-	253,794	28,075	-	-	-	30,305	-	-	312,174
Switzerland	110,168	-	110,168	11,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	121,368
Syrian Arab Rep. ³⁴	16,213	-	16,213	12,069	94,977	6,146,994	477,360	160,000	30,971	-	6,938,584
Tajikistan	3,791	-	3,791	1,413	-	-	-	7,151	-	-	12,355
Thailand ³⁵	50,067	47,504	97,571	847	-	-	-	475,009	119	-	573,425
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Togo	11,968	-	11,968	696	30	-	-	-	-	-	12,694
Tonga	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Trinidad and Tobago	2,321	-	2,321	17,367	-	-	-	-	200	7,664	27,552
Tunisia	1,746	-	1,746	1,523	-	-	-	-	17	-	3,286
Turkey ³⁶	3,579,531	-	3,579,531	328,257	-	-	-	-	1	-	3,907,789

ANNEX TABLE 1

Country/territory of asylum ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Turkmenistan ³⁷	22	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	3,688	-	-
Turks and Caicos Islands	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Uganda	1,359,464	-	1,359,464	21,658	3	-	-	-	2,304,506	-	3,685,631
Ukraine ³⁸	2,172	-	2,172	2,430	1	734,000	-	35,642	1,680,000	-	2,454,245
United Arab Emirates	1,247	-	1,247	7,270	-	-	-	-	-	136	-
United Kingdom	133,094	-	133,094	61,968	-	-	-	161	-	-	195,223
United Rep. of Tanzania	242,171	-	242,171	29,558	-	-	-	-	23,866	-	295,595
United States of America	341,711	-	341,711	847,601	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,189,312
Uruguay	516	-	516	13,750	-	-	-	-	-	2	14,362
Uzbekistan ³⁹	14	-	14	-	1	-	-	97,346	-	-	97,361
Vanuatu	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	8,945	58,810	67,755	49	-	-	-	-	494,503	-	562,307
Viet Nam	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	30581	-	-	30,582
Yemen	268,511	-	268,511	10,682	3	3,625,716	69,174	-	14	-	3,974,100
Zambia	57,521	-	57,521	5,075	-	-	-	-	23,275	-	85,871
Zimbabwe ⁴⁰	8,959	-	8,959	11,533	132	270,000	-	-	959	-	291,583
Total	20,221,181	224,718	20,445,899	4,149,853	317,207	43,503,362	5,343,793	4,161,979	6,140,688	3,582,203	86,531,669

UNHCR Bureaus											
- West and Central Africa	1,204,732	-	1204,732	60,906	55,503	4,945,912	492,052	955,514	154,520	-	7,869,139
- East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes	4,388,716	-	4,388,716	161,416	132,162	7,966,481	1,602,754	19,474	2,349,855	-	16,620,858
- Southern Africa	755,296	-	755,296	307,248	24,011	5,599,199	2,139,661	-	36,322	-	8,861,737
Total Africa	6,348,744	-	6,348,744	529,570	211,676	18,511,592	4,234,467	974,988	2,540,697	-	33,351,734
Americas	592,892	108,760	701,652	1,902,133	31	8,295,002	-	4,052	1,165,309	3,582,203	15,650,382
Asia and the Pacific	4,133,666	48,659	4,182,325	212,396	10,361	3,170,095	127,128	2,284,461	632,492	-	9,505,943
Europe	6,543,455	26,967	6,570,422	1,242,168	58	1,983,659	165	527,959	1,761,024	-	12,085,455
Middle East and North Africa	2,602,424	40,332	2,642,756	263,586	95,081	11,543,014	982,033	370,519	41,166	-	15,938,155
Total	20,221,181	224,718	20,445,899	4,149,853	317,207	43,503,362	5,343,793	4,161,979	6,140,688	3,582,203	86,531,669

UN major regions											
Africa	6,777,799	26,000	6,803,799	644,462	211,676	18,867,264	4,238,836	974,992	2,540,714	-	34,281,743
Asia	9,814,777	77,564	9,892,341	631,166	105,442	15,295,979	1,104,792	2,660,082	678,233	-	29,254,720
Europe	2,945,719	12,394	2,958,113	893,589	58	1,045,117	165	522,853	1,756,431	-	7,176,326
Latin America	146,741	108,760	255,501	937,289	31	8,295,002	-	262	1,165,107	3,485,709	14,138,901
North America and the Caribbean	446,151	-	446,151	964,844	-	-	-	3,790	202	96,494	1,511,481
Oceania	89,994	-	89,994	78,503	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Total	20,221,181	224,718	20,445,899	4,149,853	317,207	43,503,362	5,343,793	4,161,979	6,140,688	3,582,203	86,531,669

NOTES

The data are generally provided by governments, based on their own definitions and methods of data collection.

- 1** Country or territory of asylum or residence.
- 2** Refugees include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.
- 3** This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.
- 4** Asylum-seekers (with pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this table refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2019, irrespective of when those claims may have been lodged.
- 5** Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during 2019. Source: country of origin and asylum.
- 6** IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population includes only conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance.
- 7** IDPs of concern to UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during 2019.
- 8** Refers to persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. This category refers to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality. The figure reported includes stateless persons who are also refugees or asylum-seekers from Myanmar, IDPs in Myanmar, or others of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a methodology that reports on one legal status for each person of concern only. However, due to the extraordinary size of the displaced stateless population from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status that this population group possesses, pending a review of UNHCR reporting on statelessness. See Annex Table 5 at <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/2019GTannextableSTA.xls> for detailed notes.
- 9** Refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups above but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.
- 10** Venezuelans displaced abroad refers to persons of Venezuelan origin who are likely to be in need of international protection under the criteria contained in the Cartagena Declaration, but who have not applied for asylum in the country in which they are present. Regardless of status, Venezuelans displaced abroad require protection against forced returns, and access to basic services. UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration work together with this population by leading the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, which is aimed at strengthening the protection dimensions and consistent responses across the region in line with human rights standards.
- 11** The statelessness figure refers to a census from 2011 and has been adjusted to reflect the number of persons with undetermined nationality who had their nationality confirmed in 2011–2019.
- 12** According to the Government of Algeria, there are an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps. Statistical data relating to refugees are entirely for humanitarian purposes. The total number of persons in need of humanitarian assistance services is estimated to be far higher than this figure.
- 13** The methodology for estimating the number of refugees in Australia is under review and subject to adjustment in future reports. The asylum-seeker figure is based on the number of applications lodged for protection visas.
- 14** The figure reported includes 854,704 stateless persons of Rohingya ethnicity who are also counted as refugees from Myanmar, mainly from Rakhine State. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a methodology that reports only one legal status for each person of concern. However, due to the size of the
- stateless Rohingya population displaced from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status of this population group as both displaced and stateless. This approach has been used for Bangladesh since 2017.
- 15** The 303,100 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection from the Government of China.
- 16** The figure of Others of concern has been provided by the Government of Colombia. With regard to the statelessness figures, in 2019, Colombia granted nationality by birth to 28,500 children with undetermined nationality born in Colombia to Venezuelan parents displaced abroad. As these children were both identified as persons with undetermined nationality and granted Colombian nationality in 2019, there was no impact on the figures reported.
- 17** The new statelessness figure is based on a 2019 mapping study jointly conducted by the Government and UNHCR.
- 18** The figure of IDP returns was released by the "Commissions de mouvements de population" and covers the period from April 2018 to September 2019.
- 19** UNHCR is currently working with the authorities and other actors to determine the size of the population that found an effective nationality solution under Law 169-14. Since the adoption of Law 169-14 in May 2014, important steps have been taken by the Dominican Republic to confirm Dominican nationality through the validation of birth certificates of individuals born in the country to two migrant parents before 2007. According to information shared by the Dominican delegation during the 2019 High-Level Segment on Statelessness, approximately 48 per cent of the total Group A population of 61,049 persons had been authorized by the National Electoral Board (JCE) to request their nationality documentation. Additionally, as of December 2019, over 1,700 Group B persons (900 of which were children) had submitted applications for naturalization to the Ministry of Interior and of the Police (MIP). However, no naturalization decisions concerning this population have been issued to date.
- 20** Almost all people recorded as being stateless have permanent residence and enjoy more rights than foreseen in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.
- 21** The total statelessness figure reported relates to 17,730 stateless persons of Rohingya ethnicity who are also counted as refugees or asylum-seekers from Myanmar, mainly from Rakhine State. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a methodology that reports only one legal status for each person of concern. However, due to the size of the stateless Rohingya population displaced from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status of this population group as both displaced and stateless. This approach is being used for India for the first time in 2019.
- 22** The total statelessness figure reported relates to 582 stateless persons of Rohingya ethnicity who are also counted as refugees or asylum-seekers from Myanmar, mainly from Rakhine State. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a methodology that reports only one legal status for each person of concern. However, due to the size of the stateless Rohingya population displaced from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status of this population group as both displaced and stateless. This approach is being used for Indonesia for the first time in 2019. There are also indications that a potentially sizable population of non-displaced stateless persons exists for whom no data is available.
- 23** Pending a more accurate study into statelessness in Iraq, the figure is an estimate based on various sources.
- 24** Figures are UNHCR estimates.
- 25** The refugee population in Jordan includes 34,300 Iraqis registered with UNHCR. The Government of Jordan estimated the number of Iraqis at 400,000 individuals at the end of March 2015. This includes refugees and other categories of Iraqis.
- 26** All 58 persons were in the final stages of naturalization or citizenship confirmation formalities.
- 27** With respect to persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate, this figure includes persons of concern covered by two separate Latvian laws. 169 persons fall under the Republic of Latvia's Law on Stateless Persons of 17 February 2004. 216,682 of the persons fall under Latvia's 25 April 1995 Law on the Status of those Former USSR Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State ("Non-citizens"). In the specific context of Latvia, the "Non-citizens" enjoy the right to reside in Latvia ex lege and a set of rights and obligations generally beyond the rights prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, including protection from removal, and as such the "Non-citizens" may currently be considered persons to whom the Convention does not apply in accordance with Article 1.2(ii).
- 28** The total stateless population in Malaysia includes 9,040 non-displaced stateless persons who may be entitled to Malaysian nationality under the law. This number of non-displaced stateless persons is based on a registration and community legal assistance programme undertaken in West Malaysia by a local NGO with technical support from UNHCR, and, among those registered, 930 persons acquired Malaysian nationality in 2019.

TABLE 2 | Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, others of concern to UNHCR and Venezuelans displaced abroad, by origin | end-2019

All data are provisional and subject to change.

Data is available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics>

A dash ("") indicates that the value is zero, not available or not applicable.

Origin ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Afghanistan	2,721,475	7,383	2,728,858	251,042	8,402	2,553,390	-	-	450,675	-	5,992,367
Albania	15,034	-	15,034	19,007	-	-	-	-	1	-	34,042
Algeria	4,539	1	4,540	7,494	-	-	-	-	104	-	12,138
Andorra	3	-	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Angola	8,190	-	8,190	10,783	-	-	-	-	18,242	-	37,215
Antigua and Barbuda	119	-	119	63	-	-	-	-	-	-	182
Argentina	107	-	107	934	-	-	-	-	3	-	1,044
Armenia	10,967	-	10,967	11,107	-	-	-	-	4	-	22,078
Aruba	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Australia	15	3	18	58	-	-	-	-	-	-	76
Austria	20	-	20	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	32
Azerbaijan	11,053	573	11,626	8,239	-	652,326	-	-	1	-	672,192
Bahamas	498	-	498	519	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,017
Bahrain	560	-	560	151	-	-	-	-	1	-	712
Bangladesh	22,871	24	22,895	34,535	-	-	-	-	503	-	57,933
Barbados	246	-	246	117	-	-	-	-	-	-	363
Belarus	3,434	-	3,434	4,029	-	-	-	-	2	-	7,465
Belgium	37	-	37	106	-	-	-	-	-	-	143
Belize	73	-	73	278	-	-	-	-	-	-	351
Benin	722	-	722	1,181	-	-	-	-	6	-	1,909
Bhutan	6,989	-	6,989	414	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,403
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	522	-	522	1,246	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,768
Bosnia and Herzegovina	16,559	-	16,559	1,484	-	96,421	-	-	48,907	-	163,371
Botswana	232	-	232	132	-	-	-	-	-	-	364
Brazil	1,402	-	1,402	12,054	-	-	-	-	1	-	13,457
Brunei Darussalam	5	-	5	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Bulgaria	567	-	567	351	-	-	-	-	4	-	922
Burkina Faso	11,742	-	11,742	4,967	-	560,033	-	-	2,190	-	578,932
Burundi	381,515	-	381,515	46,008	21,181	33,256	-	-	17,606	-	499,566
Cabo Verde	13	-	13	246	-	-	-	-	-	-	259
Cambodia	11,931	56	11,987	844	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,831
Cameroon	66,301	-	66,301	19,904	1	950,263	347,923	-	9	-	1,384,401
Canada	73	-	73	102	-	-	-	-	3	-	178
Cayman Islands	8	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Central African Rep.	610,215	-	610,215	15,955	46,523	669,906	90,672	-	1,571	-	1,434,842
Chad	11,202	-	11,202	5,354	308	170,278	-	-	122,368	-	309,510
Chile	493	-	493	1,249	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,742
China	212,885	-	212,885	104,169	-	-	-	-	-	-	317,054
China, Hong Kong SAR	8	-	8	228	-	-	-	-	-	-	236
China, Macao SAR	1	-	1	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	33
Colombia ¹¹	80,694	108,760	189,454	75,550	31	7,976,412	-	-	400,001	-	8,641,448
Comoros	656	-	656	1,451	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,107
Congo, Republic of	13,479	-	13,479	3,128	4	134,430	5,312	-	38	-	156,391
Costa Rica	210	-	210	746	-	-	-	-	-	-	956
Côte d'Ivoire	39,375	-	39,375	19,716	3,252	-	-	-	34	-	62,377
Croatia	23,799	-	23,799	72	13	-	-	-	3,754	-	27,638
Cuba	6,638	-	6,638	55,942	-	-	-	-	1	-	62,581
Curaçao	35	-	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
Cyprus	4	-	4	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Czechia	1,168	-	1,168	183	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,351

Origin ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Dem. People's Rep. of Korea	762	-	762	124	-	-	-	-	-	-	886
Dem. Rep. of the Congo ¹²	807,170	210	807,380	109,393	23,861	5,014,253	2,134,349	-	13,130	-	8,102,366
Denmark	8	-	8	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
Djibouti	2,353	-	2,353	850	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,203
Dominica	51	-	51	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	135
Dominican Rep.	548	-	548	4,033	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,581
Ecuador	1,662	-	1,662	19,349	-	-	-	-	-	-	21,011
Egypt	27,519	-	27,519	16,371	-	-	-	-	351	-	44,241
El Salvador	41,850	-	41,850	136,292	-	71,500	-	-	33,192	-	282,834
Equatorial Guinea	165	-	165	185	-	-	-	-	-	-	350
Eritrea	493,119	12,015	505,134	71,083	434	-	-	-	134	-	576,785
Estonia	270	-	270	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	316
Eswatini	216	-	216	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	300
Ethiopia	95,688	-	95,688	84,000	144	1,733,628	1,303,736	-	3,877	-	3,221,073
Fiji	593	-	593	2,343	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,936
Finland	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
France	50	-	50	274	-	-	-	-	-	-	324
French Guiana	1	-	1	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	25
Gabon	442	-	442	901	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,343
Gambia	17,827	-	17,827	9,174	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,001
Georgia	7,515	-	7,515	19,733	-	286,216	-	-	-	-	313,464
Germany	73	-	73	207	-	-	-	-	-	-	280
Ghana	18,444	-	18,444	8,716	-	-	-	-	3	-	27,163
Gibraltar	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Greece	97	-	97	141	-	-	-	-	-	-	238
Grenada	81	-	81	86	-	-	-	-	-	-	167
Guadeloupe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guam	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Guatemala	22,774	-	22,774	119,536	-	-	-	-	47,835	-	190,145
Guinea	26,855	-	26,855	30,371	-	-	-	-	3	-	57,229
Guinea-Bissau	2,094	-	2,094	2,661	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,755
Guyana	288	-	288	682	-	-	-	-	1	-	971
Haiti	26,746	-	26,746	65,699	-	-	-	-	-	-	92,445
Holy See (the)	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Honduras	26,374	-	26,374	122,486	-	247,090	-	-	72,837	-	468,787
Hungary	4004	-	4,004	675	-	-	-	-	4	-	4,683
Iceland	.6	-	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
India	11,989	4	11,993	61,310	-	-	-	-	299	-	73,602
Indonesia	11,086	976	12,062	4,336	-	-	-	-	4	-	16,402
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	129,675	-	129,675	86,084	4	-	-	-	407	-	216,170
Iraq ¹³	343,850	628	344,478	302,720	101	1,414,632	431,130	-	31,760	-	2,524,821
Ireland	4	-	4	91	-	-	-	-	-	-	95
Israel	463	-	463	714	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,177
Italy	76	-	76	438	-	-	-	-	-	-	514
Jamaica	2,540	-	2,540	1,806	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,346
Japan	44	-	44	118	-	-	-	-	-	-	162
Jordan	2,397	2	2,399	4,740	-	-	-	-	1,955	-	9,094
Kazakhstan	2,770	-	2,770	6,994	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,764
Kenya	8,023	-	8,023	6,871	-	-	-	-	6	-	14,900
Kiribati	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Kuwait	1,307	-	1,307	1,414	-	-	-	-	6	-	2,727
Kyrgyzstan	2,969	-	2,969	2,590	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,559
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	6,753	-	6,753	395	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,148
Latvia	148	-	148	104	-	-	-	-	-	-	252
Lebanon	5,819	1	5,820	8,055	-	-	-	-	5,027	-	18,902
Lesotho	13	-	13	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	38
Liberia	5,399	-	5,399	2,913	6	-	-	-	35	-	8,353
Libya	16,041	-	16,041	6,004	-	355,672	4,369	-	43	-	382,129
Liechtenstein	2	-	2	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Lithuania	68	-	68	91	-	-	-	-	-	-	159

ANNEX TABLE 2

Origin ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Luxembourg	4	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Madagascar	301	-	301	266	-	-	-	-	-	-	567
Malawi	609	-	609	560	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,169
Malaysia	1,155	-	1,155	21,265	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,420
Maldives	76	-	76	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	91
Mali	164,480	-	164,480	8,468	5,249	207,751	35,101	-	6	-	421,055
Malta	4	-	4	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Marshall Islands	7	-	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Martinique	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Mauritania	37,427	-	37,427	8,585	-	-	-	-	1	-	46,013
Mauritius	183	-	183	308	-	-	-	-	-	-	491
Mexico	14,623	-	14,623	101,670	-	-	-	-	-	-	116,293
Monaco	3	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	5
Mongolia	2,372	-	2,372	4,067	-	-	-	-	10	-	6,449
Montenegro	662	-	662	608	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,270
Morocco	4,647	5	4,652	8,328	-	-	-	-	259	-	13,239
Mozambique	80	-	80	8,323	-	180,516	-	-	-	-	188,919
Myanmar	1,030,767	47,508	1,078,275	37,474	879	312,018	1,641	-	119	-	1,430,287
Namibia	464	-	464	768	14	-	-	-	-	-	1,246
Nauru	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
Nepal	8,194	6	8,200	9,795	-	-	-	-	345	-	18,340
Netherlands	58	-	58	106	-	-	-	-	-	-	164
New Zealand	37	-	37	25	-	-	-	-	1	-	63
Nicaragua	4,377	-	4,377	66,869	-	-	-	-	224	-	71,470
Niger	3,077	-	3,077	1,706	-	191,902	-	-	29,882	-	226,567
Nigeria	295,591	-	295,591	106,028	134	2,195,779	18,356	-	8	-	2,615,896
Niue	19	-	19	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	25
North Macedonia	1,793	-	1,793	2,528	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,321
Norway	9	-	9	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Oman	46	-	46	58	-	-	-	-	974	-	1,078
Pakistan	137,183	12	137,195	55,979	7	100,680	18	-	2,872	-	296,751
Palau	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Palestinian ¹⁴	96,340	-	96,340	11,530	-	-	-	-	1,105	-	108,975
Panama	54	-	54	240	-	-	-	-	-	-	294
Papua New Guinea	478	-	,478	554	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,032
Paraguay	87	-	87	642	-	-	-	-	-	-	729
Peru	2,767	-	2,767	8,672	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,439
Philippines	544	19	563	4,750	-	178,897	115,106	-	55,031	-	354,347
Poland	965	-	965	1,030	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,995
Portugal	22	-	22	342	-	-	-	-	-	-	364
Puerto Rico	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Qatar	36	-	36	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
Rep. of Korea	184	-	184	649	-	-	-	-	-	-	833
Rep. of Moldova	2,431	1	2,432	5,664	-	-	-	-	2	-	8,098
Romania	1,354	-	1,354	3,928	-	-	-	-	1	-	5,283
Russian Federation	62,346	-	62,346	48,304	5	-	-	-	3	-	110,658
Rwanda	246,710	-	246,710	14,646	2,149	-	-	-	15,566	-	279,071
Saint Kitts and Nevis	56	-	56	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	75
Saint Lucia	844	-	844	75	-	-	-	-	-	-	919
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	976	-	976	76	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,052
Saint Martin (French part)	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Samoa	1	-	1	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	86
San Marino	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

Origin ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
Sao Tome and Principe	27	-	27	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	56
Saudi Arabia	1,767	-	1,767	1,425	-	-	-	-	26	-	3,218
Senegal	17,216	-	17,216	14,429	-	-	-	-	-	-	31,645
Serbia and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)	31,112	145	31,257	7,463	39	214,696	165	-	1	-	253,621
Seychelles	15	-	15	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
Sierra Leone	5,269	-	5,269	7,285	-	-	-	-	1	-	12,555
Singapore	42	-	42	85	-	-	-	-	1	-	128
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Slovakia	1,346	-	1,346	236	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,582
Slovenia	23	-	23	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
Solomon Islands	27	-	27	229	-	-	-	-	-	-	256
Somalia	904,659	463	905,122	48,039	6,243	2,648,000	22,555	-	160	-	3,630,119
South Africa	453	-	453	2,865	-	-	-	-	6	-	3,324
South Sudan	2,234,793	41	2,234,834	5,636	99,817	1,665,815	276,463	-	10,001	-	4,292,566
Spain	54	-	54	295	-	-	-	-	-	-	349
Sri Lanka	110,355	-	110,355	16,053	1,068	25,110	10,363	-	9	-	162,958
Sudan	732,844	2,100	734,944	71,982	2,191	1,885,782	-	-	16	-	2,694,915
Suriname	16	-	16	75	-	-	-	-	-	-	91
Sweden	14	-	14	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	55
Switzerland	7	-	7	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	27
Syrian Arab Rep.	6,599,253	17,741	6,616,994	118,445	94,977	6,146,994	477,360	-	7,613	-	13,462,383
Tajikistan	1,997	-	1,997	2,676	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,673
Thailand	468	24	492	3491	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,983
Tibetan	12,713	-	12,713	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,713
Timor-Leste	17	1	18	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	51
Togo	8,033	-	8,033	3,378	30	-	-	-	-	-	11,441
Tonga	33	-	33	418	-	-	-	-	-	-	451
Trinidad and Tobago	307	-	307	409	-	-	-	-	200	-	916
Tunisia	2,070	-	2,070	2,674	-	-	-	-	16	-	4,760
Turkey	83,270	-	83,270	46,943	-	-	-	-	58	-	130,271
Turkmenistan	481	-	481	590	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,071
Turks and Caicos Islands	16	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Tuvalu	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Uganda	7,487	-	7,487	7,065	3	-	-	-	2,304,515	-	2,319,070
Ukraine ¹⁵	59,850	-	59,850	28,008	1	734,000	-	-	1,680,260	-	2,502,119
United Arab Emirates	162	-	162	191	-	-	-	-	-	-	353
United Kingdom	64	6	70	235	-	-	-	-	3	-	308
United Rep. of Tanzania	865	-	865	1,408	-	-	-	-	47	-	2,320
United States of America ¹⁶	308	7	315	2,941	-	-	-	-	13	-	3,269
Uruguay	24	-	24	320	-	-	-	-	1	-	345
Uzbekistan	3,228	-	3,228	5,011	1	-	-	-	2	-	8,242
Vanuatu	1	-	1	81	-	-	-	-	-	-	82
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	93,291	-	93,291	794,502	-	-	-	-	494,504	3,582,203	4,964,500
Viet Nam ¹⁷	316,435	3	316,438	8,111	-	-	-	-	68	-	324,617
Western Sahara ¹⁸	90,909	26,000	116,909	960	-	-	-	-	3	-	117,872
Yemen	36,527	-	36,527	34,331	3	3,625,716	69,174	-	45	-	3,765,796
Zambia	277	-	277	243	-	-	-	-	6	-	526
Zimbabwe	10,616	-	10,616	3,375	132	270,000	-	-	122	-	284,245
Stateless	68,787	-	68,787	7,262	-	-	-	4,161,979	-	-	3,124,832
Various/unknown	183,435	-	183,435	310,706	-	-	-	-	259,642	-	753,783
Total	20,221,181	224,718	20,445,899	4149,853	317,207	43,503,362	5,343,793	4,161,979	6,140,688	3,582,203	86,531,669

ANNEX TABLE 2

Origin ¹	REFUGEES			Asylum-seekers (pending cases) ⁴	Returned refugees ⁵	IDPs of concern to UNHCR ⁶	Returned IDPs ⁷	Persons under UNHCR's statelessness mandate ⁸	Others of concern to UNHCR ⁹	Venezuelans displaced abroad ¹⁰	Total population of concern
	Refugees ²	People in refugee-like situations ³	Total refugees and people in refugee-like situations								
UNHCR Bureaus											
- West and Central Africa	1,304,489	-	1,304,489	263,567	55,503	4,945,912	492,052	-	156,116	-	7,217,639
- East and Horn of Africa and Great Lakes	5,108,056	14,619	5,122,675	357,588	132,162	7,966,481	1,602,754	-	2,351,928	-	17,533,588
- Southern Africa	842,954	210	843,164	141,712	24,011	5,599,199	2,139,661	-	31,544	-	8,779,291
Total Africa	7,255,499	14,829	7,270,328	762,867	211,676	18,511,592	4,234,467	-	2,539,588	-	33,530,518
Americas	331,781	108,767	440,548	1,595,392	31	8,295,002	-	-	1,048,817	3,582,203	14,961,993
Asia and the Pacific	4,769,641	56,019	4,825,660	727,089	10,361	3,170,095	127,128	-	510,346	-	9,370,560
Europe	340,359	725	341,084	212,306	58	1,983,659	,165	-	1,733,006	-	4,270,278
Middle East and North Africa	7,271,679	44,378	7,316,057	534,231	95,081	11,543,014	982,033	-	49,289	-	20,519,705
Various/Stateless	252,222	-	252,222	317,968	-	-	-	4,161,979	259,642	-	3,878,615
Total	20,221,181	224,718	20,445,899	4,149,853	317,207	43,503,362	5,343,793	4,161,979	6,140,688	3,582,203	86,531,669
UN major regions											
Africa	7438,651	40,835	7,479,486	813,283	211,676	18,867,264	4,238,836	-	2,540,365	-	34,150,910
Asia	11,969,760	74,961	12,044,721	1,293,145	105,442	15,295,979	1,104,792	-	558,920	-	30,402,880
Europe	227,550	152	227,702	126,248	58	1,045,117	165	-	1,732,943	-	3,132,233
Latin America	298,022	108,760	406,782	1,518,577	31	8,295,002	-	-	1,048,599	3,582,203	14,851,194
North America and the Caribbean	33,759	7	33,766	76,815	-	-	-	-	218	-	110,799
Oceania	1,217	3	1,220	3,817	-	-	-	-	1	-	5,038
Various/Stateless	252,222	-	252,222	317,968	-	-	-	4,161,979	259,642	-	3,878,615
Total	20,221,181	224,718	20,445,899	4,149,853	317,207	43,503,362	5,343,793	4,161,979	6,140,688	3,582,203	86,531,669

NOTES

The data are generally provided by governments, based on their own definitions and methods of data collection.

1 Country or territory of origin.

2 Refugees include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.

3 This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

4 Asylum-seekers (with pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this table refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2019, irrespective of when those claims may have been lodged.

5 Refugees who have returned to their place of origin during 2019. Source: country of origin and asylum.

6 IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population includes only conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance.

7 IDPs of concern to UNHCR who have returned to their place of origin during 2019.

8 Refers to persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. This category refers to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality. The figure reported includes stateless persons who are also refugees or asylum-seekers from Myanmar, IDPs in Myanmar, or others of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR's statistical reporting generally follows a

methodology that reports on one legal status for each person of concern only. However, due to the extraordinary size of the displaced stateless population from Myanmar, UNHCR considers it important to reflect the dual status that this population group possesses, pending a review of UNHCR reporting on statelessness. See Annex Table 5 at <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/2019GTannextableSTA.xls> for detailed notes.

9 Refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of these groups above but to whom UNHCR has extended its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

10 Venezuelans displaced abroad refers to persons of Venezuelan origin who are likely to be in need of international protection under the criteria contained in the Cartagena Declaration, but who have not applied for asylum in the country in which they are present. Regardless of status, Venezuelans displaced abroad require protection against forced returns, and access to basic services. UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration work together with this population by leading the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, which is aimed at strengthening the protection dimensions and consistent responses across the region in line with human rights standards.

11 The figure of Others of concern has been provided by the Government of Colombia.

12 The figure of IDP returns was released by the "Commissions de mouvements de population" and covers the period from April 2018 to September 2019.

13 The refugee population in Jordan includes 34,300 Iraqis registered with UNHCR. The Government of Jordan estimated the number of Iraqis at 400,000 individuals at the end of March 2015. This includes refugees and other categories of Iraqis.

14 Refers to Palestinian refugees under the UNHCR mandate only.

15 The IDP figure has been aligned to the inter-agency methodology as defined in the 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview. Figure of others of concern relates to persons who have specific protection needs and live in non-government-controlled areas or within 20 km of the contact line in government-controlled areas.

16 A limited number of countries record refugee and asylum statistics by country of birth rather than country of origin. This affects the number of refugees reported as originating from the United States of America.

17 The 303,100 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection from the Government of China.

18 According to the Government of Algeria, there are an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps. Statistical data relating to refugees are entirely for humanitarian purposes. The total number of persons in need of humanitarian assistance services is estimated to be far higher than this figure.



BURKINA FASO. A Malian refugee girl in Goudoubo camp in Burkina Faso. There are currently more than 25,400 Malian refugees seeking safety in Burkina Faso, a country which is experiencing massive and rapid forced displacement.”

© UNHCR/JERRY DE MARS

At the end of 2019, the total population of concern to UNHCR stood at 86.5 million people. This included people who have been forcibly displaced (refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced people and Venezuelans displaced abroad); those who have found a durable solution (returnees) within the previous year; stateless individuals, most of whom have never been forcibly displaced; and other groups of concern to whom UNHCR has extended its protection or provided assistance on a humanitarian basis. Therefore, this categorization is different from the 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide – a figure that includes refugees and other displaced people not covered by UNHCR’s mandate and excludes other categories such as returnees and non-displaced stateless people. A detailed breakdown of UNHCR’s population of concern by category and country is provided in Annex Table 1.

Annex tables 3 through 21 can be downloaded from the UNHCR website at:
<https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/2019GTannex.zip>

Annex table 5:
<https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/2019GTannextableSTA.xlsx>

GLOBAL TRENDS

FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2019

PRODUCED AND PRINTED BY UNHCR
(18 JUNE 2020)

FRONT COVER:

SYRIA. A Syrian returnee in East Aleppo has decided to re-open the doors of his restaurant to receive visitors. His restaurant is located right opposite Aleppo's citadel.

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This document along with further information on
global displacement is available on UNHCR's
statistics website:
<http://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics>





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Lao PDR + 1 more

IOM Partners with Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare to Support Migrants Affected by COVID-19 with Funding from Japan

Source: [IOM](#)

Posted: 18 Jun 2020

Originally published: 18 Jun 2020

Origin: [View original](#)

Vientiane – The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MoLSW) today (18 June) launched the project - Enhancing COVID-19 Pandemic Preparedness to Migrants and Mobility Affected Communities in Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Thirty representatives from the Lao Government, IOM, and private recruitment agencies attended the ceremony. MoLSW and IOM presented on the current situation of return migrants affected by COVID-19 and how the project activities can support the government in assisting vulnerable populations affected by the pandemic.

The project was designed in close consultation with the Skills Development and Employment Department (SDED) under MoLSW to ensure a timely and thorough understanding of the needs of the Lao Government and vulnerable migrants.

The funds received from the Government of Japan under this project, will enable IOM to develop inclusive approaches, that take into account migrants and travellers, including cross-border coordination, tailored risk communication and community engagement. All this is set to enhance government officials' capacity to mitigate migration-related challenges and enable migrants to make informed decisions during the pandemic, as well as to curb the stigmatization of migrants during the pandemic.

As the number of COVID-19 cases increases across a growing number of countries, IOM is extremely concerned about the impact on migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and other vulnerable groups.

Business closures and travel restrictions in neighbouring countries have affected the livelihoods of migrant workers. According to the Lao National COVID-19 Taskforce, over 200,000 migrants have returned to Lao PDR since the outbreak of the pandemic.

The six-month project is generously supported by the Government of Japan.

For more information please contact Karen HO at IOM Vientiane. Tel. + 856 (0)21 267 734. Email: kho@iom.int

International Organization for Migration:

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Primary country:

[Lao People's Democratic Republic \(the\)](#)

Other country:

[Japan](#)

Source:

International Organization for Migration

Format:

News and Press Release

Themes:

Contributions / Protection and Human Rights

Vulnerable groups:

IDPs / Refugees

Disaster type:

Epidemic

Language:

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LIBYA

3 July 2019

268,629 Libyans currently internally displaced (IDPs)¹

444,760 returned IDPs¹

52,902 registered refugees and asylum-seekers²

2,755 overall persons arrived in Italy³

678 monitoring visits to detention centres


1,242 refugees and asylum-seekers released from detention

479 refugees and asylum-seekers currently hosted in the Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF); **1,708** individuals transited through the GDF since Dec. 2018

4,369 vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers departed since November 2017

Funding

USD **88.1** M required for 2019



¹ IOM-DTM May 2019.

² Data as of 2 July 2019.

³ www.data2.unhcr as of 3 July 2019

Highlights

UNHCR and IOM have **condemned** yesterday's attack on Tajoura detention centre and have called for an immediate investigation of those responsible. On 2 July, airstrikes hit Tajoura detention centre (north-eastern Tripoli) where over 600 refugees and migrants were being held. Out of these, 487 were registered with UNHCR. At least 80 persons have been injured and 40 have been killed. This latest violence in Tripoli also speaks to the danger both IOM and UNHCR have warned over returning migrants and refugees to Libya after their interception or rescue on the Mediterranean Sea. UNHCR and IOM strongly condemn this and any attack on civilian life and call for an immediate end to detention.

Today, UNHCR visited Tajoura detention centre as part of an inter-agency team. UNHCR was able to assess the situation, speak to refugees at the facility and provide food and water through its partner International Medical Corps (IMC) while options are being explored. On 9 May, UNHCR had relocated 80 vulnerable refugees from Tajoura detention centre to its GDF in the centre of Tripoli. The group included Eritrean, Ethiopian, Somali, Sudanese and Palestinians, as well as 48 children, out of whom 39 were unaccompanied.

There are 3,800 refugees and migrants held in detention centres located near conflict areas in and around Tripoli. Since the onset of the crisis, UNHCR has relocated over 1,630 refugees and asylum-seekers to the GDF or to detention centres located in safer areas, due to the lack of other alternatives. Currently, there are 479 refugees and asylum-seekers hosted in the GDF in Tripoli. Over the past three months, UNHCR has evacuated 589 individuals to Niger (294 individuals) and to Italy (295 individuals). UNHCR reiterates its call on the international community to provide humanitarian corridors for refugees to be evacuated out of Libya.

Population movements

Since 4 April, 104,000 individuals have been displaced (IDPs) due to the conflict in Tripoli. The majority of IDPs have moved to safer areas within Tripoli, cities along the coast and the Nafusa Mountains. So far in 2019, UNHCR, through its partner LibAid, has distributed core-relief items (CRIs) to over 12,000 IDPs throughout Libya.

As of 3 July, 3,686 refugees and migrants were rescued/intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) in 2019. UNHCR has noted an increase of disembarkations during May and June, with 2,560 refugees and migrants rescued/intercepted at sea. Two disembarkations took place on 27 June, when 229 refugees and migrants were disembarked at Al Khums port. UNHCR and its partner IMC provided medical assistance and CRIs to those disembarked before they were transferred to a detention centre by the authorities.

UNHCR response

UNHCR is registering persons of concern in Al Khums, Suq Al Khamis, Zliten and Kareem detention centres. On 30 June, UNHCR transferred 19 Eritreans from Al Khums detention centre to its GDF in Tripoli. Al Khums detention centre is now empty.

UNHCR continues to implement quick-impact projects (QIPs) to support IDPs and returnees. QIPs are small, rapidly implemented projects intended to help create conditions for peaceful coexistence between those displaced and their hosting communities. This week, UNHCR, through the Danish Refugee Council, renovated WASH facilities, delivered furniture and medical devices to a clinic in Azzawiya that is supporting 600 patients on a daily basis.

Special thanks to major donors: Canada | Denmark | European Union | Finland | France | Germany | Italy | Japan | Norway | Sweden | Switzerland | The Netherlands | United Kingdom | USA | Private Donors

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2010

THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION:
BUILDING CAPACITIES
FOR CHANGE



IOM International Organization for Migration

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2010

THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION: BUILDING CAPACITIES FOR CHANGE



IOM International Organization for Migration

This volume is the fruit of a collaborative effort by a team of contributing authors and the Editorial Team under the direction of the Editors-in-Chief. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

Unless otherwise stated, this volume does not refer to events occurring after August 2010.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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A complete list of the seminars and related information can be found online at: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/world-migration-report-2010/interagency-seminar-series>

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LIST OF WMR 2010 BACKGROUND PAPERS

<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/world-migration-report-2010/background-papers>

Future Trends in Migration: Regional Perspectives

- “The Future of Migration Policies in Africa” by Aderanti Adepoju
- “The Future of Migration Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region” by Graeme Hugo
- “The Future of Migration Policies in the Americas” by Agustín Escobar Latapí
- “The Future of European Migration: Policy Options for the European Union and its Member States” by Rainer Münz and Elizabeth Collett
- “Building Capacity to Manage Labour Mobility in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries” by Mohamed Dito
- “Building State Capacities for Managing Contract Worker Mobility: The Asia – GCC Context” by Nasra Shah
- “The Future of Migration Policies in the Caribbean” by Elizabeth Thomas-Hope

Migration Governance and Irregular Migration

- “Migration Governance: Alternative Futures” by Alexander Betts
- “Irregular Migration and Mixed Flows” by Ryszard Cholewinski
- “The Global Economic Crisis and Governance of Human Mobility: Can We Turn the Current Crisis Into a New Global Opportunity for the Future?” by Bimal Gosh
- “The Future of Migration Governance and Regional Consultative Processes” by Jobst Koehler and Randall Hansen
- “The Future of Labour Migration Costs” by Philip Martin

Migration and its Linkages with Employment, Health, Integration and Development

- “The Future of Diaspora Policy” by Dovelyn Agunias
- “The Future of Integration Policy” by Thomas Huddleston
- “Family Migration Issues in North-East Asia” by Hye-Kyung Lee
- “Future Capacity Needs in Managing the Health Aspects of Migration” by Greg Irving and Davide Mosca
- “The Future of Health Worker Migration” by Binod Khadria
- “Welfare Provision for Migrants: Current Trends and Future Challenges” by Rachel Sabates-Wheeler

Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Migration as an Adaptation Strategy

- “Climate Change and International Migration” by Susan Martin

LIST OF WMR 2010 INTER-AGENCY SEMINARS

<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/world-migration-report-2010/interagency-seminar-series>

- “Approaches and Capacity Needs in Managing the Health Aspects of Migration” by Greg Irving, Health Programme Officer of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Regional Mission for East & Central Africa.
- “Portability of Pension, Health, and other Social Benefits: Facts, Concepts, Issues” by Robert Holzmann, Research Director of the Labor Market Program at the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI).
- “The Future of Diaspora Policy: Building Government Capacity for Diaspora Engagement” by Dovelyn Agunias, Policy Analyst, Migration Policy Institute (MPI).
- “The Impacts of Remittances on Poverty: Some Lessons from Asia and South Pacific” by Richard Brown, Associate Professor at the School of Economics, University of Queensland.
- “The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where Do We Go from Here?” by Bimal Ghosh, Emeritus Professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Public Administration.
- “Development on the Move: The Place of Migration in Future Development Strategies” by Laura Chappell, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).
- “The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in Migration Management” by Nadan Petrovic, along with Prof. Luigi Melica and Nuria Díaz Sacristán.
- “Global Migration Futures Project” by Carlos Varga-Silva, International Migration Institute (IMI).
- “The Role of Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies” by Lindsay Lowell, Director of Policy Studies, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University.
- “Connecting the Dots: A Fresh Look at Managing International Migration” by Sergio Marchi, Special Advisor to the Secretary General, International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC).
- “The Future of Migration Policy: Long term Responses” by Rainer Münz, Head of Research and Development, Erste Group Bank.
- “A Public Goods Approach to Managing Migration” by James F. Hollifield, Director of the Tower Center for Political Studies, SMU.
- “The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change” by Khalid Koser, Associate Dean and Head, New Issues in Security Programme.

WMR 2010 EURASYLUM'S MONTHLY POLICY INTERVIEWS

<http://www.eurasylum.org/Portal/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=4&tabid=19>

Prof. Bimal Ghosh, Emeritus Professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Public Administration; former Senior UN Director; and **Ambassador Sergio Marchi**, Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD); former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration of Canada on "*Migration governance: towards a global integrated migration regime?*" - 06/2010.

Patricia Sto Tomas, Chair of the National Development Bank of the Philippines; former Secretary of Labor and Employment of the Philippines; former GCIM Commissioner; and **Dilip Ratha**, Lead Economist, Development Prospects Group, and Manager, Migration and Remittances, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. on "*Migration and development: recent and unfolding experiences*" - 05/2010.

Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, President of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE); and **Nand Kishore Singh**, Member of the Indian Parliament; former Secretary to the Prime Minister of India and former Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs on "*The future of international labour migration*" - 04/2010.

Dr. Howard Duncan, Executive Director of Metropolis, Citizenship and Immigration Canada; and **Prof. Michael Keith**, Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford; former member of the UK Government's Commission on Integration and Cohesion on "*Integration and rights of migrants: policy priorities and directions for new capacity building measures*" - 03/2010.

Theodoros Skylakakis, Member of the European Parliament; former Special Representative for Climate Change of Greece on "*Climate change and migration: impacts and policy responses*" - 02/2010.

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FOREWORD

World Migration 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change, is the fifth report in IOM's WMR series. This year's report focuses on the future of migration and the capacities that will be required by States, regional and international organizations, civil society and the private sector to manage migration successfully over the coming decades.

Ten years ago when we published our first *World Migration Report 2000* there were 150 million migrants. Now, the number of migrants has grown to 214 million, and the figure could rise to 405 million by 2050, as a result of growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks.

In response to these trends, many States are likely to need to invest in developing their migration management capacities. Already, many States report that they require assistance to develop the capabilities to respond to a diverse range of new migration challenges. Capacity-building does not necessarily imply an increase in public spending and resources; it can also refer to the elimination of outdated, inappropriate or inefficient systems, laws or policies.


Recognizing that migration is a constant but dynamic phenomenon, the *World Migration Report 2010* argues that it is essential for States to be able to develop the comprehensive knowledge and efficient, flexible institutions that they will need to promote and implement

humane and orderly policies for the movement of people, now and in the future.

Part A of the *World Migration Report 2010* focuses on identifying core capacities in key areas of migration management. The aim is not to prescribe 'one-size-fits-all' policies and practices, but to suggest objectives of migration management policies in each area, to stimulate thinking and provide examples of what States and other actors can do.

Part B of the *World Migration Report 2010* draws on the most up-to-date data to provide overviews of global and regional migration and remittances trends. In recognition of the importance of the largest global economic recession since the 1930s, this section has a particular focus on the effects of this crisis on migrants, migration and remittances.

As with previous *World Migration Reports*, the *World Migration Report 2010* distils the conceptual and practical expertise and experience of IOM colleagues throughout the world, through consultation sessions and an external advisory board that includes the staff of other agencies, external scholars, and government practitioners. I thank them all for their support, and hope that the result will be useful in providing guidance on how migration can be managed in the future for the benefit of all.


William Lacy Swing
Director General



building
capacities
for change

I. THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK FOR MIGRATION

Over the next few decades, international migration is likely to transform in scale, reach and complexity, due to growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks. These transformations will be associated with increasing opportunities – from economic growth and poverty reduction, to social and cultural innovation. However, they will also exacerbate existing problems and generate new challenges – from irregular migration, to protecting the human rights of migrants. Most States in the world (and not just in the developing world) lack the capacity to effectively manage the international mobility of persons today, not to mention respond to new dynamics. This report is intended to help States, regional and international organizations, civil society and the private sector to prepare for future opportunities and challenges in migration and build capacities for change. It provides a tool for self-evaluation in terms of future scenarios. It also demonstrates the need for a far more comprehensive approach to capacity-building for migration than has typically been adopted.

There are far more international migrants in the world today than ever previously recorded, and their number has increased rapidly in the last few decades, if not their percentage of world population (which has remained relatively stable) – Immigrant growth rates during the last five years are illustrated in map 1. If the migrant population continues to increase at the same pace as the last 20 years, the stock

of international migrants worldwide by 2050 could be as high as 405 million.¹ International migration involves a wider diversity of ethnic and cultural groups than ever before;² significantly more women are migrating today on their own or as heads of households (for regional differences in female migrants as a percentage of the stock of international migrants, see map 2); the number of people living and working abroad with irregular status continues to rise;³ and there has been a significant growth in temporary migration and circulation.⁴ The key recent global and regional trends in international migration are presented in more detail in the overviews appended to this report, which mainly focus on international migration, while acknowledging that there are far more internal migrants than international migrants worldwide.

The global economic crisis has slowed emigration in many parts of the world, although it does not appear to have stimulated substantial return migration (see the regional overviews in part B of this report, regarding the impact of the global economic crisis on international migration trends). With economic recovery and job growth, most experts expect this slowdown to be temporary. Indeed, the scale of migration may well soon exceed prior levels, as the underlying dynamics of migration have not disappeared, and also as a

¹ IOM estimate based on UN DESA, 2009.

² Hugo (2005).

³ UNDP (2009).

⁴ Hugo (2005).

result of emerging structural features in the global economy. One such factor is the rapid growth in the labour force in less developed countries compared to that in the more developed countries: the labour force in more developed countries is projected to remain at about 600 million until 2050, while the labour force in less developed countries is expected to increase from 2.4 billion in 2005 to 3 billion in 2020 and 3.6 billion in 2040.⁵ At the same time, employment is expected to stagnate in certain parts of the developing world,⁶ prompting widening differences in economic opportunities between less developed and more developed countries – at least until 2030.⁷ The demand for migrant labour is likely to increase in the developed world, for various reasons – including as a response to the social and economic consequences of ageing populations (see map 3 – illustrating population changes in European countries) – and to attract students and highly skilled migrants.⁸ Just as the momentum associated with migration networks is expected to increase as these networks extend in scale and reach, migration agents are predicted to become increasingly influential in international migration, further generating the so-called migration industry.⁹ While the relationship between environmental change and migration is complex and remains unpredictable, the number of migrants, especially in the less developed world, is expected to increase significantly as a result of environmental changes.

Carefully managed migration can be a powerful force for economic growth and innovation in destination countries, and poverty reduction and development in poorer origin countries, as well as provide important human freedom and human development outcomes for migrants and their families.¹⁰ At the same time, the growing pressure to migrate, whether for economic enhancement or to avoid or escape the effects of environmental change, far outstrips the availability of legal opportunities to do so and therefore will

continue to test the ability of States to manage their borders and address the complexities of irregular migration. More effective systems will be required to match supply and demand in the labour market. Growing numbers of migrants, from increasingly diverse backgrounds, can increase diversity and cultural innovation but will also make the development of effective integration policies more challenging. Indeed, in all countries of migration, dedicated attention to managing social change associated with migration will be required.¹¹ Protecting the human rights of migrants will become an even more pressing priority, while the question of the rights of irregular migrants and how to protect them will become increasingly acute. New forms of migration – for example, the crossing of international borders as a result of the effects of environmental change – will necessitate a reflection on and possible reconsideration of existing legal and normative frameworks.

The future of international migration, together with its opportunities and challenges, is the subject of a growing body of research and literature.¹² This report is intended to complement and advance these and other recent initiatives by focusing the spotlight on the capacities that are and will be needed to manage the movement of people. It is divided into two main parts. The first part focuses on capacity-building for the future of migration. The second part provides an overview of the latest regional trends in international migration, focusing particularly on the impact of the global economic crisis.

⁵ UN DESA (2009).

⁶ ILO (2009).

⁷ OECD (2009).

⁸ Khadria (2010).

⁹ Martin, P. (2010).

¹⁰ UNDP (2009).

¹¹ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/international-dialogue-migration/intersessional-workshops/multifaceted-impact-of-migration>

¹² In 2009, the OECD published *The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries*, assessing ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors for international migration to the OECD States over the next 50 years and developing a series of likely scenarios. The University of Oxford is currently assessing future global and regional migration trends and their effects on countries of origin – mainly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East – and on countries of destination in Europe. The European Policy Centre has established a Reflection Group to identify and formulate responses to key challenges and developments facing the European Union between now and 2030, including the management of migration flows and migrant integration. The most recent UNDP *Human Development Report* (2009) focused on human mobility and how to enhance human development outcomes in the future. From the developing world, the Jawaharlal Nehru University’s International Migration and Diaspora Studies (IMDS) Project has launched the *India Migration Report*, the inaugural issue of which made projections about India’s ‘demographic dividend’ helping to meet the global demand for workers by 2020.

Overall, like the *World Migration Reports* that have preceded it, this report is intended to contribute to the realization of the mandate of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and societies. IOM works together with its partners in the international community to uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants; encourage social and economic development through migration; assist in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration management; and advance understanding of migration issues. Specifically, recognizing that migration is an integral feature of the world today, this report aims to promote a focus on building capacities to enable States and other stakeholders to respond to, and plan for, migration effectively and in a sustainable way. In this report, this aim is achieved in three ways. First, an ‘inventory’ of capacities required for coping with likely

changes and challenges in international migration will be developed, distinguishing and highlighting core capacity requirements. This is intended as a working ‘checklist’ for States and other stakeholders in preparing for change. Second, and drawing on IOM’s extensive and global Field presence and partnerships, the report presents a selective review of existing activities, to help identify effective practice for capacity-building as well as gaps and weaknesses. Third, the report identifies a series of recommendations to States, civil society and international organizations, for building capacities for change.

After defining capacity-building, the report focuses on six main areas of international migration where change is expected to yield particular capacity challenges: labour mobility, irregular migration, migration and development, integration, environmental change, and migration governance.

2. CAPACITY-BUILDING

The term ‘capacity-building’ is often used by donors and international organizations in a narrow sense – for example, to refer to staff development through formal education and training programmes to redress the lack of qualified personnel in a project in the short term.¹³ Even where the concept is understood more broadly, there are competing definitions (for example, those provided by UNDP and the UN General Assembly), and further confusion is added where the concept ‘capacity development’ is used, although normally capacity development refers to a process of change driven internally – for example, by and within institutions or governments – rather than the external support typically implied by capacity-building. Given its currency among most governments and international organizations in the international migration context, this report uses the term ‘capacity-building’, which it defines as:

the process of strengthening the knowledge, abilities, skills, resources, structures and processes that States and institutions need in order to achieve their goals effectively and sustainably, and to adapt to change.

As understood in this report, capacity-building does not necessarily mean the creation of new processes or systems. It can also refer to the elimination of outdated, inappropriate or inefficient systems; enhancing the efficacy or cost-effectiveness of existing systems; strengthening existing systems;

and transferring lessons from other national contexts and settings.¹⁴ Budgets alone are an imperfect measure of capacity. Spending more money does not necessarily result in a higher-quality outcome. For many States and institutions, technical know-how – the operational knowledge and skills needed to pursue goals effectively – presents a greater challenge than lack of financial resources. At the same time, this report acknowledges that even a comprehensive approach to capacity-building is only a first step. Capacity-building needs to be followed by implementation, enforcement, monitoring and evaluation.

In the migration context, capacity-building is normally understood to include the following key components:¹⁵ more timely and accurate migration and labour market data; assistance in defining national migration policy goals and priorities; training of migration officials; development of an effective and equitable legal framework; coherent administrative structures; consultation mechanisms between government and other national stakeholders; and international cooperation. The African Capacity Building Centre is a good example of an initiative that addresses many of these various aspects of migration capacity-building (see textbox 1). The overall goal of migration capacity-building, as recommended in this report, is to facilitate the development of humane and orderly policies for the movement of people.

¹³ OECD (2006).

¹⁴ Lavergne et al. (2004).

¹⁵ GCIM (2005).

Textbox 1: The African Capacity-building Centre

The African Capacity-building Centre (ACBC) in Moshi, the United Republic of Tanzania, was created in 2009 to (a) promote international understanding of migrants and migration issues; (b) promote sound migration governance in Africa; (c) develop, institutionalize and deliver on-site and off-site migration management training programmes; and (d) build the migration management capacity of African States.

In order to achieve its objectives, the ACBC conducts the following range of activities:

- provides technical expertise to requesting African States to identify and respond to key migration challenges in areas such as migration and border management, migration policy, and legislative, administrative and operational reform;
- analyses and identifies training needs and training priorities of African States in the area of migration, in consultation with those governments and the respective IOM Field Offices;
- engages in research initiatives and networking in an effort to provide reliable, timely and up-to-date information on migration issues affecting the continent;
- compiles, collates and disseminates Africa-specific migration information.

ACBC focuses primarily on the development, coordination and delivery of customized, needs-targeted migration and identity management training. However, ACBC also provides assistance and training in other areas, such as human rights and detention, counter-trafficking and victim counselling, labour migration, migration and health, and plans to further broaden these activities in the future.

ACBC has different resources at its disposal for multi-country training courses in migration and border management for migration officials from all over Africa aimed at the facilitation of migration, passenger processing and mobility. For example, the *Documents: The Developer's Toolkit*, for instance, helps governments redesign and produce identity documents; the *Passport Examination Procedure Manual* provides a useful tool for detecting document fraud; and the *Essentials of Migration Practice – Level 1* aims to satisfy the learning requirements of immigration recruits. ACBC also assists in the implementation of a Personal Implementation Registration System (PIRS).

Sources: IOM (2009) *African Capacity-building Centre (ACBC)*, Brochure, IOM United Republic of Tanzania; Burke, S. (2010) The African Capacity-building Centre – Capacity-building in migration and identity management within Africa, *Keesing Journal of Documents & Identity*, Issue 31, 2010.

Besides distinguishing it from current initiatives on the future of international migration, this report focuses on capacity-building for several key reasons. First, and fundamentally, it is good governance to plan for the future, especially during a period of economic downturn when the tendency is to focus on immediate impacts and the short-term period of recovery. Second, capacity-building is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of effective migration management and, indeed, is a core element of IOM's mandate to "...help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems, and to provide humanitarian assistance to

migrants in need."¹⁶ Third, a concrete focus on specific activities also helps avoid the speculation that is rife in debates about the future of migration (especially in the context of environmental change), and that can be detrimental to policymaking by failing to deliver clear evidence or consensus. Even if there were to be no dramatic changes in the dimensions or dynamics of international migration, in most countries – and not just the developing world – capacity-building is required simply to address current challenges. A focus on capacity-building also allows for an incremental approach, recognizing differences in capacity requirements among States and other stakeholders, and the need for policy to identify priorities.

¹⁶ http://www.iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared_mainsite/published_docs/books/iomfolder_eng/iom_in_brief_en.pdf

Capacity-building is a growth area in the field of migration policy development, partly because it is widely accepted that international migration cannot be managed on a unilateral basis. Through IOM, donors contribute some USD 100 million per year to capacity-building initiatives, which includes preparing for future challenges, especially in the field of integrated border management and the fight against human trafficking. In 2009, IOM's Technical Cooperation Division alone oversaw nearly 100 projects worldwide. The European Commission (EC) also funds a growing number of major capacity-building initiatives – for example, the Migration: EU Expertise (MIEUX) programme aimed at developing the capacities of origin and transit countries to respond to irregular migration and mixed flows. The International Labour Organization (ILO) contributes to capacity-building on labour migration through a number of technical cooperation programmes and through its International Training Centre in Turin, Italy. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) works on developing capacities for statistical systems in international migration. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) works with governments, other United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to meet the emergency reproductive health needs of migrants and provide reproductive health services and counselling for victims of trafficking, as well as technical assistance, training and support to governments and other agencies for the development of policies and legal frameworks to combat the problem. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) works with governments to develop capacities to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) provides training, facilitates dialogue, and encourages partnerships to strengthen capacity in the field of international migration. The World Bank's Capacity Development Resource Centre (CDRC) works on migration issues ranging from the 'brain drain' to engaging diasporas.

One of the headline messages of this report is that, in preparing for future challenges, a far more comprehensive and coherent approach

to capacity-building is required. Capacity-building assistance for migration often tends to be narrowly focused on a limited number of policy areas, which may reflect donor and destination country priorities rather than those of origin or transit countries. Existing initiatives are geographically uneven, focusing on particular countries or subregions. They also tend to be focused more on specific issues – in particular, border management, counter-trafficking, return migration and reintegration. Few capacity-building initiatives aim to develop comprehensive national strategies. Many are also short-term.

In recent years, migration has come to be recognized as an integral and essential feature of modern life and of an increasingly integrated global economy, holding tremendous development potential for individuals as well as societies of origin and destination. This recognition, however, has not yet been matched by sufficient investment in developing or strengthening the tools needed to realize the positive potential of migration while minimizing potential negative consequences in a holistic, balanced and comprehensive way.

The main focus for this report is building capacities for change at the State level and, at times, distinctions are made between different capacity requirements in origin, transit and destination countries for migrants, equally recognizing that most States in the world today are, to some extent, all three. Another feature of contemporary international migration that needs to be acknowledged from the outset, however, is the proliferation of stakeholders – or actors – involved in migration policy, besides the State. Indeed, a critical component of State capacity is the ability to cooperate and consult with other stakeholders. Within government, important new actors include local governments, especially in urban areas, where international migrants are increasingly concentrated. Intergovernmental forums, such as regional consultative processes (RCPs) on migration, are also increasingly active in certain aspects of migration policy. Outside government, relevant stakeholders include civil society (including migrant associations, the media and academia), the corporate sector (for example, employers, unions and

recruiters), international organizations, and national and international NGOs. This report also therefore includes examples of, and recommendations for, capacity-building among this range of additional stakeholders in migration policy.

In adopting a global perspective, this report acknowledges that there are enormous divergences in existing capacities – for example, between some developing and developed countries. But it does not advocate a standardization of capacities across all States, since a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not appropriate for the different migration realities of different countries around the world. Instead, it focuses on addressing the

gap between existing capacities in individual States or among particular stakeholders, and the capacities that will be required to meet the challenges they will face in the future. There may be States that have modest, yet adequate, levels of capacity and that are unlikely to be significantly affected by new migration trends, making further capacity-building a low priority. Conversely, there may be States with very advanced migration capacities, where significant capacity-building will nevertheless be required because of the anticipated impact of migration changes. In other words, this report is not intended to be prescriptive. By distinguishing core capacities, it is intended to provide a tool that allows States and other stakeholders to assess their own capacities for dealing with future scenarios.

3. LABOUR MOBILITY

After a temporary dip during the global economic crisis, labour mobility is expected to resume worldwide and even to exceed prior levels. It has been predicted that new patterns of mobility may be observed – in particular, as the emerging economies of Asia become even more important countries of destination for labour migrants.¹⁷ Emerging countries of destination will need to develop new capacities to cope with new labour migration. At the same time, more traditional countries of destination may also need to strengthen existing capacities to cope with changes in labour mobility. Changing patterns will also affect origin countries. Particular challenges that have been identified in the coming years for the Pacific Islands, for example, include coping with rising emigration and even depopulation; adjusting to the loss of human resources; and how to compete effectively with other origin countries in establishing seasonal temporary labour migration programmes.¹⁸ It has been suggested that the economic downturn provides a window of opportunity for reforming labour migration policies and instituting new approaches before the demand for labour resumes.¹⁹

One of the primary policy challenges confronting labour mobility is how to match the supply of, and demand for, labour at a regional and global level. The combined effects of factors such as ‘youth bulges’, structural

unemployment, agricultural intensification and industrial restructuring are likely to lead to a growing labour surplus in many developing countries, and demands for greater access to labour markets in the developed world and emerging economies. While demand for migrant labour is likely to grow across much of the developed world in the short term (for example, in response to the effects of the ‘demographic crisis’), as well as in emerging economies, it will not be at a sufficient level to meet supply. Furthermore, legal opportunities for migrant labour are likely to be selective, focusing primarily on migrants with skills in short supply in destination countries (for example, in health care), and on highly skilled migrants and students, although low-skilled migrants will still be required.²⁰ Indeed, there is a persistent mismatch between policy and reality in this regard. Real demand exists at both high- and low-skilled levels for migrant labour but, in the absence of adequate legal channels for migration, this demand is met, in many instances, through irregular migration or employment, reflecting the continuing dependency of economies in many parts of the developed world on cheap, unprotected migrant labour. In addition, alternative or complementary strategies, such as increasing the capital- or technology-intensity of production, relocating to countries where labour costs are lower, increasing the working hours of currently employed workers, recruiting inactive workers, and switching to less labour-intensive services, are all trends

¹⁷ Hugo (2010).

¹⁸ UNESCAP (2008).

¹⁹ WEF (2010).

²⁰ IOM (2008).

that may limit or eventually reduce the demand for migrant labour in some developed countries and emerging economies.

The anticipated accentuation of the global mismatch of labour supply and demand places pressures on destination and origin countries to develop the capacity to effectively assess foreign labour demand while protecting the domestic labour force, regulate admissions, and ensure migrant workers' rights. It will increase the need to train migrants, strengthen and implement bilateral or other labour mobility agreements, and develop capacities for return and reintegration. Regimes for the free movement of labour, furthermore, may make it more difficult for policymakers to manage migration through migration levers. The mismatch may result in an increase in irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and mixed flows. The capacities required to more effectively respond to these challenges are discussed in section 4.

While some of the capacity requirements implied by these changes lie outside the immediate realm of migration policymaking (for example, relating to school-to-work transitions and employment promotion within the domestic labour force), they also have direct implications for building capacity for migration. Effective capacities may be required in the following ten core areas:

1. determining policy goals;
2. assessing labour markets from the migration perspective;
3. regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers;
4. determining conditions attached to employment permits;
5. training of migrant workers and placement services;
6. protecting migrant workers' rights;
7. reducing labour migration costs;
8. strengthening and implementing bilateral or other labour mobility agreements;
9. returning migrants and their reintegration;
10. implementation.

3.1 Determining policy goals

An initial decision to be made by policymakers in States confronting new or changing demands

for foreign labour is what the main policy goal for labour migration programmes is, as this will influence what type of policy approach is most appropriate and, in turn, what capacities are required. Usually, the primary goal is to alleviate labour shortages. Additional policy objectives, however, may include the reduction of irregular migration, which is a major policy objective in many bilateral recruitment agreements, such as those struck by Spain and the Republic of Korea. Some programmes, such as the working holidaymaker schemes in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, are also intended to promote special post-colonial or political relationships and cultural ties and exchanges. Another goal may be to protect native workers through restricting migration into segmented labour markets, as is the case for low-skilled non-farm labour migration programmes in the United States of America (USA). Circular migration programmes have as an additional objective promoting development in origin countries. The Netherlands is among a number of European Union (EU) countries currently establishing pilot programmes for circular migration. From a country of origin perspective, the primary goal might include the protection of rights of nationals working abroad and the enhancement of the benefits from the migration process for national development (see textbox 2 on the National Labour Migration Policy formulated in Sri Lanka).

A second decision to be made at an early stage concerns whether to prioritize temporary labour migration or migration channels that lead to a secure residence status or permanent settlement. As a generalization, traditional countries of immigration such as Australia, Canada and the USA have determined that an element of permanent immigration is required to ensure economic growth and to sustain basic welfare provisions. Most European countries, however, still emphasize facilitation of temporary labour migration, although, in certain European countries, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, policies are being developed to facilitate the acquisition of permanent residence status by migrant workers. The effects of the demographic crisis in Europe may require a shift towards more permanent immigration in the coming years.

Temporary migration programmes can have considerable benefits for destination countries

– for example, they can help the country adjust to low or negative population growth and labour shortages; increase the flexibility of labour markets to respond to seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the economy; fill labour gaps in specific sectors or industries; and strengthen the competitiveness of certain sectors in the global market.²¹ At the same time, there are risks involved. Destination countries may expect return and re-admission

commitments from origin countries that may not have the institutional capacity to fulfil the commitment. Too many restrictions on migrant workers may drive them underground. Temporary migration programmes can contribute to irregular migration if migrants overstay their temporary visas and there are socio-economic costs for migrant workers, particularly as a result of family separation and lack of access to social security benefits.

Textbox 2: Formulation of the National Labour Migration Policy for Sri Lanka: Process and outcome

The ILO assisted the Government of Sri Lanka in the formulation of a National Labour Migration Policy (NLMP), in response to a request by the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare (MFEWP).

The serious challenges relating to governance of labour migration and protection of migrant workers faced by Sri Lanka provided the backdrop to the formulation of the national policy. As reiterated in the National Policy for Decent Work in Sri Lanka, vulnerability of workers who migrate under risky and unsafe conditions is a major issue, despite all safeguards introduced. The concentration of labour migration in low-skilled categories dominated by female domestic workers, particularly to Gulf countries, had led to serious problems relating to protection, poor conditions of work, and resulting limited gains from migration.

The formulation of the national policy involved a wide range of stakeholders concerned with migration in Sri Lanka: ministries and government agencies (particularly the MFEWP, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, the Ministry of Labour and Manpower, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health Care and Nutrition), social partners (employers' and workers' organizations), the recruitment industry, civil society, academics, concerned NGOs, and relevant international agencies (ILO, IOM, UNFPA and UNDP). A Tripartite Steering Committee was set up under the guidance of the Minister of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, reflecting the above-mentioned groups. Thematic working groups steered the preparation of the national policy in three areas: governance and regulation of labour migration; protection of migrant workers; and promotion of the development contributions resulting from migration.

The main objectives of the new national labour migration policy are: developing a long-term vision for the role of labour migration in the economy, improved protection of the rights of migrant workers, and enhancing the benefits while minimizing the negative impacts of migration. The NLMP also contains an Action Plan for implementation of the policy elements.

The draft NLMP was validated at a national tripartite consultation in October 2008 and the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare adopted the policy document and obtained the approval of the Cabinet of Sri Lanka in April 2009.

The key features of this process are: deep commitment of the responsible ministry to the process; its links to the national development strategy and the National Action Plan for Decent Work; ownership of policy development by local stakeholders, with the ILO acting as a facilitator only; a rights-based approach consistent with international norms; consideration of gender as a cross-cutting issue; and a clear action plan for implementation.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare (2008), *National Labour Migration Policy for Sri Lanka*, Colombo, Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, Government of Sri Lanka, Colombo, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/mpolicy_srilanka_en.pdf

²¹ Abella (2006).

3.2 Assessing labour and skills shortages

The capacity to make an accurate and regular assessment of the demand for migrant workers in the labour market is a fundamental requirement for well-managed labour mobility – not just for destination countries, in selecting and admitting migrant workers, but also for origin countries (for example, in terms of providing appropriate training to potential migrants). Different capacity requirements call for different methods of assessing the need for foreign labour in a destination country or in particular regions or employment sectors. Establishing quotas and labour market testing are the two main methods used.²²

Quotas set fixed numerical limits for the admission of labour into a country. They are usually set annually, often at a high level of government (as, for example, in the Republic of Korea), and are normally determined in consultation with social partners. The allocation of responsibility to a particular ministry or government agency, as well as the development of effective consultation mechanisms, has immediate capacity-building implications. Furthermore, there is no consensus on how to define and measure labour shortages. A variety of models exist, but the extent to which these might work in countries establishing new systems remains to be established. The British Government has created quarterly sector-based panels to compile updates from employers on the labour market situation. The Netherlands carries out employment projections, based on flows in and out of the labour market and on expectations of labour demand, to assess potential future shortages within occupations and sectors. In France, Germany and Spain, local authorities play an important part in identifying labour shortages. The Spanish Government also establishes fixed quotas after consultation with social partners and regional governments and authorities to identify shortage sectors in the labour market.²³ In Kazakhstan, local

authorities submit estimates of the required number of foreign work permits to the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection.

An advantage of establishing quotas is that they provide a clear reference framework on the admission of foreign labour for politicians, administrators, employers, civil society and the general public. Quotas can also serve important political objectives regarding the need for migrant labour and can help to alleviate public concerns regarding migrants. Quotas are usually adjusted every year in response to economic and political changes. Governments can also create subquotas – for example, according to sector (as in the United Kingdom), occupation (as in Italy), receiving region (as in Australia), and firm size (as in Germany). An important drawback with quota systems, however, is the difficulty of ensuring that the number of permits allocated in advance matches the actual labour market needs.²⁴ Additionally, quota systems often involve a high level of regulation and bureaucracy and are therefore frequently criticized by employers for their lack of flexibility and their inability to respond to fluctuating labour demands. Finally, it can be difficult in practical terms to match potential migrant workers with employers, thus creating opportunities for unscrupulous foreign labour intermediaries or agents who take advantage of vulnerable workers.

Most migrant destination countries in Europe apply a labour market test to first-time applicants for a work permit and also to migrant workers seeking to change jobs if they have not met the minimal time requirements for free access to employment. Labour market tests assess whether there are workers available for the work in question in the domestic labour market. The labour market test normally requires employers to advertise the post with the national labour authorities for a specified period or to demonstrate that they have taken other active steps to recruit for a specified period of time. It thus involves considerable capacity requirements, ranging from establishing a national labour authority, to informing employers of procedures and monitoring their compliance.

²² ILO (2009).

²³ Collett and Münz (2010).

²⁴ OECD (2007).

In countries with low unemployment rates and strong employment services, the process of labour market testing tends to be quick and straightforward – as in Ireland, where (after the enlargement of the EU) the annual number of permits issued was simply determined by employers' demand for migrant workers.²⁵ However, when employers request migrant workers in countries with high unemployment rates, the process can be contentious – as in the USA, where some farm employers made such requests, or in Germany, where employers requested temporary farm workers from Poland. With unemployment also rising in a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially among the male youth, labour market testing also has the potential to become contentious.²⁶ The extent to which these tests may be effective in new countries of destination will therefore vary significantly according to the national labour market context.

3.3 Regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers

The next step in countries of destination following an assessment of the demand for foreign workers is to develop effective mechanisms for regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers. The main models currently in use are employment-based immigration programmes and temporary labour migration programmes.

Employment-based immigration programmes promote the admission of migrant workers with a view to their settlement in the destination country, and tend to focus on skilled workers.

They are a well-established feature of immigration systems in Canada and the USA, but have limited applicability in countries that do not intend labour migration to result in long-term settlement. There are three main mechanisms for regulating admission and selecting migrants under these programmes: points systems; work permits; and processes that enable foreign students to work and eventually settle after completing their studies.

Australia, Canada and New Zealand have, for many years, applied points systems for admitting migrant workers, and several European countries have now adopted a similar approach. The criteria against which points are awarded vary between countries, but tend to include education and qualifications, work experience and certain indicators that the applicant has the potential to settle in the destination country in the long term. Bonus points may be awarded to attract skilled workers to particular sectors or regions.

The main advantage of points systems is that points can be modulated year by year and by varying the criteria for obtaining bonus points. Governments can thus easily steer the system – for example, in the case of the Canadian Live-in Caregiver Programme – to respond to labour shortages in specific sectors (see textbox 3). At the same time, points systems have three major drawbacks: first, they imply a system for verifying qualifications and diplomas awarded in countries of origin; second, they assume the transferability of qualifications; and third, they assume that qualifications are equivalent to skills.²⁷

²⁵ Ruhs (2005).
²⁶ Shah (2007).

²⁷ Koser (2009b).

Textbox 3: The Canadian Live-In Caregiver Programme (LCP)

A programme unique to Canada that enables care providers to migrate to Canada is the Live-in Caregiver Programme, or LCP. The LCP, established in 1992 (replacing the Foreign Domestic Worker Programme, in place since 1981), is a variant of the economic class programme that enables workers to gain entry to work in Canada without having to meet the qualifications of the immigration points system, family sponsorship or refugee status. Like many developed nations, Canada has a shortage of care providers available to live in the homes of clients in need of care, and this is expected to become more acute with population ageing.

According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the LCP exists primarily to fill the shortage of caregivers needed to live in the private residence of their client (who may also be their employer). The term 'live-in caregiver', as defined in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, is "a person who resides in and provides childcare, senior home support care or care of the disabled without supervision in the private household in Canada where the person being cared for resides". To work as a live-in caregiver, one must apply directly to CIC. The current requirements include:

- a job confirmation letter from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) to the employer, outlining its opinion that the labour market situation necessitates a live-in caregiver;
- a written contract with the employer;
- successful completion of an equivalent of Canadian secondary school education;
- at least six months of recognized formal full-time training in a field related to the job, or at least one year of full-time paid work experience (including six months with one employer) in a field related to the job, within the three years preceding the application;
- good knowledge of English or French (Canada's two official languages);
- a work permit before entering Canada.

Although LCP was not established to facilitate residency for migrant care providers, in some cases it can lead to permanent residency. Recent changes in the LCP facilitate transitions to permanent residence and also enhance protections for live-in caregivers from potential exploitation and abuse, including an LCP hotline and emergency processing of new work permits for LCP victims of abuse in the employer's home. The LCP programme has evolved and holds clear potential in its revised form to better address the needs of caregivers and clients.

Sources: CIC (2009), *Live-In Caregiver Program: Who can apply?* <http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLISH/work/caregiver/apply-who.asp>; CIC (2008), *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, Citizenship and Immigration Canada*.

Work permits are usually issued for temporary employment. Although the rules that apply to the work permit system vary across countries, the following procedures normally apply:²⁸

- application for admission is usually made outside the country in response to a formal job offer;
- permission for admission is granted by consular officials in the origin country;
- an employment or work permit is granted to the employer or worker – sometimes both;
- the worker often has to obtain separate permission for residence;
- the employment or work permit is time-

limited, but can usually be renewed if the job is still available;

- free access to employment of their choice can be granted to migrant workers after a certain number of years of work or residence.

There are a number of drawbacks with work permit systems. First, where work permits are held by the employer and not the worker, there is a risk of exploitation. A second issue is that the increasing diversity of work permits has resulted in a growing number of new types of residence permit. Third, there have been criticisms that work permit systems can be overly bureaucratic.²⁹

In several destination countries, attention is being paid to the future of foreign students.³⁰ The enrolment of overseas students remained robust, even during the global economic crisis, and the global competition for students is expected to intensify in the future. Traditional and new destination countries for students will need to strengthen their capacity to compete in this market – for example, by offering incentives to overseas students. One such incentive is to allow students to stay on and work after the end of their studies. The 2007 Employment Permit Act in Ireland, for example, introduced a two-stage system that permits graduates of tertiary education institutions in Ireland to remain there for six months after termination of their studies to search for employment. If they are then offered a job, they can apply for a change of status.

Temporary labour migration programmes are designed with the intention that migrant workers will return home after the completion of their employment. The main types are: seasonal programmes, sector-based schemes, working holidaymaker schemes, trainee programmes, and domestic workers.³¹ In order to make up for sector-specific labour shortages, temporary migration programmes may admit migrants for employment in specified sectors only. In the United Kingdom, the Sector Based Scheme (SBS), for example, was intended for the temporary employment of workers in low-skilled occupations in the food manufacturing and hospitality sectors.

Temporary labour migration programmes may be open to nationals of any country, as is usually the case for skilled migration programmes or those targeting specific sectoral shortages, or they may operate on the basis of bilateral recruitment agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoUs), discussed in more detail below (see section 3.8).

In some countries, recruitment of temporary labour to fill sectoral gaps in the labour market is done by the government, either

centralized at the national level or devolved to local or regional authorities. In most OECD Member countries, senior staff in employment, labour or immigration ministries conduct the negotiations with local or regional governments. In a few cases, however, national employment offices develop and implement the recruitment procedure with origin countries – as, for example, in Germany, where the Federal Employment Agency hires seasonal workers directly in the origin countries through their respective local employment services. Policy development and design of recruitment schemes normally also occurs within employment, labour or immigration ministries. Often these schemes are designed with the assistance of, or in consultation with, representatives of employers, trade unions and foreign workers. In Spain, the government contracts IOM to recruit on its behalf low-skilled temporary workers from Ecuador.

Recruitment can also be managed by employers facing labour shortages. They sometimes recruit directly in origin countries where no bilateral agreements exist, or they can use intermediaries such as private recruitment agencies in origin or destination countries. The recruitment procedures of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Mexican Agricultural Seasonal Workers Programme in Canada are often cited as a model. The programme allows Canadian farmers to employ foreign workers for up to eight months a year from a range of countries including Guatemala and Mexico. In both cases, migrant workers are recruited and employed under the terms of a government-to-government MoU that makes the Mexican and Guatemalan Governments responsible for recruiting workers and negotiating their wages with Canadian authorities. A second programme admits Guatemalan workers specifically to Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. The Guatemalan Ministry of Labor recruits workers, and the Guatemalan consulate in Montreal provides liaison services to migrants while they are in Quebec.

A third main mechanism for recruiting foreign workers is private recruitment agencies. These operate in both origin and destination countries. Their function can range from

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Martin, P. (2007).

a straightforward matching service to a comprehensive hiring package consisting of recruitment, skills testing, travel, visa and living arrangements.³² How to regulate and monitor private recruitment agencies is considered in section 3.6.

3.4 Determining conditions attached to employment permits

States that employ foreign labour, especially temporarily, need to make clear and transparent decisions about the conditions attached to employment permits, and have the capacity to monitor and enforce these conditions. There is a wide range of experiences relating to the conditions attached to employment permits, in terms of their duration and renewability; occupational mobility; procedures governing migrants' rights upon loss of employment; possibilities for permanent residence; family reunification; and other social rights. As a generalization, better conditions are attached to employment-based immigration programmes, and offered to skilled workers, although this approach has raised concerns from an equity perspective.

The length of time a work permit is valid needs to be considered carefully as it can have important consequences. In particular, programmes with permits with too short a duration and no possibility for renewal may find it difficult to attract even low-skilled workers. Most seasonal temporary labour migration programmes impose quite strict limits on permit holders. Seasonal workers admitted to the United Kingdom under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), for example, are issued a work card with a validity ranging from five weeks to six months. If the work card is issued for less than six months, it is possible to apply for a new work card when the first one expires, and any new work card will take into account any time already spent as a seasonal worker. After six months, it is not possible to extend the work card. Workers are permitted to reapply to the SAWS programme after a three-month gap, during which time they will not

have permission to remain in the country. In contrast, temporary labour migration programmes aimed at more skilled workers tend to offer longer initial periods for permits, a straightforward procedure for renewal, and often also a path to permanent residence. Skilled workers are granted an initial permit for three years in France, and for five years in the United Kingdom.

In general, entrants under highly skilled migration programmes can also be 'free agents' with free access to the labour market, either immediately upon entry or after a certain number of years. Low-skilled migrants, in contrast, tend to be tied to particular employers either for the duration of their permit or for longer periods than is the case for highly skilled migrants, and the rules governing their access to other jobs are more rigorous. The freedom to change jobs in destination country labour markets can be an important protection for lower-skilled migrants, allowing them to escape abusive employers.

Regional free labour markets such as the EU allow freedom of movement, so that EU nationals can move and seek jobs on an equal basis with local workers. Foreign students, working holidaymakers, and other migrants who are primarily in the destination country for a purpose other than work, are also generally free agents in the labour market.³³

There is a consensus in the specific ILO and UN standards that if a migrant worker loses his or her job, he or she should not necessarily or immediately have to leave the country but should be viewed as part of the normal workforce. In cases in which migrants involuntarily lose their jobs because of illness, or because the employer terminates the employment relationship or goes bankrupt, ILO Convention No. 143 (Article 8) considers that:

1. On condition that he has resided legally in the territory for the purposes of employment, the migrant worker shall not be regarded as in an illegal or irregular

³² OECD (2004).

³³ Martin, P. (2007).

situation by the mere fact of the loss of his employment, which shall not in itself imply the withdrawal of his authorization of residence or, as the case may be, work permits.

2. Accordingly, he shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals in respect in particular of guarantees of security of employment, the provisions of alternative employment, relief work and retraining.

Normally migrant workers should be allowed a reasonable period (not less than six months) to seek employment in the event of the termination of previous employment; this is seen as a basic entitlement that should be granted even to temporary migrants to safeguard their rights (including the right to access core benefits) and to protect them from exploitation.

It is also important to determine other social rights, such as access to public services. In Ireland, for example, migrant workers' access to public services and benefits, including unemployment benefits, is regulated by the 'habitual residency test', which means that migrants become eligible for certain benefits only after they have been in the country for a certain minimum period of time.³⁴ The term 'habitually resident' is intended to convey a degree of permanence evidenced by a regular physical presence enduring for some time. It implies a close association between the applicant and the country from which payment is claimed and relies heavily on fact. The following are the relevant factors that have been set down in Irish and European law:

- length and continuity of residence in Ireland or in any other particular country;
- length and purpose of any absence from Ireland;
- nature and pattern of employment;
- applicant's main centre of interest;
- future intentions of applicant as they appear from all the circumstances.

³⁴ Ruhs (2006).

Another issue that arises in this context is the extent to which any contributions made by migrant workers to social security systems are portable back to their origin country. The consensus is that best practice for benefit portability is bilateral social security agreements, preferably based on multilaterally agreed standards.³⁵ The innovative regional arrangement in CARICOM countries holds promise for regional approaches and mechanisms.³⁶

Generally, temporary labour migration programmes do not provide the right to family reunification. In contrast, employment-based immigration programmes targeted at more skilled workers tend to permit family reunification, although conditions vary. Procedures also vary as regards the ability of dependants to work. In the United Kingdom, dependants of Ordinary Work Permit holders are entitled to undertake any employment or self-employment, provided they hold a valid UK Entry Clearance.

Employment-based immigration programmes, such as those in Australia, Canada and the USA, tend to be oriented towards the possibility for permanent residence, and the main variation is the number of years a worker needs to wait before being permitted to apply. Possibilities for applying for permanent residence for workers admitted on temporary migration programmes are more limited. Some destination countries facilitate a strictly limited and regulated transfer of migrants employed on temporary labour migration programmes into permanent residence based on a set of clear rules and criteria. One alternative is a 'points' system. To be eligible for permanent residence in Canada, for example, applicants must:

- meet certain minimum work experience requirements;
- prove that they have the funds required for settlement;

³⁵ OSCE/IOM/ILO (2006).

³⁶ See IOM International Dialogue on Migration, Migration and Transnationalism, March 2010, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/international-dialogue-migration/intersessional-workshops/migration-and-transnationalism>, CARICOM presentation by Reginald Thomas http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/migration_and_transnationalism_030910/Session1-Thomas.pdf

- earn enough points on six selection factors: education, language skills, experience, age, arranged employment in Canada and ‘adaptability’.

Destination countries may also grant temporary migrants permanent residence on non-economic grounds such as marriage to a citizen or a permanent resident. Under the new Immigration and Integration Law in France, spouses of French citizens must wait three years before applying for a ten-year residence permit. Four years of marriage are required for the spouse of a French citizen to apply for French citizenship.

3.5 Training of migrant workers and placement services

While destination countries with a need for labour migrants need to develop capacities to facilitate the orderly admission of workers and guarantee their associated rights, there is also a responsibility on origin countries keen to promote labour migration to train potential migrant workers, and to work with destination countries to identify job openings, ensure that qualifications are recognized, and also protect migrant workers' rights. Although this function is usually fulfilled by the private sector, some governments are looking into carrying it out themselves – Mauritius is one example. With the assistance of IOM, a database for foreign placement has been established, and the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with IOM, undertakes the selection. In Indonesia, IOM recently finished working with the Government to develop placement and pre-departure systems, mechanisms for the protection of labour migrants, a better statistical overview of the situation of Indonesian labour migrants, and enhanced labour migration management capacity and cooperation, particularly with Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia and Singapore.

Increasingly, these activities take place through Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) (see textbox 4).³⁷ MRCs provide support for training, either through referral to training facilities and financial support for training,

or through direct provision of training. The Migration Information Centre (MIC) in Slovakia is an example of good practice in this area. After an intensive programme of personalized counselling and interviews to assist migrants to develop a personal development plan and to identify appropriate courses, the MIC provides grants to migrants for job-related training. Staff members follow the migrants' progress and help them make links with employers. The process is evaluated by staff at the end of the course to ensure that appropriate training has been provided.

Providing support to persons seeking employment is another key part of the work of many MRCs. Currently, this assistance tends to be provided indirectly, especially in the absence of concrete multilateral or bilateral agreements providing recruitment support mechanisms. One example is the Maison des Congolais de l'Etranger et des Migrants (MCDEM) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has a job portal on its website with links to job websites both in-country and abroad. This provides an opportunity to see which jobs are available and to apply for them. The Migration Information Centre in Croatia provides information on quotas open to Croatians overseas, similarly enabling individuals to target their migration project towards specific positions.

MRCs also play an important, if indirect, role in ensuring that migrants' qualifications are recognized wherever they are. A lack of recognition of qualifications can be an important factor preventing migrants and returnees from being able to access employment that matches their skill sets. A number of MRCs have engaged in negotiations for the recognition of foreign qualifications in the country of destination. In Portugal and Slovakia, where systems of qualification recognition are already in place, MRCs support migrants going through this process: the Centro Nacional de Apoio ao Imigrante (CNAI, or National Immigrant Support Centre) in Portugal, for example, works as a facilitator and information service provider to link migrants and government schemes for the recognition of qualifications.

³⁷ IOM study on migrant resource centres, GFMD, 2009.

Textbox 4: Migrant Resource Centres

Since the 1970s, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) and other similar facilities in both countries of origin and destination. This interest in MRCs reflects the support they provide in migration management. Indeed, MRCs aim to become reference points in regular migration processes.

Although MRCs go under a number of different names, reflecting the diversity of actors involved in their set-up, functioning and the objectives that they serve, they share a number of key features. Principally, they provide an independent and impartial structure through which migrants are able to obtain accurate information on legal migration procedures; the rights and responsibilities that migrants have throughout the migration process; and information on how to protect themselves so that migration is a positive experience.

In providing this service, MRCs support a number of key policy objectives, directly or otherwise. These objectives include:

- facilitation of regular migration;
- protection of regular and irregular migrants;
- prevention of irregular migration;
- promotion of sustainable, voluntary return (where relevant);
- integration of migrants into the country of destination (where relevant);
- promotion of the links between migration and development.

In recent years, the number of MRC physical structures providing services to migrants to facilitate and empower them to migrate in a regular, voluntary, orderly and protected fashion has grown significantly. They represent good practices in empowering migrants to facilitate development and ensuring that through this empowerment they can better protect themselves:

- In relation to empowering migrants for development, MRCs play an important role in providing migrants with information on how their migration, remittances and return plans can be linked to development.
- In relation to providing services which enable migrants to protect themselves, MRCs gather and actively distribute information to enable migrants to exercise their rights and prevent their exploitation. Moreover, a number of MRCs also provide services to migrants to ensure they are able to access their rights.

Source: *Migrant Resource Centres: Examining Global Good Practices in Providing Services to Empower Migrants for Development and Protection*, IOM/LFM, 2009 (rapid assessment of Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) submitted in the context of roundtable 2 of the 2009 Global Forum on Migration and Development in Athens, "Migrant integration, reintegration and circulation for development").

3.6 Protection of migrant workers' rights

The protection of migrant workers' rights is a significant challenge, especially for workers in the informal and unregulated sectors of the economy such as domestic work and those involved in forced labour. Migrant workers with irregular status are particularly vulnerable to exploitation in work. Areas of concern include: threat or physical harm to the worker; restriction of movement and confinement to the workplace or to a limited area; debt bondage; withholding of payment or excessive wage reductions; retention of passports and identity documents; and threat of denunciation to the immigration authorities where the worker has an irregular immigration

status. As labour mobility increases, these concerns are likely to become even more acute for low-skilled and irregular migrants.

Migrants have rights under two sets of international instruments: the core human rights treaties currently in force, namely ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, ICERD, CEDAW, CRC, CRPD and ICRMW,³⁸ and international labour

³⁸ ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966); ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966); CAT (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984); ICERD (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965); CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979); CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989); CRPD (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006); ICRMW (International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990).

law, which includes the two specific ILO Conventions concerned with the protection of migrant workers (Nos. 97 and 143). The trafficking and smuggling protocols, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also refer to protecting the human rights of trafficked persons and smuggled migrants. There is a particularly vigorous debate around the Convention on Migrant Workers, which has been ratified by 42 States, none of which is a major developed country of destination or an EU Member State. Some of the main reasons provided for non-ratification include: the Convention's breadth and complexity; the technical and financial obligations it places on States that have ratified; the view that it contradicts or adds no value to existing national migration legislation; and concerns that it provides migrants (especially those with irregular status) rights that are not found in other human rights treaties. The ILO has played an important role in defining labour standards, which have had a significant impact, especially on domestic law in ILO Member States. The human rights of migrants are also protected under regional bodies (e.g. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)).

At the same time, there are significant shortcomings and implementation gaps in international labour and human rights standards concerning migrant workers, as was explored at the IOM International Dialogue on Migration in 2009, focusing on *Effective Respect for Human Rights: A Shared Responsibility*.³⁹ Human rights protection for migrants remains much less developed than the international refugee protection system and no international institution has a specific legal protection mandate applying to all migrants. The dynamics and dimensions of labour migration have changed since the main labour standards and conventions were adopted, especially with regard to: the decreasing significance of the State in the recruitment of migrant labour and the increasing importance of private agents and intermediaries (although ILO

Convention No. 181 aims to regulate private employment agencies); the feminization of migrant labour with the overrepresentation of women migrant workers in 'extremely vulnerable positions'; the increasing short-term nature of migration and the expansion of temporary migrant worker programmes; and the growth in irregular migration and the need to balance control measures with measures to facilitate labour migration and to protect migrant workers. Significant problems persist in the implementation of the principles to which States have formally agreed, sometimes due to a lack of political will, but also a lack of capacity and resources.

In response, it has been proposed that capacities be developed to provide supplementary and complementary mechanisms for protection. One focus is to enhance national protection – for example, through national courts applying international human rights law, case law and advisory opinions from regional treaties to cases that come before them. A number of national policies can also be cited as comprising good practice in protecting the rights of migrant workers – for example, the 'state-managed' policy for the employment of Filipino nationals overseas; the extensive consular network of Mexico; the United Kingdom's Gangmaster Act (2004); the issuance of 'T' visas in the USA; and the Live-in Caregiver Programme in Canada, which allows temporary migrant workers to change employers while in the country, provided that the new employment offer is confirmed by the authorities.

Capacity-building is also required among civil society to increase its effectiveness in: lobbying for the human rights of migrants and migrant workers; monitoring and reporting on conditions for migrant workers; and providing migrant workers with services and information. Trade unions across Western Europe have been active in protecting migrant domestic workers; the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) in Spain is one example. In the Philippines and Sri Lanka, civil society has lobbied for standard contracts as a means of enforcing minimum wages for their migrant workers.

³⁹ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/international-dialogue-migration/intersessional-workshops/effective-respect-human-rights-migrants-shared-responsibility>

An enhanced role for UN Special Mechanisms has also been proposed: the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has a mandate to improve knowledge of the circumstances of migrants, establish dialogue with governments, and give practical effect to human rights principles. But the international mechanisms that implement UN human rights treaties are chronically underfunded. Finally, there may be value in articulating the dispersed legal and normative framework in a single compilation of all treaty provisions and other norms that are relevant to the protection of the human rights of migrants to facilitate the consistent implementation of the provisions, noting the contribution that IOM's *Compendium of International Migration Law Instruments* has made in this regard.⁴⁰

3.7 Reducing labour migration costs

One of the obstacles to the effective matching of labour supply and demand across borders is the upfront costs of labour migration – for example, the costs incurred in obtaining information, documentation, health checks, pre-departure orientation and training, and paying for transportation. ILO and UN conventions call for employers to absorb the economic costs of migration.⁴¹ Yet, while employers typically pay these costs for professional and highly skilled migrant workers, the migrant-paid share of migration costs tends to rise as skill levels fall. One reason is that destination States, especially in the developed world, increasingly depend on private recruiters to identify foreign workers and match them with job openings in the labour market. In some cases, recruiters exploit migrant workers – for example, by promising them more wages and benefits than they will actually receive. But even in the case of legitimate recruiters, there has been a tendency to shift the costs of recruitment from employers to workers.

There are three broad government responses to private recruitment costs. One is to step

up enforcement to eliminate unscrupulous agents – for example, by requiring recruiters to identify themselves to authorities via registration, ensuring that they can meet minimum standards by requiring them to pass tests, and generating some financial security for migrants by having agents post bonds that can be tapped if agents do not fulfil their promises. A second is to encourage more legitimate agents to become involved in the migrant brokerage business so that competition gives migrants options and leads to effective self-regulation and ratings to guide migrants towards better agents. A third approach is to try to increase the role of public employment service agencies in moving workers over borders, in the hope that public agencies will be most likely to ensure that minimum standards are satisfied in recruitment and deployment.

Responsibility for reducing labour migration costs lies as much with origin countries as with destination countries. The Philippines is considered a leader in regulating recruiters.⁴² The government operates three agencies to serve and protect migrants: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) regulates recruitment and provides pre-departure orientation; labour attachés stationed at consulates abroad provide assistance to migrants while they are abroad; and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) operates centres in areas with concentrations of Filipinos that cover the cost of emergency repatriation and provide various services to families left behind. These activities are financed by fees collected from migrants, including a PHP 3,000 (USD 60) processing fee charged by the POEA, whose governing board includes representatives of the recruitment industry, and a USD 25 fee paid to the OWWA.⁴³ While the Philippine system is often considered a model for regulating recruitment and protecting migrants abroad, there is an active debate among migrant organizations, some of which allege that over-regulation of recruitment raises the costs of Filipino migrants to foreign employers,

⁴⁰ http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=19&products_id=107

⁴¹ Martin, P. (2010).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Abella et al. (2004).

reducing the number of foreign jobs for Filipinos. Most recruiters, as well as the Union of Filipino Overseas Contract Workers (OCW-Unifil), want less government regulation of recruitment, arguing that it increases the costs of sending migrants abroad at a time when other countries in the region that offer lower-wage workers are aggressively expanding deployment. Furthermore, cost implications may mean that the Philippines' systems are not easily replicable in other developing countries.

Another initiative proposed in an important origin country for labour migrants—Bangladesh—is aimed at reducing pre-departure loan costs for migrants. The Bangladeshi Government proposed at the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Brussels (2007) that donors consider expanding the country's active microfinance industry to migrants leaving the country. Pre-departure loans for Bangladeshi migrants would go primarily to men who leave the village, and the benefit of the loan would come in the form of remittances and the return of migrants with experience gained abroad. Under one proposal, a partnership of banks and NGOs could assess risks, make low-cost loans and ensure repayment, as NGOs with a presence in the migrants' home villages form partnerships with banks seeking to expand their customer base.⁴⁴

3.8 Strengthening and implementing bilateral labour mobility agreements

Bilateral labour mobility agreements have been identified as a promising mechanism for ensuring that the potential benefits of migration accrue both to origin and destination countries, as well as to migrants themselves.⁴⁵ Some countries recruit labour on the basis of MoUs—for example, in the case of programmes between Spain and major origin countries for migrants there, including Colombia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, and between Germany and Poland to facilitate a contract

worker scheme.⁴⁶ The majority now rely on more formal bilateral agreements that are legally binding.

There has been a significant increase in bilateral agreements in recent years—in 2004, there were reported to be 176 bilateral labour agreements signed by OECD countries. The reason that increasing numbers of countries are signing bilateral labour agreements is that they offer an effective method of regulating the recruitment and employment of foreign workers; they allow for greater State involvement in the migration process; they can be tailored to the specific supply and demand characteristics of the origin and destination countries; and they can provide effective mechanisms for protecting migrants.

Destination countries normally select a bilateral partner origin country for four main reasons.⁴⁷ Some countries use bilateral agreements to manage migration by asking origin countries to sign, in exchange, re-admission agreements for migrants in an irregular situation. This is the case for agreements signed between Italy and Romania, and between Spain and Morocco. Some countries may wish to promote specific economic ties or wider regional economic integration, as is the case for bilateral agreements signed between Germany and some Central and Eastern European countries. Another objective is to strengthen cultural ties between partner countries, as is the case for the Working Holiday Maker programme in Australia. Finally, some countries may sign bilateral agreements to prevent indiscriminate international recruitment in specific sectors, particularly health—as is the case for a number of bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom and sub-Saharan African nations. This range of goals makes the effectiveness of bilateral agreements difficult to gauge, because such goals can sometimes conflict, and the effectiveness of agreements will depend on the weight assigned to each goal.⁴⁸

The ILO has identified 24 basic elements to be addressed in bilateral labour agreements,

⁴⁴ Martin, P. (2010).

⁴⁵ World Economic Forum (2010).

⁴⁶ OECD (2004).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ OECD (2004).

while IOM, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the ILO have developed a matrix of good practice.⁴⁹

MoUs or bilateral agreements may also be agreed between the government of the origin country and representatives of specific employment sectors in the destination country. Provisions in such sector-based MoUs may include the identification of longer-term measures to be taken by employers in that sector for filling labour shortages domestically. Consequently, they may provide for temporary foreign labour migration in the short term, but preclude such migration becoming a permanent solution over the long term. Employers may also be subject to obligations to guarantee security in the workplace and provide basic language training necessary for undertaking the work.⁵⁰ Alternatively, MoUs or bilateral agreements may be agreed by particular subnational regions in destination countries to respond to specific local labour shortages. Australia, Canada and Italy have all merged regional and rural development with immigration goals. In Italy, for example, the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region has been actively recruiting agricultural workers in Romania.

At the same time, one of the principal challenges relating to bilateral agreements is their implementation (some 25% of bilateral agreements in OECD countries are not implemented) and implementation itself presents a significant capacity-building priority.

3.9 Return and reintegration

Return migration is a critical element of migration management, including as a strategy to prevent or deter irregular migration and maintain the integrity of asylum and migration systems, as well as in promoting circular migration. Capacity requirements in each of these areas are considered elsewhere in this report, while this section is particularly concerned with capacity-building for the reintegration of returning labour migrants.

Although returns did not take place at the scale initially predicted, the effects of the global economic crisis made it clear that many origin countries are ill-prepared for the return and sustainable reintegration of labour migrants, especially during a period of economic downturn. Yet there are good reasons to suppose that return migration will become more prevalent in the future – for example, shocks to the global economic system are cyclical and should be expected again, and temporary migration programmes and circular migration depend on return. For these reasons and more, a core capacity required in preparing for future challenges of labour mobility relates to return and reintegration.

The World Bank concluded over a decade ago that managing worker retraining programmes requires strong professional expertise and coordinating capacity, which may be beyond the means of many developing country governments. More extensive (and recent) evidence from developed countries indicates that government-managed worker retraining and skill-acquisition programmes are costly undertakings with marginal benefits, and that private sector involvement is essential.

In spite of its importance, the reintegration of migrants is among the most overlooked policy interventions in the migration cycle. Existing experience with reintegration programmes has tended to focus on providing protection and support to vulnerable humanitarian migrants rather than labour migrants. Such programmes tend to focus on assisting victims of human trafficking, returning refugees and internally displaced persons and, in some cases, migrants who have been deported back to their country of origin. These services range from counselling and education (in the case of child victims of human trafficking), to land grants and agricultural equipment (in the case of some returning refugees) and vocational training (for some deported migrants).

Increasing numbers of countries of origin are establishing new institutions, or assigning an existing one, to assist in the reintegration of at least a portion of the return flow of migrants, including those who may have lost their jobs abroad. There is some evidence

⁴⁹ <http://www.iom.int/Jahia/Jahia/pid/2056>

⁵⁰ OSCE/IOM/ILO (2006).

that these types of measures have become more important during the global economic crisis (see Asia Regional Overview, in part B). Ecuador's 'Welcome Home' programme, for example, provides guidelines on the customs and tax regulations that returning migrants face; and Morocco's National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC), which (among other things) helps returning migrants to reintegrate into professional life.

In the Philippines, the National Reintegration Center for Overseas Filipino Workers is a one-stop centre catering to the needs of returning overseas Filipino workers and their families. Operated by the Department of Labor and Employment, this PHP 7 million (USD 140,000) facility is funded by the Overseas Worker's Welfare Administration – a government-run migrant welfare fund – and offers an array of services, from providing referrals to local and overseas jobs, skills training programmes and psychosocial services, to helping well-financed returnees to access formal investment instruments. In early 2009, the Philippine Government also initiated a new project – the Filipino Expatriate Livelihood Support Fund (FELSF) – aimed at providing loans of up to PHP 50,000 (USD 1,000) to migrant workers displaced due to the global economic crisis. The PHP 1 billion fund (USD 20 million) is administered by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) and has the support of government lending institutions, such as the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

A limited number of other programmes provide support to returning labour migrants – typically, vocational training, job-placement assistance and entrepreneurship support. The EU and Mali's joint Centre on Migration Information and Management (*Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations*, CIGEM) offers job placement and training services for migrants returning to Mali. Under the aegis of Spain's co-development agreements with Colombia, Ecuador and Morocco, some NGOs provide training to migrants while they are working in Spain and microfinance support for enterprise development upon their return to their

home countries. It is important to note that successful reintegration in the home country begins in the host country. Migrant Resource Centres can also be involved in training and job placements for returnees – for example, the MRC in Sri Lanka provides training targeted at returning women migrants.

Reintegration policies for the families of migrants are also important – both at the most basic levels of public services, such as education and health care, and in efforts to attract highly skilled expatriates. The challenges are magnified when a migrant returns with a foreign-born spouse or children who have been raised abroad. Those who do not speak the local language may find themselves isolated, while the foreign credentials of a spouse may not be recognized. Since 1982, the Mexican Ministry of Public Education has operated a programme aimed at addressing the educational needs of students who move regularly between Mexico and the USA, including facilitating the reintegration of the children of return migrants into Mexican schools. Under the Binational Migrant Education Program (PROBEM), school administrators in the USA and Mexico have developed the 'Binational Student Transfer Document'. This document conveys a student's academic achievements and progress between school officials on both sides of the US–Mexican border so as to minimize the disruption that can occur in a students' academic progress when students move between countries.

3.10 Implementation

The challenge of implementation has been registered several times in this section already – for example, in the context of international labour standards and human rights, and bilateral labour mobility agreements. Indeed, as indicated in the introduction to this report, effective implementation is fundamental to successful capacity-building in any aspect of migration. Even at the stage of developing new policies or programmes, or revising existing ones, it is vital that attention be paid to the extent to which such policies and programmes will be implementable.

First, care is needed in assessing the extent to which policies and procedures in other countries can be directly transferred. As already indicated, the specific policy goals for labour mobility will influence their configuration. It is particularly important that policies and procedures be tailored to the national context. There are significant contextual differences between destination countries, whether established or emerging – for example, in terms of levels of economic development, regulation of labour markets, culture, establishment of democratic institutions, international relations with origin countries, the role and independence of the judiciary, and the capacity of the State to act and implement certain policies. Finally, it is generally very difficult to evaluate how effective labour migration policies are and, thus, to what extent they might work elsewhere. Pilot programmes are a common method for testing new policies on labour mobility.

Second, it is important to understand that the success of labour mobility programmes requires complementary policies that include a strong commitment to enforcing immigration

and employment laws, especially against employers; active regulation of the cost at which migrant workers are made available to employers; and more effective mechanisms for encouraging employers to search for local workers before demanding migrant labour.⁵¹ Specific policies and procedures for employment and work permits should be part of a wider policy framework.

Finally, it is important that new policies conform to international standards for the protection of the rights of migrant workers. ILO Conventions and Recommendations establish a core set of rights for migrant workers and encourage the development and sharing of best practices worked out in social dialogue between unions, employers and governments. The rights of migrant workers should include equal protection under labour, anti-discrimination and family law. Effective practice stresses empowering migrants by providing them with information about their rights in the labour market, giving them the identification, rights and tools needed to access banks and other institutions abroad, and developing incentives to encourage migrants to report abuses of their rights.

⁵¹ Ruhs (2006).

4. IRREGULAR MIGRATION

It is important to put any discussion on irregular migration into context. The overwhelming majority of migration is fully authorized. Estimates, while not exact (as will be discussed below), suggest that only some 10–15 per cent of today's 214 million international migrants are in an irregular situation. Most of these migrants enter legally but overstay the authorized stay. Moreover, as South–South migration is as significant as South–North migration, it is important not to fuel fear and negative perceptions of the North being overrun by poor migrants from the South, while of course not ignoring the vexing incidence of irregular migration today. One of the key questions requiring further exploration is how to get to the root of the phenomenon – most notably, underlying disparities in livelihood and safety opportunities. As indicated in the UNDP *Human Development Report 2009*, where a person is born is the single most significant determinant of human development outcomes.

Data on stocks and flows of irregular migration, at the local, national, regional and global levels, vary widely and are usually imprecise. There is also a lack of comparable data, both over time and between locations. In the absence of an authoritative single source on irregular migrant numbers, analysis inevitably depends on widely fragmented sources, some of which are significantly out of date. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that the number of irregular migrants has grown in recent years. It has been suggested that, during the

global economic crisis, irregular migration flows reduced temporarily, but irregular migrant stocks increased as laid-off workers stayed on in destination countries without authorization, rather than leaving the country at the risk of not being able to return after the recovery (see the regional overviews in part B of this report).⁵²

As indicated in the last section, the predicted global mismatch between labour supply and demand may result in a further increase in irregular migration, with more people moving to find work than will be facilitated by labour mobility agreements. Indeed, most experts today would agree that there are already inadequate legal channels for migration and especially for migration for work, indicated by skills – at high and low levels – as well as demographic gaps. Crossing borders without authorization is only one of a number of ways that migrants can find themselves in an irregular situation, and there are reasons to suppose that some of these other processes may also accelerate in the foreseeable future. Another form of irregularity arises, for example, where migrants work without authorization, even if they entered the country legally – for example, by overstaying on visas or work permits. The segmentation of labour markets between formal and informal sectors, which is already acute in many developed destination countries, is expected to continue there and become more visible in emerging

⁵² Koser (2010).

economies, thus providing expanding opportunities for irregular or unauthorized work. People moved by migrant smugglers or human traffickers (main countries of origin and destination of victims of human trafficking are illustrated in maps 4 and 5, respectively) usually also find themselves in an irregular situation – initially, at least – and most commentators agree that both phenomena are on the increase, despite concerted efforts to combat them (see map 6 on the number of signatures/ratifications of the UN Palermo Protocol on human trafficking), partly because of the huge profits they generate. It is also worth noting that, while irregularity is a deliberate choice or decision for some, many others find themselves in an irregular situation due to administrative obstacles or a lack of information. The problem is compounded by the fact that, in most countries, the procedures governing most forms of migration are becoming more complex rather than more streamlined.

Current and future challenges of irregular migration result not only from increasing numbers. Irregular migration is also becoming more complex, not just because of the variety of routes into irregularity, but also because of the difficulties in distinguishing the particular needs and rights of various types of persons forming part of irregular migration flows – for example, asylum-seekers or unaccompanied minors. This is a particular challenge in transit countries. As discussed in section 7, the effects of environmental change may exacerbate this complexity – for example, where people cross an international border as a result of the effects of environmental change leading to uncertain and non-uniform legal protection.

Fundamentally, irregular migration should be curbed because it undermines the rule of law and exerts a heavy human toll on the migrants themselves. When destination countries tolerate high levels of irregular migration, they undermine their own legal immigration systems. There is little credibility for immigration law if migrants and migrant smugglers and human traffickers are allowed to circumvent the policies in place to determine who enters, for what purposes, and for

what period of time. Irregular migration also undermines public support for immigration. Often, the public reacts negatively to migration because it feels that the government no longer has control over who is to be admitted. High levels of irregular migration can thus create a backlash that extends to legal immigration as well.⁵³ Irregular migration also undermines the rule of law in other respects. Generally, smuggling operations cannot function effectively without the aid of corrupt officials in origin, transit and destination countries. It also thrives when there is access to counterfeit and fraudulently obtained documents, which, in turn, create opportunities for identity theft. Many irregular migrants work in the informal economy, allowing unscrupulous employers to violate labour laws with relative impunity, since the irregular workers are unlikely to complain to the authorities.

Added to these concerns is the human cost to the migrants who enter through unauthorized channels or who remain illegally in the country. Clandestine migration is dangerous, as is evident in the statistics on deaths along the US–Mexican border or in the Mediterranean Sea. When migrants cross deserts, are packed in containers, or cross in unseaworthy boats, they put themselves at risk of serious harm. When they use the ‘services’ of smugglers who are only interested in profit, their lives are at further risk. Even if irregular migrants are able to arrive safely to their destination, they usually find themselves in very vulnerable situations as they attempt to evade authorities and work illegally. They have few rights and risk being apprehended and removed. Irregular migrants find it difficult to maintain contacts with families, since they are not eligible for family reunification unless they are able to obtain legal status.

Against this background, this report considers the curbing of irregular migration to be a priority. Effective capacities will be required in the following ten core areas, in order to respond to the future challenges of irregular migration:

⁵³ GCIM (2005).

1. generating better data on irregular migration;
2. enhancing law enforcement;
3. regularizing migrants' status;
4. managing detention and deportation;
5. regulating migration and employment;
6. capacity-building in transit States;
7. combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking;
8. addressing mixed flows;
9. enhancing information dissemination;
10. building partnerships and cooperation.

4.1 Better data on irregular migration

Responding effectively to irregular migration is hampered by a serious lack of verifiably accurate data, making it difficult to identify trends or compare the scale of the phenomenon in different parts of the world. While there is an ongoing debate about the utility and uses of statistics on irregular migration,⁵⁴ there are strong arguments for improving existing data-collection systems for irregular migration. States need statistics to justify the allocation of resources, to try to anticipate the economic and social impacts of irregular migration, and to plan local, regional and national responses. Responsibly handled, statistics can be used by the media to inform the public. International and non-governmental organizations, including trade unions, involved with addressing irregular migration flows or assisting irregular migrants, need reliable statistics in order to allocate resources, procure assistance, establish logistical systems, raise money and account for the organization's expenditure.⁵⁵ Enumerating irregular migrants can also help serve the interests of migrants themselves – for example, in identifying and targeting protection and assistance for those in vulnerable situations.⁵⁶

There are both conceptual and more practical challenges associated with measuring, collecting and interpreting data on irregular migration. Irregular migration is a complex and diverse concept that requires careful

clarification. Data normally distinguish flows from stocks; in both cases, obtaining reliable data is problematic. As described above, it is important to recognize that there is a wide variety of routes into irregularity. It is also important to separate out asylum from aggregate statistics on irregular migration. Another conceptual complexity arises because a migrant's status can change – often rapidly. A more practical problem is that people without regular status are likely to avoid speaking to the authorities for fear of being apprehended and deported, and thus often go unrecorded.

Various methods have been used to try to estimate numbers of irregular migrants, and each of them has drawbacks. In high-income destination countries, the most widely available and commonly used source of data on immigrants is the population census, which is administered in most countries on a regular decennial cycle. There are a number of reasons, however, why censuses are imperfect sources for estimating irregular migration.⁵⁷ One is that de jure census systems enumerate people at their place of legal residence and, since irregular migrants, by definition, have no legal residence, they are likely to be excluded. A de facto census, in contrast, enumerates people wherever they are on the census day. In addition, censuses do not include questions on the legal status of respondents; thus, although many irregular migrants may be enumerated, it is not possible to know which respondents are in the country legally and which are not. Another problem arises from the fact that most censuses take place so infrequently that data on immigration from these sources are perpetually out of date. Inter-censal surveys may overcome this problem, while otherwise having the same limitations as other censuses.

There are three more direct methods that have been used to try to enumerate the scale of irregular migration. First, files from government administrative bodies (including information on refusals for entry visas, work and residence visas and rejected asylum-seekers) can be used as data sources to indicate potential irregular migrants. Data from police checks

⁵⁴ Koser (2010).

⁵⁵ Crisp (1999).

⁵⁶ European Migration Network (2005).

⁵⁷ Massey and Capoferro (2007).

and apprehensions or labour inspections can also be useful.⁵⁸ In this context, regulated and standardized data collection, management and protection are essential aspects of border-management capacity-building. Second, special surveys have sometimes also been conducted – for example, on illegal employment in host countries, or among migrant-sending families in origin countries.⁵⁹ These are, however, usually based only on small and not necessarily representative samples.

A third direct source of numbers is regularization programmes, which are periodically declared in certain high-income economies in order to permit foreign nationals residing or working without legal authority to regularize their status (see section 4.3). As an indicator of numbers, however, regularization programmes have several limitations. No programme attempts to cover the entire range of irregular migration, targeting instead certain sectors, nationalities or people who entered before a particular cut-off date; they usually occur infrequently and it is not always clear whether or not the number of applicants includes family members. There can also be administrative problems – for example, where applicants apply to local and national authorities simultaneously.⁶⁰ The status granted to successful applicants also varies – for example, in some cases, they are legalized for only one year, after which their status becomes irregular again. Finally, once a regularization process is complete, there is a tendency for new irregular migrants to simply replace the previous ones.⁶¹

There is also a series of indirect methods for measuring the size of the irregular migrant population.⁶² Such methods aim to infer the size of the population by comparing different population censuses and registers, including data on births and deaths, and have the advantage of not relying on an actual count of irregular migrants.⁶³ They include the residual method, which makes use of census and

immigration data, and the sex-ratio method in origin countries, which compares expected populations with contemporary, observed populations to estimate the irregular migrant component.⁶⁴ Another indirect method is that of conducting surveys of employers. Estimates compare population registers and residence permit data to reveal those persons who are employed and have an expired residence permit, no permit, or a permit issued for reasons other than work. There are, however, problems inferring the size of the irregular migrant population from estimates of the scale of illegal employment, partly because a proportion of irregular migrants do not work.

Although the above-mentioned methods yield some useful insights into the role and patterns of irregular migration in many destination countries, existing information often remains scarce, out of date or unreliable. Thus, in recent years, several efforts have been made to enhance capacities to collect data on irregular migration. Successful experiences include the IOM Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM), the CIREFI (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration) or EIL (Enforcement of Immigration Legislation) statistics collected by the European Commission, together with Eurostat, the research project ‘Clandestino’, coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), improved data exchange and information lead by Frontex (the European agency for coordination of cooperation between EU Member States in the field of border management), among others:

- The European Commission/DG Justice, Liberty and Freedom developed, together with Eurostat, what used to be known as ‘CIREFI statistics’ – i.e. a data-collection system regularly compiling statistics on refusals, apprehensions and removals provided by EU Member States. Since the implementation of the Migration Statistics Regulation EC/862/2007, these data are called ‘EIL statistics’, which are put online and accessible to everyone: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

⁵⁸ Pinkerton et al. (2004).

⁵⁹ Massey and Capoferro (2007).

⁶⁰ Clarke et al. (2003).

⁶¹ Garson (1999).

⁶² Delaunay and Tapinos (1998).

⁶³ IPPR (2006).

⁶⁴ Clarke et al. (2003).

- Since its inception in 1999–2000, the IOM Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM)/ Trafficking Database has allowed for the collection of information relating to nearly 16,000 victims of trafficking in over 90 countries of destination around the world. The database now operates in 72 IOM missions globally, although usage of the tool varies from mission to mission (for more information, see commentary maps 4 and 5 and IOM, 2007⁶⁵). Within the ASEAN region, where the database is currently used by Country Offices in Thailand and Indonesia, IOM developed a data guide highlighting best practice principles for the collection of data on human trafficking and for using such data in combating trafficking.
- The ICMPD interdisciplinary project ‘Clandestino – Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable Data and Trends Across Europe’ was designed to support policymakers in developing and implementing appropriate policies regarding undocumented migration. It essentially aims to provide an inventory and comparative analysis of data and estimates on undocumented migration (stocks and flows) in selected EU countries, as well as proposing a new method for evaluating and classifying data/estimates on undocumented migration in the EU. Besides country reports for the 2000–2007 period, the main output of the project is a database (<http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net/>), which presents and classifies (as low-, medium- or high-quality) estimates and data on irregular migration in the EU and in selected Member States.
- In 2009, Frontex tried to improve its operational data collection and analytical outputs by, *inter alia*, including trafficking in human beings in its research. Furthermore, Frontex provided technical training on data exchange to the risk-analysis units of the western Balkan countries, and assisted in the arrangement of a platform for information exchange.

Irregular migration is a growing concern for many countries in the developing world, particularly those that are now countries of transit and destination.

4.2 Law-enforcement strategies

Prevention of unauthorized entry is a cornerstone of immigration-related enforcement actions.⁶⁶ States are increasingly seeking to enforce their domestic immigration laws beyond their own borders, thus managing enforcement as early as possible and prior to arrival at the border. The further away the prospective entrant, the more time government officials have to examine the individual and his or her travel documents. Once travellers reach the border, inspection officers are pressed to make quick decisions so as not to unduly inconvenience other travellers. Indeed, the entire notion of expanding borders to a place of first contact – whether through physical or electronic means – is a reality of today’s mobile and information and communication technology-intensive world.

Visa issuance is generally considered to be the first line of defence against irregular migration, particularly for those deemed likely to overstay their permission to remain in the host country. Visas generally give foreign nationals permission to travel to a destination country, although the visa holders may well be subject to further inspection on arrival. Pre-departure and en route pre-clearance and pre-inspections by destination State personnel are a further way of preventing the arrival of irregular migrants. Many countries deploy immigration officials to work with foreign governments and airline personnel to identify persons travelling with fraudulent documents and to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking operations. Pre-enrolment of frequent travellers is a further way of pre-clearing certain foreign nationals, allowing greater time and attention to be paid to visitors about whom the authorities have less information. The Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) pre-clears crossers at the US–Mexican border

⁶⁵ IOM (2007).

⁶⁶ Martin, S. (2008).

to determine whether they have a secure residence in one of the border towns, and whether they pose any security risk.

Sanctions against carriers who transport migrants ineligible to enter a destination country are a further means of preventing irregular migration. Domestic law in a number of States requires common carriers (including by sea, air and land) servicing their territories internationally to verify travel documents of all boarding passengers. Fines are imposed upon carriers that fail to comply.

Most countries subject arriving passengers to some type of inspection at the border, including those already granted visas. Entry controls suffer from the same weaknesses as visa issuance, in that officials must make judgements about likely overstays, based on little or no hard information. One of the most ambitious inspection systems is the US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) system, which captures automated information about each arriving (and, possibly, departing) passenger. It collects information on date of arrival and departure; nationality; complete name; date of birth; citizenship; sex; passport number and country of issuance; country of residence; US visa number, date and place of issuance (where applicable); and complete address while in the USA, among other data. It also records biometric information, which includes a digital photograph and fingerprints of the right and left index fingers. The system was first introduced at air and sea ports of entry and then extended to the land ports of entry, which have far more crossings each day. The departure controls – scanning of the visitor's visa or passport and recording of the two fingerprints again – are being tested at 12 major airports.

Identifying counterfeit and imposter documents used by irregular migrants is a further enforcement measure. One way to reduce counterfeiting is through the issuance of machine-readable passports and visas, and the incorporation of biometric data into travel documents. In this regard, the African Capacity Building Centre has been

working with a Technical Advisory Group on Machine-Readable Travel Documents (TAG-MRTD) with 12 African States that currently do not issue machine-readable passports. Incorporating security features into passports, visas and residence documents makes them more expensive and more difficult to forge. Documents may also incorporate biometric features such as fingerprints or digital photographs, which are almost impossible to replicate. For maximum effect, the documents should be linked to a database that allows for identification of bona fide recipients of the documents. Increases in document security also need to be supplemented by staff training on identifying fraudulent documents. Among the many initiatives supported by IOM in this field is the Personal Identification and Registration System (PIRS). PIRS is a Border Management Information System (BMIS) that allows for the capturing of biographical data of travellers entering and exiting border points, providing an entry-level, comprehensive, flexible, cost-effective and affordable solution for States that have inadequate or non-existent data-capture systems. In the past few years, IOM has undertaken technical assessments of identity management in a variety of countries including Belarus, Jamaica and Mauritania.

Border enforcement is another critical element of law enforcement. Strategies to curb clandestine entries include more and better-trained personnel to patrol borders and seaways, and technology to help identify those seeking entry. Interdiction on the high seas, preferably close to the embarkation point, is used to deter departures by boat. Such border enforcement measures attract significant capacity-building already, but much more work remains to be done, as demonstrated by the fact that, despite massive investment, there are still significant clandestine crossings over the US–Mexican border. IOM recently carried out border management assessments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Namibia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda.

To the extent that irregular migration is fuelled by the demand for labour, enforcement at the worksite is another important deterrent. Many

countries impose sanctions on employers who hire irregular migrants. The standard differs as to the level of knowledge that an employer must have about the worker's immigration status. In the many countries where systems for verifying identity are weak, employers are often able to avoid sanctions because they have not 'knowingly' hired the irregular migrant who poses as an authorized worker. In countries in which there are more rigorous systems for verifying identity, the hiring of a person unauthorized to work may be a violation. In addition to immigration status verification, enforcement at the worksite includes violations of basic labour standards, including payment of minimum or prevailing wages, health and safety standards, overtime payment, and child labour restrictions. Employers may also be investigated for failure to pay required taxes on wages.

4.3 Regularization

Another strand of a comprehensive policy strategy to address irregular migration is regularization – in other words, providing legal status to unauthorized migrants who are already in the country.⁶⁷ Often, regularization takes place in conjunction with new prevention efforts – in effect, wiping the slate clean while the new enforcement measures are put in place. Policymakers often prefer the term 'regularization' to what opponents often call 'amnesty'. Amnesty connotes forgiveness for past misdeeds, whereas regularization is promoted as a way to address irregularity by giving migrants authorization to reside and work.

Proponents often explain that regularization will apply only to those irregular migrants who have broken no laws other than immigration provisions. Regularization usually requires that migrants earn their legal status by continuing to be gainfully employed in the host country.⁶⁸ A number of southern European countries have had recurrent regularization programmes, granting a one-year work permit to migrants who have been illegally residing and working

there. If they retain their employment, they are able to renew their residence and work permits. After a specified period, they may be granted indefinite residency, which puts them on the road to citizenship.

Regularization may apply to the entire irregular population, or it may be limited to a subsection of the migrant population (often defined by their length of residence). Alternatively, different regularization approaches may be taken for different groups. In the 1986 regularization programme in the USA, for example, non-agricultural workers could obtain legal status only if they had been in the country for a lengthy period (since before 1 January 1982), whereas Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAWs) had the possibility of legalizing their status if they could demonstrate that they had worked a minimum number of hours in agriculture during the previous three years.

While regularization programmes attract the most public policy attention, there are other ways in which irregular migrants are able to gain legal status. They may become eligible for regularization by marrying a citizen or legal permanent resident; they may obtain asylum or other status that precludes their deportation; or they may find a job that affords them the opportunity to convert to a legal status. Countries differ as to the ease with which irregular migrants who become eligible for a recognized status are able to avail themselves of the opportunity. Many countries require migrants to return home to apply for a visa – something that irregular migrants may be reluctant to do if they fear that they will be denied re-entry. The USA has passed legislation to allow irregular migrants who arrived before a certain date to adjust their status within the USA, rather than face potential bars on their re-entry. The legislation is generally time-limited, however, and does not provide a means by which new migrants can adjust their status.

Regularization initiatives, whether formal or informal, can be counterproductive if implemented without adequate measures to prevent future flows. If it appears that everyone who enters illegally is able to adjust

⁶⁷ Martin, S. (2008).

⁶⁸ GCIM (2005).

their status if they manage to stay long enough, regularization serves as a magnet for more irregular migration. By contrast, implemented in combination with new enforcement or legal admission measures, regularization can allow authorities to focus attention on preventing new movements rather than apprehending those who have already established links and equities in the destination country.⁶⁹

4.4 Detention and return

Although prevention is the preferable policy approach for deterring future irregular flows, and regularization often makes sense when introducing new prevention measures, the removal of some irregular migrants may be in the best interest of the destination country. For the most part, however, locating irregular migrants can be difficult.

States attempt to track the presence of foreign nationals within their territories through registration requirements, checks of identity documents, and systems for matching entry and exit from the country. Tracking systems are costly mechanisms that, if inappropriately implemented, may infringe on privacy and civil liberties of citizens and foreign nationals alike, without efficiently and effectively identifying those in the country or engaged in employment without proper authorization. Tracking systems are particularly problematic when they appear to involve racial, ethnic or religious profiling. Profiling is not necessarily problematic if based on solid information encompassing a wide range of indicators and used in conjunction with other law-enforcement tools. When profiling is based on crude characteristics, such as those who look or sound foreign, however, it can be counterproductive for law enforcement, as it risks violating the rights of innocent persons.

The capacity to identify, detain and return irregular migrants is limited in all countries. Generally, efforts to do so are focused on targeted groups, and those who pose security risks – suspected terrorists and criminals, for example – are the principal targets. Others

are put into removal proceedings because they come to the attention of authorities – for example, in workplace raids or because their application for asylum or an immigration benefit has been rejected.

Generally, it is easiest to remove people at ports of entry, rather than those who have resided for a longer period in the destination country. States have different processes for removing individuals found inadmissible at ports of entry. The USA, for example, has an expedited exclusion procedure that permits inspectors to issue an order for removal of all aliens who enter with no documents, counterfeits or legitimate documents fraudulently obtained. If removed under these provisions, the foreign national may not re-enter the USA for five years. The only exception to the expedited process is for those who request asylum.

Detention can play an important role in securing persons prior to their removal. Absconding is a significant risk and detention is one solution. Detention policy varies across the world. In some countries, such as Australia and the USA, detention is automatic and can be used for an extended period for certain categories of foreign nationals, particularly those arriving without proper documentation and those who have committed certain criminal offences. In other countries, detention is used on a case-by-case basis and only for short periods. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), for example, does not permit long-term detention unless a Member State has the real possibility of removing someone. Even in the European Union, however, there is variation in detention policies, and the standards regarding arbitrary detention under the ECHR are not clearly spelled out.

Return is an integral component of comprehensive approaches to irregular migration and, wherever possible, should be voluntary, based on the informed choice of the individual, with respect for the individual's dignity, and with the prospect of reintegration in the country of origin. In contrast, deportation is costly, often unpopular in public opinion, may create tensions in countries of origin, and rarely addresses the root causes of irregular migration

⁶⁹ Martin, S. (2008).

– which could be achieved by, for example, assisting returnees in becoming productive upon their return to their origin countries. IOM has been operating Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes for almost three decades, which, although not exclusively focused on irregular migrants, do provide assistance for irregular migrants and unsuccessful asylum-seekers. Activities cover the pre-departure and transportation phase and, importantly, also the post-arrival stage, including training, educational assistance and reintegration grants. Often these activities are targeted at returning communities, rather than just individual returnees.

4.5 Regulating migration and employment

A comprehensive approach to irregular migration provides alternative avenues for employers to hire foreign workers when domestic workers are unwilling or unable to perform the jobs that irregular migrants hold. Establishing legal work programmes or increasing the number and types of work permits issued can provide an alternative to irregular migration for some migrants. The extent to which legal programmes offset irregular migration will be determined by a number of factors, including: the sanctions and incentives in place for employers to hire legal workers rather than maintain an irregular workforce; the eligibility of those in irregular status for the legal work programmes; the relative size of the work programmes; the procedures used to process applications from employers; and the requirements imposed on would-be workers to obtain visas.⁷⁰

As explained in the previous section, legal foreign worker programmes can admit migrants for different durations of stay. Seasonal programmes generally assume that the work is temporary and the migrants will remain only through the season, returning home when the job is finished. This type of programme often involves circulation, with workers coming the following year to perform the same service. Temporary work

programmes are usually of longer duration but the assumption is also that foreign workers will return home. The duration of stay can be from several months to several years. Problems arise, however, when temporary workers are hired for permanent jobs. As there is no natural end to the job, there is often pressure to overstay the visa. Employers do not want to lose good workers, and employees do not necessarily want to return home. Increasingly, temporary work visas are actually transitional visas that admit workers for a testing period. If the employer wants to retain the worker, he or she can apply for permanent residence. Or, if the worker's visa is renewed a certain number of times, and the migrant can demonstrate the potential for continuing employment, the government may issue a permanent work permit. Few countries give unskilled workers immediate avenues of entry for permanent residence and, in many cases, do not provide any vehicle for transition. In these cases, foreign workers are highly dependent on the goodwill of employers and may be reluctant to question their wages and working conditions.⁷¹

Reducing irregular migration may require targeting foreign worker programmes for particularly risky occupations. The majority of irregular migrants work in a relatively small number of occupations within a small number of industries, few of which tend to have a large proportion of irregular migrants among the workforce. Industries can change quickly in their reliance on foreign labour, however. In the USA, for example, food processing shifted from a largely native-born workforce to a largely immigrant workforce within a decade.

The danger in a new foreign worker programme is that industries that were not dependent on foreign labour shift to this new supply of workers, while those comfortable with their existing workforce continue to employ irregular migrants. In this scenario, the legal programmes do not serve as a substitute for irregular migration. Furthermore, if demand exceeds the legal supply of workers, the new programmes can actually precipitate new irregular migration to fill the jobs.

Regulating and reforming legal immigration

⁷⁰ Martin, P. (2010).

⁷¹ Shah (2010).

systems can also help deter irregular migration for family reunification purposes as well as direct employment purposes. In the USA, for example, there are routine waits of five years before the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents can obtain their own green cards. Residents of Mexico face even longer waiting times. These waits arise because of statutory limits on the number of family visas issued each year, as well as administrative delays in processing applications. Rather than endure such long separations, many spouses and children migrate through irregular channels.

It is often assumed that only destination countries have an interest in reducing the number of irregular migrants. The Philippines is an example of an origin country that has also acted to reduce the probability that migrants leaving the country become irregular.⁷² The Philippines has conducted awareness campaigns among prospective migrants against illegal recruitment and introduced penalties for recruiters who violate the law. The Philippines has been successful in reducing the number of migrants who leave the country irregularly, in protecting its migrants overseas, and generally in managing the flows of migrant workers.

One area for specific capacity-building in origin countries relates to the bureaucratic nature of the process of exit. The costs and ease of obtaining a passport, for example, can be significant. In addition, prospective migrants normally have to obtain some kind of certificate confirming that they have had no criminal convictions and medical clearance before even approaching a labour recruiting agent or foreign consulate for a work visa. Although these requirements are imposed by prospective destination countries, the ease of obtaining the documentation, apart from via consular visits, is largely a function of origin country bureaucracy. Official charges, but also the effort required to navigate complex government departments where petty corruption may be rife, may mean a long and increasingly costly process just to obtain

permission to leave. An alternative is to go to an agent who will arrange all documentation, perhaps fraudulent ones, to facilitate a speedy exit. In some cases, migrant smuggling and irregular migration can be as much a function of bureaucratic failure in origin countries as immigration policy failure in destination countries.

4.6 Capacity-building in transit States

Increasing numbers of migrants pass through transit States, often becoming stranded there.⁷³ Their situation draws attention to the need for more capacity-building in transit States, where recent research indicates that national laws and policies are often inadequate or ineffectively implemented. Moreover, as patterns and policies of international migration change in the near future, significant new transit States may emerge.

Whereas international and regional human rights and refugee, criminal and labour laws provide a sound base for the development, establishment and strengthening of existing legal frameworks at the national and regional level, effectively applying these standards in practice to the complex migration management situations posed by irregular migration and faced in transit States remains problematic. Equality and non-discrimination are the linchpins of any rule of law framework, and IOM works with governments and other stakeholders in various parts of the world to counter discrimination and xenophobia against migrants. For example, in Ukraine, the 'Diversity Initiative' has attempted to foster more positive attitudes towards the migrant community and supports the Government, together with its counterparts, in its activities to encourage intercultural dialogue and to develop policy and legislation.⁷⁴

The formulation of coherent policy and the development of appropriate legislation and programmes, however laudable and innovative, cannot succeed alone. Complementary capacity-building activities are essential. In particu-

⁷² Skeldon (2008).

⁷³ Crisp and Rossi (2010).

⁷⁴ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/2026>

lar, government officials have to be trained so as to raise their awareness of the complexity of irregular migration and mixed migratory movements and to enable them to identify not only possible asylum-seekers and refugees through, for example, protection-sensitive border procedures, but also the needs of particularly vulnerable migrants such as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied and separated minors, and those who have been subjected to gender-based violence. IOM carries out training activities in various parts of the world in the fields of international migration law, counter-trafficking and border management, in the context of which the complexities and challenges posed by mixed migratory movements are addressed and the human rights and needs of migrants can be properly identified. IOM capacity-building activities, including training, also target other stakeholders, such as the private sector and civil society groups. In India, for example, IOM Hyderabad engages private sector companies to train and create opportunities for trafficked persons, while, in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, such activities are aimed at civil society and address counter-trafficking, mixed flows and the provision of first assistance.

The capacity to return irregular migrants in transit is another important strategy. IOM implements a number of AVRR programmes aimed at strengthening the capacity of transit countries to manage their return caseloads, including in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, South-East Asia and the Americas. Countries of destination have at times provided funding and expert support for these programmes, in an effort to strengthen migration management links in the transnational chain of irregular migration.

4.7 Combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking

Within the broader context of irregular migration, policy reviews have highlighted a number of specific weaknesses in national responses to migrant smuggling and human trafficking where targeted capacity-building initiatives have the potential to make an impact, particularly in the field of data collec-

tion, strengthening national laws and policies, law enforcement, services for victims, border management, and national coordination and consultation mechanisms.

Very few countries undertake systematic collection of data on migrant smuggling or human trafficking. Even where they do, conceptual and practical problems preclude the availability of reliable data. Different States, for example, define migrant smuggling and human trafficking in different ways, and migrants can shift overnight between regular and irregular status and from being smuggled migrants to being victims of trafficking. There is also a series of more practical problems. Human trafficking is generally an underreported crime, with victims scared of reprisals from traffickers or penalization by the State. Most sources agree that the majority of irregular migrants – including those who are smuggled or trafficked – are not recorded. Another problem is access to data (however limited they may be) that have been collected. In many States, such data are collected by enforcement agencies and are not made publicly available. Alternatively, information and data that may establish a person's irregular status are frequently dispersed between different agencies such as government departments, the police and employment offices, making cooperation and access to data difficult.

National policies on migrant smuggling and human trafficking are evolving in different ways, but most States are intensifying their efforts aimed at policy and legislative reform, following the signing of the Palermo Protocols. Most countries already have legal provisions against aiding and abetting illegal border crossings. Many governments now provide for significant criminal penalties against human traffickers. Measures on money laundering and the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of means and assets from crime, are important additional means of preventing and reducing smuggling and trafficking. The prosecution of smugglers and traffickers is often inadequate in national legislation, and there is frequently insufficient protection for witnesses and victims. Additionally, there is an

urgent need to develop capacities to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of policies aimed at combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, as recommended by the US Government Accountability Office.⁷⁵

Limited research indicates that corrupt government officials located in origin, transit and destination countries are often part of the networks facilitating migrant smuggling and human trafficking.⁷⁶ Training and anti-corruption initiatives therefore need to reinforce technical assistance for law and policy development.

Another integral component of stemming migrant smuggling and human trafficking is criminal investigation. In a number of countries, agencies responsible for the investigation of financial crimes have extended their functions to include investigations into organized crime, including human trafficking. An alternative approach is to establish new units. There has been some international cooperation in developing investigative capacities: Interpol facilitates, coordinates and provides technical advice for national investigative structures, as does the South East Asia Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime (SECI). Nevertheless, robust investigative capacities are mainly found in developed countries, and common problems in less developed countries have been found to include a lack of resources, limited technical expertise and corruption.

The needs of trafficking victims may differ from those of smuggled migrants, but some common approaches are required. Awareness-raising is of particular importance in providing victims with information on the protection, assistance and other services that are available to them (see also textbox 5 on IOM's GAF and HASM). Likewise, the training of prosecutors, judges, police officers, border guards, labour inspection units and social workers is also required, so as to strengthen the capacity of States to provide victims with adequate and appropriate protection. Given the number of women and children (including

unaccompanied minors) who are smuggled and trafficked from one country to another, such services must evidently be provided in a gender- and age-sensitive manner. They must also be fine-tuned to address the different levels of exploitation and abuse that are involved in the discrete, but often interconnected, crimes of migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

Certain components of broader strategies for secure border management are especially relevant to combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, which often depend on fraudulent documents and illicit border crossings. These include improved frontier and pre-frontier management – for example, through passenger pre-inspection, the deployment of immigration liaison officers, advanced passenger information agreements, and carrier sanctions, as well as improved personal documentation for migrants, including identity cards, machine-readable codes on passports and travel documents, and the use of biometrics.

To enhance intra-governmental coordination in combating smuggling and trafficking, governments such as the Australian Government, the Philippine Government and the US Government have created inter-ministerial mechanisms to deal with the multifaceted policy issues of the phenomena. Effective national policies also require consultation with civil society, especially migrant groups. For example, analysis of why it may be difficult to transfer Australia's successful policy approach to migrant smuggling and human trafficking to other national contexts includes the observation that certain of these policies would be difficult to implement in European countries, in particular, where they might risk causing tension among ethnic communities.⁷⁷

4.8 Mixed flows

Mixed flows, or 'mixed migratory movements', occur when refugees are included in migratory movements. They use the same routes and

⁷⁵ GAO (2006).

⁷⁶ Koser (2008).

⁷⁷ Koser (2005).

means of transport, they employ the services of the same smugglers, and they purchase fraudulent documents from the same suppliers. They move along the same routes, through the same transit countries, and often in the hope of reaching the same countries of destination. In many cases, these refugees are joined by other people on the move with specific protection and assistance needs and rights, including victims of human trafficking, as well as unaccompanied and separated children. There is a broad consensus that such movements are likely to increase in the years to come.⁷⁸

The people involved in mixed flows, be they refugees or other types of migrants, experience many of the same hazards and human rights violations in the course of their journey. These include detention and imprisonment in unacceptable conditions, physical abuse and racial harassment, as well as vulnerability to theft, extortion, impoverishment and destitution. Those who travel by boat are at risk of interception, abandonment and drowning at sea, while those who move by land may be returned or transferred to remote or dangerous locations. People on the move who lose or destroy their identity documents may be unable to establish their nationality, becoming effectively stateless and finding it very difficult to return to their own country.

Such flows are of growing interest to a number of organizations and regional bodies, including IOM, the International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), a number of RCPs (including the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue), the Council of Europe, and the African Union (AU). UNHCR also has a particular concern that national measures intended to deter irregular migration may be applied indiscriminately and make it very difficult, if not impossible, for refugees to enter a country where they can apply for asylum. UNHCR is working with governments and other stakeholders in an attempt to ensure that the drive to impose stricter forms of migration management does not compromise the right

of asylum. The basis of this strategy is to be found in an initiative entitled 'Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: a 10 Point Plan of Action'. Key elements include: putting in place arrangements for refugees and asylum-seekers to be identified upon arrival and to be given the opportunity to have their asylum applications properly considered; improving current arrangements relating to the safe and speedy disembarkation of passengers who are rescued or intercepted at sea; and strengthening the capacity of States to develop the policies, practices and institutions needed to admit asylum-seekers to their territory, to assess their claims and to provide solutions for those who qualify for refugee status.

IOM is undertaking five major areas of work in response to the challenges of mixed flows. The first is to provide direct assistance to migrants – for example, via the Global Assistance Fund (GAF) and the Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM) Fund (see text-box 5) to provide assistance to trafficked men, women and children, as well as other stranded or particularly vulnerable migrants. The second is to help States develop appropriate policy and legislation, and to implement it in an equal and non-discriminatory manner. The third is to provide training to relevant stakeholders, including government officials, private sector companies (for example, in India) and civil society (for example, in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), as well as assisting policy-makers at the regional level – for example, through the African Capacity Building Centre (in the United Republic of Tanzania) and the Migration Research and Training Centre (in the Republic of Korea). The fourth involves the dissemination of information to potential migrants and in destination countries – for example, via radio campaigns in Somalia and awareness-raising programmes for schoolchildren in the South Caucasus. The final area of focus involves promoting partnerships and cooperation, including at the inter-State level and inter-agency levels. These last two initiatives are considered separately in the final two sections below.

⁷⁸ Crisp (2008).

Textbox 5: IOM's Global Assistance Fund (GAF) for the Protection and Reintegration of Trafficked Persons and the Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM) Fund

In view of the increasing number of vulnerable migrants in countries of destination, transit and origin, IOM created the Global Assistance Fund (GAF) as an emergency support mechanism to provide case-specific assistance to men, women and children who have been trafficked across international borders, and who are not eligible for assistance through comparable regional or national-level projects. It aims to provide safe accommodation, medical care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, assistance with retrieving lost or stolen travel documents and career counselling, to mention a few.

GAF also offers the option of assisted voluntary return in cases in which the beneficiary expresses a wish to return to his or her home country, as well as reintegration assistance, which may consist of post-arrival reception assistance, educational support either for the beneficiary or for his or her children, skills training, or small business grants to support income-generating activities.

Funded by the US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), GAF has provided direct assistance to more than 1,120 victims of trafficking since its inception in 2000 and serves an increasingly diverse range of beneficiaries every year.

Similarly, IOM has created the Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM) Fund, providing assistance to stranded migrants regardless of their status (i.e. smuggled or trafficked, irregular or regular) so long as there is an established humanitarian need and a confirmed desire to move, and the migrants are not eligible for any other programme administered by IOM or other agencies.

The objective of the HASM is twofold:

- to provide flexible and speedy humanitarian assistance to stranded migrants in difficult circumstances for whom support is not readily available from any known sources or programmes;
- to derive, from the information collected in providing such assistance, a clearer picture of changing tendencies in irregular migration in order to assist in devising counter measures that can be included in future IOM programming.

Since 2006, HASM has assisted 1,286 individuals in returning to their home country.

Sources: IOM (2010), Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM), Factsheet, IOM, Geneva; IOM (2010), IOM Global Assistance Fund (GAF), Factsheet, IOM, Geneva.

4.9 Information campaigns

An important, more general, response to mixed flows and irregular migration is information dissemination targeting potential migrants who might be contemplating hazardous journeys and information campaigns aimed at host communities. IOM has extensive experience in this field. For example, in September 2009, in partnership with the other members of the Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF), IOM launched a radio campaign to prevent mixed migratory movements through Somalia, help migrants make informed decisions and improve the capacities of host communities to receive migrants and to assist and protect them. In West Africa, in areas of high emigration pressure, where unemployed youth are most likely to seek better economic oppor-

tunities via irregular migration routes to Europe or the Maghreb, IOM has set up targeted youth-employment projects that include training and access to microcredit, and carries out information and awareness-raising campaigns on the dangers of irregular migration. With regard to counter-trafficking, IOM works in the countries of the South Caucasus to develop and introduce modules on trafficking in persons (aimed at older schoolchildren) into the national education curricula. Information dissemination initiatives on counter-trafficking also include collaboration with the international advertising company Saatchi & Saatchi on a campaign urging consumers and businesses to 'buy responsibly'; the campaign was launched on the third EU Anti-trafficking Day on 18 October 2009.

In collaboration with the governments concerned, IOM also supports the establishment and operation of migrant resource centres in countries of origin. The centres perform the dual task of providing impartial, accurate and reliable advice and information to prospective migrants about regular migration opportunities, the labour market and living conditions in destination countries, as well as alerting them to the risks of irregular migration. One example is the network of centres recently established in western Balkan countries under the auspices of a European Commission AENEAS project⁷⁹ and implemented by IOM in partnership with the ILO and local employment offices.

4.10 Partnerships and cooperation

Cooperation, both between States and between agencies, as well as with civil society, is critical to reinforcing the understandings of irregular migration forged at the grass-roots level and to sharing good practices across countries and regions.

At the inter-State level, RCPs, such as the Puebla Process and the Bali Process, provide an important platform for dialogue and cooperation, particularly in regions where mixed migration movements are especially prevalent. In recent years, the Colombo Process – an RCP for the management of overseas employment and contractual labour for Asian countries of origin and supported by IOM – has been particularly active in promoting legal migration as a means of reducing irregular migration.⁸⁰ The first-ever meeting hosted by a destination Gulf country (the United Arab Emirates), bringing together the 11 Asian labour countries of origin and the GCC countries of destination, was held in Abu Dhabi on 21 to 22 January 2008 and resulted in the creation of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. It highlighted the potential of contractual labour mobility to benefit overseas workers

as well as the development of both countries of origin and destination in Asia, through the establishment of key action-oriented partnerships. The concluding document, the Abu Dhabi Declaration (2008), focused on:

- enhancing knowledge in the areas of labour market trends, skills profiles, temporary contractual workers and remittance policies and flows and their interplay with development in the region;
- building capacity for effective matching of labour demand and supply;
- preventing illegal recruitment practices and promoting welfare and protection measures for contractual workers, supportive of their well-being and preventing their exploitation at origin and destination;
- developing a framework for a comprehensive approach to managing the entire cycle of temporary contractual mobility that fosters the mutual interests of countries of origin and destination.

As part of its efforts, the Colombo Process has been providing training courses for labour attachés and overseas employment administrators in various countries. It has carried out policy studies on topics such as the protection of migrant workers, minimum standard employment contracts, best practices in pre-departure orientation programmes, and training and skill development for migrant workers. Initiatives such as the Colombo Process and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, if followed up by implementation of the proposed actions, can play a useful role in reducing irregular migration and enhancing the benefits of regular migration for the migrants as well as the countries involved.

At the inter-agency level, the Praesidium Project constitutes a model response whereby, at the request of, and in collaboration with, the Government of Italy, IOM worked together with UNHCR and the Italian Red Cross to provide information, counselling, protection and assistance to the large numbers of migrants arriving by boat on Lampedusa and other locations in Sicily. The three agencies also pre-screened the arrivals to identify persons in need of special assistance, and to ensure that

⁷⁹ Attaining Energy-Efficient Mobility in an Ageing Society (AENEAS) is a new European project in the framework of the Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE) programme. The project's objective is to become the cornerstone for international reference projects in the field of urban mobility of older people.

⁸⁰ Shah (2010).

they were referred to appropriate procedures or structures, according to their specific needs. Other pertinent forms of inter-agency collaboration include those taking place within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and with the EU Border Agency (Frontex) and the World Health Organization (WHO), which are two of the partner organizations in the ‘Increasing Public Health Safety Alongside the New Eastern European Border Line’ (PHBLM) Project, co-funded by the European Commission, which provides individualized health care to migrants. The project also aims to build the capacity of border management and public health staff, and to minimize public health risks. With regard to providing assistance to migrants in detention, IOM Lisbon collaborates with the Government of Portugal and the Jesuit Refugee Service to monitor conditions in closed detention centres in which arriving irregular migrants may also

be temporarily held until their situation is verified.

Civil society can also be an important partner, especially in protecting the rights of vulnerable irregular migrants. Often irregular migrants are unwilling or unable to access even basic services to which they may actually be entitled, and the burden of assistance falls on church groups and non-governmental organizations. Besides providing immediate assistance, such civil society actors can help identify irregular migrants with particular needs, victims of trafficking or those who may be eligible for refugee status. Equally, through its unique access and the trust that is often developed with irregular migrants, civil society can also help identify sources of exploitation, from unscrupulous employers to agents including smugglers and traffickers.

5. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In recent years, there has been a sea change in thinking about migration and development. For many years, the focus was on migration as a problem, either because it was seen as a consequence of a lack of development, or because of fears about a ‘brain drain’ of skilled workers. Today, there is a much greater recognition among policymakers that migration can contribute to development, and that these benefits can be enhanced where policymakers have the capacities to manage migration effectively.

In addition to contributing to economic growth in destination countries, migration can contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth in origin countries, particularly as a result of the remittances sent back by migrants (see map 7 – comparing remittance flows with foreign aid received by region), through investments by diaspora associations, and when migrants go home.

A huge amount of attention is already being paid to realizing the full potential of migration for development, including through a range of capacity-building initiatives. Looking to the future, there are sound reasons to suppose that this potential will only increase, thus accentuating the need for capacities to respond to the challenges. One reason is that the predicted increase in labour mobility worldwide is expected to result in an increase in remittances sent home by migrants – these already amount to over USD 300 billion per year and their volume has risen rapidly

in recent years, apart from a temporary dip during the global financial crisis.⁸¹ The rise of the global Internet is accelerating the pace of technological diffusion, making it easier for individual migrants and their associations to influence and invest in their countries of origin – for example, the Web is predicted to become a critical tool in distributing educational content. Meanwhile, the growing impetus towards temporary migration programmes and circular migration means that the scale of return migration – both temporary and permanent – is also likely to increase in the future. As explained in section 2, the significant political will and institutional momentum around the ‘migration–development nexus’ represents another reason and opportunity to focus on capacity-building in this area.

Capacity-building is required not just to enhance the positive outcomes of migration for development, but also to reduce or prevent potentially negative outcomes. In certain circumstances, for example, remittances can become a disincentive to work for those left at home, and diaspora investments can exacerbate disparities, including gender disparities. Return migration is often not sustainable for the migrants involved. Migration can also result in the departure of a country’s brightest, best-educated and most entrepreneurial citizens, depriving the State of revenue and preventing countries of origin from gaining an early return on the investment

⁸¹ Ratha et al. (2010).

they have made in the education and training of those people. This is a particular challenge in the health sector, and may be exacerbated by the increasing demand for health-care workers that has been predicted for OECD countries in the next 20 years, if this demand cannot be met through the domestic labour force.⁸²

A final caveat is that the global financial crisis made it clear that enhancing the linkages between migration and development cannot replace development policies. Shocks to the global economy are cyclical and can be expected again, and during economic downturns migrants are often the first to lose their jobs or suffer deteriorating working conditions, including remuneration. Remittances may be reduced, albeit temporarily, and destination countries often introduce policies to prioritize nationals in the labour force.⁸³ Migration should be an integral part of national development plans, but not a surrogate for them.

To realize more fully the potential of migration to contribute to development, more effective capacities may be required in the following ten core areas:

1. mainstreaming migration in development plans;
2. optimizing formal remittance flows;
3. enhancing the developmental impacts of remittances;
4. engaging diasporas;
5. consolidating knowledge networks;
6. strengthening the links between return and development;
7. promoting circular migration;
8. training to retain;
9. developing ethical recruitment policies;
10. institutional capacity-building.

5.1 Mainstreaming migration in development plans

There is a strong case for mainstreaming migration in national and regional development

plans and poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). This allows for migration to be embedded in the broader development debate, which fosters a coherent approach rather than piecemeal uncoordinated actions; it ensures that migration is included in national development priorities, which usually enjoy a high level of political support; it facilitates coordination among all government departments and the creation of synergies between the work of national actors; it places migration issues within a holistic planning framework that involves assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and it can facilitate funding and technical assistance for migration activities through the mobilization of resources from international partners for development plans.

Nevertheless, migration as an issue is still rarely acknowledged in development planning tools. Some of the reasons for this, which require targeted capacity-building, include: a lack of understanding of the linkages between migration and development; inadequate financial resources; the fact that migration as a portfolio is often fragmented across government departments and thus there is no single 'champion' within government to mainstream the topic; and the multiplicity of development planning tools used by developing countries, which hinders the effective, coherent integration of migration as a development issue.

A recent inter-agency handbook identifies in detail the capacity-building priorities for mainstreaming migration into development planning (see textbox 6).⁸⁴ Critical steps include: establishing a plan to collect and analyse relevant data; preparing national migration profiles; creating an institutional migration and development structure; developing a national plan of action on migration and development; securing international organization expertise; setting up a core team including a national focal point and expert facilitator; awareness-raising for government, donors, international organizations, NGOS, academia and the private sector; undertaking a scoping mission; and

⁸² OECD (2009).

⁸³ Koser (2010).

⁸⁴ IOM (2010).

developing a funding proposal. Cross-cutting capacity requirements include expert advice on institutional reform, leadership capacities, training and mechanisms for accountability.

What is needed now is to test the handbook in some pilot countries to demonstrate how capacities to mainstream migration into national development plans can be enhanced.

Textbox 6: Handbook on mainstreaming migration into development strategies

Mainstreaming migration in development and poverty reduction planning may be defined as the process of assessing the implications of migration on any action (or goals) planned in a development and poverty reduction strategy, including legislation, policies and programme, and at all levels (local, national and, if applicable, regional). It is a process for integrating migration issues in a balanced manner into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in any sphere related to development and poverty reduction. The goal of this process is to provide support for a more development-friendly approach to migration.

However, migration as an issue is rarely acknowledged in development planning tools and remains at a conceptual rather than practical level. Some poverty reduction strategy papers refer to the benefits of remittances (as in Bangladesh, Ghana and Liberia), while others refer to migration in a more negative light, focusing on human trafficking, the loss of skilled professionals, health-related problems and the spread of disease (Uganda), increased poverty and slum-dwelling (United Republic of Tanzania) and criminality (Zambia). Policy measures linking migration with development therefore tend towards law-enforcement activities (curbing irregular migration and trafficking and strengthening immigration and customs services), rather than harnessing beneficial effects such as remittances.

Recognizing this gap, IOM, UNDP, the ILO and UNICEF collaborated to develop Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners. The aim of this handbook is to show how migration can be systematically integrated into development planning, and to guide governments and their partners through this uncharted process in order to give practical meaning to the concept of migration and development. The handbook does not prescribe a uniform policy or programme, but rather provides guidance, ideas and suggestions so that countries can tailor their migration and development approach to suit their context.

The handbook targets government officials as well as officials from international, regional and national organizations who are supporting the development planning process (UN agencies, donors, private sector, civil society, academia), providing a step-by-step guide for those most closely involved in directing the mainstreaming process. The handbook comprises two main parts that address:

- a process for mainstreaming migration into development, which describes the institutional structures and policy frameworks that need to be implemented and how migration can be integrated at different levels of the development planning cycle;
- a compilation of migration and development programme experiences that show how migration can be used to benefit development in a practical way, through programmes, interventions and projects (intended as a reference section prompting ideas and providing inspiration for action).

Source: Global Migration Group, "Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners", to be published by IOM.

Another capacity requirement that crosses all the stages of this process is consultation. For a migration and development initiative to be successful and sustainable, it needs broad national ownership and should involve government, civil society and donors/development partners, parliamentarians, academics and the private sector. Participation of stakeholders can be at different levels: some

may be involved in broader development planning consultations, while others may be convened in specialist working groups.

5.2 Optimizing formal remittance flows

It is generally agreed that remittances transferred through formal rather than

informal systems are more likely to be leveraged for development. In addition, formal transfers can reduce the risk that migrants and recipients will be exploited by clandestine money-laundering networks. The best ways to optimize formal remittance flows are already well understood. These include reducing the costs and increasing the speed and efficiency of formal transfers – for example, through the promotion of competition between transfer providers; disseminating information to both migrants and receivers about opportunities for formal transfers and the risks of informal transfers; providing training in financial literacy; and promoting the development of new technologies for money transfer (for instance, using cell phones). Achieving these goals, however, requires considerable capacity-building in both origin and destination countries and among an array of stakeholders. Some of the more innovative examples of capacity-building are outlined below.

An initial capacity requirement involves assessing what proportion of transfers in any given remittance channel is sent informally, and to understand the reasons why. An example of data collection and research undertaken by a civil society organization is the Information and Resource Centres for Labour Migrants (IRCLMs) in Tajikistan, which has systematically gathered and integrated information on remittances as part of its work – for example, by including questions on remittances in the brochures and leaflets they distribute to clients.

A good model of how origin countries can enhance the developmental impact of remittances is the Government of Albania's National Action Plan on Remittances.⁸⁵ It is comprehensive, including specific measures to improve data collection, expand banking services, develop partnerships between Albanian banks and those in the main destination countries for Albanian migrants (especially Greece and Italy), strengthen Albanian microfinance institutions (MFIs), increase knowledge of and access to formal

remittance channels for migrants and their families, and strengthen relations between the government and the Albanian diaspora. In the Republic of Moldova, IOM and the ILO, working with local partners, are developing a comprehensive mass information campaign on remittances and financial literacy, utilizing television and radio, using a volunteer network for field outreach, and working with the Border Guard Service to distribute materials at border-crossing checkpoints.

In host countries, a relatively new target for capacity-building is employers' and workers' organizations. Employers can, for example, pool transactions to reduce costs and ensure the safety and efficiency of remittance transfers by having them sent directly to the employee's home account. There is also scope for payroll deduction of transfers, which can result in bulk discounts in the transfer process. Employers can offer on-site banking with access to an ATM machine or mobile bank units, which is an attractive alternative to paying migrant workers through a pay cheque that needs to be cashed at considerable expense by those without a bank account. Knowledge gaps around affordable money transfer mechanisms have been found to particularly affect women's remitting capacity (as women tend to send less money but more frequently than their male counterparts) and workers' organizations and civil society can also play an important role in developing financial literacy among women migrants in host countries.

More generally, there has been found to be a correlation between the level of integration of migrants and their preponderance to remit, thus highlighting the importance of capacity-building in the field of integration for promoting the links between migration and development. Legal status, for example, is an important variable in determining the extent to which migrants make contributions to their country of origin. Capacity-building for integration is considered in more detail in the next section.

In terms of developing the appropriate physical infrastructure to facilitate formal remittances, and testing the value of new

⁸⁵ <http://www.iomtirana.org.al/Remittance/en/NAP%20on%20Remittances.pdf>

technologies such as cell phones, partnerships are required between migrant origin and destination countries, often involving not just bilateral governmental agreements, but also the private sector and civil society. Filipino Overseas Workers Resource Centres (FWRCs), for example, gather information on cheaper remittance transfer options, and also identify and engage with local money transfer agencies in order to reduce costs and speed up transfers. The FWRCs' links to the government also enable them to negotiate cost-reducing bilateral agreements with service providers. In some countries, new legal frameworks will be required to facilitate and secure remittance transfers through new technologies. IOM has worked with the Universal Postal Union to establish a new formal channel for remittances between the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda,⁸⁶ which it is considering expanding to other countries.

5.3 Enhancing the developmental impacts of remittances

While it is important to understand that remittances are private monies, and that the scope for policy to intervene in how they are spent is thus appropriately limited, capacities can still be developed to encourage the investment of remittances in projects that contribute to community development and have an impact beyond that of the immediate recipients (see textbox 7 on the Joint Migration and Development Initiative supporting civil society organizations and local authorities in linking migration and development).

In the Republic of Moldova, for example, a proposal currently under consideration by the Government involves providing special privileges, such as temporary exemptions from all taxes and from State inspections, for enterprises set up with capital financed from remittances. Another initiative, also in the Republic of Moldova, involves establishing a scheme for loans to migrant families using remittances as a guarantee. In Colombia, IOM has worked with the Chamber of Commerce

in the town of Armenia (MICROS) to increase access to microcredit for Colombian migrants in Spain, using remittances. IOM has also promoted the AESCO Microcredit Fund, focusing on migrants' families in Colombia and using remittances for repayment of the credit. The credit is oriented towards productive projects and education.

Such initiatives are of limited value unless remitters and recipients are aware of them and have the capacity to engage. In several countries, Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) facilitate the use of remittances for development by providing information on opportunities for investment. In the Philippines, FWRCs provide comprehensive information on philanthropic investment opportunities in the Philippines to migrants and their families, and have also encouraged temporary contractual workers from the same region to pool their resources to fund the construction of classrooms in their home region. Similarly the Congolese Maison des Congolais de l'Etranger et des Migrants (MCDEM) provides information on business-related investment opportunities for returnees and migrants.

Working with particular communities of origin in Colombia, IOM has developed pre-departure training programmes on how to develop business plans and how to orient remittances towards income-generating activities and productive projects for prospective migrants. In Tajikistan, Information and Resource Centres for Labour Migrants (IRCLMs) provide information on IOM projects focusing on the investment of remittances in social infrastructure.

A critical aspect of capacity-building to support all such initiatives is the development of a banking system and business environment that is conducive to investment. Best practice, in this regard, is to adopt an integrated and holistic approach, thus improving the investment climate for all enterprises, rather than creating new distortions by granting special privileges to one particular sector. The Ministry of Economy and Trade in the Republic of Moldova has acknowledged the need for

⁸⁶ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/mi/tanzania.pdf>

analysis of successful models and policies from other remittance-affected countries to develop concrete proposals for their application in the Moldovan context. An initial proposal involves the establishment of a legal, regulatory and institutional fiscal framework to support the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Even more fundamental than such business- and investment-specific capacities is the overall

need in countries trying to attract remittances and enhance their impact on development to cut red tape, sustainably combat corruption and establish the rule of law. This is another example of where capacity-building outside the direct area of migration is essential for the effective management of migration, and the importance of coordination between different parts of government is further addressed in section 8.

Textbox 7: Joint Migration and Development Initiative

The EC–UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI), a EUR 15 million, three-year programme funded by the European Commission and implemented by UNDP in close partnership with IOM, ILO, UNFPA and UNHCR, supports civil society organizations and local authorities seeking to link migration and development. The specific focus of the JMDI is justified by the fact that civil society and local authorities are among the most active players implementing concrete initiatives in this field, yet they are the ones most in need of support. The JMDI sets out to provide that support through a EUR 10 million call for proposals, which provides grants to 55 projects linking small-scale groups and local authorities in the European Union and in 16 target countries in the developing world (Algeria, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Tunisia). In addition to funding projects, the JMDI has also launched an online global community, M4D-Net (www.migration4development.org), which brings together individuals and groups from around the world to exchange information and ideas on migration and development, develop skills and provide mutual support.

One of the main aims of the JMDI is to support the capacity development of civil society groups and local institutions working on migration and development. At the overall programme level, applicants for funding were guided throughout the application process and pre-selected applicants received feedback on their proposals. Grantees have access to advice and support from JMDI staff in Brussels and on the ground, and an online training tool is being developed. One of the final outputs of the programme is a set of policy recommendations on migration and development, which will draw on the lessons learned and good practices arising from JMDI-funded projects and from discussions among the online community supported by the JMDI. Alongside the policy recommendations, which will also be geared towards the governments of migrant-origin and -destination countries, the JMDI is contributing to the ongoing UN–IOM effort to mainstream migration within developing countries' poverty reduction strategies.

At the project level, a number of JMDI-funded projects also specifically focus on building the capacity of civil society organizations, local authorities and other actors such as local credit unions or health-care professionals – as in the case of an initiative implemented in the Kayes region of Mali by local authorities, assisted by a French research group, to map and codify good practices in the area of migration and development, or of a Senegalese project that links local credit unions with the French ethical finance circuit.

Source: Prepared by UNDP, 2010.

5.4 Engaging diasporas

Besides sending home money on an individual basis, migrants can also make contributions to their origin countries collectively, via migrant or diaspora associations, including hometown associations. Particularly where these are professional associations – for example, of engineers, doctors or education professionals –

additional short-term contributions can be made through arrangements such as secondment or sabbatical arrangements. In other cases, members of the diaspora may choose to return permanently – for example, at the end of a conflict in their origin country – and how to link permanent return with development is considered below (section 5.6).

In recent years, an array of government initiatives has been introduced to harness the potential of diasporas for development. For example, a 2009 review of measures taken in 30 developing countries reveals the existence of 45 different types of diaspora institutions occupying different levels of government and exhibiting diverse priorities and degrees of organization. While a growing number of governments increasingly acknowledge the importance of diaspora engagement, many still lack the capacity to design effective diaspora policies and to implement them on a meaningful scale.⁸⁷

Lessons learned from existing initiatives, such as IOM's Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme, highlight a series of capacity-building requirements.⁸⁸ A matching procedure is required, for example, whereby members of the diaspora who wish to return on a short-term basis can be matched with work opportunities in their origin country. The capacity requirement in the origin country is therefore that of identifying and prioritizing the sectors where returnees can contribute. Placements under MIDA also take place in the private sector, where defined terms of reference and monitoring by the hosting institution are required. Finally, placements also need to be linked to existing development and reconstruction strategies.

Equally, diaspora communities need to be aware of opportunities for return, which highlights the need for information dissemination. Preparatory visits can be necessary to ensure that facilities for placements are adequate in the host institution. If the migrant has been overseas for a long period of time, or was born abroad, cultural orientation may be required – for example, about the particular sector to which he or she plans to return to work in. Virtual networking and teleconferencing can be a useful way to make initial contact between the migrant and host institution, even before return, and to maintain contacts and knowledge transfer after the end of the secondment period.

One of the main challenges of achieving diaspora engagement is that, by definition, a range of stakeholders is involved. The governments of the origin and host country will be involved in legal aspects, such as the issuance of visas, and often also contribute funding; the migrant's employer in the destination country will need to authorize a period of leave, while the host institution in the origin country will need to have the capacity to take full advantage of the return opportunity; and migrant associations in the destination country can play an important role in information dissemination, while the logistical expertise and coordination experience of international organizations such as IOM is usually necessary. Clear institutional responsibilities and coordination mechanisms are thus important capacities to develop. One of the recommendations of an internal review of the MIDA programme in the health sector in Ghana, for example, was that IOM transfer ownership of the programme to the Ministry of Health in Ghana, on the basis of clear milestones. Another was to more proactively contact industries and other development projects in Ghana and abroad for financial support and for supplies and equipment for specific projects. A further recommendation was to hold an annual stakeholder conference that includes staff of teaching hospitals, medical directors in hospitals, regional directors of health, key medical facilities and the donor community, to review progress.

Partly because of the coordination efforts required, and the corresponding financial requirements, civil society, especially in origin countries, has not yet become fully engaged with diaspora mobilization, and this represents a significant capacity-building requirement. There are some examples of good practice. In September 2009, the Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations (CIGEM) in Mali launched a series of initiatives aimed at involving Malians residing abroad in co-development projects, within the framework of an EC-funded diaspora-engagement programme. The Congolese MCDEM actively maintains links with diaspora groups, such as the Belgian-based diaspora NGO Entreprendre-CEDITA, and these groups

⁸⁷ Agunias (2010).

⁸⁸ http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/mida/global_strat_mida.pdf

jointly organized the Forum Economique de la Diaspora Congolaise (The Economic Forum of the Congolese Diaspora) in August 2009, to promote dialogue between the Government and around 400 members of the diaspora to facilitate their investment in the country.⁸⁹ As a further example of civil society activities in destination countries, the Portuguese National Immigrant Support Centre (CNAI) has assisted in outreach for the IOM ‘DIAS De Cabo Verde’ initiative, which aims to mobilize the human, social and professional resources of the Cape Verdean diaspora for the development of their country of origin.

While there are many new diaspora initiatives, a key problem stems from a lack of sustained commitment within governments.⁹⁰ Critical technical know-how is acquired typically through years of trial and error, but many government initiatives on diasporas tend to be short-lived, according to an assessment prepared for this report.⁹¹ Furthermore, longstanding programmes such as the Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA) in the Philippines have not been subject to a great deal of monitoring and evaluation.

5.5 Consolidating knowledge networks

Given the types of bureaucratic hurdles to even short-term return, highlighted in the previous section, another way to engage the diaspora is through the development of knowledge networks, allowing for the transfer of skills and expertise without necessitating a physical return (sometimes referred to as ‘virtual return’). Alternatively, these can be complementary approaches, with knowledge networks established, for example, to maintain momentum after an initial secondment.

The rapid growth of the Internet is making this an increasingly feasible option, although there are important reservations. There are three main areas for capacity-building to

establish and consolidate such knowledge networks. First, members of the diaspora need to be employed in relevant sectors and occupations – giving rise to capacity-building requirements (described below) concerning issues such as the integration of migrants, access to the labour market, and recognition of qualifications. Second, the appropriate technology is needed both in origin and destination countries to allow for knowledge transfer – including the Internet and video-conferencing. Third, the origin country needs to have the capacity and, in particular, appropriately trained personnel to implement the knowledge that is transferred.

A concrete example of a knowledge network is the RAICES Programme established in 2007 by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (SeCyT) in Argentina. It aims to link Argentine scientists abroad with local research groups in order to help the country capitalize on the work carried out by Argentine scientists living abroad. The SeCyT provides technical and electronic support and carries out coordination and promotion activities. It also offers access to its building and technological infrastructure, meeting rooms and videoconferencing systems. SeCyT subsidies are used to finance knowledge networks and hold virtual forums, seminars and workshops.

5.6 Strengthening the links between return and development

Some of the capacities required to achieve sustainable return were considered in section 3.9 – for example, regarding counselling, training and job placement. Sustainable return is not necessarily the same as return that contributes towards wider development, however, and this is a distinction that is often not appreciated.⁹² In most countries, there has been even less investment in linking return with development than in trying to achieve sustainable return, and even the latter goal has proved hard to achieve.

⁸⁹ AllAfrica.com (2009).

⁹⁰ Agunias (2010).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/international-dialogue-migration/intersessional-workshops/enhancing-role-of-return-migration-2008>; http://www.gfmdathens2009.org/fileadmin/material/docs/workp/working_paper_2.pdf

One promising avenue for strengthening the link between return and development is to support enterprise development among return migrants. There is evidence from Colombia, for example, that the participation of return migrants in small business helped stave off economic recession during the 1990s.⁹³ A number of factors have been cited in the research literature as facilitating entrepreneurial activities among returning migrant workers. One is their capacity to save while abroad.⁹⁴ Another is their ability to create synergies with local government that often cannot be formed by foreign investors without national ties. A third factor is the scale of public and private investments in business compared to the quantity of people returning.⁹⁵ Additional factors cited in the literature include length of time spent abroad, gender, marital status, number of dependants, education and work experience. The evidence on the significance of reintegration programmes as a factor facilitating enterprise development is mixed. It has been suggested that too much attention has been paid to providing start-up financial capital and training in business techniques, and too little to the development of social capital – for example, through developing local networks of trust.⁹⁶ It has also been found that the main obstacles to enterprise development among returning migrant workers are the constraining and restricting national policies, laws and regulations in the countries to which migrant workers are returning – for example, concerning permits to build premises or employ workers.

A series of practical capacity-building interventions can be conceived to support entrepreneurship among returning migrants. One is an analysis of national labour and product markets in the return country, in order to provide better information and data on which to base more effective matching of labour market and product market demands and returning migrant workers. A second is to review existing reintegration and enterprise programmes applicable to returning migrant workers, to

develop a framework for best practice in designing interventions on reintegration and enterprise development within the specific national context. A third is the establishment of a programme of assistance for enterprise development among returning migrant workers; including vocational training and counselling services, access to microcredit financing, and technical assistance for national and regional-level policymakers, legislators and representatives from trade unions and the private sector. A good example is the Georgia reintegration centre, which provides job counselling and referrals for return migrants. A fourth intervention would be the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation programme, to ensure that those enterprises that are established are sustainable and make a maximum contribution to poverty reduction and economic development.

5.7 Promoting circular migration

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (2007) used the following working definition of circular migration: “the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or permanent movement, which, when it occurs voluntarily and is linked to labour needs of countries of origin and destination, can be beneficial to all involved.” Without underestimating challenges such as the protection of the rights of short-term migrant workers and of their reintegration back home, considerable political momentum has developed around promoting circular migration. In the specific context of development in origin countries, its advantages include the fact that human capital is not lost permanently, that circular migrants may be particularly incentivized to send home remittances to prepare for their return, and that when they do return they may bring back new skills.

Capacity-building is required throughout the cycle of circular migration, from pre-departure, through insertion in the labour market, to reintegration in the origin country and procedures to potentially permit periodic re-entry into the destination country to work.

⁹³ Black and Castaldo (2009).

⁹⁴ Ilahi (1999).

⁹⁵ Ghosh (2000).

⁹⁶ Black and Castaldo (2009).

Spain – the Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) programme – training and counselling sessions (involving conflict resolution and team work, among other things) were provided for temporary migrants before their departure, along with their families, to prepare them for the process of separation and help them maintain family ties. Counselling continued with family members after the departure of the migrant workers.⁹⁷

In response to an identified need to gather and disseminate information on nationals interested in working abroad, the Mauritius Circular Migration Database (MCMD) was developed by IOM and the Government of Mauritius as an online tool for storing information on candidates interested in job opportunities abroad, in order to match the local labour supply with demand of foreign employers for temporary workers. The MCMD also enables foreign employers to make an online selection of candidates who best suit their desired profile. The Mauritius circular migration programme is also noteworthy for providing robust pre-departure training for potential migrants, including training on their rights and obligations in destination countries, cultural issues and access to services, as well as practical information, such as emergency hotlines.

In destination countries, many of the capacity requirements identified in section 3 regarding temporary migration also apply – for example, with regard to the duration of the work permit, conditions for switching employer, and the protection of migrant workers' rights, as well as identification of sectors that lend themselves to circular schemes. In the specific context of circular migration, the main policy challenge that recurs in current debates concerns how to encourage return. Options to incentivize return include longer contracts that allow the migrant to pay off the transaction costs associated with migration and earn sufficient additional income; providing an option for re-entry through preferential visa regimes; guaranteeing portable social security benefits; and, in limited cases, providing the

option for permanent immigration rather than return. It is widely expected that such incentives will be more likely to succeed if circular migration programmes also contain an element of enforcement, and proposals in this regard include imposing financial security bonds on either migrant workers or their employers; introducing mandatory savings schemes for temporary migrants; and the strict enforcement of employment and immigration laws. While identifying the capacity requirements for achieving these policies is relatively straightforward, the greater challenge involves assessing which combination of policies will actually work. In the particular case of circular migration, pilot programmes are probably a precursor to recommendations on specific capacity-building, in most contexts.

In the case of the TCLM programme between Colombia and Spain, specific efforts are also made in Spain to promote the contribution of migrants to local development upon their return to Colombia. This includes training in entrepreneurship, consultancy workshops aimed at defining and formulating productive social initiatives, courses for co-development community projects, and mentoring in the preparation of business plans.

While it has been made clear in this report that capacities for return and reintegration of migrants tend to be very poorly developed in most origin countries, these gaps are magnified in the case of circular migration. Procedures are required to continue to match workers with potential job openings in the destination country after their return; there may be particular socio-psychological problems arising from short-term return and reintegration into the origin society; and, in order to genuinely fulfil the potential of circular migration for origin countries, returning migrants should be assisted in re-entering the local labour market, even if this is only for a relatively short period of time. For circular migration to become more than simply a one-off temporary migration experience, significant new capacity-building in these sorts of areas will be required in origin countries, in close collaboration with partner destination countries.

⁹⁷ IOM (2009a).

5.8 Training to retain

One way to reduce the potentially deleterious impact on origin countries of the migration in disproportionate numbers of skilled workers, such as those trained to be doctors, nurses and teachers, is to train more of them and provide incentives for more of them to stay in the origin country rather than migrate for career enhancement. Such an approach is certainly preferable to efforts to prevent workers from legally migrating when their labour is in demand, which run counter to human rights principles regarding the right to leave any country.

There is genuine potential in this approach for responsibilities for capacity-building to be shared among a number of partners. Ultimately, responsibility for providing decent work for citizens rests with their State. Equally, destination countries can benefit from investment in training and retention by increasing the pool of skilled labour available to them, while also reducing the negative impacts on origin countries, and promoting conditions that encourage the return of migrant workers. Additionally, for the private sector in origin countries, there is a clear benefit to ensuring a sustainable supply of appropriately skilled workers.⁹⁸

In the context of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the World Bank has identified a number of key steps for achieving better training and retention of workers:⁹⁹ skill development to promote the emergence of knowledge-based economies; improvement of higher education management and provision to promote knowledge-based economies; activation of labour markets; improvement of social protection and labour management for migrants; and promotion of income opportunities and the active citizenship of young people.

Globally, a number of alternative approaches have also been proposed. One is to target incentives in the form of wage supplements for

public-sector workers, for whom remuneration and career trajectories are often particularly poor. A second is training tailored to skills that are useful in origin countries but less tradable across borders (for example, paramedics rather than doctors). A third is to reform education financing to allow for private-sector provision so that people seeking training as a way to move abroad do not rely on public funding; this is already taking place in the Philippines, with particular regard to nurses. A fourth is to expand investment in alternative technologies (such as cellphones, Internet telephony and website-enabled distance services) so that skills in short supply can benefit larger numbers of people in the origin country. Finally, development assistance might be better targeted towards, for example, regional and national research institutions, to make up for the loss of innovation and investment occasioned by migration.

5.9 Ethical recruitment policies

The Commonwealth Code of Practice for International Recruitment of Health Workers is often cited as a model for ethical recruitment.¹⁰⁰ In part, its purpose is to ensure the sorts of protections referred to in the previous section on labour mobility (section 3) – for example, regarding providing information so that workers can make an informed decision before migrating, full disclosure of requirements and conditions attached to employment, and the development of sanctions against unethical private recruiters. Its ethical stance is partly derived from its objective of reducing the negative impacts of migration by controlling the outflow of personnel in large numbers from regions and countries where their skills are in short supply and high demand, and by encouraging governments to consider methods of compensation, reparation and restitution for countries affected, including through promoting return. More recently, WHO developed a code of practice intended to establish and promote voluntary principles, standards and practices for the international recruitment of health personnel.

⁹⁸ GCIM (2005).

⁹⁹ UNDP (2009).

¹⁰⁰ Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers (2003) http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B7BDD970B-53AE-441D-81DB-1B64C37E992A%7D_CommonwealthCodeofPractice.pdf

An initial capacity requirement for the introduction of ethical recruitment policies is that of identifying particular sectors in particular developing countries that risk being adversely affected by the emigration of skilled workers.¹⁰¹ This will require a coordinated effort to pull together a growing but disparate literature and develop a robust methodology. Understanding the complete picture of the impacts of emigration will require combining quantitative (e.g. modelling demand/growth in training in particular sectors, rate of growth in wages and conditions) and qualitative (e.g. surveying migration intentions) efforts. It will also require considerable context-specific evidence such as information on vacancy rates in key sectors, historical and comparative changes in the distribution of certain key workers, the size and nature of the origin economy, and the migration experience of those who leave (relative incomes, remittances, return). One proposal is for a global audit of so-called ‘brain drain hotspots’ to be carried out.¹⁰²

Even if such ‘hotspots’ can be identified and appropriate recruitment guidelines developed (perhaps following the Commonwealth Code of Practice), there is evidence that further capacities are required, particularly in the implementation of such guidelines, to make them effective.¹⁰³ They are likely to be most effective, for example, if adhered to by both public- and private-sector recruiting bodies. Their effect will be limited if they are voluntary, and also if private sector recruitment agencies are exempt. It follows that an effective monitoring process is required, combined with enforcement where the guidelines are not adhered to by signatories. These requirements, in turn, point to the need to establish multilateral agreements on this issue, and for governments to work in partnership with the private sector, particularly international recruitment agencies.

5.10 Institutional capacity-building

Effectively linking migration with development requires considerable institutional capacity-building. Within governments in migration origin countries, for example, there is a need to: improve the understanding of, and ability to facilitate, the use of remittances for economic growth; strengthen the institutional, human and infrastructural resource capacities of relevant ministries to implement migration and development policies; improve the reliability of migration and remittance data and the capacity to collect, share and apply such data; improve the knowledge and capacity of migrant workers and their families to channel and use their remittances for investments; facilitate the links between remittances and innovative financial services; and improve the linkages of the government with its diasporas.

Within governments in migrant destination countries, policies specific to migration and development outlined in the preceding section need to be complemented by wider migration capacity-building – for example, with regards to entry to the labour market, integration and policies on return. An immediate implication is that greater coordination between diverse ministries and government agencies is required to effectively improve the contribution of migrants and migration to development.

Equally, partnerships are required between particular sets of origin and destination countries – for example, to facilitate remittances and manage circular migration.

At the same time, the private sector, diaspora associations, workers’ organizations and other non-governmental stakeholders also have an essential role to play in supporting migration and development initiatives. Non-State actors are critical, for example, to establishing and maintaining an ethical and regulated recruitment industry; disseminating information to migrants; lowering the costs of remittances; and engaging diaspora associations. The development of effective consultation mechanisms between government and other stakeholders in society, in both origin and destination countries, is another institutional capacity-building prerequisite.

¹⁰¹ GCIM (2005).

¹⁰² Sriskandarajah (2005).

¹⁰³ Ibid (2005).

6. INTEGRATION

Integration can be defined as ‘...the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups’.¹⁰⁴ Integration is a two-way process, involving immigrants and the society in the destination country. Furthermore, it takes place both at the individual and collective level. A distinction is often made between economic, social and political integration by migrants and migrant communities. A further distinction exists between different ‘models’ of integration – primarily, assimilation and multiculturalism. In some parts of the world, as emphasized in section 3 above, migrants are generally admitted on a temporary basis only, and thus integration is not always intended as a pathway to permanent settlement or citizenship. Key components of integration policy include: labour market policies; policies related to ethnic entrepreneurship and self-employment; support for vocational or professional training; support for education; housing policies; health policies; naturalization policies; and promotion of civic and political participation.¹⁰⁵ Particular attention has been paid in recent years to integration in urban areas, and the role of local and regional governments in the process.¹⁰⁶ The immigrant integration policies adopted in Portugal provide a good example of coordinated and coherent intervention by different stakeholders (see textbox 8).

As has been emphasized throughout this report, significant capacity-building is still

required in most countries in the world – and not just developing countries – in order to respond more effectively to current challenges, as well as anticipating future trends. This is certainly the case in the area of migrant integration. On the one hand, across the world, migrants are disproportionately unemployed or underemployed; they are poorly represented at the high end of the labour market; they experience either directly or indirectly prejudice, discrimination and marginalization; they have children who under-perform at school; they do not benefit from adequate political or civic participation; and they under-achieve on a whole range of other indicators of successful integration. In some countries, the global economic crisis has only magnified these effects. In others, there is also a lack of clear political leadership, with political leaders often susceptible to populist pressures.

Multiculturalism is openly questioned and ethnic diversity and social cohesion are widely thought to be irreconcilable. The securitization of migration in the post 9/11 era has only exacerbated suspicion about immigration in the minds of the public. Recent surveys of public attitudes to migrants illustrate the extent of the misconceptions about migration. Yet the challenges of integration are only likely to increase worldwide in the near future. As has already been highlighted, it is expected that some countries that have traditionally been predominantly origin countries for migration will begin to experience increasing

¹⁰⁴ Penninx (2003).

¹⁰⁵ Bosswick and Heckmann (2006).

¹⁰⁶ ECOTEC (2008).

immigration – for example, in Eastern Europe and South Asia – and will need to adapt policies oriented towards the export of labour to policies directed at facilitating the integration prospects of new members of society. In many countries that are already primarily countries of destination, new challenges may include growing numbers of immigrants, increasing diversity of migrants (the term ‘hyper-diversity’ has been coined to describe the scenario whereby no single ethnic group forms the majority of immigrant populations in destination countries), and the increasing concentration of migrants in urban areas, exacerbating congestion effects in schools, housing and health care. In Europe, Japan and other parts of the world that will undergo a demographic transition in the near future, there may well be a decline in the proportion of nationals to migrants, placing still more emphasis on policies for managing diversity and promoting social cohesion in the future. A particular challenge for certain societies in East Asia will be the need to manage marriage migration, the demand for which is rising as a result of demographic imbalances within the population.¹⁰⁷

Ten core areas for capacity-building to promote migrant integration are:

1. strengthening economic participation;
2. encouraging civic participation among migrants;
3. simplifying rules on citizenship, nationality and dual nationality;
4. family migration;
5. managing temporary migration;
6. promoting migrant education;
7. strengthening anti-discrimination policies and practices;
8. promoting migrant health;
9. fostering public dialogue;
10. mainstreaming integration across government.

6.1 Strengthening economic participation

The impact on human capital development of the lack of integration of migrants into the for-

mal labour market is clear.¹⁰⁸ Research demonstrates that migrants are especially prone to poverty and social exclusion. When they enter into relative poverty, this can become a vicious circle, as poverty and exclusion lead, in turn, to a further set of barriers and obstacles to accessing the labour market, including: isolation, lack of access to information and networks, and physical disability; lack of work experience and references; homelessness; lack of affordable help with caregiving responsibilities; dependence on the welfare system; crime; mental health, drugs, drinking and other health problems; and prejudice by employers. In this way, limited integration prospects inhibit or restrict the potential of migrants to realize their potential as well as to contribute to development in origin and destination countries.

The development – or reinforcement – of a strong legislative framework on access to the labour market for migrants is a fundamental target for capacity-building. In most developed countries, equal job security and workers’ rights are guaranteed in legislation for migrant residents, although this is often not the case in developing countries. Even in developed countries, however, there are legislative gaps and inconsistencies surrounding the rights of temporary migrant workers – for example, concerning the extent to which they can renew their permits or take a period of time to change employers or look for a new job, should they become unemployed, and conditions regarding access to unemployment benefits. As highlighted previously in this report, clear policies on the rights of temporary migrants are critical for the effective and future management of labour mobility, including circular migration, and these are also discussed in further detail in section 6.5.

Action by civil society actors at the local level can address some of the reasons why certain migrant populations have limited access to the labour market, even where strong legislation is in place. Civil society can support sensitivity to the employment potential of, and to the barriers to employment for, immigrant populations; build up sustainable

¹⁰⁷ Lee (2010).

¹⁰⁸ UNDP (2009).

relationships with local employers to support flexible approaches to employment; develop a holistic approach, bringing together a variety of agencies to tackle the multifaceted problems faced by these persons; and provide outreach services to hard-to-reach groups that are isolated from mainstream services in the fields of information, training and entrepreneurship.¹⁰⁹ Such activities are particularly critical in cities, and urban areas are likely to become increasingly important new loci for capacity-building to strengthen the governance of migration.

Surveys reveal that trade unions are often the mainstream organizations in which immigrants are most likely to participate.¹¹⁰ Because trade unions were the historical cradle of immigrant inclusion, because equal rights were granted

to all members (regardless of citizenship or legal status) to vote and participate within the organization, they represent a best practice for other economic and civic actors to study. The right to freedom of association is one area where national and international courts play an active role in the review of changing interpretations or restrictions. In 2007, the Spanish Constitutional Court, for example, ruled that certain fundamental rights pertain to every person, regardless of administrative status, among which stand the rights to association and demonstration. At the EU level, a 2004 decision by the European Court of Justice encouraged Austria to extend to all third-country national workers the right to stand for elections as shop-stewards and delegates to the Chamber of Labour.

Textbox 8: Immigrant integration policies in Portugal

Although Portugal has only recently become a country of immigration, the investment made in integration policies in the past few years has had positive outcomes that merit attention. Public attitudes towards immigration, as shown by a 2007 Eurobarometer poll, are among the most positive in Europe (Portugal was the second-most positive country in the EU-25), with the majority of those questioned stating that the contribution of immigrants to Portuguese society was positive. Also in 2007, the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) placed Portugal in second place out of 28 countries in terms of best practice for each policy indicator, set at the highest European standard. Moreover, in the UNDP *Human Development Report 2009*, Portugal was the country with the best score in terms of attributing rights and providing services to immigrants. The awareness of immigrants' needs that underlies these policy developments and public opinion reflects Portugal's emigrant experience. This framework has been very important in terms of public debate and legislative activity on immigration and integration. Recent years have seen the passing of two significant pieces of legislation in Portugal:

- In December 2006, the new Nationality Law was unanimously approved by parliament, and with great consensus in society. This law, which aims to engender a more cohesive society, has significantly liberalized the process for acquisition of nationality. A year after the new law had come into force, over 35,000 applications for nationality had been made – more than triple the number of applications in 2005.
- In May 2007, after broad public consultation, the Immigration Law was also changed and passed by a majority in the Portuguese parliament. The new legislation simplifies procedures and reduces bureaucratic requirements, seeks to promote legal migration, combats irregular migration and facilitates family reunification.

In 1996, recognizing the importance of having a coherent integration policy for immigrants, Portugal also created a State service that intervened on a cross-cutting basis, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Hence, in Portugal, there is a whole-of-government approach to immigrant integration. In 2007, this State service became a public institute – the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI) – thereby officially recognizing its importance for immigrants, reinforcing its powers, and expanding its areas of activity.

¹⁰⁹ Koser (2009a).

¹¹⁰ Huddleston (2009).

In response to the linguistic and cultural diversity of new immigrants, ACIDI recently opened three 'one-stop-shops' – the National Immigrant Support Centres (in Lisbon, Porto and Faro). The centres have proved to be innovative in terms of providing a holistic and comprehensive government service. The centres have been mainstreaming the provision of immigrant services and consolidating partnerships and cooperation between civil society organizations, public authorities and central government.

As a further step forward in integration policy, the Portuguese Government launched an Action Plan for the integration of immigrants in 2007, which was the result of a process of broad consultation with immigrant associations and other stakeholders, involving 13 different ministries, under the coordination of ACIDI. The Action Plan defined 122 measures that set out the objectives and commitments of government agencies in welcoming and integrating immigrants.

As a country that considers its immigrants to be part of the solution, actively involving them in dialogues relating to integration policy, Portugal has demonstrated how an integrated approach can produce successful policies and services that promote a harmonious, shared future.

Source: Prepared by ACIDI, 2010.

6.2 Encouraging civic participation among migrants

As just described, governments in some developed countries have shown renewed interest in civic participation as a means of making more effective and democratically legitimate decisions on policies affecting a diverse population. This area of integration is, however, one where policies diverge significantly between developed and developing countries, and within the EU, between Western and Eastern Europe.

Granting voting rights is one way of increasing the capacity of migrants to participate in civic life. North and north-western European countries were among the first to grant local voting rights in the 1970s and 1980s and, today, EU citizens living in another Member State can vote and stand for local election in all EU Member States, while non-EU citizens can vote in 15 Member States. This trend has recently re-emerged, first in the Czech Republic in 2001, followed by Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia in 2002, Luxembourg and Slovakia in 2003, and Belgium and Ireland in 2004. Local enfranchisement is regularly proposed in political debates in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, and recently also in cities in Canada and the USA. Once these electoral rights are granted, they are not revoked or seriously challenged. In practice, allowing immigrants to participate in elections comes with neither

high implementation nor maintenance costs, and has none of the negative effects often imagined by their opponents.¹¹¹

At a less formal level, the civic participation of migrants can be encouraged through promoting active migrant associations. Indeed, ongoing comparative research in different European cities demonstrates that authorities should invest in immigrant self-organization as a means of integrating into public life. The more foreign residents create their own associations and link up together, the more they trust in public institutions and participate in mainstream organizations and politics. The more government supports, consults and delivers services through these organizations, the more likely they are to become active and effective in public life.¹¹² Yet, in some countries, there are restrictions on foreigners' rights to form an association, suggesting the requirement for legislative reform. In many other countries where immigrants are allowed to form associations, dedicated public funding for immigrant associations' political activities is often unavailable, and funding is therefore another important focus for capacity. Even where migrant associations do exist, they often lack the competencies, skills or networks to effectively participate in public affairs. An example of capacity-building to address

¹¹¹ Huddleston (2010).

¹¹² Huddleston (2009).

this particular challenge is the ‘Active and Competent Migrants in Civic Society’ project implemented by IOM in Warsaw, Poland, which has convened a series of seminars and workshops to try to establish a sustainable platform for cooperation between migrants and Polish institutions.

6.3 Simplifying rules on citizenship, nationality and dual nationality

Certainly in the European context, it is widely accepted that the State has a democratic, social and economic interest in facilitating the acquisition of nationality by the long-term, non-national population, especially by children born in the country. Immigrants who plan to settle down in their country of residence have an interest in taking up nationality and its full set of rights and responsibilities, including the right to access employment in all parts of the public sector, free movement rights, and full formal democratic rights. Naturalization, which is a form of civic participation in itself, removes the legal obstacles to full civic participation and has an important catalysing effect on the integration process.

The acquisition of nationality represents a major area of weakness in the integration strategies of most recent countries of immigration, partly because there are few international standards governing the process. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, for example, domestic laws of citizenship have inconsistent rules on acquisition, and often limit the rights to citizenship for children of migrants. Surveys of policies and rates of migration in developed countries show that most foreign nationals naturalize in traditional settlement countries, such as Australia and Canada, that emphasize the public’s interest in encouraging shared national citizenship. In contrast, in Europe, only a very small proportion of the foreign national population goes through the procedure, a gap that the European Commission has identified as an important area for improvement. For instance, many European countries are adopting more inclusive policies for migrants to obtain a long-term residence status, without facilitating access to nationality. Developing countries

often make the acquisition of citizenship for immigrants and their descendants even more onerous, if not impossible. As the settled non-national population increases in many countries in the future, there will need to be a re-examination of the purpose and effect of naturalization policies that may exclude one part of the settled population from shared citizenship. Policies that acknowledge the growing trend towards dual and multiple citizenship/nationality will also need to be explored, since increasing numbers of people are connected to more than one place, either sequentially or simultaneously.¹¹³

A particularly politicized debate in the EU concerns the extent to which individual assessments of language ability, civic knowledge or ‘integration’ promote civic participation. It is now relatively common for naturalization procedures to require that applicants, who have lived in the country for many years, have a basic ability in one of their official languages. In 2001, Germany was the only EU country that imposed such conditions on long-term residents; by 2007, this practice had been adopted by Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These language and integration conditions may or may not have the effect of promoting integration. The rationale for introducing these assessments or ‘tests’ is that they act as incentives to learn the country’s language and other salient facts. In the past, however, some countries have removed or simplified such assessments, viewing them as legal deterrents that amplify administrative discretion and serve policy goals other than integration. The outcome of these conditions may simply be a reduction in the number of participating legal residents. Those not selected may not necessarily be those least integrated or fluent, but rather those less educated, less affluent, the elderly, the preliterate, victims of post-traumatic stress disorder, and women in vulnerable situations.

In the future, more and more of the children born and educated in countries to which

¹¹³ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/international-dialogue-migration/intersessional-workshops/migration-and-transnationalism>

their parents immigrated will face unequal opportunities to develop and participate, partly due to their citizenship. Born and socialized in the country of destination (for their parents), like the children of nationals, the so-called second and third generations often see their country of birth as an important part of their identity and know no other country as their own. Many EU Member States have taken a generational approach to meeting their integration objectives in nationality law. The introduction of *ius soli* (birthright citizenship) for immigrants' descendants means that birth is the sufficient basic criterion for eligibility for nationality. The second generation has an automatic right at birth in traditional countries of immigration such as Canada and the USA. A similar right can be claimed by the third generation in countries such as Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and, since 2009, Luxembourg. For the second generation, however, European countries have moved towards conditional *ius soli*. Citizenship can be acquired only sometime after birth, as in France, and/or only by those born to a legal resident, as in Belgium, Germany and Ireland. The extent to which such generational approaches are appropriate and effective is consistently raised in public debates in the Baltics, Greece, Italy and Switzerland, and is likely to become more important in new countries of destination too.

The global trend towards tolerating multiple nationality (either in part or in full) is removing one of the main obstacles to naturalization, which is a reflection of the reality that, with globalization, more people are leading multi-sited lives – born in one country, educated in another, living and working perhaps in a third, and retiring in the place of origin or yet another location. The majority of EU Member States, for example, no longer require applicants to renounce their previous citizenship, while most others do so only under exceptional circumstances. Origin countries are also recognizing the value of dual citizenship – Ghana's Citizenship Act of 2001, for example, determines that 'a citizen of Ghana may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition to his citizenship of Ghana' (Part III, 16(1)).¹¹⁴

Overall, the standards and effects of conditions for naturalization need to be regularly evaluated to establish whether or not they are efficient or effective integration incentives. For example, after the introduction of the Australian citizenship test led to a significant drop in applications and a higher failure rate among humanitarian immigrants, a citizen test review recommended that the content should focus on the basic legislative requirements and that the format be simple and in clear English. Economic resource conditions should also be evaluated in terms of the labour market context and implications for democratic governance. For instance, Portugal abolished its 'means of subsistence' test for citizenship in 2006. Instead, any registration or declaration regarding nationality, as well as any certificates required, are made free of charge for those with an income that is equal to or below the national minimum wage.

6.4 Family migration

The rights to family reunification and to found a family are widely recognized as fundamental aspects of integration. There are at least four categories of family migration: family reunification, family formation (or marriage migration), the migration of the entire family, and migration by sponsored family members. Definitions, patterns, processes and current policy developments pertaining to all these categories are discussed in depth in chapter 6 of the last IOM *World Migration Report* (2008).¹¹⁵

For the purposes of this report, where the focus is on capacity-building for future challenges, four areas are highlighted. The first relates to gaps in existing international and regional instruments. The right to family reunification has been included in two human rights conventions: the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (in particular, Article 9), and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (in particular, Article 44). As already explained above, however, relatively few States – and no major

¹¹⁴ <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3eda135a2.pdf>

¹¹⁵ IOM (2008).

industrialized countries of destination – have yet ratified the latter Convention. At a regional level, the EU Council Directive on the right to family reunification for third-country nationals lawfully residing in the EU has not yet been transposed into the laws of all EU States, and also allows for a large measure of discretion in its application under national law. In contrast, the ‘Agreement on Residence for Nationals of MERCOSUR States, Bolivia and Chile’, of 6 December 2002, provides for the right to family reunification and equal treatment of migrants with nationals concerning all civic, social, cultural and economic rights.

The second capacity issue is the need for clearly defined national rules on family reunification, while recognizing differences in national priorities and goals. There are currently many inconsistencies. Temporary labour migration programmes deny the right to family reunification, whereas employment-based immigration programmes targeting more skilled workers tend to permit family reunification, although conditions vary. In Ireland, Green Card holders are entitled to bring their family with them, whereas holders of regular work permits must live and work in Ireland for at least one year before their family can join them. In the United Kingdom, Ordinary Work Permit holders may also be joined by a dependant defined as a husband, wife, civil partner or eligible partner or children under 18. Under exceptional circumstances, work permit holders in the United Kingdom may also be joined by children over 18 and dependent parents. In both cases, the dependants require a visa, and proof must be provided that they can be supported without drawing on public funds.

The third area of focus relates to the rules and regulations that apply to the family members that join migrants abroad through family migration. In the United Kingdom, dependants of Ordinary Work Permit holders are entitled to undertake any employment or self-employment, provided they hold a valid UK Entry Clearance. In Japan, dependants of all five categories of skilled migrant work permit holders are eligible to apply for a part-time work permit that allows them to engage in part-time employment for up to

28 hours per week. In France, in an effort to prevent immigrant families from becoming dependent on France’s welfare system, the law requires immigrants to prove that they can independently support all family members who seek to come to France. Specifically, they must earn at least the French minimum wage and not be reliant on assistance from the French State. Access to government assistance is also limited to EU citizens. Those who reside in France longer than three months without working or studying must be able to support themselves without relying on social or medical benefits from the French Government.

Finally, a series of capacity-building requirements arise in the specific context of marriage migration – a phenomenon that is expected to increase significantly in the future, especially in East Asia.¹¹⁶ In the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, free language classes, public health coverage, and other support programmes have already been developed for marriage migrants; however, in both countries, there is a noticeable gap between the stated goals of migrant integration policies and the situation on the ground. One problem is that both governments tend to view marriage migrants as being primarily wives, daughters-in-law and mothers, and most programmes are hence oriented towards childcare, care of the elderly, and domestic work, rather than wider aspects of integration for these populations. The second problem is that marriage migrants tend to be viewed as ‘beneficiaries’, and their role as potential active citizens is often ignored. Specific capacity-building recommendations that arise from this analysis include the need to develop training and support programmes that empower marriage migrants to become more independent, and that do not segregate them from other migrants and nationals who may also be targeted by similar programmes. Another capacity gap is at the level of international cooperation to assist those who fail in their international marriage and wish to return to their country of birth. Although the exact number is not known, the divorce rate of international marriages is increasing; when individuals return to their home country, follo-

¹¹⁶ Lee (2010).

wing the breakdown of their marriage, they may have lost their citizenship status as a result of rules restricting dual nationality and, hence, their national entitlements.¹¹⁷

In addition to these four categories of family migration, capacity-building is required to support governments in guaranteeing the protection of particularly vulnerable

family and household members such as children and adolescents. A good example is provided by UNICEF's efforts in Guatemala, raising awareness on the impact of the economic crisis on children and adolescents and enhancing the capacities of consular services to assist unaccompanied migrant children (see textbox 9).

Textbox 9: UNICEF capacity-building on migration, children and human rights in Guatemala

As a country of origin, transit and destination whose social and economic development is partly supported by remittances sent from abroad, Guatemala is a country in which international migration over the past few years has become a policy priority. In response to this reality, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Guatemala has given increasing priority to protecting the rights of children and adolescents in this context. In particular, together with IOM, UNICEF Guatemala has supported the strengthening of government and civil society capacity on several fronts.

Building evidence-based capacity in the face of the current economic crisis

In order to measure the impact of the economic crisis and resulting decline in remittances, UNICEF Guatemala and IOM conducted a joint survey of 3,000 remittance-receiving households. The results of this study were published in *Cuadernos de trabajo sobre migración 27, Encuesta sobre remesas 2009, niñez y adolescencia* (*Migration Working Papers No. 27, Survey on remittances in 2009, childhood and adolescence*) and highlight the impacts of the crisis on households, in particular on children and youth.

UNICEF Guatemala also produced a paper, in support of its joint work with IOM, entitled *Impacto de la crisis económica mundial en la niñez y adolescencia de Guatemala* (*Impact of the global economic crisis on childhood and adolescence in Guatemala*). This paper is meant to raise awareness on the impact of the crisis on vulnerable populations, especially children and adolescents, providing recommendations for institutional strengthening in the face of the deterioration of living conditions.

UNICEF Guatemala continues to monitor the impact of the crisis on Guatemalan households, and particularly on children and adolescents. In collaboration with the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEFI), it is using the 2009 UNICEF–IOM survey data on migration and remittances to highlight the need to act and make decisions and economic policies aimed at ensuring the rights of children and adolescents.

Building the capacity of consular services to protect the rights of migrants and their families

The crisis is still severely impacting Guatemala and affecting the development opportunities of children and adolescents. Accordingly, UNICEF Guatemala has supported the Guatemalan Government in building the capacity of its consular services in an effort to handle the increased number of migrants returning from Mexico and the USA, as well as the increased number of deportations from the USA.

The Guatemala Directorate General for Migration, in collaboration with Mexican officials, agreed to launch the Oficiales de Protección a la Infancia (Child Protection Officers) (OPIs) in Guatemala. UNICEF Guatemala has been involved in providing training to both Guatemalan and Salvadoran migration officials (OPIs) in charge of receiving unaccompanied migrant children and adolescents on their borders and accompanying them through the repatriation process to their countries of origin.

Source: UNICEF, Division of Policy and Practice, 2010.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

6.5 Managing temporary migration

Given the expected rise in the scale of temporary migration, for the reasons already alluded to in this report, many destination countries will be faced with the challenge of elaborating integration rules on temporary migration. While migrants are entitled to respect of their basic human rights, regardless of the duration of stay (and, indeed, regardless of whether they are in a regular or irregular status), a balance must be struck between permitting migrants to stay long enough so that they can succeed and generate savings, and not diminishing the likelihood of return. Specific challenges already considered in this report relate to whether and how to provide temporary migrant workers the freedom of movement between jobs or sectors, and how to incentivize or enforce return and circularity. Additional challenges include questions of access to health care, education and other social benefits.

From a rights-based perspective, liberal democracies should not maintain migrants indefinitely without extending to them broad integration rights, including access to permanent residence and the right to family reunification. Research also shows that the lack of a long-term perspective of settlement in host countries can marginalize migrants in host societies.¹¹⁸ The lack of consistency in procedures for transferring temporary employment permits for migrant workers to permanent employment permits and, ultimately, residence rights has already been discussed in section 6.1 above. One of the most contentious debates regarding circular migration concerns whether or not these policy frameworks should also include provision for the limited transfer of selected migrants into a permanent immigration programme. Proponents, including trade unions in many countries and a number of civil society organizations, have argued from a rights-based approach that the restrictions associated with strictly temporary workers' schemes may not be compatible with a liberal democratic framework. Other commentators

have acknowledged these reservations, but argued that ensuring temporariness is, in practice, the best available compromise. They also argue that creating the expectation of permanence may undermine the notion of circularity, although one way to avoid that is to guarantee that rules and criteria are transparent and accessible for all migrants from the outset.

Where the possibility for limited permanent immigration has been considered, the Canadian model for temporary migrants is widely cited as good practice: in order to be eligible, applicants must satisfy certain requirements, including a certain minimum work experience; sufficient funds to settle; and no criminal record in Canada. Points are then allocated to identify successful applicants on the basis of education, language skills, experience, age, arranged employment, and adaptability. The programme is open to both non-residents and resident migrants on temporary work permits.

6.6 Promoting migrant education

In recent years, the main focus for policymaking in the area of migrant education has been newcomer students. In most countries, the basic right to compulsory education is already guaranteed for all children – except, in some cases, the children of undocumented migrants – and capacity-building is therefore largely required in implementing this basic right. A good example is the ‘bridging schools’ initiative in Japan, created for the children of Peruvian–Japanese and Brazilian–Japanese descendants to respond to the impact of the economic crisis on migrant households (see textbox 10).

¹¹⁸ GCIM (2005).

Textbox 10: Social protection and integration of immigrants during the economic crisis: The example of ‘bridging schools’ in Japan

Since the end of 2008, the economic crisis has severely affected migrants in Japan, including Japanese descendants such as Japanese–Brazilians and Japanese–Peruvians, many of whom used to work in the automotive sector. A number of migrant children have dropped out of private ethnic schools, where they are taught in their mother tongue, since their unemployed parents can no longer pay the high tuition fee. Because many of these children have difficulty transferring to Japanese public schools due to the lack of support mechanisms, particularly in Japanese language education, a substantial proportion of them do not attend school.

To assist in the establishment of bridging schools for these out-of-school children, prior to their transfer to Japanese public schools, IOM implemented a three-year project in August 2009 which is part of the “Support Program to Facilitate School Education for Foreign Children” funded by the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology (MEXT) with a total budget of JPY 3.7 billion (approx. USD 39 million) and 42 partner organizations selected to date. Under this programme, IOM Tokyo set up a Japanese Bridging School Fund through which to establish free bridging schools and community spaces for migrant children to learn the Japanese language, school subjects and Japanese culture, so that out-of-school children can smoothly transfer to Japanese public schools.

The Fund also: a) supports grass-roots activities to promote mutual understanding between foreign residents and local communities; b) creates new employment opportunities for Japanese teachers, multilingual instructors and integration coordinators, thereby helping to reinvigorate local communities; and c) conducts a comprehensive review of the current teaching materials and methodologies in Japanese-as-Second Language (JSL) education, including school subjects and the development of practical, visual and online resources in close coordination with the bridging schools supported by the Fund.

Source: Prepared by IOM, 2010.

There is a range of areas where policies and common practice guidelines are required, including: equal access to school services and financial support; information about the general educational system; designation of special resource persons; intensive language support, upon arrival, in compulsory education; minimum support for newcomers in the mainstream classroom; adoption of official intercultural education goals; extracurricular/remedial provision of tuition for certain mother tongues and countries of origin; criteria and support for assessments of newcomers' prior educational attainment; a statutory right for parents and newcomers to access interpretation services; information about pre-primary education; additional meetings with immigrant parents; adaptations of assessment mechanisms or limiting class sizes for migrant pupils; adaptations of daily school life to enhance participation of diverse pupils, implementation and funding of intercultural education, especially in teacher training and learning materials for all subjects; and monitoring of migrant pupil performance and evaluation of targeted policies.

An example of training to promote migrant education is the ‘Psychological and Cultural Integration’ project (adopted by IOM Warsaw), which targets teachers and school administrators in order to increase their intercultural competencies and prepare them for working with multicultural classes. The project also promotes open and non-discriminatory attitudes among Polish schoolchildren towards other cultures by utilizing intercultural activities.¹¹⁹

While educating newcomer students, especially children, is critical, it is also probably true that continuing education and adult-learning are even more important among migrant populations than non-migrants, particularly in terms of learning to adapt to new cultures and understanding practical procedures. An unusual example of adult education for migrants is the INTI programme implemented in Helsinki by IOM, which aims to develop the competencies of migrant

¹¹⁹ www.iom.pl

religious leaders in their roles as counsellors – for example, by providing them with training on relevant legal and social issues in Finland, such as divorce, gender issues, education and the role of the media.

6.7 Strengthening anti-discrimination policies and practices

A State's capacity to promote equal opportunities for diverse populations lies in its anti-discrimination laws and equality bodies. Individual migrants and nationals who want to participate in different areas of life cannot be treated less favourably because of, for example, their race, religion, gender, disability, nationality or language ability. European and international law have often encouraged States to introduce dedicated anti-discrimination laws. Because of the EC anti-discrimination directives, the legal definitions of discrimination and mechanisms to enforce them have been one of the areas of greatest and most recent progress in the capacity of EU Member States to fight discrimination. Most now have laws that are designed to protect residents of different races and ethnic origins from discrimination in employment, education, vocational training and housing, as well as in access to health care and social protection and advantages. However, a significant gap remains in terms of religious and nationality discrimination. A high number of countries in the EU effectively allow a form of unequal treatment that undermines the ability of immigrants to exercise, and service providers to deliver, comparable rights for nationals and non-nationals.¹²⁰

A theme that has pervaded this report is the need for capacities to implement national laws and policies, and this is particularly important in the anti-discrimination arena, where the legal framework is relatively well-developed, in many countries, but discrimination remains a significant challenge. An important capacity-building requirement is the adoption of equality policies that empower civil society actors and the private sector to apply and use the law in practice, and to secure equal

opportunities within their organizations. National equality bodies and support NGOs have been recently established in EU Member States, for example, to give advice and support potential victims. To do their work effectively, many equality bodies will need greater legal standing and investigative powers, and NGOs will need greater legal opportunities for class action and situational testing. Aspects that need to be developed, in turn, by and for civil society actors, include the ability to monitor equality policies' implementation, improved statistics, public opinion and victim surveys, and regular reporting on anti-discrimination cases and their outcomes.

A critical additional element in combating discrimination is public education and awareness-raising. Following the xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008, IOM Pretoria initiated the 'ONE movement' project – a 'social-change' campaign to promote human rights, unity in diversity, and the overall integration of migrants in South Africa. The campaign uses multipronged strategies drawing on behavioural change methods aimed at addressing the prejudicial attitudes that lead to racism, xenophobia and other discriminatory practices. Specific capacity-building initiatives have included dialogue in schools and communities, as well as media and public information campaigns broadcast through television programmes, and debates through interactive media platforms such as Facebook, blogs and SMS. The campaign actively seeks multisector partnerships by facilitating public and private sector involvement. Another example is the Diversity Initiative in Ukraine, through which IOM provides a platform for exchange between international, civil, corporate and government actors to promote cultural understanding.

6.8 Promoting migrant health

The challenges surrounding the access of migrants – especially migrants in an irregular status – to health care in the developed world should not be underestimated. Restricted access on the part of migrants also highlights capacity-building requirements – for example, concerning information dissemination among migrants, cross-cultural education to reduce

¹²⁰ Huddleston (2010).

the stigma around health conditions associated with certain migrant groups, and procedures that reduce the discriminatory delivery of even basic health care (for instance, on the basis of legal status). At the same time, the greatest capacity-building requirements in this field occur in the less developed world, partly because migrants often suffer a higher incidence of disease in these countries. IOM and other international and non-governmental organizations invest significantly in building capacities to promote migrant health – indeed, IOM has a dedicated Migration Health Division – providing extensive assistance in the developing world.

A survey of capacity-building requirements in the field of promoting migrant health, commissioned for this *World Migration Report*, nevertheless identified a series of systemic gaps.¹²¹ One is the need to mainstream migration health within governmental structures. Specific examples of capacity needs include the establishment of Coordinating Units on Migration Health to facilitate coordination within government and between governments, and also to strengthen collaboration between the various stakeholders, including the private sector, migrant networks and NGOs. Policy development is also identified as crucial for developing effective and sustainable means of meeting the health needs of migrants. This involves reviewing policies related to health, immigration, security, finance and labour, among others.

Another capacity-building requirement relates to the establishment and implementation of financing options to meeting the health needs of migrants, including increasing health literacy, primary health care and access to more advanced care. Options for supporting the costs of migrant health include increasing the engagement of the private sector in extending health insurance, and allowing migrants to pay into the government health-insurance schemes of host countries. Other innovative schemes include harnessing remittance flows for supporting the health of

migrants and their families back home, as well as those facilitating migrants' access to health services while abroad, while paying into the national scheme of the country of origin.

A related broad area for further capacity-building involves establishing sustainable and innovative delivery structures that engage migrants. In particular, capacity must be built for the provision of services through mechanisms that are accessible, affordable and meaningful for migrants. One example of a successful service-delivery mechanism is the training and deployment of migrants within governmental structures. Migrant health workers, health-care volunteers and translators are able to act as a bridge between marginalized communities of migrants and the services available to them. Participatory community mapping can be undertaken jointly by health-care providers and migrant communities in order to delineate population demographics, identify available social resources, and find vulnerable households in need of assistance. Family health folders, bilingual mother-child health records, and migrant involvement in the development of educational materials are additional options that are already being deployed. Other innovative practices are migrant reception desks at hospitals, mobile clinics that reach remote areas, and the establishment of health posts in migrant communities. Building a more migrant-friendly health-care workforce is another aspect of capacity-building in this area. The capacity of health workers to engage with migrant clients in an effective and culturally sensitive manner requires strengthening. This can be implemented by integrating sensitivity training into curricula for health professionals, running workshops on effective interpersonal communication, assessing client testimonies, anthropological research and feedback sessions, international exchange visits, and other means.

Another major area in need of capacity-building is the transborder dimension of health-care systems, which needs to be strengthened. One way of doing this is to increase the surveillance and control of communicable diseases carried through increased international travel – for example, through 'fit-to-travel' health

¹²¹ Khadria (2010).

assessments for prospective migrants, as IOM currently undertakes in the context of several government immigration and refugee-resettlement programmes. A second aspect involves strengthening the health-care systems in border areas, which often exhibit weak health infrastructures, where counterfeit drugs are common, and a largely unregulated private sector often fills the service provision gap. Governments on both sides of borders need to work together in dealing with border area populations as a single health community. This will entail increased collaboration on surveillance of health and disease issues, development of common standard operating procedures, and targeting of programmes for the heterogeneous populations living in border sites. A third challenge relates to capacity needed to assist particularly mobile populations (e.g. truck drivers, sex workers, commercial fishermen, nomads, etc.) in accessing services at the appropriate times and locations. Health records of individuals need to be available in facilities along the main stopping points of transport corridors using smartcard (or other) technology – or carried on the person as a ‘health passport’.

Treatment guidelines need to be harmonized between countries in order to appropriately refill prescriptions. Communication strategies and programme monitoring and evaluation systems must encompass the migration route instead of being boxed within individual countries or non-governmental organizations. To better address the transborder dimensions of health care, it will be important to build the capacity of regional economic communities and intergovernmental bodies to increase collaborative efforts. Technical resources and personnel, in particular, are required to advocate programming and to mobilize national counterparts. In addition, the way that donors, international partners and governments work with stakeholders to facilitate the development of transborder health-care programming should be more closely examined, as establishing bilateral and multi-country initiatives requires up-front financial and time investment to ensure inclusion of stakeholders and political commitment of countries. Many transborder

partnerships fail to materialize due to the complexity of distilling the programme focus into an achievable list of priorities based on empirical evidence, rather than the special interests of development partners and donors. Moreover, the proposed programme must fill gaps not met by country programmes, complement national strategies, and clearly show the added value of regional or cross-border approaches. Many regional initiatives that are funded place too much emphasis on the regional coordination aspects, with expectations that country-level resources will fill the gap, which rarely transpires. Countries will need to be capacitated with sufficiently committed focal points who are able to influence and harness country-level resources for implementation of regionally coordinated initiatives.

A final area of migrant health care that requires particular attention relates to persons who have been trafficked, who often have specific needs in terms of physical health, psychological and emotional trauma, shelter, protection and reintegration, as well as, potentially, seeking redress through legal channels. The health aspects relate to physical trauma, sexual and reproductive health, disability and infectious diseases. Capacity is required to ensure that functioning systems are in place to address the needs of trafficked persons, while respecting their rights. Referral needs to be carefully managed in order to respect the choices and privacy of survivors. Social service providers and law-enforcement agencies need to have increased understanding of the health aspects of trafficking, and to know how to deal effectively with such cases. Likewise, health-care providers need to know how to identify suspected cases of trafficking, to offer the appropriate medical care, and to appropriately refer patients to other practitioners for assistance. In this respect, the report *Caring for Trafficked Persons: Guidance for Health Providers* is widely viewed as establishing good practice.¹²²

¹²² IOM/UNGIFT/LSHTM (2009).

6.9 Fostering public dialogue

Integration policy is not just about improving the lives of migrants. The well-being of all residents in any country of immigration is at stake. This message needs to lie at the heart of renewed efforts to foster public dialogue on, and support for, migrant integration.

Though integration will be increasingly prioritized, it need not be politicized. The level of politicization is a result of the extent to which integration policy is still an area of political contention versus consensus. The more different political parties agree on common integration objectives, the greater the likelihood that the resulting policy will be designed around the needs of both immigrants and receiving communities. For instance, the main Portuguese political parties agreed not to politicize the major 2006 nationality law reform. As a result, the parliament was able to give unanimous approval to the idea that all immigrants, regardless of their origins, should have equal opportunity to become Portuguese and that their children's children should no longer be treated as foreigners. On the other end of the scale, the more that parties use integration to distinguish themselves on the political spectrum, the more likely that policy will be designed around winning votes from majorities and swing voters – most worryingly, from the extreme right. Whether or not integration policies are changed for mere electoral gain will greatly depend on how local and national contexts change – and how opinion-formers and policymakers choose to respond to these changes.

One practical way to foster public support for immigration is through citizenship ceremonies. While these have existed for many years in traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, they are newly present in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. Some have revived the tradition – as is the case for Norway, after a 30-year interruption. Others have started from scratch, inspired particularly by North American models. High levels of participation of naturalizing citizens

and their families, politicians, the media and members of the public turn ceremonies into a rallying point for public awareness-raising, giving voice to immigrants, and promoting mutual interaction between new and old citizens. The main concern, when performing such ceremonies, is to remove any requirement that might exclude successful applicants from participating in them or in any way prevent them from receiving their national citizenship. In France, the High Authority for the Fight against Racism and for Equality (HALDE) and the Interior Ministry have ensured, for example, that prefectures do not exclude participants who wear religious garments such as the Islamic headscarf.

6.10 Mainstreaming integration across government

One of the obstacles to better integration is that, in many countries, responsibilities are not centralized, and integration policy is driven by local and regional factors and often depends on the vision and limited capacity of local administrations.¹²³ Where guidelines exist in the form of national integration plans, they are often not binding and cannot be enforced by legal action. A very mixed picture of integration achievements results from this deficit. Some communities – for example, where political and civil actors have formed alliances – are able to present considerable success. Others are registering rising problems. But even the success stories show structural deficits: notwithstanding the fact that, in most cases, there are very engaged people with ambitious objectives, no commonly defined goals or indicators of success exist, nor are the integration activities properly evaluated. Furthermore, as an increasing number of administrative and civil society actors become engaged in integration programmes, there is a risk of overlap and a lack of coordination. In some countries, integration has effectively become a business, whereby the competition for financial resources for integration sometimes becomes more important than the integration outcomes themselves.

¹²³ Klingholz (2009).

One response to these challenges is to define integration as a national mandatory task, in the same way that education, health-care systems or internal security are national tasks in most countries. This would raise the profile of integration and also enable governments to define standards and the legal framework under which integration activities should be carried out. One of the capacity requirements for achieving this goal relates to institutional reform and, in particular, coordinating efforts across government. One approach is to designate a lead ministry to take responsibility for mainstreaming integration; another is to transfer the integration portfolio from ministries of interior or social affairs and employment to new ministries and agencies dedicated to integration; and a third is to establish inter-ministerial coordinating committees. This does not mean that national governments should take over the whole responsibility for integration or push aside local authorities and civil society. They should, however, set defined integration goals and the framework for a better and coordinated organization of the work to be done.

Another way to overcome a lack of coordination between proliferating governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in the integration process proposed by the European Commission in the Common Agenda for Integration¹²⁴ is to develop ‘one-stop-shop’ services to provide information, interpretation and translation, mentoring and mediation services. As an example, in 2004, Portugal,

through the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (now the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue – ACIDI), developed ‘one-stop-shops’, called National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAIs), in Lisbon, Porto and, subsequently, Faro. These centres, created exclusively for immigration issues, bring together under the same roof a number of services related to immigration. Through shared responsibility and partnership between various levels of the Portuguese Government, the centres involve six branches of five Ministries (Foreigners and Borders Service, Working Conditions Authority, Social Security, Central Registry Office, Health and Education) and offices that provide specific support, specifically with regard to legal advice, family reunification and labour market integration. The services are enhanced through the involvement of 61 cultural mediators from the different immigrant communities. These stakeholders, representing immigrant associations and working in partnership with the government, have played a key role in bridging the gap between the immigrants and Portuguese public administration. In 2006, IOM undertook an independent evaluation of the outcomes of these support centres, concluding that the National Immigrant Support Centre model “...is effectively an initiative and an experience that should be disseminated, and that can be internationally replicated within other institutional contexts, obviously always taking into consideration the various specifics that characterize different international migration scenarios”.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ European Commission (2005).

¹²⁵ IOM (2007: 81).

7. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

Probably the best available data on environmental migration are the figures on the number of persons displaced by natural disasters. In 2008, for example, 20 million people were displaced as a result of sudden-onset climate-related weather events, compared to 4.6 million internally displaced by conflict and violence.¹²⁶ There is, however, no global database on migratory movements related to natural disasters. At best, there are estimates that can be derived from displacement data relating to particular crises. Although the number of disasters has increased significantly over the last two decades (see map 8 showing the change in the number of natural disasters between 1990 and 2009), there has not been a major impact on international migratory flows, as much displacement is short-lived and temporary, and those who are displaced do not have the resources or networks to migrate abroad.¹²⁷ This is why it is often asserted that environmental change is likely to contribute to more internal rather than international migration. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that, although extreme environmental events such as cyclones, hurricanes and tsunamis tend to capture the media headlines, gradual changes in the environment are likely to have a much greater impact on the movement of people in the future.¹²⁸ For example, over the last 30 years, twice as many people worldwide have been affected by droughts

as by storms (1.6 billion compared with approximately 718 million).¹²⁹

Most commentators agree that migration resulting from environmental change is likely to continue to increase in the foreseeable future.¹³⁰ The effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate this trend, although it is not always appropriate to ascribe environmental changes that might precipitate migration to climate change. For example, environmental degradation may be the result of changes in average annual temperatures or rainfall levels, but it may equally be the result of deforestation or poor land management – or a combination of these factors. Additionally, it can be difficult to isolate environmental factors from other drivers of migration. In the Middle East and North Africa, for example, it has been predicted that environmental degradation will reduce the amount of fertile arable land and thus compound a shortage of employment for a youthful population expanding quickly as a result of demographic trends, a proportion of whom may thus migrate to look for work.¹³¹ In this case, environmental degradation, demographic trends and economic factors (a lack of employment) combine as potential drivers for migration. There is no agreed definition or defined category and no explicit legal or normative framework pertaining to people moving as a result of the effects of environmental change. In other words, even

¹²⁶ UN-OCHA/IDMC (2009).

¹²⁷ IOM (2009b).

¹²⁸ Leighton (2010).

¹²⁹ IOM (2009b).

¹³⁰ Zetter (2009).

¹³¹ Koser (2009b).

if such movements are already taking place or are likely to in the future, they may not be recognized, categorized or counted as distinct from other types of movement.

At the same time, the outlines for an analytical framework for trying to understand the links between environmental change and migration are emerging. A distinction is usually made between slow-onset processes and extreme environmental events or natural disasters – distinguishing, for example, desertification from floods. In this context, there is growing recognition that migration is not always the only response to the effects of environmental change – in the case of slow-onset events, for example, adapting settlement and land use practices may mean that people can remain at home safely and productively. Some will move for sheer survival, others as part of a family strategy to maximize household incomes. Equally, not all migration arising from environmental change effects will be long term. Natural disasters tend to generate temporary movements if the affected area is still habitable, while slow-onset processes may lead to long-term or permanent migration. This section of the report considers capacity-building requirements during the pre-migration, migration and resettlement stages.¹³²

It needs to be acknowledged that policymakers in both the developed and developing world may be unwilling to invest significant resources in planning to respond to potential migration outcomes from environmental change, given short-term political horizons and the budgetary impact on already strained resources, especially in countries where there is no immediate threat. In making a case for migration capacity-building in response to future challenges arising from the effects of environmental change, the need for policymakers to be able to justify their priorities is evident in this report. Thus, as an essential first step in capacity-building, it identifies the need to establish a more robust evidence base on the relationship between environmental change and migration. Second, it focuses on adapting and

strengthening existing laws and policies, rather than starting from scratch. Third, it suggests changes to the legal and normative framework that, once in place, will provide the scaffolding for future policymaking, even if that policy-making need not take place in every country straight away.

Consequently, capacity-building requirements are identified in the following ten areas:

1. establishing a better evidence base;
2. disaster risk reduction;
3. developing adaptation strategies;
4. preparing evacuation plans;
5. filling gaps in the legal and normative framework;
6. implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement;
7. amending national immigration laws and policies;
8. establishing proactive resettlement policies;
9. providing humanitarian assistance
10. planning for resettlement.

7.1 Establishing a better evidence base

A global database on migration resulting from the effects of environmental change would be one step in establishing a better evidence base for new policies. The challenges relating to establishing such a database would be significant, including the need to standardize definitions and develop internationally comparable indicators. It would also rely on national-level reporting, raising significant capacity challenges – particularly in poorer countries – relating to data collection and analysis.¹³³ Furthermore, to be of real value, such a database would need to be freely and widely accessible. An international organization, such as IOM or one of the UN agencies – or, ideally, an inter-agency collaborative effort – might be best placed to initiate such a project. In this context, IOM has proposed the establishment of an independent Commission on Migration and Environment Data (CMED) to bring together experts and

¹³² Martin, S. (2010).

¹³³ IOM (2009b).

representatives from agencies that collect data to develop practical guidelines on collecting and sharing data relevant to this context. The Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance (CCEMA) is a multi-stakeholder global partnership that also advocates a more integrated approach to research and policy in this area.

Besides reliable and regularly updated estimates of numbers, there is also a need for more comprehensive and comparative research on the relationship between environmental change and migration – in order to, for example, better understand why, in some circumstances, climate change does contribute to migration but, in others, it does not.

There is also a need to collate in one single location a description of existing laws, policies and programmes that pertain to environmental migration at the national, regional and global level. One advantage would be to facilitate a more systematic analysis of the gaps in the existing legal and normative framework (see section 7.5 below). In moving towards more coherent frameworks, learning the lessons of the past will also be useful, particularly in the context of those countries that foresee the possibility that planned resettlement, including internationally, may be needed. More systematic examination of previous planned resettlement programmes – for example, in the context of transmigration, villagization and development projects – would help ensure that resettlement programmes do not fall victim to the problems identified in earlier initiatives. Identifying the best case examples of resettlement is as important as identifying the pitfalls in programmes that failed.

A recent IOM publication makes a series of recommendations on how to improve the current evidence base.¹³⁴

7.2 Disaster risk reduction

A first step in mitigating migration arising from the effects of environmental change is to reduce the likelihood of its negative impact

on people. Disaster risk reduction involves ‘systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events’.¹³⁵

Probably the most widely known international instrument on the prevention of disasters is the Hyogo Framework for Action, which was adopted at an international conference convened by decision of the UN General Assembly, although it remains legally non-binding.¹³⁶ The Hyogo Framework sets out five priority areas of action for governments and other stakeholders for the period of 2005–2015:

1. ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation;
2. identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning mechanisms;
3. use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
4. reduce the underlying risk factors;
5. strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

Arising from these priority areas, a number of specific capacity-building recommendations can be identified, mainly targeting governments:¹³⁷

1. Develop specific national platforms and policies on disaster risk reduction, consonant with the Hyogo Framework. Responsibilities for risk reduction and early warning should also be integrated into institutional arrangements for disaster relief and recovery to ensure a holistic approach.
2. Ensure that zoning regulations and building codes are in place and attuned to addressing disaster risk, and ensure that they are adequately enforced. Care should be taken to mitigate the potential negative effects of such enforcement on the poor and marginalized.

¹³⁴ IOM (2009b).

¹³⁵ UNISDR (2009).

¹³⁶ GA resolution 58/214, 23 December 2003.

¹³⁷ Fisher (2010).

3. Countries that face the possibility of floods should ensure that a comprehensive approach to flooding mitigation, including environmental regulations and zoning, are included in their legislation and plans.
4. Devote adequate attention to equitable solutions for insecure land tenure issues to increase incentives for communities to make their own land less vulnerable.
5. Disaster risk reduction activities should be assigned specific budgets and be sufficiently funded.
6. Incorporate risk reduction elements into development planning.
7. Ensure that agencies tasked with disaster risk reduction activities regularly report to legislative oversight bodies.
8. Provide a legal remedy to affected communities where disaster-related damage is attributable to gross negligence by government actors.
9. Ensure that adequate procedures are in place to provide populations with early warnings of impending hazards, involving community-level actors as much as possible in the implementation process.
10. Ensure that procedures are in place to regularly collect data on potential hazards and on populations in order to support contingency planning, and ensure access to such information.
11. Seek and promote the involvement of civil society and communities in risk reduction and, particularly, early warning initiatives. The role of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, should be clearly set out in disaster legislation.
12. Ensure that gender issues and the needs of vulnerable groups are adequately taken into account in disaster risk reduction legislation and planning.

As emphasized above, migration will not necessarily be an automatic response to the effects of environmental change. Developing strategies to support alternative ways of adapting to these effects and, hence, avoiding the need to move, are thus an important aspect of improved migration management (see textbox 11).

Textbox 11: Building local capacity for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation: The case of Mozambique

Mozambique is one of the most natural hazard-exposed countries in Africa: between 1976 and 2007, there were at least 45 significant incidents of natural disasters, including floods, cyclones, earthquakes and droughts. The impacts of these events are compounded by chronic vulnerability resulting from high poverty levels, almost 30 years of conflict, weak infrastructure, substantial transit migration flows to South Africa, increasing incidence of HIV and weakened government and local-level capacities. As a result, disasters claim a high human toll: in 2005, the World Bank estimated that 25 per cent of Mozambique's population faced a high mortality risk from natural disasters (Dilley et al., 2005). Displacement as a result of natural disasters is another major risk for the local population: floods, for instance, displaced 200,000 people in 2001, 163,000 people in 2007 and 102,000 more in 2008 (INGC, 2009). Climate change is expected to further raise the risk and severity of cyclones and lead to rising sea levels and coastal erosion. Furthermore, increasingly erratic rainfall patterns are expected to result in both more prolonged periods of drought and higher flood risks during the rainy season.

In recent years, with the assistance of the international community, the Government of Mozambique has made significant progress in strengthening its national response capacity and shifting from a reactive to a proactive and systematic approach focusing on disaster risk reduction rather than responding to individual events. The reality of climate change further increases the need for holistic, proactive approaches that incorporate the expected changes into existing disaster risk reduction plans and call for an approach to climate change adaptation involving the whole of government.

At a local level, IOM has supported this process by implementing projects with the UN and local partners, ranging from providing assistance in emergencies to families affected by the 2007/2008 floods in the Zambezi Valley, to community stabilization activities for these internally displaced communities and

disaster risk reduction initiatives. The latter involves working with local partners, including NGOs, to support capacity-building and provide technical assistance to existing community radio stations in areas affected by natural disasters to develop disaster preparedness programming material with local community groups in order to ensure that broadcast messages are accessible and contain locally understandable content (IOM, 2009b).

As a next step, IOM, together with its partners, is working to strengthen the communities' food security and overall resilience to natural disasters and climate change by increasing their capacities to use improved and more sustainable farming techniques, fishing and food storage, and complementing emergency assistance measures with longer-term sustainable solutions aimed at helping rural communities to live and cope with recurrent floods and droughts.

Among the key lessons learned from IOM's engagement in Mozambique and other such initiatives is the importance of working in close cooperation with local authorities and communities. Building partnerships at the local level and empowering communities is essential to instilling a sense of ownership of disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation measures and to ensure their long-term sustainability. In developing such partnerships, it is important to ensure that different groups within the community are involved, including women and young people. Their involvement helps to reduce their vulnerability to trafficking, while also being an effective way to disseminate knowledge within communities and promote behavioural change. In the context of migration and displacement, it is also essential to involve not only the migrants and displaced themselves but also the entire affected community, with the aim of preventing further displacement. Receiving communities and their concerns also need to be factored into the decision-making process. Such involvement not only gives community members ownership of the process, but also allows for the process to be built on local knowledge (IOM, 2009).

Sources: Dilley, M. et al. (2005), Natural Disaster Hotspots – A global risk analysis, World Bank, Washington, D.C.; National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) (2009) Mozambique: National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7440_finalmozambique.pdf; IOM (2009) Compendium of IOM's Activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, IOM, Geneva.

7.3 Developing adaptation strategies

Adaptation refers to "initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change effects".¹³⁸ National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) are the principal mechanisms through which low-income developing countries identify adaptation needs and programmes. The relevant and widely accepted international instrument is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that NAPAs "provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change – those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage".

To date, 38 countries have submitted plans, although fewer than ten of them have been

implemented. In submitting NAPAs, countries prepare syntheses of available information, undertake a participatory assessment of vulnerability, identify key adaptation measures and criteria for prioritizing activities, and select a prioritized shortlist of activities. The guidelines on developing NAPAs specify that they should take a "complementary approach, building upon existing plans and programmes, including national action plans under the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, national biodiversity strategies and action plans under the Convention on Biological Diversity, and national sectoral policies".¹³⁹ They also should be consistent with policies aiming at sustainable development, gender equality, cost-effectiveness, simplicity and flexibility of procedures based on individual country circumstances.

NAPAs do, however, have limitations as a mechanism for identifying the full range

¹³⁸ IPCC (2007).

¹³⁹ <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf#page=7>

of adaptation needs and plans. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) made the following assessment of NAPAs in its *2007/2008 Human Development Report*:

Many of these plans include useful analytical work, providing important insights on priorities. However, they suffer from two basic shortcomings. First, they provide a very limited response to the adaptation challenge, focussing primarily on ‘climate-proofing’ through small-scale projects: the average country financing proposal generated in the plans amounts to USD 24 million. Second, the NAPAs have, in most countries, been developed outside the institutional framework for national planning on poverty reduction. The upshot is a project-based response that fails to integrate adaptation planning into the development of wider policies for overcoming vulnerability and marginalization.¹⁴⁰

NAPAs nevertheless remain one of the few planning instruments for least developed countries that are facing the prospect of large-scale population movements due to environmental change, and their scope could eventually be expanded to include developing countries in general, as a means of ensuring more adequate and targeted assistance for adaptation efforts.

According to Theodoros Skylakakis, Member of the European Parliament and former Special Representative for Climate Change of Greece (in an interview on ‘Climate change and migration: impacts and policy responses’), “national adaptation plans are in their infancy due to the uncertainty inherent in the climate change phenomenon. The best thing we can do to mainstream migration into them is to create trusted networks of legal short-term (e.g. seasonal) migration. In this way, when disaster strikes and migration pressures rise we can use these networks to channel activities in a meaningful and mutually productive way, prioritizing environmental migrants that need a temporary solution to their economic needs, while the rebuilding effort is organised.”¹⁴¹

In some cases, the NAPA identifies migration as an adaptation strategy in itself. This perspective appears in two contexts. First, some countries see migration as a way to reduce population pressures in places with fragile ecosystems. Second, some countries recognize that resettlement of some populations may be inevitable, given the likely trends, and should be accomplished with planning. IOM has undertaken considerable capacity-building to raise awareness and facilitate adaptation to environmental change through planned and authorized migration. In Egypt, it works in partnership with the Government to increase awareness of the actual and potential impacts of sea-level rise on migration, and identify and implement strategies to best respond through migration. The Colombian Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) programme offers a livelihood alternative for families confronted with natural disasters. In Mali, IOM has partnered with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to implement selected projects from the NAPA and demonstrate the usefulness of mainstreaming migration and human security in national and local strategies to adapt to climate change.

The majority of NAPAs see the adaptation strategies they describe as ways to reduce migration pressures and allow people to remain in their original settlements. The strategies generally seek to adapt agricultural practices, management of pastoral lands, infrastructure such as dykes and coastal barriers, fishing patterns and other strategies to reduce pressures on fragile ecosystems, thereby allowing populations to remain in place. Other NAPA approaches focus on early warning and emergency preparedness to reduce displacement due to natural disasters associated with climate change. Tuvalu has proposed a project – Strengthening Community Disaster Preparedness and Response Potential – that includes a post-disaster resettlement and rescue plan. Mozambique has proposed establishing an early warning system that will help identify risky and vulnerable areas and resettle the affected populations from flood- and cyclone-prone areas. Bangladesh’s NAPA reflects policies also promulgated in its 2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),

¹⁴⁰ UNDP (2007: 4).

¹⁴¹ IOM/EurAsylum (2010).

which presented the need for a Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, with the following objectives: professionalizing the disaster management system; mainstreaming risk management programming; strengthening community institutional mechanisms; expanding risk reduction programming across a broader range of hazards; and strengthening emergency response systems.

The Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009 made some progress in identifying funding mechanisms to support adaptation initiatives. Paragraph 8 of the Copenhagen Accord specifies:

Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention.

The parties to the Accord pledged to provide USD 30 billion for the period from 2010 to 2012, with funding allocated between adaptation and mitigation. The most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small-island developing States and African countries, will be given priority for adaptation programmes. Developed countries also committed to a goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. Whether and how some of these funds might be utilized in a migration-related context is yet to be tested.

7.4 Preparing evacuation plans

There may be circumstances where the evacuation of populations is required – for example, as a result of early warning of a flood or hurricane or, in the longer term, of sea levels rising to a critical level. As for many of the capacity-building areas identified in

this report, preparing for such an eventuality will be a higher priority in certain States (and localities within those States) than in others.

Where evacuation plans are prepared, it is important that they prohibit the arbitrary displacement of people from their home or place of habitual residence, unless justified by compelling and overriding public interests. In the case of natural disasters, such displacement is arbitrary, “unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation”. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement also require that “the authorities concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects”.¹⁴²

Capacity is also required to ensure that evacuation plans include the following critical steps.¹⁴³ One is to ensure that a specific decision authorizing the evacuation has been taken by a government authority empowered by law to order such measures. Second, the affected populations should, if at all possible, be informed of the reasons and procedures for their evacuation. Where possible, those affected should also be involved in the planning and management of their relocation. It is also important that proper accommodation be provided to those evacuated, that evacuations take place in satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene, and that family members are not separated.

7.5 Filling gaps in the legal and normative framework

The gaps in the existing legal and normative framework pertaining to environmental migration have been systematically analysed and are well understood.¹⁴⁴ One significant gap is that there is no agreed definition for people who migrate as a result of the effects of environmental change. IOM uses the term

¹⁴² UN-OCHA (1998).

¹⁴³ Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2005).

¹⁴⁴ Zetter (2009).

'environmental migrants' to describe them, and uses the following working definition:

Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.¹⁴⁵

However, the term 'environmental migrants' is not accepted universally, and there are a number of competing definitions; a first step in filling gaps in the legal and normative framework therefore involves achieving consensus around terminology and a definition.

A number of gaps have also been identified with regard to the protection of affected populations. Cross-border environmental migrants, for example, fall in the gap between the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as they have crossed a border) and existing frameworks for protecting other international migrants or refugees, which do not specify environmental factors as a cause of migration. In a few cases, ad hoc responses have developed to protect those who move across borders temporarily, while the needs of those who are forced to migrate permanently across national borders have yet to be addressed.

The capacity-building challenge for the international community involves strengthening the legal and normative framework to fill such gaps. A number of options are being debated, ranging from adapting or building on existing norms and instruments, to the development of guidelines on environmental migration in a 'soft law' approach, and the elaboration of a new binding instrument or convention. As emphasized above, the reason that achieving consensus on the legal and normative approach should be a priority is that it can pave the way for the development of national laws and policies.

The application of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement at the national level provides a model for the adoption of 'soft law' guidelines in national laws and policies. Currently, about 30 countries worldwide have developed national laws or policies on internal displacement, and there have been four main approaches.¹⁴⁶ One is a brief instrument, simply adopting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, exemplified by the one-page Instrument of Adoption of Liberia. The wholesale incorporation of the Guiding Principles may appear an effective way of ensuring the implementation of all provisions of the principles, suggesting absolute agreement with the principles and ensuring against the dilution of its provisions. Such an approach, however, limits opportunities that the development of a more tailored law would present for national authorities, relevant governmental bodies, civil society, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) themselves. A second approach has been to develop a law or policy to address a specific cause or stage of displacement. The Indian National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, for example, addresses displacement only as a result of development projects. The Angolan Norms on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Populations, as well as laws and policies adopted in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal and Serbia, address only return and resettlement. A third approach is a law or policy developed to protect a specific right of the internally displaced, examples of which include the Turkish Law on the Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight Against Terrorism and the US Hurricane Education Recovery Act, which was developed following Hurricane Katrina and addresses, among other issues, the needs of displaced students and teachers. The final approach is a comprehensive law or policy addressing all causes and stages of internal displacement. The Colombian Law 387 and Ugandan National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons most closely approximate a comprehensive law on internal displacement.

¹⁴⁵ IOM (2007).

¹⁴⁶ Wyndham (2007).

7.6 Implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement

Given that a significant proportion of people displaced by the effects of environmental change are expected to move within their own countries, strengthening national laws and policies on internal displacement is an immediate capacity-building requirement in order for those affected to be afforded assistance and protection. Unlike the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement explicitly include people displaced as a result of natural disasters and, in this sense, the normative framework is adequate (although the Guiding Principles are not binding). At the same time, such laws and policies need to be extended to more than the 30 or so countries where they currently exist. But it is equally important to ensure that such laws and policies are effectively implemented at the national level.

The Framework for National Responsibility¹⁴⁷ identifies a number of concrete steps that governments can take to implement national laws and policies on internal displacement, and each step represents a target for capacity-building efforts. One is the need to raise awareness of the problem of displacement – for example, through information and sensitization campaigns targeting relevant authorities, including the military and police, as well as the public. Data collection is another step, with the important proviso that such efforts should not jeopardize the security, protection or freedom of movement of those displaced. Training on the rights of the internally displaced is also a necessary component, targeting government policymakers at the national, regional and local levels, the military and the police, camp administrators, commissioners and staff of national human rights institutions, parliamentarians and civil society, as well as the displaced themselves, among others.

The adoption of a national policy or plan of action is another important tool in the enactment of national legislation. Such a plan

could usefully spell out national and local institutional responsibilities for responding to internal displacement, indicating the roles and responsibilities of different government departments, and identifying a mechanism for coordination among them. Indeed, designating a national institutional focal point on IDPs is identified in the Framework for National Responsibility as another critical step towards implementing laws and policies. Such an approach includes various options, such as allocating overall responsibility to an existing government agency, designating a new body with an exclusive focus, and establishing a task force that brings together officials from the relevant ministries and departments. A role is also identified for national human rights institutions, particularly with regard to monitoring the conditions of the displaced, conducting inquiries into violations of their rights, following up on early warnings of displacement, advising the government on the rights of IDPs, monitoring and reporting on government implementation of national legislation, undertaking educational and training programmes, and networking among other civil society actors.

Another important recommendation is that governments devote, to the extent possible, adequate resources to address the needs and protect the rights of the displaced. Where a government lacks sufficient financial or other capacity to provide for the security and well-being of the displaced, it should invite and accept international assistance and work with international and regional organizations to provide assistance, protection and solutions. Specifically, such organizations can: provide technical cooperation on issues such as data collection, registration, and the development of national action plans; offer training on international guidelines; undertake field visits to assess the conditions of the displaced; establish a monitoring presence; support the formation of IDP associations; and facilitate dialogue between government, civil society and displaced populations.

¹⁴⁷ Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2005).

7.7 Amending national immigration laws and policies

While most of the movements within a State's borders that can be envisaged as a result of the effects of environmental change are included within the remit of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a significant gap, as explained above (section 7.6) that remains unaddressed in the current legal and normative framework is that of cross-border environmental migrants, especially those moving permanently. Even if a 'soft law' approach is adopted to address these current shortcomings, achieving consensus and then translating it into national laws and policies is a lengthy process. A shorter-term option is to amend national immigration laws and policies, which should be a priority for States either neighbouring or with strong migration channels with countries or regions that are likely to be impacted by the effects of environmental change in the relatively near future.

The immigration policies of most potential destination countries are not conducive to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants, unless they enter through already existing admission categories – for example, for labour or for family reunification, or on humanitarian grounds. The Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) programme between Colombia and Spain is an unusual example of an existing labour mobility programme that specifically extends to populations in high-risk zones of natural disasters.

Some countries have, however, established special policies that permit individuals whose countries have experienced natural disasters or other severe upheavals to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation. The USA, for example, enacted legislation in 1990 to provide temporary protected status (TPS) to persons "in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions." Environmental disaster may include "an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or

other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected." In the case of environmental disasters, as compared to conflict, the country of origin must request designation of TPS for its nationals.¹⁴⁸ Importantly, TPS applies only to persons already in the USA at the time of the designation. It is not meant to be a mechanism for responding to an unfolding crisis in which people seek admission from outside of the country. It also only pertains to situations that are temporary in nature. If the environmental disaster has permanent consequences, a designation of TPS is not available, even for those already in the USA, or it may be lifted. Another significant factor is that the designation is discretionary and can only be granted by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

At the European Union level, the Temporary Protection Directive establishes temporary protection during 'mass influxes' of certain displaced persons. The term 'mass influx' refers to situations where large numbers of people are suddenly displaced and where it is not feasible to treat applicants on an individual basis, and it is defined on a case-by-case basis by a qualified majority of the European Council.

Sweden and Finland have included environmental migrants within their immigration policies. Sweden includes within its asylum system persons who do not qualify for refugee status but require protection. Such a person in need of protection "has left his native country and does not wish to return there because he: has a fear of the death penalty or torture; is in need of protection as a result of war or other serious conflicts in the country; is unable to return to his native country because of an environmental disaster." The decision is made on an individual, rather than group, basis. Although many recipients of this status are presumed to be in temporary need of protection, the Swedish rules foresee that some persons may be in need of permanent solutions. Similarly, in the Finnish

Aliens Act, “aliens residing in the country are issued with a residence permit on the basis of a need for protection if [...] they cannot return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster.”

A number of other countries provide exceptions to removal on an ad hoc basis for persons whose countries of origin have experienced significant disruption because of natural disasters. Following the 2004 tsunami, for example, Canada, Switzerland and the United Kingdom temporarily suspended deportations of individuals from such countries as the Maldives, India, Indonesia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

7.8 Establishing proactive resettlement policies

To date, there are no examples of legislation or policies that address resettlement as a result of slow-onset processes that may destroy habitats or livelihoods in the future and make return impossible.

The Green Party in Australia launched an initiative in 2007 to establish a ‘climate refugee visa’ in immigration law. The initiative had three components: to amend the Migration Act to incorporate a Climate Change Refugee Visa class; to establish a programme for the migration of up to 300 climate change refugees from Tuvalu per year, 300 from Kiribati, and 300 from elsewhere in the Pacific, where appropriate; and to push the government to work in the UN and other international forums for the establishment of an international definition and framework on climate change and environmental refugees. The visa would be available to persons who had been displaced as a result of a ‘climate change-induced environmental disaster’, which, in turn, was defined as:

A disaster that results from both incremental and rapid ecological and climatic change and disruption, that includes sea level rise, coastal erosion, desertification, collapsing ecosystems, fresh water contamination, more frequent occurrence of extreme

weather events such as cyclones, tornadoes, flooding and drought and that means inhabitants are unable to lead safe or sustainable lives in their immediate environment.

The bill was defeated in 2007.

New Zealand, under similar pressures regarding the potential need for resettlement of Pacific Islanders affected by rising sea levels, also has not yet established a specific category of admissions. The Government has introduced a Pacific Access Category (PAC), under which 75 people from Tuvalu, 75 from Kiribati, and 250 from Tonga may immigrate to New Zealand each year. The programme is, however, based on employment rather than environmental factors. The immigrants must be 18–45 years old, have an offer of employment in New Zealand, have English skills, meet a minimum income requirement, undergo a health check, and have no history of illegal entrance. The programme is not intended to provide access to those who may be most vulnerable to climate change-induced displacement, such as the elderly or the infirm.

A number of origin countries see the potential need for large numbers of their population to relocate internationally if the worst-case scenarios of climate change come to pass. President Mohamed Nasheed announced at the end of 2008 that the Maldives was establishing a sovereign wealth fund that could be used to purchase a new island for the country’s population. According to Nasheed, “this trust fund will act as a national insurance policy to help pay for a new homeland, should future generations have to evacuate a country disappearing under the waves.” Hoping that the funds would never be used for this purpose, Nasheed used the announcement as a call for renewed action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Anote Tong, President of Kiribati, has also made it clear that the population of his island might be forced to relocate en masse. His focus has been on identifying immigration possibilities for Kiribati nationals in nearby countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand. In a recent trip to New Zealand, he suggested that the best educated people

of Kiribatis should emigrate first, in an orderly fashion, and then establish communities that others could join as the situation requires.

7.9 Providing humanitarian assistance

Even in the absence of a legally binding international or national framework to protect the rights of people who have been forced to migrate as a result of the effects of environmental change (whether internally or across borders), many will be in need of immediate humanitarian assistance – for example, as a result of losing shelter and access to their livelihoods.

A number of principles could usefully guide the formulation of plans for providing humanitarian assistance in such circumstances, although their full implementation is unlikely. Ideally, for example, governments could ensure that national law guarantees the right to request and receive, without discrimination, humanitarian assistance in the form of adequate food, water, medical supplies, clothing and similar necessities, as well as essential services, such as emergency medical care and sanitation measures. Laws and policies on humanitarian assistance should be as concrete as possible, without becoming overly rigid, as to types and amounts of assistance to be provided. Particular budgets might be assigned to humanitarian assistance and would need to be adequately provided for. Procedures for establishing eligibility for assistance should ideally be accessible, expeditious and well disseminated to affected populations. National law could also set out minimum quality standards for humanitarian assistance provided by the government, consistent with internationally accepted standards.

The provision of assistance would, ideally, be terminated only once the humanitarian need has been met, and in a manner linked with measures to assist with rehabilitation, including livelihood development. The right to medical care in disaster settings should include psychological, reproductive and preventive care and be made available without charge in the period of emergency. Special attention could also be paid to the needs of

vulnerable groups, including children, the disabled and elderly persons. Gender barriers and discrimination need to be specifically addressed. Assistance plans should also clearly designate institutional responsibilities across different ministries and levels of government. Provincial and local governments should retain sufficient authority to contribute to assistance activities, but should also be effectively coordinated. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other relevant domestic actors should be fully integrated into national assistance plans and policies.

Where domestic means are insufficient to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance in disaster settings, national law could provide for a request for international assistance. It would clearly set out procedures for assessing needs and domestic capacities in order to rapidly decide upon the need for international assistance in disaster settings. Joint needs assessments with international relief providers should be encouraged. National law should clearly set out rules for the facilitation, regulation and coordination of international humanitarian assistance, including how it is initiated and terminated.

Where international assistance is requested, procedures are required to expedite its effective delivery. Visas and work permits for relief workers should be waived or expedited, and customs barriers should be lowered and duties and charges banned to expedite the import and use of vehicles, telecommunications and information technology, and appropriate medicines. Similarly, national law should provide for expedited registration of foreign humanitarian organizations, providing them with full domestic legal standing. Expeditious means should also be available for the temporary recognition of foreign qualifications of humanitarian professionals (such as doctors). National law or policy should also include the obligation to ensure the security of relief personnel, goods, vehicles and equipment.

7.10 Planning for return and resettlement

As explained in the introduction to this section, migration resulting from the effects

of environmental change can range from short-term to permanent. In the case of short-term movements – for example, as a result of a flood or hurricane – capacity is required for the return of the affected populations to their home areas as soon as it is safe. In the case of permanent movements, the affected populations will need to be resettled either elsewhere in their own country or in another country.

The manual *Human Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster*, issued by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, provides guidance to State authorities on return.¹⁴⁹ It defines the conditions for the return of displaced persons thus:

The return of persons displaced by the disaster to their homes and places of origin should only be prohibited if these homes or places of origin are in zones where there are real dangers to the life or physical integrity and health of the affected persons. Restrictions should only last as long as such dangers exist and only be implemented if other, less intrusive, measures of protection are not available or possible.

Conversely, people should not be required to return to areas in which their safety may be compromised:

Persons affected by the natural disaster should not, under any circumstances, be forced to return to or resettle in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at further risk.

The term resettlement is not defined in international law, and is subject to various interpretations and application. An important challenge for the international community is thus to agree internationally accepted minimum benchmarks concerning the resettlement of environmental migrants (and

other displaced communities). Indicators might, for example, include: provision of adequate housing; provision of cultivable and irrigated land; proximity to natural resources, livelihood sources, workplaces, schools and markets; access to health care, safe drinking water and basic services; provision of public transport and proper roads; child-safe spaces, including crèches and play areas; spaces for community activity, such as community centres; and safety and security for women.

The World Bank and the regional development banks have also promulgated guidelines for measuring the adequacy of resettlement plans adopted in the context of large-scale development programmes. These guidelines are pertinent to the management of resettlement in the environmental context. The World Bank recommends that baseline surveys precede resettlement, identifying two types of surveys: a census of all affected persons and assets, and a survey of the socio-economic conditions of the affected persons. Baseline surveys are important for developing resettlement plans and for measuring the impact of resettlement on the socio-economic status of the affected persons.

The World Bank also recommends a Resettlement Action Plan, which consists of several basic features: a statement of policy principles; a list or matrix indicating eligibility for compensation and other entitlements or forms of assistance; a review of the extent and scope of resettlement, based upon a census of those affected by the project; an implementation plan establishing responsibility for delivery of all forms of assistance, and evaluating the organizational capacity of involved agencies; a resettlement timetable coordinated with the project timetable, assuring (among other things) that compensation and relocation are completed before initiation of civil works; and discussion of opportunities afforded to those affected to participate in the design and implementation of resettlement plans, including grievance procedures.

Consultation with the affected populations (those who are resettled and the communities

¹⁴⁹ Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2009).

they join) is an essential part of managing resettlement. The Inter-American Development Bank¹⁵⁰ describes the benefits of an effective participatory process:

Participation can facilitate the provision of information and helps ensure that the resettlement plan reflects the needs and

aspirations of those affected. It promotes greater transparency and encourages the community to take a more active role in economic development and in the operation and maintenance of local infrastructure. Effective consultation is also essential to avoid the creation of undue expectations and speculation.

¹⁵⁰ Cited in IASC (2010).

8. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

So far, in this report, capacity requirements have been identified for strengthening the response of governments and other important actors in international migration, across the areas of labour mobility, irregular migration, migration and development, integration, and responding to the effects of environmental change on migration. In this final substantive section of the report, capacity-building to improve the overall governance of international migration is considered. As emphasized in the introduction, the overall aim of migration governance should be to facilitate humane and orderly migration policies for the benefit of all.

An important aspect of achieving this aim is strengthening the capacity of governments to adopt a comprehensive approach to migration management. At the government level, capacity-building requirements vary enormously, and a first critical step is to develop assessment tools through which to gauge capacity levels and gaps. In some countries, the priorities are basic, such as training staff or establishing administrative structures; in others, they are more sophisticated – for example, developing mechanisms to ensure coordination between different ministries with responsibility for migration portfolios. The trends highlighted in this report so far, including increasing labour mobility, growing irregular migration, more opportunities for migrants and migration to contribute to poverty reduction and development, the challenges of increasing diversity, and the predicted impacts of environmental

changes on migration, all indicate the need to strengthen migration management across all countries, even if the priorities and degree of urgency differ.

It is not just at the national level that migration management needs to be strengthened. International migrants are increasingly concentrated in urban areas, where new regulatory frameworks and administrative structures may be required to respond to an issue normally dealt with by central government. Certain subregions within a particular country may be more likely than others to be impacted by the effects of climate change, thus requiring an appropriate distribution of resources at the national level. Greater cooperation between States is another important aspect of better migration governance. How to improve bilateral agreements between States has already been addressed in this report (section 3.8). There has also been a rapid expansion in recent years in regional consultative processes (RCPs) focusing on migration, but gaps and inefficiencies remain here too. At a global level, there is growing consensus that even greater cooperation between States will be required in the future.

Furthermore, greater capacity is not just a requirement at the governmental level. Another theme in this report is the growing importance of non-State actors in contemporary migration patterns and processes. Private employers and recruiters are

playing an expanding role in temporary labour migration programmes; civil society can be an invaluable partner in identifying vulnerable irregular migrants; community associations are critical in mobilizing and engaging diasporas for development; and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play in supporting integration, especially among marginalized migrant groups. Recognizing the potential role of non-State actors, consulting with them and, where appropriate, including them in policy formulation and evaluation are also important aspects of strengthening migration governance.

A final aspect of migration governance considered here is the capacity of international institutions and organizations to cooperate more effectively at the level of global governance in responding to change.

Capacity-building requirements are therefore considered across the following ten areas, progressing from the national (and subnational) to the regional and global levels:

1. developing a national migration policy;
2. strengthening migration management at the national level;
3. enhancing coordination of policymaking and implementation;
4. better research and data;
5. policy evaluation;
6. developing urban governance;
7. engagement with the private sector;
8. enhancing the role of civil society;
9. effective RCPs and cooperation between regional processes;
10. more coherent global governance.

8.1 Developing a national migration policy

Good governance of migration begins at the national level. While the level of capacity-building required may vary significantly, there is scope in most States for strengthening the national capacity for coherent policymaking and implementation in relation to international migration. For a coherent national approach, States need agreed national objectives for their migration policies, as well as agreed criteria

for the entry and residence of non-citizens, that are consistent with international law. Although the exact nature of these objectives and criteria will vary – for example, according to national specificities, requirements and circumstances – they should, according to the Global Commission on International Migration, at least address the following issues:

- the role of international migration in relation to economic growth and development;
- family reunification, asylum, refugee protection and resettlement;
- the prevention of irregular migration and the promotion of regular migration;
- integration, including the rights and obligations of migrants, citizens and the State;
- the protection of migrants' rights.

In those States with very poorly developed systems of managing migration, an initial aspect of any capacity-building effort is to assess capacity requirements against current and projected migration trends, and to identify priorities within a particular national setting. Many States may require technical and financial resources, access to appropriate expertise and training simply to undertake this initial assessment of their capacity requirements in migration management. IOM's *Essentials of Migration Management Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners* provides a valuable foundation.

It is important that national migration policy balance and take into account a range of priorities affecting and affected by migration – that is, as a social, economic and cultural phenomenon, migration policy needs to take account of labour, health, development, security, human rights, integration, environment and other related realms of policy.

Moreover, as indicated above in reference to countries such as Ireland, Mexico and Portugal, States can rapidly change from being countries of origin, transit or destination to all three simultaneously. Therefore, comprehensive and flexible policies are needed

to address each of these perspectives and allow for regular adjustment to accommodate changing circumstances.

8.2 Strengthening migration management at the national level

Strengthening migration management is already one of the most important aspects of migration-related capacity-building support provided for poorer countries by donor countries and the international community. At times, however, it can take place in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner, or focus on particular aspects of governance rather than adopting a comprehensive approach. A snapshot analysis of IOM capacity-building initiatives for migration management across 30 countries, prepared for this report, found that the majority of the 112 separate initiatives surveyed focused on counter-trafficking, irregular migration, public dialogue, awareness-raising and research. Only four were concerned with monitoring and institution-building.

A model that addresses some of these concerns is the Capacity-Building in Migration Management Programme (CBMMP) established by IOM as a framework for technical assistance. The specific aims of this programme are to:

- harmonize national and regional policy and practice consistent with international norms;
- improve the facilitation of regular migration;
- reduce irregular migration;
- strengthen the protection of migrants' human rights;
- expand international cooperation.

These aims are achieved by addressing specific needs:

- policy, legal and administrative framework review and updating;
- improvement of operational systems related to migration management;
- training and human resource development;

- economic and community development in areas of high migration pressure;
- increased joint planning and action.

The type of assistance provided within CBMMP includes:

- technical assistance in assessing and implementing migration management initiatives;
- project design and management services;
- training and human resource development programmes for migration officials;
- transfer and exchange of experts;
- regional forums and technical meetings.

Recent examples of where the model has been successfully deployed are within the East African Community (EAC), where it has contributed particularly to reducing irregular migration in the region, and in China (PRC), where it has, among other things, promoted cooperation on migration between China and the European Union.

8.3 Coordinated policymaking and implementation

In countries where there is already a well-established governance structure on international migration, the ministerial setting for migration issues can range from a single ministry dealing with all or most of the issues involved, to a department within a broader ministry holding these portfolios, and the portfolios being spread across several ministries. The UK Border Agency is one example of the first model, as is Canada's Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), which deals with immigration, refugees, asylum, integration and citizenship policies. Its mandate covers the admission of immigrants and visitors to the country; resettling, protecting and providing a safe haven to refugees; and helping newcomers adapt to and integrate in Canadian society. As well as policymaking, CIC also deals with implementation at all levels of the immigration service. Indeed, the only migration-related area that is outside CIC's mandate is border management, which

is the responsibility of the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA). The Netherlands is an example of the second model, where there is a Minister for Immigration and Integration, who is supported by a civil service apparatus that forms part of the Justice Ministry. In most other EU States, responsibility for migration issues is divided between interior ministries, ministries of foreign affairs, and ministries dealing with social affairs and employment.

(Annex 1 in a recent publication by the European Policy Centre (EPC) lists the location of immigration in national governments across the EU-27.¹⁵¹) At the same time, there has not yet been a systematic review of these different models of governance to establish whether one really is more effective than another or whether each national context dictates its own response or approach¹⁵² (see, for instance, the approach used by the Mexican Government, as described in textbox 12).

Textbox 12: Mexico builds ‘hospitable doors’

Over the last 15 years, Mexico has consolidated its position as a country of origin, transit and destination for migrants, in the context of more governmental and social participation in regional integration and globalization processes. In that time, increased international mobility has been demonstrated by a doubling in the numbers of tourists, business people and other visitors entering Mexico, who now exceed 21 million per year. Mexican emigration to the USA has ranged between 200,000 and 400,000 permanent emigrants per year, while irregular transit migration flows through Mexico towards the USA have had similar volumes, as a result of an increase in human trafficking.

In order to address the current migratory dimension in Mexico and its future tendencies, in 2009 the migratory authority started a ‘transformation’ process of migration management in the country. This involved the consolidation of the Instituto Nacional de Migración and changes in its structure, better use of IT, the development of a new culture to assist migration through dedicated officials and agents, and the creation of a new regulatory framework that replaces the current legislation, which dates back to 1974.

The Mexican Government’s draft migration Bill seeks to deal with the international mobility of people in the country in an inter-institutional and integrated manner, and respond to current global migratory dynamics. It includes previous governmental, legislative and civil society proposals and it harmonizes national legislation with the diverse international instruments on migrant rights that Mexico has signed and ratified.

The basic premise for this legal adjustment is a ‘hospitable doors’ policy that can facilitate the documented international movement of people and guarantee migrants’ rights, modernize legal and institutional structures in the migratory field, and generate better conditions for dealing with entrances that could be hazardous to national, public or border security.

To this end, the draft bill simplifies processes and reduces discretion in the authorization of both entrance and stay in the country, and it also offers foreigners more clarity regarding compliance with migratory procedures. In addition, it strengthens migrant security and reduces the gaps exploited by organized crime to plague undocumented transit migrants. This new legal framework will also provide better mechanisms for combating crimes related to human trafficking.

The bill retrieves the decriminalization of undocumented migration, adopted by the legislature in June 2008, and it clearly defines the rights and obligations of foreigners in Mexico. It grants the migratory authority the ability to penalize its officials for serious or recurrent violation of migrants’ rights.

The draft bill confirms principles such as unconditional respect for migrants’ rights, family unity, equal treatment, migrants’ acquired rights, more protection for child migrants or foreigners in a vulnerable situation, a global approach to migratory policy and shared responsibility among governments and national and foreign institutions.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), Mexico, 2010.

¹⁵¹ Collett (2009).

¹⁵² Van Selm (2005).

It is often recommended that, where the governance of migration is divided between ministries, as is usually the case, mechanisms for coordination need to be established, because migration is very much a cross-cutting issue. Again, there are various models for addressing this. In Costa Rica, for example, the General Directorate of Migration Planning Unit has been established to encourage coordination between the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, international organizations (including IOM) and civil society. In Mauritius, the Prime Minister's Office (Home Affairs Division) is the national focal point for coordination of migration policies, working with several ministries. Ghana has encouraged ministries and agencies to set up migration focal points, while the National Development Planning Commission, which has principal responsibility for preparing the 2010 medium-term development plan, has responsibility for ensuring consultations with major stakeholders regarding the migration component of the plan.¹⁵³

In recent years, particular attention has been paid to coordinating policymaking on migration and development, especially in developing countries. As already highlighted elsewhere in this report, this can be achieved by mainstreaming migration in poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs)/national development plans (see section 5.1), as well as by integrating migration in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) (see section 7.3). Other methods include paying greater attention to migration in mid-term reviews of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

8.4 The need for better research and data

The need for better migration research and data is regularly identified as a significant capacity-building requirement at the national level, as is the need for coordination between States to allow for greater comparability. Indeed, the recent Report of the Commission on International Migration Data for Develop-

ment Research and Policy of 2009, *Migrants Count*,¹⁵⁴ concluded that data on international migration are so limited that even some of the most basic questions concerning the future of international migration cannot be answered, and that there is the risk of a 'default' migration policy being made on the basis of anecdotes and emotion rather than evidence. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that progress has been made in collecting and disseminating data, particularly on the links between international migration and development over the last decade or so. Mechanisms for data collection and dissemination include the UN Population Division's Global Migration Database, the World Bank's data on remittances and tabulation of highly skilled migrants, the ILO's International Labour Migration database and the OECD's SOPEMI¹⁵⁵ and SICREMI.¹⁵⁶

One problem in many States is a basic lack of data; another is that the data that do exist at the national level are scattered and not effectively shared within or between countries, and States often lack the capacities to analyse the existing data that they do collect. In this regard, Migration Profiles, initiated by the European Commission (EC), have become a useful low-cost tool for helping governments identify data gaps and capacity-building needs, as well as being a tool for promoting policy coherence (see textbox 13). They have evolved from concise statistical reports that provide a snapshot of migration trends in a particular country, to a means of collating data from a wide range of sources and developing strategies to address data gaps. Ultimately, it is hoped and expected that they will become the basis for the development of national migration policy and for ensuring effective linkages with development and other related policies.

¹⁵⁴ Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy (2009).

¹⁵⁵ The Permanent Observation System on Migration (French acronym SOPEMI) provides Member States of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with a mechanism for the timely sharing of information on international migration, based on annual country reports prepared by a group of national experts.

¹⁵⁶ The Continuous Reporting System on Labour Migration (Spanish acronym SICREMI) is a continuous reporting system of standardized and up-to-date information on labour migration for the Americas. It is based on the model of SOPEMI, created by the OECD for its Member States. http://www.sedi.oas.org/ddse/documentos/mide/BrochureSicremi_e.pdf

¹⁵³ GFMD (2009).

Textbox 13: Migration Profile as an information tool for strategic policy planning

Lack of data and indicators on migration in many developing countries is a major constraint to mainstreaming migration into development plans. The Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy (CGD, 2009), for instance, cites the non-existence or inaccessibility of detailed, comparable, disaggregated data on migrant stocks and flows as the greatest obstacle to the formulation of evidence-based policies to maximize the benefits of migration for economic development around the world. On the other hand, countries already collect a wealth of data on foreign citizens but often fail to take full advantage of this storehouse of knowledge as a means of better understanding migration processes.

In 2005, the European Commission (EC) proposed a tool for generating more data on the migration situation in developing countries – Migration Profiles. According to the text, migration profiles should “aim to gather information on issues such as the labour market situation, unemployment rates, labour demand and supply and present or potential skill shortages by sector and occupation, skills needs in the country, skills available in the diaspora, migration flows, incoming and outgoing financial flows linked with migration, including migrant remittances, as well as relevant gender aspects and those related to minors” (EC, 2005).

Originally, Migration Profiles were conceived of as a concise statistical report, prepared according to a common framework, which could make it easier to understand, at a glance, the migration situation in a particular country. IOM first tested the basic Migration Profile in Ecuador and Senegal in 2006 and has subsequently prepared migration profiles in over 30 countries around the world, including in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Over time, the Migration Profile has evolved from being a means of bringing together data from a wide range of sources, to a more elaborate process involving consultation with many different actors in an effort to help identify and develop strategies to address data gaps and produce the evidence required – both from a range of ministries and from the local non-governmental sector – to inform policy. IOM’s Migration Profile exercise in West and Central Africa has shown that the process of preparing Migration Profiles can improve the basis for coherent policymaking and coordination between ministries and other stakeholders, as well as foster country ownership. It was the first project to test a methodology linking the preparation of comprehensive reports to a range of capacity-building and policy-development activities.

While the lessons from this pilot initiative still need to be fully put into practice, it has become clear that establishing migration profiles as a government-owned framework for data collection and analysis and as a national policy-development instrument is a process requiring extensive capacity-building and government support. The capacity-building would allow the country to assume full ownership of the creation and the regular update of the reports. As a regularly updated information tool, Migration Profiles will enable countries to better plan and evaluate their policies related to migration and development. As such, Migration Profiles can be a critical tool in any migration-mainstreaming exercise.

Sources: Centre for Global Development (CGD) (2009), Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy, *Migrants Count: Five Steps Toward Better Migration Data*; Washington, D.C.; European Commission (2005), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations, COM (2005) 390: 37 and Annex 8, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0390:FIN:EN:PDF>

The *Migrants Count* report developed a series of recommendations aimed at helping States to more rapidly develop better data sets on migration.¹⁵⁷ First, it recommends that population censuses should include questions on the place of birth, country of citizenship, and place of residence for each person enumerated – and that the tabulations of these results should be openly disseminated. Second, it recommends that existing administrative data should be compiled and released. Third, the Commission recommends that those States with frequent and detailed labour force surveys should give permission for those surveys' individual records to be unified into a single, harmonized, annually updated database. Fourth, it is recommended that National Statistical Offices that already collect data on migrants through general or specialized surveys make anonymous data on individuals available to researchers. And the final recommendation is to include migration modules in existing household surveys in migration countries of origin. In the longer term, the Commission recommends capacity-building to strengthen institutional capacities to collect and disseminate migration data in developing countries. Specific steps would include the convening of a task force to bring together national policymakers, statisticians, researchers and migration specialists, and the preparation of annual or biannual national migration Data reports, very much along the lines of what is being done with the Migration Profiles.

In addition to collecting and analysing data, there is also significant scope for collating existing research or supporting new research on policy-relevant migration issues. In Colombia, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has compiled a list of recent seminar reports, studies, statistics and unpublished reports. The Government has also strengthened its relationship with universities and national and international institutions in order to access relevant data and research. In Jamaica, the Government is undertaking research itself. The Population Unit of the Planning Institute of Jamaica has collaborated with other units

in the Social Policy and Planning Division to undertake two studies: one on estimating the scale and impact of the 'brain drain' from Jamaica, and the other a legislative review.¹⁵⁸

Just as important as developing sound national and international databases on international migration, and promoting research, is making sure that these, in turn, feed into the policymaking process. The ad hoc Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) reported that governments often find it difficult to absorb the growing amount of information on migration and often overlook research that might be valuable because it is not presented in an accessible form. It also reported that there is often a lack of consultation between research institutions and governments on shared priorities and insufficient research capacities in developing countries. Among its recommendations is the establishment of national working groups to ensure the exchange of data and information and stimulate the identification and dissemination of best practices.¹⁵⁹ Another important recommendation concerns the need to invest in research capacity-building to enable developing countries to gather the evidence required to implement policies effectively. A good example of a research capacity-building project is the Intra-ACP Observatory on Migration (see textbox 14).

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422146/>

¹⁵⁸ GFMD (2009).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

Textbox 14: The Intra-ACP Observatory on Migration

Much of the recent debate about migration and development has focused on South–North migration, and the importance of South–South migratory flows has tended to be overlooked. South–South migration seems to be overwhelmingly intraregional, including within the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States; however, solid and reliable knowledge on migration and development in this region requires capacity-building and enhanced data collection in the South, as available data are scarce and/or not comparable. Where relevant data do exist, they are often not adequately shared between stakeholders and analysis of such information may be limited. There is a clear need for help in ACP countries to strengthen their research networks and train and support experts from those countries in improving data and information management on intraregional migration and link them with policymakers.

In order to build capacity in the area of research, the Secretariat of the ACP and the European Commission have entrusted IOM and a consortium of 19 research partners with setting up an Intra-ACP Observatory on Migration. This Observatory is one of three components of a larger ACP Migration Facility, which aims to foster institutional capacity in ACP countries and strengthen civil society with the ultimate aim of including migration issues in national and regional development policy strategies. It will establish a network of observatories on migration in the six regions of the ACP Group of States: West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Observatory will work through the network of regional observatories to provide policymakers, civil society and the public at large with reliable and harmonized data through applied research and research-based action on intraregional migration.

The regional observatories will consolidate existing migration data, identify gaps, develop common methodologies, undertake research projects, facilitate the exchange of expertise and data, and help train, support and link multidisciplinary Southern specialists and experts in collecting, processing and disseminating policy-oriented information on human mobility within the ACP, with a focus on linking migration to development. They will also ensure the wider dissemination of their information to academics, civil society and policymakers, as well as provide training to build their capacity in gathering and using harmonized data.

Programme activities will start in 12 pilot countries: Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Republic of Tanzania. However, the aim is to progressively extend the Observatory's activities to other interested ACP countries.

Source: Prepared by IOM, 2010.

8.5 Policy evaluation

Evaluating policy is an essential component of good governance, including for migration. It is important to provide evidence to the public that policies represent good value for money. It is also important to maintain public confidence in government generally, and in the ability of government to manage migration in particular, especially as migration continues to rise on the political and media agenda. It is also good practice to learn lessons from previous policy experiences in devising new policy approaches to prepare for future challenges. A recent review of policy responses to financial and economic crises during the twentieth century, for example, has demonstrated that

many of the impacts of the more recent global economic crisis on migration replicate earlier impacts and that, in some cases, current policy responses have not taken into account the mistakes of previous responses.¹⁶⁰

It is often not clear exactly what evaluation entails. A study on how the costs and impacts of migration policies are evaluated offers the following working definition: “a relatively regulated and systemic exercise looking at the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, internal and external coherence, synergies, impact, added value, and sustainability of policies or

¹⁶⁰ IOM (2009a).

programmes".¹⁶¹ Using this definition, there are at least three key dimensions in evaluating public policy on migration. First, evaluation is required to estimate the impact of policy on individual migrants, as well as on the host population. Second, policy should be examined from a macroeconomic perspective to assess the extent to which it yields net social gains. Third, from a cost-benefit perspective, it is necessary to assess whether the best possible outcome has been achieved relative to the cost of each policy. This analysis would take into consideration each country's specific immigration system – for example, whether it is labour-market driven or focuses more on family reunification.

The ad hoc Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research of the GFMD concluded that, in most countries, there is insufficient evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of policies and programmes on migration, and mechanism that facilitate the exchange of information and lessons learned, both within and between States, are lacking. It recommends the development of indicators or benchmarks at the national level, against which to assess the effectiveness of policies. At a multilateral level, it recommends a workshop to take stock of policy evaluation that does exist, in order to compare appropriate methodologies and best practice. The World Bank and IOM are developing a partnership to take this initiative forward, together with interested governments and institutions.

The study cited above identifies a number of specific challenges that may need to be overcome to improve migration policy evaluation. First, many public administrators tend to hire evaluation experts, rather than migration experts, to conduct evaluations of policy implementation. Second, there is usually limited interaction between public administrations and migration researchers, and limited mobility between the civil service and academia. Third, NGOs are rarely involved in conducting evaluations or in formal government-appointed independent advice bodies. Fourth, evaluation reports

tend to be published selectively, without any explicit criteria guiding the publication policy. Finally, there are rarely systematic rules or mechanisms to ensure that evaluation findings can feed into policy formulation or revision.

8.6 Developing urban governance

It is likely that the majority of the world's international migrants already live in urban areas, and this trend is likely to intensify in the future. The decisions that municipal governments make concerning land use, building regulations, economic development, public health, social services, transportation, libraries, culture, parks, recreation and police forces have a profound impact on the reception and settlement experiences of migrants. Yet, in most countries, migration policy is set at the national level, with little attention to capacity-building at the local level, where policy is usually implemented.

In strengthening urban governance for international migration, an important first step is to establish a constitutional and legislative framework in which municipal authorities can assume responsibilities for migration from central government. In Canada, for example, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001 authorizes the Federal Minister to sign agreements with the provinces to facilitate the coordination and implementation of immigration policies and programmes. Thus, in 2007, the Toronto City Council ratified an MoU, negotiated with the provincial and federal governments, in which the three levels of government agreed to collaborate on research, policy and programme development related to immigration and settlement issues affecting the city. Subsequent steps that have been identified through a comparative review of how Canadian cities respond to international migration include formulating and adopting formal immigration and settlement policies; establishing advisory bodies to advise elected officials; formulating and disseminating vision statements, particularly to attract public support; developing strategic plans; and creating administrative structures.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Ardittis and Laczko (2008).

¹⁶² Tossutti (2009).

All of these steps give rise to significant capacity requirements, especially as regards funding mechanisms and the establishment of a trained cadre of local officials. Another interesting example is the city of Montreuil, outside Paris, which has effectively developed a local citizen policy and practice to ensure full integration of migrants into social, economic and civic life.¹⁶³

It is also often the case that international migrants depart from urban areas and, in such situations, there may also be merit in developing policies at the city level to manage migration outflows. One example comes from the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in the north-eastern Chinese province of Jilin. The prefecture has responded to high levels of international emigration originating there by establishing policies on pre-migration training, financial assistance, and labour market insertion in the destination country.¹⁶⁴ These policies are implemented through a network of prefectoral administrative bodies, including the Prefectural Departments of Commerce, Labour and Social Security, Municipal Foreign Trade Offices, and village- and township-level Labour and Social Security Service Stations.

8.7 Engagement with the private sector

There are a number of reasons why engagement with the private sector is an important component of strengthening the governance of international migration. First, as has been highlighted elsewhere in this report, the private sector (for example, in the form of employers, trade unions and private recruiters) plays an important role in managing labour migration, in particular. Second, and in keeping with the overall theme of this report on capacity-building, private sector investments can support government efforts to manage immigration and further integration, while also making good ‘business sense’. Over the last ten years, the Spanish food service company Grupo Vips, for example, has leveraged

training subsidies from the Spanish Government to prepare workers for jobs before they arrived in Spain, and offered immigrants the opportunity to develop long-term careers with the company (including the prospect of moving from entry-level to managerial positions).¹⁶⁵ Third, there are ongoing tensions between the private sector and government – for example, relating to practical obstacles inhibiting the free movement of skilled labour, which are best overcome through dialogue.

As one of the chief beneficiaries of labour migration, the private sector should have an interest in engaging with governments to plan and prepare for orderly migration and mitigate potential adverse consequences of labour mobility. Given the general consensus that migration is good for business, it is surprising that the private sector does not engage more proactively. A business round-table discussion convened in preparation for the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Athens in 2009 identified a number of reasons why, including a concern on the part of business leaders that they might experience a public backlash for supporting migration, in particular they might lack influence among policymakers, and why policymakers might be unwilling to countenance their recommendations, especially with regard to lowering obstacles to migration.¹⁶⁶ The round-table participants identified several strategies for overcoming reluctance on the part of the private sector to engage in discussions on international migration. An initial step would be for the private sector to better articulate its needs to policymakers. At the same time, it is important to recognize the diversity of private sector actors: their needs may not always align. Second, there may be lessons to learn from other global advocacy campaigns. Businesses that get involved, speak out, and frame their recommendations cogently. In particular, business advocates need to be clear about their audience – for example, targeting different messages towards local authorities, national governments and international organizations.

¹⁶³ International Dialogue for Migration Workshop, Migration and Transnationalism: Opportunities and Challenges, 9–10 March 2010: www.iom.int/idmtransnationalism/lang/en

¹⁶⁴ Luova (2008).

¹⁶⁵ GFMD (2009).

¹⁶⁶ GFMD (2009).

It was also recommended that business leaders recognize the wider context for migration. While migration may be primarily an issue of economics and competitiveness for business leaders, others see it differently. For instance, the general public may view migration in terms of the costs and contributions of both immigrants and their children, and is concerned about how fast their communities are changing. At the same time, the private sector has a significant role to play in promoting their positive experiences of migration, working to build durable partnerships and publicizing the benefits of managed migration. In reality, companies have already achieved much in terms of training, education, research and development but have often not been very successful in publicizing these positive results.

8.8 An enhanced role for civil society

Civil society – including non-governmental organizations, policy advocacy groups, educational establishments, religious organizations, trade unions and the media – has an important role to play in migration governance. It can help gather data and conduct research, thus strengthening the evidence base for policy. It can access the least-accessible of migrant populations (for example, irregular migrants) and work in partnership with authorities to deliver assistance. It can also campaign for more coherent policies.¹⁶⁷ A good example is the Public Services International (PSI) – the global union representing around 7 million workers in the delivery of health and social care – which is embarking on a programme on migration in the health and social care sectors. The aim is to strengthen the capacity of public sector trade unions in addressing the causes, impact and challenges of migration in the health and social care sectors through capacity-building, education and information dissemination, organizing and outreach, union-to-union bilateral partnerships, advocacy and campaigns, union representation and collective bargaining. Yet the involvement of civil society

in the migration arena outside operational activities, and especially in contributing to migration policy, has been limited compared to its involvement, for example, in environmental and development policy. In these latter fields, civil society has made a significant impact – for example, with regard to defining the international agenda, providing information, exerting ‘moral authority’, monitoring and building consensus.

A number of obstacles to an enhanced role for civil society in migration governance have been identified, with capacity-building implications for civil society organizations, States and institutions. One reason why it has been difficult for civil society to engage has been that migration policy covers such a broad scope and comprises extensive inter-linkages, such as with trade, development, the environment, security and conflict management. Civil society organizations tend to have narrow and specialized interests – for example, in human rights advocacy – and may lack the breadth of expertise required to engage in migration policy. One possible response is for civil society organizations to establish coordinating mechanisms to provide a broader base for engagement. A related challenge for many civil society organizations is a lack of financial resources. While, in certain circumstances, States may fund civil society organizations, it is also incumbent upon such organizations to raise funds, and there is a capacity-building requirement for training on fund-raising within these organizations.

Equally, access by civil society organizations to formal policy forums is often limited by States. The Global Commission on International Migration concluded that, “... the policy-making process is more likely to be effective when it is based on widespread consultation [...] with diverse components of civil society” and, where they do not already exist, governments might consider the potential benefits of establishing formal mechanisms for consultation with civil society.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Chappell (2010).

¹⁶⁸ GCIM (2005).

Some of the regional consultative processes (RCPs) on migration (discussed below) have vigorous mechanisms for the participation of civil society actors in regional migration policy dialogue – for example, the Regional Conference on Migration (or ‘Puebla Process’), the South American Conference on Migration, and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. The IOM Council and its International Dialogue on Migration engages non-governmental partners on an equal footing with governments in the development and conduct of its regular workshops and senior policy-level discussions.

The GFMD represents an innovative effort to achieve dialogue on migration policy between governments and civil society at the global level, certain aspects of which could easily be replicated at the regional or national level. Currently, a broad range of civil society organizations convene in advance of the meeting of governments, discuss the same agenda, and present key recommendations to the governments. This process provides the opportunity for consensus-building within civil society and for access to governments, but also does not undermine open government-to-government dialogue. A number of concrete recommendations have been made for making the Civil Society Days at the GFMD more effective. One is to help ground the discussion and generate concrete best-practice recommendations with smaller sessions that are focused on specific issues. A second is to select chairs with experience in dealing with governments in international forums so that there is a clearer message to governments. Additionally, it has been suggested that a basic administrative structure be established to support civil society, in order, for example, to raise funds and thus reduce dependence on the host institution, and to provide training in advance of the meetings.

8.9 Effective RCPs and cooperation between regional processes

There has been a proliferation of RCPs on migration in recent years (see map 9). These processes are usually not officially associated with formal regional or other institutions, and they provide States with the opportunity for

dialogue centred on regionally or thematically relevant migration issues in an informal and non-binding setting. Although experiences vary widely across RCPs, a comparative analysis of some of the main processes has concluded that they have been effective in building trust between States, increasing understanding of migration issues, helping States better understand their capacity requirements, fostering the exchange of information and experiences, breaking down divides between States and, within States, between departments, creating networks and harmonizing regional positions.¹⁶⁹

Providing the opportunity to exchange experiences and learn from policy initiatives in neighbouring countries is an important capacity-building element of RCPs. As emphasized in the introduction to this report, capacity-building need not be about reinventing the wheel, although it is equally important to understand that experiences cannot simply be transferred without understanding the specific national or local context. RCPs have also been more directly involved in capacity-building, particularly through providing regular workshops and seminars at the technical level, and supporting pilot projects. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Processes on Migration (IGAD-RCP), for example, carried out an EU-funded border assessment that resulted in training for officials and the provision of better equipment by IOM with EU support. In Lebanon, there is currently a pilot project organized through the Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) dialogue on capacity-building in detention centres, including staff training and the development of standard operating procedures, with support from UNHCR and Caritas.

Building the capacity of RCPs is therefore a way to increase cooperation between States at the regional level, and promote further capacity-building, often in conjunction with other partners. A review commissioned as a background paper for this report has collated a series of lessons learned on the circumstances in which RCPs are most effective, and each of

¹⁶⁹ Hansen (2010).

these represents a potential area for capacity-building.¹⁷⁰ Networking is identified as critical, particularly between and after meetings. This effect can be supported through the designation in participating States of RCP focal points, and facilitated, for example, through the tabulation, distribution and maintenance of e-mail and telephone lists. The Bali Process, for example, has established a liaison network. Networking is easier where RCPs are relatively small. Where large numbers of participating States are involved, one way to promote networking and continue to build trust and consensus is to devolve responsibility to working groups and task forces that bring together a smaller number of the States involved. The level and type of participation is also important, preferably combining political and technical officials, from the full range of government ministries involved in migration issues, and with consistency of representation. Another recommendation is for a two-level structure, allowing for technical-level workshops and seminars, and a political-level meeting to establish consensus and, if necessary, coordinate a regional position.

As has been emphasized is the case for individual States, capacity-building requirements will vary significantly between RCPs depending, for example, on how new they are, which region they cover, what their goals are, and to what extent they face significant current or future migration challenges. Another focus for capacity-building in this area relates to the promotion of greater cooperation between RCPs, and between RCPs and more formal Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This may not always be appropriate because the migration priorities of concern to RCPs may be so different; however, sharing experiences on administrative and technical issues may still be of value. Sometimes it is, in effect, already taking place – for example, where a single State participates in more than one RCP. One option for greater cooperation is to provide opportunities for non-members to attend RCP meetings in an observer capacity. Another is to convene on a regular basis meetings that bring

together representatives of the various RCPs, as was done in June 2009 jointly by the Thai Government and IOM.

8.10 Addressing the need for more coherent global governance

It is not within the scope or remit of this report to reflect upon the mandate of IOM or to comment on those of its partner organizations in the field of international migration. At the same time, any discussion of capacity-building requirements for migration governance needs to acknowledge a growing consensus that the current global institutional framework on migration lacks coherence. A background paper on the global governance of international migration commissioned for this report reaches the following conclusion:¹⁷¹

Global migration governance is currently made up of a range of informal Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs); formal Regional Economic Communities (RECs) engaging in regional integration; international dialogues such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development; coordination mechanisms such as the Global Migration Group (GMG) and the UN DESA Migration Annual Coordination Meeting; and a range of international organizations often competing over resources and mandates. At the moment these structures lack coherence, and are not based on a rational institutional design to address the realities of migration in the Twenty-First Century.

While there is still no single international institution or agency with overall responsibility for international migration, it is worth noting that, at the operational level, and through a series of more informal networks, there is already extensive cooperation between intergovernmental organizations. IOM, for example, although outside the UN system, has a long-standing and close working relationship with UN organizations at a

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Betts (2010).

number of levels. It has observer status at the UN General Assembly, it is a regular member and a full participant in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) mechanism and it has signed a cooperation agreement with the UN (in 1996). Through its Permanent Observer Office in New York, IOM maintains active liaison with the UN Secretariat, and New York-based UN bodies such as UNFPA, UNICEF and UNDP, and has memorandums of understanding with the vast majority of UN entities whose work touches upon aspects of migration, including UNEP and WHO. At an operational level, IOM Chiefs of Mission are regularly invited by UN Resident Coordinators to participate in UN Country Teams. Within the IASC 'Cluster Approach', IOM has taken the lead role for the Camp Coordination/Camp Management Cluster in natural disasters and also plays an important role in various other clusters including shelter and logistics.

IOM is also a founding member of the Global Migration Group (GMG) (and its predecessor, the Geneva Migration Group), an inter-agency group that meets at Heads of Agency and working levels with the aim of promoting the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments relating to migration, and the provision of more coherent and stronger leadership to improve the overall effectiveness of the UN and the international community's policy and operational response to international migration. Current members of the GMG are: the ILO, IOM, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNDP, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNFPA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNHCR, UNICEF, UNITAR, UNODC, the World Bank, and

UN regional commissions. While the GMG has yet to realize its full potential to contribute collectively to more effective governance of migration, recent changes to its operating procedures (for example, the creation of a troika to ensure continuity from one chair to the next, and the development of an annual workplan) are promising. Pooling the collective expertise and resources of the 14 participating agencies in the field of capacity-building to devise and undertake joint programming could go a long way towards creating better coherence and capacity.

The GFMD will be assessed following its sixth iteration with a view towards a recommendation on its future, which could be considered during the 2013 second UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. Among the current questions for discussion are whether to maintain the GFMD and, if so, whether to maintain it in its current State-led, non-binding format outside of any institutional structure but with loose links to the UN through the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Migration and Development and the contributions of the GMG, or whether to 'move it into the UN'. Integrally linked to these questions is IOM's relationship to the UN and whether, as well as under what conditions, IOM could or should become a part of the UN system. These are all questions to be taken up by the Member States of the respective organizations and, in the context of this report, ought to reflect consideration of how the collective capacities of the international system can best be organized so as to enhance prospects for delivering timely, coherent and sound advice and services to governments and migrants on the multifaceted aspects of migration, while avoiding duplication, bureaucratic responses and unproductive internal competition.

9. NEXT STEPS

Most States in the world – and not just in the developing world – do not have adequate capacity to effectively manage migration today. Despite a temporary dip during the period of the global economic crisis, global migration is expected to resume to pre-crisis levels. The need for better migration management will, therefore, not go away. Indeed, the current lull may be a good time to try to catch up.

At the same time, this report has identified a series of structural trends – ranging from growing disparities in demographic growth, to environmental change – that are likely to result in more, and more complex, international migration, in the not-too-distant future. Every State will be affected. In some, migration and its impacts may diminish, over time. In others, current capacities can be expected to continue to cope with future changes, albeit imperfectly. In perhaps the majority of States, however, significant changes will require significant new capacities or adaptation of existing capacities. It has become clear, through this report, that capacity-building is already a growth area in international migration: as has been demonstrated, hundreds of millions of dollars are spent each year by numerous donors and international organizations in strengthening migration capacity all over the world. Equally, it is clear that there are significant gaps in capacity-building, which is often short-term and rarely comprehensive. In many cases, its effects are not fully evaluated and, where they are, it is often not as effective as it might be.

This report confirms that migration capacity-building is an essential and worthwhile investment – as it should be. At the same time, however, it highlights a need for better capacity-building – across a range of migration areas and a variety of migration actors – that is effective, sustainable and prepared for the future.

Against this backdrop, this report has had three main objectives. The first has been to develop a preliminary inventory of core capacities required across the breadth of international migration, both to make management more effective today and to prepare for the future. These core capacities are summarized in the checklist that follows. Second, drawing particularly on the wide range of activities in the field of migration capacity-building implemented by IOM and partners, it has compared existing models, provided examples and highlighted effective practice – from how to assess labour markets from a migration perspective, to addressing the need for more coherent global governance, in countries ranging from Armenia to Zimbabwe. Third, the report has made preliminary recommendations on capacity-building for stakeholders including governments, UN agencies and civil society.

It is hoped that this report will provide a solid basis for further action, and this final section considers the next steps to be taken.

First, a more rigorous analysis of core capacities should be undertaken. This report has been

selective in its choice of migration topics (labour mobility, irregular migration, migration and development, integration, environmental change, and migration governance). These aspects have been selected because they are expected to undergo significant transformations in the coming years as the dimensions and dynamics of international migration change. It may be contended that some topics that have been subsumed in this report deserve greater attention in their own right – for example, migration health, gender or border management. Other topics, such as forced migration, migrants' rights and internal migration, certainly deserve greater attention than space allowed here. Under each heading, this report has focused on just ten core capacities and has had to be selective – for example, in citing examples of good practice from around the world. Equally, there may well be core capacities that have not been identified or paid sufficient attention. Perhaps the most important objective of such an exercise would be to try to achieve some degree of consensus around an inventory or 'checklist' of core capacities. This would have the potential to serve the donors that fund capacity-building, the international organizations that often deliver it, and the States and other stakeholders that benefit from it, to prioritize as well as achieve a degree of comprehensiveness, while always acknowledging that capacity requirements will vary according to national and regional contexts.

A second step that is required is to undertake a more systematic review of existing capacities worldwide. Certainly, more work is needed to collate examples and models from around the world and this, in itself, is a pressing capacity requirement. At times, this report has found it difficult to provide examples, particularly from the developing world, because there is insufficient readily accessible information on capacity-building initiatives and, more importantly, on their effectiveness. Initiatives funded or supported by the international community can normally (although not always) be identified, but capacity-building is also undertaken by States and other stakeholders without widespread recording or reporting.

On the basis of the inventory discussed above, it is possible to envisage a regional or even global survey to gather information on existing capacity-building programmes and practices. Such a capacity-building 'database' could provide alternative models and examples of best practice that might be adopted elsewhere.

A third step implied by this report but deliberately not undertaken here is to assess current capacities. There are several aspects to this process. The first involves undertaking a needs-assessment exercise to determine the migration issues facing particular States, institutions or other stakeholders. To an extent, this is already taking place – for example, under the auspices of national development plans, poverty reduction strategy papers, and migration profiles – but it is by no means systematically done. The second involves assessing current capacities and, in particular, determining how effective they are. As was emphasized earlier in this report (see section 8.5), all too often, migration policies and programmes are not adequately evaluated. The third aspect of this process involves identifying the capacity gaps – the migration-related areas in which States, institutions and other stakeholders are currently failing. The entire process is, of course, even more challenging when looking at possible future scenarios, which may be why most States have not done this. Yet the same issues will need to be addressed: what are the likely changes in migration trends in the near future, how will these affect States, institutions or other stakeholders, and to what extent will current capacities suffice?

A fourth step would require individual States, institutions and other stakeholders to identify priorities in capacity-building. The inventory of core capacities discussed above may provide a template – for example, for States dealing for the first time with significant labour migration, or those that are particularly susceptible to climate change – but it will need to be adjusted according to national and regional contexts. As already emphasized, this report is intended to provide guidance rather than being prescriptive. While making the assessment may be the responsibility of the specific actors

involved, there is certainly a supportive role to be played by regional and international organizations – for example, in terms of funding, training and sharing expertise. Similarly, while non-State actors at the national level may be ultimately responsible for developing their own capacity, there is a case for bringing their needs to the attention of the State and even international donors. Certainly, this report has demonstrated the interconnectedness of migration governance across all levels, with capacity required at the international, national and subnational level

simultaneously, and across all involved actors, in order to effectively manage migration for the future.

As stated in the introduction to this report, however, capacity-building is only the beginning – even though it is, in many ways, an ambitious beginning. Implementation, enforcement, monitoring and evaluation, are just as important. These processes, in themselves, require significant capacity and far more systematic attention in the future.

Checklist of core capacities in international migration

Labour mobility

- determining policy goals
- assessing labour markets from the migration perspective
- regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers
- determining conditions attached to employment permits
- training of migrant workers and placement services
- protecting migrant workers' rights
- reducing labour migration costs
- strengthening and implementing bilateral or other labour mobility agreements
- returning migrants and their reintegration
- implementation.

Irregular migration

- generating better data on irregular migration
- enhancing law enforcement
- regularizing migrants' status
- managing detention and deportation
- regulating migration and employment
- capacity-building in transit States
- combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking
- addressing mixed flows
- enhancing information dissemination
- building partnerships and cooperation.

Migration and development

- mainstreaming migration in development plans
- optimizing formal remittance flows
- enhancing the developmental impacts of remittances
- engaging diasporas
- consolidating knowledge networks
- strengthening the links between return and development
- promoting circular migration
- training to retain
- developing ethical recruitment policies
- institutional capacity-building.

Integration

- strengthening economic participation
- encouraging civic participation among migrants
- simplifying rules on citizenship, nationality and dual nationality
- family migration
- managing temporary migration
- promoting migrant education
- strengthening anti-discrimination policies and practices
- promoting migrant health
- fostering public dialogue
- mainstreaming integration across government.

Environmental change

- establishing a better evidence base
- disaster risk reduction
- developing adaptation strategies
- preparing evacuation plans
- filling gaps in the legal and normative framework
- implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement
- amending national immigration laws and policies
- establishing proactive resettlement policies
- providing humanitarian assistance
- planning for resettlement.

Migration governance

- developing a national migration policy
- strengthening migration management at the national level
- coordinated policymaking and implementation
- generating better data and research
- policy evaluation
- developing urban governance
- engaging with the private sector
- enhancing the role of civil society
- effective RCPs and cooperation between regional processes
- addressing the need for more coherent global governance.

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an overview of
international
migration trends

INTRODUCTION

This section of the *World Migration Report 2010* aims to provide readers with a brief overview of regional and global trends in international migration. This section highlights some of the key migration trends that have occurred since the publication of the 2008 *World Migration Report*. In particular, this year's report examines how the global economic crisis has affected migration trends around the world.

Regions

Each regional overview aims to include the following information:

- migrant stock in the region and general trends;
- percentage of stock within region, as percentage of total global migrant stock;
- net migration rates;
- main countries of origin and destination;
- emigration trends;
- remittance inflows and outflows, in general for the region (in absolute terms)

and in relation to main recipients and senders (in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP);


- major migration corridors;
- gender dynamics;
- urban areas with more than 100,000 foreign-born residents;
- persons displaced by natural disasters;
- internally displaced persons and refugees;
- irregular migration;
- effects of the global economic crisis on jobs, returns, remittances and migration flows.

Although efforts have been made to use the latest available and most comparable data on migration trends in each of the six regional overviews presented below, there are clearly many gaps in information, given the paucity of international migration data. (See the annex for a full discussion of sources and definitions used and of the limitations of existing migration data.) It should also be noted that this report was finalized at the end of April 2010.

GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF MIGRATION

Global stocks

- The total number of international migrants worldwide in 2010 is estimated to be 214 million persons. This figure has remained relatively stable as a share of the global population, increasing only by 0.1 per cent, from 3.0 per cent to 3.1 per cent, between 2005 and 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).
- The United States of America (USA) still hosts the largest migrant stock of any country worldwide, while six of the top ten countries with the largest foreign-born populations (France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) are found in Europe (see figure 1).




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Fifty-seven per cent of all migrants live in high-income countries – up from 43 per cent in 1990. Migrants make up 10 per cent of the population of high-income regions (compared to 7.2 per cent in 1990) (UN DESA, 2009).
- When migrants are considered as a percentage of a country's population,


the picture changes. Among the countries with a population of more than 1 million, only Saudi Arabia features in the top ten countries of destination. In some small countries, migrants account for more than half the population (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Percentage of foreign-born in population in 2010



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Most of the main destination countries consider their current level of immigration to be "satisfactory", as do 152 governments worldwide. Only France, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia consider their current level of immigration to be "too high" (31 other governments worldwide share this opinion), while Canada is one of the 9 governments that consider current levels of immigration to be "too low". Compared to 1996, 14 governments (almost all from countries in Africa or the Middle East) changed their opinions about immigration from "satisfactory" to "too high" while, on the other hand, 20 governments (about half of them from countries in Europe) considered the level of immigration to be "satisfactory" in 2009, compared to "too high" in 1996 (UN DESA, 2009; see map 10).
- There are more than 20 cities across the world (9 in North America, 4 in the Middle East, 3 in Europe, and 2 each in Asia and Oceania) with over 1 million foreign-born inhabitants; the total foreign-born population of these cities alone accounts for 37 million migrants. Twenty-five cities around the world also had populations consisting of over 25 per cent foreign-born (Price and Benton-Short, 2007).
- Many of the main countries of destination (Germany, India, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) are also among the top ten countries of origin of migrants (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Countries with the largest emigrant populations in 2000 (in millions)

Note: DRC estimates are based 2000 Census Round Data.

Source: DRC, 2007.

- The absolute numbers of both male and female migrants have grown over recent years, with the proportion of male migrants remaining steady at around 51 per cent (UN DESA, 2009). However, national and regional variations in this figure are significant (see map 2), and women are particularly represented among highly skilled migrants (UNIFEM, 2008).
- Although comprehensive and comparable data are lacking, it is clear that youth and child migration are important phenomena. Much of this migration takes place in the context of family reunification in destination countries; however, it seems likely that an important proportion of children and young people are migrating independently (McKenzie, 2007). According to a cross-country census-based study of child migration in Argentina, Chile and South Africa, around 4 per cent of all children were international or internal migrants, representing around a quarter of all migrants (Yaqub, 2009).
- According to the UNDP 2009 *Human Development Report*, there are an estimated 740 million internal migrants in the world (UNDP, 2009).
- A new cross-country study on migration and development¹ (IPPR/GDN, 2010) suggests that, although the numbers involved in return migration movements vary, this kind of movement can involve from 12 to 37 per cent of people who go abroad for more than three months.


Remittances

- Remittances in 2009 are estimated at USD 414 billion, of which over USD 316 billion went to developing countries – a drop of 6 per cent from USD 336 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2010a; Ratha et al., 2010).
- Although this figure represents the first recorded drop in remittances since 1985, reflecting the effects of the global recession (see ‘Migration and the economic crisis: 2008–2010’ below) remittances are still at a higher level than in 2007 (when the figure stood at USD 385 billion).

¹ The countries analysed by this study include Colombia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Viet Nam. The results refer to trends observed in these countries and, thus, may differ from return patterns only elsewhere.


- The top ten recipients accounted for over USD 200 billion of this flow, with China and India receiving almost USD 100 billion between them (see figure 4).
- In relative terms, remittances in ten countries accounted for over a fifth of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008; in the case of Tajikistan, remittances represented almost half of the country's GDP (see figure 5).

Figure 4: Top ten remittance receivers in 2009 (in USD millions)



Source: Ratha et al., 2010.

Figure 5: Percentage of GDP in 2008 represented by remittances



Source: Ratha et al., 2010.

Internally displaced persons

- According to the latest figures from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2009), at the end of 2008, there were 26 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world – the same figure as in 2007.
 - Despite an important 1.1 million-person drop in the IDP population in Sudan, it remains the most affected country, with 4.9 million IDPs; numbers in the other most affected countries have, however, increased.
 - In particular, Colombia has seen the lower estimate of its IDP population increase by over 600,000 since 2007 to 3.3 million (the upper estimate is over 4.9 million, up from 3,940,164).
- Other notable changes:
 - The upper estimate for the number of IDPs in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Afghanistan almost doubled to 1 million, 400,000 and 235,000, respectively.
 - The Democratic Republic of the Congo's IDP population increased from 1.36 million to 2.1 million.
 - New data on IDPs in Pakistan (data had previously not been available) suggest this population numbers around 1.25 million.
 - Iraq's IDP population decreased by around 35,000 to 2,842,191, while the number of IDPs in Somalia reached 1.3 million – up from 1.1 million in 2007.
 - Progress has also been made in Uganda and Timor-Leste, which have seen their IDP populations fall from about 1 million and 100,000 in July 2008, to 437,000 and 400, respectively (see map 11).

Refugees

- The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were 15.2 million refugees

worldwide at the end of 2008 (UNHCR, 2009).²

- According to UN DESA figures, the proportion of refugees in global migrant stocks is 7.6 per cent (UN DESA, 2009).
- Four fifths of the world's refugees are located in developing countries (UNHCR, 2009).
- Pakistan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran host the largest number of refugees, with 1.8 million, 1.1 million and 980,000 refugees, respectively.
- Afghans (2.8 million) and Iraqis (1.9 million) make up the largest groups of refugees (UNHCR, 2009; see map 12).
- Furthermore, in 2009, the total number of asylum-seekers in industrialized nations remained stable, with about 377,000 applications, despite significant regional disparities: the Nordic region recorded a 13 per cent increase, with 51,100 new applicants – the highest in six years. By contrast, the number of applications in southern Europe fell by 33 per cent, with 50,100 claims, driven by significant declines in Italy (-42%), Turkey (-40%) and Greece (-20%). Overall, the number of asylum applications increased in 19 countries, while they fell in 25 countries (UNHCR, 2010).

Health migration

- The medical brain drain continues to be an issue of concern. Although there are no global figures on the subject, data

² This figure includes 'refugees' (9.05 million at the end of 2008) and 'people in refugee-like situations' (estimated at 1.4 million at the end of 2008), both in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate, as well as refugees in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (estimated at 4.7 million at the end of 2008). 'Refugees' are persons recognized under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, as persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection, while 'people in refugee-like situations' represent a category that is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

from Africa suggest that 19 per cent of doctors and 8 per cent of nurses born in African countries (and 28% of doctors and 11% of nurses born in sub-Saharan African countries) are working in nine key countries of destination.³

- In some cases, the majority of health workers born in African countries work abroad: for example, 75 per cent of Mozambican doctors and 81 per cent of Liberian nurses are working outside their country of origin (see map 13).
- According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007), based on Census 2000 data, India is the top country of origin in terms of the absolute number of doctors in OECD countries (nearly 56,000), followed by Germany (over 17,000), the United Kingdom (under 17,000), the Philippines (around 16,000) and China (around 13,000). In terms of the expatriation rate of doctors (the share of doctors working in OECD countries as a total of the doctors from that country), Antigua and Barbuda show the highest rate (89.3%), followed by Grenada (72.7%), Guyana (72.2%), Mozambique (64.5%) and Angola (63.2%).
- In terms of nurses, the Philippines is the main country of origin for nurses, with over 110,000 Filipino nurses working in OECD countries, followed by the United Kingdom (just under 46,000), Germany (under 32,000), Jamaica (over 31,000) and Canada (just under 25,000). The top five countries in terms of emigration rates of nurses are all Caribbean: Haiti leads with an expatriation rate of 94 per cent, followed by Jamaica (87.7%), Grenada (87.6%), St Vincent and the Grenadines (81.6%) and Guyana (81.1%) (OECD, 2007).

Student mobility

- The migration of people pursuing educational opportunities is an important trend with implications for future highly skilled migration flows.

- In all, there were 2.8 million students in the world in 2007 (UNESCO, 2009). The top three countries of origin of students, accounting for almost a quarter of all international students, are all Asian: Chinese students alone account for around 15 per cent of the world's mobile students, while Indian (5%) and Korean (4%) students are second and third, respectively.⁴ Between them, the countries highlighted in map 14 hosted nearly 2.5 million foreign students in 2007, with students from Asia representing half of this number. The United Kingdom and the USA together account for almost a million foreign students, while France is the main destination for African students.
- There are certain regional hubs: South Africa, for example, is the main country of destination for students from Southern African countries as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe; around 60,000 of the roughly 97,000 mobile students in Central Asia go either to Kyrgyzstan or the Russian Federation; Australia attracts over 135,000 of the nearly 800,000 student migrants in the Asia-Pacific; almost a quarter of mobile Eastern European students go to Germany; and, among Western European and North American students, the United Kingdom is the study destination of just under 24 per cent of students (UNESCO, 2009).

Irregular migration

- Data on irregular migration are inevitably difficult to gather, and there has been no global update on estimates since a 2002 study estimated that 10–15 per cent of the migrant population in OECD countries was irregular (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). More recent estimates suggest that around one third of all migration from developing countries could be irregular (UNDP, 2009).
- Some data sources from countries of destination, such as law-enforcement

³ The countries of destination are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the USA.

⁴ http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/ged/2009/UIS_press_conference_presentation.pdf

statistics and census data, can be used, however, to give an indication of the number of migrants in irregular situations.

- The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2010), for example, estimated the unauthorized immigrant population at 10,750,000 in January 2009. In the fiscal year 2007–2008, 358,886 people were deported (an increase of around 40,000 deportations on the 2006–2007 figures) (DHS, 2009). However, border apprehensions decreased in 2008 to 724,000 – their lowest level since 1976. The overwhelming majority of irregular migrants in the USA are from Latin America: Mexicans alone accounted for 62 per cent of the unauthorized immigrant population, with 6,650,000 irregular Mexican migrants in the USA (DHS, 2010).
- In Australia, meanwhile, in 2008–2009, 6,818 migrants in irregular situation were removed, voluntarily or involuntarily (DIAC, 2009).
- Finally, in Europe between 2005 and 2007, around 1.4 million people were apprehended for being illegally present in European Union (EU) countries, and almost 760,000 removals were undertaken (EC, 2009). Albanians and Moroccans form the largest groups of apprehended and returned migrants.⁵ The Clandestino Project,⁶ meanwhile, estimates that there were between 1.9 and 3.8 million migrants in an irregular situation in the EU-27 in 2008, between 7 and 13 per cent of the overall migrant population (HWI, 2008⁷).
- CARIM⁸ (2009) estimates that the deaths of migrants crossing on boats from South-Eastern Mediterranean countries to Europe decreased from 1,765 in 2007 to 1,235 in 2008.

- New research on regularization programmes in the EU estimated that 5.5 to 6 million people applied for regularization between 1973 and 2008, of whom at least 4.3 million were regularized. Most of these regularizations took place in southern Europe in countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; most regularization programmes were undertaken in the ten years between 1998 and 2008 (Kraler, 2009).
- Data from Brazil suggest that the regularization programme launched in July 2009 has regularized over 40,000 persons, nearly 17,000 of whom are Bolivian (Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 2010).
- A regularization of migrant domestic and health-care workers in an irregular situation in Italy, meanwhile, resulted in about 300,000 requests (Italian Ministry of Interior, 2009).

Environment

- The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that sudden-onset natural disasters led to over 36 million people being displaced or evacuated in 2008; 20,293,413 of these people were evacuated or displaced because of climate-related disasters, with the Sichuan earthquake responsible for the displacement of 15 million people alone. Asia, with 31,397,358 persons displaced due to natural disasters, was the most affected region, followed by the Americas (OCHA/IDMC, 2009).
- Although media and policymakers often focus their attention on sudden-onset disasters (cyclones, hurricanes and tsunamis, *inter alia*), slow-onset changes in the environment are likely to have a greater impact on migration in the future. Over the last 30 years, twice as many people have been affected by droughts as by storms (1.6 billion compared with approximately 718 million) (IOM, 2009).

⁵ Romanians formed the largest group in 2005–2006, before Romania's entry into the EU. It should therefore be noted that the entry of new Member States into the EU has had a significant regularizing effect.

⁶ Please see <http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/>

⁷ Please see <http://www.hwwi.org/>

⁸ Please see <http://www.carim.org/>

- The negotiating text for the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (2009) explicitly mentioned that migration should be considered as part of adaptation strategies. Although no final text was adopted, a draft decision on enhanced action on climate change adaptation by the Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action explicitly identified the need to pay further attention to climate-change-induced migration.

Migration and the economic crisis 2008–2010

- Since the publication of the last *World Migration Report in 2008*, the world has been affected by the worst global recession since the 1930s. Global GDP declined by 2.2 per cent in 2009 (World Bank, 2010b). The international financial crisis that began in the USA in 2008, and quickly transformed into a global crisis by the second half of 2008 and into 2009, has had a substantial impact on international migration.
- At the time of writing (the first quarter of 2010), the world economy is beginning to recover. Though economists are still debating the ‘shape’ of the economic recovery, it is expected that the recovery in 2010 and 2011 will be marked by continued unemployment, especially in developed countries hardest hit by the crisis, as economic growth will not automatically translate into new jobs (World Bank, 2010b).
- The depth, scope and duration of the economic crisis have varied according to country, geographic region and labour market sector. Although it remains difficult to determine the full scale of the impact of the crisis on migrants and migration, several effects of the crisis have already been identified.
- The overall stock of migrants has not decreased in response to the crisis. However, flows of new migrants have slowed in many parts of the world, either because news of the decrease in opportunities spread through migrant

networks or because the more restrictive policies of certain destination countries took effect.

- Confronted with the crisis, some governments have responded by trying to send migrants back home. Special voluntary return programmes for migrants have been created in a number of countries, such as the Czech Republic, Japan and Spain. In the Czech Republic, only 2,089 people returned under voluntary return programmes, although the quota had been set at 4,000. A similar programme in Spain has resulted in 8,724 people taking up the offer – about 10 per cent of the potential beneficiary population (IOM, 2010). In Japan, according to figures available up to October 2009, 13,188 applications have been received for its voluntary return programme (MPI, 2009).
- More broadly, although data on return migration trends are limited, there seems to be relatively little evidence, so far, of a mass return of migrants to countries of origin. This is largely due to factors such as the high level of social protection in some host countries’ system and the fact that conditions at home may be much worse than in the country of destination. Nonetheless, some countries, such as India, the Republic of Moldova and Poland, have reported an increase in the scale of returns for certain categories of labour migrants.
- Reports suggest that the flow of irregular migrants slowed throughout 2009 on the US/Mexican border and southern Europe (MPI, 2009). Another consequence of the crisis, which is less easy to document, is the likely increase in the number of migrant workers who move into irregular forms of employment in the shadow economy in the country of destination. Migrants may adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach, preferring to take on new employment opportunities, possibly in the informal sector, or even overstay on their current visa, while waiting for an economic upturn.
- The situation of migrants who have remained in their countries of destination has generally deteriorated. During

- economic downturns, migrants are often among the most vulnerable category of workers affected by job losses, as they tend to be younger, are more likely to be in temporary jobs, have less formal education, and are concentrated in sectors of employment most affected by the recession, such as construction, manufacturing and services.
- This certainly seems to be the case in the current downturn. Although there are no global figures on migrant unemployment and conditions, it seems that migrants have generally faced higher levels of unemployment than native workforces:

- Comparing figures from selected European countries from the first three quarters of 2008 and 2009, map 15 shows that, with the exception of Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, levels of unemployment increased more among migrants than among natives. Some of the largest increases in unemployment took place in countries most heavily hit by the recession (such as Spain, where the unemployment rate among migrants (28%) was nearly twice as high as the unemployment rate among nationals (15.8%), Iceland and the Baltic countries), which also tended to be newer countries of destination.
- Migrants in the USA have also suffered: unemployment for Mexicans and Central Americans stood at 11.5 per cent, compared to 9.5 per cent of Americans in October 2009. Unemployment was 2.1 per cent higher for migrants in Canada than for the native-born in October 2009 (MPI, 2009). In Japan, up to 40 per cent of Brazilians are unemployed, while the impact of the crisis on Dubai has seen high levels of unemployment among South Asian workers.
- The recession can also have an impact on those migrants who remain in employment: for example, migrants in the Russian Federation who are able to find work face reduced wages, or move into irregular work (ICG, 2010).

- Recently arrived migrants are particularly vulnerable as they may have fewer entitlements to social protection and unemployment benefits.
- Rising unemployment among migrant workers has negative effects on the flow of remittances, which, in turn, can increase poverty and inequality in countries of origin. As noted earlier, for 2009, the World Bank estimated that USD 316 billion were remitted to developing countries – a decrease of 6 per cent, compared to 2008 (Ratha et al., 2010). In some countries and regions, however, the fall in the level of remittances has been much greater. For example, in Nigeria, which is the top remittance-receiving country in Africa, remittances fell by nearly 20 per cent during the first part of 2009; and, in Uganda, the figure was nearly 40 per cent (see Africa section).
- However, some regions have been less affected than others or have experienced an increase in remittance transfers. For example, countries that send large numbers of migrants to the Gulf States, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines, have seen remittances grow in 2008–2009.
- For 2010 and 2011, remittance flows are expected to rise again, at around 6 and 7 per cent, respectively. However, uncertain employment opportunities and unemployment rates that are expected to remain high in advanced, industrialized countries will probably result in a lower rate of growth than before the beginning of the economic crisis. In 2010, remittance flows to developing countries are estimated at USD 335 billion – almost equal to the level recorded in 2008 (Ratha et al., 2010).
- According to World Bank regional analyses, the economic crisis revealed that (i) “the more diverse the migration destinations, the more resilient remittances” (e.g. remittance flows from Filipino and Indian migrants fell only modestly as they originated in different countries, in contrast to those sent by migrants from Latin American and Caribbean countries,

which primarily originated in the USA and were dependent on the US economic cycle); (ii) “the lower the barriers to labour mobility, the stronger the link between remittances and economic cycles in that corridor” (the integrated EU labour market and Russia’s border porosity with neighbouring countries, for instance, allow migrants to leave and return easily to their country of destination and, thus, these migrants might be more inclined to return home instead of staying and searching for a job in order to send home remittances); and (iii) “exchange rate movements produce valuation effects, but they also influence the consumption-investment motive for remittances” (e.g. the depreciation of the Indian rupee against the US dollar in 2008 augmented the value of remittances increasingly invested in cheaper assets) (Ratha et al., 2010).

- Across the world, new migration policy measures have been introduced in response to the crisis. Broadly speaking, these measures have tried to achieve three objectives: protect labour markets for native workers, restrict the inflow of migrants, and encourage their return. For example, a range of restrictive immigration policies were introduced in 2009 to protect the local labour market in Italy, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, all of which reduced the numerical scope

of their respective quotas. In the same year, a stop on all new entries of foreign workers was put in place in some East, South-East and Central Asian countries. However, not all countries have pursued restrictive policies: Sweden, for instance, implemented its new demand-driven labour migration model, which still allows trade unions to review job offers but without the possibility of vetoing an application from a foreign worker (IOM, 2010).

- Several countries of origin have also responded to the crisis by actively monitoring the situation of their nationals abroad, instituting further skills training back home and seeking alternative employment possibilities for their workers abroad (see regional overviews for Asia and Europe, for further information). Some Latin American and Caribbean countries have taken action to assist returning migrants. Colombia and Ecuador, for example, both introduced measures to support the reintegration of returnees (see the Americas).
- Despite the deep recession, an international survey of public opinion conducted by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) in 2009 found that, in most of the countries surveyed, despite some recent hardening of attitudes towards migrants, the majority of people still considered immigration to be “more of an opportunity than a problem” (GMF, 2009).

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AFRICA REGIONAL OVERVIEW


- The number of international migrants in Africa⁹ in 2010 is estimated to be 19 million – an increase of 1.5 million migrants since 2005. Africa hosted just under 9 per cent of the total global stock of migrants in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009). This figure is probably an underestimate, given that migration data are particularly poor in Africa.
- Africa remains a continent with strong international migration dynamics. Conflicts, income inequality and environmental change result in very low levels of human security that act as push factors for people to move from their countries of origin in Africa. Nearly 40 per cent of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world are living in East and Central Africa. Furthermore, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), almost 700,000 people were displaced in Africa in 2008 as a result of environmental disasters (OCHA/IDMC, 2009).
- Although there were 291 million Africans living in urban areas in 2006, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009a) estimates that 1.2 billion people will be living in cities in Africa by 2050. As a result of both higher growth rates in cities and rural–urban migration, it is expected that urban areas will host 68 per cent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa in 2050 – up from 38 per cent in 2006. This process is complicated, however, by the fact that rural-to-urban migration in Africa is often temporary; indeed, the high costs of living in urban areas have led to widespread return to rural areas in countries such as Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe (UN-HABITAT, 2008).
- While the total net migration rate in Africa remained neutral in 2005–2010 (with no change from the period 1990–1995), some countries have experienced positive net migration rates in the period 2005–2010 (the top three being Burundi, Liberia and South Africa), while others have experienced negative rates (the most notable cases being Zimbabwe, São Tome and Príncipe, and Guinea) (UNDP, 2009).
- According to estimates based on the Census 2000 data, the total number of migrants from Africa is almost 23 million, with approximately half of them moving to, and/or living in, a sub-Saharan country (see figure 1) (DRC, 2007). With the exception of North Africa, intraregional

⁹ East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Central Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe. North Africa: Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo (division of countries according to UN DESA, 2009). Egypt is covered in the regional overview on the Middle East.

migration represents the most common form of migration, accounting for almost three quarters of migration outflows in East, Central and West Africa. Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco and Nigeria are the most important countries of origin

of African migrants (DRC, 2007), while Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are the top receiving countries in the continent, with over 1 million foreigners each (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 1: African emigrants, by region of origin and destination, in 2000 (in millions)




Note: DRC estimates are based on the 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.

- The World Bank estimates that the region received approximately USD 30.3 billion in remittances in 2009, while USD 4.6 billion were sent in 2008 by migrants residing in the region (see figure 2). Despite the recent crisis, remittance flows to sub-Saharan

Africa experienced a slower negative growth compared to the rest of the world in 2009 (falling a modest 3%) (Ratha et al., 2010) and are expected to grow slightly faster in 2010 and 2011 (1.8% and 3.9%, respectively) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 2: Percentage growth of remittance inflows in sub-Saharan Africa 2007–2010




Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- Despite the importance of remittances in the continent, the African remittance market exhibits a low level of competition and actors have a limited presence in rural areas. Two major money transfer companies control 65 per cent of all remittance payout locations. Effectively, 80 per cent of African countries restrict the type of institutions that can offer remittance services to banks (IFAD, 2009).

EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA


- The total migrant stock in East and Central Africa remained unchanged at 6.7 million between 2000 and 2010, mainly as significant decreases in migration stock in some countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia) were matched by commensurate increases in other countries (Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda) (see figure 3). As the number of international migrants increased by less than the growth of total population, the stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population decreased from 1.7 per cent in 2005 to 1.5 per cent in 2010 (see figure 4) (UN DESA, 2009). Forced displacement remains the main driver behind the changes in stocks of international migrants in this subregion.

Figure 3: Stock of migrants in East and Central Africa, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.


Figure 4: Stock of migrants, as a percentage of total population, in East and Central Africa, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Migration from East Africa is primarily intraregional, with considerable flows of forced and voluntary migrants, which results in many countries being source, transit and destination countries at the same time. Migration outside the region is primarily to Southern Africa, the Middle East and, especially for countries in the Horn of Africa, Europe (ICMPD, 2007).
- Internal displacement is significant in East and Central Africa. An estimated 26 million people were internally displaced

worldwide at the end of 2008, with at least 10 million (38%) living in East and Central Africa (see figure 5) (IDMC, 2009). In addition to conflict and instability, environmental degradation and natural disasters result in population movements across the region. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia host more than 1 million IDPs each, as a result of entrenched conflict but also renewed instability.


Figure 5: Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in East and Central Africa

Note: This figure includes the most recent available country figures. These refer either to 2009 (Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) or 2008 (Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Somalia) data. For Burundi and Zimbabwe, the estimates are for 2006 and 2005, respectively.

Source: IDMC, 2009.

- In East Africa, a recent prolonged drought has caused widespread crop failures, killed thousands of cattle and kept food prices high, leaving much of the population struggling to survive in the driest regions of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. The impact of environmental change could lead to a large number of people moving to cities or across borders, especially among pastoralist communities who live in the most arid parts of East Africa. For instance, in 2009, the number of Kenyans in urgent need of food aid had risen to 3.8 million from 2.5 million (*Financial Times*, 29 September 2009).
- After a 5 per cent increase between 2007 and 2008, remittance inflows to countries of East and Central Africa are estimated to have declined by 3 per cent in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009). Kenya is the top receiving country in the region, with nearly USD 1.6 billion received as remittances in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009).


Figure 6: Remittance inflows to East and Central Africa in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)




Source: Ratha et al. 2009.

- Countries of East and Central Africa also recorded significant remittance outflows, reaching USD 1.7 billion in 2008; Angola was the top sending country, with USD 600 million in remittances sent in 2008 (see figures 6, 7 and 8) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 7: Remittance inflows in East and Central Africa as a share of GDP: top five countries in 2008 (in %)



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- Regional economic communities, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East Africa Community (EAC), have developed initiatives aimed at fostering regional integration and management of mobility between participating countries, as well as increased awareness of the correlation between migration and development (ICMPD, 2007).

IGAD's Health and Social Development Programme explicitly includes a migration policy dialogue component and, in 2008, it launched a regional consultative process (RCP) on migration for IGAD countries, comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, to develop a common regional migration policy that would harmonize laws, standards and procedures, and share information on migration issues (IGAD, 2008a).

The IGAD-RCP will promote a continuous migration dialogue for the East Africa Region, bringing together representatives of IGAD


Member States and other stakeholders, including countries of transit and destination.

The IGAD-RCP will support Member States in integrating migration issues into their national development plans, including poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), in order to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Further, it will establish a follow-up mechanism, as well as ensuring regular reporting on implementation of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and related activities (IGAD, 2008b).

NORTH AFRICA


- The total migrant stock in North Africa decreased between 1990 and 2005. Over the last five years (2005–2010), however, it has increased, reaching 1.8 million migrants in 2010. Similarly, the stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population increased slightly from 1.3 per cent in 2005 to 1.4 per cent in 2010 (see figures 9 and 10) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 9: Stock of migrants in North Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 10: Stock of migrants in North Africa, by destination, as a percentage of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Remittance inflows to North Africa are estimated to have declined by nearly 9 per cent between 2008 and 2009, with decreases in remittances to Morocco accounting for most of this change (see figure 11). According to Ratha et al. (2009), Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia rank among the top five remittance-receiving countries in Africa, with an aggregate of USD 14.0 billion remittances received in 2008 (12.8 billion


estimated for 2009), which accounts for over 40 per cent of recorded total remittance flows to Africa (see figures 12 and 13). In 2007, remittances represented 9 per cent of GDP in Morocco, 4.9 per cent in Tunisia, 3.8 per cent in Sudan and 1.6 per cent in Algeria. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is the main sending country of remittances, with almost USD 1 billion remitted by migrants in 2008 (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 11: Remittance inflows in North Africa in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)




Source: Ratha et al. 2009.

Figure 12: Remittance inflows in North Africa, as a percentage of GDP, in 2008



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 13: Remittance outflows from North Africa in 2006–2008 (in USD millions)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- Given the important changes in the population age structure of countries of origin in the Maghreb, demographic pressure will remain high and will possibly increase in the coming decades. This suggests that the number of potential migrants will be on the rise in the next two decades, as international migration has traditionally provided a solution to labour market disequilibrium in this region in the past. However, given the age structure of the population, this migration potential is likely to rapidly decline from 2030 onwards (OECD, 2009b).
- The impact of climate change on sea-level rise is likely to be important for migration. However, experience from the past in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia suggests that, while environmental hazards (droughts, earthquakes and floods) affect large numbers of people, those displaced have a high propensity to return to their homes after a disaster, whenever possible. This may then mitigate the role of climate change in shaping future migration patterns from these countries (OECD, 2009b).
- North African countries, which have traditionally been countries of origin of migrants, are progressively becoming

transit and destination countries for African and other migrants, most of them en route to Europe. Increasingly, African migrants are remaining in North African countries, with only a minority estimated to make the onward journey to Europe (IOM, 2008).


- In order to manage these migration flows through and from North Africa, countries in the region have resorted to establishing bilateral agreements with countries of destination, in addition to various cooperation methods on re-admission, including exchanges of letters, memorandums of understanding, administrative accords and police cooperation agreements with clauses concerning re-admission (OECD, 2009a). Calculations based on the MIREM database¹⁰ show that 18 agreements related to re-admission have been signed by countries of the Maghreb, while ten further agreements were being negotiated as of August 2009 (MIREM, 2010).

¹⁰ The MIREM project was created to support the reintegration of return migrants in their country of origin and to understand the impact of return migration on the Maghreb countries. See <http://www.mirem.eu/>


SOUTHERN AFRICA

- The total migrant stock in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average annual increase of 7.3 per cent since 2005. South Africa hosts the vast majority of these migrants (1.9 million) (see figure 14). The stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population increased from 2.7 per cent in 2005 to 3.7 per cent in 2010. While

Namibia is the country with the highest number of migrants as a percentage of the total population (6.3%), Botswana and South Africa experienced the highest increase in the number of migrants, both as a result of higher rates of economic growth and political and economic crisis in neighbouring countries, especially Zimbabwe (see figure 15) (UN DESA, 2009).




Source: UN DESA, 2009.


Figure 15: Stock of migrants as a percentage of total population in Southern Africa in 2000, 2005 and 2010

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Countries of Southern Africa received almost USD 1.6 billion in remittances, half of which went to South Africa alone (see figures 16 and 17). South Africa is also the top sending country in the region, with over USD 1.1 billion sent by migrants working in South Africa (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 16: Remittance inflows in Southern Africa in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 17: Remittance inflows in Southern Africa, as a percentage of GDP, in 2008


Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- In 2005, as part of efforts to build an integrated community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) produced a Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons, meant to enable citizens of the community “to enjoy freedom of movement of persons, namely visa-free entry, residence and establishment in the territories of Member States.” As of 2008, nine Member States had ratified the protocol, with South Africa expected to complete the ratification process in 2009. Even though the signature of the Protocol by at least nine Member States should have prompted agreement over the implementation framework, the framework has not been developed. The degree of overall compliance with the protocols on the movement of persons is low in Southern Africa, with only Mauritius and Zimbabwe 75 per cent compliant, while the figures for other countries are between 30 and 45 per cent (UNECA, 2008).


WEST AFRICA

- Compared to 2005, the total migrant stock in West Africa increased by 700,000 people (1.8% annual average growth rate), reaching a total migrant stock of 8.4 million people in 2010, which represents 2.8 per cent of the total population (UN DESA, 2009). Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria alone host two thirds of the international migrants in West Africa (see figures 18 and 19). Whereas 89 per cent of migrants in Côte d’Ivoire work in agriculture and the informal sector, the majority of the migrants in Ghana and Nigeria are employed in industry and services. According to the Nigerian Manpower Board, Nigeria also attracts foreign managers. Most of the migrants working in technical/managerial professions (47.4%) are from Europe (IOM, 2009a, b, c).

Figure 18: Stock of migrants in West Africa, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Widening economic disparities between and within ECOWAS¹¹ countries, where growth is concentrated in urban and coastal areas, and progress in the application of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment result in most West African nationals moving to other countries in the ECOWAS region (OECD, 2009a).
- It is expected that urban and coastal areas will experience a higher level of in-migration from rural areas and neighbouring

countries. In 2006, 39 per cent of the population in ECOWAS countries was living in urban areas. This figure is expected to rise to 75 per cent in 2050 (OECD, 2009a).

- Countries of West Africa received an estimated USD 12.7 billion in remittances in 2009. Nigeria is the top remittance-receiving country in Africa, with over USD 9.5 billion received in 2009, which accounts for approximately three quarters of all remittances received in West Africa (Ratha et al., 2009).

¹¹ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 countries, founded in 1975 to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity. <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=member&lang=en>

Figure 20: Remittance inflows in West Africa, as a percentage of GDP: top five countries in 2008

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons represents the founding block of migration management systems in West Africa. The main aim of the Protocol is to make ECOWAS a region where nationals of the 15 Member States can move, reside and work freely. The implementation of the protocol is not uniform across the different countries; however, all ECOWAS States have abolished visa and entry requirements for ECOWAS nationals for a 90-day stay. Seven countries issue ECOWAS travel certificates that allow for easy travel in the region and are substantially cheaper to produce and acquire than national passports. In addition to the travel certificate, Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal have issued the ECOWAS passport to their nationals, and Ghana is expected to begin doing so in April 2010. Holding either one of these documents exempts a Community citizen from completing immigration and emigration forms when entering or leaving


ECOWAS Member States. Eventually, the passport is expected to replace the travel certificate (OECD, 2009a).

West African countries have also started to resort to the use of bilateral re-admission agreements, following the growth of such agreements in North African countries. Fifteen agreements related to re-admission have been signed, and a further 11 are currently being negotiated between West African countries and countries of the European Union. However, such agreements can put some West African States in a delicate position in relation to the ECOWAS free movement protocols, as they may require ECOWAS States to restrict the free movement within the ECOWAS region. As a consequence of these potentially conflicting demands on countries in the region, an increasing number of transit migrants remain stranded in ECOWAS countries and North Africa en route to Europe (OECD, 2009a).

Effects of the economic crisis

- Remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to have only slightly decreased in 2009 (USD 20.7 billion compared to USD 21.3 billion in 2008), but still remain at a higher level than in 2007 (USD 18.7 billion) (World Bank, 2010a). However, it is expected that a lagged response to a weak global economy will result in a slow recovery for African countries.
- The first countries to have been affected by the crisis were those that were more integrated into global financial markets, such as South Africa. The ripple effects of the crisis were felt in less globalized African economies, due to a reduction in demand for key African exports (namely oil, for countries such as Angola, Gabon and Nigeria, and commodities, for countries such as Botswana and Zambia), lower tourism volumes and levels of official development assistance. Overall, GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have decelerated by 4 percentage points between 2008 and 2009. Growth in middle-income countries, such as Botswana, Seychelles and South Africa, is projected to increase from 0.3 per cent in 2009 to 3.5 and 4 per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. In addition to stronger external demand and growth in the tourism sector, the recovery will also be led by stronger remittance inflows. Oil-exporting countries, such as Angola and Gabon, are likely to be the first to experience growth in 2010, reaching 4.9 per cent in 2010, and 5.3 per cent in 2011. For low-income countries in Africa, the recovery will be slower due to weaker recovery in key economic sectors. Fragile States will see slightly more robust growth, due to less exposure to global economic dynamics, and will experience benefits, in some cases, from the peace dividend (World Bank, 2010b).
- Overall, the recovery is expected to be modest, with GDP expanding by a comparatively small 3.8 and 4.6 per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. These estimates are subject to growth at the international level and thus are uncertain. Stronger growth in key economic partners will result in stronger external demand and more foreign direct investment flows. Incomes in countries dependent on workers' remittances are expected to remain subdued, largely owing to continued high unemployment in key African and OECD destination countries (World Bank, 2010b).
- The flow of Moroccan migrants to Spain declined less than flows from other countries of origin, which are more recent and labour-market driven. In addition, while the National Statistics Institute of Spain estimates that the number of migrants leaving Spain doubled from 120,000 in 2006 to 232,000 in 2008, anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of unauthorized sub-Saharan African migrants have stayed in Spain, largely because of poor economies in their home countries (Fix et al., 2009).
- Closures in the mine and smelter sector, which has traditionally employed migrants from neighbouring countries, have led to mass layoffs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (100,000), South Africa (40,000) and Zambia (3,000) (Fix et al., 2009).
- World Bank data (2009) from major origin countries of North and West Africa reveal negative growth of remittance inflows, starting from the fourth quarter of 2008 and deepening in the first part of 2009 to reach almost -20 per cent for Morocco and Nigeria. Data from the second half of 2009 show a slowdown in the negative year-on-year growth, signaling that, while remittance inflows are still decreasing, it can be expected that the first part of 2010 will see a slight growth in remittance flows (compared to the same period in 2009) (see figures 21 and 22). It should, however, be noted that the decrease in remittance growth takes place in the context of high remittance growth, prior to the crisis, and currency fluctuations due to pervasive instability in the financial markets.

Figure 21: Year-on-year growth in remittance inflows, per quarter, for selected countries in North and West Africa in 2008–2009 (in %)




Note: Refers to latest available data as of November 2009.

Source: Based on data from the World Bank (2009).

- Data on remittance inflows from major countries of origin in East Africa reveal an even more marked decrease on a year-on-year basis. The first signs of a decline in remittance inflows were felt as early as the third quarter of 2008, with negative growth reaching almost -40 per cent in Uganda in the first quarter of 2009 (World Bank, 2009).
- Against this trend, data from Cape Verde's Central Bank registered annual increases in remittance inflows between 2008 and June 2009. However, this was mostly due to exchange-rate fluctuations (Fix et al., 2009).

Figure 22: Year-on-year growth in remittance inflows, per quarter, for selected countries in East Africa in 2008–2009 (in %)



Note: Refers to latest available data as of November 2009.

Source: Based on data from the World Bank (2009).

- According to IOM (2009d), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Morocco reported increased irregular migration in the months following the beginning of the financial crisis. In Morocco, the number of Moroccan migrants returned through IOM Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes from destination countries

decreased from 2007 to 2008 but increased in early 2009. In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the number of migrants returned through IOM AVR programmes from destination countries decreased from 2007 to 2008, while the number returned to source countries remained stable.

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
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AMERICAS REGIONAL OVERVIEW

- The number of international migrants in the Americas has increased over the last two decades, from almost 47 million in 2000 to over 57.5 million in 2010. Just over a quarter (27%) of all migrants in the world reside in the Americas (UN DESA, 2009).
- Migration in the Americas is overwhelmingly between countries within the region. According to the Census 2000 data,

- the main country of destination for migrants in the Americas is the USA, which hosts over two thirds of Latin American and Caribbean emigrants and over 70 per cent of Canadian emigrants (DRC, 2007).
- Net migration rates vary, depending on the subregion. Generally, net migration rates are positive for North American countries and negative for Latin American and Caribbean countries (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Net migration rates per 1,000 population in 2000–2005 and 2005–2010*




Note: *For convenience, the subregions defined by UN DESA have been used here.
Source: UN DESA, 2008.

- The sex ratio of migrants in the region is balanced, with practically the same number of male and female international migrants (UN DESA, 2009).
- As a result of the global economic crisis, remittances sent to Latin America and the Caribbean were expected to decrease by 9.6 per cent to almost USD 58.5 million in 2009 (World Bank, 2010). Latest estimates on remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean indicate a drop of 12 per cent in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2010). However, even though migration outflows in the region have decreased, they are still positive and there is no evidence of a large-scale return to countries of origin.

NORTH AMERICA¹²

- In total, migrants account for 14.2 per cent of the total population in North America. The number of international migrants in North America increased from 40.4 million in 2000 to 50 million in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).
- The USA remains the top migrant destination country in the world, with 42.8 million migrants in 2010 – around 23 per cent more than in 2000 (see figure 2a). However, relative to population size, Bermuda has the highest share of migrants, followed by Canada and Saint Pierre et Miquelon (see figure 2b). Compared to 2000, Bermuda, Canada and the USA have seen an increase in their immigrant stocks in both absolute and relative terms (UN DESA, 2009).


Figure 2a: Stock of migrants in the USA and Canada, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

¹² This section covers Canada, the USA and three dependent territories or overseas departments (Bermuda, Greenland and Saint Pierre et Miquelon).

Figure 2b: Stock of migrants in North America, as a share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)




Source: UN DESA, 2009.


- As an immigration subregion, emigrant stocks are significantly less important than immigrant stocks in North America. Around 3.6 million North American citizens lived outside their country of birth

(see figures 3a and 3b), over 60 per cent of which came from the USA. However, in relative terms, less than 1 per cent of the North American population lives abroad.

Figure 3a: Emigration in North America in 2000 (in thousands)



Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data. Values for Saint Pierre et Miquelon are not available.
Source: DRC, 2007.

Figure 3b: Emigration in North America, as a share of total population, in 2000 (in %)


Note: Values for Saint Pierre et Miquelon are not available.

Source: Based on DRC, 2007 and UN DESA, 2008.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- The USA remains the top migrant destination country in the world, hosting around a fifth of all migrants. Here, migrants account for 13.5 per cent of the population (UN DESA, 2009) and they come mainly from Mexico, followed by the Philippines, Germany, India, China, Viet Nam, Canada, Cuba, El Salvador and the United Kingdom (World Bank, 2008).

- Latin American and Caribbean migrants currently account for 53 per cent of the total foreign-born population in the USA. Mexicans alone make up 30 per cent of the total migrant population living in the USA. Asians are the second-most numerous group, with over 10 million people – a 27 per cent share of the total migrant population, made up of nearly 2 million Chinese, 1.7 million Filipinos and 1.6 million Indians (see figure 4) (MPI, 2008).

Figure 4: Foreign-born population by region of birth for the USA: 1960–2008 (in millions)

Source: Migration Policy Institute (MPI), based on Decennial Censuses 1960 to 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey.

- Overall, migration to the USA is slowing (Fix et al., 2009), which is likely to be due not only to the economic crisis, but also to stricter immigration and border enforcement, increasing anti-immigrant sentiment and improving conditions in some sending countries (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009).
- The USA is by far the largest source of remittances in the world, with USD 47.2 billion in outward flows recorded for 2008, which represents 17 per cent of the world total remittance outflows. However, the USA's share of global outward flows has decreased: in 2000, it was the source of 28 per cent of global remittances (World Bank, 2009). This decline may be related to world migration patterns being characterized by a more diverse range of destination countries.
- Following the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, the US Government granted Haitians in the country Temporary Protected Status, ensuring that Haitians living in the country are protected from deportation and enabling them to work. Hondurans, Nicaraguans and Salvadorans already benefit from this status (USCIS, 2010).
- It is estimated that 30 per cent of the foreign-born population in the USA is in an irregular situation; at least 40 per cent of this population is made up of women (Latapi, A. et al., forthcoming).
- Although no data on remittances to or from Canada are available, Canada is likely to be an important source of remittances: a study by Statistics Canada found that nearly 30 per cent of new arrivals remitted an average of CAD\$ 1,450 (around USD 1,350) per year (Statistics Canada, 2008).

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN^{13, 14}

- The number of international migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean is estimated to have increased from 6.5 million in 2000 to 7.5 million in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).
- Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, with 1.4 and 1 million immigrants in 2010, respectively, remain the two top destination countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, while Mexico has replaced Brazil in third place. Among the ten main destination countries in the region, Argentina, Paraguay, Puerto Rico and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have seen a reduction in the number of migrants since 2000 (see figure 5a). On the other hand, Ecuador has experienced the highest relative increase compared to 2000, ranking now as the seventh-most important country of destination (UN DESA, 2009).
- Relative to population size, overseas departments and dependent territories of the larger countries have the highest proportion of immigrants. The Cayman Islands rank first, followed by the US Virgin Islands and French Guiana (see figure 5a) (UN DESA, 2009).

CANADA

- In 2010, Canada is estimated to host 7.2 million immigrants, who comprise 21 per cent of its total population (UN DESA, 2009). Unusually, for a country in this region, most of the top countries of origin of these immigrants (China, India, Italy and the United Kingdom) are not in the Americas (World Bank, 2008).
- Canada is also a country of emigration, with 1.3 million citizens living abroad in 2005 – around 4 per cent of the total population. The USA is the primary country of destination, followed by the United Kingdom and Australia (World Bank, 2008).


¹³ This section covers 14 Caribbean countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Grenadines, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago); 8 Central American countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama); 12 South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)), and 10 dependent territories or overseas departments (Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands).

¹⁴ In previous *World Migration Reports*, Mexico has been considered as part of North America; however, to bring the regional definition more closely into line with that provided by other agencies, it has been decided to include Mexico in the Latin American and Caribbean region for 2010.

- The growing participation of women in the labour market over the last decades has been accompanied by the feminization of migration in the subregion. The share of female migrants


in the international migrant stocks has grown from 44.2 per cent in 1960, to 48.1 per cent in 1980 and 50.1 per cent in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 5a: Stock of migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.


Figure 5b: Stock of migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, as a share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Over the last few decades, Latin America and the Caribbean has become a region of net emigration. Between 2000 and 2010, emigration flows in the countries of the region surpassed immigration flows by 11.0 million people. This difference between the flows of emigrants and immigrants is widest in Central America (6.8 million), followed by South America (3 million) and the Caribbean (1.2 million) (UN DESA, 2009).
- According to the Census 2000 data, around 26.6 million Latin American- and Caribbean-born people live outside their country of birth (DRC, 2007). Emigration from Latin American and Caribbean countries accounted for about 15 per cent of international migration in the world.
- The top emigration countries in the region are Mexico, Colombia, Puerto Rico¹⁵ and Cuba, followed by El Salvador, Brazil, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Peru (see figure 6a). Mexico is the top emigration country in the world, with 10.1 million people living abroad (about 10% of the country's total population) (DRC, 2007).
- Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands Antilles and the US Virgin islands are among the top ten countries with both the largest number of emigrants and immigrants relative to their total population (see figure 6b) (DRC, 2007; UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 6a: Emigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, top ten countries in 2000 (in thousands)




Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.

Source: DRC, 2007.

¹⁵ Puerto Ricans are US citizens and are thus able to travel freely to the USA, where around 90 per cent of Puerto Rican migrants reside.

Figure 6b: Emigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, as share of total population, top ten countries in 2000 (in %)




Source: Based on DRC, 2007 and UN DESA 2008.

- According to the Census 2000 data, the main destinations for Latin American migrants were the USA, Argentina and Spain, followed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Canada, with 68 per cent of the total subregional emigrant stock residing in the USA. More than half of

these emigrants came from Mexico (see figure 7). The Mexico–USA corridor is the largest migration corridor in the world, with 9.3 million migrants (DRC, 2007). This reflects the particular “historical and geographical relation” between the USA and Mexico (Durand, 2009).

Figure 7: Destination countries of emigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in 2000 (in %)




Note: DRC estimates are based on the Census 2000 data.

Source: Based on DRC estimates, 2007.

- Latin American and Caribbean emigration towards Canada, although numerically smaller than flows towards the USA, has shown a significant growth during the last decades, particularly from the English-speaking Caribbean countries (Pellegrino, 2003).
- Migration towards Latin American and Caribbean countries is dominated by corridors between bordering countries – from the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay towards Argentina; from Colombia towards the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and from Nicaragua towards Costa Rica.
- Emigration to Europe is predominantly to Spain: migrants from Latin American and Caribbean countries make up nearly 38 per cent of all Spain's immigrants (DRC, 2007).
- Brazil is unusual, for a mainland Latin American country, in that it receives more migrants from outside the region. Its extra-regional emigration flows are also significant: almost 20 per cent of Brazilian migrants live in Japan, making up the third-largest group of migrants in the country (DRC, 2007). Most of these migrants are of Japanese origin, taking advantage of facilitated visa arrangements and comparatively high wages (Durand, 2009).
- Civil conflict in Colombia displaced over 200,000 civilians within the country in 2008. Overall, the Government estimates that around 6 per cent of the population (over 2.5 million people) are internally displaced, meaning that Colombia hosts one of the three largest IDP populations in the world (IDMC, 2009).
- Several Central American and Caribbean countries are heavily dependent on migrants abroad. In Honduras and Nicaragua, in Central America, and in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Guyana, in the Caribbean, 60 per cent of the population has relatives abroad and about half of those households receive remittances (Orozco, 2009a).
- According to migrant remittance data provided by the World Bank, Latin American and Caribbean countries received USD 64.7 billion in remittances in 2008 (World Bank, 2009), which represents about 1.5 per cent of the regional GDP. This makes it the region with the highest level of remittances per capita (Awad, 2009). Four out of every five remittance dollars sent to Latin American and Caribbean countries come from migrants in the USA (Ratha et al., 2008).
- Since Latin America and the Caribbean is an emigration subregion, its outward flows are much smaller; they measured USD 4.4 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2009).
- The country with the highest remittance inflows is Mexico, which received USD 26.3 billion in 2008 (41% of the total inflows into the countries in the region), making it the third-largest remittance recipient in the world. At a regional level, Mexico is followed by Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala (see figure 8). In relative terms, in 2007, remittances accounted for more than 10 per cent of GDP in seven economies, six of them in Central America and the Caribbean: Guyana (25.8%), Honduras (21.5%), Jamaica (18.8%), El Salvador (18.2%), Haiti (18.2%), Nicaragua (12.9%) and Guatemala (12.6%) (World Bank, 2009).

Remittance inflows to most Latin American and Caribbean countries began to fall from 2006 onwards. This took place primarily as a result of the first signs of stagnation and decline in the construction sector in the USA and Spain – two top destinations for Latin American emigrants and two economies particularly hard hit by the recession.

**Figure 8: Remittance inflows to the top ten recipient countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2008
(in USD millions)**



Source: Based on the World Bank's migrant remittance inflows, November 2009.

Effects of the economic crisis

The economic crisis began in the USA and its impacts there have been severe, leading to unemployment climbing to 9.2 per cent in 2009, and GDP shrinking by 2.5 per cent. Canada also experienced rising unemployment and falling GDP (OECD, 2009a). In Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC¹⁶ (2009) estimates that the GDP of the region fell by 3.1 per cent by the end of 2009, resulting in the loss of 3.4 million jobs.

Central American countries have been hurt more than South American countries by the economic crisis, due to their strong ties to the North American economy (Cox, 2009).

Economic output in the region is expected to grow in 2010. Regional GDP is projected to increase by 3.1 per cent in 2010 and 3.6 per cent in 2011. However, many small countries in Central America, which are highly dependent on migrant remittances, are likely to lag behind the overall recovery in output (World Bank, 2010).

Unemployment

- Rising unemployment in key destination countries, such as Spain and the USA, adversely affected migrant workers from Latin America and the Caribbean. The recession has had a harsh impact on the employment of Latin American immigrants in the USA. In particular, the unemployment rate for Mexican and Central American immigrants (11.4% in June 2009) is greater than the unemployment rate for native-born Americans (9.5%) and 2.6 times greater than the rate recorded in 2007 (4.4%) (Fix et al., 2009). Migrants have been vulnerable to the effects of the recession due to their over-concentration in sectors such as construction (13% migrant workers) and manufacturing, which have been hardest hit by the recession; 1.1 million construction jobs were lost between January 2007 and early 2009. Migrants are also strongly represented in the North American hospitality sector, which also suffered significant job losses (OECD, 2009b). Migrant workers also hold a disproportionate number of vulnerable temporary or part-time jobs in the retail trade, food services and construction sectors (OECD, 2009b). In Portugal, over 10,000 Brazilian migrants were reported as unemployed at the end of 2009 (IOM, 2010).

¹⁶ The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) is one of five regional commissions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It was created in 1948 and supports governments in the economic and social development of that region.

Higher unemployment rates for migrants are not only due to their over-representation in sectors that are particularly sensitive to the business cycle. Minority and immigrant groups in the USA have been affected differently, indicating that factors beyond immigration status, such as education, language fluency or duration of stay, are also important. Additionally, the economic crisis has been more widespread than previous recessions and has caused job losses in a wide range of industries (OECD, 2009b). Surveys of migrants in the USA in 2008 found that the majority of migrant remitters thought their employment situation was unstable (Orozco, 2009a).

Lack of social protection for migrants in some countries, such as the USA, makes migrants particularly vulnerable during an economic crisis. Recent legal immigrants and undocumented immigrants are ineligible for unemployment benefits or underemployment programmes. Undocumented immigrants are also ineligible for all federal benefit programmes and services except minimal emergency services (Orozco, 2009a).

Spain, another key country of destination for Latin American and Caribbean migrants, saw its unemployment rate reach 17.4 per cent in March 2009 – an increase of 1.8 million additional unemployed workers compared with March 2008 (OECD, 2009c). Migrant workers are strongly represented in the construction sector, which saw a 107 per cent increase in unemployment (Awad, 2009; IOM, 2010).

Remittances


Rising unemployment, along with immigration controls and fluctuations in exchange rates, affects remittance decisions among migrant workers and has had a significant impact on remittance flows (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2009).

The impact of the economic crisis on migrant remittances was felt strongly and early in Latin America and the Caribbean because of the existing links with Spain and the USA – two countries among the first to be severely hit by the recession and key destinations for Latin American migrants.

Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, which had increased by more than 15 per cent between 2000 and 2006, slowed their growth in 2007 and 2008 (World Bank, 2009), reflecting mainly the problems in the US job market (Ratha et al., 2009a). The World Bank projected that remittance flows into the region would decline by 9.6 per cent overall by the end of 2009 (World Bank, 2010).

Remittance inflows to every Latin American and Caribbean country were expected to drop in 2009 and the steepest declines occurred in Mexico, Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras and El Salvador. Mexico was hardest hit by the recession as it felt the effects of the crisis first, with a 3 per cent decline in remittances between 2007 and 2008, and experienced the largest drop in 2009, with a 13 per cent decrease (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Latin American and Caribbean remittance recipients with the largest recent declines in remittances in 2004–2009 (in %)



Note: Remittance inflows for 2009 are estimates.

Source: Based on the World Bank's migrant remittance inflow data, November 2009.

- According to the latest data reported by central banks, this decline seems to have bottomed out, with remittances expected to start rising again following the recovery of the US economy (Ratha et al., 2010).
- It is estimated that 1 million households that previously received remittances did not receive money in 2009, and an additional 4 million households received 10 per cent less than in previous years. Some households may have lost as much as 65 per cent of total household income (Orozco, 2009a).
- Andean countries in South America are also affected by reductions in remittance flows from Spain. Remittances to Ecuador fell by 13 per cent in the third trimester of 2008 (Santiso, 2009).
- Until the third quarter of 2009, remittance flows to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region show larger declines than expected. However, the decline in flows appears to be bottoming out in most countries across the region. Remittances are also expected to remain more resilient than private capital flows and will become even more important as a source of external financing in many developing countries (Ratha et al., 2009b).
- However, only a modest recovery is estimated for remittances in the 2010–2011 period, due to weak labour market conditions in the USA and other high-income countries (World Bank, 2010).

Irregular migration

- US Border Patrol data show that fluctuations in migrant apprehensions closely track changes in labour demand. Given the high proportion of irregular migrants from Mexico to the USA in 2008 (it is estimated that 55% of Mexican migrants, and 80–85% of recent arrivals, in the USA are unauthorized), the recent steep drop in the flows from Mexico (from 1 million in 2006, to 600,000 in 2009) is largely due to potential irregular Mexican migrants deciding to stay at home, as legal immigration levels have remained largely unchanged. As a result, the overall number of Mexicans in the USA has remained essentially unchanged during a period when it would have been expected to grow by 1 million (Fix et al., 2009).
- However, the downward trend in irregular migration is the consequence

of a combination of the recession and increased enforcement against undocumented workers (Martin, 2009). Besides a significant reduction in labour demand in economic sectors that traditionally employ migrant workers, many countries of destination have reinforced their internal measures against employers of irregular migrants, while stepping up their use of return programmes, enforcing residence laws more strictly, and stiffening border controls (Fix et al., 2009).

Return

- The crisis has not caused a mass return of Latin American and Caribbean migrant workers to their home countries (Awad, 2009). Migration flows from many countries appear to have been negatively affected by the financial crisis and by weak job markets in countries of destination, but flows are still positive.
- Return migration is more often linked to conditions in the source country than in the destination country (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009).
- Surveys from 2008 indicated that only 10 per cent of migrants in the USA plan to return home, and none of them plans to return home within one year (Orozco, 2009a).
- The net outflow of Mexicans from the USA dropped by over 50 per cent between August 2007 and August 2008 (INEGI, as cited in Awad, 2009) and additional data from the Mexican Government's Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico show that return migration from the USA appears to have declined in recent years. About 210,000 migrants returned in the first quarter of 2007, compared to about 199,000 in the first quarter of 2008 and 166,000 in the first quarter of 2009. There appears to have been more returns to Mexico at the time of the last recession in 2001 (240,000) (Fix et al., 2009).
- The crisis in Spain has also produced declining immigrant inflows, although the bulk of Latin American migrants seem to be staying, largely because of weak

economies in their countries of origin (Fix et al., 2009).

- Intraregional migration, such as migration within Central America, is not expected to fall significantly. Foreign labour will continue to be needed for traditional export products such as coffee, sugar and fruits. These are the largest agribusinesses in the subregion and major sources of demand for migrant workers (ILO, 2009).
- Governments of countries of destination have adopted a series of policy responses in order to pursue three main objectives: protect labour markets for native workers, restrict the inflow of migrants, and encourage their departure.

Policy responses

- Some of the primary destination countries for Latin American and Caribbean migrants have implemented policies that make it harder to recruit foreign workers. The US financial stimulus package, for example, placed limitations on hiring foreign nationals if native-born workers are available, and Spain reduced its quotas for non-seasonal workers to be recruited from abroad by 90 per cent in 2009, compared to 2008 (IOM, 2010). Canada left its permanent and temporary immigration targets unchanged, but created stricter job advertising requirements, particularly for unskilled and low-skilled jobs (Awad, 2009). Such policies contribute to the current reduction in labour migration flows (OECD, 2009b).
- Although the temporary work permit caps have not been changed in the USA in recent years, employers using temporary permits have become subject to more stringent authorization procedures and control mechanisms, such as the E-Verify system for checking the immigration status of new employees. Additionally, temporary permits have become more difficult to renew (OECD, 2009a).
- These measures resulted in a 16 per cent decline in the issuance of H-1B visas (the main temporary employment visas) in 2008 and, in 2009, for the first time, the cap for filling H-1B visas was not reached

- in the first week that applications were being accepted (OECD, 2009a).
- In addition to being affected by the recession in the USA, immigrants have also faced increasing border enforcement and deportation. In 2007, almost 320,000 migrants were deported; 96 per cent were from Latin America. Since 2004, deportations have risen by 50 per cent overall (Orozco, 2009a). Between fiscal year 2004 and 2009, the US Government budget for border enforcement rose 82 per cent – from USD 6 billion to USD 10.1 billion – largely to increase the number of border patrol agents and build physical and virtual fencing along the US–Mexico border (Meissner and Kerwin, 2009).
 - In response to rising unemployment, Spain and Japan offer economic incentives, such as paid one-way tickets home and payments in exchange for migrants' promise to leave the country for a period of time or even indefinitely.
 - In 2009, Spain (the main country of destination for South American migrants in Europe), offered return bonuses to non-EU foreigners who would leave Spain for at least three years, whereas Japan introduced a programme that pays USD 3,000 to unemployed immigrants of Japanese descendants from Latin America (mainly from Brazil and Peru), plus USD 2,000 for each dependant to return to their countries of origin until the economic conditions have improved in Japan (Ratha et al., 2009b).
 - These programmes have had only modest results, to date: during the first eight months of Spain's programme, only 5,391 people (5% of the eligible population) applied and 90 per cent of them were Latin Americans, primarily from Ecuador (IOM, 2010). Partly because of the weak response to financial incentives, Spain and other European countries are now considering alternative immigration measures (Ratha et al., 2009b).
 - Some Latin American and Caribbean countries have introduced direct mea-sures to assist returning migrants. Additionally, social and employment policies implemented to address the consequences of the economic crisis may affect migration trends as well.
 - Ecuador has new programmes to aid returning migrants. A plan called Welcome Home was initiated in 2007 to facilitate return in a number of ways, such as by providing an aid package and social reintegration programmes. Ecuador also signed an agreement with a university in Madrid to begin a training programme for Ecuadorian nationals returning to jobs in Ecuador's agricultural sector (Awad, 2009). Colombia has also launched a plan to assist Colombian returnees. The Welcome Home programme (an initiative of the Mayor of Bogota, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IOM) facilitates the process for those who need psychosocial or legal assistance, guidance on entering the job market, access to educational and health services, and support in setting up income-generating projects.
 - In some countries, policies aimed at alleviating the consequences of the economic crisis on labour markets are expected to have an impact on migration trends. The use of unemployment insurance is being increased and initiatives that consider the medium- and long-term implications of the crisis, such as vocational education and professional training, are receiving increased attention. Peru is providing job retraining for people who have been laid off because of the crisis, and Costa Rica is proposing financial assistance to families to keep students in school longer. Direct and indirect government job-creation policies are also being strengthened, particularly in Chile and Colombia. Finally, programmes such as Mi Primer Empleo and ProJoven, which address unemployment among youth, are being emphasized in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Peru (ECLAC/ILO, 2009).

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
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ASIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

- The stock of international migrants in Asia¹⁷ in 2010 is estimated to rise to 27.5 million, which represents just under 13 per cent of the total global figure (UN DESA, 2009).
- There has been a slight increase in the number of female international migrants in all the subregions of Asia, except for South-Central Asia. Almost half of all international migrants in Asia (48%) are women (see figure 1) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 1: Female migrants as a percentage of international migrants in 2000, 2005 and 2010




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

¹⁷ These data do not include the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) or Turkey. Please see the regional overview for Europe for data on these countries.

- The net migration rate for Asia continues to be negative, at -0.3 per 1,000 of population between 2005 and 2010. This is also true for the subregions of Asia (see figure 2). The top five countries with negative rates in 2005–2010 are Sri Lanka (-3), Lao People's Democratic Republic (-2.4), Myanmar and the Philippines (-2) and Pakistan (-1.6). By contrast,

Singapore and Macau, China, continue to have high net migration rates with 22 and 19.3 per 1,000 population, respectively, in 2005 and 2010. Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region of China) and Bhutan are among the few countries in Asia with positive net migration rates (3.3 and 2.9, respectively) (UN DESA, 2008).

Figure 2: Net migration rate per 1,000 population in 1995–2000, 2000–2005 and 2005–2010




Source: UN DESA, 2008.

- In absolute numbers, China, Bangladesh and India are among the top ten emigration countries worldwide (World Bank, 2008). According to the Census 2000 data, Pakistan, with 3,426,337, and the Philippines, with 3,399,794, remain important origin countries for migrants

moving both within and outside the region (see figure 3) (DRC 2007).


- Approximately 37 per cent of Asian migrants move to OECD countries; of the remainder, 43 per cent migrate within the region and the rest migrate to other countries outside the region (see figure 4a).

Figure 3: Top ten emigration countries in Asia in 2000 (in millions)



Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.

Figure 4a: Stock of emigrants from Asia, by region of destination, in 2000 (in %)




Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.

- According to the 2000 Census Round Data, the USA was the main destination for Asians, with 7.9 million emigrants recorded there. However, countries within Asia are also important destinations for migrants from the region, with India registering 6.1 million immigrants from

Asian countries, primarily Bangladesh and Pakistan, followed by Pakistan (with nearly 2.8 million intraregional migrants), Hong Kong SAR (nearly 2.5 million),¹⁸ Iran (almost 1.9 million) and Malaysia (almost 1.7 million) (see figure 4b) (DRC, 2007).

Figure 4b: Stock of emigrants from Asia, by country of destination, in 2000 (in millions)




Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.

- Four of the top ten migration corridors worldwide include Asian countries, led by Bangladesh–India (3.5 million migrants in 2005), and followed by India–United Arab Emirates (2.2 million), the Philippines–USA and Afghanistan–Iran (both 1.6 million) (World Bank, 2008).
- Undocumented migration is increasingly an issue within the region. It is estimated that some of Asia's largest undocumented migration flows may be among the largest overall contemporary flows, with the Bangladesh–India corridor alone involving up to 17 million people (Hugo, 2010).

¹⁸ It should be noted that migration to both the Hong Kong SAR and Macau, China, are dominated by migrants from mainland China, who are counted as foreign-born.


- The number of refugees in Asia is rising: from 2.9 million refugees in 2005, there are now 3.9 million refugees in 2010, accounting for 14 per cent of all international migrants in the region and almost a quarter of the world's refugees. The increase of the refugee stock in South-Central Asia is the largest of the subregions (UN DESA, 2009).
- There has been an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disaster-related hazards and the impacts of this trend are already, highly visible in Asia. In 2008, the earthquake in the Sichuan Province displaced 15 million people in China, accounting for over 40 per cent of all persons displaced by natural disasters in 2008. Some 31 million (86%) of all people displaced by disasters in 2008 were living in Asia. Of the 20 disasters that caused most displacement in 2008, 17 were in Asia (IDMC/OCHA, 2009).
- The total remittance inflow in Asia was USD 162.5 billion in 2009 (39% of total global remittances). This is only a small decrease compared to the USD 165.8 billion the region received in 2008. India and China (both of which received USD 47 billion) account for over half of these remittances; these countries also rank first and second on the list of the ten leading remittance-receiving countries worldwide. The list also includes the Philippines (USD 19 billion), Bangladesh (USD 10 billion) and Pakistan (USD 8.6 billion) (see figure 5a) (Ratha et al., 2009).
- In 2008, the largest remittance outflows came from Malaysia (USD 6.4 billion), China (USD 5.7 billion) and Japan (USD 4.8 billion) (see figure 5b) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 5a: Remittance inflows to selected countries in Asia in 2002–2008 (in USD millions)



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 5b: Remittance outflows from selected countries in Asia in 2002–2008 (in USD millions)



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- In the last quarter of 2009, the region may even have experienced a surge in remittances, as migrants sent money to help relatives affected by natural disasters, such as the typhoons in the Philippines and earthquakes in the Pacific Islands and Indonesia (Ratha et al., 2009).
- Karachi, Nagoya, Osaka, Seoul and Taipei are all global metropolitan areas – cities of 1 million or more people – with at least 100,000 foreign-born residents. Hong Kong SAR and Singapore are urban areas that host more than 1 million foreign-born residents (MPI, 2007).


EAST ASIA

- East Asian countries host nearly 6.5 million migrants, with almost all countries

of this subregion experiencing a growth of their migrant stock. East Asia hosts the highest percentage of female international migrants in the region (55%).

- The Hong Kong SAR is the main destination of international migrants in East Asia, with about 2.7 million migrants, followed by Japan (around 2.2 million). While the Republic of Korea ranked fourth in the sub-region as a country of destination in 2000, China surpassed the Republic of Korea in 2010 (see figure 6a) (UN DESA, 2009).
- When migrants are considered as a proportion of the total population, Macau, China emerges as the main destination for migrants, with 54.7 per cent, followed by Hong Kong SAR (38.8%), Japan (1.7%), the Republic of Korea (1.1%) and Mongolia (0.4%) in 2010 (see figure 6b).


Figure 6a: Stock of migrants in East Asia, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Note: East Asian countries showing negligible values on the scale are not included in this table.

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 6b: Stock of migrants in East Asia, as share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)




Note: East Asian countries showing negligible values on the scale are not included in this figure.

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- East Asian countries are the source of around 10 million emigrants, nearly 6 million of whom are Chinese. According to the Census 2000 data, the USA, with nearly 3 million East Asian migrants, is the main country of destination, followed by Japan (783,000), Canada (775,000) and Australia (almost 300,000). Furthermore, Hong Kong SAR receives 2.3 million migrants, almost exclusively coming from China (DRC, 2007).
- In 2009, remittance inflows decreased slightly – from USD 55 billion in 2008 to USD 52 billion (Ratha et al., 2009).¹⁹ The largest amounts go to China and the Republic of Korea (see figure 7). Together with Japan, these two countries are also the source of the largest outflows. In 2008, remittances from East Asian countries totalled USD 15.3 billion.

Figure 7: Remittance inflows to East Asia in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)



Note: Remittance inflows for 2009 are estimates.

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- Chinese students represent almost 25 per cent of students in Australia, making them the most important source of overseas students (Koser, 2009).
- There is a significant increase in family-formation migration (marriage migration) in East Asia. This is especially the case in Taiwan Province of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, and has the potential to be a source of future chain migration (Lee, 2009). In the Republic of Korea, the number of immigrants naturalized through marriage rose from 75,011 in 2005 to 109,564 in 2007 (Hugo, 2010). This marked increase in international marriages has led to growing policy interest in the Republic of Korea in promoting integration and multiculturalism.
- Given their status as rapidly ageing societies, Japan and the Republic of Korea are increasingly considering migration as part of a strategy to offset the labour market and social welfare costs of this

process. Public opinion in Japan, especially among the younger generation, seems to be shifting towards more favourable views on the subject (Llewellyn and Hirano, 2009).

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

- Malaysia and Singapore are the main destinations for international migrants in South-East Asia, with about 2.4 million and almost 2 million migrants, respectively, in 2010. They are followed by Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia is ranked fifth, although the total number of migrants is expected to decrease in 2010 (see figure 8a) (UN DESA, 2009). When migrants are considered as a proportion


¹⁹ Please note that the World Bank only provides data for China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Mongolia in comparison to the countries in the subregion of East Asia used in the *World Migration Report*.

of the total population, however, Singapore is the top country of destination followed by Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia (see figure 8b).

- Migration in the subregion is dominated by labour migration, with over 1.2 million of the almost 10.2 million migrants from the region working in Malaysia alone, and emigration to Saudi Arabia accounting for almost 700,000 migrants from the region. The main country of destination is the USA (almost 3.2 million migrants).


The Philippines may be the country most affected by global labour migration, with an estimated 3.4 million migrants abroad (DRC, 2007). Over half of the Filipinos employed abroad are women, and there are growing complaints that families pay a high price for this migration (*Migration News*, 2010). Other important countries of origin in the region include Viet Nam (2 million emigrants) and Indonesia (1.8 million) (DRC, 2007).

Figure 8a: Stock of migrants in South-East Asia, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 8b: Stock of migrants in South-East Asia, as share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)




Note: South-East Asia countries with a share below 0.3 of top population are not included in this figure (Myanmar, Viet Nam and Indonesia).
Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Remittances in the subregion increased slightly in 2009,²⁰ from USD 36.9 billion in 2008 to around USD 37.2 billion in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009). This slight increase in remittance flows represents, however, a significant slowdown compared to the high growth rates recorded in previous

years (Ratha et al., 2010). The Philippines and Viet Nam received the largest amounts – an estimated USD 19.4 billion and almost 7 billion, respectively, in 2009 (see figure 9). Concerning outflows, migrants in Malaysia sent the largest amount – USD 6.4 billion in 2008.

Figure 9: Remittance inflows to selected South-East Asia countries in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)



Note: Remittance inflows for 2009 are estimates.

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- Extreme weather conditions led to high floods, such as the Jakarta flood in February 2007, which inundated 70,000 houses and displaced 420,440 people (*Jakarta Post*, 2009). Similarly, severe earthquakes, such as the one in Aceh, impact societies and cause major, mostly internal, displacement. Tropical storms, such as those in the Philippines in September and October 2009, displaced around 1 million people (*Jakarta Post*, 2009). Typhoon Parma, for instance, caused heavy rainfall, triggering floods and landslides that killed people and displaced about 170,000.
- Population projections suggest that, by 2019, nationals will only constitute 46.2 per cent of Singapore's total population, while foreigners with permanent residence status will make up the majority (*The Temasek Review*, 2009).

This partly reflects Singaporeans' low fertility rate of 1.28 children per woman, which has resulted in an increasing median age for Singapore's nationals; facilitated citizenship of foreigners and engagement of Singaporeans abroad are two potential ways of offsetting this trend (National Population Secretariat, 2009).

SOUTH-CENTRAL ASIA

- Despite the decrease in the number of international migrants in South-Central Asia from 15.7 million in 2000 to 13.8 million in 2005, their number is on the rise again, with an estimated 14.3 million international migrants in 2010. This increase seems mainly based on the change in the migrant stock in Pakistan – the second-most important


²⁰ Please note that the World Bank does not provide data for Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Timor-Leste in comparison to the countries of South-East Asia used in the *World Migration Report*.

destination country in the subregion, from -3.5 per cent between 2000 and 2005, to 3.5 per cent between 2005 and 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

- India remains the main country of destination in Asia, although its migrant stock decreased by 1.6 per cent between 2005

and 2010 (see figure 10a) (UN DESA, 2009). India is also a country of origin; the Indian diaspora numbers almost 25 million persons, 10 per cent of whom can be found in the USA. Other major destinations include Singapore, Malaysia and the Gulf States (Khadria, 2009).


Figure 10a: Stock of migrants in South-Central Asia, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Note: Maldives is not included in this figure as its value is negligible at this scale.

Source: UN DESA, 2009.


Figure 10b: Stock of migrants in South-Central Asia, as share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- In relative terms, the largest estimated number of international migrants in South-Central Asia is in Bhutan, representing a share of 5.7 per cent of the total population of this small country (see figure 10b) (UN DESA, 2009).
 - In addition to India, Bangladesh (6.9 million emigrants), Pakistan (3.4 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million) and Nepal (1 million) are major countries of origin in the region. According to the Census 2000 data, almost half of the emigrants remain within the region (12.1 million), while 5.1 million
- work in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2.4 million live in the USA and Canada, and the United Kingdom hosts around 1.1 million (DRC, 2007).
- In 2009, overall remittance inflows to South-Central Asia, fuelled by increases in inflows to Bangladesh and Pakistan, have only slightly decreased from USD 74.4 billion to USD 73 billion in 2009 (see figure 11). Financial outflows in 2008 amount to USD 2 billion, which were mostly sent from India.

Figure 11: Remittance inflows to selected countries in South-Central Asia in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)




Note: Remittance inflows for 2009 are estimates.

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- The newly created Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare has just released a National Policy on Labour Migration, aiming to ensure that Sri Lankan migrants' interests are protected (News Blaze, 2009). The biggest demand for Sri Lankan workers (male and female) exists in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Qatar accounted for 86 per cent of migrant employment (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), 2009).
- In 2009, 475,278 Bangladeshis went abroad to work – down from 875,000 in 2008. Their top destinations were Oman, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (see figure 12) (Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), 2010). These figures indicate the significant impact of the global economic downturn on the deployments of Bangladeshis to foreign jobs.

Figure 12: Overseas employment of workers from Bangladesh in 2009 (in thousands)



Source: BMET, 2010.

- Pakistan hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide (almost 1.8 million in 2008), almost all of whom are Afghans; The Islamic Republic of Iran hosts the third-largest number, with 980,000 refugees (UN DESA, 2009; UNHCR, 2009).

Effects of the economic crisis

Unemployment and return

- In Asia, unemployment rates rose in many countries throughout 2009. Where impacts were most severe, it was largely due to the effect of the downturn on exports as a result of the economic crisis on export-dependent economies. In East Asia, for example, the unemployment rate was estimated at 5 per cent for men in 2009, and 3.7 per cent for women (ILO, 2010).
- The impact of the recession on migrant workers depends on the sector and country in which they work. The contraction of economic activities in sectors such as electronics and car manufacturing in countries such as China led to rising unemployment among migrant workers, while other sectors, such as health, have been less affected. With the exception of Dubai, the infrastructure projects that employed large numbers of male migrants from Asia in the GCC countries

have not been stopped (GMG/UNESCAP, 2009).


- Between January and November 2008, there was an 84 per cent increase (from 3,642 to 6,707) in the number of foreign workers seeking relocation to new jobs in the Republic of Korea. The government decided to stop issuing visas even to ethnic Koreans seeking employment (Awad, 2009).
- In China, one of the effects of the current economic downturn is a significant reversal of rural-to-urban internal migration (Kundu, 2009). By the early months of 2009, 20 million internal migrant workers, highly concentrated in export-oriented, labour-intensive industries, had lost their jobs, reflecting “a rapid decline in labour demand” leading to un- and underemployment (Fix et al., 2009; IMF, 2009; ILO, 2010).
- The slowdown of export activities in East Asia had severe effects on South-East Asian countries, because of their dependence on foreign trade and investment flows. The large bulk of migrant workers in Malaysia and Thailand, for instance, were particularly hard hit. Significant returns to Indonesia took place due to the increase in unemployment in Malaysia. In Singapore, there are 900,000 migrant workers, concentrated largely in the manufacturing and services sectors, who face large-scale job losses equivalent to 30 per cent of the labour force (Koser, 2009; Awad, 2009). The share of workers

entering Thailand from Cambodia dropped 10 per cent (NTS, 2009).

- It is noteworthy that, for the Philippines, worker outflows actually increased by 28 per cent in 2008 over the previous year, reaching a total of 1.38 million (see figure 13). According to the Department of Labor

(DOLE, 2010), until January 2009, Filipino workers were mainly going to Taiwan Province of China (3,494), the United Arab Emirates (297), Brunei Darussalam (69), and Macau, China (45). Throughout 2009, the Philippines experienced a continuing stable outflow (DOLE, 2010).

Figure 13: Deployment of land-based overseas Filipino workers, by region of destination (new hires and rehires, excluding seafarers), in 2002–2008 (in thousands)



Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), 2009.

- India and Pakistan, as the largest economies in South-Central Asia, are less export-reliant than many economies in East Asia and South-East Asia. Therefore, countries in South-Central Asia were spared a larger shock to growth.
- The feminization of the migrant labour force has been striking in Sri Lankan migration. Women made up an average of 54 per cent of the roughly 200,000 Sri Lankans who leave each year; in 2006, it was estimated that around 60 per cent of female migrants were domestic workers (IOM, 2009), while 88 per cent of female migrants who left Sri Lanka in 2008 went to work as housemaids. However, the financial crisis appears to have at least temporarily reversed this trend: recruitment of men increased by over 24 per cent in 2008 (SLFBE, 2009). This could be explained by an estimated 15–20 per cent drop in demand for women domestic workers from the Gulf and Middle East, when the crisis first erupted (Awad, 2009). Other migrant domestic workers are likely to be facing worse working conditions as a result of the crisis (GMG/UN-ESCWA, 2009).

- The impact of the crisis on Dubai has been particularly acute, leading to the suspension of USD 582 billion worth of infrastructure projects and prompting the return of largely Indian nationals (Koser, 2009). However, some countries in the GCC countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, seem not to be affected as much.

Remittances

- Despite the economic slowdown, remittance flows to South-Central and East Asia have been relatively robust. According to the World Bank, “Remittance inflows to South Asia contracted by a modest 1.8 per cent in 2009, compared with a 7.5 per cent decline for developing countries, excluding South Asia” (World Bank, 2010). Remittance inflows have therefore been supportive, particularly in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Flows to Bangladesh and Pakistan have grown significantly in 2009 but have started to slow down since the last quarter of 2009, mainly due to a decrease in inflows for emigrants working in the GCC countries.

India experienced a sharp drop in remittance inflows in the first quarter of 2009, followed by an increase throughout the rest of the year. According to the latest estimates, overall, “remittance flows to South Asia (and, to a lesser extent, East Asia) continued to grow in 2009, although at a markedly slower pace than in the pre-crisis years” (Ratha et al., 2010).

- A continuing growth in remittance flows from the Gulf States can still be observed, although Bangladesh and Pakistan, for instance, are simultaneously experiencing falling remittance inflows from the USA (Ratha et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in total, the Central Bank of Bangladesh recorded increasing inflows towards the end of 2009 (USD 873.86 million in December), compared to the slight declines in the year before (USD 758.03 million) (Bangladesh Bank, 2010). Pakistan has also continued to record positive growth in 2009, as Pakistani authorities actively took measures to increase flows through formal channels, including the provision of subsidies for marketing expenses to providers of remittance services (World Bank, 2010).

- In June 2009, remittances transferred to the Philippines through banks amounted to USD 1.5 billion – an all-time high. This record represents a 3.3 per cent year-on-year increase compared to June 2008. In the first half of 2009, the accumulated funds sent by migrants in that six-month period, which amounted to almost USD 8.5 million, were 2.9 per cent higher than for the same period the year before. Remittances were sent mainly from the USA, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. The continuing demand for highly skilled and skilled Filipino overseas workers, together with the government’s active search for new markets for Filipino workers and improved access to financial products and services for migrants and their families, led the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) (the central bank of the Philippines) to expect positive remittance growth prospects for 2009 (BSP, 2009).

Policy responses in destination and source countries

- In destination countries within the region, policy measures in response to increasing unemployment have been introduced. The Government of the Republic of Korea, for instance, reduced the quota of employed foreign workers from 100,000 in 2008 to 34,000 in 2009. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand responded to the economic crisis by ceasing to issue or renew work permits, especially in the manufacturing and services sectors (Koser, 2009).
- Malaysia had 2.2 million registered migrant workers at the end of 2008; this number fell by 300,000 to 1.9 million in August 2009, as expiring work permits were not renewed. There were about 32,000 registered layoffs in the first half of 2009 (*Migration News*, 2009a). Malaysian authorities also introduced a policy for fast-track deportation that could affect an estimated 1 million unauthorized workers residing in Malaysia (Fix et al., 2009).
- In response to job losses, the Government of the Taiwan Province of China announced plans to cut the number of low-skilled foreign-worker permits to create jobs for local workers, as unemployment of all Taiwanese workers reached 5.3 per cent (up from 4.1 per cent in 2008) (Fix et al., 2009).
- In Japan, ethnic Japanese Brazilians ('Nikkei Brazilians') are the third-largest immigration community, after Korean and Chinese immigrants. The crisis dramatically affected them because many hold part-time or non-regular jobs. Estimates suggest that 40,000 (12%) of them have already returned to Brazil (*Financial Times*, 2009). In April 2009, the government implemented a repatriation programme – or voluntary ‘pay-to-go’ programme for the Nikkei, which offers migrants money if they and their families leave the country (Fix et al., 2009).
- In South-East and South-Central Asia, many countries of origin responded to the current economic downturn in largely similar ways. Some have formulated

programmes to facilitate the reinsertion of returnees into their labour markets, or they intend to ensure the protection of the rights of their migrant workers. Some are also exploring new labour markets for their workers. More specifically, countries such as the Philippines and Nepal offer reintegration and skills training.

- The Overseas Workers Welfare Association (OWWA) of the Philippines provides an Expatriate Livelihood Fund with loans for returnees who want to start businesses (OWWA, 2009).
- In India, the responses have been formulated at the State level, since not all States were equally affected. For example, in Kerala (a major region of origin of emigrants going to work in the United Arab Emirates), a loan programme

to assist returning migrants from the Gulf States was established (Fix et al., 2009).

- Sri Lanka and Bangladesh built up task forces to monitor the effects of the crisis on nationals working abroad and to offer assistance in finding new employment (Awad, 2009).
- Between January and September 2009, around 358,000 Bangladeshi migrants went abroad – down almost 50 per cent from 689,000, compared to the same period in the previous year (*Migration News*, 2009b). According to the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training of Bangladesh, over 13,000 repatriations occurred in the first two months of 2009. Malaysia alone revoked the visas of 55,000 workers (NTS, 2009).

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
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EUROPE REGIONAL OVERVIEW

- An estimated 72.6 million migrants in 2010 lived in Europe and Central Asia²¹ – a figure 5.1 million higher than the migrant stock in 2005. One in three of all international migrants in the world live in Europe. Migrants represent 8.7 per cent of the total European population (UN DESA, 2009).
- Net international migration rates have increased across Europe in the period 2005–2010, compared to the previous decade. While the picture varies within different subregions, the majority of Western and Central European countries have witnessed an increase in net

immigration, with Cyprus, Luxemburg, Spain, Iceland and Ireland being the most affected countries. Eastern European, Central Asian and new Member States of the EU have experienced a reduction in their net emigration, with the vast majority of them reporting a net migration rate between -1.5 and 0 per 1,000 population cent in 2000–2005. A few countries, such as Albania, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Lithuania and Tajikistan, still remain essentially ‘sending’ countries, although to a lesser degree than in the 1990s (see figure 1) (UNDP, 2009).

Figure 1: Net migration rates per 1,000 population in selected European countries in 1990–1995 and 2005–2010




Source: UNDP, 2009.

²¹ For the purpose of this report, Europe comprise countries of Western and Central Europe (see specific section for country breakdown) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (see specific section for country breakdown).

- During the last five years (2005–2010), southern Europe accounts for the biggest share of the increase (3.4 million people, with an annual average growth rate in migrant stock of 5.2%), while Central Asia was the only region to witness a decline (-0.4% annual average growth rate of migrant stock).
- Intraregional migration flows in Europe remain strong, particularly since the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007. According to the estimates based on Census 2000 data by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC), at the University of Sussex, the vast majority of Western and Central European migrants move

within EU countries or to North America, while Central Asian and Eastern European migrants migrate mostly to other former Soviet republics (especially the Russian Federation) or Western Europe (see figure 2). The Russian Federation is both the most important country of origin in Europe and the most important country of destination, with over 12 million people originally native-born now living abroad, and 12 million foreign-born living in the country. As a country of destination, the Russian Federation is followed by Ukraine (5.9 million), the United Kingdom (4.2 million), Germany (4.1 million) and Kazakhstan (3.6 million) (UN DESA, 2009; DRC, 2007).

Figure 2: Total number of European emigrants in 2000, by region of origin and destination (in millions)



Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.

- While the number of female migrants increased by 2.7 million between 2005 and 2010, reaching a total of 36.5 million women migrants in Europe, the percentage of women in the total stock of migrants in Europe remained stable at 52.3 per cent, with no significant change between 2005 and 2010. While female migrants are evenly distributed among the various subregions, Eastern Europe records the highest proportion of female

migrants (57.3% of total migrant stock), while the proportion is lowest in Western Europe (49% of total migrant stock) (UN DESA, 2009).

- Urban centres in Europe attract a significant number of migrants. London, Paris and Moscow all host more than 1 million foreign-born. Among 85 cities with a population of between 100,000 and 1 million foreign-born, 30 cities are located in Europe. In Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt

and London, foreign-born persons represent over a quarter of the total population (MPI, 2007).


- Seven of the world's top ten remittance-sending countries in 2008 were countries located in Europe, namely the Russian Federation (USD 26.1 billion), Switzerland (USD 19.0 billion), Germany (USD 15.0 billion), Spain (USD 14.7 billion), Italy (USD 12.7 billion), Luxembourg (USD 10.9 billion) and the Netherlands (USD 8.4 billion).
- The top five remittance recipients in 2009 were France (USD 15.6 billion), Spain (USD 11.7 billion), Germany (USD 10.8 billion), Belgium (USD 9.1 billion) and Poland (USD 8.5 billion).
- Tajikistan, the Republic of Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are among the top five countries worldwide, in terms of remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP, with 49.6, 31.4 and 27.9 per cent, respectively (Ratha et al., 2009).
- Europe is the destination and origin of four out of ten top global remittance corridors, namely the Russian Federation–Ukraine, Ukraine–the Russian Federation, Turkey–Germany and Kazakhstan–the Russian Federation (World Bank, 2008).
- Owing to the global economic crisis, virtually all European countries have seen a sharp increase in unemployment rates, prompting governments to introduce measures to protect domestic labour markets. Combined, the measures have amounted to new immigration restrictions aimed at reducing the inflow of migrants and encouraging their return. A significant reduction in labour demand, reinforced measures against employers of irregular migrants, return programmes, stricter enforcement of residence laws, enhanced border management and rising unemployment rates in EU Member States have done little to counter the increasing negative public opinion regarding migrants and migration in Europe.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE²²

- Western and Central Europe host 51 million migrants, representing two thirds of international migrants residing in Europe. The top five destination countries are Germany (10.8 million migrants), France (6.7 million), the United Kingdom (6.5 million), Spain (6.4 million) and Italy (4.5 million) (see figure 3) (UN DESA, 2009).
- Western European countries registered an increase of 5.6 million migrants between 2005 and 2010. Spain and Italy have seen the highest increase in the number of immigrants (1.8 and 1.4 million, respectively), followed by the United Kingdom (610,000), Ireland (280,000) and France (210,000) (UN DESA, 2009).

²² This section covers the 27 EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the three other European Economic Area (EEA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), as well as Switzerland and two EU candidate countries for which negotiations are open – Croatia and Turkey.


Figure 3: Stock of migrants in Western and Central Europe, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- With the exception of a few countries, the number of migrants as a percentage of total population has also increased almost across the board in Western and Central Europe, reaching 35 per cent in Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, 23 per cent in Switzerland and almost 20 and 18 per cent in Ireland and Cyprus, respectively (see figure 4) (UN DESA, 2009).
- The drivers behind the increase in the number of migrants (both as a total stock and as a percentage of total population) vary but include rapidly declining populations (especially in Southern Europe), family reunification and natural growth of long-term foreign-born population (in France, Germany and the United Kingdom), and high rates of economic growth before the economic crisis (Ireland).


Figure 4: Stock of migrants, by destination, as a percentage of total population in Western and Central Europe: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010



Source: UN DESA, 2009.


- While Europe experienced sustained increases in inflows of migrants, it is important to note that emigration of the foreign-born population remains significant. Data from the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD), from some of the

top destination countries in Europe in 2007, show that significant outflows of foreign-born population have reduced net migration by over a third in Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (see figure 5) (OECD, 2009a).

Figure 5: Inflows and outflows of foreign-born population in selected EU countries in 2007 (in thousands)

Source: OECD, 2009a.


- As a result of the EU enlargement in 2004, it was predicted that between 2 and 8 per cent of the population of new Member States (EU-10 countries) would move to the old Member States (EU-15 countries) in the long run. Evidence suggests that migration flows between the eight Eastern European countries that joined in 2004 and EU-15 Member States have been quite modest, on average, but EU enlargement had a significant impact on migration flows from new to old Member States, including to those States that did not initially open their labour markets, such as Austria and Germany. Data show that EU Member States with more open economies managed to attract the bulk of educated and younger migrants from the new EU Member States (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009).
- Emigration from Europe is mostly within the continent and towards other countries of the OECD. In 2006, 1.7 million OECD country nationals moved to another OECD country, with the outward movement of British citizens putting the latter among the largest emigrant groups (OECD, 2008). Data from selected major destination countries in Europe show that migrants from EU-15 countries in 2007 represent between 60 and 20 per cent of the total foreign-born population (see figure 6) (OECD, 2009a). Overall, 34 per cent of immigrants to EU Member States come from other EU Member States (Eurostat, 2008).

Figure 6: Stock of migrants from the EU-15 in selected European countries in 2007 (in thousands)

Source: OECD, 2009a.

- Migrants residing in Western and Central Europe sent USD 120.9 billion worth of remittances in 2008, representing over 40 per cent of global remittance outflows.

The major sending countries include Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland²³ (see figure 7) (Ratha et al., 2009).


Figure 7: Remittance outflows from Western and Central Europe in 2006, 2007 and 2008 (in USD million)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

²³ In the case of Luxembourg and Switzerland, some remittances are related to border residents working in one of these two countries during the day but living in a neighbouring country. These workers are not, strictly speaking, considered to be migrants.

- Western and Central Europe is expected to receive USD 106.1 billion of remittances in 2009 – a 5 per cent decrease from 2008. The top five receiving countries in 2009 are France (USD 15.6 billion), Spain (USD 11.7 billion), Germany (USD 10.8 billion), Belgium (USD 9.1 billion) and Poland (USD 8.5 billion). Bulgaria, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany are the top five recipients of remittances as a percentage of GDP (see figure 8) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 8: Remittance inflows to Western and Central Europe, as a percentage of GDP in 2008: top five countries




Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA²⁴

- Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Central Asia and Central Europe hosted 25.6 million migrants in 2010. While the number of migrants in top receiving countries has increased, albeit slightly, declines in the number of migrants residing in Central Asian countries and in the number of refugees in countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (such as Serbia and Armenia) have resulted in a decline of 400,000 in the total number of international migrants, compared to the levels in 2005.
- The Russian Federation (12.3 million), Ukraine (5.3 million) and Kazakhstan (3 million) are the top three destination countries, hosting 80 per cent of the international migrants in the region (see figure 9) (UN DESA, 2009).

²⁴ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, UN Security Council Resolution 1244-Administered Kosovo (hereinafter referred to as Kosovo/UNSC 1244), Kyrgyzstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova (Republic of), Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Figure 9: Stock of migrants in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- The number of international migrants as a percentage of total population remained at 8.6 per cent in 2010, with almost no change since 2005 suggesting that the decrease in the total stock of international migrants took place within the context of population decline in Eastern Europe

and Central Asia. Migrants represent more than a tenth of the population in Kazakhstan (19.5%), in Ukraine (11.6%), the Republic of Moldova (11.4%), Belarus (11.4%) and Armenia (10.5%) (see figure 10) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 10: Stock of migrants in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, by destination, as a percentage of total population: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Immigration to the Russian Federation is dominated by the inflow of ethnic Russian citizens residing in countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, while most of the registered immigrants that arrived in 2007 already had Russian citizenship (75% of those who arrived from Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic countries and 71.1% of those who arrived from other countries), labour migration by non-ethnic Russian citizens of former Soviet republics may become the main driver of the increase in migration inflows in the future. A large proportion of labour migrants are already living permanently in the Russian Federation. The reform of migration laws in 2006 simplified migrant legalization for citizens of former Soviet republics. Before 2006, unregistered migrants represented almost half (46%) of the total, but this share decreased to 15 per cent after 2007. Most migrants (85%) registered their presence and thus regularized their residence status. In 2007, three quarters of labour migrants also obtained work permits. This compares with only 15–25 per cent of migrants that were employed by employers on a legal basis before 2007 (Vishnevsky and Bobylev, 2009).
- Some of the more prevalent migration corridors worldwide are located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including the route between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, with migration flows in both directions, as well as migration flows from Belarus to the Russian Federation and from Uzbekistan to the Russian Federation (Ratha et al., 2009).
- According to World Bank estimates, in 2009, the region received USD 27.1 billion in remittances – a 14 per cent de-

cline from 2008. The Russian Federation (USD 5.5 billion), Serbia (USD 5.4 billion), Ukraine (USD 4.5 billion), Bosnia and Herzegovina (USD 2.6 billion) and Tajikistan (USD 1.8 billion) – the top five countries in the region, in terms of remittance inflows – received over 70 per cent of the remittances sent to Eastern Europe and

Central Asia (see figure 11) (Ratha et al., 2009). Latest estimates indicate that the fall in remittance flows has been higher than expected, partially due to the depreciation of the Russian rouble (the currency of the main destination country for migrants in the region) against the US dollar (Ratha et al., 2010).

Figure 11: Remittance inflows in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: top five countries in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)




Note: Values for 2009 are estimates.

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- This region contains some of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world. Remittance inflows represent half of the GDP in Tajikistan (the highest figure worldwide), 31 per cent in the

Republic of Moldova, 28 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, and 15 per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see figure 12) (Ratha et al., 2009).


Figure 12: Remittance inflows in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2008, as a percentage of GDP: top five countries



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- Remittance outflows from countries in the region reached USD 31.7 billion in 2008, with over 80 per cent of outflows originating from the Russian Federation (USD 26 billion) (see figure 13) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 13: Remittance outflows from Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2006–2008: top three countries (in USD millions)




Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Effects of the economic crisis

- The economic downturn affecting the global economy since mid-2008 has turned into a jobs crisis for migrant workers. As a result, following many years of continuous increase, a fall in labour migration has become apparent since the second half of 2008 in virtually all EU countries, due to a significant decline in international recruitment by employers (OECD, 2009b). As the economic crisis affected output in specific sectors, such as industry, construction and retail trade, it has had a stronger impact on specific categories of workers, including young people, the low-skilled and men rather than women. Migrants, from outside the EU, especially low-skilled and male migrants, have also been particularly affected (European Commission, 2009).
- Data from the European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2009a) reveal that, while unemployment rates have increased across the board for nationals and EU nationals working in the EU but outside their country of origin, it is migrants from outside the EU that have witnessed the sharpest increase in job losses, with men more affected than women. On average, the unemployment rate of EU nationals increased by 1.7 per cent between the beginning of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009, while the unemployment rate of male and female third-country nationals increased by 6.6 and 2.2 per cent, respectively (see figure 14).

Figure 14: Unemployment rates in EU-27 countries in 2008–2009 (in %)



Source: Eurostat, 2009a.


- In general, migrants have been hit harder by the crisis than the native workforce. According to an IOM report (2010), unemployment rates for migrants (already higher than those for nationals, before the crisis) have increased at a

faster rate in 2009, reaching between 9.4 and 10.75 per cent in Austria, Greece and Italy and 27.5 per cent in Spain (an increase of over 16% compared to 2007). According to the same report, while Irish nationals represent the vast majority of

people receiving unemployment benefits in Ireland, the number of foreigners receiving these benefits in Ireland rose to 77,500 in December 2009, and over half of these were nationals from new EU Member States; this represents a 173 per cent increase between June 2008 and the end of 2009.

- Unemployment of immigrants from EU10 countries, many of whom were employed in the construction sector, rose from 2.3 per cent in February 2008 to 8.2 per cent in February 2009, in comparison to the average unemployment rate, which rose from 3.3 per cent to 6.6 per cent (see figure 15) (OECD, 2009b).

Figure 15: Changes in unemployment rates for selected EU countries in 2007–2009 (in %)




Source: National Statistical Offices, compiled in IOM survey (2010).

- Net migration flows in the United Kingdom were also affected by the crisis. While national outflows increased from 83,000 in the first quarter of 2008 to 93,000 in the third quarter, the positive flow of foreigners decreased from 274,000 at the beginning of 2008 to 226,000 in the first months of 2009 (Office for National Statistics, 2009). This trend is confirmed by data on national insurance number registrations for foreigners entering the United Kingdom for the first time.

According to these data, the number of people registering each quarter fell by 74,000 between early 2008 and mid-2009 – a decline of almost 40 per cent. The decline was led by citizens of what the United Kingdom defines as ‘A8 countries’ (the eight Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004²⁵), which experienced a decrease of 50 per cent, followed by Asia and the Middle East (which, together, experienced a 31% decline) (see figure 16) (DWP, 2009).

²⁵ The A8 countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Figure 16: National insurance registrations to overseas adult nationals entering the United Kingdom in 2008–2009 (in thousands)




Source: Department for Work and Pensions (DWP, 2009).

- According to the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) (IOM, 2010), the economic crisis has not had as negative an impact on migrants in Germany as in other countries – for example, migrant unemployment in December 2009 was actually lower than in December 2007.
- The economic crisis has also had an impact, albeit limited, on migration to the EU10 and countries looking to accede to the EU. The number of work permits issued in Croatia decreased from 10,242 in 2008 to 7,877 in 2009 and 6,948 in 2010. In addition to a decrease in new arrivals of foreigners (from 20,000 per quarter in early 2008, to 9,500 in the third quarter of 2009), in 2009, the Czech Government established two special governmental voluntary return programmes for regular and irregular migrants, both of which were concluded in December 2009 (IOM, 2010, forthcoming).
- Web surveys targeting Polish migrants in the United Kingdom have revealed that nearly 12 per cent of respondents lost their jobs as a result of dismissals and job cuts. When asked about their future intentions, nearly 90 per cent of respondents said that they were not planning to return to Poland (IOM, 2010).
- According to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2010), migrant workers make up 40 per cent of the construction workforce in the Russian Federation, which has undergone major bankruptcies and cessation of activities since the onset of the crisis (Awad, 2009). According to a study by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Aid Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) (OSCE/ACTED, 2009), the salary of Kyrgyz migrants decreased by 20–30 per cent, on average, during the first months of the crisis, while the amount of remittances received by households decreased by 25–40 per cent. However, according to the same survey, only 10 per cent of respondents had returned to Kyrgyzstan due to the crisis, and 60 per cent of them plan to go back to the Russian Federation once the economic outlook improves, which suggests that the long-term impact of the crisis may be limited. Many migrants are staying on, accepting worse conditions and diversifying their destinations and sectors (ICG, 2010).
- Many European countries have instituted new policies aimed at stemming the inflows of migrants, including more stringent conditions for admission under labour migration programmes and reduction in quotas (as is the case in the Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania, Spain, the Rus-

sian Federation and Ukraine), stricter labour market tests (as in Estonia and the United Kingdom), decreased possibilities to change status and/or to renew work permits, and stricter controls on family and persons entering on grounds of humanitarian protection (Italy) (OECD, 2009b; IOM, 2010). In December 2008, Italy set a cap of 150,000 for entries after receiving 700,000 applications the year before. However, the new 2010 decree on immigration flows and quotas has been registered by the Corte dei Conti (State Auditors' Department). This year, contrary to expectations, there will not be a quota for regular workers but only 80,000 seasonal workers (for tourism and agriculture), which also include 4,000 self-employed workers.

- In addition to enacting restrictions on entry and stay, some countries have witnessed a reduction in the number of migrants applying for residence and work permits. The number of migrants who entered under the employer-nominated system (Regime General) in Spain fell from more than 200,000 in 2007 to 137,000 in 2008. Notably, in Catalonia, the highest receiving area of foreigners, applications fell by 15 per cent in 2008 (IOM, 2010). In the first quarter of 2009, the number of approved initial applications to the Workers' Registration Scheme in the United Kingdom decreased by 54 per cent (from 46,600 to 21,300) compared with the same quarter of the previous year (OECD, 2009b). In Iceland, the number of labour migrants in 2008 was approximately one third of that of the previous year, and it fell to almost zero in early 2009 (OECD, 2009a).
- A report published by the EU border agency Frontex (2009) suggests that worsening employment opportunities will prompt more irregular migrants to postpone their migration decisions until the economy recovers, while those irregular migrants already present in the EU are likely to remain, as increased border enforcement at external borders represents a clear disincentive to return, given that re-entry would be riskier.
- The economic crisis has resulted in a reduction in the number of work permits for migrants in the Russian Federation. In addition, new government regulations ban the employment of migrants in specific sectors, including retail and trade, which are traditionally dominated by migrant workers from republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the same time, Russian authorities have sought to decrease the influx of temporary migrants by applying a differential tax rate for migrants residing for more than a year (13%) and those identified as non-resident migrants (30%) (OSCE/ACTED, 2009).
- Return migration increased within the free mobility regime of the EU when economic conditions and job opportunities in migrant destination countries (such as Ireland and the United Kingdom) deteriorated more than those in origin countries (such as Poland) (OECD, 2009b). In September 2008, Spain enacted a law to encourage the return of migrant workers to their country of origin, by providing reintegration support. The offer was taken up by 8,724 migrants, representing approximately 10 per cent of the beneficiary population (IOM, 2010). The Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation established programmes to assist returning nationals. As admission to the EU and Russian labour markets tightened, authorities in Uzbekistan sought alternative destinations for their labour migrants.
- Increased forced return measures have been taken in France, Italy and Ukraine (IOM, 2010; Awad, 2009). There were varied reports from source countries about the changes in the number of migrants returning from destination countries. While Kosovo/UNSC 1244, Latvia, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported declining numbers of returning migrants, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine reported increasing numbers of returnees. In many cases, data are not available and, when available, do not distinguish between forced and voluntary returns (see figure 17) (IOM, 2010).

Figure 17: Numbers of forced removals from selected EU countries in 2007–2009




Note: Data for 2009 are based on IOM projections of data available up to April 2009. Figures for 2009 are not available for Germany and Spain.
 Source: IOM, 2010.

- The factors influencing flows of irregular migration to the EU during the current crisis are very complex, according to a report by Frontex (2009), which suggests that irregular migration inflows mainly act as a function of labour demand in destination countries. The report suggested that the decline in the number of irregular migrants coming to the EU, due to the worsening employment situation, is likely to be felt mainly in the latter part of 2010, although at different levels, depending on the EU Member State.
- The German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends survey on attitudes towards immigration noted a rise in the number of people in Europe seeing immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity. On average, the number of Europeans with a negative attitude increased from 43

to 50 per cent between 2008 and 2009, with the British being the most sceptical (66% of respondents indicated it was a problem), followed by the Spanish (58%). The biggest shift in attitude was found in the Netherlands, where the proportion of respondents showing a negative attitude towards immigration increased from 36 to 45 per cent. However, in most of the countries surveyed, the majority of respondents still considered immigration to be more of an opportunity than a problem (German Marshall Fund, 2009).

Remittances

- Remittance inflows to countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are expected to experience a decline of 14 per cent – from USD 34.3 billion in 2008, to USD 29.6 billion in 2009 (see figure 18) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 18: Growth in remittance inflows between 2008 and 2009, in USD terms (in %)


Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- The significant decline in remittance inflows to countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe can be partly explained by the devaluation of the Russian rouble vis-à-vis the USD. For example, according to Ratha et al., remittance flows to Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan declined by 15 per cent, 33 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively in the first half of 2009 compared to the same period in 2008 in USD terms. However, if measured in rouble terms, remittances to Kyrgyzstan actually increased 17 per cent in the first half of 2009 on a year-on-year basis. In Armenia, the year-on-year fall in rouble terms was only 8 per cent and, in Tajikistan, it was 10 per cent. Similarly, a significant part of the decline in remittance flows to Poland can be explained by a depreciation of the British pound against the US dollar by over 25 per cent between the third

quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009). Latest World Bank estimates indicate that remittance flows fell more than expected in 2009, partially due to the large declines recorded in Poland and Romania (Ratha et al., 2010).

- Remittance outflows from EU countries increased by 20 per cent between the first and last quarter of 2008 and then returned to slightly below the previous year's quarterly average in 2009. The seemingly unchanged remittance outflows from Europe, however, conceal a number of variations. While remittances to the Russian Federation increased by 20 per cent, remittances sent to Brazil, China and India decreased considerably over the course of 2009, with a decrease of 60 per cent in remittances sent to Brazil in the second quarter of 2009 (Eurostat, 2009b) (see figure 19).

Figure 19: Remittance outflows from EU to non-EU countries in 2008–2009 (in %)



Note: Indexed at 2008 Q1 = 100; Value in the first quarter of 2008 was EUR 1,713 million for the total remittance outflow, EUR 35 million to Brazil, EUR 48 million to the Russian Federation, EUR 133 million to China and EUR 17 million to India.

Source: Eurostat, 2009b

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
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MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL OVERVIEW

- The stock of migrants in the Middle East²⁶ in 2010 stands at an estimated 26.6 million migrants (around 13.5% of the total global migrant stock). The region saw an increase of 4.5 million migrants, compared with the 2005 figure. The Middle East thus continues to be one of the fastest-growing migrant-receiving regions, with an annual average growth rate in migrant stock equal to 3.8 per cent. Migrants represent 11.9 per cent of the total population in the region (UN DESA, 2009).
- The net international migration rates in the region have remained positive over the period 2005–2010, with the mean net migration rate increasing from 9.2 migrants per 1,000 population between 2000 and 2005 to 9.8 in the period 2005–2010. The growth is mainly due to a significant increase in Qatar (from 59 to 94 migrants per 1,000 population), although this has been counterbalanced by decreasing rates registered in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (see figure 1) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 1: Net international migration rate per 1,000 population in 2000–2005 and 2005–2010



Source: UNDP, 2009.


²⁶ Following the regional classification used in IOM (2005), this section examines the **Arab Mashreq** (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen), the **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries** (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and **Israel**.

- Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel remain the main destination countries in the region. While some countries in the Mashreq are still countries of origin of migrants, Jordan and Lebanon are also slowly becoming destination countries for Arab and Asian migrants. According to the World Bank (2008), the United Arab Emirates–India remittance corridor is among the top ten remittance corridors worldwide.
- Economic growth and labour shortages in the GCC countries, as well as conflict and insecurity in the Mashreq region, acted as the main drivers of mobility to and from the region in recent years.
- In 2010, there were 10.2 million women migrants in the Middle East – a 20.4 per cent increase from 2005. Women are estimated to represent 38 per cent of the total number of migrants in 2010, but there is considerable variation across the region, with figures ranging between 55.9 per cent in Israel and 20.8 per cent in Oman (UN DESA, 2009).
- Major urban centres in the region attract a high number of migrants. Between 1 million and 500,000 foreign-born live in Jeddah and Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and Tel Aviv (Israel), in addition to Muscat (Oman), Medina (Saudi Arabia) and Jerusalem, where the foreign-born represent a quarter of the total population (MPI, 2007).
- According to the World Bank, the region is both a major source and receiver of workers' remittances. In 2009, it was estimated that the region received approximately USD 22.7 billion in remittances, while USD 25 billion were sent by migrants residing in the region. It is expected that remittance flows from the Middle East and North Africa will experience an annual growth of -7 per cent and 5 per cent for 2009 and 2010, respectively (Ratha et al., 2009).


ARAB MASHREQ

- The migrant stock in the Arab countries of the East Mediterranean increased by 1.8 million between 2005 and 2010, reaching 8.7 million migrants (see figures 2 and 3) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 2: Stock of migrants in the Arab Mashreq in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 3: Stock of migrants in the Arab Mashreq, as a percentage of the total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- According to estimates (based on Census 2000 data) elaborated by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC) (2007), of 6.6 million migrants from the Mashreq and Yemen, over 70 per cent

live in other Arab countries (especially Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, but also increasingly Jordan, Lebanon and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), with the rest living mostly in OECD countries (see figure 4).


Figure 4: Total number of emigrants from Arab Mashreq countries in 2000, by country of origin and region of destination (in thousands)

Note: (a) DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data; (b) MENA refers to Middle East and North Africa; (c) OPT - Occupied Palestinian Territories; (d) GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

Source: DRC, 2007.

- Forced migration was the main driver behind the increase in the number of migrants in the region, due to the external displacement of Iraqis and the demographic growth of Palestinian and other refugees in the region. The vast majority (77%) of the 8.7 million migrants in the Mashreq were refugees (UN DESA, 2009). The region hosted 4.7 million Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2009) and 2 million Iraqi refugees (UNHCR, 2009a).
- A growing trend seems to be the increase in mixed flows of African migrants and refugees arriving irregularly across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen, mostly from Somalia but also increasingly from Ethiopia. UNHCR (2009b) estimates suggest that this number grew by nearly 50 per cent from 2008 to 2009 – from 50,000 to 74,000.
- In addition to external displacement, internal displacement in Iraq has been significant. Since February 2006, more than 1,600,000 Iraqis (270,000 families) have been displaced – approximately 5.5 per cent of the total population (IOM, 2009). Conflict-induced internal displacement in Yemen has now reached 200,000, according to UNHCR (2010). Meanwhile, droughts affecting up to 60 per cent of the land of the Syrian Arab Republic have led to between 40,000 and 60,000 families migrating away from affected regions (OCHA, 2009).
- Besides insecurity, conflict and climatic factors, demographic and socio-economic trends acted as the other structural forces influencing migration dynamics from and to the Middle East. As Mashreq countries have begun their demographic transition, according to UN DESA (2008), 57 per cent of the population in Mashreq countries will be younger than 24 years of age in 2010. This, coupled with relatively high literacy rates and youth unemployment ranging between 14 and 50 per cent (ILO, 2007), indicates that the Mashreq will remain a source of young migrants – a significant proportion of them skilled migrants.
- Remittance inflows to countries of the Mashreq have been steadily increasing. With USD 7.8 billion, Egypt ranked as the fourteenth-most important remittance-receiving country in the world in 2009. Lebanon and Jordan were the seventh- and eleventh-biggest receivers of remittances as a percentage of GDP in the world in 2008 (see figure 5) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 5: Remittance inflows in Arab Mashreq, as a percentage of GDP, in 2008




Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

GCC COUNTRIES

- Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council remained among the major destinations of migrants at different skill levels, especially those from South and South-East Asia as well as the Middle East. According to UN

DESA (2009), by 2010 the migrant stock in the six countries of the GCC countries will have reached 15.1 million, an increase of 2.4 million (19%) compared to 2005 (see figure 6).

Figure 6: Stock of migrants in Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- The structural needs of oil-rich GCC labour markets, especially in those countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain that have been promoting the creation of service- and knowledge-based economies to diversify the source of their revenues, indicate that contractual foreign workers will continue to represent

a high share of the population and, as a consequence, of the labour force in the GCC. In 2010, temporary contractual workers are expected to represent significantly more than two thirds of the population in Qatar (86.5%), the United Arab Emirates (70%) and Kuwait (68.8%) (see figure 7) (UN DESA, 2009).


Figure 7: Stock of migrants in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as a percentage of the total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- According to Ratha et al. (2009), Saudi Arabia was the fourth-biggest remittance-sending country in the world in 2008 (see figure 8).
- The sponsorship system (Kafala) remains the basis for migration management in the GCC. Recently, however, significant attempts at reforms have been made. In May 2009, Bahrain's Labour Minister transferred the responsibility of sponsoring the visas of migrant workers from kafils (sponsors) to the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (Human Rights Watch, 2009). This move is expected to decrease the dependence of foreign contractual workers on their kafils and facilitate access to different jobs in the market. Since August 2009, foreign employees are also able to change employers without the consent of their current employer (Al Jazeera, 2009).
- In Kuwait, expatriates holding university degrees (especially doctors, engineers, architects, lawyers, nurses and accountants) may soon be allowed to sponsor themselves if they have spent a specific number of years in Kuwait and have no criminal record. Kuwaiti officials are also looking into establishing a State company that would be tasked with hiring expatriates and bringing them into the country's labour market. The company would be in charge of the expatriates, who will have the right to switch jobs without their employers' consent (*Gulf News*, 2009).
- In 2009, the Shura Council of Saudi Arabia passed and submitted for approval to the Cabinet a bill for the protection of domestic workers (Human Rights Watch, 2009).
- In 2009, the United Arab Emirates rolled out a Wage Protection System, whereby all businesses must choose an agent through which their workers will be paid. When wages are received by the agent, the responsible ministry is notified, which enables it to ensure that payments are made. More than 100,000 workers received their wages through the system in July and August 2009 – up from 28,000 in June of the same year. Companies guilty of 'incessant violations' in failing to pay workers face legal action and may be prevented from receiving work permits (*The National*, 2009a).

Figure 8: Remittance outflows from Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2006–2008 (in USD millions)




Note: Values for 2008 are estimates.

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

ISRAEL

- The stock of international migrants in Israel increased by 10.5 per cent between 2005 and 2010, reaching almost 3 million migrants in 2010, which represents 40 per cent of the total population (see figures 9 and 10).

Figure 9: Stock of migrants in Israel in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.


- Migration to Israel is regulated by the 1950 Law of Return, which facilitates the migration of persons of Jewish ancestry to Israel. In recent decades, substantial inflows of Russian and Ethiopian Jews have contributed to the population and labour force growth in Israel. With the

number of workers from the Occupied Palestinian Territories diminishing in recent years, a total of 30,300 non-Jewish migrants were granted work permits in 2008 – down from 36,500 the year before. Main countries of origin (in addition to Member States of the European

Commonwealth of Independent States) include Thailand (5,800), the Philippines (5,500) India (2,700), and China and Nepal (2,300 each). In contrast to 2007,

the majority of work permit recipients were women (55%) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009a).

Figure 10: Stock of migrants in Israel, as a percentage of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- With a large Israeli diaspora abroad and a substantial number of migrants in Israel, remittance inflows and outflows in Israel tend to be significant, with approximately USD 3.6 billion remittances sent by workers in Israel and USD 520 million

sent by Israeli citizens abroad in 2008. However, the financial crisis resulted in slower growth and decline in inflows and outflows in the last quarter of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2009 (see figure 11).

Figure 11: Growth in remittance flows in Israel in 2008 and 2009 (in %)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009b.

Effects of the economic crisis

- While the financial crisis unfolded in main receiving countries of migrants from the Middle East (especially OECD countries and GCC countries), remittances to the Arab Mashreq region started showing signs of slower growth or even decline. Recruitment agencies in Egypt and Jordan reported a drop by up to a half in demand for labour in the Gulf region since the beginning of 2008, especially for skilled labour (Awad, 2009).
- Traditionally, the demand for temporary contractual workers in the GCC countries has been driven both by structural factors, such as labour shortages, demographic trends and rigidities of the labour market, and by cyclical factors, such as demand for

goods and services and the construction boom fuelled by high oil prices. Figure 12 below shows that demand for workers from Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines in the six GCC countries has been following the trends in the price of oil. Based on trends from previous years, migration flows to the GCC countries could have been expected to decline in 2009 and 2010 if the financial crisis resulted in lower oil prices, which would depress the level of aggregate demand, investment and, therefore, demand for foreign labour in the GCC countries. In Kuwait, there was “a small decline in the total number of non-Kuwaitis between June 2007 and December 2008”, in contrast to an upward trend in the proportion of non-nationals between 2000 and 2007 (Shah, 2009).

Figure 12: Migrant flows from Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines to GCC countries (in thousands), and oil prices (in USD per barrel), 1999–2009




Note: Data for Philippines and Pakistan for 2009 are based on projections from historical data.

Source: Based on data from New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Bangladesh Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), Pakistan Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, and Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

- According to the estimations of Ratha et al. (2009), the financial crisis has had a noticeable impact on temporary contractual workers in GCC countries. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, where more than two thirds of the population is made up of non-nationals, media polls show that 10 per cent of nationals participating in the survey reported having lost their jobs because of the financial crisis. Non-nationals' responses were mainly "staying in the United Arab Emirates and looking for another job" (58%) and "planning to leave (either to their countries of origin or another country)" (33%) (*The National*, 2009b).
- The workforce demand in the construction sector of Dubai, a major employer of temporary contractual workers, was expected to decline by 20 per cent in 2009. The anticipated departure of workers was expected to lead to a population decline of 8 per cent in 2009 (UN-ESCWA, 2009).
- The result of this unemployment is that, after years of substantial growth in remittance outflows, such growth is projected to have halted, as of the end of 2008, in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The reason for such a decline might be attributable to the loss of income of foreign workers that have become unemployed and either stayed in the region to look for employment or returned to their country of origin. IOM research on the remittance behaviour of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia revealed that over 85 per cent of respondents expected remittances to decline in the future as a result of the crisis, while 32 per cent expected the impact of the financial crisis to be severe. While 20 per cent of Pakistani contractual foreign workers have stated that they did not foresee alternative options, if remittances declined in the future, 29 per cent saw returning and seeking employment in Pakistan and opening a new business or expanding existing ones (25%) as a potential solution (Arif, forthcoming).
- Data from the central banks of Mashreq countries show that remittance growth slowed but remained positive in the last quarter of 2008. In the first quarters of 2009, money sent by migrants experienced negative growth, possibly as a result of some migrants sending their savings home at the end of 2008 before returning in 2009 (see figure 13).

Figure 13: Growth of remittance inflows in selected Mashreq countries, 2008–2009 (in %)




Note: Data for Lebanon are available only for 2008 but include remittance inflows and outflows. Total remittances in 2008 reached USD 8.7 billion in Egypt, USD 2.2 billion in Lebanon and USD 1.4 billion in Jordan, according to the respective banks.

Source: Based on data from respective central banks.

- Analysis of remittance inflows to Egypt reveals that remittances from North America started declining in the third quarter of 2008, while remittances from European and Arab countries peaked in

the third and fourth quarters of 2008, respectively, and then decreased. The third quarter of 2009 witnessed a negative growth of remittance inflows of between -1 and -29 per cent (see figure 14).

Figure 14: Growth of remittance inflows to Egypt, according to sending country, 2008–2009 (in %)




Note: The main EU destination countries are France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.


Source: Based on data from the Central Bank of Egypt.

- Migrants working in the Mashreq countries have also been badly affected by the crisis. A study conducted by the Phoenix Centre for Economic and Informatics Studies claimed that, out of 10,500 workers in several sectors that lost their jobs in 2009, 6,750 were foreign workers, concentrated mostly in the textile factories in the Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan (*Jordan Times*, 2010).
- Egyptian Government statistics revealed that Egyptians in the United Arab Emirates remitted USD 1.12 billion between July 2008 and March 2009, compared with USD 941.6 million over a similar period in 2007/2008. The spike could be attributed to laid-off Egyptians receiving a severance package, emptying their bank accounts

and returning home (Al Masry Online, 2009). Data on remittances sent from GCC countries to Egypt and Pakistan show that the growth in remittances experienced in the first quarter of 2009 slowed down in the following period, registering negative growth for Egypt until the third quarter of 2009. While the biggest drop has been experienced in remittances sent from the United Arab Emirates, migrants in other GCC countries have been equally hard hit by the crisis, with a drop of 20 per cent in remittances sent to Egypt in the second and third quarters of 2009. Remittances sent from GCC countries to Pakistan have experienced declining growth rates, but no negative growth until the end of 2009 (see figures 15 and 16).

Figure 15: Growth of remittance outflows from GCC countries to Egypt in 2009 (in %)

Source: Based on data from the Central Bank of Egypt, 2009.

Figure 16: Remittance outflows from GCC countries to Pakistan in 2009 (in %)

Source: Based on data from the State Bank of Pakistan, 2009.

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
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OCEANIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

- Oceania²⁷ hosts over 6 million international migrants, who make up 16.8 per cent of the population in the region. Although only accounting for less than 3 per cent

of the global migrant stock, Oceania is the region with the highest proportion of migrants in its population (see figure 1) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 1: Stock of migrants (in thousands) and share of total population (in %) in Oceania in 2000, 2005 and 2010




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

²⁷ Oceania includes the following countries and subregions: Australia, New Zealand, **Melanesia** (Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), **Micronesia** (Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federates States of), Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau), and **Polynesia** (American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna Islands).

- In recent years, 21.8 per cent of the population growth experienced by the region has been directly related to the arrival of new migrants (UN DESA, 2009).
- Migrants represent 25 per cent or more of the total population in four cities in the region: Sydney, Melbourne, Perth (Australia) and Auckland (New Zealand). Sydney and Melbourne host the highest number of migrants, with 1,235,908 and 960,145 foreign-born residents, respectively (MPI, 2007).
- Oceania remains a region of immigration, with more people entering the continent than leaving. However, latest estimates project an increased outflow of migrants from the region; although the net migration rate remains positive, it decreased from 4.1 migrants per 1,000 population between 2000 and 2005 to 2.8 between 2005 and 2010. The consistent positive migration rate is largely due to Australia and New Zealand, which remain attractive destination countries for international migrants (UN DESA, 2008).
- According to Census 2000 data, there are over 1.5 million²⁸ emigrants originating from Oceania. Emigrants from the Pacific Islands account for 37 per cent of this figure, followed by emigrants from New Zealand (35%) (see figure 2). Among the Pacific Islands, Polynesia is the subregion with the highest number of emigrants (DRC, 2007). Around half of this migration is intraregional, with Australia alone receiving nearly 455,000 migrants from within the region. Emigration outside the region is largely directed towards the USA and the United Kingdom, which together account for nearly 471,000 migrants from Oceania (DRC, 2007).
- The percentage of female migrants in Oceania is steadily growing – from 50.7 per cent of international migrants in 2005, to 51.2 per cent in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).
- For the first time since 2005, remittance inflows decreased from USD 7 billion (in 2008) to USD 6.9 billion (in 2009), reflecting the effects of the economic crisis (Ratha et al., 2009).²⁹

Figure 2: Emigrants from Oceania, by place of origin, in 2000 (in %)



Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.

Source: DRC, 2007.

²⁸ The statistics do not include data on Pitcairn.


²⁹ The figures refer to remittance inflows in the following countries: Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

- The migrant population in Australia and New Zealand increased consistently in the last decade, accounting for over a fifth of the total national population in both countries and reflecting the policy of both Governments to promote immigration. In Australia, international migrant numbers grew from 4 million in 2000 to an estimated 4.7 million in 2010. New Zealand experienced an even


steeper increase – from 685,000 in 2000 to 962,000 in 2010 (see figure 3a). The percentage of migrants as a share of the total population has also increased steadily. In 2010, for the first time since 1990, New Zealand will host a higher percentage of migrants as a share of the total population than Australia (see figure 3b) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 3a: Stock of migrants in Australia and New Zealand in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 3b: Stock of migrants as a percentage of total population in Australia and New Zealand in 2000, 2005 and 2010




Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- British migrants make up the largest group of migrants in both countries, with migration between the two countries also being significant. Overall, intraregional migration is more important for New Zealand, accounting for nearly a quarter of immigration, compared to 11 per cent of immigration to Australia.
- According to Census 2000 data, Australian and New Zealander emigrants follow similar routes, moving either towards their main neighbouring country (i.e. New Zealand and Australia, respectively), or towards the English-speaking countries of the United Kingdom and the USA. These destinations host 55 per cent of


the Australian emigrant population and 84 per cent of New Zealand's emigrant population. Australia is the main destination for New Zealand emigrants, with 68 per cent of its total migrant population (see figure 4b) (DRC, 2007). This is facilitated by the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which gives citizens of Australia and New Zealand the right to visa-free travel and residence between the two countries. For Australians, the United Kingdom remains the primary destination, with 25 per cent of emigrants moving there, followed by the USA and New Zealand (see figure 4a).

Figure 4a: Emigrants from Australia in 2000, by country of destination (in %)



Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.


Figure 4b: Emigrants from New Zealand in 2000, by country of destination (in %)



Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
Source: DRC, 2007.

- Australia and New Zealand have historically recorded more immigrants than emigrants. This trend is likely to continue in future years, although at a slower pace (see figure 5) (UN DESA, 2008).

Figure 5: Net migration rates per 1,000 population from Australia and New Zealand in 1995–2000, 2000–2005 and 2005–2010



Source: UN DESA, 2008.


- In Australia, 66 per cent of the total population growth recorded between 2008 and 2009³⁰ was due to net overseas migration (NOM).³¹ This increase, estimated at 297,400 persons, represents the largest increase recorded in the country since the quarterly Estimated Resident Population survey began in 1981 (ABS, 2009). Further, since 2004,³² migration flows have accounted for an increasing share of national population growth, rising from 45.6 per cent in 2004, to 59.5 per cent in 2008 (DIAC, 2009a). This steady increase was due to an increase in the number of overseas students, the resilience of the Australian economy and larger migration programmes.
- In the financial year 2008–2009, 32,000 British migrants were registered as permanent additions to the resident population (14.2% of this group), along with around 26,000 New Zealanders, 25,000 Indians, 24,000 Chinese and 12,000 South Africans (DIAC, 2009b).
- New Zealand's net migration rate peaked in 2003, although it has remained positive ever since. In detail, however, the flow is much more complex and multifaceted; at the country level, the numbers of New Zealanders going to Australia have historically outpaced the Australians coming to New Zealand (see figure 6). Regarding British residents, the trend has changed since 2002, with more British citizens going to New Zealand than New Zealanders going to the United Kingdom. In 2009, the positive migration balance recorded by China and India strongly increased (Statistics New Zealand, 2008 and 2009).

³⁰ These figures refer to the period September 2008 to September 2009.

³¹ According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), net overseas migration (NOM) is the difference between those leaving and arriving permanently (permanent migrants, settlers who were granted visas offshore) or for at least 12 months out of the 16-month period (long-term migrants, which include temporary residents and students).

³² These figures reflect migration flows recorded up to June of the indicated year (12-month period).

Figure 6: Net migration from New Zealand, by country of residence:^{*} top four countries in 2001–2009 (in thousands)



Note: *The net migration refers to the difference between permanent and long term (PLT) arrivals and departure. PLT include people who arrive/depart to/from New Zealand for a period of 12 months or more.


Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2008 and 2009.

- According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship in Australia, it is estimated that, in 2008, almost 50,000 immigrants were staying irregularly in the country. The majority of these (84%) entered the country as tourists and overstayed their visas. Citizens of China and the USA represent the highest number of ‘overstayers’, accounting for 10 per cent of the total (DIAC, 2009a). From August 2008 through July 2009, 28 boats with irregular migrants landed or were in-

tercepted by the Australian authorities (Koser, 2009).

- In Australia, the stock of foreign-born workers has increased consistently since 2000, making up about a quarter of the total working population (see figure 7). After a slight decrease, in relative terms, in 2004 and 2005, the number of foreign workers rose significantly in 2007 (from 24.9% of total labour force in 2006, to 25.8%) (OECD, 2009a).

Figure 7: Foreign workers in Australia: total stock (in thousands) and as a share of the labour force (in %) in 2000–2007




Source: OECD, 2009a.

- The number of temporary workers in Australia showed a dramatic increase – from 36,000 in 2002, to 87,300 in 2007
 - outpacing numbers of permanent

settlers, which still steadily increased but at a much lower rate (see figure 8) (OECD, 2009a).

Figure 8: Comparison between inflows of permanent settlers and inflows of temporary foreign workers to Australia in 2000–2007 (in thousands)




Source: OECD, 2009a³³

- From 2000 to 2007, temporary migration rose to an even higher level in New Zealand, where the annual inflow of foreign workers doubled in five years – from 59,600 in 2002, to 121,500 in 2007

(see figure 9). The inflow of permanent migrants over the years appears to be more stable. Nevertheless, after a peak of 14,500 reached in 2005, the numbers declined to 12,400 in 2007 (OECD, 2009a).

Figure 9: Comparison between inflows of permanent settlers and inflows of temporary foreign workers to New Zealand in 2000–2007 (in thousands)




Source: OECD, 2009a.

³³ Permanent settlers are skilled workers in the following categories: Australian Sponsored, Regional Designated Area Sponsored, Employer Nomination Scheme, Business Skills, and Special Talents and Independent, including accompanying dependants. Temporary workers are included in the following categories: Skilled Temporary Resident Programme, including accompanying dependants and Long Stay Temporary Business Programme. Period of reference: fiscal year (July to June of the indicated year).

- Temporary work schemes for Pacific Islanders in both countries, such as the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme in New Zealand and the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWP) in Australia, have been designed with an explicit focus on linking migration to the development of the country of origin (Hugo, 2010).
- The number of overseas students³⁴ admitted into Australia has strongly increased in recent years. In 2008, 409,136 temporary permits were issued, compared to 321,631 in 2006. In relation to the countries of origin, Chinese and Indian

students account for the largest share of arrivals, with 90,900 and 49,800 students, respectively (see figure 10) (DIAC, 2006, 2008 and 2009a). While official figures for 2009–2010 are not yet available, it is estimated that a significant slowdown of recruitments for 2009–2010 will occur. Following the economic crisis, families in the two leading source countries – China and India – are experiencing a reduction in the value of their savings, which is likely to have diverted the flow of resources used for their children’s education towards educational institutions closer to home (Koser, 2009).

Figure 10: Student arrivals in Australia, by country of birth: top five countries in 2006–2008



Source: DIAC, 2006, 2008 and 2009a.


³⁴ Students are defined as people approved for entry into Australia for a specific period of time, for the purpose of undertaking formal and non-formal studies.

MELANESIA, POLYNESIA AND MICRONESIA

- The migrant population increased in all Oceania subregions between 2000 and 2010 (see figure 11a). Micronesia is the subregion with the highest number of migrants – 151,000 – which represents


also the highest percentage in the region, relative to the total population. However, this rate decreased slightly from 27.5 per cent in 2000 to 26.4 per cent in 2010 (see figure 11b) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 11a: Stock of migrants in Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)



Source: UN DESA, 2009.


Figure 11b: Stock of migrants as a percentage of total population in Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia in 2000, 2005 and 2010



Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- The corridors for emigration from the Pacific Islands are strongly linked to geographical ties. According to Census 2000 data, 50 per cent of the Pacific Islands' migrants left their countries and remained within the region, with

New Zealand being the leading country of destination, with 20 per cent of the total, followed by Australia (17%), and other Pacific Islands (13%) (see figure 12). Canada and the USA receive 36 per cent of the Pacific Islands' migrants (DRC, 2007).

Figure 12: Pacific Islands' emigrants, by country/region of destination, in 2000 (in %)


Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.

Source: DRC, 2007.

- The political and economic disparities between the Pacific Islands and neighbouring countries (to which migration has long been seen as a potential solution), coupled with the associative status of many islands granting their inhabitants free movement to, or citizenship of, countries such as New Zealand and the USA,³⁵ and the active recruitment policies of New Zealand, in particular, have resulted in continued high out-migration from the Pacific Islands. However, the negative rate has been decreasing overall since 1995–2000 (Stahl and Appleyard, 2007).
- The outflow differential of migrants has more than halved in Micronesia, from -9.6 in 1995–2000, to -3.8 in 2005–2010 (see figure 13). Polynesia remains the region with the highest negative migration rate, with -8.5 migrants per population of 1,000 recorded between 2005 and 2010 (UN DESA, 2008). New Caledonia and French Polynesia are the only countries where the migration rate is positive, due to labour migration in the mining sector and in the professional and administrative sectors, respectively (World Bank, 2006).

³⁵ Free Association grants free movement to Micronesians and inhabitants of the Marshall Islands to the USA; the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau are associated with New Zealand.

Figure 13: Net migration rates per 1,000 population in Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia in 1995–2000, 2000–2005 and 2005–2010



Source: UN DESA, 2008.

- This outflow, combined with the Pacific Islands' small populations, means that diasporas from some Pacific Island countries outnumber the resident populations. This is the case in Niue, where the diaspora represents 294.2 per cent of the resident national population, and in Tokelau (138.5%) (Hugo, 2010).
- Emigration is particularly relevant among skilled workers, and 52 per cent of the Pacific Islands' emigrants residing in OECD countries have a post-secondary education.³⁶ On the list of the top 30 countries with the highest migration rates for skilled migration in OECD States, eight are States from the region: Palau (80.9%), Tonga (75.6%), Samoa (73.4%), Nauru (72%), Tuvalu (64.9%), Fiji (62.8%), Kiribati (55.7%) and Marshall Islands (42.8%). Emigration rates are especially high among women, with 63.1 per cent of them being skilled migrants (Docquier et al., 2008).

Effects of the economic crisis


- Although the economic crisis hit the Oceania region after other areas of the world, the effects have nonetheless been significant. Australia and New Zealand are facing slow or negative economic growth, as well as rising unemployment rates; unemployment is expected to continue to increase in 2010 (OECD, 2009b).
- Migrants have been affected by job losses. In New Zealand, for example, the unemployment rate among recent migrants was 6.7 per cent, compared to 5 per cent for the wider population through 2008–2009 (IMSED, 2009a). Furthermore, although the impact of the global crisis was delayed in the region, the same is predicted of its recovery. This slow recovery could affect migration trends for a longer period of time.
- Australia and New Zealand were the first nations in the region to introduce restrictive migration policy measures in response to the economic crisis, in order to protect local workers.
- The decline in remittances could particularly affect several Pacific Island States that are highly dependent upon

³⁶ Figures refer to year 2000. The statistics reflect only the population over 25 years of age.

- migrant transfer of funds for their economic and social development.
- In Australia, inflows of remittances dropped in 2009 after several years of strong increases. In 2009, they accounted for USD 4.5 billion – down from USD 4.6 billion in 2008. In New Zealand, after a peak

of USD 1.3 billion in 2002, remittances have been steadily declining, reaching USD 615 million in 2009 (see figure 14). In Australia and New Zealand, the ratio of remittances to GDP remained marginal at 0.5 per cent in 2008.

Figure 14: Remittance inflows to Australia and New Zealand in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)




Source: Ratha et al., 2009.³⁷

- World Bank data for 2009 and 2010 remittance outflows from Australia are not yet available; however, the funds transferred by migrants to their countries of origin are expected to fall. This would be the second consecutive decrease recorded in the country after 2008,

when remittances declined from USD 3.0 billion in 2007 to USD 2.9 billion in 2008. In New Zealand, remittance outflows have been inconsistent over the years. In 2008, migrants sent home USD 1.202 billion – a drop from USD 1.207 billion in 2007 (see figure 15) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 15: Remittance outflows from Australia and New Zealand in 2000–2008 (in USD millions)



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

³⁷ 2008 values are estimates. World Bank estimates are based on the International Monetary Fund's *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2008*.

- Unemployment affected Pacific Island workers residing in New Zealand, including migrants who were particularly vulnerable in the labour market due to their relative youth and low-skilled status (Department of Labour of New Zealand, 2009).
- As a result of the financial crisis, the Australian Government reviewed its migration policy for 2009–2010,³⁸ reducing the number of permanent and temporary migrants admitted, for the first time in ten years. In 2009, the programme for permanent skilled admissions was reduced from 155,000 to 108,000 persons (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 2009; Thomson Reuters Australia, 2009). Many trades previously on the Critical Skills List, such as bricklaying, plumbing and carpentry, have been removed. Additionally, the Government revised the requirements for temporary visas (457 Visas³⁹), compelling local employers to give priority to Australian workers. In June 2009, the 457 Visas Scheme recorded a drop of 45 per cent in received applications, compared to the same month of the previous year. Additionally, more demanding English-language skills were introduced for categories such as trades, chefs and lower-skilled occupations for both temporary and permanent applicants (Fix et al., 2009).
- In Australia, in the third quarter of 2009, for the first time, Chinese immigrants accounted for the largest share of settlers⁴⁰ moving to Australia, with 6,350 individuals, compared to 5,800 and 4,740 from the United Kingdom and New Zealand, respectively. The curtailment of the skilled migration programme particularly affected British settlers, who previously formed the largest group of applicants for skilled visas. Chinese migration, linked mostly to family reunifications, was less affected (Australian Visa Bureau, 2009).
- Faced with rising unemployment and slow or declining economic growth, due to the economic crisis, the New Zealand Government has modified some of its key active migration policies. In July 2009, the General Work policy was replaced by the Essential Skills policy⁴¹ – a new temporary work policy framework that mandates officers processing work permit applications to ensure that no local workers are available for any given position. Furthermore, the length of these permits has been reduced from three years to one year, for low-skilled migrants. The number of approvals under this category has declined significantly: 20 per cent fewer approvals were given in the month of December 2009 than in December 2008. This also reflects the fact that the number of applications has decreased by 34 per cent in the second half of 2009, compared with the same period in 2008 (IMSED, 2009b).
- Temporary work permits⁴² were also affected: the number of approvals was 3 per cent lower in the second half of 2009 than in the second half of 2008 (IMSED, 2009b).
- The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy,⁴³ which has been in place since 2007 and has been very relevant for migrants coming from the Pacific Islands,⁴⁴ was also revised. In 2009, the Supplementary Seasonal Employment (SSE) policy was introduced to replace the previous Transitioning to Recognised Seasonal Employer (TRSE) policy. The permits issued under the SSE policy are now subjected to a Labour Market Test, are not available for those previously holding a TRSE or SSE permit, and do not allow migrants to support applications

³⁸ Fiscal year: from 1 July to 30 June.³⁹ The 457 Visa Scheme is a long-stay business visa that allows employers to sponsor an overseas worker for up to four years.⁴⁰ According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), settlers are defined as immigrants holding a permanent or temporary visa and New Zealanders and persons otherwise eligible that have a clear intention to settle.⁴¹ The Essential Skills work permit is the standard skill-shortage work permit, consisting of occupations on the Immediate Skill Shortage List (ISSL) and the Long Term Skill Shortage List (LTSSL).⁴² Temporary work permits include several types of permits, along with the Essential Skills permits, such as Working Holidays, Specific Purpose and Student permits.⁴³ RSE and SSE allow the horticulture and viticulture industries to hire seasonal workers. In the recruitment process, Pacific Islands have been given priority.⁴⁴ The eligible Pacific Island countries are the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Fiji was excluded, in response to the 2006 military coup.


for their partners or children. In 2008, up to 8000 places were available to overseas workers under the RSE Policy (Immigration New Zealand, 2009).

- However, the planning level for permanent residence approvals in 2009–2010 remains unchanged from 2008–2009, although the actual number of approvals has decreased (IMSED, 2009b).
- In August 2008, the Australian Government announced the introduction of a Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS), modeled on the New Zealand RSE policy, with selected Pacific Island countries.⁴⁵ The scheme was expected to distribute initially 2,500 temporary visas per year. Owing partly to the worsening economic conditions, the implementation of the programme proceeded slowly (Bedford, 2009).

The first migrants participating in the scheme were 50 Tongan workers who arrived in February 2009 (PITIC, 2009).

- Inflows of remittances are traditionally very important for Pacific Island economies. In 2009, after years of steady increases, the Pacific Islands recorded a decline of remittances – to USD 1,819 million, down from USD 1,834 million in 2008.⁴⁶ The money sent home by migrants is particularly important in Tonga, Samoa, Kiribati and Fiji, where remittances accounted for 37.7, 25.8, 6.9 and 5.9 per cent of the GDP in 2008, respectively. French Polynesia was the only Pacific Island State that recorded an increase in remittances in 2009 – from USD 751 million in 2008 to USD 761 million (see figure 16) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 16: Remittance inflows to Pacific Islands in 2004–2009: selected countries (in USD millions)




Note: Figures for 2009 are estimates.

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

⁴⁵ The PSWPS concerns citizens of Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu.


⁴⁶ The estimates on remittance inflows refer to the following countries: Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

Figure 17: Remittance inflows to selected Pacific Islands in 2008, as a share of GDP (in %)



Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 18: GDP annual percentage change in selected Pacific Island countries, 2005–2010



Note: Figures for 2010 are estimates.

Source: IMF, 2009 (IMF estimates are calculated at constant prices).

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ANNEX: MIGRATION DATA: COMPARABILITY, QUALITY AND LIMITATIONS

Migration is, by nature, a difficult variable to capture. The multidimensional and multidirectional characteristics of migration today, as well as its temporary and circular patterns, require sophisticated data-collection systems and methodologies – which, in most cases, countries are not prepared to apply or lack the capacity to do so. One of the main challenges of measuring international migration remains the fact that countries still define ‘international migrant’ differently. This lack of consistency and conformity is one of the main obstacles to setting accurate measurements allowing for comparability at the regional and international levels.

The UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration (UN DESA, 1998) prepared a series of definitions and classifications of migratory movement aimed at forming a basis for data collection on migration. However, countries collecting data on migration do so to support their own national legislative, administrative and policy needs and are therefore often reluctant to adopt concepts and definitions that would allow for regional and international coherence at the expense of their own specific use of the data collected.

An example of these methodological inconsistencies is the use of residency to define migrant status, in some cases, and nationality or country of birth, in others. In addition, the migrants’ duration of stay is often unspecified in migration data, and thus information referring to permanent, temporary or even short-term migration remains vague.

Another source of continuous misunderstanding is the difference between stock and flow data. Stocks of migrants indicate the total number of migrants present at a determined location at a specific point in time, which accounts for lifetime migration – i.e., for the population that has migrated at any point in time in the past and is still present in the analysed location. In other words, migrant stocks are the cumulative result of past flows. On the other hand, flows of migrants measure the number of migrants who have arrived at, or departed from, a certain location during a specific period of time. Knowing what migration statistics published by governments, academic bodies or international organizations are aimed at measuring is critical to understanding the migration phenomenon. A misunderstanding of the different concepts can lead to false conclusions and, therefore, to inaccurate policy recommendations by the users of the data, such as policymakers and the wider public.

In addition, there is a perceived sensitivity around the issue of migration. Given the volume of migrants around the world, as well as their impact on both countries of origin and destination, migration is perceived as a sensitive political issue. Governments have a sense of ownership of the data collected and, given this sensitivity, may prefer not to release the information available. This can result not only in a lack of available information on the issue, but also a hindrance to putting into practice new systems of data collection that address the weaknesses of existing systems. In

this introduction, the aim is to discuss the data quality of the main sources of information used in the different regional overviews, in order to assess their comparability and reliability, and explain the potential limitations of the data provided.

Immigration and emigration

There are generally two types of sources of information regarding immigration and emigration data: international and national migration statistics. These information sources are usually based on different assumptions and follow a different methodology of data collection. As a result, they are meant to address different needs. While national statistics might include country-specific data and, therefore, be more accurate for national purposes, international statistics generally allow for better comparability. This is why the regional overviews presented here include data of the latter type.

The data used to estimate a country's number of immigrants and emigrants are measured in terms of stocks rather than flows. While flows allow for a more dynamic and chronological analysis of migration, it is generally easier to compute comparable stock rather than flow data, given most current migration data-collection methodologies. Given the limited information available in terms of migration, stock data facilitate the assessment of migration patterns, especially when accompanied by additional socio-demographic and economic determinants.

Immigration estimates

In terms of international immigration, the regional overviews draw primarily on the statistics provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (UN DESA, 2009). UN DESA provides estimates of migrant stocks on a regular basis, basing its calculations mostly on population censuses corresponding to the decennial rounds of censuses from 1950 to 2000, though some of the basic data used were obtained from population registers and

national surveys. In the majority of cases, the sources available provided information on place of birth, which allows for the identification of the foreign-born population. Thus UN DESA migrant stock estimates define international migrants as the foreign-born population, whenever possible. In most countries where information on place of birth was not recorded, information on citizenship (i.e. legal nationality) was available. In these cases, international migrants are defined as foreign citizens.⁴⁷

Census and survey data are the main sources of stock data on migrants. Most countries have carried out censuses and surveys, yet not all are in a position to determine their migrant stocks, due to the high cost of processing the information; and the countries that do produce their own stocks of migrants use them internally because this information is usually not comparable regionally or internationally, due to differences in definitions. Estimates from the UN DESA are especially helpful in providing information that has considerable value for migration analysis and that is, at times, the only available information.

Furthermore, it is important to point out that the UN DESA immigration data included here for 2010 are projections based on long-run tendencies and may not accurately predict the effect of unexpected short-term fluctuations, such as the 2008–2009 economic crisis.

Emigration estimates

Measuring international emigration is an even more challenging task than measuring immigration. Reliable estimates of emigration (either flows or stocks) are necessary for policymakers in order to manage international emigration and assess its consequences for countries of origin.

Currently, the most effective (even if not yet totally reliable) method of measuring emigration stocks is through the destination

⁴⁷ For more detailed information regarding the methodology used by UN DESA for estimating the stock of migrants, please refer to: <http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=4>

countries' censuses, gathering information on the foreign-born population or on foreign nationals. However, many problems remain, especially in terms of the level of comparability across the different calculations of the destination countries' censuses (such as the different definitions and categories of migrants used, as well as the different points in time when the censuses are carried out).

The regional overviews presented here obtain their information on emigrant stocks from the Global Migrant Origin Database (version 4) compiled by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC, 2007), based at the University of Sussex, England. This database consists of a 226x226 matrix of origin–destination stocks by country and territory. It is primarily based on the national population censuses conducted during the 2000 round of censuses and other secondary sources, and estimates the missing data via a variety of techniques.⁴⁸ It combines foreign-born and foreign-nationality migrant stock data to create a single complete bilateral matrix: it uses information on foreign-born migrants as a default, making use of foreign nationality data only where data on foreign-born migrants were unavailable (Parsons et al., 2007).

However, as with every cross-country source of international migration data, when using the information provided by this source, the heterogeneity in the original underlying migration statistics should be taken into consideration. This responds to several factors, such as disparities across countries in data-collection practices, differences in definitions used to classify migrants, shifting borders, undercounting of irregular and forced migrants, high non-response rates in poorer countries, and varying rates of naturalization of the foreign-born – all of which affect comparability of migrant stocks across countries.

Several caveats should be applied to the international estimates presented here. The

first, as mentioned before, is the definition of migrant. In the databases used here, migrants are defined as either foreign-born or with foreign nationality (where data by country of birth were not available). These two definitions are not conceptually the same, yet they are merged in order to achieve a global database. For example, counting migrants by foreign nationality would exclude the foreign-born who have acquired citizenship in other countries (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). However, in the absence of complete information for all countries by country of birth, international databases (such as those developed by UN DESA, OECD, DRC and the World Bank) combine data on country of birth and country of citizenship to arrive at global estimates of migrant stocks.

Interpreting the meaning of migrant stocks also presents some difficulties, such as measuring children born abroad to seasonal migrants who may appear as foreign-born, but are not necessarily migrants. Another example is the case of foreign students who are included as migrants in some national migration statistics but not in others.

In addition, the disintegration and reunification of countries cause discontinuities in the international migrant stocks. The disintegration of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, accompanied by the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia in 1992, as well as that of the former Czechoslovakia in 1993, dramatically changed the volume of migrants in the world. Since an international migrant is defined as a person who was born in a country different from the one in which he or she resides, when a country disintegrates, people who had been internal migrants because they had moved from one part of the country to another may, effectively, become international migrants overnight, without having moved from their place of residence. Such changes introduce artificial but unavoidable discontinuities in the trend of the international migrant stocks.

Finally, estimates of global migrant stocks appear to undercount the actual stock of migrants in a number of countries because

⁴⁸ It refers to the period 2000–2002. Data prior to 2000 were scaled to the United Nations (2004) mid-year totals for 2000, whereas data for 2001 and 2002 were not scaled to the United Nations totals. The result is a complete bilateral matrix for the years 2000–2002.

of the lags in census data collection and the underreporting of irregular and forced migrants (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

All of this indicates that migration data are in need of a serious overhaul in terms of availability, timeliness, quality and cross-country comparability. Ultimately, the quality of migration data is determined by the quality of the population censuses of the different countries, many of which have not conducted censuses recently or regularly.

Remittances

In general, the quality and coverage of existing data on remittances are inadequate, and the definition of remittances is still under debate. While some international agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), count only workers' remittances, the World Bank maintains that compensation of employees and migrants' transfers should also be counted. In addition, there is the problem that many types of formal remittance flows are not recorded, in some countries, due to weaknesses in data collection. For example, reporting of 'small' remittance transactions made through formal channels is sometimes not mandatory, and remittances sent through post offices, exchange bureaux, and other money transfer operators (MTOs) are often not reflected in official statistics (de Luna Martinez, 2005). Moreover, remittances are often misclassified as export revenues, tourism receipts, nonresident deposits, or even foreign direct investment (FDI) (World Bank, 2008). However, the most important challenge arises when trying to add to the calculations flows that go through informal channels, such as unregulated money transfer firms and family, friends or acquaintances who carry remittances.

The remittance data shown in the regional overviews come mostly from the international remittance information gathered by the Development Prospects Group of the World Bank. Even though the data from the national central banks may be more accurate for national purposes, the World Bank data allow

for better comparability. Where they are of particular interest, national bank data have been included.

World Bank data on remittances

The World Bank defines migrant remittances as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers (World Bank, 2008). Data for these variables are mostly obtained from the balance of payments (BoP) data file of the IMF. Besides the fact that, in some countries, many types of formal remittances are not recorded and that, in all countries, remittances sent through informal channels are underestimated, it also has to be taken into consideration that many countries do not report data on remittances in the IMF BoP statistics. For these latter countries, the World Bank has used alternative estimates of workers' remittances based on either country desk or central bank data.

According to the World Bank:

Workers' remittances, as defined in the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, are current private transfers from migrant workers who are considered residents of the host country to recipients in their country of origin. If the migrants live in the host country for a year or longer, they are considered residents, regardless of their immigration status. If the migrants have lived in the host country for less than a year, their entire income in the host country should be classified as compensation of employees.⁴⁹

However, this rule is not always followed:

Many countries compile data based on the citizenship of the migrant worker rather than on their residency status. Further, data are shown entirely as either compensation of employees or as worker remittances, although they should be split between the two categories if the guidelines were correctly followed. Therefore, the distinction between these two categories appears to be

⁴⁹ Quoted from: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/476882-1157133580628/FactbookDataNotes.pdf>

entirely arbitrary, depending on country preference, convenience, and tax laws or data availability (World Bank, 2008).

On the other hand, migrants' transfers are the net worth of migrants that are transferred from one country to another at the time of migration (for a period of at least one year). As

the number of temporary workers increases, the importance of migrants' transfers may increase. Therefore, in order to get a complete picture of the resource flow from migrants, the three items – workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers – have to be considered together.

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
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Map 1: Immigrant growth rates (2005–2010), immigrant stocks and immigrants as a percentage of total population in 2010



Note: Regions in this map relate to IOM regions as defined in the regional overviews.
Source: UN DESA, Population Division (2009), *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*.

Europe was the region that recorded the largest number of migrants in 2010, with 77.1 million foreign-born¹ living within this region. However, proportionally, migration's most significant effect on population composition was seen in Oceania and the Middle East, where a smaller number of migrants made up much larger proportions of the population (16.8% and 12%, respectively). By way of comparison, in Asia, a larger number of migrants account for a relatively small proportion of the overall population (0.7%).


Migrant stocks worldwide continued to grow between 2005 and 2010 in most countries of the world. Ecuador saw the largest year-on-year growth, with the migrant stock increasing at the rate of 23 per cent; Iceland, Qatar and the Syrian Arab Republic also saw a year-on-year migrant stock growth rate of over 10 per cent.

At the other end of the spectrum, the annual growth rate was negative in over 60 countries, with the most important falls being recorded in Iraq (-8.6%), Armenia (-8.4%), Sierra Leone (-7.1%), Tonga (-6.3%) and Burundi (-5.9%).

Between 2005 and 2010, in North America, Western Europe and Scandinavia and the Middle East (with the exception of Iraq) most countries registered growth in the numbers of migrants living in their country. However, Central and Eastern European and Central Asian countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan) registered consistent decreases in such numbers. Other clusters of shrinking migrant stocks can be seen in parts of Western Africa, Central Africa, South America and South-East Asia.

¹ According to UN 1998 *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration – Revision 1*, the foreign-born population of a country include "all persons who have that country as country of usual residence and whose place of birth is located in another country".

Map 2: Female migrants as a percentage of international migrant stock, 2010



This map shows that the Middle East remains the region with the lowest share of female migrants in relation to the total migrant population. Only 38 per cent of the migrant stock in Middle Eastern countries is made up of female migrants, with the figure being particularly low for countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Women make up 20.8 per cent of the migrant stock in Oman, 25.8 per cent of migrants in Qatar, 27.4 per cent of migrants in the United Arab Emirates, 30 per cent of migrants in Kuwait, 30.1 per cent of migrants in Saudi Arabia, and just under a third of migrants in Bahrain (32.9%).¹

Other countries where a large majority of migrants are male include Bangladesh (86.1%), Bhutan (81.5%), Cuba (71.1%), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (64.5%), Viet Nam (63.4%), Papua New Guinea (62.6%) and Zimbabwe (62.2%), to mention a few. Apart from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, noted above, Côte d'Ivoire, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan and South Africa are countries of destination with a migrant stock of over 2 million that is over 54 per cent male.


Globally, Nepal is the country with the most feminized migrant stock (68.2%), followed by Mauritius (63.3%), Montenegro (61.5%), Barbados (60.7%) and Estonia (59.6%). Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uzbekistan are major countries of destination where migrant stocks are heavily feminized.²

Proportions of female migrants among migrants in Eastern European and Commonwealth of Independent States countries are consistently among the highest in the world. The highest proportions can be found in Montenegro (61.5%), Estonia (59.6%), Latvia (59.3%), Poland (59%), Armenia (58.9%), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (58.3%) and Kyrgyzstan (58.2%). This trend means that Europe and Oceania are the only regions that have a majority of females in migrant stocks – 52.6% and 51.2%, respectively – while, in the Americas, females and male migrants are almost equal (50.1% females). However, these values are regional averages; at the country level, some additional differences become clear: female migration to Canada and the Southern Cone of South America compensates for a predominantly male migrant stock in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Suriname and the USA, while, in Europe, Germany, Greece, Slovenia and Spain have a majority of male migrants.

¹ Please note that these numbers might not represent the full scale of female migration in the region, due to the high number of female domestic workers, which are not often captured in official statistics.

² Feminization of migration also occurs in qualitative terms – i.e. female migrants moving autonomously abroad in search of job opportunities, rather than as a household dependant or in the context of family reunification.

Map 3: Total population change in Europe due to net migration and natural population change (NPC), 2008



- Notes:** (a) 'Total population change' is the difference between the size of the population at the beginning and at the end of a given period. It can be calculated by adding the country's natural population change (see b below) and net migration (including corrections). There is negative change when both of these components are negative or when one is negative and has a higher absolute value than the other.
- (b) 'Natural population change' (NPC) shows the difference between the number of live births and the number of deaths during a given period. The natural increase (or natural decrease) is negative when the number of deaths exceeds the number of births.
- (c) 'Net migration' shows the difference between the number of people entering and leaving the country during a given period. The net migration rate is negative when more people leave the country than enter it.
- (d) 'France' stands for the whole of France, including its overseas departments.

Source: Eurostat, online database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, extracted on 5 February 2010.


With the exception of Germany, most Western and Central European countries experienced an increase in their populations in 2008. For the majority of these countries, this increase is due to both positive natural population change (a higher number of live births than deaths during the year) and positive net migration (a higher number of immigrants than emigrants).

The benefit of immigration is perhaps most evident in Italy, where a positive net migration rate offsets a low birth rate.


In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland and Turkey, the number of emigrants is larger than the number of immigrants; however, a higher birth than death rate keeps the total population growing.

In Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany and Latvia, positive net migration rates are not sufficient to entirely offset low birth rates compared to death rates. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania face both negative net migration and negative natural population change.

Map 4: IOM Assisted Victims of Human Trafficking (VoT), by country of origin, 2000–2009



Map 5: IOM Assisted Victims of Human Trafficking (VoT), by country of destination, 2000–2009



Notes: The Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM),¹ known also as the IOM human trafficking database, is the largest transnational database containing only primary data on victims of trafficking (VoT). It was developed and implemented by IOM in 1999–2000 in UNSC/Resolution 1244-administered Kosovo and its usage has since increased to include all regions of the world. The structure follows the format of two accompanying IOM VoT questionnaires used by IOM missions and partner organizations involved in direct assistance. The IOM Screening Interview Form is an institution-wide form intended to assess whether the individual is a victim of trafficking and thus eligible for an IOM assistance project; and the Assistance Interview Form aims to track the nature of direct assistance given, as well as documenting further details of the trafficking experience (for more information, see IOM, 2007).² The database now operates in 72 IOM missions globally, although usage of the tool varies from mission to mission. Although not every IOM mission is able to use the IOM human trafficking database, additional data from non-users have been integrated to increase accuracy and completeness of all IOM-assisted VoT cases. While the system was initially designed as a case-management tool for IOM counter-trafficking direct-assistance programmes, it has since demonstrated its added value to research.

Source: IOM, Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM) Database, March 2010.

¹ The database is referred to as the ‘CTM’ internally as this is the formal technical name. For ease of understanding, in the context of this section, we refer to the IOM human trafficking database.

² IOM (2007) *The IOM Handbook on Direct Assistance for Victims of Human Trafficking*, IOM, Geneva.

Over the ten years that the IOM human trafficking database has been operating, IOM has collected information relating to nearly 16,000 victims of trafficking in over 90 countries of destination around the world. With the exception of Oceania, there are data on victims assisted after being trafficked to, from, or within, all regions of the world.


It is important to duly contextualize the information presented within the map and care should be taken when interpreting these figures. Importantly, the data relate only to IOM-identified and -assisted cases encoded into the data-management system. Moreover, the number of people assisted by IOM forms just one part of our understanding of human trafficking and does not necessarily relate to the overall size of the number of trafficking victims. At any given point in time, the number of unidentified or unassisted trafficking victims remains unknown. The IOM case-management information may also reflect the interplay of other factors, such as:

- the existence or not of an IOM counter-trafficking project in a country and/or the length of time this project has been running;
- the thematic focus of this project (e.g. with regard to eligibility – that is, the type of trafficking and/or the sex and/or the age of the victim);

- the existence of more or less active outreach programmes in the country;
- better or worse relations with authorities who may or may not provide automatic referral and/or full case information to IOM;
- more or less active enforcement measures;
- better or worse identification of victims by authorities;
- the ability or inability of victims to escape from their situation;
- rejection of ‘victim’ status and the declining of IOM assistance by victims.

The above-mentioned issues can lead to unintentional biases in the dataset. For example, during the earlier years of implementation, the IOM human trafficking database was primarily used in South East Europe and the former Soviet Union where IOM was only, at that time, involved in providing assistance to females trafficked for sexual exploitation. Similarly, high assistance figures are not necessarily reflective of the actual incidence or severity of trafficking within a country, because of the above-mentioned factors.

Map 6: Signatures/ratifications of the UN Palermo Protocol on human trafficking, January 2010



Note: This map shows the ratifications of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (one of the two so-called Palermo Protocols). Please note that some countries acceded to the Protocol (Belize, Bahrain, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Zambia), Finland and the Netherlands accepted the European Community approved and Montenegro succeeded to the Protocol.

Source: United Nations Treaty Database, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtidsg_no=XVII-12-a&chapter=1&lang=en, extracted on 16 February 2010.

The Palermo Protocols (the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air), adopted by the United Nations in 2000 in Palermo, Italy, together with the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, have seen a rapid entry into force through widespread ratification. As this map shows, by early 2010, the overwhelming majority of countries (137 countries out of the 192 Member States of the United Nations) had ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, with 2009 alone seeing ratifications in Chad, Indonesia, Iraq, Luxembourg, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Togo and the United Arab Emirates.


Few countries in Europe and the Americas have not ratified the Protocol: Andorra, San Marino,

Ireland, the Czech Republic and Greece are the only countries in Europe not to have done so, while in the Americas, the Caribbean countries of Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Haiti, Santa Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have not ratified the Protocol.

Asia, particularly South-Central and South-East Asia, is a major region where ratification is not so widespread: countries such as Bangladesh, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand have either not signed or not ratified the Protocol. East Africa is also an area where there is still progress to be made in ratification, as Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have yet to ratify the Protocol; in West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have yet to sign the Treaty, as does Angola in the south-west.



Map 7: Remittances and foreign aid, total values and ratio by region, 2007



Notes:

(a) Foreign aid includes official development assistance (ODA) and official aid.

(b) Regional figures correspond to regions as defined by the World Bank for remittance flows and not to the regional groupings, as used by IOM. Please note that World Bank regional figures do not include high-income OECD countries or high-income non-OECD countries in these regions. In addition, figures for the EU Member States Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Romania have also been excluded. Regional figures used by the World Bank for foreign aid, however, do include some additional countries such as EU Member States, Australia, Japan, etc., which are not highlighted in the map as the amount of foreign aid received by these countries is considered to be insignificant.

Source: World Bank staff estimates, based on the International Monetary Fund's *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2008* (update November 2009); World Development Indicators, online database <http://data.worldbank.org/>; World Bank catalog/g/worldevelopment-indicators, extracted on 4 February 2010, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

The growth in remittances continues to outstrip the growth in foreign aid (official development assistance (ODA) and official aid). The difference is most pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the ratio is USD 9.3 of remittances to USD 1 of foreign aid, followed by East Asia and the Pacific (USD 8.3 of remittances to USD 1 of foreign aid). At the other end of the spectrum, sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where foreign aid outstrips remittances, with almost USD 2 of foreign aid for every USD 1 of remittances.


Since 2005–2006,¹ these differences have become more pronounced: while there has been large-scale growth in remittance flows to all regions, the level of foreign aid has grown

much more slowly – or, indeed, shrunk: foreign aid to East Asia and the Pacific, for example, shrank by 10.4 per cent, while remittances grew by 41 per cent; and, in sub-Saharan Africa, the importance of foreign aid is diminishing as there are 91 percentage points' difference between the percentage growth of remittances and foreign aid.

However, the distribution of remittances tends to favour middle- rather than lower-income countries, with the former receiving nearly USD 265 billion and the latter only USD 25 billion in 2007, amounting proportionally to only a 0.4 per cent increase in the share of remittances going to developing countries.

¹ See map 8, *World Migration Report 2008*. Please note that, for Middle East and North Africa as well as for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, comparison is not possible as the countries included have been changed.

Map 8: Growth in the number of natural disasters



Note: The type of natural disaster used for this comparison includes droughts, earthquakes (seismic activities), floods and storms.
Source: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be), extracted on 10 March 2010, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels.

This map compares the number of natural disasters that occurred during the period 1990–1999 with the number that occurred in 2000–2009. The total number of disasters increased by almost 50 per cent (2,117 disasters occurred in the first period, compared to 3,151 during the last decade). Similarly, the number of countries experiencing an increase in disasters (137 countries) is significantly higher than those registering a decrease in disasters (37); 15 countries did not present any change in the number of disasters.

Regionally, the picture is more varied, with increases in disasters in some areas being offset by decreases in disasters in others. The highest increases in the number of natural disasters occurred mainly in South and East Asia – in particular, China, India, Indonesia the Philippines and Viet Nam. Other countries presenting a significant increase are Haiti (in the


Caribbean), Romania (in Europe) and Algeria, Burundi, Kenya and Mozambique (in Africa).

Based on the total number of disasters that took place over the past ten years, Asia emerges as the continent most affected by natural disasters. Indeed, seven out of the top ten countries are located in that region: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and Viet Nam. The other three countries are the USA (which ranked second in the 2000–2009 period), Mexico and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On the other hand, a few countries presented an important decrease in the number of natural disasters, with the largest being in the USA, followed by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bangladesh, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Belgium.



Map 9: Memberships of regional consultative processes (RCPs), January 2010



Notes: (a) Fourteen of the major RCPs have been considered for the elaboration of this map, as follows: IGC (Inter-Governmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees), Budapest Process, Söderköping Process or CBCP (Cross-Border Co-operation Process), Ruebel Process or RCM (Regional Conference on Migration), SACM (South American Conference on Migration), 5+5 Dialogue (Regional Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean), MIDSA (Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa), MIDWA (Dialogue on Mediterranean Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants), MTM (Migration Dialogue for West Africa), APC (Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants), Bali Process (Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime), Colombo Process (Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia), Abu Dhabi Dialogue (Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia), and IGAD-RCP (Inter-governmental Authority on Development – Regional Consultative Process on Migration).

(b) New Zealand was a Member State of APC until 2003.

(c) Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal are MTM Partner States (not members).

Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2010.

Most countries participate in one or more regional consultative process on migration (RCP). In general, Asian countries have tended to belong to more than one of these informal inter-State dialogues on migration. Countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Viet Nam and others participate in four different RCPs. Several European and North American countries are also members of multiple RCPs.

Most Latin American and Caribbean countries participate in either the Puebla Process or the South American Conference on Migration. Similarly, countries in the Middle East Region and Southern Africa are members of only one RCP. Governments in West Africa, the Mashreq region and Eastern European countries often participate in two different RCPs.

Several countries are not members of any single regional consultative process on migration. These include Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Haiti, Israel and Rwanda.


Overall, countries of Central Africa and the Caribbean regions show the lowest levels of membership in RCPs.

For the purposes of the elaboration of this map, only membership of an RCP is considered. Countries that are observers are not in any way reflected in this mapping exercise.

Please see the Summary Report of Chairs and Secretariats of Regional Consultative Processes on Migration for a matrix outlining the memberships of the different RCPs.¹

¹ See www.iom.int/rcps and http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/rcps/rcp_bkk/bkk_final_report.pdf for profiles of different RCPs and other background material.

Map 10: Government views on the level of immigration in 1996 and 2009



Source: UN DESA (2010), World Population Policies 2009.

This map compares the results of the latest surveys of governments' views on the level of immigration (in 1996 and again in 2009), administered by the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). Governments were asked if they considered the prevailing level of immigration to be too high, too low, or satisfactory, in relation to other social and economic conditions.


The overwhelming majority of governments surveyed considered current levels of immigration to be "satisfactory". This included governments from six of the top ten countries of destination (Germany, India, Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the USA), as well as 146 other governments worldwide. Overall, 20 countries changed their rating from "too high" to "satisfactory" in the period 1996–2009 (including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and Zambia); this, arguably, indicates an increasingly positive attitude towards migration – in particular, among European countries.

Of the major countries of destination, only France, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia considered their level of immigration to be "too high" in 2009; 31 other governments worldwide shared this opinion. Compared to 1996, 14 governments changed their opinions about immigration from "satisfactory" to "too high", with the large majority of them located in the Middle East or in Africa.

Canada is one of nine governments that considered levels of immigration to be "too low" in 2009, and five other countries changed their status from "satisfactory" in 1996 to "too low" in 2009. Israel and New Zealand are the only countries that considered immigration to be too low in both 1996 and 2009. In Suriname, the government perceived the level of immigration to be "too low" in 2009 but "too high" in 1996 (UN DESA, 2009).



Map 11: Internally displaced persons worldwide: March 2010



Note: IDMC monitors internal displacement caused by conflict, situations of generalized violence and human rights violations. Updated versions can be accessed at <http://www.internal-displacement.org/worldmap> and further details are available in IDMC's annual Internal Displacement: Global Overview.

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010.

Compared to the figures for 2008, there have been important changes in the populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2010. Although, at the time of writing, global figures for the IDP population were not available, country-level analysis suggests the following:

Despite an important 1.1 million-person drop in the IDP population in Sudan, it remains the most affected country, with 4.9 million IDPs; there has also been a slight drop in the IDP population in Iraq – from 2,778,000 to 2,764,111, although this, too, remains high (Iraq has the third-largest IDP population in the world, as of 2010). Numbers in the other most affected countries have, however, increased. Colombia has seen the lower estimate of its IDP population increase by over 600,000 compared to 2008; it now stands at 3.3 million (the upper estimate is over 4.9 million – up 1 million from 3,940,164). The upper estimate for the IDP population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo almost doubled to 2.1 million, while new data on IDPs in Pakistan (data had not previously been available) suggest this population numbers around 1.2 million.

Other major changes include the IDP population in Yemen quintupling compared to 2008, while, in Afghanistan, it has more than tripled – growing from an estimated 132,000 in 2008 to 414,000 in 2010. Upper estimates for Ethiopia and Zimbabwe almost doubled to 350,000 and 1 million, respectively.


Other previously important IDP populations have remained largely unchanged: this is the case in Azerbaijan, Kenya, Nepal, Peru, Senegal, Turkey and, despite their upheavals, Georgia and Sri Lanka. In Georgia, it seems that most of the displaced (apart from ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia¹) have returned to their homes, while, in Sri Lanka, the displacement caused by the conflict was partially offset by returns.²

Elsewhere, however, progress has been made – such as in Uganda, which has seen its IDP population decrease by half, and in Timor-Leste, where the IDP population decreased from 100,000 to 400. Bangladesh has also seen a major reduction in its IDP population – from 500,000 in 2008 to around 60,000 in 2010. Indonesia's IDP population has also shrunk – from 150,000–200,000 to around 70,000.

¹ [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/F62BE07C33DE4D19802570A7004C84A3?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/F62BE07C33DE4D19802570A7004C84A3?OpenDocument)

² [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/7E8CFF727BBFB54DC12576B3002DEBD9?OpenDocument#44.2.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/7E8CFF727BBFB54DC12576B3002DEBD9?OpenDocument#44.2.1)

Map 12: World's refugees by region of asylum and region of origin, 2008



Notes:

(a) Dates are provisional and subject to change.

(b) Figures used to create this map include all persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. 'People in refugee-like situations' (estimated at 1.4 million at the end of 2008) and refugees in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (estimated at 4.7 millions at the end of 2008) are not included in this map.

(c) Regional distribution by country of origin does not include 14,171 stateless refugees, nor does it include 168,381 refugees for whom the exact origin was either not reported or unknown at the time the figure was recorded. These refugees together represent about 2 per cent of the total number of refugees recorded at the end of 2008.

(d) Regions in this map relate to IOM regions as defined in the regional overviews.
Source: UNHCR, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returns, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a013eb06.html>).

In comparison to 2006,¹ the overall number of refugees in the world at the end of 2008 had decreased by nearly a million – from 9.9 to 9.1 million.


Decreases in the refugee population elsewhere have been partially offset by the growth in the number of refugees from the Middle East. In 2006, this region was the region of origin of 18 per cent of refugees; at the end of 2008, it was the region of origin of almost a quarter of the world's refugees. Most refugees seem to have remained within the region: in 2008, the Middle East hosted 24 per cent of the world's refugees – up from 17 per cent in 2006. This means 23 per cent more refugees come from the Middle East, and 29 per cent more find asylum there. The only other region to show a major increase as a region of origin was Oceania, although the absolute size of the increase can be measured in hundreds.

By contrast, there has been an important fall in the number of refugees from the main two regions of origin: Asia and Africa. Asia saw a 10 per cent decrease in refugees from this region, and Africa a 14 per cent decrease. However, these regions are still the regions of origin for 62 per cent of the world's refugees.


In terms of regions of asylum, the main decreases in the number of refugees are recorded in North America and Oceania, with the former registering a drop of 55 per cent (from almost 1 million to less than half a million) and the latter a drop of 60 per cent. Asia and Africa also saw a fall in their refugee populations (13% and 10%, respectively), although, between them, they still host 52 per cent of the world's refugees and, thus, remain the most important regions of asylum. The Latin America and Caribbean region, meanwhile, saw a 25 per cent growth in the number of refugees – although, again, the absolute number remains small.

¹ See *World Migration Report 2008*, map 4.

Map 13: Emigration rates of health professionals in Africa, 2000



Africa total	64,941	19%
Sub-Saharan Africa	36,653	28%



Africa total	69,589	8%
Sub-Saharan Africa	53,298	11%

Note: Estimates based on last census data of the following countries: France, 1999; the USA, 2000; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom, 2001.
Source: M.A. Clemens and G. Pettersson (2008), New data on African health professionals abroad, *Human Resources for Health* 2008, 6:1.


Emigration of health professionals (i.e. physicians and nurses) is particularly evident in the African continent, with significant implications for the health-care conditions of the local population.

The figures presented by Clemens and Pettersson (2007) indicate that, in general, emigration rates are higher for physicians than for nurses. For physicians, the most affected countries are Mozambique (where 75% of trained physicians had left the country), Guinea-Bissau (71%), Angola (70%), Equatorial Guinea (63%), Liberia (63%) and Sao Tome and Principe (61%); however, in a number of other countries, almost 50 per cent of physicians had left.


Emigration of trained nurses seems, instead, to be particularly relevant only in Liberia (where 81% of nurses worked abroad), Burundi (78%), Gambia (66%), Mauritius (63%), Sierra Leone (49%), Sao Tome and Principe (46%), Cape Verde (41%), Equatorial Guinea (38%) and Eritrea (38%). All other African countries present values inferior to 30 per cent and, thus, may suffer less from the emigration of nurses.

Liberia is the country with the highest rate of emigration of physicians and nurses (with 63% and 81%, respectively), followed by Gambia (53% and 66%), Burundi (37% and 78%), Mauritius (46% and 63%), Sao Tome and Principe (61% and 46%), Equatorial Guinea (63% and 38%), Guinea-Bissau (71% and 25%), Mozambique (75% and 19%), Cape Verde (51% and 41%) and Sierra Leone (42% and 49%).

However, to obtain a clear indication of the real impact of the medical ‘brain drain’ (i.e. the lack of physicians or nurses vis-à-vis the population’s need for care), the ratio of nurses to inhabitants also needs to be considered; indeed, the total number of trained nurses can differ significantly, independently from the total population of a country. According to the sampled 2000 Census Round Data, in Equatorial Guinea, 258 nurses were trained, whereas 7,192 were trained in Mauritius, despite the fact that the latter’s population was only twice as high as the former’s. This means that, although there is a lower emigration rate of nurses from Equatorial Guinea than from Mauritius, the result is potentially more damaging to the former, as only 160 nurses remain in the country, as opposed to 2,661 in Mauritius.



Map 14: Foreign students in higher education, 2007




In all, there were about 2.8 million internationally mobile students in 2007. The main destinations for international students in higher education continue to be Europe, North America, Japan and Australia. The top six countries of destination for students (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA) accounted for 62 per cent of all mobile students.

Asian students are prevalent among internationally mobile students. Asian students represent a large majority of foreign students in Canada and the USA (42% and 65%, respec-

tively) as well as in Australia (80%) and Japan (94%). In Europe, Asian students are present in most European countries – in particular, in the Russian Federation, where they represent 57 per cent of total foreign students, and in the United Kingdom, where almost 50 per cent of foreign students are Asian.

Western Europe alone hosts around 1.2 million foreign students. Students from Africa mainly go to universities in France and the United Kingdom, and they account for two out of three international students in Portugal.

Map 15: Changes in unemployment rates of nationals and foreigners, in selected European countries, 2008–2009



Note: Values for 2008–2009 comparison are the average unemployment rates for the first three quarters of each year.

Source: Eurostat, online database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, extracted on 16 February 2010.

This map shows the impact of the recession on migrant unemployment in selected European countries. Migrant unemployment rates are generally higher than unemployment rates for nationals and have grown faster than unemployment rates for nationals between 2008 and 2009. Estonia had one of the largest differences in unemployment between migrants and nationals at the end of the third quarter of 2009, with the increase in migrant unemployment being almost 6 percentage points higher than the increase in unemployment among nationals, when comparing the first three quarters of 2008 and 2009,¹ followed by Spain (a difference of 5.4%), Portugal (4.7%), Latvia (3.9%) and Ireland (3%).

Elsewhere, the effect is less severe, although the trend is still one of faster growth in migrant unemployment. However, the difference in growth was negligible in some countries: in the Czech Republic, the difference in the growth of unemployment rates among migrants and nationals was 0.1 percentage points; in Denmark and Finland, it was 0.2; and in the Netherlands, 0.3 percentage points.

There are, however, two particularities: migrant unemployment grew more slowly in the United Kingdom and Luxembourg. In the United Kingdom, unemployment grew among both groups; however, whereas the growth was 1.8 percentage points for migrants, the growth was 2.2 percentage points for nationals.² In the case of Luxembourg, a large third-quarter drop in 2009 unemployment among migrants actually meant that the average unemployment for migrants decreased in the first three quarters of 2009, compared to the first three of 2008, while unemployment among nationals increased by 0.3 percentage points over the same period.

¹ However, it is important to bear in mind that many of the unemployed non-nationals belong to the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia.

² The underrepresentation of migrant workers in sectors of cyclical demand may explain why migrants in the United Kingdom were less affected by the crisis than the general population, although further investigation is required. Another factor that might have contributed to a slow increase in migrant unemployment compared to the overall population in the United Kingdom is out-migration.

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2010

The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change

Migration is a constant and dynamic phenomenon increasingly requiring diversified policy intervention in order to maximize its potential benefits and minimize related costs for both countries of origin and destination as well as migrants themselves. Better knowledge and enhanced capacities in different policy areas are essential to ensure the protection of migrants, the facilitation of legal migration, the integration of migrants into the country of destination, the support for sustainable voluntary return and the greater interlinking between migration and development.

The challenge remains in translating improved understandings into policy and practice on the ground. State capacities around the world for managing migration are limited. Legal frameworks may need to be updated or overhauled to focus on new areas of migration, or to handle new influxes or outflows of migrants; staff working on the front line may need equipment, training and support; civil society and migrants themselves may not be adequately integrated into the process of data-gathering and making and implementing policy; vulnerability factors and health risks inherent to the migration process need to be better understood and addressed.

International migration is likely to transform in scale, reach and complexity, due to growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks. These transformations will be associated with increasing opportunities, exacerbate existing problems and generate new challenges.

The *World Migration Report 2010* provides a tool for self-evaluation in terms of future scenarios, and demonstrates the need for a far more comprehensive approach to capacity-building for migration than has typically been adopted. The aim is not to prescribe ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies and practices, but to suggest objectives of migration management policies in each area, to stimulate thinking and provide examples of what States and other actors can do.

Part A of the report focuses on identifying core capacities in key areas of migration management, raising key concepts and outlining important examples of existing practices in these areas. Part B provides an overview of migration in the world today, from both the global perspective and through six regional chapters, drawn from the most up-to-date data.

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IOM International Organization for Migration





WORLD MIGRATION REPORT

Update

Migration and Migrants: Africa

www.iom.int/wmr/world-migration-report-2018

This *World Migration Report* update provides an overview of the latest data on international migrants in Africa. It is based on the most recent estimates from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). Released in December 2017, the international migrant stock datasets estimate the number of international migrants by age, sex and origin.¹ In addition to presenting current data on international migrants in Africa, the update briefly discusses trends in African migration.²

Migration in Africa involves large numbers of migrants moving both within and out of the region. As shown in figure 1, in 2017 over 19 million Africans were living in another African country, a significant increase from 2015 when 16 million Africans were estimated to be living within the region. The number of Africans living in a different region only grew moderately during the same period, from around 16 million in 2015 to around 17 million in 2017.


Figure 1 reflects that since 2000 international migration within the African region has increased significantly. And since 1990, the number of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with the growth to Europe most pronounced. In 2017, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (9.3 million), Asia (4.4 million) and Northern America (2.6 million).

One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in figure 1, is the small number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. Between 2015 and 2017, the number of migrants born outside the region remained virtually unchanged (around 2 million), most of whom were from Asia and Europe.

¹ UN DESA, 2017.

² For details on the composition of Africa, see World Migration Report 2018, Appendix A (page 310). https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf.

Figure 1. Migrants to Africa, within Africa and from Africa between 1990 and 2017




Source: UN DESA, 2017.

Note: "Migrants to Africa" refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Africa) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia)."Migrants within Africa" refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Africa) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the African region."Migrants from Africa" refers to people born in Africa who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

The African countries with the largest number of emigrants tend to be in the north of the region. These are shown on the left-hand side of figure 2, where countries are ranked by their overall numbers of migrants (i.e. the combination of immigrants in the country and emigrants from the country). In 2017, Egypt had the largest number of people living abroad, followed by Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria. In terms of the number of immigrants, South Africa remains most significant destination country in Africa, with around 4 million international migrants residing in the country (or around 7% of its total population). The number of migrants moving to South Africa increased by nearly 1 million between 2015 and 2017. Other countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total populations included Gabon (14%), Libya (12%), Djibouti (12%), the Gambia (10%) and Côte d'Ivoire (9%).

Figure 2. Top 20 African migrant countries in 2017




Source: UN DESA, 2017.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2017.

There are significant migration corridors within and from Africa, many of which are related to geographic proximity and historical ties, as well as displacement factors. The size of a migration corridor from country A to country B is measured as the number of immigrants from country A who were residing in country B in 2017. Migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Some of the largest migration corridors involving African countries, as shown in figure 3, are between North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, Spain and Italy, in part reflecting post-colonial connections. There are also significant labour migration corridors to Gulf States – see Egypt to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia for example. Importantly, just over half of the main migration corridors shown in figure 3 were within Africa, with the corridor between Burkina Faso to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire constituting the second largest for Africa overall.

Figure 3. Top 20 migration corridors involving African countries



Source: UN DESA, 2017.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

For more information, please refer to *World Migration Report 2018* or UN DESA websites below:

- *World Migration Report 2018*
www.iom.int/wmr/world-migration-report-2018
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/index.shtml



WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020



The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

This flagship World Migration Report has been produced in line with IOM's Environment Policy and is available online only. Printed hard copies have not been made in order to reduce paper, printing and transportation impacts. The report is available for free download at www.iom.int/wmr.

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Cover photos

Top: Children from Taro island carry lighter items from IOM's delivery of food aid funded by USAID, with transport support from the United Nations. © IOM 2013/Joe LOWRY

Middle: Rice fields in Southern Bangladesh. © IOM 2016/Amanda NERO

Bottom: Ferrick Ibet village, Chad. © IOM 2018/Amanda NERO

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WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020



This volume is the result of a highly collaborative venture involving a multitude of partners and contributors under the direction of the editors. The *World Migration Report 2020* project commenced in May 2018 and culminated in the launch of the report in November 2019 by the Director General at the 110th session of IOM Council.

The findings, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States.

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this report, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. Unless otherwise stated, this report does not refer to data or events after June 2019.

The stories behind the photographs can be found on page v.

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Chapter 11: Recent developments in the global governance of migration: An update to *World Migration Report 2018*

Authors: Kathleen Newland, Marie McAuliffe and Céline Bauloz

Photographs

Chapter 1

Participatory video team recording their stories and messages of hope in Herat, Afghanistan. A group of 13 young Afghan women and men spent a week together in Herat to exchange experiences, direct and produce a film about migration. The initiative is part of IOM's Global Migration Film Festival Participatory Video Project to engage migrants and host communities in participatory filmmaking that strengthens social cohesion.
© IOM/Amanda NERO

Part I

Many Venezuelans travelling through the continent do so by foot carrying their children and possessions. Caminantes, or walkers, trek along major highways and through difficult terrain. They must go through mountainous areas where temperatures drop below zero and through scorching hot areas where water is scarce. Many make this journey with just a light jacket, rubber flip flops and a small backpack with the most essential items they manage to carry. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

Chapter 2

Aerial view of internally displaced persons in Wau protection of civilians site, South Sudan.
© IOM/Rainer GONZALEZ PALAU

Chapter 3

The Kutupalong Refugee camp near Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

Chapter 4

Abdulai Adum, Mixammete Village, Central African Republic. © IOM/Amanda NERO

Part II

IOM shelters in Bakassi internally displaced persons Camp, Nigeria. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

Chapter 5

Robeiro, an ex-combatant from an illegal paramilitary group in Colombia, carries harvested chili peppers. Robeiro is one of 300 beneficiaries of an income generation project implemented by IOM Colombia.
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Chapter 6

Burmese migrant worker in Bangkok. © IOM/Benjamin SUOMELA

Chapter 7

IOM Thailand's Migrant Health Assessment Centre on Silom Road in Bangkok provides health screenings for migrants who are about to migrate abroad. © IOM/Benjamin SUOMELA

Chapter 8

Children play at the playroom at the Processing Centre for Syrian families resettling to Canada.
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Chapter 9

Bercy is the principal of an elementary school on Udot Island, Federated States of Micronesia. During the typhoon, one of their buildings was severely damaged. The new building is used as a library for students.
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Chapter 10

Mass Evacuations in Natural Disasters (MEND) - Quezon City, the Philippines. © IOM/Charissa SORIANO

Chapter 11

The second workshop of the International Dialogue on Migration 2017 offered a global platform to discuss and analyse migrants' vulnerabilities and capacities, guide appropriate policy, programmatic and operational responses to address them, and enhance resilience through protection and assistance services.
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Chris's mother is so happy to find her son after he was separated from his mother and little brother during their migration. © IOM

Appendices

Ameerah and Anajia spend time practising their drawing skills after class (the Philippines).
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Foreword

IOM's responsibility to provide an objective and balanced account of migration globally has never been more important. Not only is the political salience of migration high, and frequently fevered, but the capacity for rapidly disseminating disinformation to influence the public discourse has expanded.

Twenty years ago, IOM published the first World Migration Report with the stated aim of providing an authoritative account of migration trends and issues worldwide. With the initial report published in 2000, the series has quickly become established as IOM's flagship publication.

The early World Migration Reports were framed around specific themes. They provided deep dives into topics such as labour mobility, migrant well-being and communication on migration. But, with time, there was a sense that the broader landscape and complexity of migration issues was being neglected.

Times have changed, dramatically so. Migration is now a top-tier political issue interconnected to human rights, development, and geopolitics at national, regional and international levels. Accordingly, IOM has enhanced the flagship series to ensure that the World Migration Report is, in fact, a *world* migration report.


We have revamped the series to offer a more strategic contribution to the public debate. We have strengthened our collaborative partnerships with scholars and applied researchers in order to benefit from their diverse expertise and knowledge. We have made content and structural changes to increase the World Migration Report's utility to the evidence base on migration globally, in line with IOM's growing role in data collection and analysis.

The *World Migration Report 2018* is the most downloaded of all IOM publications. It is clearly fulfilling the need to provide a balanced understanding of migration's complexities, present the latest global data and information in an accessible way, and explore and explain complex and emerging migration issues.

As the United Nations' migration agency, IOM has an obligation to demystify the complexity and diversity of human mobility. The report also acknowledges IOM's continuing emphasis on fundamental rights and its mission to support those migrants who are most in need. This is particularly relevant in the areas in which IOM works to provide humanitarian assistance to people who have been displaced, including by weather events, conflict and persecution, or to those who have become stranded during crises.

Likewise, IOM remains committed to supporting Member States as they draw upon various forms of data, research and analysis during policy formulation and review processes. Indeed, this is reflected in IOM's Constitution where the need for migration research is highlighted as an integral part of the Organization's functions. The World Migration Report is a central component of this important function.

In this era of heightened interest and activity towards migration and migrants, we hope this 2020 edition of the World Migration Report becomes a key reference point for you. We hope it helps you to navigate this high-profile and dynamic topic during periods of uncertainty, and that it prompts reflection during quieter moments. But most importantly, we hope that you learn something new from the report that can inform your own work, be it in studies, research and analysis, policymaking, communication, or migration practice.



António Vitorino
Director General



MARIE MCAULIFFE
BINOD KHADRIA

1

REPORT OVERVIEW: PROVIDING PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION AND MOBILITY IN INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN TIMES¹

Introduction

The long-term and growing body of evidence on migration and mobility shows that migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues.² As the processes of globalization deepen, these transformations increasingly shape our lives – in our workplaces, in our homes, in our social and spiritual lives – as we go about our daily routines. Increasing numbers of people are able to access information, goods and services from around the world because of the ongoing expansion in distance-shrinking technologies.

There is also a sense that we are in the midst of a period of considerable uncertainty. Many commentators have called into question the solidity of aspects of the global political order forged in the immediate aftermath of the two world wars, including as they relate to alliances and common interests.³ Others are calling this time the “age of anger”, tracing back the current sense of geopolitical uncertainty and discontent to a dominant and relentless focus on “logic” and “liberal rationalism” at the expense of emotional responsiveness.⁴

It is within this context that this world migration report focuses on developments in migration over the last two-year period, with an emphasis on providing analysis that takes into account historical and contemporary factors. Historical in recognition that migration and displacement occur within broader long-term social, security, political and economic contexts. Contemporary in recognition that we are in the midst of profound global transformations, and that the resultant changes to our daily lives are impacting the current environment in which migration occurs and is discussed.

What has happened in migration?

A lot has happened in migration in the last two years since the release of the *World Migration Report 2018* in late 2017.⁵ The world has witnessed **historic change at the global level** with United Nations Member States coming together to finalize two global compacts on the international manifestations of migration and displacement: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees. The finalization of the compacts is a result of decades-long efforts by States, international organizations, civil society organizations and other actors (such as private sector organizations) to improve

1 Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM and Binod Khadria, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

2 See, for example, Castles, 2010; Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, 2011; Koser, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2018.

3 Ikenberry, 2018; Stone, 2016.

4 Mishra, 2017.

5 IOM, 2017.

how migration is governed at the international level. In the years leading up to States committing to develop the compacts,⁶ numerous dialogues, workshops, consultations and side events at international, regional, national as well as local levels have enabled different migration “realities” to be shared and the many areas of common interest to be expanded through deeper understandings of the benefits of migration as well as the challenges it may present. The compacts, therefore, build upon many years of engagement on the key issues underpinning the two compacts.

The unfortunate reality is that there have been **major migration and displacement events** during the last two years; events that have caused great hardship and trauma as well as loss of life. Foremost have been the displacements of millions of people due to conflict (such as within and from the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan), extreme violence (such as inflicted upon Rohingya forced to seek safety in Bangladesh) or severe economic and political instability (such as faced by millions of Venezuelans). There has also been growing recognition of the impacts of environmental and climate change on human mobility (such as planned migration/relocation and displacement), including as part of global efforts and international policy mechanisms to address the broader impacts of climate change.⁷ Large-scale displacement triggered by climate and weather-related hazards occurred in many parts of the world in 2018 and 2019, including in Mozambique, the Philippines, China, India and the United States of America.⁸

We have also seen the **scale of international migration increase in line with recent trends**. The number of international migrants is estimated to be almost 272 million globally, with nearly two-thirds being labour migrants.⁹ This figure remains a very small percentage of the world’s population (at 3.5%), meaning that the vast majority of people globally (96.5%) are estimated to be residing in the country in which they were born. However, the estimated number and proportion of international migrants already surpasses some projections made for the year 2050, which were in the order of 2.6 per cent or 230 million.¹⁰ That said, it is widely recognized that the scale and pace of international migration is notoriously difficult to predict with precision because it is closely connected to acute events (such as severe instability, economic crisis or conflict) as well as long-term trends (such as demographic change, economic development, communications technology advances and transportation access).¹¹ We also know from long-term data that international migration is not uniform across the world but is shaped by economic, geographic, demographic and other factors resulting in distinct migration patterns, such as migration “corridors” developed over many years (see chapter 3 of this report for details). The largest corridors tend to be from developing countries to larger economies such as those of the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This pattern is likely to remain the same for many years into the future, especially as populations in some developing subregions and countries are projected to increase in coming decades, placing migration pressure on future generations.¹²

Highlights from Part I of the report on data and information on migration and migrants are outlined below. Further information and discussion are provided in the report.

⁶ States’ commitment was articulated in the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNGA, 2016).

⁷ See chapter 9 of this report for detailed discussion.

⁸ See chapters 2 and 3 of this report for discussions on global and regional migration data and information.

⁹ UN DESA, 2019a; ILO, 2018.

¹⁰ See, for example, IOM 2003.

¹¹ WEF, 2019; UN DESA, 2003.

¹² UN DESA 2019b.

Highlights from Part I: Data and information on migration and migrants

The number of international migrants globally in 2019: 272 million (3.5% of the world's population)

- 52 per cent of international migrants were male; 48 per cent were female.
- 74 per cent of all international migrants were of working age (20–64 years).

India continued to be the largest country of origin of international migrants

- India had the largest number of migrants living abroad (17.5 million), followed by Mexico and China (11.8 million and 10.7 million respectively).
- The top destination country remained the United States (50.7 million international migrants).

The number of migrant workers declined slightly in high income countries while increasing elsewhere

- Between 2013 and 2017, high-income countries experienced a slight drop in migrant workers (from 112.3 million to 111.2 million). Upper middle-income countries observed the biggest increase (from 17.5 million to 30.5 million).
- Globally, male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by 28 million in 2017. There were 96 million male migrant workers (58%) and 68 million female migrant workers (42%).

International remittances increased to USD 689 billion in 2018

- The top 3 remittance recipients were India (USD 78.6 billion), China (USD 67.4 billion) and Mexico (USD 35.7 billion).
- The United States remained the top remittance-sending country (USD 68.0 billion) followed by the United Arab Emirates (USD 44.4 billion) and Saudi Arabia (USD 36.1 billion).

The global refugee population was 25.9 million in 2018

- 20.4 million refugees were under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 5.5 million were refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East.
- 52 per cent of the global refugee population was under 18 years of age.

The number of internally displaced persons due to violence and conflict reached 41.3 million

- This was the highest number on record since the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre began monitoring in 1998.
- The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced (6.1 million) followed by Colombia (5.8 million) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (3.1 million).

The number of stateless persons globally in 2018 was 3.9 million

- Bangladesh had the largest number of stateless persons (around 906,000). It was followed by Côte d'Ivoire (692,000) and Myanmar (620,000).

For further details, refer to chapter 2 of this report. Sources and dates of estimates above are outlined in the chapter.

Migration patterns vary from region to region

- While most international migrants born in Africa, Asia and Europe reside within their regions of birth, the majority of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean and Northern America reside outside their regions of birth. In Oceania, the number of intraregional migrants and those residing outside the region remained about the same in 2019.
- More than half of all international migrants (141 million) lived in Europe and Northern America.

Migration has been a key determinant of population change in several countries

- Intraregional migration has been an important contributor to population change in some African countries such as Equatorial Guinea.
- Labour migration has contributed to significant population changes especially in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. With the exceptions of Oman and Saudi Arabia, migrants made up the majority of the populations in GCC countries.

Displacement remained a major feature in some regions

- The Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey were the origin and host of the largest number of refugees globally, 6.7 million and 3.7 million, respectively. Canada became the largest refugee resettlement country, resettling more refugees than the United States in 2018.
- The Philippines had the largest number of new disaster displacements in 2018 (3.8 million).
- Around 4 million Venezuelans had left their country by mid-2019. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the largest source country of asylum seekers in 2018 (over 340,000).

For further details, refer to chapter 3 of this report. Sources and dates of estimates above are outlined in the chapter.

Migration research and analysis output remained high

- There was a continued increase in the number of migration-related academic publications, with the largest ever academic output produced during the last two years. There was significant output from international organizations on a wide range of migration issues.
- Academic output on migration is dominated with perspectives from destination countries, especially in relation to Europe. A geographic comparison of the primary affiliations of authors in selected journals shows that most are from institutions in developed countries.

For further details, refer to chapter 4 of this report. Sources and dates of estimates above are outlined in the chapter.

Is migration changing, or are the depictions of migration changing?

As can be seen from the discussion and key highlights above, there have been incremental changes in migration in recent years, such as in the overall scale of migration and displacement, although these changes could not be described as “seismic”. Rather, it would appear that there has been a deepening of existing patterns of migration as opportunities brought about by economic growth and reform, trade liberalization and long-term stability have been further realized. There is also a growing body of evidence indicating that while the general notion of international migration may seem simple and straightforward – as depicted in

news media, for example – its complexities are becoming more apparent.¹³ The issue of how we conceptualize migration and mobility has long been a focus of many scholars and policymakers.¹⁴ Recently, some are calling for a rethink, highlighting the growing anomalies resulting from a fairly fixed view of “migration” – see text box below on Professor Ronald Skeldon’s recent paper on the topic.

Rethinking international migration, internal migration, mobility and urbanization

That migration is the most problematic of the population variables is taken as given. Unlike the unique events of birth and death that define an individual’s lifetime, migration can be a multiple event. Its measurement depends entirely upon how it is defined in time and across space.

...

Despite all the problems inherent in the collection of migration data, significant progress has been achieved over recent years. The compilation of a world origin-destination database, developed originally at the University of Sussex and now much extended and maintained by the United Nations Population Division and the World Bank, has provided the framework for a more precise measurement of global international population movement.^a These data showed that about 3 per cent of the world’s population lived in a State or territory not of their birth and that that proportion had not changed significantly since the 1990s ... As the systems of internal and international migration evolve and change, so too, does the nature of the linkages between them ... other forms of short-term mobility emerge from essentially urban cultures and economies.

...

The idea that most people do not move or are fixed at a specific location might be appealing but it is wrong. Mobility is an inherent characteristic of all populations unless specific policies or other factors are in place that limit or control that mobility. Nevertheless, some peoples appear to move more than others and in different ways from others, which appears to be closely linked with the level of development in each country, which, in turn, is linked with the distribution of the population in each country. Despite all the difficulties with the measurement of internal migration as sketched above, considerable progress has been made towards the construction of analytical models that allow the comparison of patterns across space.

a Parsons et al., 2007; UN DESA, 2015.

Abridged excerpt of Skeldon, 2018.

We must recognize, however, that the increasing complexity of migration is, in part, also due to more information on migration and migrants being available than ever before. We know more about who migrates, why people migrate, where and how they migrate, although perhaps not to the extent we would prefer. But it is clearer that the bigger issue of “complexity” applies to very many changes occurring globally. Some of the specific ones, highlighted in the textbox below, have been intensively explored and analysed by experts in Part II of this report.

¹³ Czaika and de Haas, 2014; De Witte, 2018; Hall and Posel, 2019.

¹⁴ Faist and Glick-Schiller, 2009; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2008; King, 2012.

Highlights from Part II: Complex and emerging migration issues

- Migrants have made significant sociocultural, civic-political and economic contributions in origin and destination countries and communities, including by being important agents of change in a range of sectors (chapter 5).
- Immigrants tend to have higher entrepreneurial activity compared to natives. In countries such as the United States, migrants have disproportionately contributed to innovation (chapter 5).
- Migrants' inclusion in the receiving society relates to diverse societal/policy areas that are closely interdependent. Inclusion outcomes in one policy area – such as language, education, labour market inclusion, family reunification, political participation and naturalization – will likely impact others (chapter 6).
- There is a dynamic and complex relationship between migration and health that extends well beyond crisis events. Migration can lead to greater exposure to health risks but it can also be linked to improved health, especially for those seeking safety from harm (chapter 7).
- While the majority of children who migrate do so through safe migration processes as part of family units, many other child migrants lack effective protection from harm and face human rights violations at all stages of their journeys (chapter 8).
- The most recent global estimate for the total number of child migrants is approximately 31 million. There are approximately 13 million child refugees, 936,000 asylum-seeking children, and 17 million children who have been forcibly displaced inside their own countries (chapter 8).
- There is increasing evidence that the magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events are rising, and this is expected to increasingly affect migration and other forms of movement. While human mobility resulting from environmental and climate change is often framed along protection and security lines, understanding mobility as adaptation allows for migrants' agency to be part of the response equation (chapter 9).
- Migration status can significantly impact on migrants' ability to deal with crisis. Flexible immigration and visa policies help make it possible for migrants to keep themselves safe as well as recover from the impact of a crisis. Return is one, but not necessarily the primary, response option (chapter 10).
- The last two years have seen substantial change in the global governance of migration, principally in the formation of the United Nations Network on Migration and the two global compacts on refugees and migration. Although they are not legally binding, the two global compacts represent a near-universal consensus on the issues requiring sustained international cooperation and commitment (chapter 11).

The unprecedented pace of change in the (geo)political, social, environmental and technological spheres has led some analysts and commentators to coin or use phrases such as the “age of accelerations”,¹⁵ the “fourth industrial revolution”,¹⁶ and the “age of change”.¹⁷ There is wide recognition of how quickly the world is changing, and of how the pace of change seems to be accelerating beyond all expectations and predictions. There is also a sense that change is resulting in unexpected (and unwanted) impacts:

We are living through an era of intense turbulence, disillusionment and bewilderment. Deepening geopolitical tensions are transforming international relations, and political tribalism is revealing deep fissures within countries. The spread of exponential technologies is upending long-held assumptions about security, politics, economics and so much more.¹⁸

Of particular note have been major shifts in the political realm, particularly in terms of civic engagement through emerging social media and other online platforms as well as the standards of political leadership. The “Arab Spring”, for example, heralded a significant development in how voices were heard and activists organized in political arenas.¹⁹ More recently, we have seen a groundswell in analysis and commentary on the changes that are occurring in democratic systems around the world, and the implications for governance, geopolitics and international cooperation. We are living in a period in which the core values underpinning global governance are being challenged. The values of equity, accountability, impartiality, fairness, justice and probity are being actively undermined as some political leaders disregard common interest in preference for personal interest – even if it corrodes laws, processes and institutions that have, overall, sought to advance whole nations and peoples, without excluding or expelling some because of their inherent characteristics or beliefs.²⁰ Ongoing and systematic corrosion, as we have witnessed throughout history, can extend to attacks on human rights and ultimately on groups of people within societies.²¹

As part of current shifts, international migration has increasingly become weaponized. It is being used by some as a political tool, undermining democracy and inclusive civic engagement, by tapping into the understandable fear in communities that stems from the accelerated pace of change and rising uncertainty of our times.²² Some leaders seek to divide communities on the issue of migration, downplaying the significant benefits and enrichment migration brings and steadfastly ignoring our migration histories. And we are increasingly witnessing the harnessing of social media as a means of division and polarization, not just on migration, but at certain times we have seen the deployment of online “tribal tactics” by activists attempting to depict migration in a negative and misleading light.²³ Underpinning these changing depictions of international migration is the uptake of technological innovation, particularly information and communications technology (ICT). However, we must also recall that the politicization of migration is not new, as the text box below highlights.

¹⁵ Friedman, 2016.

¹⁶ Schwab, 2016.

¹⁷ Mauldin, 2018.

¹⁸ Muggah and Goldin, 2019.

¹⁹ AlSayyad and Guvenc, 2015.

²⁰ Fotaki, 2014.

²¹ Rawnsley, 2018.

²² Ritholtz, 2017.

²³ McAuliffe, 2018.

The enduring issue of politics: Excerpt from the *World Migration Report 2003*^a

Migration is an eminently political topic. Over the past decade, the politicization of migration has been evidenced by a series of developments: the fear in Western countries of an influx of masses of migrants from countries of the former Soviet bloc and in European Union countries of an invasion by citizens from new member countries with each enlargement of the Union; the questioning of the role of migrants in the economic and social upheavals triggered by the financial crisis in South-East Asia; restrictive policies and anti-immigration backlash in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; renewed outbreaks of xenophobia in several African countries that blame domestic crises on migrants; and the exploitation of migration issues by some politicians to gain electoral mileage. All these examples illustrate the close links between economic, political and social issues on the one hand, and mobility on the other. More than ever therefore, migration is a ready target with psychological, economic, and public relations connotations.

a IOM, 2003.

Technology as an enabler and a game-changer

Migration is intertwined with technology and innovation and there exists a large body of analysis that has assessed how international migration acts to support (and sometimes limit) the transfer of technology and knowledge, often working in tandem with investment and trade flows along historical, geographic and geopolitical connections between countries and communities.²⁴ Technology is increasingly critical throughout the migration process, especially newer forms of technology. In recent years, for example, we have witnessed the use of ICT by migrants to gather information and advice in real time during migration journeys; an issue that is raising interest and, at times, concern. The use of ICT, such as apps to share the latest information, including to support clandestine border crossings, together with the consolidation of social media platforms to connect geographically dispersed groups with common interests, has raised valid questions concerning the extent to which technology has been used to support irregular migration, as well as to enable migrants to avoid abusive and exploitative migrant smugglers and human traffickers.²⁵ Due to the ever-increasing access to emerging technology at low cost, migrants have also developed applications to support better integration in receiving countries, while maintaining social links and financial support to their families and societies back home, including through the increasing prevalence of “mobile money” apps.

Other connections between migration and technology are also emerging in migration debates. As artificial intelligence is progressively taken up in key sectors, its consequences for migrant worker flows and domestic labour markets are areas of intense focus for policymakers and businesses in origin and receiving countries.²⁶

²⁴ Burns and Mohapatra, 2008; Kapur, 2001; Khadria, 2004.

²⁵ McAuliffe, 2016; Sanchez, 2018.

²⁶ McAuliffe, 2018.

Recent discussions have also turned to blockchain technology and its consequences for migration, especially for remittances, but also for digital identities and global mobility.²⁷ Social media technology is also increasingly impacting the politics of migration, with a surge of far-right activism on social media platforms seeking to influence political debates and ultimately political decisions.²⁸

It is within this current context of great change and increasing uncertainty that the *World Migration Report 2020* seeks to draw upon the body of available data, research and analysis to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of some of the most important and pressing global migration issues of our time. By their very nature, the complex dynamics of migration can never be fully measured, understood and regulated. However, as this report shows, we do have a continuously growing and improving body of data and evidence that can help us make better sense of the basic features of migration and how they are changing – as well as understanding how the context in which migration is occurring is evolving. This is increasingly important as public debates, littered with misinformation and untruths, are increasingly able to utilize the ongoing expansion of open “new media” platforms to achieve distortion and misrepresentation of migration and migrants.

The World Migration Report series

The first World Migration Report was published 20 years ago, initially as a one-off report designed to increase the understanding of migration by policymakers and the general public. It was conceived at a time when the effects of globalization were being felt in many parts of the world and in a multitude of ways. Indeed, the first World Migration Report states that part of its genesis was due to the effects of globalization on migration patterns, and that the report therefore “looks at the increasingly global economy which has led to an unprecedented influx of newcomers in many countries...”.²⁹ The report highlighted the fact that, despite being an “age-old phenomenon”, migration was accelerating as part of broader globalization transformations of economic and trade processes, which were enabling greater movement of labour as well as goods and capital. Table 1 below provides a summary of key statistics reported in the *World Migration Report 2000*, as compared to this current edition. It shows that while some aspects have stayed fairly constant – the proportion of female international migrants as well as the overall proportion of the world’s population who were migrants – other aspects have changed dramatically. International remittances, for example, have grown from an estimated 126 billion in 2000 to 689 billion in 2020, underscoring the salience of international migration as a driver of development. This helps to partly explain the emergence of migration as a first-tier global issue that has seen United Nations Member States take a series of steps to strengthen global governance of migration, most notably since 2000 (see chapter 11 of this report for discussion). It is unsurprising then that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) itself has grown in size, with a significant increase in membership over the last two decades up from 76 to its current membership of 173 States. Also of note in table 1 is the rise in international migrants globally (up around 85%) as well as of refugees (up around 80%) and internally displaced (up around 97%); all the while remaining very small proportions of the world’s population.

27 Latonero et al., 2019; Juskalian, 2018.

28 See chapter 5 of this report for discussion of how social media platforms are transforming public debates on migration.

29 IOM, 2000.

Table 1. Key facts and figures from the World Migration Reports, 2000 and 2020

	2000 report	2020 report
Estimated number of international migrants	150 million	272 million
Estimated proportion of world population who are migrants	2.8%	3.5%
Estimated proportion of female international migrants	47.5%	47.9%
Estimated proportion of international migrants who are children	16.0%	13.9%
Region with the highest proportion of international migrants	Oceania	Oceania
Country with the highest proportion of international migrants	United Arab Emirates	United Arab Emirates
Number of migrant workers	-	164 million
Global international remittances (USD)	126 billion	689 billion
Number of refugees	14 million	25.9 million
Number of internally displaced persons	21 million	41.3 million
Number of stateless persons	-	3.9 million
Number of IOM Member States*	76	173
Number of IOM field offices*	120	436 ⁺

Sources: See IOM, 2000 and the present edition of the report for sources.

Notes: The dates of the data estimates in the table may be different to the report publishing date (refer to the reports for more detail on dates of estimates); refer to chapter 3 of this report for regional breakdowns; * indicates the data was not included in the report but is current for that year; ⁺ as at 28 October 2019.

The *World Migration Report 2000*'s contribution to migration policy as well as migration studies was timely, and its success heralded the World Migration Report series. Since 2000, ten World Migration Reports have been produced by IOM (see text box below) and it has become the organization's flagship publication series. Its continued strong focus is on making a relevant, sound and evidence-based contribution that increases the understanding of migration by policymakers, practitioners, researchers and the general public.

In late 2016, IOM made the decision to refine the World Migration Report series in order to ensure it was able to maximize its contribution to fact-based knowledge on migration globally. Each edition of the series now has two parts comprising:

- Part I: Key information on migration and migrants (including migration-related statistics);
- Part II: Balanced, evidence-based analysis of complex and emerging migration issues.

*World Migration Report 2000**World Migration Report 2003: Managing Migration – Challenges and Responses for People on the Move**World Migration Report 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration**World Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy**World Migration Report 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change**World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration**World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Well-Being and Development**World Migration Report 2015: Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility**World Migration Report 2018**World Migration Report 2020*

The move away from single theme editions of the report series to this two-part structure was in recognition of the significant changes in migration research, analysis and publishing, as well as the different expectations and needs of readers. For those who want to find out about key migration facts and figures, Part I brings together the latest information and statistics so that readers are able to better understand migration trends, changing patterns and processes at the global and regional levels. But for those who may be working on (or studying) specific areas of migration policy or practice, deeper dives into the complexities are offered in Part II. Refinement of the series was also in recognition that, as the focus on, and complexity of, migration intensifies, reports limited to a single theme have the potential to understate or miss entirely the broader changes that are occurring in migration transformations globally.

A further consideration of the revised series was its intended “value-add”. As an intergovernmental organization, and a new United Nations related organization, it is critical that IOM ensures the World Migration Report serves the public in providing information and analysis that is relevant, accessible, sound, accurate and balanced. The need to avoid duplication or significant overlap is a genuine one, especially in light of newer contributions on migration governance (such as the Migration Governance Indicators). In this way, the World Migration Report series was re-framed to offer strategic analysis of complex and emerging issues facing migration policymakers, rather than describe or assess current policy and governance on migration. The series complements rather than duplicates other work.

Evidence indicates that the revised series has been successful in achieving its intended aims, with positive responses from readers, including Member States, migration academics and general readers. The significant, sustained increase in downloads during 2018 and (to date) 2019 of the *World Migration Report 2018* over previous editions is another encouraging indicator.³⁰

30 Figure 6 in chapter 4 of this report provides download statistics for the World Migration Reports 2018 and 2015.

World Migration Report 2020

This edition, heralding the twentieth anniversary of the World Migration Report series, builds on the previous report, the 2018 edition, by providing updated migration statistics at the global and regional levels as well as descriptive analysis of complex migration issues.

Part I, on “key data and information on migration and migrants”, includes separate chapters on global migration trends and patterns; regional dimensions and developments; and a discussion of recent contributions to migration research and analysis by academia and a wide range of different organizations, including IOM. These three chapters have been produced institutionally by IOM, drawing primarily on analyses by IOM experts, practitioners and officials around the world based on data from a wide range of relevant organizations. The seven chapters in Part II are authored by applied and academic researchers working on migration. They cover a range of “complex and emerging migration issues” including:

- migrants’ contributions to societies;
- migration, inclusion and social cohesion;
- migration and health;
- children and unsafe migration;
- migration and adaptation to environmental change;
- migrants caught in crises; and
- recent developments in global migration governance.

While the choice of these topics is necessarily selective and subjective, all the chapters in Part II of this report are directly relevant to some of the most prominent and important debates about migration in the world today. Many of these topics lie at the heart of the conundrums that face policymakers as they seek to formulate effective, proportionate and constructive responses to complex public policy issues related to migration. Accordingly, the chapters aim to inform current and future policy deliberations and discussions by providing a clear identification of the key issues, a critical overview of relevant research and analysis, and a discussion of the implications for future research and policymaking. The chapters are not meant to be prescriptive, in the sense of advocating particular policy “solutions” – especially as the immediate context is an important determinant of policy settings – but informative and helpful to what can be highly contested debates.

Part I

Chapter 2 provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and stateless persons – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter refers to the existing body of IOM programmatic data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement, displacement tracking and human trafficking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant IOM programming and operations globally.

Following the global overview, chapter 3 provides a discussion of key regional dimensions of, and developments in, migration. The discussion focuses on six world regions as identified by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America, and Oceania. For each of these regions, the analysis includes: i) an overview and brief discussion of key population-related statistics; and ii) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses, including from international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues *within* each of the six regions, descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” are presented at the subregional level.

There is a substantial amount of research and analysis on migration that is being undertaken and published by a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. Chapter 4 provides a selective overview of such contributions, updating the chapter on the topic as it first appeared in the *World Migration Report 2018*. The overview focuses on migration research outputs published by academia and intergovernmental organizations in 2017 and 2018, which saw a peak in output from intergovernmental organizations, some of which was produced to inform States and other actors during deliberations on the Global Compact for Migration (see chapter 11 of this report for discussion of the compact processes and outcome).

Part II

The lead chapter in Part II examines the historical and contemporary contributions of migrants to communities of destination as well as those back in their place of origin. With this perspective, it focuses on three central domains of migrants’ contributions: sociocultural, civic-political and economic. In the face of often negatively skewed discussions on migration and migrants, one can lose sight of the fact that migrants have made significant contributions in a multitude of ways. This “reality check” chapter 5 highlights an often overlooked but important topic, placing the analysis in the context of emerging impediments to the recognition of migrants’ contributions globally. The chapter concludes by outlining the implications for policy deliberations and for further research.

Chapter 6 critically reviews the issue of inclusion of migrants in host societies where they adapt to new cultures, customs, social values and language. The chapter provides an overview of the historical development of the policy approaches and terminology related to the topic. It discusses the roles of different stakeholders in optimizing the inclusion of migrants, as well as the importance of policy settings that are directly and indirectly related to inclusion. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the implication for policy responses.

Health and migration is often only thought about in crisis terms, but there is much more to the connections between the two. Chapter 7 provides an overview analysis of key issues related to health and migration, including in terms of benefits, vulnerabilities and resilience. The chapter then examines health systems’ responses and prevailing approaches, as well as gaps in the governance of migration and health. Lessons from good-practice guidelines and the global agendas in migration and health are provided.

Chapter 8 deals with child migration that does not conform to the traditional pattern of the migrant child accompanying or following the family in a safe environment, but rather migration that is unsafe, for example, occurring through irregular pathways without family. Following an expository approach, the chapter elaborates different types of child migration, their drivers, and issues related to the data on child migration. It discusses

key protection challenges affecting child migrants and addresses the current issues and the evolving policies to handle them. The chapter explores the main emerging challenges confronting child migrants and concludes by reflecting on policy and research priorities.

Providing an overview of human mobility and adaptation to cope with environmental and climate change, chapter 9 explores empirical research from around the world. Diverse examples of adaptive behaviour are presented from different ecological zones particularly at risk under climate change, namely, mountainous, dryland and coastal areas, as well as cities. The examples address a variety of strategies that promote one or several adaptive forms of migration. The chapter also provides a summary of the international policy frameworks on responses to the mobility aspects of environmental and climate change. The chapter concludes with focused recommendations for research, policy and practice.

Chapter 10 deals with crises that migrants are caught up in. Presenting examples of such crises like floods, hurricanes, conflicts, and political and economic crisis, it examines current emergency assistance and urgent protection responses. The chapter provides an overview of the local, national and international responses to such needs faced by different types of migrants and their effectiveness. By drawing on the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, it examines the varying contexts, responses, gaps, and lessons learned in crisis preparedness and post-crisis recovery. The chapter provides an overview of existing data on migrants facing risk and situations of vulnerability in various countries and assesses the gaps. It concludes with policy and practice implications of responses.

As the title spells out, chapter 11 provides an update on the migration governance chapter in the *World Migration Report 2018*, documenting key developments in global migration governance in the two years since the last report. The chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the development and adoption of the two global compacts, a brief analysis of their contents and the areas of convergence and divergence, an assessment of how they affect global migration governance framework, and the future implications as well as the challenges for implementation. The chapter discusses States' commitments to implement and review follow-up and progress of the compacts, and summarizes changes in institutional architecture to support the Global Compact for Migration. The chapter also considers longer-term issues and implications for the future.

Overall, this world migration report has been produced to help deepen our collective understanding of the various manifestations and complexities of migration in the face of growing uncertainties. We hope that all readers are able to learn something new from this edition, as well as to draw on its contents as they undertake their work, study or other activities.



PART I

DATA AND INFORMATION ON MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS





2

MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

In most discussions on migration, the starting point is usually numbers. Understanding changes in scale, emerging trends and shifting demographics related to global social and economic transformations, such as migration, help us make sense of the changing world we live in and plan for the future. The current global estimate is that there were around 272 million international migrants in the world in 2019, which equates to 3.5 per cent of the global population.¹ A first important point to note is that this is a very small minority of the world's population, meaning that staying within one's country of birth overwhelmingly remains the norm. The great majority of people do not migrate across borders; much larger numbers migrate within countries (an estimated 740 million internal migrants in 2009).² That said, the increase in international migrants has been evident over time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a slightly faster rate than previously anticipated.³

The overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and study – involving migration processes that largely occur without fundamentally challenging either migrants or the countries they enter. In contrast, other people leave their homes and countries for a range of compelling and sometimes tragic reasons, such as conflict, persecution and disaster. While those who have been displaced, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), comprise a relatively small percentage of all migrants, they are often the most in need of assistance and support.

This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview of information on migration and migrants. The chapter draws upon current statistical sources compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).⁴ The chapter provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and missing migrants – as well as of stateless persons and remittances.

The chapter also refers to the growing body of programmatic IOM data, particularly on assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement, displacement tracking and victims of human trafficking. While these

1 UN DESA, 2019a.

2 UNDP, 2009.

3 See, for example, IOM's *World Migration Report 2003* (IOM, 2003), which drew upon United Nations population data (UN DESA, 2002) and migration data (IOM, 2000).

4 In keeping within the scope of this report, statistics utilized in this chapter were current as at 30 June 2019, except for international migrant stock data which were incorporated into the chapter following the release of the 2019 revision by UN DESA on 17 September 2019.

data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant programming and operations globally. As the United Nations migration agency, with activities relevant to all the themes discussed in this chapter, IOM data have the capacity to provide further insights on migration and its various dynamics, including the diverse needs of migrants.

This chapter highlights some of the challenges associated with data collection and definitions that make a comprehensive analysis of migration trends at the global level difficult.⁵ This also remains an issue for many States attempting to analyse migration trends within their own countries or regions, as reflected in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, with its emphasis on data collection for evidence-based policy (Objective 1 of the Global Compact – see discussion in chapter 11 of this report). Ongoing efforts to collect and improve migration statistics have led to an expansion in available data; however, the need for further technical capacity is an obstacle that is yet to be overcome as the international community works to develop a more comprehensive global picture of key aspects of migration. Similarly, defining migration and migrants is complex, as discussed in the text box below.

Defining migration, migrant and other key terms

Outside of general definitions of *migration* and *migrant*, such as those found in dictionaries, there exist various specific definitions of key migration-related terms, including in legal, administrative, research and statistical spheres.^a There is no universally agreed definition of migration or migrant, however, several definitions are widely accepted and have been developed in different settings, such as those set out in UN DESA's 1998 *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration*.^b

Technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants and migration are necessarily informed by geographic, legal, political, methodological, temporal and other factors. For example, there are numerous ways in which migration events can be defined, including in relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence and duration of stay.^c This is important when it comes to quantifying and analysing the effects of migration and migrants (however defined). We encourage readers to refer to primary sources cited in the chapter for information on specific definitions and categorizations underlying the data. Readers may also find the IOM *Glossary on Migration* (2019 edition) to be a useful reference.^d

a See, for example, Poulain and Perrin, 2001.

b UN DESA, 1998.

c See, for example, de Beer et al., 2010.

d IOM, 2019b.

5 In general, explanatory notes, caveats, limitations and methodologies on specific sources of data can be extensive, and are therefore not included in this chapter. However, sources have been clearly identified so that readers can refer to them.

International migrants: numbers and trends

UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.⁶

The United Nations *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration* defines an “international migrant” as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” (those who have changed their countries of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and “long-term migrants” (those who have done so for at least one year). However, not all countries use this definition in practice.⁷ Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants by, for example, applying different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions, as well as data collection methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants.

Overall, the estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past five decades. The total estimated 272 million people living in a country other than their countries of birth in 2019 was 119 million more than in 1990 (when it was 153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million; see table 1). While the proportion of international migrants globally has also increased over this period, it is evident that the vast majority of people continue to live in the countries in which they were born.

Table 1. International migrants, 1970–2019

Year	Number of migrants	Migrants as a % of the world's population
1970	84,460,125	2.3%
1975	90,368,010	2.2%
1980	101,983,149	2.3%
1985	113,206,691	2.3%
1990	153,011,473	2.9%
1995	161,316,895	2.8%
2000	173,588,441	2.8%
2005	191,615,574	2.9%
2010	220,781,909	3.2%
2015	248,861,296	3.4%
2019	271,642,105	3.5%

Source: UN DESA, 2008, 2019a, 2019b.

Note: The number of entities (such as States, territories and administrative regions) for which data were made available in the 2019 UN DESA *Revision of International Migrant Stock* was 232. In 1970, the number of entities was 135.


In 2019, most international migrants (around 74%) were of working age (20 to 64 years of age), with a slight decrease in migrants younger than 20 years old from 2000 to 2019 (from 16.4% to 14%), and a constant share (around 12%) of international migrants 65 years of age and older since 2000.

⁶ Data are also provided to UN DESA by territories and administrative units. For a summary on UN DESA stock data sources, methodology and caveats, please see UN DESA, 2019b.


⁷ UN DESA, 1998.

Snapshot of international migrants

The international migrant population globally has increased in size but remained relatively stable as a proportion of the world's population




52% of international migrants are male, 48% are female



Most international migrants (74%) are of working age (20–64 years)


*Age groups above 75 years were omitted (male 4%, female 6%).

The proportion of international migrants varies significantly around the world



Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.


272 million international migrants in 2019 out of a global population of 7.7 billion:
1 in every 30 people



Note: Infographics based on UN DESA, 2019a and UN DESA, 2019c.

In 2019, Europe and Asia each hosted around 82 million and 84 million international migrants, respectively – comprising 61 per cent of the total global international migrant stock combined (see figure 1). These regions were followed by North America, with almost 59 million international migrants in 2019 or 22 per cent of the global migrant stock, Africa at 10 per cent, Latin America and the Caribbean at 4 per cent, and Oceania at 3 per cent. When compared with the size of the population in each region, shares of international migrants in 2019 were highest in Oceania, North America and Europe, where international migrants represented, respectively, 21 per cent, 16 per cent and 11 per cent of the total population.⁸ In comparison, the share of international migrants is relatively small in Asia and Africa (1.8% and 2%, respectively) and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8%). However, Asia experienced the most remarkable growth from 2000 to 2019, at 69 per cent (around 34 million people in absolute terms).⁹ Europe experienced the second largest growth during this period, with an increase of 25 million international migrants, followed by an increase of 18 million international migrants in North America and 11 million in Africa.¹⁰

Figure 1. International migrants, by major region of residence, 2005 to 2019 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2019a. Datasets available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp (accessed 18 September 2019).

Note: Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3, appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

The increase in international migration in some regions over time has had an impact on population change. Figure 2 shows the proportional population change for each of the world's six regions from 2009 to 2019. While Europe has traditionally been one of the major destination regions for international migrants, it has had the slowest rate of proportional population change over this period, at slightly over 1 per cent. However, the rate would arguably be much lower without international migrants who have mitigated decreasing populations


8 UN DESA, 2019a.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

in some European countries due, for example, to declining birth rates.¹¹ By comparison, Africa underwent the most significant change, with its population growing by nearly 30 per cent over this period, due to high fertility rates and increasing lifespans.¹² This growth has nevertheless been softened by emigration from Africa to other regions (namely Europe and Asia – see chapter 3 of this report for discussion).

Figure 2. Proportional population change by region, 2009–2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3, appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

While population growth over the decade may be most pronounced for Africa, in 2019 more than half the world's total population resided in just one region: Asia (4.6 billion people). From 2009 to 2019, the population in Asia grew by nearly 440 million (from 4.16 billion to 4.6 billion), compared with just under 300 million in Africa (from 1.01 billion to 1.31 billion).¹³ Five of the world's top 10 most populous countries are in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh).¹⁴

The United States of America has been the main country of destination for international migrants since 1970.¹⁵ Since then, the number of foreign-born people residing in the country has more than quadrupled – from less than 12 million in 1970, to close to 51 million in 2019. Germany, the second top destination for migrants, has also observed an increase over the years, from 8.9 million in 2000 to 13.1 million in 2019. A list of the top 20 destination countries of international migrants is provided in the left column of figure 3.

¹¹ UN DESA, 2019c. See chapter 3 of this report (figure 14) showing countries with the largest proportional population change in Europe.

¹² UN DESA, 2019c. See chapter 3 of this report (figure 2) showing countries with the largest proportional population change in Africa.


¹³ UN DESA, 2019c.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ UN DESA, 2008, 2019a.

The list of largest migrant origin countries and territories is shown on the right in figure 3. More than 40 per cent of all international migrants worldwide in 2019 (112 million) were born in Asia,¹⁶ primarily originating from India (the largest country of origin), China, and South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mexico was the second largest country of origin, and the Russian Federation was fourth. Several other European countries have sizable populations of emigrants, including Ukraine, Poland, the United Kingdom and Germany.

Figure 3. Top 20 destinations (left) and origins (right) of international migrants in 2019 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2019a (accessed 18 September 2019).

In regard to the distribution of international migrants by countries' income group,¹⁷ nearly two thirds of international migrants resided in high-income countries in 2019 – around 176 million.¹⁸ This compares with 82 million foreign-born who resided in middle-income countries (about one third of the total migrant stock) and 13 million in low-income countries in the same year. Income levels of destination countries for migrant workers are further discussed in the section on migrant workers below.


16 UN DESA, 2019a.

17 Per World Bank country income group classifications, in World Bank Country and Lending Groups (World Bank, n.d.a).

18 UN DESA, 2017a.

While international migrants may tend to gravitate toward high-income countries, their origins globally can be diverse. Some origin countries have high proportions of their nationals living abroad for economic, political, security, trade or cultural reasons that may be contemporary or historical in nature. For example, the Syrian Arab Republic has a higher rate of emigration than most other countries due to displacement caused by long-term conflict (see discussion below on refugees for more detail). Figure 4 highlights countries with high proportions of emigrants in 2019. Importantly, the emigration proportion of a country represents an accumulation of migration (and displacement) over time, sometimes many decades. Of note is the geographic diversity of the countries in figure 4 (countries from all regions except Northern America are included) as well as the high number of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean (10 of the 20 countries).

Figure 4. Top 20 countries of emigration in 2019 (proportion)



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Notes: The population size used to calculate the percentage of emigrants is based on the UN DESA resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born, and UN DESA international migrants originally from that country. Only countries with a combined population of more than 100,000 residents and emigrants were included in the analysis.

UN DESA estimates of foreign-born populations do not reflect immigration status or policy categories (such as students, highly skilled migrants, or refugees). Capturing such attributes is inherently difficult for several key reasons. First, a person's immigration status can be fluid and change quickly, arising from circumstances and legal/policy settings. For example, many international migrants who may be described as "undocumented" or "irregular" enter countries on valid visas and then stay in contravention of one or more visa conditions. In fact, there are many paths to irregularity, such as crossing borders without authorization, unlawfully overstaying a visa period, working in contravention of visa conditions, being born into irregularity, or remaining after a negative decision on an asylum application has been made.¹⁹

Second, countries have different immigration policy settings and different ways of collecting data on migrants, which makes it difficult to establish a harmonized approach to capturing irregular migrant stocks globally. The pace of change in the migration policy arena also poses an extra dimension of complexity, as people may slip into and out of "irregularity". Notably, there have been very few global estimates of the number of irregular migrants because of this complexity. However, this has not prevented some organizations from coming up with inflated and incorrect global estimates—see text box below on "what not to do".

What not to do: estimating the global population of irregular migrants

In an August 2019 report on irregular migration, the authors come up with a global estimate of the number of irregular migrants that is based on a lack of understanding of migration and displacement policy, practice and normative settings.^a In arriving at an erroneous figure of 106.9 million people, the authors include groups of people who would not be considered irregular, such as internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and Venezuelan migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers.^b

The important lessons in this example include:

- that categories of migrants (even while overlapping at times) and limitations on definitions must be well understood before analysis commences;
- ensuring qualified and experienced analysts with an understanding of the topic lead such work;
- seeking the advice and feedback of knowledgeable specialists in the field prior to publication (commonly referred to as "peer review").

a CSIS, 2019:5–6.

b Many Venezuelans were authorized to cross international borders by receiving countries following the economic and political crisis causing displacement, and have been offered some form of status by the receiving country, even if temporary in nature.

Third, as noted in the text box earlier on the chapter on "defining migration, migrant and other key terms", there necessarily exist different definitions, depending on the circumstances in which they are applied. In some legal/policy situations, as well as in general discussions, for example, a "migrant" can include a person who has *never migrated*. See the discussion of the common problem of conflating "migration" and "migrant" in the text box below.

19 Gordon et al., 2009.

Conflating “migration” and “migrant”

In a general sense, *migration* is the process of moving from one place to another. To migrate is to move, whether from a rural area to a city, from one district or province in a given country to another in that same country, or from one country to a new country. It involves action.

In contrast, a *migrant* is a person described as such for one or more reasons, depending on the context (see the text box on “Defining migration, migrant and other key terms” earlier on the chapter). While in many cases, “migrants” do undertake some form of migration, this is not always the case. In some situations, people who have never undertaken migration may be referred to as migrants – children of people born overseas, for example, are commonly called second or third-generation migrants.^a This may even extend to situations involving statelessness, whereby whole groups of people are not able to access citizenship despite being born and raised in a country.^b On the other hand, for example, returning citizens who have undertaken significant and/or long-term international migration are generally not classified as “migrants” upon or after their arrival to their country of birth, despite their migration journeys and experiences.^c

a See, for example, Neto, 1995; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001.

b Kyaw, 2017.

c Skeldon, 2018.

International migration flows: definitions, numbers and gaps

While data on migrant stocks are widely available, data on global migration movements (flows) are much more limited. Available UN DESA estimates on global migrant stocks are extensive and global in scope; however, the database of migration flows only encompasses 45 countries.²⁰ Capturing data on migration flows is extremely challenging for several reasons. First, while international migration flows are generally accepted as covering inflows and outflows into and from countries, there has been a greater focus on recording inflows. For example, while countries such as Australia and the United States count cross-border movements, many others only count entries and not departures.²¹ Additionally, migration flow data in some countries are derived from administrative events related to immigration status (for example, issuance/renewal/withdrawal of a residence permit) and are thus used as a proxy for migration flows. Furthermore, migratory movements are often hard to separate from non-migratory travel, such as tourism or business.²² Tracking migratory movements also requires considerable resources, infrastructure and IT/knowledge systems. This poses particular challenges for developing countries, where the ability to collect, administer, analyse and report data on mobility, migration and other areas is often limited. Finally, many countries’ physical geographies pose tremendous challenges for collecting data on migration flows. Entry and border management, for example, is particularly challenging in some regions, because of archipelagic and isolated borders, and it is further complicated by traditions of informal migration for work.²³

²⁰ Laczko, 2017.

²¹ Koser, 2010.

²² Skeldon, 2018.

²³ Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.

IOM's Global Migration Data Portal

The Global Migration Data Portal was launched in December 2017 as a one-stop access point for timely, comprehensive migration statistics and reliable information about migration data globally. The site is designed to pull together, in one place, key global data sources on migration from across different organizations, agencies and reports. The portal serves users in the field of migration by making international migration data more accessible and visible, and easier to understand.

The world map features more than 70 migration data indicators from more than 20 different international data sources, broken down by country, region, subregion and IOM region. Most data displayed are publicly available and provided by numerous international agencies. Migration data on the portal can be accessed for all United Nations countries and are complemented by contextual information, including demographic and employment data. Key additional resources, including written reports and alternative data sources, are made available for all countries, regions and subregions, where available. A regional section provides regional profile pages covering migration data and available sources within different United Nations regions.

In the thematic section, the portal offers reviews of available data in various fields of migration, provides explanations of concepts and definitions, and describes key strengths and weaknesses of the available data sources. The thematic pages review the data for around 30 topics of migration. The portal also features a collection of more than 100 handbooks and guidance reports on how to measure migration and collect data in various fields. Numerous blogs discussing recent data and innovations authored by leading experts in the field of migration, and video interviews with leading data experts from around the world, are also included on the portal.

The portal also includes migration governance country profiles and a dedicated section on data on migration governance. A specific section shows how data can support United Nations Member States in achieving the migration-relevant Sustainable Development Goals and in implementing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.


The portal is available in English, and translations of key sections are available in French, Spanish and German. For more information see: <http://migrationdataportal.org>.

Migration flows

There are currently two main international datasets on international migration flows, both of which are derived from national statistics: UN DESA's International Migration Flows dataset and OECD's International Migration Database. Since 2005, UN DESA has compiled data on the flows of international migrants to and from selected countries, based on nationally available statistics. At the time of writing (August 2019), there had been no update to the UN DESA flows dataset, with the most current being the 2015 version. The 2015 migration flows dataset comprises data from 45 countries (only 43 on emigration flows), up from 29 countries in 2008 and 15 countries in 2005.²⁴

The OECD data on migration flows have been collected since 2000, which allows for limited trend analysis, as shown in figure 5 (though data are not standardized, as explained in the note under the figure).²⁵ The estimates suggest that permanent migration inflows to OECD countries increased from 3.85 million in 2000 to 7.06 million in 2016, with a temporary lull occurring around the time of the global financial crisis (figure 5). Germany remained the main OECD destination country in 2016, with over 1.7 million new international migrants (more than double the levels registered in 2000, but with a decrease compared with more than 2 million in 2015) arriving that year, followed by the United States (nearly 1.2 million) and the United Kingdom (about 450,000 new migrants).²⁶

Figure 5. Inflows of foreign nationals into OECD countries, permanent migration, 2000–2016 (millions)



Source: OECD, n.d.a.

Notes: Data are not standardized and therefore differ from statistics on permanent migration inflows into selected countries contained in OECD's *International Migration Outlook 2018* (OECD, 2018).

The 35 countries typically included in OECD statistics are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. In some years, data for particular countries are not made available: data were made available for 31 countries in 2000 and 33 countries in 2016. Notably, data for Greece have not been reported since 2012 and data for Turkey have not been reported since 2010.

24 For UN DESA migrant flow data, as well as for the specific countries included, please see UN DESA, 2015.

25 This subsection is based on data from the OECD International Migration Database. For additional data on migrant flows and other migrant data in OECD countries, please see OECD, n.d.a.

26 These are the top OECD countries for permanent inflows of foreign nationals for which data were made available in 2017.

Migrant fatalities and IOM's Missing Migrants Project

In the wake of the tragic events of October 2013, in which an estimated 368 migrants died in the sinking of two boats near the Italian island of Lampedusa, IOM began collecting and compiling information on migrants who perish or go missing on migratory routes worldwide, within its Missing Migrants Project (MMP). Information on migrant fatalities is collected daily and made available on the Missing Migrants Project's online database, managed by IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. MMP also provides analysis of the data and issues related to deaths during migration, in briefings and its "Fatal Journeys" reports (volume 4 published in 2019). Data sources include official records of coast guards and medical examiners, media stories, reports from non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, and interviews with migrants. Data collection challenges are significant. For instance, the vast majority of recorded deaths are of people travelling via clandestine routes, which are often at sea or in remote areas (chosen with the aim of evading detection), meaning remains are not found. Few official sources collect and make data on migrant deaths publicly available. Relying on testimonies of fellow migrants and media sources can be problematic, due to inaccuracies and incomplete coverage.

In the five years (2014–2018) of systematically recording deaths during migration, MMP has documented over 30,900 women, men and children who lost their lives while trying to reach other countries. During that time, the Mediterranean Sea has seen the highest number of deaths, claiming the lives of at least 17,919 people, 64 per cent of whose bodies have not been recovered from the sea. In 2018, the Mediterranean continued to be the place with the highest known number of deaths during migration, but compared with the previous four years, there was a much higher proportion who died on the "Western Mediterranean route". A total of 813 deaths were recorded on this sea crossing from the coast of Northern Africa to Spain in 2018, compared with 272 in 2017. Nearly 570 deaths during migration were recorded in North Africa in 2018, mostly due to the harsh natural environment, violence and abuse, dangerous transportation conditions, and sickness and starvation. Despite the ongoing war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen, in 2018 the migration route to the country from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden continued to be in high use. In 2018, 156 people are known to have drowned in this crossing. In the context of the displacement of millions of people from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 42 people from the country lost their lives while trying to migrate elsewhere in the region in 2018. No deaths of Venezuelans were recorded by MMP in the previous year. Since 2014, 1,884 deaths have been recorded along the United States–Mexico border, including 434 in 2018.


To download the MMP data, see <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/downloads>. New data sources are constantly added and efforts are ongoing to improve data collection globally. For a discussion of the challenges of collecting data on migrant deaths, please see <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/methodology>.

Migrant workers

The latest available estimates indicate that there were roughly 164 million migrant workers around the world in 2017, accounting for nearly two thirds (64%) of the (then) 258 million global stock of international migrants.²⁷ When compared with the global population of international migrants of working age – regarded as 15 years of age or older (234 million) – migrant workers account for 70 per cent. For a range of reasons, however, these global figures are likely to be underestimates.²⁸ While earlier global estimates of migrant workers have been produced, ILO notes that these cannot be compared with 2017 figures, due to definitional differences and changes in methodology and data sources.

In 2017, 68 per cent of migrant workers were residing in high-income level countries – an estimated 111 million people. An additional 47 million migrant workers (29%) were living in middle-income countries, and 5.6 million (3.4%) were in low-income countries. While we are unable to compare the numbers of migrant workers over time, it is useful to examine changes in proportional distribution. In 2017, for example, there was a noticeable change in destination country category; that is, from 2013 to 2017, high-income countries experienced a 7 percentage point drop in migrant workers (from 75% to 68%), while upper-middle-income countries observed a 7 percentage point increase (from 12% to 19%) (see figure 6). This apparent shift may be influenced by economic growth in middle-income countries and/or changes to labour immigration regulations in high-income countries. The share of migrant workers in the total workforce across country income groups was quite small in low-income (1.9%), lower-income (1.4%) and upper-middle-income countries (2.2%), but much greater for high-income countries (18.5%).

Figure 6. Migrant workers by destination country income level, 2013 and 2017



Source: ILO, 2018.

²⁷ The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from ILO, 2018. Please refer to this document for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, limitations and caveats associated with the numbers and trends presented. More generally, information on foreign-born employment in OECD countries is available at OECD, n.d.b.

²⁸ See, for example, ILO, 2018.

Male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by 28 million in 2017, with 96 million males (58%) and 68 million females (42%), in a context where males comprised a higher number of international migrants of working age (127 million or 54%, compared with 107 million or 46% females). This represents a slight shift since 2013, towards an even more gendered migrant worker population, when the share of male migrant workers constituted 56 per cent and females 44 per cent. See table 2 for further breakdowns by income level and sex.

Table 2. Migrant workers, by sex and income level of destination countries, 2017

	Low-income			Lower-middle-income			Upper-middle-income			High-income			Global total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Migrant workers (millions)	3.6	1.9	5.6	10.9	5.6	16.6	17.4	13.1	30.5	63.7	47.5	111.2	95.7	68.1	163.8
As a proportion of all migrant workers (%)	2.2	1.2	3.4	6.7	3.4	10.1	10.6	8	18.6	38.9	29	67.9	58.4	41.6	100

Source: Based on ILO, 2018.

Note: Totals may not add up due to the effects of rounding.


As evident from the data, the international migrant worker population is currently gendered as well as geographically concentrated. There is a much larger number of male than female migrant workers worldwide (see table 2), with a gender composition that sees much higher numbers of men in low-income and lower-middle income countries compared with women, and in contrast to the gender splits for high-income countries. In terms of geography, and as seen in figure 7 below, 99.6 million or almost 61 per cent of all migrant workers resided in three subregions: Northern America; the Arab States; and Northern, Southern and Western Europe.²⁹ Notably, there is a striking gender imbalance of migrant workers in two regions: Southern Asia (6 million males compared with 1.3 million females) and the Arab States (19.1 million males compared with 3.6 million females). The Arab States region is one of the top destinations for migrant workers, where they can dominate key sectors. For example, in the Gulf States, over 95 per cent of the labour force for construction and domestic work is comprised of migrant workers.³⁰ From 2013 to 2017, the number of migrant workers in the Arab States increased by over 5 per cent, following greater demand for male migrant workers, many of whom are involved in manual labour, mostly in the construction sector.³¹

29 The ILO category of “Arab States” includes the following countries and territories: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories.

30 ILO, n.d.

31 ILO, 2018.

Figure 7. Geographic distribution of migrant workers by sex, 2017



Source: ILO, 2018.

Note: The figure reflects ILO geographic regions and subregions, and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Please see annex A of ILO, 2018 for more information on regional breakdowns. Please note that the rest of this chapter refers to the UN DESA geographical regions.

International remittances

Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to families or communities in their countries of origin. The World Bank compiles global data on international remittances, notwithstanding the myriad data gaps, definitional differences and methodological challenges in compiling accurate statistics.³² Its data, however, do not capture unrecorded flows through formal or informal channels, and the actual magnitude of global remittances are therefore likely to be larger than available estimates.³³ Despite these limitations, available data reflect an overall increase in remittances in recent decades, from USD 126 billion in 2000, to USD 689 billion in 2018.

There was a 9 per cent increase in remittances in 2018, up from USD 633 billion in 2017. However, the two consecutive years prior to 2017 witnessed a decline; from 2014 to 2015, global (inward) flows of remittances

³² The content of much of this subsection, unless otherwise noted, is based on and drawn from the World Bank's data in relation to migration and remittances (World Bank, n.d.b); and publications on the topic (World Bank, n.d.c.). In particular, the World Bank's annual remittances datasets (World Bank, n.d.b), the Migration and Development Brief 31 (World Bank, 2019), Migration and Development Brief 30 (World Bank, 2018), the Migration and Development Brief 27 (World Bank, 2017a) and its 21 April Press Release (World Bank, 2017b) are key sources of information. Please refer to these sources as well as the World Bank's Factbooks on Migration and Development, including its latest, published in 2016, for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented.

³³ World Bank, 2016.

contracted by an estimated 1.2 per cent, from USD 603 billion in 2014 to USD 595 billion in 2015, and by another 1.1 per cent from 2015 to 2016 (from USD 595 billion to USD 589 billion). Consistent with this trend, remittances to low- and middle-income countries (which account for the majority of the global total) had declined for two consecutive years, from 2014 to 2016 – a trend that had not been seen for three decades, according to the World Bank, before returning back to the positive long-term trend from 2016 to 2018 (from USD 444 billion in 2016, to USD 483 billion in 2017, and USD 529 billion in 2018). Since the mid-1990s, remittances have greatly surpassed official development assistance levels,³⁴ defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.³⁵

In 2018, India, China, Mexico, the Philippines and Egypt were (in descending order) the top five remittance-recipient countries, although India and China were well above the rest, with total inward remittances exceeding USD 67 billion for each country (see table 3). When remittances are viewed as a percentage of gross domestic product, however, the top five remittance-receiving countries in 2018 were Tonga (at 35.2%), followed by Kyrgyzstan (33.6%), Tajikistan (31%), Haiti (30.7%) and Nepal (28%).

High-income countries are almost always the main source of remittances. For decades, the United States has consistently been the top remittance-sending country, with a total outflow of USD 67.96 billion in 2017, followed by the United Arab Emirates (USD 44.37 billion), Saudi Arabia (USD 36.12 billion) and Switzerland (USD 26.6 billion). The fifth-highest remittance-sending country in both 2016 and 2017 was Germany (with total outflows of USD 20.29 billion and 22.09 billion, respectively). In addition to its role as a top recipient, China (classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank) has also been a significant, although declining, source of remittances, with USD 20.29 billion in 2016, down to USD 16.18 billion in 2017. Table 3 provides further details and trends.³⁶

Table 3. Top countries receiving/sending remittances (2005–2018) (current USD billions)

Top countries receiving remittances						
2005		2010		2015		2018
China	23.63	India	53.48	India	68.91	India
Mexico	22.74	China	52.46	China	63.94	China
India	22.13	Mexico	22.08	Philippines	29.80	Mexico
Nigeria	14.64	Philippines	21.56	Mexico	26.23	Philippines
France	14.21	France	19.90	France	24.06	Egypt
Philippines	13.73	Nigeria	19.75	Nigeria	21.16	France
Belgium	6.89	Germany	12.79	Pakistan	19.31	Nigeria
Germany	6.87	Egypt	12.45	Egypt	18.33	Pakistan
Spain	6.66	Bangladesh	10.85	Germany	15.81	Germany
Poland	6.47	Belgium	10.35	Bangladesh	15.30	Viet Nam

³⁴ See World Bank, 2019, for example.

³⁵ See, for example, OECD, n.d.c, which also contains data on official development assistance. There is a growing body of work exploring the developmental, economic and social impacts of this trend.

³⁶ Breakdowns for countries sending remittances in 2018 were unavailable at the time of writing.

Top countries sending remittances							
2005		2010		2015		2017 ^a	
United States	47.25	United States	50.78	United States	61.86	United States	67.96
Saudi Arabia	14.30	Saudi Arabia	27.07	United Arab Emirates	40.33	United Arab Emirates	44.37
Germany	12.71	Russian Federation	21.45	Saudi Arabia	38.79	Saudi Arabia	36.12
Switzerland	10.52	Switzerland	17.76	Switzerland	25.40	Switzerland	26.60
United Kingdom	9.64	Germany	14.68	China	20.42	Germany	22.09
France	9.48	Italy	12.89	Russian Federation	19.69	Russian Federation	20.61
Republic of Korea	6.9	France	12.03	Germany	18.03	China	16.18
Russian Federation	6.83	Kuwait	11.86	Kuwait	15.20	Kuwait	13.76
Luxembourg	6.70	Luxembourg	10.65	France	12.79	France	13.50
Malaysia	5.68	United Arab Emirates	10.57	Qatar	12.19	Republic of Korea	12.89

Source: World Bank, n.d.b. (accessed July 2019).

Note: All numbers are in current (nominal) USD billion.

a The latest available data at the time of writing was for 2017. Breakdowns for countries sending remittances in 2018 were unavailable.

IOM's assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes

IOM has implemented assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes since 1979. IOM's AVRR support to migrants comprises a range of activities, and typically includes: the provision of pre-departure counselling, the purchase of flight tickets, administrative and travel assistance and, where possible, the provision of reintegration assistance.

On average, from 2005 to 2014, IOM assisted 34,000 migrants per year through AVRR. In line with the rise in the volume of migration in recent years, the number of returns has increased. In 2018, AVRR support was provided to 63,316 migrants returning from 128 host or transit countries to 169 countries or territories of origin. However, this amounts to a 12 per cent decrease compared

with 2017 (72,176). This decrease can be explained by a combination of structural and contextual factors, varying from country to country: lower numbers of migrant arrivals and asylum applications, and changes in national migration and asylum policies. Of the 63,316 AVRR beneficiaries in 2018, approximately 24 per cent were women and 22 per cent were children. Over 7 per cent of these returnees were victims of trafficking, unaccompanied migrant children, or migrants with health-related needs. Approximately 18,274 beneficiaries were provided with pre-departure reintegration counselling in host countries, and 41,461 beneficiaries were provided with reintegration counselling upon arrival in their countries or territories of origin.

Top 10 host/transit countries and countries of origin of AVRR beneficiaries, 2018

Host or transit countries		Countries of origin	
Germany	15,942	Iraq	5,661
Niger	14,977	Guinea	5,088
Greece	4,968	Ethiopia	4,792
Austria	3,469	Mali	4,041
Djibouti	3,392	Georgia	2,681
Belgium	2,795	Afghanistan	2,232
Netherlands	2,149	Albania	2,167
Morocco	1,508	Russian Federation	1,952
Turkey	1,494	Ukraine	1,901
Italy	958	Côte d'Ivoire	1,834

In 2018, the majority of AVRR beneficiaries (54%) returned from the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland, particularly from Germany, Greece, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands. Returns from the EEA and Switzerland decreased from 50,587 in 2017 to 33,971 in 2018. This trend confirms the increasing number of voluntary returns from transit countries. In 2018, returns from the Niger, Djibouti and Morocco to countries such as Guinea, Mali and Ethiopia amounted to more than 22 per cent of the global total. The main regions of origin for AVRR beneficiaries in 2018 were West and Central Africa (31% of total); South-East Europe, East Europe and Central Asia (28%); and Asia and the Pacific (14%). Together, the top 10 countries and territories of origin accounted for 51 per cent of the total number of AVRR beneficiaries.

For more information, see IOM, 2019a.

Refugees and asylum seekers

By the end of 2018, there was a total of 25.9 million refugees globally, with 20.4 million under UNHCR's mandate and 5.5 million refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East.³⁷ The total number of refugees is the highest on record, although the annual rate of growth has slowed since 2012.

There were also approximately 3.5 million people seeking international protection and awaiting determination of their refugee status, referred to as asylum seekers. In 2018, approximately 2.1 million asylum claims were lodged with States or UNHCR. Of the roughly 1.7 million first-instance applications for asylum lodged in 2018, the United States was the top recipient of asylum claims, with 254,300 new asylum applications, a 23 per cent decrease from 2017 (331,700), contrasting with the previous trend of increasing asylum applications in the United States from 2013 to 2016. Peru was the second largest recipient, with a sharp increase of asylum applications, from 37,800 new asylum claims in 2017 to 192,500 in 2018, mainly lodged by Venezuelans (190,500). Peru was followed by Germany, where the number of asylum applications continued to decrease (722,400 in 2016, down to 198,300 in 2017 and 161,900 in 2018).

UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2018, those under 18 years of age constituted roughly 52 per cent of the global refugee population. From 2003 to 2018, according to available disaggregated data, the proportion of children among stocks of refugees was very high, fluctuating between 41 and 52 per cent. The proportion of females has remained relatively stable, at 47 to 49 per cent, over the same period. Consistent with broader global dynamics, refugees continued to be primarily based in urban settings, with about 61 per cent of refugees located in urban areas at the end of 2018.³⁸

Unaccompanied and separated children lodged an estimated 27,600 individual asylum applications in at least 60 countries in 2018, marking a continued declining trend since the exceptionally high number of applications in 2015 (98,400).³⁹

As in other years, unresolved or renewed conflict dynamics in key countries contributed significantly to current figures and trends. Of the refugees under UNHCR's mandate at the end of 2018, the top 10 countries of origin – the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Eritrea and Burundi – accounted for roughly 16.6 million, or 82 per cent of the total refugee population. Many of these countries have been among the top sources of refugees for at least seven years. The ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic saw the number of refugees from that country reach approximately 6.7 million. The instability and violence that have made Afghanistan a major source of refugees for over 30 years have continued, with the country being the second largest origin country in the world, with 2.7 million refugees; this is a slight increase from 2017 figures (2.6 million), largely due to births during that year. South Sudan remained the third largest origin country of refugees since large-scale violence erupted in the middle of 2016, with 2.3 million at the end of 2018. Refugees from


³⁷ The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from UNHCR, 2018 and UNHCR, 2019. Please refer to these documents for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. UNHCR's previous *Global Trends* reports, as well as its Population Statistics database (UNHCR, n.d.a) are other key sources of information.

³⁸ See UNHCR, 2018 and UNHCR, 2019 for limitations applicable to these assessments related to age, sex and location.

³⁹ See UNHCR, 2019 on why these figures are underestimates.

the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia comprised over two thirds of the world refugee population. Figure 8 shows the trends in refugee numbers for the top five countries of origin from 2005 to 2018. The impact of the Syrian conflict is clearly illustrated in figure 8; in 2010, the Syrian Arab Republic was a source country for fewer than 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers, whereas it was the third largest host country in the world, with more than 1 million refugees mainly originating from Iraq.⁴⁰

Figure 8. Number of refugees by top 5 countries of origin as of 2018 (millions)




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a. (accessed on 9 July 2019).

Note: South Sudan became a country in 2011.

In 2018, for the fifth consecutive year, Turkey was the largest host country in the world, with 3.7 million refugees, mainly Syrians (over 3.6 million). Reflecting the significant share of Syrians in the global refugee population, two other bordering countries – Jordan and Lebanon – also featured among the top 10. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts of refugees from Afghanistan, the second largest origin country. Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Bangladesh and Ethiopia comprised the rest. The vast majority of refugees were hosted in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR, the least developed countries – such as Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen – hosted 33 per cent of the global total (6.7 million refugees). It is only when refugees are measured against national populations that high-income countries, such as Sweden (seventh) and Malta (ninth), rank among the top 10. Figure 9 shows trends in refugee numbers for the top five host countries from 2000 to 2018.

Figure 9. Number of refugees by top 5 host countries as of 2018 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, n.d.a. (accessed on 25 June 2019).

During 2018, over 590,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin – a decrease compared with the 667,400 returned refugees in 2017 – while the global refugee population has continued to increase. The majority of returns (210,900) were to the Syrian Arab Republic, primarily from Turkey.


While there are many challenges to measuring those benefiting from local integration, UNHCR estimates that, in 2018, 27 countries reported at least one naturalized refugee (compared with 28 countries in 2017), with a total of 62,600 naturalized refugees for the year (a decrease from the 73,400 newly naturalized refugees in 2017, but a significant increase compared with the 23,000 reported in 2016). Turkey, which naturalized an estimated 29,000 refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic in 2018 (compared with 50,000 in 2017), represents the greatest proportion, with Canada, the Netherlands, Guinea-Bissau and France contributing the bulk of the rest.

The traditional resettlement countries of Canada, the United States of America and Australia continued to conduct the majority of the world's refugee resettlements. In 2018, approximately 92,400 refugees were admitted for resettlement globally, representing more than a 10 per cent decrease from 2017 (102,800). Syrian, Congolese and Eritrean refugees were the key beneficiaries. Figure 10 provides an overview of resettlement statistics for key countries from 2005 to 2018. With almost 23,000 resettled refugees in 2018, it was the first time since 1980 that the United States of America was not the top resettlement country.⁴¹ The significant decline in the number of refugees resettled in the country was due to a substantial lowering of the refugee admission ceiling (the number of refugees admitted for resettlement each fiscal year) and enhanced security screening for refugees from "high-risk" countries, which has had the effect of decreasing the number of refugee admissions from these countries.⁴² With a steady increase in the number of resettled refugees over the last decade, Canada became the top resettlement country in 2018, with slightly more than 28,000 resettled refugees.

41 Radford and Connor, 2019.

42 United States Department of Homeland Security, 2018; and Blizzard and Batalova, 2019.

Figure 10. Number of refugees resettled by major resettlement countries in 2005–2018 (thousands)



Source: UNHCR, n.d.b. (accessed on 25 June 2019).

IOM's role in resettlement

IOM arranges safe and organized travel for refugees through resettlement programmes, as well as for other vulnerable persons of concern moving through other humanitarian pathways. Beyond traditional refugee resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes, more States are interested in or are currently carrying out other forms of admission, such as private sponsorships, academic scholarships and labour mobility schemes. IOM's movement data for resettlement assistance refer to the overall number of refugees and other persons of concern travelling under IOM auspices from various countries of departure to destinations around the world during a given period.

During calendar years 2017 and 2018, IOM supported some 40 States in carrying out resettlement, humanitarian admission and relocation initiatives in over 138 countries of departure, with significant operations conducted in Lebanon, Turkey, Afghanistan, Jordan, Greece, Italy, Uganda, Kenya, Iraq, Ethiopia and Sudan.

In 2017, a total of 137,840 individuals travelled to 40 States under IOM auspices for resettlement assistance; the top nationalities were Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans, Iraqis and Congolese. In 2018, a total of 95,400 individuals travelled to 30 States under IOM auspices for resettlement assistance; the top 5 nationalities were the same as the previous year. From 2017 to 2018, the gender breakdown remained close, with 52 per cent males and 48 per cent females resettling to third countries.

Comparing years 2015–2016 with 2017–2018, there was a 49.6 per cent reduction of individuals resettled to North America, and a 46 per cent increase in resettlement and relocation to the European Economic Area (EEA). The top nationalities admitted to the EEA during 2017–2018 were Syrians, Eritreans, Iraqis, Congolese, Sudanese and Afghans.

Under cooperative agreements, IOM provides stakeholders with necessary information and shares data with key partners, such as UNHCR, resettlement countries and settlement agencies. IOM works in close collaboration with UNHCR on a regular basis, to verify and better align aggregate data related to resettlement, specifically around departures figures. For more information on IOM's resettlement activities, see www.iom.int/resettlement-assistance.

Internally displaced persons

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) compiles data on two types of internal displacement: new displacements during a given period, and the total stock of IDPs at a given point in time. This statistical information is categorized by two broad displacement causes: (a) disasters, and (b) conflict and violence. However, IDMC acknowledges the challenges associated with distinguishing between disasters and conflict as the immediate cause of displacement, and highlights the growing need to identify better ways to report on displacement in the context of multiple drivers.⁴³

With an estimated 41.3 million, the total global stock of people internally displaced by conflict and violence at the end of 2018 was the highest on record since IDMC began monitoring in 1998, and represents an increase from the 40 million reported in 2017. As with trends for refugees (discussed in the previous section), intractable and new conflicts have meant that the total number of persons internally displaced by conflict and violence has almost doubled since 2000, and has risen sharply since 2010.


Figure 11 shows the world's top 20 countries with the largest number of IDPs displaced due to conflict and violence (stock) at the end of 2018. Most countries were either in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced due to conflict (6.1 million) by the end of 2018, followed by Colombia (5.8 million). The Democratic Republic of the Congo had the third largest number with 3.1 million, followed by Somalia (2.6 million) and Afghanistan (2.6 million). Over 30 million (nearly 75%) of the global total of 41.3 million people displaced live in just 10 countries.⁴⁴ In terms of proportion of national population, the Syrian Arab Republic, whose conflict has dragged on for several years, had over 30 per cent of its population displaced due to conflict and violence. Somalia had the second highest proportion (18%), followed by the Central African Republic and Colombia (with both over 10%). It is important to note, however, that especially for protracted displacement cases, such as in Colombia, some

⁴³ IDMC highlights the challenges in collecting data on displacements due to development projects, criminal violence, or slow-onset disasters, as well as their efforts to overcome these difficulties. See IDMC, 2019.

⁴⁴ The 10 countries include: the Syrian Arab Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and Iraq.

people who have returned to their places of origin and to their homes may still be counted as internally displaced. This is because, in some cases, a durable solution has not been achieved.⁴⁵ Organizations such as IDMC follow the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's framework on "Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons", which stipulates eight criteria that constitute a durable solution in determining when people should no longer be considered internally displaced.⁴⁶

Figure 11. Top 20 countries with the largest stock of internally displaced persons by conflict and violence at the end of 2018



Source: IDMC, 2019.

Notes: IDP stock refers to the accumulated number of people displaced over time.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of conflict stock displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates.

⁴⁵ A durable solution is achieved "when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement". See, for example, the Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 2010.

⁴⁶ The criteria include: safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and property; access to documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice. See, for example, the Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 2010; IDMC, 2019.

In 2018, for the first time, IDMC also provided an estimate of the global stock figure of persons displaced by disasters. Slightly over 1.6 million persons were reported to be still living in displacement at the end of 2018 due to disasters that occurred in 2018. As noted by IDMC, this figure is a “highly conservative estimate”, as it does not capture those living in displacement because of disasters that took place before 2018.

New displacements in 2018

At the end of 2018, there were a total of 28 million new internal displacements across 148 countries and territories. Sixty-one per cent (17.2 million) of these new displacements were triggered by disasters, and 39 per cent (10.8 million) were caused by conflict and violence. As in previous years, weather-related disasters triggered the vast majority of all new displacements, with storms accounting for 9.3 million displacements and floods 5.4 million. The number of new displacements associated with conflict and violence almost doubled, from 6.9 million in 2016 to 11.8 million in 2017, and slightly decreased, to 10.8 million, in 2018.⁴⁷

In 2018, Ethiopia topped the list with a significantly higher number of new displacements caused by conflict and violence (2.9 million in 2018, compared with 725,000 in 2017), considerably influencing global numbers as a result.⁴⁸ Ethiopia was followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.8 million) and the Syrian Arab Republic (1.6 million).


Many more people are newly displaced by disasters in any given year, compared with those newly displaced by conflict and violence, and more countries are affected by disaster displacement. This is apparent when examining the number of countries and territories in which new displacements occurred in 2018: 144 for disasters, compared with 55 for conflict and violence. In 2018 (as in previous years), disasters triggered by climate and weather-related hazards, such as storms and floods, accounted for the bulk of the total (16.1 million, or almost 94%). Information on displacements caused by droughts was also available and obtained for the first time in 2017, with 1.3 million new displacements and, in 2018, 764,000, mostly in the Horn of Africa. Since 2008, the other cause of disasters, geophysical hazards, has triggered an average of 3.1 million displacements per year. While 2017 statistics for geophysical disasters were well below average, with 758,000 new displacements recorded, the number increased to 1.1 million in 2018. The Philippines and China (approximately 3.8 million each), as well as India and the United States (respectively around 2.7 and 1.2 million), had the highest absolute numbers of disaster displacements in 2018.

As shown in figure 12, in previous years, annual new disaster displacements outnumbered new displacements associated with conflict and violence. IDMC notes, however, that a significant portion of the global total of new displacements by disasters is usually associated with short-term evacuations in a relatively safe and orderly manner.

47 The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from IDMC, 2018 and IDMC, 2019. Please refer to these documents for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. IDMC’s previous Global Estimates reports (available at www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/), as well as its Global Internal Displacement Database (IDMC, n.d.), are other key sources of information.

48 IDMC highlights possible reasons for these changes, including stabilization of front lines of conflicts, ceasefires, restrictions on freedom of movement, and changes in methodology for data collection.

Figure 12. New internal displacements by conflict and disasters, 2008–2018 (millions)



Source: IDMC, n.d. (accessed 4 June 2019).

Notes: The term “new displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in a given year, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once, and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during a given year.

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) programme tracks displacement in countries affected by conflicts or natural disasters. It is designed to capture, process and disseminate information on the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations and migrants. Data are shared in the form of maps, infographics, reports, interactive web-based visualizations and raw or customized data exports. Based on a given situation, the DTM gathers information on populations, locations, conditions, needs and vulnerabilities, using one or more of the following methodological tools:

- Tracking mobility and multisectoral needs in specific locations to target assistance;
- Tracking movement (“flow”) trends and the overall situation at origin, transit and destination points;
- Registering individuals and households for beneficiary selection, vulnerability targeting and programming;
- Conducting surveys, to gather specific in-depth information from populations of interest.

In 2018, the DTM tracked over 40 million individuals (including internally displaced persons, returnees and migrants) in over 60 countries. IOM's DTM data is one of the largest sources for global annual estimates on internal displacement compiled by IDMC. For more information on IOM's DTM, see www.globaldtm.info.

Stateless persons

Stateless persons are, by definition, in a vulnerable situation, as they are not recognized as nationals by any State.⁴⁹ They face obstacles in accessing basic services – such as education, employment or health care – and can suffer discrimination, abuse and marginalization. While stateless persons are not necessarily migrants, their situations involving vulnerability and lack of rights may lead them to migrate, internally or across borders, and often irregularly, given the significant obstacles they can face in accessing travel documents and regular migration pathways.⁵⁰

As part of its statelessness mandate, UNCHR reported 3.9 million stateless persons globally in 2018, the same global figure as in 2017.⁵¹ This figure is, however, a low estimate, and the number may have been as high as 10 million in 2017, according to UNHCR. Indeed, while identifying who is stateless is a necessary first step towards preventing and reducing statelessness worldwide, data collection remains a significant challenge.⁵²

For the first time, UNHCR included Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and IDPs in Rakhine State, Myanmar, in its 2017 and 2018 data of stateless persons, “in light of the size of this population and that they are in fact stateless as well as displaced”.⁵³ Bangladesh and Myanmar were the countries with the first and third largest populations of stateless persons, respectively, in 2018 (around 906,000 stateless persons in Bangladesh and 620,000 in Myanmar). Figure 13 shows the other countries in the top 10 as of 2018. Côte d’Ivoire stood at the second position with 692,000 stateless persons, including mainly persons considered as “foreigners” after the country’s independence, as well as their descendants.⁵⁴ Thailand had the fourth largest population of stateless persons in 2018, which consisted mostly of indigenous and ethnic communities.⁵⁵ Latvia reported almost 225,000 stateless persons, with a significant number of ethnic Russians who have not been able to naturalize due to the country’s citizenship law after its independence from the Soviet Union, which only grants nationality by descent.⁵⁶ It was followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (160,000), Kuwait (92,000), Uzbekistan (80,000), Estonia (78,000) and the Russian Federation (76,000). In terms of proportion of national populations, over 11 per cent of Latvia’s population was stateless, followed by Estonia, where stateless persons amounted to nearly 6 per cent.

49 United Nations, 1954. See also UNHCR, 2014a.

50 McAuliffe, 2018.

51 The content of this subsection is based on and drawn from UNHCR, 2018 and UNHCR, 2019, unless otherwise indicated.

52 UNHCR, 2019:51.


53 UNHCR, 2018:53. In line with UNHCR statistical methodology, stateless refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in other countries remain excluded from reported data on stateless persons. In Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, however, UNHCR indicates that the statistical reporting for stateless populations is currently being reviewed (UNHCR, 2018). See also Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2018.

54 Adjami, 2016.

55 Van Waas, 2013.

56 Venkov, 2018; Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2014.

Figure 13. Major populations of stateless persons by top 10 reporting countries as of 2018



Source: UNHCR, 2019; UN DESA, 2017b.

Notes: The stock on the left side of the graphic refers to the reported accumulated number of persons who fall within the international definition of stateless persons and under UNHCR mandate, although some countries may include persons whose nationality is undetermined. Data are from the UNHCR *Global Trends* report, which diverges from data reported in its Population Statistics database. In contrast to its report, the database does not include Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and IDPs in Myanmar, who were stateless in 2017 and 2018.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of the stock of stateless persons on the right side of the graphic is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates.

Unfortunately, given current data gaps and methodological challenges, it is not feasible to provide trends over time either of statelessness, or of the impact of current efforts to eradicate it. While UNHCR's *Global Action Plan to End Statelessness* by 2024 has led to tangible results since 2014, reducing statelessness is a slow process.⁵⁷ UNHCR notes a reported 56,400 stateless persons in 24 countries who acquired nationality or whose nationality was confirmed in 2018, especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.


57 UNHCR, 2014b; UNHCR ExCom, 2017.


The Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative

Since the mid-1990s, IOM has assisted over 100,000 victims of trafficking globally. Through these direct assistance activities, IOM has developed its central case management database, which contains information on over 55,000 individual cases since 2002. These data include information on victims of trafficking, including demographics, but also information on their trafficking experience. As a unique source of information on human trafficking, IOM has worked to bring these data to a public audience so that valuable insights can be developed and shared among counter-trafficking actors worldwide. A major part of this effort has been the launch of the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) in 2017, in partnership with Polaris and Liberty Shared.^a

CTDC is the first global data hub on human trafficking, and combines the three largest case-level datasets, resulting in one centralized dataset with information on over 90,000 cases. For programme years 2016 and 2017, 40,190 new case registrations were included. Victims registered in that period were from 147 countries and were exploited in 107 countries. Most of them were women (54%), while 20 per cent were girls, 22 per cent were men and 5 per cent were boys. Just over a quarter were children, with 16 per cent of the victims from 15 to 17 years of age. Nearly 30 per cent were trafficked into forced labour, while 47 per cent were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. However, as shown in figures below, there are substantial regional differences.^b

Gender by region of exploitation in CTDC data (2016–2017)





a Available at www.ctdatacollaborative.org/.

b Oceania was omitted, due to the small number of victims in the CTDC dataset. The “other exploitation” category in the right-hand side of the figure includes forced marriage, organ removal, slavery and similar practices, and other kinds of exploitation. Information on definitions can be found on the CTDC website.

Conclusion

It is important to understand migration and displacement, and how they are changing globally, given their relevance to States, local communities and individuals. Human migration may be an age-old phenomenon that stretches back to the earliest periods of history, but its manifestations and impacts have changed over time as the world has become more globalized. Now, more than at any other time in history, we have more information on migration and displacement globally at our disposal. And yet, the very nature of migration in an interconnected world means that its dynamism can be difficult to capture in statistical terms. Migration involves “events” that can be fast-paced and complex. While it is certainly true that international migration patterns are related to social, economic and geopolitical processes that have evolved over generations, if not hundreds of years, recent advances in transnational connectivity are opening up more opportunities for greater diversity in migration processes.

It is increasingly relevant, therefore, to stay abreast of trends and evolving patterns in migration and displacement. In this chapter, we have provided a global overview of migration and migrants, based on the current data available. Notwithstanding data gaps and lags, several high-level conclusions can be drawn. At the global level, for example, we can see that, over time, migrants have taken up residence in some regions (such as Asia) at a much greater rate than others (such as Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean), and that this trend is likely to continue (see figure 1). Likewise, statistics show that migrant workers continue to gravitate toward regions with greater opportunities, as economies grow and labour markets evolve, and that some migrant worker populations are heavily gendered (see figure 7).

The global data also show that displacement caused by conflict, generalized violence and other factors remains at a record high. Intractable, unresolved and recurring conflicts and violence have led to an upsurge in the number of refugees around the world in recent years, with women and children comprising a substantial portion of the total. While a handful of countries continue to provide solutions for refugees, overall, these have been insufficient to address global needs, especially given the recent change in refugee resettlement patterns to the United States (see figure 10). In addition, there were estimated to be more people displaced internally at the end of 2018 than ever before. We also find that the estimated number of stateless persons globally is significant, at almost 4 million, notwithstanding that it has been cautioned that this is an underestimate. Aside from fundamental human rights issues, statelessness can place people at risk of (irregular) migration and displacement, so it is an important global issue worthy of further data collection, reporting and analysis.⁵⁸

International cooperation on migration has been recognized by a significant majority of States – along with non-State actors in migration – as essential and central to achieving safe, orderly and regular migration for all. The Global Compact for Migration makes this clear, emphasizing a global commitment to improving international cooperation on migration, as well as the collection of migration data, so that we may better understand trends and evolving patterns and processes, to support the development of evidence-based responses.⁵⁹ There are opportunities to be realized as well as challenges to be overcome, as we work collectively toward implementation of this commitment.

58 Objective 4 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration recognizes the need to reduce statelessness and outlines measures to achieve this.

59 See chapter 11 of this report for discussion of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and its 23 objectives.



3

MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

The previous chapter provides an overview of migration globally, with specific reference to international stocks and flows. Particular migrant groups – including migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – as well as remittances, were outlined. Chapter 3 focuses primarily at the regional level in order to provide a more detailed picture of migration, which sets out a different, but complementary, perspective of migrants and movements in different parts of the world.¹

Our starting point is geographic, rather than thematic, given that geography is one of the fundamentals underpinning migration today, just as it was in the past. Notwithstanding increasing globalization, geography is one of the most significant factors shaping patterns of migration and displacement. Many people who migrate across borders do so within their immediate regions, to countries that are close by, countries to which it may be easier to travel, that may be more familiar, and from which it may also be easier to return. For people who are displaced, finding safety quickly is paramount. People, therefore, tend to be displaced to safer locations nearby, whether that is within their own countries or across international borders.

This chapter seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers to make better sense of international migration globally by using a geographic perspective to present regional migration overviews. The analysis in this chapter focuses on six world regions as defined by the United Nations, and used by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and other organizations:

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Northern America
- Oceania

For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (a) an overview and brief discussion of key migration statistics based on data compiled and reported by UN DESA, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC); and (b) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses from international organizations, researchers and analysts.

¹ All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this chapter, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. While the report generally does not refer to data or events after June 2019, international migrant stock statistics published by UN DESA on 17 September 2019 have been incorporated to the extent possible.

To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, the descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” are presented at the subregional level. For Asia, for example, this cascade approach allows for the presentation of insights from statistical data on Asia as a whole, followed by summary information on subregions, including Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. A breakdown of the regions and subregions is provided in appendix A. These subregional overviews provide information on migration patterns from, within and to the subregions.² Beyond this, attention has been paid to particular features that exist in a subregion, such as labour migration and remittances, irregular migration, human trafficking, displacement (internal and international) and integration. The subregional overviews are not intended to be exhaustive, but are designed to be illustrative of key trends and recent changes in migration.

It is important to note that this chapter builds on chapter 3 of the *World Migration Report 2018*, Migration and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments, by providing an update on statistics and current issues. Importantly, it has been produced as a stand-alone chapter and does not require readers to refer back to the previous report.³ Significant changes over the two years since the last report have been reflected in this chapter, which incorporates data and information up until the end of June 2019. Recent shifts in migration and displacement – such as the large-scale movement through South and Central America from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – are discussed, as is the mass displacement of Rohingya from Myanmar’s Rakhine State in the second half of 2017. The chapter draws on the existing evidence base, and sources are provided in footnotes and the references section. We encourage readers to refer to sources cited in this chapter to learn more about topics of interest.

Africa⁴

Migration in Africa involves large numbers of migrants moving both within and from the region. As shown in figure 1, in 2019, over 21 million Africans were living in another African country, a significant increase from 2015, when around 18.5 million Africans were estimated to be living within the region. The number of Africans living in different regions also grew during the same period, from around 17 million in 2015 to nearly 19 million in 2019.

Figure 1 shows that, since 2000, international migration within the African region has increased significantly. And since 1990, the number of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with the growth to Europe most pronounced. In 2019, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (10.6 million), Asia (4.6 million) and Northern America (3.2 million).


One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in figure 1, is the small number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. From 2015 to 2019, the number of migrants born outside the region remained virtually unchanged (around 2 million), most of whom were from Asia and Europe.

2 Please note that subregions relate largely to migration dynamics and so may differ from those of UN DESA. Details are provided in appendix A.

3 In order to ensure, to the extent possible, that this chapter provides a comprehensive “stand-alone” overview of regional migration in 2017 and 2018, we have drawn upon relevant material included in the *World Migration Report 2018* (chapter 3), especially that which provides historical context to recent events and migration trends.

4 See appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.

Figure 1. Migrants to, within and from Africa 1990–2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: “Migrants to Africa” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Africa) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Africa” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Africa) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the African region. “Migrants from Africa” refers to people born in Africa who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).


Many African countries have experienced significant changes in the size of their populations in recent years, as shown in figure 2, which ranks the top 20 African countries with the largest proportional population change between 2009 and 2019. All top 20 countries were in sub-Saharan Africa and each underwent substantial population growth during this period. These 20 countries reflect the trend across the continent, with Africa currently the fastest-growing region in the world and expected to surpass 2 billion people by 2050.⁵ It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 occurred in countries with relatively smaller populations, as to be expected. Africa’s most populous countries – Nigeria, Ethiopia

5 UN DESA, 2019b.

and Egypt – are not among the top 20; however, all three countries also experienced increases in their populations.⁶ The population growth in Africa is in contrast to population change in Europe, for example, which has experienced slower population increases in some countries and even decline in others over the same period (see figure 14).

The significant increase in international migration *within* Africa (see figure 1) has contributed to the recent population growth at the national level. While migration is not the only factor, with high fertility rates and increasing life expectancy also playing roles,⁷ increased intraregional migration within the continent has influenced population changes in some countries. For example, the share of international migrants as a proportion of national population in Equatorial Guinea has sharply increased in recent years. In 2005, international migrants accounted for less than 1 per cent of Equatorial Guinea's population; by 2019, this figure had increased to nearly 17 per cent. South Africa is another example. In 2005, international migrants comprised 2.8 per cent of South Africa's population; by 2019, this figure had risen to 7 per cent.

Figure 2. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Africa, 2009–2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019c.


Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

The African countries with the largest numbers of emigrants tend to be in the north of the region. These are shown on the left-hand side of figure 3, where countries are ranked by their overall numbers of migrants (the combination of immigrants in the country and emigrants from the country). In 2019, Egypt had the largest number of people living abroad, followed by Morocco, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria. In terms of the number of immigrants, South Africa remains the most significant destination country in Africa, with around 4 million international migrants residing in the country. Other countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total populations but not among the top 20, included Gabon (19%), Equatorial Guinea (18%), Seychelles (13%) and Libya (12%).

Figure 3. Top 20 African migrant countries in 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

Significant migration corridors within and from Africa exist, many of which are related to geographic proximity and historical ties, as well as displacement factors. The size of a migration corridor from country A to country B is measured as the number of immigrants from country A who were residing in country B in 2019. Migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Some of the largest migration corridors involving African countries, as shown in figure 4, are between North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, Spain and Italy, in part reflecting post-colonial connections and proximity. Others, such as those between South Sudan and Uganda as well as Somalia and Ethiopia are the result of large-scale displacement due to conflict. Significant labour migration corridors to Gulf States also exist, as in the case of Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Importantly, just over half of the main migration corridors shown in figure 4 were within Africa, with the corridor from Burkina Faso to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire constituting the second largest for Africa overall.

Figure 4. Top 20 migration corridors involving African countries, 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

Displacement within and from Africa is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 5. Most refugees and asylum seekers on the continent were hosted in neighbouring countries within the region. The top 10 countries in Africa, ranked by the combined total of refugees and asylum seekers both hosted by and originating from a given country, are shown in figure 5. Similar to 2017, South Sudan produced the highest number of refugees in Africa in 2018 (2.3 million), and ranked third in the world, with most hosted in neighbouring countries such as Uganda. After decades of conflict, Somalia produced the second highest number of refugees in the region and the fifth highest in the world, with the majority hosted in Kenya and Ethiopia. Other large refugee populations have originated from Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Eritrea. Uganda remained the largest host country of refugees in the region, with around 1.2 million refugees living in the country; most were from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other large refugee hosting countries in 2018 were Sudan and Ethiopia.

Figure 5. Top 10 African countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018




Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

The largest new internal displacements in Africa in 2018 took place in sub-Saharan Africa, with the majority displaced by conflict, not disasters. This is in contrast to Asia, which experienced a larger number of displacements caused by disasters (see figure 12). Conflict displacement within countries was most pronounced in Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which dwarfed the remainder of the region (figure 6). At the end of 2018, there were 2.9 million new conflict displacements in Ethiopia, the largest number globally, and much higher than the 2017 figure, which was just over 700,000. In addition to those displaced by conflict, there were more than 290,000 new displacements in Ethiopia as a result of disasters. In 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had the second highest number of new conflict displacements both in Africa and globally, with the figure reaching 1.8 million. In the Central African Republic, while the scale of displacement was not as acute as in countries such as Ethiopia, it had the highest proportional rate of internal displacement (11%). Notably, several countries with large numbers of internal displacements – such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Somalia – are also either hosting or producing significant numbers of refugees and asylum seekers (see figure 5). It is also important to mention that countries such as Mozambique, which recently experienced large-scale displacement due to cyclones Idai and Kenneth, are not included in figure 6. This is because the data used only capture the number of new internal displacements during 2018, not 2019. However, the discussion on displacement in Southern Africa due to weather-related events such as cyclone Idai can be found in “Key features and developments in Africa” below.

Figure 6. Top 20 African countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018



Source: IDMC, n.d; UN DESA, 2017.

Notes: The term “new displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Africa

Eastern and Southern Africa

Intractable conflicts, political and communal violence, and peacebuilding setbacks have resulted in the displacement of millions in Eastern Africa, with most countries in the subregion affected. At the end of 2018, for example, there were over 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees and close to 1.9 million IDPs.⁸ While the South Sudanese refugee population decreased slightly, from 2.4 million in 2017, it was still the largest in Africa in 2018.⁹ In the same year, Somalia was the origin of nearly 1 million refugees and had more than 2.6 million IDPs displaced by conflict and violence.¹⁰ Meanwhile, with 2.1 million IDPs, Ethiopia ranked among the top 10 countries with the largest number of people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2018.¹¹ In Somalia, the protracted civil war has pushed people into other countries in the subregion, as well as eastward to countries such as Yemen; however, the unrelenting conflict in Yemen has created intolerable conditions, forcing migrants to return to Eastern Africa, while generating new asylum and refugee arrivals, including Yemenis.¹² Thousands of Yemenis have fled to East African countries such as Djibouti, which, relative to its population size, ranked among the top 10 refugee hosting countries in the world in 2018.¹³ Other countries – including Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania – continued to host substantial numbers of refugees, predominantly from the subregion, as did South Sudan – notwithstanding the conflict that has prompted large-scale displacement from and within that country.¹⁴ The complex and multicausal factors triggering displacement and inhibiting solutions have meant that these host countries – some of the least developed in the world – continue to provide long-term refuge to a disproportionate share of the world's displaced.¹⁵ In recognition of the challenges that many African countries face hosting large numbers of displaced people, and in an effort to highlight the link between displacement, peace, security and its development dimension, the African Union declared its theme for the year 2019 as "Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Towards Durable Solutions to Forced Displacement in Africa".¹⁶ In 2019, the African Union not only aims to bring greater attention to the challenges of displacement in Africa, but also to foster innovative and robust initiatives to address the root causes and promote lasting solutions to forced displacement on the continent.¹⁷

Eastern and Southern Africa have long been major destinations for migrants from within Africa and other regions, while Eastern Africa is also increasingly a significant origin of migrant workers going to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States.¹⁸ Immigration from India has historically been significant in countries such as Uganda, Kenya and South Africa,¹⁹ while recent years have seen a sharp increase in the

⁸ UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.

⁹ UNHCR, 2018a, 2019a.

¹⁰ UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.

¹¹ IDMC, 2019.

¹² UNHCR, 2019a; IOM, 2018a.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ UNHCR, 2019a.

¹⁵ For internal displacement more generally, see also the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, particularly for Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

¹⁶ African Union, 2019.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional political organization comprised of six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

¹⁹ Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.

number of Chinese migrant workers moving to countries in the subregion.²⁰ Given its advanced economy and relative political stability, South Africa has also experienced high volumes of immigration in recent years, attracting migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from within and outside Southern Africa. The number of international migrants in South Africa increased from around 2 million in 2010 to over 4 million in 2019.²¹ Meanwhile, Eastern Africa continues to experience considerable levels of outward labour mobility, driven by poverty, low wages and high unemployment.²² This is most evident in the large number of low- and semi-skilled East Africans who have in recent years moved to GCC States on temporary work contracts. The Gulf States' proximity to Eastern Africa and their employment opportunities make them an attractive destination for many East Africans.²³

In Eastern and Southern Africa, intraregional migration is also driven by the growing demand for high- and low-skilled labour. As East African economies, such as Kenya and Rwanda, are becoming increasingly diversified, demand for workers in the services industry, for example, has drawn migrant workers from other East African countries, including Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. This is especially the case for Rwanda's expanding technology sector, which continues to attract workers from within the subregion.²⁴ The East African Common Market Protocol, which provides for the free movement of labour, has helped to facilitate labour migration within the subregion.²⁵ Several countries have ratified the Protocol and some have already abolished work permits for East African citizens, making it easier for people to work across the subregion. Meanwhile, intraregional labour migration is well established in Southern Africa, where significant numbers of people have traditionally migrated from countries such as Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi and Zimbabwe, to work in South Africa and Botswana.²⁶ While traditional sectors, such as mining, continue to attract migrant workers, other sectors – including finance and information technology – are increasingly drawing migrants to South Africa.²⁷

Migration in Eastern and Southern Africa continues to involve high numbers of irregular migrants, characterized by mixed migration flows and underpinned by multiple drivers, including socioeconomic factors, conflict and political instability. Migrant smuggling is particularly prominent in both subregions, with many people using the services of smugglers to reach their intended destinations. Many smuggling networks are based in the Horn of Africa, while countries that are members of the East African Community – such as Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania – are largely transit countries.²⁸ The Middle East, Europe and Southern Africa are among the major destinations for migrants from Eastern Africa, who use several routes, including the Eastern routes to the Arab Peninsula and other countries in the Middle East, southern routes to Southern Africa, and northern routes to North Africa, Europe and North America. However, the Horn of Africa routes are also significant, with a large number of people moving to or within the Horn of Africa.²⁹ Similar to Eastern Africa, irregular migration is widespread in Southern Africa, and involves intraregional

²⁰ Cook et al., 2016.

²¹ UN DESA, 2019a.

²² Manji, 2017.

²³ Atong, Mayah and Odigie, 2018.

²⁴ UNCTAD, 2018.

²⁵ East African Community, n.d.

²⁶ Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013.

²⁷ UNCTAD, 2018.

²⁸ UNODC, 2018.

²⁹ IOM, 2019a.

migrants, such as those from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, moving to South Africa, as well as those from outside the subregion.³⁰ Migrant smuggling networks have proliferated over the decades and have become more organized and professionalized, as it has become increasingly difficult to cross borders in Southern Africa.³¹ While a significant number of migrants smuggled into Southern Africa are from within the subregion, a large number also originate from outside Southern Africa, most notably from the Horn of Africa. Many migrants often face significant vulnerability, with many experiencing violence and extortion.³²

Environmental change and disasters in Eastern and Southern Africa are prevalent and increasing, and are influencing human movement and displacement. The subregion has faced increased variability in precipitation and higher occurrence of drought in recent decades.³³ These slow-onset environmental changes have a major impact on food security, given that agriculture is a dominant economic sector in both Eastern and Southern Africa.³⁴ Droughts have become a regular occurrence in countries such as Somalia, and are a major driver of displacement in the country. In 2018, there were a quarter of a million new displacements in Somalia due to drought.³⁵ In 2017, drought-related displacements reached more than 850,000 in Somalia.³⁶ Drought conditions have been responsible for increased malnutrition, food scarcity and increased competition for already limited resources, especially among farmers and pastoralists in the subregion; an estimated 1.2 million children in Somalia were acutely malnourished in 2017.³⁷ Several countries in Southern Africa also experienced significant displacement due to sudden-onset hazards. From January to June 2018, Eastern Africa accounted for five of the most severe disaster events in the world.³⁸ And in March 2019, Southern Africa experienced two subsequent cyclones, Idai and Kenneth, which brought torrential rains and winds, leaving a trail of destruction in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Cyclone Idai, which made landfall in central Mozambique, is considered one of the worst natural disasters to hit Southern Africa in decades.³⁹ By April, the cyclone had claimed almost 600 lives and displaced more than 130,000 people in Mozambique alone.⁴⁰

Xenophobic attacks on migrants and the emergence of new armed groups in Southern Africa have contributed to increased displacement in the subregion. Over the last 10 years, migrants in countries such as South Africa have increasingly been subjected to violence, resulting in the destruction of property, injuries and sometimes loss of life. Nationwide xenophobic attacks, such as those that took place in 2008, displaced thousands of migrants and resulted in more than 60 deaths.⁴¹ More recently, xenophobic attacks in 2018 led to several deaths, looting and destruction of property belonging to foreign nationals; the violence has extended into 2019 with more lives lost.⁴² Outbreaks of xenophobic violence are most common in South Africa's townships and other economically poor neighbourhoods, where residents often blame foreign nationals for

³⁰ Maher, 2018.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014a.

³⁴ Tierney, Ummenhofer and deMenocal, 2015; USAID, n.d.

³⁵ IDMC, 2019.

³⁶ IDMC, 2018a.

³⁷ UN Environment, 2018a.

³⁸ IDMC, 2018b.

³⁹ UNICEF, 2019.

⁴⁰ IOM, 2019b.

⁴¹ Landau, 2018.

⁴² Amnesty International, 2018.

high rates of crime and job losses. In parts of the subregion, armed groups terrorizing communities continue to cause displacement. In northern Mozambique, for example, an armed group known as *Al-Sunna wa Jama'a* remains a potent threat and has driven hundreds of people from their homes.⁴³

West and Central Africa

Intraregional migration, which is significant in West and Central Africa, is characterized by migration flows that are influenced by multiple drivers. While there are significant data deficits on movement, and accurate numbers can be difficult to ascertain, recent estimates indicate that the majority of international migrants in West and Central Africa move within the subregion.⁴⁴ Intraregional migration dominates for several reasons, including visa-free movement among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, the relatively small sizes of many countries in the subregion and the strong networks among the many ethnic groups scattered across the subregion.⁴⁵ Importantly, intraregional migration within ECOWAS is mostly due to labour mobility, with seasonal, temporary and permanent migrant workers moving largely from countries such as the Niger and Mali toward Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁶ A large number of migrant workers are in low-skilled sectors, including domestic work, informal trade and agriculture.⁴⁷ In parts of West Africa, agricultural labourers often move during the harvest period (July to September), as well as through the off-season harvest that runs until March.⁴⁸ Some of the migrant workers are children, as is the case with the movements between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso.⁴⁹ Unlike West Africa, where environmental and economic factors are important drivers of intraregional migration, conflict and instability have played a larger role in displacement to neighbouring countries in Central Africa.⁵⁰ However, labour migration is not absent in Central Africa, with Gabon, for example, home to a large number of migrant workers from within Central Africa who work in its oil and lumber industries.⁵¹

Irregular migration remains prevalent in West and Central Africa, although free movement agreements in the subregion have been designed to facilitate migration and reduce irregularity. The use of smugglers to cross borders even within free movement areas such as ECOWAS is not uncommon, particularly in circumstances where people do not possess identity documents.⁵² It is important to emphasize, however, that most West Africans who are smuggled overland begin their journeys as regular migrants under the free movement protocol and only violate immigration laws after exiting the ECOWAS area.⁵³ Moreover, a number of borders in West Africa are extremely porous, enabling unauthorized movements between countries, with several ECOWAS borders cutting across politically unstable and sparsely populated areas, which are also characterized by security deficiencies.⁵⁴ For many West and Central African migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, the Niger is an important country of transit as well as a major smuggling

43 Human Rights Watch, 2018.

44 Adepoju, 2016.

45 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.

46 Devillard, Bacchi and Noack, 2016.

47 UNCTAD, 2018.

48 ACAPS, 2018.

49 UNCTAD, 2018.

50 IOM, n.d.a.

51 Ibid.

52 Altai Consulting and IOM, 2015.

53 Carling, 2016.

54 Ibid.

hub.⁵⁵ The Niger's weak border management capacity has been exacerbated by an increase in attacks by armed and extremist groups operating along the country's borders. Most attacks, including from Boko Haram, have been concentrated in the Niger's Diffa region, located in the south-east of the country, bordering Nigeria. The violence has had a devastating impact on health services and education, and has driven thousands of people from their homes.⁵⁶

Conflict and violence linked to political upheavals, communal and ethnic tensions and Boko Haram extremism, have meant that most countries in West and Central Africa are affected by internal or cross-border displacement, although the magnitude varies dramatically. As with other subregions in Africa, countries in West and Central Africa have long histories of hosting and producing displaced populations, often simultaneously. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one such example. At the end of 2018, it was home to more than half a million refugees, while at the same time it was the country of origin of over 700,000 refugees, with 300,000 of them residing in Uganda and significant numbers in other neighbouring countries, including Rwanda (77,000) and Burundi (71,000).⁵⁷ The protracted nature of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involves dozens of armed groups, has had a devastating effect on the country, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. At the end of 2018, there were 3 million IDPs in the country, the third highest number of people displaced as a result of violence and conflict globally (see chapter 2, figure 11).⁵⁸ Meanwhile, with large swathes of the country controlled by armed groups, the civil war in the Central African Republic was reignited in 2016 after a period of relative calm; the conflict spilled over into 2017 and 2018, wreaking havoc and sending hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. Both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic ranked among the top 10 origin countries of refugees in the world in 2018, with the Central African Republic producing nearly 600,000 refugees and more than half a million conflict IDPs.⁵⁹ The Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2009 in Nigeria's northern State of Borno, combined with counter-insurgency operations and communal clashes over scarce resources, have also led to significant displacement in the Lake Chad region. With more than 2.2 million IDPs, Nigeria ranked among the top 10 countries with the highest number of people displaced due to conflict and violence by end of 2018 (see chapter 2, figure 11).⁶⁰ In the same year, there were more than 600,000 IDPs in Cameroon and over 156,000 in the Niger.⁶¹ Some of the violence and displacement in West Africa is linked to conflict between pastoralists and farmers over land and resources, although these conflicts often have ethnic and religious dimensions too.⁶²

Environmental changes in West and Central Africa are impacting human livelihoods and mobility. For example, although precipitation events in the Sahel⁶³ are slowly increasing, they are becoming increasingly unpredictable, leading to the frequent occurrence of droughts and floods.⁶⁴ In the Niger, an estimated 40,000 disaster-related displacements were recorded at the end of 2018, while in Nigeria, there were around 600,000

55 Altai Consulting and IOM, 2015.

56 IFRC, 2018.

57 UNHCR, 2019a.

58 IDMC, 2019.

59 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.

60 IDMC, 2019.

61 Ibid.

62 UNOWAS, 2018.

63 The Sahel region is a semi-arid tropical savanna ecoregion spanning many countries in West and Central Africa, including Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan.

64 Hummel, Doevenspeck and Samimi, 2012.

displacements as a result of floods in the same year.⁶⁵ At the same time, rapid population growth has led to the intensification of cropping, deforestation and overgrazing, contributing to land degradation.⁶⁶ Despite an increase in the scale of agriculture in the subregion, food insecurity remains rampant.⁶⁷ For example, at the end of 2018, more than 3 million people were affected by food insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin.⁶⁸ Millions of people in West and Central Africa depend on Lake Chad; however, the lake's volume has decreased by 90 per cent in area in the last 40 years, due to increased drought and human-related causes such as increased irrigation withdrawals.⁶⁹ The lake's shrinkage has not only affected the livelihoods of millions of people, but also impacted cattle transhumance, and is increasingly a source of tension and communal conflict;⁷⁰ moreover, the deterioration of living conditions, which has made it difficult for people living along the lake to adapt to the harsher conditions, has created an ideal environment for armed groups to emerge.⁷¹ The complex and interconnected environmental changes – such as droughts and floods, overexploitation of resources and climate change – are contributing factors to rural–urban and cyclical mobility within countries and across borders in the subregion. Migration is one strategy used to increase livelihoods and reduce risks in the Western Sahel, particularly in light of uncertain agricultural returns.⁷² Research has also highlighted the interconnections between, on the one hand, impacts of climate change on natural-resource-dependent livelihoods and food insecurity and, on the other hand, tensions, conflicts and mobility.⁷³

North Africa

Migration of North Africans to Europe and Gulf States continues to be a defining feature of the migration dynamics of the subregion, and one that has developed over several decades. Migration of North Africans to countries outside of Africa has been, and continues to be, much higher than migration to other countries within the subregion and within Africa.⁷⁴ Two distinct streams have characterized outflows from North Africa: migrants from the north-west (such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) have historically moved to Europe, owing to their geographic proximity, previous labour recruitment agreements and post-colonial ties,⁷⁵ while those from the north-east (such as Egypt and Sudan) have predominantly sought temporary work in GCC countries. Large income disparities between the origin and destination countries, and the high levels of unemployment in North Africa, remain significant drivers of migration. As of 2019, almost 12 million North Africans were living outside their countries of birth, with roughly half in Europe and 3.3 million living in Gulf States.⁷⁶

In addition to being a major migrant transit area, North Africa also hosts notable populations of international migrants, including refugees. Sudan had the largest number of international migrants in

⁶⁵ IDMC, 2019.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ UNEP, 2011.

⁶⁸ European Commission, 2018a.

⁶⁹ Gao et al., 2011.

⁷⁰ UN Environment, 2018b.

⁷¹ Rudincova, 2017.

⁷² Hummel and Liehr, 2015.

⁷³ UNEP, 2011.

⁷⁴ Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.

⁷⁵ Natter, 2014.

⁷⁶ UN DESA, 2019a.

the subregion, over 1.2 million in 2019.⁷⁷ Sudan was followed by Libya, with over 800,000. The number of international migrants in Egypt increased from 300,000 in 2010 to more than 500,000 in 2019, with migrants primarily originating from the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia, Sudan and the Palestinian Territories.⁷⁸ While Morocco has traditionally been a country of emigration, it is increasingly becoming a destination country, including of migrants from other subregions in Africa, who stay for an indeterminate period while looking for a way to cross over to Europe.⁷⁹

Conflict and violence within North Africa, and in surrounding subregions, have contributed to displacement. At the end of 2018, Sudan was the sixth largest country of origin of refugees globally, with around 700,000 refugees, the majority of whom were hosted by the neighbouring countries of Chad, South Sudan and Ethiopia.⁸⁰ Sudan also had approximately 2.1 million IDPs due to conflict and violence.⁸¹ At the same time, Sudan is also a prominent host country of refugees, with over 1 million refugees (this number more than doubling since 2016), most of whom were from South Sudan, Eritrea and the Syrian Arab Republic.⁸² Algeria also hosted over 94,000 refugees by the end of 2018,⁸³ while Egypt hosted over 240,000 refugees, primarily originating from the Syrian Arab Republic, the Palestinian Territories and other African countries and territories.⁸⁴ A volatile security and political situation in Libya had contributed to a total population of 221,000 IDPs by the end of 2018 (a drop from over 300,000 in 2016), while also affecting the more than 56,000 refugees and asylum seekers residing in Libya.⁸⁵

As a key hub of transit activity for migrants originating from many countries to the south, the North African subregion is confronted with protection challenges associated with irregular migration to Europe. In 2018, approximately 117,000 migrants arrived in Europe by sea.⁸⁶ This is a significant drop compared with 2017 (around 172,000) and 2016, when the number rose to 364,000.⁸⁷ There has also been a shift in the routes taken by most irregular maritime migrants; while the majority from Africa who entered Europe in 2016 and 2017 used the Central Mediterranean route (from Libya, mainly to Italy), most irregular maritime arrivals to Europe in 2018 took the Western Mediterranean route (from Morocco, mainly to Spain).⁸⁸ There were close to 59,000 sea arrivals in Spain, as opposed to around 23,000 in Italy.⁸⁹ The change in major routes, from the Central to the Western Mediterranean, is linked to several factors, including closer cooperation between the European Union (EU) and countries of origin and transit, counter smuggling efforts, as well as increased maritime security patrols off the Libyan coast.⁹⁰ Migrants from sub-Saharan African countries comprised the majority of irregular maritime arrivals in Spain, followed by Moroccans.⁹¹ People who travelled the Central Mediterranean route to Italy were mostly Tunisian, followed by Eritreans, Iraqis,

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Reifeld, 2015.

⁸⁰ UNHCR, 2019a.

⁸¹ IDMC, 2019.

⁸² UNHCR, n.d.

⁸³ UNHCR, 2019a.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ IDMC, 2019, UNHCR, 2019a.

⁸⁶ IOM, n.d.b. This includes arrivals to Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Frontex, 2019; MacGregor, 2019.

⁸⁹ IOM, n.d.b.

⁹⁰ UNHCR, 2019b; Frontex, 2019; MacGregor, 2019.

⁹¹ UNHCR, 2019b.

Sudanese and Pakistanis.⁹² From January to November 2018, an estimated 15 per cent of all irregular maritime arrivals in Italy were unaccompanied children.⁹³

There are sizeable migrant smuggling routes to, within and from North Africa, with smuggling increasingly concentrated among a few organized criminal networks.⁹⁴ With the help of smugglers, migrants from countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, often embark on highly dangerous journeys to North Africa, including through the Sahara Desert.⁹⁵ One of the main smuggling passageways includes migrants moving from Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, towards Egypt and Israel.⁹⁶ But as socioeconomic conditions in Egypt have deteriorated in recent years, smugglers have turned increasingly to countries such as Libya, which prior to 2011 was a significant destination for migrant workers and, more recently, has become a major smuggling hub and the main departure point for migrants trying to get to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route.⁹⁷ The subregion continues to struggle with serious human rights violations and protection challenges; many migrants in transit are exposed to sexual and gender-based violence, forced labour, arbitrary detention, extortion and exploitation, among other abuses. This is especially the case in Libya, where human smuggling often morphs into trafficking. In 2018, IOM assisted over 16,000 migrants to return home after they had been detained or stranded in Libya,⁹⁸ some at the hands of smugglers and traffickers. The protracted civil conflict in Libya has created a climate of lawlessness, in addition to severely weakening its institutions and crippling its economy.⁹⁹

Asia¹⁰⁰

Asia – home to around 4.6 billion people – was the origin of over 40 per cent of the world's international migrants in 2019 (111 million). More than half (66 million) were residing in other countries in Asia, a significant increase from 2015, when around 61 million were estimated to be living within the continent. As shown in the middle panel of figure 7, intraregional migration within Asia has increased significantly over time, rising from 35 million in 1990. Considerable growth has also occurred in Asian-born migrant populations in Northern America and Europe over the last two decades. In 2019, migration from Asia to Northern America reached 17 million, rising from a little over 16 million in 2015, whereas in Europe, migration from Asia stood at nearly 22 million in 2019. Migration from Asia to Northern America and Europe drove much of the increase in the number of Asian migrants outside the region, reaching a total of 44.6 million extra-regional migrants in 2019, an 11 per cent increase from 40 million in 2015.

The number of non-Asian-born migrants in Asia has remained at relatively low levels since 1990. Europeans comprise the largest group of migrants from outside Asia in the region. These numbers include migrants from the European part of the former Soviet Union now living in Central Asia. During the same period, the number of Africans – the other sizable group of migrants in Asia – has grown.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ UNODC, 2018.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ İçduygu, 2018.


⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ IOM, 2018b.

⁹⁹ UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018.

¹⁰⁰ See appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.

Figure 7. Migrants to, within and from Asia, 1990–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: “Migrants to Asia” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Asia) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Africa). “Migrants within Asia” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Asia) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Asian region. “Migrants from Asia” refers to people born in Asia who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

Several Asian countries have undergone substantial changes in the size of their populations in recent years. These changes are shown in figure 8, which ranks the top 20 Asian countries with the largest proportional population change from 2009 to 2019. Except the Syrian Arab Republic, all top 20 countries experienced increases in their populations during this period. GCC countries, which are all represented among the top 20 countries, underwent some of the most significant population changes over the last decade. International

migration has been a significant determinant of population change in Asia, and especially in GCC States, which continue to be important destinations for migrant workers from within Asia and from outside the region. As illustrated in figure 9, international migrants make up large proportions of national populations in GCC States, with migrants in the United Arab Emirates, for example, accounting for 88 per cent of the country's population.¹⁰¹

Figure 8. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Asia, 2009–2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 were more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

The two Asian “population giants”, India and China, have the largest absolute numbers of migrants living abroad (figure 9). It is important to add that these large absolute numbers of emigrants constitute small shares of the total populations of India and China. Migrants from China made up the third largest population of foreign-born migrants in the world after India and Mexico. Nearly 3 million Chinese-born emigrants resided in the United States, which was also home to other large Asian migrant groups from India, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Other countries with large numbers of migrants residing abroad include Bangladesh and the Syrian Arab Republic.


In GCC countries, migrants make up high proportions of the total national populations (figure 9). For example, in 2019, migrants accounted for 88 per cent of the population in United Arab Emirates; 72 per cent in Kuwait;

101 UN DESA, 2019a.

nearly 79 per cent in Qatar; and 45 per cent in Bahrain.¹⁰² Many migrants came from Africa, South Asia (for example, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal), and South-East Asia (for example, Indonesia and the Philippines).

It is also important to note that current data on foreign-born migrants also partly reflect significant historical events, such as the 1947 Partition, resulting in the mass displacement of people from and to India and Pakistan. This is evident in 2019 data, which show that over 5 million and 3 million foreign-born migrants, respectively, resided in the two countries.

Figure 9. Top 20 Asian migrant countries in 2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.


Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

102 UN DESA, 2019a.

Figure 10 shows the top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, with a little over half of them – 13 of 20 – occurring within the region. These migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest corridor is from the Syrian Arab Republic to Turkey, where over 3.7 million Syrians were residing in 2019. This is a change from 2015 and 2017 when the largest corridor in Asia was India to the United Arab Emirates.

Figure 10. Top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

International displacement within and from Asia is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 11. The Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan were the top origin countries of refugees in the world. The impact of the Syrian conflict on displacement can be clearly seen in figure 11, with refugees and asylum seekers from the Syrian Arab Republic dwarfing numbers from Afghanistan. In 2018, the vast majority of refugees from Asian countries lived in neighbouring countries. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, were predominantly hosted in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while refugees from Afghanistan, whose size grew from 2.6 million in 2017 to 2.7 million in 2018 (mostly due to births during the year), were largely hosted in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to violence against and persecution of the Rohingya, Myanmar produced the third largest refugee population in the region and the fourth largest in the world in 2018, with most refugees hosted in Bangladesh. As shown in figure 11, it is also important to note that origin countries such as Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are also themselves hosting refugees.

Figure 11. Top 10 Asian countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018




Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

The largest new internal displacements in Asia resulted from disasters (figure 12). The Philippines, which had 3.8 million new disaster displacements at end of 2018, recorded the largest number globally. The disasters that triggered displacement included volcanic eruptions, and flooding caused by monsoons and landslides. With around 3.7 million displacements, China recorded nearly as many new disaster displacements as the Philippines. China was followed by India (2.7 million) and Indonesia (853,000). Conflict also contributed to a large number of new internal displacements in Asia, with the Syrian Arab Republic recording the largest number (1.6 million), around 9 per cent of its population. Other countries where conflict led to significant internal displacement included Afghanistan (372,000), Yemen (252,000) and the Philippines (188,000).

Figure 12. Top Asian countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2017.

Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Asia

South-East Asia

For many countries in South-East Asia, migration entails significant levels of both emigration and immigration, as well as transit migration. Considerable income disparity in the subregion is a major factor underpinning the strong trend of people to migrate from lower-income countries to higher-income countries within (and beyond) the subregion. There are a little more than 10 million international migrants within the subregion and just over 21.8 million total migrants from the subregion, 6.8 million of whom migrated to other countries within South-East Asia.¹⁰³ The advanced economies of Malaysia and Singapore are notable destinations for migrants. The efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward greater regional integration have contributed to increased intraregional migration. There is also a strong geographic aspect to migration, with higher levels of migration occurring between countries sharing borders, particularly along Thailand's border with neighbours Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar.¹⁰⁴ Intraregional, long-term migration corridors are evident, which are mainly dominated by temporary labour migration, with smaller components of permanent (skilled and family) migration, student migration and forced migration.¹⁰⁵

Labour migration, a prominent feature in South-East Asia and a key driver of economic growth and development, is also associated with inconsistent human rights practices. Labour migrants have long been integral to the economies of major destination countries within the subregion – such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand – where they help fill gaps in labour markets. This is especially the case for lower-skilled sectors such as fisheries, domestic work and construction.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, the prospects for employment and higher wages often compel people from countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia to move to more prosperous economies within the subregion.¹⁰⁷ Many migrants send significant shares of their earnings to their families back home, with the Philippines, for example, consistently ranking among the largest remittance-recipient countries in the world. In 2018, the Philippines, whose international remittance inflows amounted to USD 34 billion, was the fourth largest remittance recipient globally after India, China and Mexico.¹⁰⁸ But even as labour migration has helped relieve labour shortages in destination countries, many labour migrants continue to face exploitative conditions. Workers employed in low-skilled, labour-intensive sectors, regardless of their legal status, are most affected, with wage-related abuse the most common.¹⁰⁹ Many labour migrants are required to work extremely long hours for below minimum wages, a consequence of inadequate protection afforded to labour migrants during both recruitment and employment.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ UN DESA, 2019a.

¹⁰⁴ Hugo, 2014; Hatsukano, 2015.

¹⁰⁵ Hugo, 2014.

¹⁰⁶ Harkins, Lindgren and Suravoranon, 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Pholpirul, 2018.

¹⁰⁸ World Bank, 2019a.

¹⁰⁹ Harkins, Lindgren and Suravoranon, 2017.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Migration involves high proportions of irregular migration, mostly in relation to economic factors such as poverty and lack of employment. Irregular migration flows such as those from Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic to destinations including Thailand and Malaysia are often facilitated by smugglers. Smugglers also play a significant role in irregular migration out of the subregion, with Vietnamese migrants moving to Europe, for example, often using smugglers to reach their destinations.¹¹¹ Mixed migration flows exist (involving movements of people with and without international protection needs), as do migration flows underpinned by mixed motivations. Many migrants face exploitation in South-East Asia, stemming from their irregular status. Migrant workers in particular industries also face forced labour, exploitation and serious abuse (for example, in the fishing, agriculture, construction and manufacturing industries).¹¹² In addition to smuggling, trafficking of persons continues to be a challenge in South-East Asia, with nearly half of all victims in Asia (46%) trafficked within the subregion.¹¹³ Large numbers of people are trafficked for both sexual exploitation and forced labour, with a larger share of females trafficked for sexual exploitation in 2016.¹¹⁴ Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand had more victims of forced labour than sexual exploitation in 2016.¹¹⁵

There has been an increase in displacement in the subregion due to violence, systemic persecution and marginalization. The Rohingya refugee situation is the most acute, and remains one of the most complex refugee crises in the world. By end of 2018, there were over 900,000 Rohingya in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, and more than 1 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.¹¹⁶ The Kutupalong-Balukhali site in Cox's Bazar continues to be the biggest and most densely populated refugee settlement in the world; refugees from Myanmar accounted for the fourth largest refugee population in the world in 2018.¹¹⁷ Due to a surge in targeted killings and human rights abuses in August 2017, a significant number of Rohingya were displaced from Myanmar's Rakhine State, the majority seeking protection in Bangladesh. While this was not the first time that Rohingya fled Myanmar as a result of violence, the August 2017 violence prompted one of the largest waves of displacement in decades. Meanwhile, within South-East Asia, Malaysia continued a long-term trend of hosting a large population of refugees and people in refugee-like situations (over 120,000 in 2018), mainly as a result of displacement caused by civil conflict in Myanmar over many years.¹¹⁸ Resettlement of refugees from the subregion is mainly undertaken by "traditional" resettlement countries (such as the United States, Canada and Australia), and there is little by way of "protection infrastructure" within the subregion.¹¹⁹ There are also large populations of IDPs and stateless populations in the subregion, with eight countries in the subregion hosting stateless populations (the largest of which is in Myanmar, which hosted more than 600,000 at end of 2018).¹²⁰

¹¹¹ UNODC, 2018.

¹¹² Gois, 2015.

¹¹³ IOM, n.d.c.

¹¹⁴ UNODC, 2018.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ IOM, 2018c.

¹¹⁷ UNHCR, 2019a.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ McAuliffe, 2016. "Protection infrastructure" encompasses domestic law, national policies as well as administrative practices on protection; see Sitaropoulos, 2000.

¹²⁰ Southwick, 2015; UNHCR, 2019a.

Southern Asia

Migration from Southern Asia to other subregions is a key feature, with many temporary migrant workers in the GCC countries originating from this subregion. The prospects of higher wages and accessible employment opportunities have resulted in a significant increase in the number of people leaving the subregion in recent years.¹²¹ For countries in the subregion with significant labour surpluses, migration has relieved labour pressures, while helping to reduce poverty through remittances. Accordingly, Southern Asia is among the largest recipients of remittances in the world. In 2018, remittance inflows to India amounted to USD 79 billion, the largest in the world; and in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances exceeded 5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the same year.¹²²

Migration within the subregion is a dominant feature in Southern Asia, driven by economic and labour market differentials.¹²³ Intraregional movement, both regular and irregular, is related to strong common historical roots, geographic proximity, and cultural and kinship ties between countries.¹²⁴ In 2019, just under 80 per cent of the 14 million international migrants in Southern Asia originated from other countries in the subregion.¹²⁵ Major migration corridors include Bangladesh–India, Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Pakistan and Nepal–India; however, it is important to note that these corridors are all quite distinct, reflecting a range of historical and contemporary economic, security and cultural factors. There are millions of Bangladeshi and Nepalese labour migrants currently working in India, for example, primarily in the informal sector as construction labourers and domestic workers, whereas the India–Pakistan corridor in part reflects the mass displacement following the 1947 Partition of India and Pakistan.¹²⁶ Further, many of the 3.9 million Afghan international migrants who reside in the subregion (primarily in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan) have been displaced across borders due to conflict and violence within Afghanistan that has waxed and waned since the 1970s.¹²⁷ Internal migration within the countries of South Asia is extensive and larger in scale than international migration, related primarily to temporary and seasonal migration from rural to urban areas.¹²⁸ From 2001 to 2011, Southern Asia's urban population grew by 130 million people.¹²⁹ However, while rural–urban migration has contributed to this growth, it has largely been driven by the reclassification of rural settlement and natural population increase.¹³⁰

121 Doherty et al., 2014.

122 World Bank, 2019a.

123 Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.

124 Ibid.

125 UN DESA, 2019a.

126 Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.

127 Schmeidl, 2016; UNHCR, 2016.

128 Ibid.

129 Ellis and Roberts, 2016.

130 Ibid.

Irregular migration both within and from the subregion is common in Southern Asia, and is often aided by loose smuggling networks. While the exact number of people undertaking irregular migration within the subregion is not known, there are estimated to be large irregular migrant populations within the subregion.¹³¹ India, for example, is home to significant populations of irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal and, to a lesser extent, Sri Lanka.¹³² Regions including Europe, Northern America and Oceania are among the most preferred destinations of irregular migrants from Southern Asia.¹³³ Socioeconomic and insecurity factors in countries of origin, in addition to better wages and employment opportunities in destination countries, are among the factors associated with irregular migration and migrant smuggling.¹³⁴ Migrants from Southern Asia heading to Western Europe are primarily smuggled through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, as well as through the Middle East into the Western Balkans.¹³⁵ Other irregular migrants are smuggled through to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia for work.¹³⁶ There have been many documented cases of migrants being exploited and abused by smugglers in Southern Asia.¹³⁷ Trafficking of persons remains a serious concern in Southern Asia, although data and information for many countries in the subregion are scarce. A 2018 UNODC report estimates that nearly 60 per cent of victims of trafficking detected in the subregion in 2016 were female, based on information available for four countries, including Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan.¹³⁸ In Nepal, there were more child victims than adult victims.¹³⁹

Long-standing conflict, political instability, violence and repression have made Southern Asia a significant source of displacement; the subregion also hosts significant populations of displaced persons. In recent history, every country in the subregion (other than Maldives) has been an origin or a host of displaced populations. Most notably, at the end of 2018, there were 2.7 million Afghan refugees, the second largest refugee population in the world after the Syrian Arab Republic, and 2.6 million Afghan IDPs.¹⁴⁰ The neighbouring countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted the most Afghan refugees and, accordingly, featured among the top host countries in the world.¹⁴¹ Pakistan, with its porous border and close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties, has been the major host for decades, with around 1.4 million refugees at the end of 2018, almost exclusively Afghans;¹⁴² around 60,000 refugees were repatriated to Afghanistan in 2017, most of them from Pakistan.¹⁴³ At the end of 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted close to 1 million refugees,¹⁴⁴ making it the sixth largest refugee host country in the world, while both India and Bangladesh continued to host large IDP populations.¹⁴⁵

131 Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.

132 Jayasuriya and Sunam, 2016.

133 McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016.

134 Ibid.

135 Sengupta, 2018.

136 Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.

137 UNODC, 2018.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.

141 UNHCR, 2019a.

142 Ibid.

143 IOM and UNHCR, 2018.

144 UNHCR, 2019a.

145 IDMC, 2019. For internal displacement more generally, see also the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, particularly for Afghanistan, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Southern Asian populations are particularly vulnerable to slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters related to natural hazards and climate change. Except for Afghanistan, where conflict and violence played a larger role in driving people from their homes, disasters were responsible for most displacements in Southern Asia in 2018.¹⁴⁶ There were an estimated 3.3 million new displacements in Southern Asia due to sudden-onset hazards in 2018, with most of those affected in India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Relative to its population size, Southern Asia has the highest number of people at risk of displacement as a result of sudden-onset hazards, with Bangladesh, India and Pakistan having the highest disaster risk.¹⁴⁷ India bore most of the brunt of the disasters in the subregion, with more than 2.7 million displacements as a result of tropical storms and floods.¹⁴⁸ Afghanistan had the second highest number of disaster displacements in the subregion, with 371,000 new displacements, mostly due to drought conditions. Thousands of people were also displaced in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as a result of monsoons.¹⁴⁹ The scale of disaster-related destruction and displacement in Southern Asia in recent years has in part been attributed to poor planning and lack of preparedness in the subregion.¹⁵⁰ Migration and mobility are particularly important coping strategies in response to environmental change events in Southern Asia – including sea-level rise, coastal erosion, flooding and groundwater depletion – all of which pose considerable challenges in the subregion.¹⁵¹

Eastern Asia

Eastern Asia is undergoing significant demographic change, with several countries experiencing low fertility rates and ageing populations, leading to revisions of immigration policies. Countries such as Japan are already experiencing negative population growth, while the Republic of Korea's fertility rate is well below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to sustain a population.¹⁵² In 2019, Japan had the lowest potential support ratio in the world (the number of workers per retiree) and, along with China, was among the top 10 most populous countries with fertility rates that are below replacement.¹⁵³ These demographic changes have far-reaching implications for public debt, the welfare state and labour markets. Japan, for example, is grappling with an acute labour shortage.¹⁵⁴ These realities are prompting policymakers to reassess historically restrictive approaches toward immigration, which have been associated with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity in some countries, more limited experience in immigration policy compared with other regions and subregions, and the relative unpopularity of immigration in many countries.¹⁵⁵

146 IDMC, 2019.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.

150 IDMC, 2018a.

151 Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014b. See also Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.

152 UN DESA, 2019c.

153 Ibid.

154 Nye, 2019.

155 Staedicke, Batalova and Zong, 2016.

As key Eastern Asian countries experience declines in their populations, several countries have passed new immigration laws or implemented programmes meant to attract foreign workers. In December 2018, Japan's Parliament approved a new immigration law easing restrictions on foreign workers in industries facing labour shortages, with the changes expected to bring in more than 300,000 workers.¹⁵⁶ Recent changes to Japan's immigration laws are also partly a response to the surge in demand for workers in areas such as construction, as the country prepares to host the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo.¹⁵⁷ Meanwhile, through the Employment Permit System, which allows inflows of foreign workers from partner Asian countries¹⁵⁸ that have signed memorandums of understanding, the Republic of Korea is expected to accept 56,000 foreign workers in 2019, in an effort to address labour shortages.¹⁵⁹ China, primarily a country of origin of migrant workers, has also recently sought to attract workers in high-skilled and low-skilled sectors, both through changing its immigration policies and signing bilateral agreements. Attracting an increasing number of foreign workers is not only designed to address skills gaps, but is also part of the country's efforts towards more economic openness and inclusiveness. In 2018, for example, China relaxed its visa requirements for professionals and high-skilled workers, in a bid to attract top foreign talent¹⁶⁰ to join an economy that is gradually transitioning from manufacturing to services. In the same year, the country established, for the first time, the State Immigration Administration. The new immigration bureau is a response to both a growing number of international migrants in China and the need to streamline and better manage immigration.¹⁶¹ Additionally, China and the Philippines signed an agreement in 2018 that will allow 300,000 Filipino workers, including 100,000 English language teachers, to work in China.¹⁶²

Migration in Eastern Asia is increasingly characterized by significant outward and inward student mobility. The number of international students from Eastern Asia, particularly at the tertiary level, has increased rapidly in recent years, while the number of foreign students within the subregion also continues to grow. Driven by the prospect of better-quality education, a high number of international students from Eastern Asia study in destinations such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. China continued to a major source of international students globally in 2018, with over half a million of its students embarking on further studies abroad, an increase of more than 8 per cent from 2017.¹⁶³ However, Eastern Asia is not only a major origin of international students, it is also gradually becoming an important destination for foreign students, many of them coming from within the subregion. The number of international students at higher education institutions in China was over 490,000 in 2018.¹⁶⁴ Students from the Republic of Korea accounted for the largest number of international students in China in 2018.¹⁶⁵ They were followed by students from Thailand, Pakistan and India.¹⁶⁶

156 McCurry, 2019; BBC, 2018.

157 Tian and Chung, 2018.

158 The Employment Permit System partner countries as of 2019 include Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

159 Ju-Young, 2018.

160 Ning, 2018.

161 The State Council, the People's Republic of China, 2018.

162 Jennings, 2018.

163 Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, 2019a; Shuo, 2019.

164 Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, 2019b.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.

Outward labour migration, particularly from China, has meant that the subregion is one of the largest recipients of international remittances in the world. In 2019, Chinese-born international migrants were the third largest foreign-born population in the world after Indians and Mexicans, with nearly 11 million Chinese migrants living outside of China.¹⁶⁷ Global remittance flows in 2018 amounted to nearly USD 690 billion, with China receiving over USD 67 billion, the second largest share of international remittances worldwide after India.¹⁶⁸

While this chapter is focused primarily on international migration, it is important to note that, in this context, internal migration has been a significant feature in Eastern Asian countries, involving unprecedented movement of people from rural areas to urban centres. While the pace of urbanization has slowed and even decreased in parts of the continent such as Western Asia, Eastern Asia has undergone one of the fastest rates of urbanization over the last few decades.¹⁶⁹ By 2015, the share of urban population in the subregion had risen to 60 per cent, more than tripling since 1950.¹⁷⁰ This has most notably been the case in China, where the economic and social reforms of the 1980s initiated one of the largest human migrations in history. Among the reforms was the relaxation of the Hukou system, devised to record and control internal migration, which tied people's access to services to their residential status. As a result, hundreds of millions of workers, driven by the prospect of employment and higher wages, left the countryside for the cities, where most economic activities were concentrated and in demand of both unskilled and skilled labour migrants.¹⁷¹ Most people have migrated from China's western provinces to its eastern provinces. The socioeconomic dynamics between western and eastern China are important factors, with the west characterized by high population growth rates, a surplus of workers and lower incomes, while the east contends with a shortage of workers in metropolitan areas and records both higher incomes and higher education levels.¹⁷²

A recent new (atypical) feature in Eastern Asia's migration dynamics was the arrival of hundreds of asylum seekers from countries ravaged by conflict and violence. In 2018, over 500 Yemeni asylum seekers arrived on the Republic of Korea's Jeju Island, gaining entry through the Island's visa-free policy designed to attract tourists.¹⁷³ The arrival of Yemenis generated intense public debate and some anti-immigrant sentiment, in a country where asylum applications have historically been low. The Republic of Korea has not previously been much of a destination country for those seeking protection (except those from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea).¹⁷⁴ By the end of 2017, China and the Republic of Korea had around 600 and nearly 20,000 asylum seekers, respectively.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁷ UN DESA, 2019a.

¹⁶⁸ World Bank, 2019a.

¹⁶⁹ UN DESA, 2018.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Hu, 2012; Qin et al., 2016.

¹⁷² Hugo, 2015.

¹⁷³ Kwon, 2019.

¹⁷⁴ People from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who move to the Republic of Korea seeking protection are not considered asylum seekers, but are recognized as citizens under the Republic of Korea's Constitution.

¹⁷⁵ UNHCR, 2019a.

Central Asia

Migratory movements in Central Asia occur in large part out of the subregion, and most noticeably northward to the Russian Federation. In 2019, for example, there were just under 5 million migrants born in Central Asia who were living in the Russian Federation.¹⁷⁶ With significantly higher wages and better employment opportunities,¹⁷⁷ the Russian Federation has long been a leading destination for labour migrants from Central Asia.¹⁷⁸ For people in rural Kyrgyzstan, for example, labour migration has become a livelihood strategy, with many Kyrgyz migrant workers seeking employment in the Russian Federation, with provinces such as Siberia becoming increasingly popular.¹⁷⁹ The Russian Federation is also attractive because of the large number of Kyrgyz who are already well-established in the country and provide assistance in terms of finding suitable accommodation and work for new arrivals.¹⁸⁰ But not all migrants from Central Asia to the Russian Federation are low-skilled labour migrants; migrants from Kazakhstan, for example, are largely composed of students and highly skilled professionals.¹⁸¹ People from Central Asia also migrate to other parts of Europe and China, where work and family ties are relatively strong. An increasing number of Central Asians are also moving to destinations such as Turkey and the Republic of Korea to find work; movements to the Republic of Korea have been facilitated by bilateral labour agreements with countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹⁸²

Intraregional migration is a key feature in the subregion and is underpinned by geographic, cultural, economic, political and social links that are historical in nature. Central Asia is home to millions of international migrants, mainly from within the subregion, but also from further afield. Migrants primarily originate from countries of the former Soviet Union, many of which are current members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.¹⁸³ In 2019, Kazakhstan, for example, had a substantial foreign-born population (3.7 million), of whom 2.4 million were born in the Russian Federation.¹⁸⁴ Kazakhstan is now predominantly a country of transit and of immigration, attracting skilled workers from various countries and, increasingly, becoming a destination for low-skilled migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In recent years, Central Asian countries have revised policies regulating intraregional migration, including through the conclusion of bilateral agreements on entry and readmission.¹⁸⁵ For example, the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 has allowed people from its member States – including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – to move freely to live, work and study in other member States of the Union.¹⁸⁶ Further cooperation is currently occurring in the region on enhancing the management of mixed flows, including on aspects related to border management, migrants' rights and protection, and irregular migration.¹⁸⁷ There is a growing recognition of the importance of undertaking proactive migration policies and programmes in order

176 UN DESA, 2019a.

177 Sengupta, 2018.

178 Turaeva, 2018.

179 Sengupta, 2018.

180 Ibid.

181 Nikiforova and Brednikova, 2018.

182 Eurasianet, 2019; Matusevich, 2019.

183 Ibid.

184 UN DESA, 2019a.

185 OSCE, 2016.

186 Eurasian Economic Union, n.d.

187 IOM, 2016a.

to protect the rights and dignity of migrants, as well as their families and communities. Both male and female migrant workers from Central Asia can be vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, particularly within informal employment, such as construction, agricultural and domestic work.¹⁸⁸

International remittances play an important role in Central Asian economies, especially for the less developed countries in the subregion. Two of the world's top 10 remittance-receiving countries relative to GDP are in the subregion – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.¹⁸⁹ In Kyrgyzstan, remittances have been estimated to reduce the national poverty rate by 6–7 per cent.¹⁹⁰ Remittance flows into Central Asian countries largely reflect migration patterns within and from the subregion, which are closely linked to work and income generation. Remittances from the Russian Federation, for example, have been substantial over time, aided by the relatively low transfer costs from the Russian Federation to the Central Asian countries. After a few years of consecutive decline, driven by economic slowdown and policy changes in the Russian Federation, remittances to Europe and Central Asia bounced back in 2017, growing by 21 per cent and reaching USD 48 billion in 2017.¹⁹¹ This figure further increased to USD 59 billion in 2018.¹⁹² Among the factors behind this growth was the continued recovery of economic activity in the Russian Federation.¹⁹³

Irregular migration is a feature in Central Asia, although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain. Irregular migrants come from both within and outside the subregion, with those transiting through Central Asia often moving toward Western Europe. Most migrants' first points of entry are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before being smuggled through Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation to Western Europe.¹⁹⁴ Factors such as weak border management, combined with isolated borders, have contributed to irregular migration across the subregion.¹⁹⁵ Migrant smuggling in Central Asia is a complex process, and involves both formal and informal arrangements at various border points within the subregion, as well as transborder activities that help facilitate the movement of people beyond Central Asia.¹⁹⁶

Middle East

Gulf countries have some of the largest numbers of temporary labour migrants in the world. Driven by oil wealth, GCC countries have undergone remarkable economic development over the last few decades, drawing both skilled and semi-skilled workers to various sectors, including construction and maintenance, retail and domestic service. In countries such as Qatar, the recent increased demand for workers in areas such as construction is partly driven by the country's preparation for the 2022 World Cup.¹⁹⁷ The increase in labour migration to GCC States has created tremendous demographic change. In 2019, migrants made up the majority of the population in half of the GCC countries – comprising 88 per cent of the population

188 IOM, 2016b.

189 World Bank, 2019a.

190 UNDP, n.d.

191 World Bank, 2018a, 2018b.

192 World Bank, 2019a.

193 Ibid.

194 Sengupta, 2018.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 Buckley et al., 2016.

in the United Arab Emirates, around 79 per cent in Qatar and 72 per cent in Kuwait.¹⁹⁸ Labour migrants in GCC countries primarily originate from Asia and Africa. Income differentials between origin and destination countries are a key driver of migration, with the Gulf countries providing higher wages and employment opportunities to labour migrants.¹⁹⁹ Despite some progress, regulation and protection of migrants' rights remain a challenge in the subregion. The *Kafala* sponsorship system,²⁰⁰ which ties migrant workers to their employers and is practised across a number of GCC States, has come under scrutiny. Although several Gulf States have implemented reforms to the *Kafala* system, the changes have been minimal and have had little positive effect on migrants.²⁰¹ The sponsorship system remains widespread and continues to contribute to the vulnerability of labour migrants in the Gulf, including to conditions of forced labour and wage exploitation.²⁰²

Civil conflict, intensification of sectarian violence and the proliferation of terrorism (particularly by Daesh) have resulted in extensive levels of internal and international displacement in the subregion in recent years. Two countries in the subregion – the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen – are facing "level 3" emergencies (the global humanitarian system's classification for the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises) and are key contributors to the world's total displacement figures.²⁰³ The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, occurring now for over seven years, has displaced well over half of the country's population, with over 6.6 million refugees and over 6.1 million IDPs, and had produced close to 140,000 asylum seekers by the end of 2018.²⁰⁴ Successive waves of displacement in Iraq – a feature since the beginning of the century – continued and intensified in 2016 and into 2017. This occurred in the context of efforts to retake territory and counter Daesh. While over 1.9 million Iraqis remained internally displaced by end of 2018, this was the first time in nearly over four years that this number fell to under 2 million.²⁰⁵ A growing number of Iraqis have also returned home, as Daesh has increasingly been pushed back and lost territory in both Iraq and in the Syrian Arab Republic; the militant group has lost more than 90 per cent of the territory it controlled in both countries.²⁰⁶ Yemen's political and security situation continued to deteriorate, and the ensuing violence and volatility left the country with over 2.3 million IDPs at the end of 2018.²⁰⁷ By the end of 2018, more than 8 per cent of Yemen's population had been internally displaced.

The Middle East continues to host a significant share of the world's refugees. At the end of 2018, the Middle East subregion hosted the largest number of refugees globally, including the refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).²⁰⁸ Neighbouring countries inevitably share a disproportionate burden when it comes to hosting people seeking refuge in other countries, and this dynamic is a key feature of contemporary displacement patterns in the subregion. As countries bordering the Syrian Arab Republic and the principal hosts of Syrian refugees, Turkey, Lebanon

198 UN DESA, 2019a.

199 Jacobsen and Valenta, 2016.

200 "The Kafala system restricts family reunification for unskilled migrants, ties them to a single employer, disallows them from marrying locals, and enforces other restrictions on rights and movements so that migrants stay as transient workers in the Gulf countries" (Rahman, 2013).

201 Diop, Johnston and Le, 2018.

202 Ibid.

203 OCHA, n.d.

204 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.

205 IDMC, 2019; IOM, 2018d.

206 Seligman, 2018.

207 IDMC, 2019.

208 UNHCR, 2019b.

and Jordan were all among the top 10 host countries in the world in 2018 (Turkey is 1st, Lebanon 7th and Jordan 10th).²⁰⁹ The depth of their responsibility is particularly apparent when the number of refugees in each country is compared against the national population – in Lebanon, there were 156 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants; in Jordan, 72 per 1,000; and in Turkey, 45 per 1,000.²¹⁰ Other countries in the subregion, including those affected by conflict, also host many refugees, including Yemen and Iraq, and even the Syrian Arab Republic.²¹¹ The almost 5.5 million refugees registered with UNWRA are also located in the subregion.²¹²

Irregular migration within and from the subregion continues to pose challenges for migrants and States. Political instability and protracted conflicts in the Middle East are major drivers of irregular migration and migrant smuggling in the subregion.²¹³ Most smuggled migrants in the subregion are people escaping conflict and violence. Migrant smuggling and irregular migration often go hand in hand with refugee and asylum movements.²¹⁴ As conflicts have proliferated across the subregion, so has the number of smuggled migrants and countries affected by smuggling networks. Moreover, smuggling networks have become a lot more diversified and complex.²¹⁵ The very large numbers of Syrian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries, together with the protracted conflict and the low probability of return to the Syrian Arab Republic, have seen refugees undertaking irregular migration onward to other countries, most notably those in Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route.

Europe²¹⁶

Over 82 million international migrants lived in Europe in 2019, an increase of nearly 10 per cent since 2015, when 75 million international migrants resided in the region. A little over half of these (42 million) were born in Europe but were living elsewhere in the region; while this number has only moderately increased since 2015, it was much lower in 1990, at around 28 million (figure 13). From 2015 to 2019, the population of non-European migrants in Europe increased from a little over 35 million to around 38 million.

In 1990, there were roughly equal amounts of Europeans living outside Europe as non-Europeans living in Europe. However, unlike the growth in migration to Europe, the number of Europeans living outside Europe mostly declined during the last 30 years, and only returned to 1990 levels over recent years. In 2019, European-born migrants living outside the continent were based primarily in Northern America (7.4 million). There was also some gradual growth of European migrants in Asia and Oceania from 2010 to 2019.

209 Ibid.

210 UNHCR, 2019a.

211 Ibid.

212 UNRWA, n.d.


213 İçduygu, 2018.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid.

216 See appendix A for details of the composition of Europe.

Figure 13. Migrants to, within and from Europe, 1990–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: “Migrants to Europe” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Europe) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Africa or Asia). “Migrants within Europe” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Europe) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the European region. “Migrants from Europe” refers to people born in Europe who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Latin America and the Caribbean or Northern America).

Several European countries have experienced large changes in the size of their populations over the last decade. Figure 14 ranks the top 20 European countries with the largest proportional population change from 2009 to 2019. While some countries, such as Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland experienced population growth, others underwent substantial population decline over the last 10 years. Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia experienced the steepest population declines (more than 10%). Low fertility rates are the most important driver of negative population change in parts of Europe. However, negative net migration,

where the number of emigrants exceeds the number of immigrants, has also contributed to population decline on the continent, especially in countries such as Lithuania and Latvia. A discussion on demographic changes in Europe, and their link to migration, can be read below under “Key features and developments in Europe”.

Figure 14. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Europe, 2009–2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019c.


Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

Many countries in the east of Europe – such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland and Romania – have some of the largest emigrant populations within the region (figure 15). At over 10 million emigrants in 2019, the Russian Federation had the largest population of its citizens living abroad in Europe. After the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom had the third and fourth largest European emigrant population (4.4 million and 4.3 million respectively). Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest share of emigrants in comparison with the resident population in 2019, many of whom left during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Portugal and Bulgaria, two countries that have long histories of emigration, also had high shares of populations abroad.

With over 13 million migrants in 2019, Germany had the largest foreign-born population of any country in Europe; the number of immigrants in the country increased by nearly 3 million between 2015 and 2019. The largest groups came from Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The populations of the United Kingdom and France each included over 9.5 million and around 8 million foreign-born people, respectively, in 2019. Migrants born in French-speaking North African countries made up

some of the largest foreign-born populations in France. In the United Kingdom, some of the largest migrant populations were from India, Poland and Pakistan. With foreign-born populations of around 6 million, Italy and Spain were the fifth and sixth most popular migrant destinations in Europe in 2019; both countries experienced slight increases in the number of foreign-born migrants since 2015. Many of the foreign-born populations in these countries came from elsewhere in Europe – such as Romania, Albania and the Germany – or from North African countries such as Morocco. The migration of people from countries of the former Soviet Union – such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – accounted for some of the largest European migrant corridors (see figure 16). As illustrated in figure 15, of the top 20 migration countries in the region, Switzerland had the highest share of migrants in its population (29.9%) followed by Sweden (20%), Austria (19.9%) and Belgium (17.2%).

Figure 15. Top 20 European migrant countries in 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

Figure 16 shows the top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, representing an accumulation of migratory movements over time, and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. One of the more striking features of the main migration corridors involving European countries is that most are intraregional corridors. The Russian Federation features heavily in the main corridors. Russian-born populations in former member States of the Soviet Union – such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – formed some of the largest European migrant corridors in 2019. However, it is important to note that these Russian-born populations only became international migrants after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; before that, they were internal migrants within the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was also the second largest destination of migrants in Europe after Germany.

Figure 16. Top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2018, Germany continued to host the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and the fifth largest in the world (figure 17). The largest number of refugees in Germany came from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan. France and Sweden were the second and third largest hosts of refugees in Europe, with over 368,000 and over 248,000, respectively. Ukraine and the Russian Federation produced the largest refugee population in Europe at the end of 2018, around 93,000 and 61,000 respectively.

Figure 17. Top 10 European countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018




Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Most new internal displacements in 2018 in Europe were the result of disasters, not conflict (figure 18). Ukraine was the only country in Europe with new conflict-related internal displacements in 2018, with an estimated 12,000 new displacements due to conflict and violence during the year. The rest of the new internal

displacements were triggered by disasters, with Greece recording the largest number of disaster-induced displacements (9,200) followed by France (6,300). Both countries suffered from significant floods and storms. The Russian Federation, Spain and Italy recorded over 3,000 new disaster displacements in 2018.

Figure 18. Top 20 European countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018



Source: IDMC, n.d; UN DESA, 2017.

Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Europe

South-Eastern and Eastern Europe

For most South-Eastern and Eastern European countries, emigration rather than immigration has been the key feature over recent years and decades, with fairly low levels of immigration compared with other subregions of Europe. Due to this and other factors, several countries in Europe are projected to experience very significant population decline by 2050 (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).²¹⁷ Emigration from Eastern European countries to Western Europe has been a growing trend, particularly since the expansion of the EU in both 2004 and 2007 to encompass more Eastern European member States, while extending the external borders of the EU outward towards non-member countries in the East.²¹⁸ Emigration from Eastern and Southern Europe largely comprises labour migrants in high-skilled and low-skilled occupations. Recent years have, for example, seen a sharp increase in the number of medical professionals moving to Western Europe. Attracted by higher wages, a significant number of medical professionals from countries such as Romania, Poland and Slovakia have left their countries to work in Western Europe.²¹⁹ It is estimated that, by 2015, Romania had lost half its doctors.²²⁰ The emigration of high-skilled professionals, in addition to a declining population, has created a severe shortage of workers in some sectors in several countries in Eastern Europe.

Despite the anticipated demographic decline across Europe, with Eastern Europe experiencing some of the most dramatic population changes, some countries are resistant to immigration as part of a broader response. As fertility rates in Europe fall, the number of elderly continues to rise. More people are living longer and life expectancy in Europe and Northern America reached 78.7 years in 2019 and is projected to increase to 83.2 years by 2050.²²¹ Globally, an estimated 962 million people were over the age of 60 in 2017, with Europe having the largest percentage (25%).²²² As the number of elderly expands, the social protection systems in Eastern European countries will come under significant strain, with public spending on health care and pensions expected to significantly increase.²²³ Meanwhile, a decline in the number of people of working age will have key implications for Europe's labour force, with the average age of people participating in the labour force reaching 42.6 years by 2030.²²⁴ Even as Eastern Europe's population grows older, many countries in the subregion are reluctant to embrace immigration as one part of the longer-term solution to impending demographic crises. Countries such as Hungary are already beginning to feel the negative effects of a declining labour force. In response to a shortage of workers and the impact this is having on the country's economy, in 2018 the Government of Hungary passed a controversial law that generated mass protest action; the so-called "slave law" could require people to work up to 400 hours of mandatory overtime.²²⁵ In February 2019, Hungary also announced new loan and tax benefits aimed at boosting the country's low birth rate, while

²¹⁷ UN DESA, 2015.

²¹⁸ Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009.

²¹⁹ Hervey, 2017.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ UN DESA, 2019c.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ ILO, 2018.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Karasz and Kingsley, 2018; Peto, 2019.

it remains openly opposed to immigration.²²⁶ However, while attitudes and political discourse on immigration remain negative across Eastern Europe, countries such as Poland have increasingly been tapping into foreign labour, particularly Ukrainians, to address labour shortages. The number of Ukrainians in Poland has sharply increased since fighting began in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. In 2017, Poland issued more than 660,000 residence permits to foreigners, with the majority (more than 85%) going to Ukrainians.²²⁷

The Russian Federation remains the major destination country in the subregion (and one of the most significant in the world). In 2019, the country hosted around 11.6 million international migrants.²²⁸ Most immigrants have come from neighbouring countries, most notably members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.²²⁹ Immigrants from Ukraine comprised the largest number of foreign born populations in the Russian Federation (over 3 million), followed by Kazakhstan (around 2.5 million) and Uzbekistan (1.1 million).²³⁰ The Russian Federation's large number of international migrants, many of whom are labour migrants, means that the country is also one of the biggest origins of remittances in the world. In 2018, remittances from the Russian Federation amounted to USD 21 billion, owing to the slow and but steady rebound of the country's economy, which continues to attract labour migrants.²³¹ In 2019, Ukraine also had a significant foreign-born population at around 5 million, with migrants originating in large part from the Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation and Uzbekistan.²³²

The subregion has experienced increased displacement in recent years, largely as a result of the protracted conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The conflict, now in its fifth year, has resulted in significant internal displacement and generated an outflow of refugees and migrants to neighbouring States. By the end of 2018, Ukraine was the origin of nearly 93,000 refugees and around 800,000 IDPs.²³³ In 2018 alone, there were 12,000 new conflict/violence displacements in Ukraine (see figure 18).²³⁴ A significant number of refugees from Ukraine were living in the Russian Federation. Since the start of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, an estimated 400,000 people moved to the Russian Federation, with a large number having gained refugee status or temporary asylum.²³⁵

226 Szakacs, 2019; Walker, 2019.

227 Eurostat, 2018.

228 UN DESA, 2019a.

229 The Commonwealth of Independent States consists of nine member States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; as well as two associate States: Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

230 UN DESA, 2019a.

231 World Bank, 2019a; Hickey, 2019; World Bank 2018a.

232 UN DESA, 2019a.

233 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.

234 IDMC, 2019.

235 UNHCR, 2019c.

Northern, Western and Southern Europe

Intraregional migration within Europe is particularly dynamic, continuing to increase over time. As of 1 January 2017, there were 22 million persons living in one of the EU member States with the citizenship of another member State, up from 16 million a year prior.²³⁶ Such a high degree of intraregional migration is made possible by free movement arrangements, which enable citizens to cross borders without being subjected to border checks. The Schengen Area, which comprises 22 EU member States and 4 non-EU member countries, guarantees free internal movement to over 400 million citizens.²³⁷ In 2017 Romania, Poland, Italy, Portugal and Bulgaria had the highest numbers of their citizens living in other EU member States.²³⁸ However, free movement in Europe faces challenges. In 2015, the arrival of large numbers of migrants and refugees to Europe via the Mediterranean put pressure on the common European asylum system and affected the functioning of the Schengen rules. This led to a temporary suspension of the Dublin system and the introduction of border checks by several member States.²³⁹ There is also a degree of uncertainty, particularly for migrant workers, following the June 2016 EU membership referendum in the United Kingdom about future migration settings arising from "Brexit" negotiations. However, the bigger issue is the finalization of Brexit itself, and whether/how it will be implemented.

Immigration continues to be a contentious issue in Europe and remains on top of the political agenda across the region. While balanced debates on the issue are not absent, political rhetoric and public discourse on migration have at times been dominated by anti-immigrant sentiments. Over the course of 2017 and 2018, far-right wing groups across Europe promoted myths or "fake news" about migration.²⁴⁰ This was most evident in the coordinated online campaigns against the Global Compact for Migration by far-right activists, including through social media, online petitions and videos. The negative campaigns played a significant role in generating backlash against the Global Compact for Migration in several European countries, prompting some governments to withdraw from the migration pact.²⁴¹ General attitudes toward immigration also remain polarized, while negative anti-immigration political rhetoric continues to take centre stage in several national elections across Europe.²⁴² A 2018 European Commission survey found that four in ten Europeans view immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity.²⁴³ In a separate survey conducted in 10 EU countries²⁴⁴ by the Pew Research Centre, more than half said they want fewer immigrants in their countries.²⁴⁵

Irregular migration continues to pose challenges to the region, and remained high on the European agenda in 2017 and 2018. By the end of 2018, the largest number of irregular maritime arrivals to Europe used the Western Mediterranean route, which leads to Spain.²⁴⁶ This marked a change from 2016 and 2017, when irregular maritime migrants arrived to Europe in the greatest numbers via the Central Mediterranean route from Libya (mainly to Italy) or from Turkey to Greece on the Eastern Mediterranean route. In 2018, over

²³⁶ Eurostat, 2019.

²³⁷ European Commission, n.d.

²³⁸ Eurostat, 2019.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ McAuliffe, 2018.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Diamant and Starr, 2018.

²⁴³ European Commission, 2018b.

²⁴⁴ The 10 EU countries surveyed included Greece, Hungary, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Poland, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain.

²⁴⁵ Connor and Krogstad, 2018.

²⁴⁶ Frontex, 2019; MacGregor, 2019.

117,000 and more than 26,000 migrants arrived in Europe by sea and land, respectively.²⁴⁷ There were around 59,000 sea arrivals in Spain and 23,370 in Italy in the same year.²⁴⁸ More than 2,000 migrants died in the Mediterranean in 2018, with the Central Mediterranean route by far the deadliest route for irregular migrants in 2018 (over 1,300 deaths).²⁴⁹ While the number of migrants who died at sea trying to reach Europe dropped in 2018 due to fewer overall crossings, the death ratio along the Central Mediterranean route increased from 2.6% in 2017 to 3.5% in 2018 and, by April 2019, it had reached 10 per cent.²⁵⁰ A large number of maritime arrivals in 2018 came from countries that continue to be affected by violence and conflict, including Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, especially to Greece. North and sub-Saharan Africans also continued to make up a significant portion of migrant flows to Europe, especially to Italy and Spain.

Human trafficking remains a major challenge in Europe, and the region has seen a rise in both trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation. Trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation remains the predominant form of human trafficking in Europe (56%), followed by labour exploitation (26%) and other forms of exploitation, such as forced begging or organ removal (18%).²⁵¹ Women and girls continue to be the most vulnerable group (68% of victims), often exploited in care and domestic work and forced prostitution.²⁵² Two important trends reported by EU member States are the sharp increase in child trafficking (23% of all victims) and the growth of intra-EU trafficking (44% of victims are EU citizens).²⁵³ Profiles of traffickers and modus operandi have changed, with an observed increase in the number of women and younger perpetrators, and a growing role of Internet and social media for recruitment and distribution of exploitation material. Despite growing awareness and knowledge of trafficking practices, prosecution and conviction rates remain low. Irregular migrants are especially vulnerable, as traffickers often take advantage of their status to lock them into cycles of exploitation. In 2018, a case of migrant fishermen working on Irish registered trawlers was brought to the Republic of Ireland's High Court; some of the migrants were believed to have been trafficked and worked under harsh conditions, including being racially abused, underpaid and overworked.²⁵⁴

Latin America and the Caribbean²⁵⁵

Migration to Northern America is a key feature in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. In 2019, over 26 million migrants had made the journey north and were residing in Northern America. As shown in figure 19, the Latin American and the Caribbean population living in Northern America has increased considerably over time, from an estimated 10 million in 1990 and 25.5 million in 2015 to 26.6 million in 2019. Another 5 million were in Europe in 2019; while this number has only slightly increased since 2015, the number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean living in Europe has more than quadrupled since 1990. Other regions, such as Asia and Oceania, were home to a very small number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2019 (400,000 and 200,000 migrants, respectively).

247 IOM, n.d.b.

248 Ibid.

249 IOM, n.d.d.

250 IOM, 2019c.

251 European Commission, 2018c.

252 Ibid.


253 Ibid.

254 O'Faolain, 2018.

255 See appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The total number of migrants from other regions living in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained relatively stable, at around 3 million over the last 30 years. These were comprised mostly of Europeans (whose numbers have declined slightly over the period) and Northern Americans, whose numbers have increased. In 2019, the number of Europeans and Northern Americans living in Latin America and the Caribbean stood at 1.4 million and 1.2 million, respectively.

Figure 19. Migrants to, within and from Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: “Migrants to Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. in Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Latin America and the Caribbean region. “Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to people born in Latin America and the Caribbean who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

Several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone considerable population change over the last decade. Figure 20 shows the 20 countries in the region which have experienced the largest proportional population change from 2009 to 2019. All the top 20 countries experienced an increase in the size of their populations during this period, with the largest proportional population changes occurring in Central America. Belize had the greatest percentage change, with its population increasing by 24 per cent from 2009 to 2019. It was followed by Guatemala and Honduras, whose populations grew by nearly 23 and 20 per cent respectively.

Figure 20. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2009–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

Mexico was by far the largest emigration country in Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 21). Around 12 million Mexicans lived abroad in 2019. Mexico is also the second largest migrant origin country in the world after India. Most Mexican emigrants lived in the United States, which continues to be the largest country-to-country migration corridor in the entire world (figure 22). Many other Central American countries – such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – also have large migrant populations in the United States, as do South American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru. Large populations of South American migrants resided elsewhere in the region. Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had the second and third highest number of emigrants in the region in 2019 (2.9 million and 2.5 million respectively). Around 1 million Venezuelans lived in Colombia, reflecting recent cross-border displacement from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

In 2019, Argentina was home to the largest foreign-born population in the region (with over 2 million migrants), mainly from neighbouring countries such as Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had the next largest migrant population, followed Colombia and Mexico. In 2019, Mexico had over 760,000 migrants born in the United States. As illustrated in figure 21, of the top 20 migrant countries in the region, Costa Rica had the highest immigrant share of its total population (8%), due to long-standing migration from neighbouring Nicaragua. Other countries in the region outside of the top 20 had higher migrant populations as a proportion of the total population, such as Belize at 15 per cent.

Figure 21. Top 20 Latin America and Caribbean migrant countries in 2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.


Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

The most striking feature of the main migration corridors within and from the region (figure 22 is the dominance of the United States as the main country of destination. Most of the corridors in 2019 were to the United States, with the remainder all occurring within the Latin American and Caribbean region (for example,

the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to Colombia). These migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements involving countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over time, and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

Figure 22. Top 10 migration corridors involving Latin America and Caribbean countries, 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2018, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the largest source country of asylum claims in the world, with over 340,000 new asylum claims submitted by the end of the year. This is a sharp increase from 2017, when new asylum claims numbered just over 100,000. An estimated 3 million Venezuelans had left their country at the end of 2018 due to several factors, including violence, persecution and economic/political crisis. The vast majority of Venezuelans displaced abroad lived in Colombia (around 1 million). Colombia was the largest country of origin of refugees in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Most of the refugees from Colombia were hosted in the neighbouring countries of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador. El Salvador was the second largest country of origin of refugees and the second largest source of new asylum claims in the region, after the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. El Salvador was followed by Haiti, which was the third largest origin of refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean at the end of 2018.

Figure 23. Top 10 Latin America and Caribbean countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018




Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Most new internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean were due to violence and conflict, not disasters. Figure 24 shows the top 20 countries in the region with the largest new internal displacements triggered by both conflict and violence and disasters. El Salvador and Colombia recorded the highest numbers of new internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2018, with most displacements driven by violence and conflict in both countries. There were 246,000 new conflict-related displacements in El Salvador (nearly 4% of the country’s population), while Colombia recorded 145,000. With 11,000 new displacements due to violence and conflict, Mexico recorded the third highest number in the region. The rest of the large internal displacements in the region were triggered by disasters, with Brazil recording the largest number (86,000), followed by Colombia (67,000) and Cuba (52,000). While the number of new internal conflict

displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean are much lower compared with Africa, these are the only two regions where the number of new displacements due to violence and conflict is higher than those caused by disasters.

Figure 24. Top Latin America and Caribbean countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018



Source: IDMC, n.d; UN DESA, 2017.

Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean

South America

Political and economic turmoil in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has resulted in one of the most acute humanitarian crises in the world, displacing millions of people from the country. By the end of 2018, the number of displaced Venezuelans worldwide had surpassed 3 million;²⁵⁶ by mid-2019, this number had risen to 4 million.²⁵⁷ The large majority were hosted in neighbouring countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile and Brazil, although an increasing number of Venezuelans are also moving to countries in Central America and the Caribbean.²⁵⁸ Colombia and Peru hosted the largest number of Venezuelans at the end of 2018, over 1 million and 500,000 people, respectively.²⁵⁹ With the economy collapsing, a dire economic crisis has left millions of people unable to afford basic needs such as food, medicine and medical supplies. The poor state of the health-care system and increasing levels of malnutrition among children resulted in multiple deaths in 2018.²⁶⁰ The International Monetary Fund estimated that hyperinflation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would reach over 1 million per cent in 2018, and would increase to 10 million per cent in 2019.²⁶¹ In addition to the economic crisis, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is experiencing a deteriorating political situation, which involves targeting of political opponents and the arrest of thousands of protesters.²⁶² The rise in violent crimes in the country also continues to force more people to seek protection in other countries. Asylum applications lodged by Venezuelans arriving in the United States, for example, reached nearly 28,000 by the end of June 2018.²⁶³

Intraregional migration within South America is very significant, with the large majority of international migrants currently moving within the subregion. Most migrants in countries such as Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the two countries with the largest number of international migrants in South America in 2019, were from within the subregion.²⁶⁴ Argentina's international migrants were mainly from Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Chile, while those in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were largely from Colombia.²⁶⁵ Most of the foreign-born population in Chile is also primarily comprised of migrants from South American countries such as Peru, Argentina and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.²⁶⁶ The Residence Agreements adopted by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) – an economic and political body made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela²⁶⁷ – have played a significant role in enhancing intraregional labour migration, while at the same

256 IOM, 2018e.

257 UNHCR, 2019d.

258 UNHCR, 2019a.

259 Ibid.

260 OHCHR, 2018a.

261 Werner, 2018; Reuters, 2018.

262 Human Rights Watch, 2019.

263 UNHCR, 2019a.

264 UN DESA, 2019a.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.

267 Chatzky, 2019.

time reducing irregular migration within the subregion.²⁶⁸ These agreements allow nationals of MERCOSUR to reside and work in member States for a period of two years, provided they have no criminal record and can prove citizenship.²⁶⁹ As a result, low- and semi-skilled migrants in sectors such as agriculture, fishing and domestic work, who comprise the majority of labour migrants in South America,²⁷⁰ have been able to move and work more freely within the subregion.

Millions of South Americans continue to reside outside of the subregion, while at the same time the number of migrants from outside the subregion is slowly growing. Emigration from South America is mostly related to work, fuelled by economic crises and political instability in origin countries.²⁷¹ The United States is the largest destination country of South American migrants, with 3.4 million.²⁷² The countries with the highest numbers of emigrants residing outside of South America in 2019 were Colombia (around 1.57 million), followed by Brazil (1.5 million) and Ecuador (around 1 million).²⁷³ At the same time, reduced opportunities in labour markets abroad, as well as improved economic conditions in the subregion, are contributing to the return of many South American migrants and a decrease in the rate of extraregional migration.²⁷⁴ The number of migrants in South America from outside the subregion is also growing. For example, since 2010, more people have emigrated from the EU to Latin America and the Caribbean overall, than from Latin America and the Caribbean to the EU.²⁷⁵ Many of these people are not return migrants, but rather EU nationals, primarily from Spain, Italy and Portugal.²⁷⁶ Migrants from these three origin countries collectively represented a population of over 800,000 people in South America in 2019.²⁷⁷ Increased numbers of Haitians, Cubans and Dominicans have also migrated to South America.²⁷⁸

Though localized to particular countries, conflict and violence contribute to human displacement and migration in the subregion. In Colombia, over 5.7 million people remained internally displaced as of the end of 2018 – the second highest number of IDPs in the world.²⁷⁹ In the same year, around 139,000 Colombians were living as refugees or in refugee-like situations abroad, a drop from more than 190,000 in 2017 and around 300,000 in 2016.²⁸⁰ There were around 1 million Colombians in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador in 2019. However, as Colombia begins to transition out of five decades of violence with peace talks in late 2016 and 2017, deteriorating economic and social conditions in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are leading many Colombians to return home.²⁸¹

268 Acosta, 2016; Aimsiranun, 2018.

269 Ibid.

270 Aimsiranun, 2018.

271 IOM, 2017.

272 UN DESA, 2019a.

273 Ibid.

274 IOM, n.d.e.

275 IOM, 2015.

276 Ibid.

277 UN DESA, 2019a.

278 IOM, 2017.

279 IDMC, 2019.

280 UNHCR, 2018a, 2019a.

281 UNHCR, 2019a.

Central America and the Caribbean

Migration northward continues to be the predominant trend in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean. Mexico remains a prominent origin country, with thousands emigrating mainly to the United States each year. It is also a significant transit country for migrants travelling northward to the southern United States border. However, within a context of improving economic conditions and rising educational levels in the country, as well as stricter immigration enforcement in the United States, Mexico is an increasingly significant destination country for international migrants, some of whom may have been unable to enter the United States as initially planned.²⁸² The total number of foreign-born persons in Mexico increased from around 970,000 in 2010 to a little over 1 million in 2019 – a majority of whom were North Americans, but also an increasingly larger portion of whom were migrants from other Latin American and Caribbean countries.²⁸³ However, the United States is by far the most popular destination for Central American migrants, with more than 90 per cent of Central American migrants living in the United States in 2017.²⁸⁴ Violence and insecurity, poverty and family reunification remain important drivers of migration from Central America.²⁸⁵ The most prominent intraregional migrant corridors involve Nicaraguans, Panamanians and other Central Americans moving to Costa Rica for temporary or permanent labour, and Central Americans (primarily from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) migrating to Belize because of instability and a lack of employment opportunities.²⁸⁶ In the Caribbean, the most prominent intraregional migrant corridors include Haitians migrating to the Dominican Republic.²⁸⁷ There is also an increasing number of migrants from other regions, including those from Africa, transiting through Central America toward the United States.²⁸⁸

Irregular migrant flows in the subregion are dynamic, becoming increasingly complex as well as diverse. Mexicans represented the vast majority of irregular migrants apprehended while attempting to cross the United States–Mexico border for many years. However, in recent years, apprehensions of Central Americans originating from the “Northern Triangle” region of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador exceeded that of Mexicans at the United States–Mexico border.²⁸⁹ Fleeing violence, persecution and poverty, thousands of migrants from Central America trekked for thousands of miles toward the Mexico–United States border. The most recent so-called “migrant caravan” began in Honduras in October 2018. As Honduran migrants made their way toward the United States–Mexico border, thousands more migrants from countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala joined the group. By the end of 2018, the migrant caravan had grown to thousands of migrants, many of them children.²⁹⁰ Several factors drove people to the caravan, including escaping violence in countries such as Honduras, fleeing extreme poverty and seeking better economic opportunities. The migrant caravan resulted in fierce political debate in the United States and prompted the Government to deploy more than 7,000 active-duty military officers to the border with Mexico.²⁹¹ By early 2019, a few thousand migrants who managed to reach the United States border had been apprehended. Some received Mexican humanitarian visas, while others were deported or chose to return to their countries of origin.²⁹² Hundreds of migrants remain in Tijuana, Mexico. In February 2019, a caravan of Cubans and Haitians, including some Africans

²⁸² Dominguez-Villegas, 2019.

²⁸³ UN DESA, 2019a.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ FAO, 2018a; CEPAL, 2019.

²⁸⁶ ILO, 2016.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Solomon, 2019.

²⁸⁹ Bialik, 2019.

²⁹⁰ UNICEF, 2018.

²⁹¹ Meissner, 2018.

²⁹² Dominguez-Villegas, 2019; BBC, 2019.

and Asians, entered Panama from Colombia and later reached Mexico. In a shift from its more open policy announced at the start of 2019, Mexico began detaining migrants from Central America in April 2019.²⁹³

Migrant smuggling is also a major feature of the subregion, as people attempt to bypass border controls in Central America and Mexico. Along the United States–Mexico border, smuggling networks are a profitable industry overseen by international crime groups.²⁹⁴ Smuggled migrants are known frequently to fall victim to predatory practices ranging from demands for bribes to mass kidnapping and extortion.²⁹⁵ Migrants have also been subjected to execution, physical and sexual assault, torture and disappearance; this is especially the case in Mexico, where it has been reported that some smuggling networks are often managed by drug trafficking organizations.²⁹⁶ Migrant smuggling has also long enabled irregular migration in and through Central American countries such as Guatemala, especially with migrants moving to the United States. Both Guatemalan nationals and international migrants transiting through Guatemala have historically heavily relied on smuggling, locally known as *Coyoterismo*, to reach their final destinations.²⁹⁷ There is growing concern in Latin America that visa regimes are exploited to enable migrants to enter countries in the region before they are smuggled onward to other destinations.²⁹⁸ Moreover, a significant number of people have died while making irregular migration journeys across Central America.²⁹⁹

Socioeconomic conditions and generalized community-level violence in a number of Central American countries contribute to migration, notably of high numbers of women and children. There has been a significant increase in the number of asylum claims from Central America. Applications from Central America and Mexico comprised 54 per cent of all asylum claims in the United States in 2017.³⁰⁰ Migrants from El Salvador made up the majority of applicants (over 33,000), followed by those from Guatemala (around 33,000) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (27,500).³⁰¹ There has been an increase in the number of family units apprehended at United States–Mexico border; in 2018, around 163,000 family members were apprehended, accounting for 35 per cent of all border apprehensions and more than three times the number of family apprehensions in 2017.³⁰² Unaccompanied children remain a significant part of irregular migration flows, with about 54,000 unaccompanied children apprehended at the border in 2018.³⁰³

Climate change appears to be impacting on human mobility in Central America and the Caribbean, although isolating the environmental drivers of migration remains a complex task. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the rise in global temperature is associated with outmigration in communities dependent on agriculture.³⁰⁴ In 2018, drought conditions in Central America were responsible for an estimated 82 per cent loss of maize and bean crops in Honduras, putting nearly 3 million people at risk of food insecurity.³⁰⁵ In countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, a large share of the populations live in rural areas and heavily rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, making

293 Cullell, 2019.

294 Sanchez, 2018.

295 Ibid.

296 Ibid.

297 Velasco, 2018; Sanchez, 2018.

298 Ibid.

299 IOM, n.d.d.

300 UNHCR, 2019a.

301 Ibid.

302 Bialik, 2019.

303 Ibid.

304 IPCC, 2018.

305 Palencia, 2014; FAO, 2018b.

them especially vulnerable to environmental changes such as droughts.³⁰⁶ The effects of climate change may have played a role in recent migration dynamics in Central America, with a significant number of people who were part of the caravan, for example, engaged in activities such as agriculture, forestry, cattle raising and fishing prior to embarking on the journey northward.³⁰⁷ Meanwhile, the Caribbean is located in an area highly prone to both seismic activity and climate-related disaster risks. Countries in the Caribbean are among the most vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. With a significant share of the Caribbean population living in areas exposed to sea-level rise, recent disasters have resulted in large-scale displacement and loss of life. Hurricane Irma, for example, which swept across parts of the Caribbean and Northern America, was the largest disaster event globally in 2017, displacing more than 2 million people in both regions.³⁰⁸ In addition to the loss of life, the hurricane left catastrophic damage to property and infrastructure in several Caribbean areas, including Puerto Rico, Cuba and the United States Virgin Islands.³⁰⁹ Many Caribbean islands are also heavily reliant on sectors such as agriculture and tourism, and disasters have taken a significant toll on their economies. As these disasters increase in frequency and intensity due to climate change, health risks and food insecurity are expected to worsen, in addition to increasing damage to biodiversity.³¹⁰

Emigration to the United States is a key feature in the Caribbean, with Caribbean-born immigrants among the largest groups in the country. Historical ties between the Caribbean and the United States, as well as geopolitics, have significantly influenced migration northward. In 2017, 10 per cent of all immigrants in the United States were from the Caribbean, making it the largest destination for Caribbean migrants outside the subregion.³¹¹ Other main destinations include Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom. Over 65 per cent of Caribbean immigrants in the United States in 2019 came from just five countries (Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic), with the majority of these coming from Cuba.³¹² The increase in the Cuban population in the United States post-mid-1960s was to a large extent driven by two laws that offered unique treatment to immigrants from Cuba: the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act and the 1994 and 1995 United States–Cuba Migration Accords, which made it possible for Cubans (who had arrived in the United States via land) to gain permanent residence after living in the country for one year. This came to be known as the “wet foot, dry foot” policy.³¹³

Northern America³¹⁴

Migration in Northern America is dominated by migration into the region. As shown in figure 25, over 58.6 million migrants were residing in Northern America from a variety of regions in 2019. This number has increased by around 3 million since 2015, when around 55.6 million migrants were living in the region. The largest group was from Latin America and the Caribbean (26.6 million), followed by Asia (17.4 million) and Europe (7 million). During the last 30 years, the number of migrants in Northern America has more than doubled in size, driven by emigration from Latin American and the Caribbean, and Asia, as well as by economic growth and political stability in Northern America.

³⁰⁶ CEPAL, 2019.

³⁰⁷ IOM, 2018f.

³⁰⁸ IDMC, 2018a.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Otker-Robe, 2019.

³¹¹ Zong and Batalova, 2019.


³¹² UN DESA, 2019a.

³¹³ CEPAL, United Nations and IOM, 2017; Zong and Batalova, 2019.

³¹⁴ See appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.

The number of Northern American migrants living within the region or elsewhere was very small compared with the foreign-born population in the region. In contrast to regions such as Asia and Africa where intraregional migration is dominant, more Northern American-born migrants lived outside the region (around 3 million) than had moved elsewhere within the region (1.4 million).

Figure 25. Migrants to, within and from Northern America, 1990–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: “Migrants to Northern America” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Northern America) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Northern America” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Northern America) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Northern American region. “Migrants from Northern America” refers to people born in Northern America who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Africa).

Figure 26 shows the countries with the largest proportional population change in Northern America between 2009 to 2019. The population changes in both Canada and the United States were in terms of growth, with Canada experiencing the largest change in the size of its population over the last decade (11%). The United States' population also expanded during the same period, increasing by around 7 per cent. In Canada, recent population changes have largely been driven by immigration, which remains the main driver of population growth in the country.

Figure 26. Countries with the largest proportional population change in Northern America, 2009–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2007 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

In 2019, the United States had the largest foreign-born population in the world, while Canada had the eighth largest. Over 86 per cent of the foreign-born population in the region lived in the United States. As shown in figure 27, the share of Canada's total population that was foreign-born (at over 21%) was considerably higher than in the United States in 2019 (15%). Canada also had a larger share of its citizens who had emigrated (as a percentage of its total home population) compared with the United States.

Figure 27. Main migration countries in Northern America in 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

Figure 28 shows the top 10 migration corridors involving Northern American countries, representing an accumulation of migratory movements over time and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest migrant corridors in Northern America all involve migrants either from Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean, to the United States. Mexican-born migrants form the biggest migrant group, with over 11 million living in the United States in 2019. The next largest migration corridors involve populous Asian countries, including China, India and the Philippines. Some of the other large migration corridors from Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea and Cuba to the United States grew rapidly after conflicts or political changes in origin countries many years ago.

Figure 28. Top 10 migration corridors involving Northern American countries, 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

The United States hosted over 1 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2018. As apparent from figure 29, the majority, over 700,000, were asylum seekers. The United States also remained the largest recipient of new asylum claims in the world in 2018 (over 250,000), although this was a decrease from 2017, when asylum claims surpassed 300,000. Asylum seekers in the United States came from a vast range of countries; however, the largest populations were from El Salvador, Guatemala, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Honduras. Canada is also host to a large number of refugees and asylum seekers. In 2018, Canada hosted over 190,000 refugees and asylum seekers, an increase from 2017, when the country hosted about 150,000. Recent changes in refugee resettlement to the United States and Canada are discussed in the “Key features and developments in Northern America” section below.

Figure 29. Numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in and from Northern American countries, 2018




Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country.

All new internal displacements in Northern America were due to disasters (figure 30). The United States recorded the highest number, with more than 1.2 million people displaced as a result of two major hurricanes and wildfires. The scale of displacement in the rest of Northern America was much lower compared with the United States; Canada, for example, recorded 19,000 new displacements in 2018. The number of new internal displacements due to disasters in Northern America came second only to Asia, which experienced more disaster-driven displacement than conflict (see figure 12).

Figure 30. Top Northern American countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018



Source: IDMC, n.d; UN DESA, 2017.

Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Northern America

Migration trends in the United States are characterized by high levels of immigration, primarily from Latin America and Asia, although the demography of international migrants continues to evolve. The United States' foreign-born population increased by 5 per cent from 2015 to 2019, reaching nearly 51 million people.³¹⁵ As of 2019, Mexican-born migrants were still by far the largest foreign-born population living in the United States, at just over 12.4 million, accounting for around 22.7 per cent of the total number of immigrants in the United States.³¹⁶ However, while Mexicans have historically comprised the largest inflows of migrants to the United States (at least since 1970), their numbers have dropped over the last few years.³¹⁷ Recent arrivals have mainly come from Asia – particularly India, China and the Philippines – as well as from other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba and El Salvador.³¹⁸ In 2019, China was the origin of the second largest number of immigrants to the United States, and Asia is projected to become the largest origin region by 2055.³¹⁹ The largest immigration pathway for Asians migrating to the United States is through family-sponsored visas,³²⁰ although many are also students; there were more than 360,000 Chinese international students in the United States in the academic year 2017/2018.³²¹

Migrant populations in Canada continue to increase, representing a growing percentage of the country's total population. In 2000, foreign-born persons represented about 18 per cent of Canada's total population, increasing to nearly 19 per cent in 2005, around 20 per cent in 2010 and over 21 per cent in 2019.³²² However, while migrant populations in Canada have originated primarily from European countries in the past, the composition of the country's foreign-born population has shifted to include large populations of migrants from Asian countries. For example, in 2000, the largest origin country of international migrants in Canada was the United Kingdom (608,000), followed by China (412,000), India (319,000) and Italy (315,000). By 2019, India and China had surpassed the United Kingdom as the two largest origin countries, with around 709,000 and nearly 700,000 migrants respectively.³²³ Other Asian countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran also featured in the top 10 largest populations within Canada's total 7.9 million total foreign-born population in 2019.³²⁴ In 2017, Canada admitted over 286,000 new permanent residents, with India, the Philippines and China representing the top three countries of origin.³²⁵

The estimated number of irregular migrants in the United States is thought to be lower than a decade ago, but remains much larger when compared with Canada. An estimated 10.5 million irregular migrants were living in the United States in 2017, accounting for 3.2 per cent of the total population.³²⁶ The number

315 UN DESA, 2019a.

316 Ibid.

317 Zong, Batalova and Burrows, 2019.

318 UN DESA, 2019a.

319 Radford, 2019; UN DESA, 2019a.

320 Malik, 2015.

321 IIE, 2018.

322 UN DESA, 2019a.

323 Ibid.

324 Ibid.

325 IRCC, 2018.

326 Krogstad, Passel and Cohn, 2019.

of irregular migrants has been decreasing, falling from a high of 12.2 million in 2007.³²⁷ For the first time, Mexicans comprised less than half (47%) of all undocumented migrants in the United States.³²⁸ The number of Central American irregular migrants – most from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – increased from 1.5 million in 2007 to 1.9 million in 2017.³²⁹ A significant number of adult irregular migrants in the United States are not new arrivals; more than 65 per cent of adults in 2017 had lived in the United States for more than 10 years.³³⁰ Irregular migrants may enter the country without authorization; however, a large number are visa overstayers who initially entered the United States regularly. In the fiscal year 2018, for example, there were more than 600,000 foreigners who overstayed their visas in the United States.³³¹ Canada also has a significant number of irregular migrants, although estimates vary widely, and accurate numbers are difficult to establish. However, in the two years prior to June 2019, more than 45,000 migrants were reported to have crossed into Canada irregularly.³³²

The United States and Canada have resettled significant numbers of refugees, representing the two largest resettlement countries in the world. In 2018, Canada resettled more refugees than the United States, the first time that the United States has not taken the lead globally. Out of the 92,400 refugees resettled around the world in 2018, Canada admitted around 28,000, while the United States took in a little less than 23,000.³³³ The number of refugees resettled in the United States has been declining over the last two years; in 2016, for example, the United States admitted nearly 100,000 refugees.³³⁴ This number dramatically dropped to 33,000 the following year.³³⁵ There has also been a significant increase in the number of United States citizens applying for asylum in Canada since 2016. In 2017 alone, more than 2,500 citizens of the United States applied for asylum in Canada,³³⁶ six times the number of applications in 2016 and the highest number on record since Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) began reporting on the number of asylum seekers more than two decades ago.³³⁷ The majority of asylum applications from United States' citizens were made by children of parents without United States residency.³³⁸

Immigration policies in the United States have hardened, slowing immigration inflows and humanitarian intakes. For example, in 2018, overall visa issuances for both immigrant and non-immigrants declined for a second year in a row.³³⁹ More than 10 million non-immigrant visas were issued in 2016; by the end of 2018, this number had fallen to a little over 9 million. The United States' travel ban – which first came into effect in January 2017 and originally included citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen – has contributed to a reduction in the number of immigrants and visitors entering the United States. After it was challenged in court, the revised

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ United States Department of Homeland Security, 2018.

³³² Connolly, 2019.

³³³ UNHCR, 2019a.

³³⁴ UNHCR, 2018a.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Patriquin, 2018.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ United States Department of State, n.d.

travel ban, which added more names to the list of banned countries, came into effect in September 2017. It included the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chad, Yemen, Somalia and Libya, although Chad was later removed from the list.³⁴⁰ The most controversial change began in June 2018, when the Government put into effect the so-called “zero-tolerance policy”, applying to migrants, including asylum-seeking families crossing the United States border without documentation. The policy was meant to serve as a punitive deterrent for irregular border crossing,³⁴¹ and its implementation led to the separation of over 2,600 children from their parents,³⁴² but the public outcry that ensued forced the Government to quickly reverse course. Tougher immigration policies have come on the back of widespread anti-immigrant rhetoric, which has sought to characterize migrants as both a danger and drain on United States society; conspiracy theories about immigration have also been widespread, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and fear.³⁴³ A 2018 poll found that more than half of United States citizens believed their Government to be withholding information on the real cost of immigration to society and taxpayers.³⁴⁴ Recent data also reveal that the number of hate crimes in the United States increased in 2017, with many victims targeted because of their race or ethnicity.³⁴⁵

As immigration policies become more restrictive at the national level, “sanctuary cities” in the United States have stepped in, offering protection to undocumented migrants whose status puts them at risk of either being detained or deported. While the concept of sanctuary cities exists in other parts of the world, it is most commonly applied in the United States, where many local jurisdictions – such as cities, counties or States – are in open defiance of national immigration laws³⁴⁶ and have passed legislation aimed at protecting undocumented residents.³⁴⁷ In 2018, California – the most populous state in the United States, and with the largest number of undocumented migrants – signed into law statewide measures that limit local law enforcement cooperation with federal authorities on immigration enforcement.³⁴⁸ Sanctuary cities have generated backlash from federal authorities, including attempts to punish jurisdictions that do not comply with federal immigration ordinances.³⁴⁹

Oceania³⁵⁰

In 2019, around 7.7 million international migrants from outside Oceania were living in the region. As shown in figure 31 the foreign-born migrant population was primarily composed of people from Asia (49%) and Europe (38%). Throughout the last 30 years, the Asian migrant group has grown, while the number from Europe has remained steady.

³⁴⁰ Chishti and Bolter, 2019.

³⁴¹ OHCHR, 2018b.

³⁴² Mittelstadt, 2018; Shapiro and Sharma, 2018.

³⁴³ Gaston and Uscinski, 2018.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ FBI, 2018.

³⁴⁶ Duncan and Popp, 2017.

³⁴⁷ Bauder, 2016.


³⁴⁸ Raphelson, Hobson and Bentley, 2018.

³⁴⁹ Chishti and Bolter, 2019.

³⁵⁰ See appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.

Out of all of the six world regions, Oceania had the lowest number of migrants outside its region in 2019, partly a reflection of the low total population size of the region, although there was an increase in their number during the previous 30-year period. Most of those born in Oceania living outside the region resided in Europe and Northern America.

Figure 31. Migrants to, within and from Oceania, 1990–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: "Migrants to Oceania" refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Oceania) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). "Migrants within Oceania" refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Oceania) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Oceania region. "Migrants from Oceania" refers to people born in Oceania who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Asia).

Several countries in Oceania have experienced significant changes in the size of their populations over the last decade. The largest changes, as shown in figure 32, occurred in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, whose populations increased by around 30 per cent between 2009 and 2019. The population change in the rest of the countries was also in terms of growth.

Figure 32. Countries with the largest proportional population change in Oceania, 2009–2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

The vast majority of international migrants in Oceania were living in either Australia or New Zealand (figure 33). Most countries in the region have skewed migration profiles, being either large net origin or net destination countries. For example, Tonga, Samoa and Fiji all have high counts of emigrants in comparison with their native population, and very low shares of foreign-born populations. Their emigrants were located primarily in New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, in Australia. Australia and New Zealand have high shares of foreign-born populations as a portion of their total population, comprising around 29 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively.

Figure 33. Oceania migrant countries in 2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.


Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: "Immigrant" refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. "Emigrant" refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

Figure 34 with the top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries shows an accumulation of migratory movements over time, and provides a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Eight out of the 10 top migration corridors in the region involve migrants to Australia, with the largest being of migrants from the United Kingdom. These

larger corridors also include migrants from a variety of countries from outside Oceania – including China, India, Viet Nam and the Philippines – many of which have experienced rapid population growth over recent decades. Migrants from Oceania were more likely to end up within the region than in other regions. For example, New Zealand had high shares of migrants abroad, with the vast majority residing in Australia.

Figure 34. Top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries, 2019




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2018, Oceania hosted a little more than 126,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Australia was the largest host country in this region, followed by Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. Most of the refugees in these countries originated from Asia, such as Indonesians in Papua New Guinea or Afghans and Iranians in Australia. Globally, there were around 3,000 refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the Oceania region in 2018.

Figure 35. Numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in and from Oceania countries, 2018




Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The figure is based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Most new internal displacements in Oceania in 2018 resulted from disasters, not conflict (see figure 36). Papua New Guinea recorded the highest number of internal disaster displacements (61,000), which were largely triggered by an earthquake. Other large displacements associated with disasters were recorded in the Northern Mariana Islands (14,000), Vanuatu (13,000) and Australia (11,000). Volcanic activity led to most internal displacements in Vanuatu, while in Australia, bush fires were responsible for most of the displacements recorded in 2018. With 360 new conflict displacements, Papua New Guinea was the only country in Oceania that experienced displacements driven by violence and conflict.

Figure 36. Top countries in Oceania by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2017.

Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Oceania

Annual net migration to both New Zealand and Australia has declined. In the year that ended November 2018, New Zealand had a net migration of a little over 51,000, slightly down from around 52,000 in the year ending December 2017;³⁵¹ estimates for Australia's net overseas migration in the year ending June 2018 was 237,200 people, a 10 per cent drop from the year ending June 2017.³⁵² The regions where migrants to Australia are born have changed in recent years; since 2014, the largest number of immigrants have largely come from Asia as opposed to traditional regions of origin, including Oceania and Europe.³⁵³ For example, the number of migrant arrivals from South and Central Asia have now surpassed those from North-West Europe and Oceania.³⁵⁴ In 2019, 30 per cent of Australia's population was foreign born, in comparison with 21.3 per cent in Canada and 15.4 per cent in the United States.³⁵⁵ The United Kingdom has consistently been the main origin country of migrants in New Zealand for decades, with a notable increase in the number of Asian migrants, particularly from China and India, as well as a considerable population of people from the Pacific

³⁵¹ Stats, New Zealand, 2019.

³⁵² Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ UN DESA, 2019a.

Islands, including Fiji, Samoa and Tonga.³⁵⁶ In 2017, New Zealand's foreign-born population constituted nearly 23 per cent of the country's total population.³⁵⁷ In both Australia and New Zealand, there are a significant number of temporary workers. Over 209,000 people were granted work visas in New Zealand in 2016/2017, an increase of 9 per cent from 2015/2016.³⁵⁸ The largest origin country of temporary migrant workers in New Zealand was India in 2016/2017, followed by the United Kingdom, China and Germany.³⁵⁹ Both countries also attract a large number of international students. The number of international students has increased since 2012 in Australia, reaching a record high of nearly 700,000 in 2018,³⁶⁰ while there were over 91,000 student visa holders in New Zealand in the year 2016/2017, with most students primarily from China and India.³⁶¹

Both Australia and New Zealand participate in refugee resettlement. Australia's refugee resettlement programme is the third largest in the world, with nearly 13,000 refugees resettled in the country in 2018.³⁶² Under Australia's Humanitarian Program, an additional 12,000 humanitarian places were made available in 2015 for people displaced by conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.³⁶³ The number of places under Australia's Humanitarian Program rose to 16,250 in 2017/2018 and was expected to further increase to 18,750 place from 2018 to 2019.³⁶⁴ Australia's policy is to transfer those who arrive irregularly by boat as asylum seekers to offshore processing centres on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and in Nauru.³⁶⁵ In July 2013, Australia also announced that all persons arriving by boat and found to be in need of international protection would not be resettled to Australia.³⁶⁶ As part of a 2016 bilateral resettlement arrangement between the United States and Australia, the United States agreed to resettle up to 1,200 refugees from Nauru and Papua New Guinea's Manus Island.³⁶⁷ By early 2019, only around 500 refugees from these offshore processing centres had been resettled in the United States under the arrangement.³⁶⁸ At the same time, around 1,000 of those who were transferred to Manus Island and Nauru remain there, some of whom were experiencing severe physical and mental health needs.³⁶⁹ New Zealand is also a refugee resettlement country, resettling 1,000 refugees annually through its Refugee Quota Programme.³⁷⁰ This also includes 250 places specifically set for Syrian refugees in 2016/2017 and in 2017/2018.³⁷¹ New Zealand has also established an additional quota of 300 places per year that allow extended family members of refugees in New Zealand to apply for Permanent Residence.³⁷²

356 Ibid.

357 Ibid.

358 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2018.

359 Ibid.

360 Australian Department of Education and Training, 2018.

361 New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2018.

362 UNHCR, 2019a.

363 Australian Department of Social Services, 2019.

364 Ibid.

365 Refugee Council of Australia, 2017.

366 Ibid.

367 Andrew and Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, 2019.

368 Davidson, 2019.

369 UNHCR, 2019e.

370 New Zealand Immigration, n.d.

371 UNHCR, 2018b.

372 Ibid.

Economic challenges influence emigration from Pacific Island countries. Many Pacific Islands continue to experience persistent challenges related to poverty and inequality. The Islands' economic growth has also been hampered by their remoteness or vast distances between them and larger markets, limited natural resources and narrowly-based economies.³⁷³ Additionally, the subregion is experiencing a significant "youth bulge", with 70 per cent of the population in Solomon Islands, for example, under the age of 34.³⁷⁴ This has resulted in a significant number of young people struggling with unemployment, leading to a high degree of labour emigration. Since 2007, seasonal labour migration schemes have helped to relieve labour shortages in the Pacific Islands, with the establishment of New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme and Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme in 2012, aimed at meeting labour needs, mainly in the horticulture and viticulture industries.³⁷⁵ Over 9,600 people from the Pacific Islands were granted visas under New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme during the 2017/2018 season and more than 8,000 under Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme during the same season.³⁷⁶ In 2018, a new labour scheme, the Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS), was established to fill gaps in low- and semi-skilled jobs in both rural and regional Australia.³⁷⁷ Importantly, while Australia and New Zealand remain the major destinations for labour migrants from Pacific Islands, labour emigration from these Islands has diversified, with Fijians and Tongans, for example, increasingly moving to countries such as Japan.³⁷⁸

Environmental change and degradation are also among the array of factors influencing many Pacific Islanders to migrate. The Pacific region is extremely vulnerable to natural hazards, some of which are linked to climate change. Vulnerability to climate change and associated migration, displacement and planned relocation varies among Pacific Island countries and territories. Half the population in Kiribati and Tuvalu lives in overcrowded urban areas on atolls of narrow strips of coral with limited access to water and land.³⁷⁹ Incremental sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion and drought are important factors, among others, impacting people's decisions to migrate in the region, both internally and internationally.³⁸⁰ In this context, there is also growing discussion around the need for the planned relocation of groups and communities.³⁸¹ For example Kiribati, one of the States most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, promoted the "Migration with Dignity" policy as a long-term adaptation measure.³⁸² The policy aims to facilitate both permanent and temporary labour migration on a voluntary basis as a way of coping with the effects of climate change.³⁸³ Meanwhile, the Government of Fiji has been relocating people from several coastal villages that have been identified as highly vulnerable to the impacts of environmental change and degradation.³⁸⁴

373 World Bank, 2019b.

374 Vanderwey, 2019.

375 ILO, 2019.

376 Ibid.

377 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019.

378 Ibid.

379 Curtain et al., 2016.

380 ESCAP, 2015.

381 See, for example, Georgetown University, n.d., for a range of resources on planned relocation.

382 Farbotko, 2018; Curtain and Dornan, 2019.

383 Ibid.

384 Ibid.

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on a wide range of statistics and information to provide regional overviews of international migration around the world, with emphasis on changes occurring in calendar years 2017 and 2018 (and drawing on material published up until the end June 2019). The chapter focused on six broad world regions (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania), and provided discussion of key issues as well as recent developments at the subregional level.

Overall, and as is highlighted by the graphs presented at the regional level, there are clear geographic aspects to migration and displacement. A quick scan of figures in the chapter shows visually the significant differences in migration patterns between regions: migration in Africa has been predominantly intraregional (from one African country to another) with migration also occurring to other regions of the world (from African to non-African countries), whereas in Latin America and the Caribbean, migration is dominated by emigration to other world regions, especially Northern America, with intraregional migration playing a more limited role.

The addition of two regional graphs in this edition of the *World Migration Report* – one on population change over a decade and one on new internal displacements for 2018 – highlights and reinforces some interesting dynamics at the regional level. For example, we can see that, while the most significant proportional population change over the last decade has been mostly in terms of growth, parts of Europe have experienced significant population decline; this is exceptional globally, with no other region experiencing such results. The curious anomaly of population decline, long-term emigration trends, ageing populations and hostility toward immigration raises a number of strategic policy questions that some European countries will likely face for years to come. At the same time, demographic challenges are being addressed in other parts of the world, including in several North Asian countries, which are reassessing their approaches to immigration with a keen eye to labour markets, meeting key occupation and sectoral needs and preparing further for ageing populations. The addition of the new internal displacement graphs highlights the stark differences between conflict-related displacement and disaster displacement globally, with strong variations evident at the regional level.

At the subregional level, we can see that key features may remain largely the same from year to year, with only incremental change evident. It is, however, in the examination of recent developments that we can see substantial change occurring in some areas of the world. In part, this change is due to significant migration “events”, such as the large-scale outflow of people from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, or the mass displacement of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. We are also seeing change occurring on migration governance as subregions experience shifts in migration patterns and underlying population change. In North Asia, for example, China established its first immigration agency, bringing together functions from a number of agencies into one consolidated authority. Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea experienced large arrivals of asylum seekers from the Middle East not previously seen before, prompting intense public debate on related policy issues.

The regional differences and complexities, as well as recent developments, provide an important perspective to understanding migration. So often, we read and hear about migration from a national perspective, most commonly in recent times portrayed as a critical (negative) domestic political issue. But this dominant focus can mask the reality that migration patterns and processes are very closely linked to geography, and that key regional features developed over decades, if not centuries, continue to play a central role in how and where people migrate internationally. Greater recognition of regional and subregional migration patterns, variations and complexities can assist in formulating strategic and sustainable policy responses.



4

Migration Research and Analysis: Growth, Reach and Recent Contributions

Introduction

In its simplest form, public policy has been defined as “anything a government chooses to do or not to do”.¹ Policymaking involves action through the setting of rules, laws, procedures, programmes, guidelines and other forms of regulation. But how do States decide on what should be regulated, and what should go into those regulations? Questions of policy settings transcend political systems, although policymaking processes vary across different types of systems.² The “raw ingredients” of policymaking include evidence (statistics and other data, research and evaluation) as well as funding, public sector capability and political dynamics.³ In migration policymaking, all ingredients are important; however, in recent years, we have seen the emphasis on political dynamics grow, sometimes regardless of, or in contrast to, the existing evidence base. It is clear, therefore, that the raw ingredients themselves are not enough to result in evidence-based policymaking, but that the following conditions are required:⁴

1. Evidence exists and is accessible to policymakers.
2. Policymakers are motivated to use evidence.
3. Policymakers have the capacity to use evidence.
4. Policymakers and policymaking bodies have relationships that facilitate the relevance and use of evidence.

This chapter on migration research and analysis is focused on point 1 above – for without statistics and other data and research on migration, any attempts at evidence-based decision-making are futile. The evidence for policymaking that originates from rigorous analysis and research on migration is the prime source and starting point for migration policymakers. It is also fundamental to migration practitioners, students, scholars and the public, as they examine aspects of migration and how they might be changing. A key challenge for many is how to determine the *relevance* and *quality* of an ever-growing body of migration research and analysis. It can often be overwhelming to identify what is important, and what should be afforded weight, when faced with virtual mountains of research output. This chapter is aimed in particular at those who would benefit from some broad guidance on this topic. It provides an overview of research and analysis on migration being undertaken and published by a range of actors – such as academics, governments, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations – by building on the foundational chapter of the same name in the *World Migration Report 2018*.⁵ Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics of the different types

¹ Dye, 1972.

² Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Duckett and Wang, 2017.

³ Hewlett Foundation, 2018.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ This topic first appeared in the *World Migration Report 2018* (IOM, 2017e), and will be repeated in future editions.

of research and analysis being produced on migration is important for those working on migration policies, studying migration, or wanting to develop an informed opinion on migration.

It is important to highlight at the outset that there are fundamental differences in the publishing processes for academic and non-academic material, and each has its strengths and weaknesses. The academic publishing system is largely focused on producing journal articles and books. This process typically involves multi-stage reviews and editorial comments involving authors, editors and reviewers. Most published academic research ("white" literature) is behind paywalls (that is, not freely accessible), and often managed by commercial publishers. In contrast, the production of research and analysis publications outside of academic publishing ("grey" literature) generally involves faster and simpler processes that are typically, although not always, characterized by more limited peer review. Contributions from grey literature (such as research reports, working papers and government/official documents) are usually freely available. A report such as this, designed to contribute to our collective understanding of migration and mobility in an increasingly interconnected world, would clearly be incomplete without describing the role of grey literature, which has been "recognized as a key source of evidence, argument, innovation, and understanding".⁶

The volume, diversity and growth of both white and grey literature preclude a systematic review of all the material produced and published on migration in 2017 and 2018. Instead, this chapter highlights examples of key contributions made during this period, published in English by a selection of academic journals and intergovernmental organizations. It provides an update to the chapter in *World Migration Report 2018*, including by focusing on different academic journals and intergovernmental organizations, and their key output in 2017 and 2018.⁷ The next section provides an overview of the different actors involved in migration research and analysis. The third section features recent, selected contributions from academia and intergovernmental organizations, and the reach and impact of some of the migration research materials published.

Main producers of migration research and analysis

Academia

Ideally, researchers create new knowledge that is supported by strong evidence and is useful for others. Research findings are produced for, and disseminated to, different target audiences. Traditional academic work can be highly technical and narrowly focused, although academic researchers are increasingly encouraged to disseminate their work beyond academic spheres.⁸ Researchers analysing policy-relevant issues are often keen to engage with policymakers to impart knowledge that can inform policy deliberations and help shape policymaking – this is especially the case with migration. Effective research contributions for policy audiences tend to take the form of short papers and blog articles, as well as policy workshops and interactive expert meetings.

⁶ GreyNet International, 2014.

⁷ In order to ensure, to the extent possible, that this chapter provides a comprehensive "stand-alone" overview of migration research and analysis in 2017 and 2018, we have drawn upon key background and context material included in the *World Migration Report 2018* (chapter 4).


⁸ McAuliffe, 2016.

In academia, the main focus is on publishing, with some forms (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others. A key strength of academic publications is that they have usually been peer reviewed by experts in the field, which typically enhances their quality. The growing number of publishing outlets is, however, characterized by a wide range of peer review standards. Arguably, one of the weaknesses of academic research is that the pressure to publish has contributed to a large increase in academic output in recent years, not always of high-quality material. Appendix A provides a summary of academic publishing, including details of peer-review processes, citations and impact assessment.

Within the many thousands of journals currently being produced – covering all disciplines, topics and research fields⁹ – we identified over 130 migration-related journals publishing in English, French or Spanish, a list of which is published on the research page of the IOM website as a resource for students and others conducting migration research (www.iom.int/migration-research). Mainstream academic publishers tend to publish in English, which has the advantage of standardizing outputs but the downside of excluding those who are not able to submit manuscripts with an acceptable level of English.

Recent academic output on migration comprises mainly journal articles (see figure 1). The long-term trend shows a gradual increase in academic publishing on migration, which is likely to be related to both the general expansion of academic literature production, and the increased prominence of migration research.

Figure 1. Number of academic publications on “immigration” OR “emigration”



Source: Scopus, Available at www.scopus.com (accessed 18 June 2019).

Note: Querying the term “migration” alone returns figures that are more than 10 times higher. However, these include use of the term “migration” in disciplines that are irrelevant to the current research, such as computer science (data migration), biology (cell migration), zoology (bird or fish migration) and many others. Using the Scopus advanced search, we excluded subject areas such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, neuroscience and so forth.

⁹ Ware and Mabe, 2015.

Governments

Historically, government administrative data on persons entering and/or leaving a country's territory constitute the earliest sources of information on international migration.¹⁰ The earliest scholarly work on migration in the modern era, however, was on internal migration dynamics based on national census data collected by authorities in the United Kingdom.¹¹ To this day, data enumerated by population censuses, population registers, representative surveys and other official statistical sources often constitute the basis for migration-related databases. The centrality of migration-related data within a government context is recognized, for example, by the IOM Development Fund, which supports (among other things) capacity-building of Member States on migration-related statistics.

Beyond statistical data collection, administration and reporting, some governments are also significant contributors of information on migration, particularly in the form of policy-related materials, such as evaluations, studies and discussion papers. They may also commission research with partners in academia, applied researchers, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. The increasing relevance of migration has led to governments providing funding for empirical work directly (rather than indirectly through national research councils, funds or grant bodies), thereby opening up new research areas and broadening the scope of migration studies.¹² This has led to some criticism of government-commissioned research being overly focused on policy issues and for, at times, suggesting "simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues",¹³ or of researchers being used to legitimize immigration policy.¹⁴ While this may be a valid concern, especially for commissioned research, governments continue to be significant funders (if not the most significant) of academic research in many countries, including of research on migration. There are, however, different ways research is funded and supported – some examples are provided in table 1.

There has been some evidence of researchers being pressured into "produc[ing] politically useful results" in policy-related research more generally.¹⁵ Understandably, issues addressed in government-commissioned dedicated migration research vary widely, and can depend on the countries' role in the migration process.¹⁶ Equally, there is recognition that policy-*irrelevant* research is also crucial – particularly migration research that looks beyond the policy frames of reference to explore less visible aspects of migration.¹⁷ It is also important to note that research commissioned by governments can provide useful and rigorous examinations of migration – particularly in partnership with academic and other researchers, who can bring different perspectives, knowledge and analytical approaches to the examination of complex, multi-faceted migration issues, including by drawing upon administrative data that might not otherwise be accessible.

10 Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006.

11 Ravenstein, 1885.

12 Castles, 2010.

13 Ibid.

14 Boswell, 2008.

15 The LSE GV314 Group, 2014.

16 Iredale et al., 2001.

17 Bakewell, 2008.

Table 1. Examples of government funding of migration research

Example	Description
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa	Funded by multiple donors and focusing on producing social science research in Africa, including on the links between migration and urbanization (see www.codesria.org/spip.php?rubrique193).
Horizon 2020 (European Union)	Largest research platform to date, focusing on the impact of migration and integration, as well as migration and development (see https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/what-horizon-2020).
India Centre for Migration	Funded by the Ministry of External Affairs and conducting research on international migration that informs policymaking, including on the international labour migration of Indians (see https://mea.gov.in/icm.htm).
Irregular Migration and Border Research Programme (Australia)	Producing policy-relevant research on the complex dynamics and drivers of irregular migration and the challenges of border management (see www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/research/irregular-migration).
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Program (Canada)	Federal research funding program supporting research that enhances understanding of people, societies and the world, including on migration (see www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/funding-financement/umbrella_programs-programme_cadre/insight-savoir-eng.aspx).
Swiss Network of International Studies	Funding for interdisciplinary academic research in Switzerland on topics transcending nation-State boundaries, including migration (see https://snis.ch/).
UK Research and Innovation	Range of funding support for research and innovation, such as the Global Challenges Research Fund, a GBP 1.5 billion fund to promote research on the challenges faced by developing countries, including migration (see www.ukri.org/research/).

Note: All hyperlinks were operating at the time of publication.

Think tanks and governments

The role of think tanks in informing migration policymaking is capturing increasing political and academic attention. As major contributors to grey literature, and in an era of increasing contestability of policy advice to governments, think tanks have emerged as important producers of migration-related information and analysis. The increasing prevalence of think tanks working on migration was quantified in *World Migration Report 2018*.

Think tanks are often associated with governments because, among other reasons, many aim to link scientific and policy communities by a range of activities, such as dialogues, workshops and closed meetings conducted under the Chatham House Rule. Think tanks may also undertake research and present it to governments in the form of analytical briefings (published and unpublished). Think tanks tend to act as brokers of policy knowledge, centres of research and incubators of new ideas, including by providing advisory services to governments and civil society, conducting training activities, publishing research reports, collaborating with the media, and undertaking advocacy work.^a Many think tanks produce high-quality work and thus play an important role in generating and disseminating new data and information about migration.^b Not all think tanks operate in the same way, however; some are independent and do not rely on government funding, while others may operate as part of broader State functions and authorities.

Although think tanks often portray themselves as experts providing evidence-based information and analysis, some are driven by political ideologies and agendas.^c Some of them work directly for, and develop close relationships with, governments or specific political parties, as advisors or helping drafting legislative reform agendas on immigration.^d Politicization of some think tanks can result in biased and ideologically-grounded information.^e There is a risk that some think tanks promote anti-immigration narratives and restrictive immigration policies to large audiences, especially when material produced is then relayed by news and other media.^f

a Rich, 2004.

b Carling, 2016.

c Troy, 2012.

d Rojc, 2017; FAIR, 2017; Lopez, 2016.

e Langerak, 2010; Woods and Manning, 2015.

f Ellis, 2017.

Intergovernmental organizations

As publishers and institutional authors, intergovernmental organizations make specific contributions on migration. In some circumstances, such organizations may be the only source of information, and multiple references to publications by intergovernmental organizations are therefore often found in academic literature. A commercially published edited volume or article on an aspect of international migration or displacement, for example, can typically refer to material from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM, the

International Labour Organization (ILO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and/or the World Bank, among others. Scholarly publications note that intergovernmental organizations are now among the main producers of information on migration, which reflects a broader growing interest in the issue of migration.¹⁸

Although definitions of intergovernmental organizations may vary, Davies and Woodward define the term as "formal, continuous structures founded by an authoritative instrument of agreement between members (including two or more sovereign states) or an existing international organization through which members pursue their common interest".¹⁹ Since the first half of the last century, the number, diversity and influence of intergovernmental organizations have grown,²⁰ so much so that a systematic review of contributions on migration by such organizations is well beyond the scope of this chapter. The focus of this chapter is on *global* contributors within the United Nations system – UN DESA, UNHCR, IOM, ILO, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNODC, UNDP, UNESCO and the World Bank – which in no way diminishes the work of other organizations, including those operating at a regional or national level.²¹ As programmes or units within the principal organs of the United Nations or semi-autonomous, specialized or related agencies, the intergovernmental organizations discussed in this chapter all have global reach, access to the inputs and expertise of diverse stakeholders and, in some cases, global operations that enable them to shape discourse and practice on migration and mobility.

The mandates, missions or competencies of some of the organizations (such as IOM and UNHCR) are focused on specific forms of migration and displacement, while others have responsibilities relevant to particular aspects or groups of people: UN DESA for data; ILO for migrant workers; OHCHR for migrants' rights; UNICEF for migrant children; UNODC for transnational criminal aspects (such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling); UNDP for migration and development; UNESCO for the educational, scientific and cultural aspects of migration; and the World Bank for economic implications of migration. Their various mandates enable such intergovernmental organizations to collect significant quantities of data and/or access data from States. Many of these organizations also convene and report on dialogues and conferences related to migration and mobility, in addition to generating and publishing background, technical, operational, state-of-the-art and agenda-setting research and analysis, including on global statistical data. As with other publishers, intergovernmental organizations are not immune to criticism related to quality, framing and agenda-setting. However, there is clearly also recognition of the responsibility of producing rigorous and robust data and research. Intergovernmental organizations, for example, routinely work in collaboration with leading migration-related data analysts and researchers as a means of drawing on critical skills and expertise.

Given the cross-cutting nature of migration, research on the topic is often undertaken jointly by intergovernmental organizations. Many publications were released under the aegis of the Global Migration Group (GMG) which, prior to its transition in late 2018 to the United Nations Network on Migration, consisted

¹⁸ See, for example, Mason, 1999; Pécoud, 2015.

¹⁹ Davies and Woodward, 2014.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Other organizations – such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – also publish material on aspects of migration, according to the thematic perspectives of their respective mandates. Future editions of the *World Migration Report* are expected to highlight some of the growing body of work by not-for-profit and for-profit international non-governmental organizations, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

of 22 member agencies working on migration.²² The importance of collaborative research on migration was recently highlighted in the report of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) *Strengthening Policy Research Uptake in the Context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, published in 2018.²³ While the report is more broadly concerned with policy research within the United Nations system, it features a case study on migration that maps collaboration on migration research among 14 JIU participating organizations, as well as IOM (see the text box below).

Collaborative research on migration in the United Nations system

Excerpt of the JIU report *Strengthening Policy Research Uptake in the Context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*^a

...the Inspector map[ped] the pattern of inter-agency collaborative research [on migration]. The mapping was based on the responses to a specific question about the organizations' engagement in any form of cooperation with other United Nations entities prior to, during and after the research process. This mapping is not exhaustive, but it presents a sample of such interaction. The 15 available examples of inter-agency collaborative research are summarized in [the] table below, while [the] figure illustrates the relationships of the co-authors.


Samples of inter-agency collaborations in research projects on migration:

Projects	Collaborating organizations
Management of refugee data	DESA, UNHCR
Co-custody of [Sustainable Development Goal] indicator 10.7.2 on countries with well managed migration policies	DESA, IOM
The 2018 Report on "Migration and Structural Transformation"	UNCTAD, IOM
Impact of foreign direct investment by diaspora in Tunisia	UNDP, IOM
Six-country study on access to economic opportunities for people affected by the Syrian crisis	UNDP, ILO, WFP
Report on "Violence against women migrant workers"	UN-Women, ILO, IOM, UNHCR, OHCHR
Study "At the Root of Exodus: Food Security, Conflict and International Migration"	WFP, IOM, FAO
Joint analysis of data for the "Migration Pulse" initiative	WFP, IOM, FAO, World Bank

²² Discussion of GMG and the United Nations Network on Migration are included in chapter 11 of this report on global migration governance.

²³ Dumitriu, 2018.

Projects	Collaborating organizations
The 2017 publication “Migration, Free Movement and Regional Integration”	UNESCO, UNU-CRIS
The 2019 Global Education Monitoring report on migration, displacement and education	UNESCO, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF
“Breaking the Impasse” study	OCHA, UNHCR, UNDP, IOM
Preliminary discussion on taking forward projects on migration	UNRISD, IOM
Research initiative on migration governance and policy in the Global South	UNU-WIDER, FAO
Research projects related to migration and displacement in the context of the climate change	UNU-EHS, IOM, UNHCR, UNDP
Collective contributions to the research outcomes of the Global Management Group	DESA, UNDP, UNESCO, ESCAP, ESCWA, UNU, IOM (GMG)



As limited in size as is, the above sample of cases, corroborated with information extracted from interviews, allowed the Inspector to note:

- (a) The collaborative research reflects by and large the necessity to add the interdisciplinary perspective to research activities;
- (b) The collaboration scheme is more the result of separate initiatives and case-by-case needs than a systematic process of collaboration, characterized by joint agenda-setting, knowledge-sharing, co-design and co-production of research based on the specific mandates and expertise of interested organisations;

- (c) While various undertakings do not necessarily converge into the same directions, there are three vectors indicating an emerging trend for a more systematic collaborative research:
- the presence of IOM, as a specialized partner, in most of the collaborations identified;
 - the role of DESA and IOM as co-custodians of indicator 10.7.2 on migrations, which indicates an option towards a more systematic and demand-driven approach of policy research;
 - the use of a group for collective reflection, action and enhanced coherence.

a Inspector Petru Dumitriu. Full report can be accessed at www.unju.org/sites/www.unju.org/files/jiu_rep_2018_7_english_0.pdf.

IOM produces a large number of research and analysis publications on migration. Given the Organization's focus on the provision of technical assistance and direct support to migrants and Member States, publications produced by IOM outside the realm of research and analysis typically include corporate reports (such as meeting/workshop reports and *Migration Initiatives*), training materials, handbooks and guides, and information materials for migrants (including graphic novels). It is worth acknowledging the mandate and context within which IOM operates, as well as its status as a United Nations-related organization.²⁴ IOM's role as a service delivery agency over almost 70 years has necessarily shaped how it articulates aspects of migration, including the links between its operations and migration practice, as well as migration policy and governance. Programmatic data, for example, have been a mainstay of IOM migration data – a reflection of IOM's strong and enduring role in migration and displacement, including, for example, the support of internally displaced persons, the resettlement of refugees globally, health assessments, assistance to victims of human trafficking, and support to migrants returning home. Concomitantly, IOM has long recognized the need to support more nuanced understandings of migration, including through its focus on specific thematic areas, such as migration health and environmental migration.

Recent contributions: 2017 and 2018 in focus

Having described the main producers of migration research and analysis, we now turn to a discussion of examples of recent contributions by academia and intergovernmental organizations.

Academia

The large number of scholarly publications on migration precludes a review of all material published in 2017 and 2018. We instead examine a sample of contributions from the scholarly community, focusing on eight peer-reviewed migration-related journals. The previous edition of the *World Migration Report* featured different journals, as will future ones. For this chapter, we focused on the *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies*, *International Migration*, the *International Migration Review*, the *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee*

24 IOM was established as an intergovernmental organization in 1951 and became a United Nations-related organization in September 2016.

Studies, the *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, *Migration Studies*, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, and the *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*.²⁵ The examination comprised two components: analysis of all article titles published by these journals in 2017 and 2018 (totalling 493 articles); and editors' overviews of their journals' key contributions for this two-year period. This exercise allowed for deeper insights into journal contributions, highlighting their similarities as well as different interests and areas of focus, including thematically and geographically. Each editor's overview is provided in full in appendix B. Excerpts of journal editors' overviews are included in text boxes throughout the remainder of this chapter.

All journal editors emphasized the importance of rigorous and high-quality research on migration; however, relevance of scientific/academic writings for policymakers emerged as an important aspect for only some journals. Two editors emphasized the importance of contributions tackling policy-relevant issues in the field of migration (Gamlen and Chetail – see appendix B). This was noted as expanding the “growing community of migration experts” who are in turn “contributing to public life by informing and impacting the thoughts and decisions of politicians, policymakers and practitioners of migration policy at every level, from local NGOs, to municipal governments, to national governments and international organizations” (Gamlen – see appendix B). In addition, policymakers were specifically identified as falling within the target audience of two other journals (Duncan and Kerwin – see appendix B). The content of these journals is designed to appeal to a policy audience: one journal requires each contribution to start with an executive summary and set out a series of policy recommendations at the end (Kerwin – see appendix B), while the other journal introduced occasional interviews with senior policy officials (Duncan – see appendix B).

Migration Studies

Through scholarship that is policy-relevant but not policy-driven, *Migration Studies* is one of a range of academic journals contributing to building migration management capacity in communities and governments around the world. The past several years have seen a worldwide proliferation of graduate programmes and think tanks specializing in migration issues. At the same time, the rising political salience of migration has created a growing need for policymakers, journalists and NGO professionals in other areas to gain working familiarity with migration issues. In view of these trends, in the past two years, *Migration Studies* has run two series intended to contribute to the theory and practice of higher education on this topic.

Source: Alan Gamlen, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

The analysis of the thematic focus of articles published in the selected journals in 2017 and 2018 in part relates to the specific, narrower focus of some of the journals. The *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, for example, is primarily on refugee research (Chetail – see appendix B), while the *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* covers labour migrants and asylum seekers/refugees (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B). The editors of the *International Migration Review* note that “beyond a general focus on international migrants, we find equal

²⁵ We have attempted to provide geographic diversity in the contributions obtained from the main migration journals. This exercise will be repeated in future editions of the *World Migration Report*, for which other journals will be invited to provide input. Ten journals were invited to contribute to this edition, and editors of nine journals replied positively, while only eight ended up providing input. Editors of *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* accepted the invitation but did not end up contributing, and *Migraciones internacionales* did not reply to the initial invitation.

attention to native-born and second-generation groups, a critical mass of articles focus on immigrant youth, but far less work on refugees" (Winders et al. – see appendix B).

Nevertheless, the topics covered in the articles published in these eight journals in 2017 and 2018 are diverse and address complex migration issues. They also reflect new developments and trends in migration, acknowledging some delay effect due to the time frame required for peer review and publication (Duncan – see appendix B). For instance, among the 2017 and 2018 contributions, only three articles addressed the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees initiated in September 2016 by the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and adopted in December 2018. We expect that many more articles on the two compacts will be published in 2019 and 2020 (and beyond).

International Migration

The academic literature on migration responds in part to trends in migration phenomena and policy as well as to shifts in migration-related theory and previously published literature. Normally, there is a discernible time lag between the onset of a phenomenon and the appearance of scientific literature, this owing to the time required for research and then for publishing. The literature on the Syrian refugee crisis is now beginning to appear in significant amounts, and we can expect that the literature on the United Nations' Global Compacts will start appearing in 2019. But looking back only slightly, to 2017–2018, we see discussions of earlier trends and phenomena [...].

Source: Howard Duncan, Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.

That said, two main themes reflecting complex migration issues emerge from editors' contributions. The first topic is irregular migration, including in relation to border controls and enforcement. Editors of three journals identified this theme as particularly salient in the 2017 and 2018 contributions, covering issues ranging from human trafficking (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B), to border violence (Ma Ming and Petit – see appendix B), or detention and deportation (Kerwin – see appendix B). As "asylum and migration have become increasingly blurred in the past decades in both policy and practice", this topic was also addressed in research on forced migration, most notably through the securitization of asylum and the detention of asylum seekers (Chetail – see appendix B).

Revue européenne des migrations internationales

The issue of violence is a recurring theme in the latest dossiers. The importance of this issue reflects the tragic consequences of migration policies in particular contexts or crises, and the emergence of work around migrants' journeys. [...] Considering language practices as an integral part of migration practices in the context of migration to Europe, the articles analyse how the actors put into words death and violence at borders. Death is considered in multiple dimensions: social death, physical death, disappearance, institutional and security arbitrariness, etc. These language practices are

understood at different sociological and political levels, whether it is their production from institutional spaces (international organisations, political spaces at European or state level) or their reception by migrants, during their life in Europe or afterwards when they arrive there, or when they return to their country after an expulsion. The language approach, corresponding both to a consideration of the discourses produced on migrants and of the narratives taken by migrants in plural discursive frameworks. This perspective makes it possible to think of the border object while offering a grid for interpreting socio-spatial inequalities in the era of globalization.

Source: Emmanuel Ma Mung and Véronique Petit, Chief Editors. The full submission is in appendix B.

The second topic of convergence across the selected articles is migrants' inclusion, which was identified by editors of four journals as a prominent thematic focus in 2017 and 2018 (Gamlen, Triandafyllidou, Winders et al., and Ma Mung and Petit – see appendix B). The diversity of issues related to inclusion addressed in these four journals reflects the complexity of the topic. Contributions to the *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* analysed integration processes, including the role of non-governmental and governmental organizations, integration barriers and the gender dimension of integration (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B). The issue of labour market incorporation was more particularly examined in *Migration Studies*, together with wider adaptation processes in terms of class, capital accumulation and happiness (Gamlen – see appendix B). The *International Migration Review* featured articles on assimilation, economic mobility and interpersonal contacts (Winders et al. – see appendix B), while contributions to the *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* approached inclusion through migrants' perspectives.


Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies

The JIRS offers a unique virtual transnational space where different systems of reception and integration and different populations coming into the host countries under a variety of regimes (labour or family migrants, asylum seekers or resettled refugees) may face similar challenges (including that of mental and physical health), learning the ropes in their new environment, activating their social capital resources, and eventually carving a place for themselves in their destination country, are discussed. The double background of the JIRS from social work/community studies, and from sociology/ethnic studies pays well in bringing these different topics together.

Source: Anna Triandafyllidou, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 493 articles published in 2017 and 2018 in the selected journals according to their geographic focus. The greater proportion of articles focused on Europe (233 or 47 %), followed by Northern America (153 or 31 %), Asia (150 or 30 %), Africa (107 or 22 %), Latin America and the Caribbean (89 or 18%) and Oceania (34 or 7 %).

Figure 2. Number of articles published by selected journals in 2017 and 2018, by region



Notes: Articles could be classified in more than one region. n=493.

"LAC" means Latin America and the Caribbean. Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3 appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

One editor noted a shift of geographical focus from North America to Europe, Asia and the Pacific, as well as South-East Asia, with "a clear increase in recent years of articles focusing on the Middle East and particularly on Turkey, and the Syrian conflict" (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B). Broadening the geographical coverage of contributions to provide more articles on developing country issues was described as a new approach by one editor to better account for the fact that "the vast majority of refugees are hosted in the Global South" (Chetail – see appendix B). Editors of two other journals noted that increasing the geographic scope of articles was an objective for their journals (Kerwin and Winders et al. – see appendix B).

International Migration Review

A close examination of *IMR* publications since 2016 (about 100 articles) identifies a number of trends.^a First, in terms of geography, around 80% of articles focus on North America or Western Europe, with a significantly smaller percentage focused on Asia (just over 10%) and an even smaller number on Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa. This uneven geographic coverage reflects one of the main shortcomings of migration studies – limited attention to migration dynamics beyond North America and Western Europe. It also highlights the challenges that scholars writing about the wider geography of international migration face in attempts to situate their work in relation to hegemonic perspectives about two global regions.

a This discussion is based on articles officially published in an *IMR* volume. It does not consider articles published "early view" online but not yet assigned to a journal volume.

Source: Jamie Winders, Pieter Bevelander, Cynthia Feliciano, Filiz Garip and Matthew Hall, Associate Editors. The full submission is in appendix B.

However, so far, there remains a dominant “receiving country” perspective, especially in relation to Europe. This was already observed in chapter 4 of the *World Migration Report 2018*, where Europe was the only geographical term among the 10 terms most frequently used in the 538 articles under consideration.²⁶ Referred to by Castles as the “receiving country bias”, the traditional focus of migration research and analysis on developed countries is explained: “Most migration research has taken the situation in northern destination countries as its starting point, neglecting the perspectives of origin and transit countries, and of migrants. This is not surprising, since research funding and capacities are concentrated in the North.”²⁷ The concentration of research funding in wealthy industrialized States not only affects the geographic focus of research, it also acts to build research skills and capacities within donor countries at the expense of developing country researchers.²⁸ For example, while there were some 3,000 researchers for every 1 million people in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as of 2007, fewer than 50 researchers for every 1 million persons were accounted for in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁹

Refugee Survey Quarterly

One of the main challenges for the years to come will be to further diversify the geographical origin of contributors to the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*. While efforts have been made in this sense in the past years, submissions are still dominated by scholars from the Global North. This is not peculiar to the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, but more broadly reflects the prevailing biases in academic research and publications. In this field like in many others, the production of knowledge remains largely structured by the Western-centric priorities of research funding that is financed by wealthy states and fuelled by the dominant discourse of the governing elites. This trend is further exacerbated by the enduring misperceptions spread by mass media, as illustrated by the rhetoric – if not the obsession – about the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. While it may have less implications in other fields, the geographical representation of researchers is particularly crucial in migration to account for the multifaceted dimensions and challenges of such a worldwide phenomenon that concerns every region of the world. There is more than ever a vital need for developing a more nuanced, representative and comprehensive understanding of migration through independent and evidence-based knowledge.

Source: Vincent Chetail, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

A geographic comparison of the primary affiliations of authors as reported in the articles they published in the selected journals in 2017 and 2018 confirms that a disproportionately high number of contributors are from institutions in developed countries (see figure 3). Of the 917 authors, 84 per cent were affiliated with institutions in developed countries. Almost 43 per cent were affiliated with institutions based in Europe, and 36 per cent in Northern America. Of the 6 per cent affiliated with institutions in Oceania, nearly 91 per cent of these institutions were based in Australia or New Zealand.


26 IOM, 2017e.

27 Castles, 2010.

28 McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016.

29 Ibid., citing DFID, 2008.

Figure 3. Distribution of primary academic affiliations of authors by selected journals in 2017 and 2018, by region



Notes: Multiple categories were applied when an author had multiple academic affiliations in different regions. Affiliations of authors from international or non-governmental organizations are not included. n=917.

"LAC" means Latin America and the Caribbean. Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3 appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

While fewer than 12 per cent were affiliated with institutions in Asia, researchers from institutions in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are particularly underrepresented (accounting for, respectively, approximately 3% and 2%). This may also be explained in part by language barriers, noting the dominance of English language academic journals over other languages.³⁰ It is important to note, however, that figure 3 only accounts for authors' affiliations as published in the articles under consideration. Many academics have multiple affiliations and some may choose to publish under a (more prestigious) affiliation that may not be the author's main institution.

International Journal of Migration and Border Studies

The IJMBS contributed to the understanding of how the logics of borders are confronted by migrant realities and everyday experiences. Research has documented the increasingly protracted nature of migrants' journeys. Being in transit has become the daily lived reality of many people on the move. Accordingly, special attention was paid by IJMBS to the concept of transit as a space constructed through mobility restrictions regimes and the above-mentioned systems of reciprocal conditionalities.

Source: Idil Atak, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

³⁰ See IOM's lists of migration journals in Spanish and French, respectively, Available at www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/MPR/Migration-Journals-ES.pdf and www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/MPR/Migration-Journals-FR.pdf (both accessed 18 June 2019).

Plan S: The future of open access for scientific research?

Plan S is an open access initiative of Science Europe and the Open Access Envoy of the European Commission that was launched in September 2018 by a coalition of national research funding organizations, with the support of the European Commission and the European Research Council. Its objective is for all scientific publications funded by national and European research councils and funding bodies to be immediately available in open access after 1 January 2020. While authors will retain copyrights on their publications, funding institutions will cover open access publication fees applied by publishers, which will be standardized and capped.

The success of Plan S to establish universal open access will depend on the participation of funding institutions worldwide. As of April 2019, Plan S was supported by a coalition of 15 national research funding organizations and 4 philanthropic organizations within and outside Europe. Other funding institutions were awaiting a decision concerning the amount of capped fees for open access to be applied by publishers and/or investigating the impact that Plan S will have on research funding and scientific research before deciding whether or not to join.^a Some publishers have raised concerns about the implications of the initiative on academic freedom and the quality of scientific research, as the choice of publishers for researchers will be limited to those giving the option of open access publications.^b

The more funding institutions will decide to join “cOAlition S”, the more likely Plan S will be able to break the paywall business model of publishers and secure free access to scientific research worldwide. While this is particularly important for researchers in developing countries, whose institutions do not always have the financial resources to pay subscriptions to scientific journals, Plan S may well, however, create another geographic bias: open access publications will likely be outside the reach of researchers from the Global South, whose funding institutions will not be able to pay open access costs applied by publishers.

More information on Plan S can be found at www.coalition-s.org/.

a Rabesandratana, 2019.

b Kelly, 2019.


Beyond the selected journals, it is likely that this uneven distribution reflects the broader state of migration research. In 2015, professor Jørgen Carling compiled a list of “top” migration researchers who have published extensively in leading migration journals, concluding: “It’s striking that there’s not a single person on the list based in Africa or Latin America. And the six people based in Asia are all working in countries of immigration. This geographical bias continues to be a major challenge for migration research.”³¹

As the interest in migration has increased, and the amount of migration research and analysis material has grown, it would be reasonable to expect that the reach (through expanding readerships, for example)

31 Carling, 2015.

has also increased. One indicator – though extensively criticized – in academic publishing is a journal's Impact Factor.³² However, Impact Factors were available for only three of the selected journals (*International Migration*, *International Migration Review* and *Migration Studies*). Taking into consideration these three journals, together with those examined in the *World Migration Report 2018*, there appears to have been an increase (see figure 4). The recent average Impact Factor increase suggests that the articles published in these journals are receiving more attention: citing a paper reasonably implies that it has been read, and that some of its content was helpful in adding to the evidence base and/or generating debates, building knowledge, or informing migration policy and practice.

Figure 4. Impact Factor of selected journals



Source: <https://jcr.incites.thomsonreuters.com/> (accessed 21 June 2019).

Note: *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies*, *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, *Refugee Survey Quarterly* and *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* were not indexed by InCites at the time of writing (June 2019), while *Migration Studies* started to be indexed in InCites in 2017. The Impact Factor is the ratio of citations to publications.

Publication metrics based on citation counts (including the Impact Factor) clearly have various limitations and downsides.³³ First, citations tend to accumulate slowly, given academic publishing timelines and the time it takes to compile/release statistics. Second, citations are a matter almost solely within the academic context, which is one reason alternative measures (discussed below) have been developed. Third, citations do not measure quality of material, but are a way of quantifying impact (see the discussion on this point in

³² The Impact Factor is a citations-publications ratio. For a given year, it takes into account citations and publications from the preceding two years. For more information, please see the example in appendix A.

³³ For a recent overview of Impact Factor limitations, see Williams and Padula, 2015. For a broader account of Impact Factor misuse, see The PLoS Medicine Editors, 2006.

appendix A). While citation metrics have become a priority for academic publishers and scholars, they are likely to be less relevant to people outside academia.

New metrics are being developed for scholarly publications to assess their impact outside of academia. One such metric is the Altmetric Attention Score,³⁴ indicating “how many people have been exposed to and engaged with a scholarly output”.³⁵ For any research output, the Attention Score “provides an indicator of the amount of attention that it has received”,³⁶ with some sources having more weight than others. For instance, coverage in the news has the highest weight of 8, since “it’s easy to imagine that the average newspaper story is more likely to bring attention to the research output than the average tweet”.³⁷ Other high-weight sources include blogs (5), Wikipedia (3), policy documents (3) and Twitter (1). Altmetrics are relatively new, having commenced in 2012. They have been recognized as “tools that aim to measure the real-time reach and influence of an academic article”.³⁸ Academics found “positive but relatively weak correlation with citations”,³⁹ supporting the idea that “citation and altmetrics indicators track related but distinct impacts”.⁴⁰ Mentions in blogs are particularly “able to identify highly cited publications”⁴¹ – an empirical finding that supports the important weight assigned to blogs within the altmetric algorithm, further highlighting the increasing importance of this form of dissemination of scientific material.

We have analysed views/downloads and the Altmetric Attention Score of 410 peer-reviewed articles published in 2017 and 2018 by six of the eight journals under consideration in this chapter (*International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* and *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* were not publishing these data at the time of writing). The Attention Score was chosen for two main reasons: (a) first, it was freely available on all the journal publishers’ websites; (b) second, the available evidence supports its use, especially for tracking recent research output.⁴² The analysis allowed us to unveil quantitative aspects of academic publications on migration, such as how many were mentioned, viewed and/or downloaded. Table 2 shows the top 10 articles with the highest Altmetric Attention Score for the selected journals in April 2019. The high scores obtained by these articles, however, does not reflect the Altmetric Score of the 410 sampled articles. Only 21 articles (5%) scored higher than 20 – roughly the equivalent of one mention in the news and one in a blog plus five tweets. The largest share of scholarly articles (172 or 42%) had a score from 2 to 20. However, 75 articles (18%) had a score of 2 or lower – meaning that they attracted, at most, the equivalent of a couple of tweets – and 142 articles (35%) scored zero, as they were not mentioned online by any source. This relates in part to the fact that they are recently published, and we would expect to see some articles attract more attention over time.

³⁴ See www.altmetric.com (accessed 19 June 2019).

³⁵ See www.altmetric.com/about-altmetrics/what-are-altmetrics/ (accessed 19 June 2019).

³⁶ Available at <https://help.altmetric.com/support/solutions/articles/6000060969-how-is-the-altmetric-attention-score-calculated->.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Warren, Raison and Dasgupta, 2017.

³⁹ Costas, Zahedi and Wouters, 2015; Thelwall et al., 2013.

⁴⁰ Priem, Piwowar and Hemminger, 2012.

⁴¹ Costas, Zahedi and Wouters, 2015.

⁴² Just like classic citation metrics, altmetrics offer benefits and disadvantages. See Bornmann (2014) for a deeper discussion.

**Table 2. Top 10 articles with the highest Altmetric Attention Score
for selected journals, 2017 and 2018**


Article	Journal	Score
The 2,000 mile wall in search of purpose: Since 2007 visa overstays have outnumbered undocumented border crossers by a half million, by R. Warrant and D. Kerwin	<i>Journal on Migration and Human Security</i>	139
Unpacking the presumed statelessness of Rohingyas, by N. Kyaw	<i>Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies</i>	125
Between rootedness and rootlessness: How sedentarist and nomadic metaphysics simultaneously challenge and reinforce (dual) citizenship claims for Liberia, by R.N. Pailey	<i>Migration Studies</i>	101
Does the legalization of undocumented immigrants in the US encourage unauthorized immigration from Mexico? An empirical analysis of the moral hazard of legalization, by T. Wong and H. Kosnac	<i>International Migration</i>	50
The effect of visas on migration processes, by M. Czaika and H. de Haas	<i>International Migration Review</i>	45
Refugee resettlement as an alternative to asylum, by N. Hashimoto	<i>Refugee Survey Quarterly</i>	39
Repeat migration in the age of “unauthorized permanent resident”: A quantitative assessment of migration intentions postdeportation, by D. Martinez, J. Slack and R. Martinez-Schuldt	<i>International Migration Review</i>	39
Sanctuary cities: Policies and practices in international perspective, by H. Bauder	<i>International Migration</i>	38
The borders beyond the border: Australia’s extraterritorial migration controls, by A.L. Hirsch	<i>Refugee Survey Quarterly</i>	35
Forced displacement in Turkey: Pushing the limits of the ECHR system, by D. Dinsmore	<i>International Migration</i>	34

Note: *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* and *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* were not publishing these data at the time of writing (April 2019).

Concerning article views and downloads, not all journals provide such data on their websites. At the time of writing, one (*Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*) was providing views only, one (*Journal on Migration and Human Security*) provided only downloads, and two (*Migration Studies* and *Refugee Survey*

Quarterly) provided views and downloads. Four journals (*International Journal of Migration and Border Studies*, *International Migration*, *International Migration Review*, and *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*) were not showing any data on article views or downloads. To overcome this lack of standardization, we aggregated views and downloads. Figure 5 shows the distribution of views/downloads of 181 articles from the four available sources, grouped by hundreds. As for the articles of the seven journals examined in the *World Migration Report 2018*,⁴³ the skewed shape of the distribution – similar to the Attention Score – highlights a relatively low level of reach. Only 24 articles (13%) were viewed/downloaded more than 1,000 times. The views/downloads data indicate that most academic writings have fairly limited readership.

Figure 5. Distribution of numbers of views and downloads of 181 articles from 2017 and 2018, selected journals



Source: Journal publishers' websites, as of 26–28 February 2019.

Note: *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies*, *International Migration*, *International Migration Review* and *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* were not providing data on views or downloads at the time of writing (April 2019).

In summary, our quantitative analysis shows that migration as a topic is receiving increasing attention: the growing number of publications and citations are a sign of heightened interest, at least within the academic community. Measures of views/downloads and Altmetrics suggest that there is room for improving the reach and readership of scholarly production on migration. One of the main obstacles to this is the fact that academic publications tend to be behind paywalls, significantly limiting access to material beyond academia. Journal subscribers, for example, are often academic institutions, and the cost of downloading single articles

for non-subscribers can be prohibitive. Open access for academic publications enables free downloads, but usually requires publisher fees to be paid by the author or their institution. More open-access journals (such as *Comparative Migration Studies* and *Anti-Trafficking Review*) have, however, been publishing on migration.⁴⁴

In addition, academic language and writing style tend to be more technical than in other areas of publishing, and the topics tend to be narrower. Dissemination of findings, however, through both traditional and newer forms of media, offer opportunities for academic research on migration to inform public and policy discourses. The potential reach of blogs on migration, for example, is discussed further below.

Journal on Migration and Human Security

Without sacrificing academic and analytical rigor, *JMHS* papers take a human-centered approach to migration scholarship, focusing on (typically) at risk, vulnerable, and marginalized persons who are misunderstood and often scapegoated in migration policy debates. *JMHS* requires that each published paper begin with an executive summary and end with a series of policy recommendations. This increases the accessibility of *JMHS* papers to policymakers, policy influencers, and the general public. *JMHS* promises potential authors that their work will be rigorously reviewed, published in a timely fashion (if accepted), and distributed through research and university library databases, to *JMHS*'s extensive dissemination list, and to tailored lists of policymakers, the press and others with a special interest in the topic. *JMHS* also publicizes its papers via social media, both upon their release and subsequently in response to news hooks and relevant policy discussions.

Source: Donald Kerwin, Executive Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.

Intergovernmental organizations

The contributions of key United Nations organizations working on migration reflect mandates as well as current trends and issues in migration. Table 3 provides examples of key material published in 2017 and 2018 by the United Nations organizations examined in this chapter. Given the high number and variety of publications issued during these two years, the table is limited to key material that has a global focus.

Table 3. Examples of key global material published in 2017 and 2018

UN DESA	<i>International Migration Report 2017</i> <i>International Migration Policies Data Booklet, 2017</i> Dataset on International Migrants Stock Dataset on International Migration Flows	2017 2017 Ongoing (2019) Ongoing
UNHCR	<i>Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017</i> <i>Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016</i> Population Statistics Database	2018 2017 Ongoing

⁴⁴ Open access involves making published material available for free, not on a fee/subscription basis. See text box above on Plan S.

ILO	<i>ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology</i> <i>Addressing Governance Challenges in a Changing Labour Migration Landscape</i> ILOSTAT	2018 2017 Ongoing	
OHCHR	<i>Principles and Guidelines, Supported by Practical Guidance, on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations^a</i>	2018	
UNICEF	<i>A Child Is a Child: Protecting Children on the Move from Violence, Abuse and Exploitation</i>	2017	
	<i>Beyond Borders: How to Make the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees Work for Uprooted Children</i>	2017	
	<i>Education Uprooted: For Every Migrant, Refugee and Displaced Child, Education</i>	2017	
UNODC	<i>Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018</i> <i>Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants</i> Smuggling of Migrants Knowledge Portal	2018 2018 Ongoing	
UNDP	<i>Climate change, migration and displacement^b</i>	2017	
UNESCO	<i>Global Education Monitoring Report on Migration, Displacement and Education</i>	2018	
	<i>Migration and its Interdependencies with Water Scarcity, Gender and Youth Employment</i>	2017	
World Bank	<i>Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets</i> <i>Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook – Transit Migration</i> <i>Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook – Return Migration</i> Migration and Remittances Data	2018 2018 2017 Ongoing	
	GMG^c	<i>Handbook for Improving the Production and Use of Migration Data for Development^d</i> <i>Migration, Remittances and Financial Inclusion: Challenges and Opportunities for Women's Economic Empowerment^e</i>	2017 2017
		<i>G20 International Migration and Displacement Trends Report 2018^f</i>	2018 2017

Note: This table does not include all material, such as working papers; only key material is included. IOM publications are discussed below.

Sources: (a) Published by OHCHR and the Global Migration Group; (b) Published by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and UNDP; (c) GMG was an inter-agency group within the United Nations system that worked collaboratively on migration. Prior to its transition in late 2018 to the United Nations' International Network on Migration, it had 22 member agencies, with a rotating annual chair. Discussion of GMG and the Network are included in chapter 11 of this report on global migration governance; (d) Produced by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank; (e) Produced by the Economic Empowerment Section of UN-Women, New York, on behalf of GMG; (f) Led by OECD, jointly published with ILO, IOM and UNHCR.

UN DESA coordinates the assembly of data, including in relation to migration – a process that has highlighted limitations in the capabilities of national statistical offices.⁴⁵ In 2017, its Population Division published the *International Migration Report 2017*⁴⁶ – a biennial publication that presents information on levels and trends in international migration for major areas, regions and countries of the world, and on the ratification status of migration-related legal instruments. The Population Division maintains the United Nations Global Migration Database – the most complete set of statistics on international migrants enumerated in countries or areas, and classified by age, sex and country or area of birth or citizenship – as well as a smaller data set with annual data on international migration flows for 45 countries.

As a United Nations agency with a mandate to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees, UNHCR produces a wealth of publications and has a dedicated research repository – refworld. Released annually in June, *Global Trends*⁴⁷ is one of UNHCR's flagship publications. It presents and analyses annual trends worldwide in relation to refugee and other populations of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR is also the key source of global statistics on refugees and other populations of concern, as reported in its online Population Statistics Database.

ILO is a standard-setting body responsible for coordinating the development and supervising the implementation of international labour standards. In the context of its efforts to improve the collection and production of labour migration statistics, *ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers*⁴⁸ provides estimates of the proportion of labour migrant workers among the total number of migrants worldwide. In 2017, it also published a report entitled *Addressing Governance Challenges in a Changing Labour Migration Landscape*⁴⁹ to inform the development of just and effective governance of labour migration. In addition to labour migration data, the ILOSTAT database contains diverse statistics related to the labour market which are also relevant to labour migration.

Part of the United Nations Secretariat, OHCHR is the principal United Nations office mandated to promote and protect the human rights of all persons, including migrants. In addition to supporting United Nations human rights mechanisms, such as treaty bodies and Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OHCHR produces a wealth of relevant materials. As co-chair of the former GMG Working Group on Migration, Human Rights and Gender, it led the development of the *Principles and Guidelines, Supported by Practical Guidance, on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations*.⁵⁰ These *Principles and Guidelines* offer guidance to States on the operationalization of international human rights law to protect migrants who find themselves in vulnerable situations but do not fall into the legal category of "refugee". They are explicitly referred to in the Global Compact for Migration to "[d]evelop national policies and programmes to improve national responses that address the needs of migrants in situations of vulnerability".⁵¹

Although UNICEF's flagship publication – the *State of the World's Children*⁵² – does not necessarily single out migrant children, in 2017 UNICEF published *A Child Is a Child: Protecting Children on the Move from Violence*,

⁴⁵ Davies and Woodward, 2014.

⁴⁶ UN DESA, 2017.

⁴⁷ UNHCR, 2019.

⁴⁸ ILO, 2018.

⁴⁹ ILO, 2017.

⁵⁰ OHCHR, 2018.

⁵¹ UNGA, 2018: para. 23(l).

⁵² UNICEF, 2017a.

*Abuse and Exploitation.*⁵³ It examines the risks faced by migrant children because of the lack of safe and legal migration pathways, and sets out some policy recommendations to better protect them.

Within its mandate to assist States in addressing international crimes, UNODC undertakes efforts to combat transnational organized crime, including human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and produces a variety of reports on these themes. The fourth *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*,⁵⁴ published in 2018, provides an overview of patterns and flows of trafficking in persons, and is based primarily on trafficking cases detected from 2014 to 2016. In 2018, UNDOC released its first *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants*,⁵⁵ which gives an account of the magnitude and functioning of migrants' smuggling, the profiles of the people involved, and the risks faced by migrants. UNODC also maintains a Smuggling of Migrants Knowledge Portal on information to support the implementation of the 2000 United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime⁵⁶ (such as case law, annotated bibliography and legislation).

As the United Nations global development agency, UNDP's commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals translates into a broad range of programmes, including for building long-term development responses to migration and displacement. In 2017, UNDP issued a report, together with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), entitled *Climate Change, Migration and Displacement*,⁵⁷ which seeks to shed light on the complex connections between climate change and human mobility.

UNESCO's mandate is focused on building peace by means of education, culture and science. The 2019 edition of its annual *Global Education Monitoring Report*⁵⁸ series focuses on migration and displacement. It analyses the impact of human mobility on the education systems and the way these systems can help address the challenges posed by human mobility, offering examples of successful policies.

As a United Nations specialized agency and a major international financial institution, the World Bank publishes a variety of books, reports and working papers on the importance of migration for growth and economic prosperity, and monitors data on migration and remittances, such as remittances inflows and outflows. It issues regular Migration and Development Briefs on topical issues, the two most recent ones dealing with transit and return migration. The Policy Research Report entitled *Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets*,⁵⁹ released in 2018, analyses the apparent tension between academic findings on the social and economic benefits of migration, and the antimigration public discourse.

Key global material was also published in 2017 and 2018 as a result of inter-agency collaboration. Prior to its transition into the United Nations Network on Migration, GMG produced publications covering various topics relating to migration, often taking the form of handbooks and guidelines.⁶⁰ In 2017, it published a handbook to support Member States in the production and use of data on migration for development purposes (produced by UN-Women). It also released a report examining the question of remittances and migrant

⁵³ UNICEF, 2017b.

⁵⁴ UNODC, 2018a.

⁵⁵ UNODC, 2018b.

⁵⁶ UNODC, 2000.

⁵⁷ UNDP and ODI, 2017.

⁵⁸ UNESCO, 2018.

⁵⁹ World Bank, 2018.

⁶⁰ GMG was an inter-agency group gathering 22 United Nations agencies working collaboratively on migration.

women's financial inclusion (produced by KNOMAD, World Bank). Another key publication resulting from inter-agency collaboration is the *G20 International Migration and Displacement Trends Report 2018*⁶¹ produced by OECD,⁶² jointly with ILO, IOM and UNHCR. The report presents migration trends and policy challenges in G20 countries and Member States of the European Union.⁶³

IOM

IOM published a wide range of research and analysis materials in 2017 and 2018 – most notably in the form of stand-alone studies and reports, many of which stemmed directly from specific projects and often produced locally by IOM missions. For example, the report *Making Mobility Work for Adaptation to Environmental Changes: Results from the MECLEP Global Research*⁶⁴ is the final publication of the European Union-funded Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project assessing the evidence base on migration and climate change in the six countries involved in the project: the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam.

The text box below lists key publications produced by IOM in 2017 and 2018. In 2017, IOM released its biennial flagship publication, the *World Migration Report 2018*.⁶⁵ In 2018, the Organization also revitalized its *Migration Research Series*, which publishes policy-relevant research and analysis on diverse and complex migration issues. Calls for abstracts were circulated in 2018 on topics addressed in the *World Migration Report 2018* to further stimulate research and analysis, and three papers were published. Additionally, three *Migration Profiles* were issued in 2017 and five in 2018. They provide country-specific migration overviews (largely funded by IOM's Development Fund) to support, among other things, capacity-building on migration data, and research and analysis in Member States. IOM's support of migration journals – *International Migration* and *Migration Policy Practice* – was also an important contribution to migration research.

Key IOM research-related publications produced in 2017 and 2018

World Migration Report 2018^a

Migration Research Leaders' Syndicate: Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration^b

Migration and the 2030 Agenda: A Guide for Practitioners^c

Fatal Journeys, Volume 3: Improving Data on Missing Migrants (Parts 1 and 2)^d

The Atlas of Environmental Migration^e

⁶¹ OECD, ILO, IOM and UNHCR, 2018.

⁶² OECD comprises 36 members. Its mission is to promote policies enhancing the economic and social well-being of individuals worldwide. It conducts research on a variety of topics, including migration, with a scope that often goes beyond its member and partner countries.

⁶³ G20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

⁶⁴ IOM, 2017c.

⁶⁵ IOM, 2017e.

Making Mobility Work for Adaptation to Environmental Changes: Results from the MECLEP Global Research^f

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A Global Review of the Emerging Evidence Base (volume 2)^g

Global Migration Data Analysis Centre Data Briefs

Migration, Environment and Climate Change Policy Briefs

Migration Profiles (several country reports, including Jamaica, Kenya, Maldives, Senegal and Zimbabwe)

a IOM, 2017e.

b IOM, 2017d.

c IOM, 2018.

d IOM, 2017a, 2017b.

e Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.

f IOM, 2017c.

g Triandafyllidou and McAuliffe, 2018.

In 2017 and 2018, IOM also supported Member States during the consultation and negotiation process of the Global Compact for Migration with the creation of the Migration Research Leaders' Syndicate. A collection of short technical papers was published in 2017 in the form of a report (*Migration Research Leaders' Syndicate: Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*)⁶⁶ was one of the key outputs of the Syndicate's work, as presented in the text box below.

IOM 2017 Migration Research Leaders' Syndicate in support of the Global Compact for Migration

The innovative research "Syndicate" initiative drew upon the research and knowledge of 36 of the world's leading "migration policy scholars" hailing from all regions.

The 2017 Syndicate was established and convened to enable high-quality technical expertise and deep knowledge to be fed directly into the development of the Global Compact for Migration. Key outputs included:

- Syndicate members' top three reads for policymakers on migration;
- Short technical papers on Global Compact for Migration-related themes with evidence, analysis and recommendations for policymakers;

66 IOM, 2017d.

- Blogs published by IOM's partner, the World Economic Forum, on Global Compact for Migration-related topics;
- Syndicate members' participation in Global Compact for Migration consultations as thematic experts and panel members;
- Syndicate panel discussions at United Nations headquarters on Global Compact for Migration-related topics, including in the margins of the Global Compact for Migration negotiations.


Further information is available in IOM, 2017d.

In recent years, the IOM online bookstore has been upgraded and improved. Launched in 2009 as a means of facilitating greater access to IOM publications, the online bookstore is now able to track and support analysis of data on the number of downloads of IOM publications. These data provide insights into accessibility and reach of IOM publications, supplementing readers' surveys of specific outputs. As of the end of 2018, the bookstore contained 1,794 electronic publications in 28 different languages, most of which could be accessed free of charge. While download data do not allow for an assessment of the quality of publications (such as can be done through reader surveys or peer review, for example), they do provide some insights into the individual publications that have high download rates, as well as the themes and geographic nature of the research-related publications that are produced and accessed globally. In 2018, the number of downloads from the IOM bookstore exceeded 2 million.

In 2018, the *World Migration Report 2018* became the most downloaded IOM publication of all time, with over 400,000 downloads globally as at end of August 2019 (or around 620 downloads per day). The *World Migration Report 2018* was the first edition after substantive changes were made to the *World Migration Report* series concerning content and quality assurances processes, including a move away from a single thematic report to a much broader coverage of key data and information on migration as well as complex and emerging issues. These changes have been successful in expanding the report's readership and sustaining a high download rate compared with previous editions, such as the *World Migration Report 2015*, which was on the single theme of migrants and cities (see figure 6). In addition, the 2018 report has received more than 500 citations in academic literature.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ At 14 October 2019 Google Scholar searches found 551 citations.

Figure 6. Downloads of World Migration Report 2018 compared with 2015 edition




Source: IOM.

Note: Downloads for each month following respective report launches; includes the English versions only.

An examination of IOM research-related publications that were each downloaded more than 1,000 times shows that some themes were more prominent than others, with cross-cutting publications featuring heavily – including, for example, country migration profiles that traverse multiple thematic issues. Interest in migration law and governance increased in 2017 (see figure 7).

Figure 7. Proportion of IOM research-related downloads by theme




Source: IOM.

Notes: “IM” means irregular migration. Only publications downloaded more than 1,000 times in a year included (downloads in 2015 have been prorated, as data for the entire year are not available). Downloads could be classified by more than one theme. n=5,547,808 downloads.

Overall, interest in research on specific regions was relatively stable from 2015 to 2018. Publications focusing on Africa featured more heavily than others for the past four years (see figure 8), followed by Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania.

Figure 8. Proportion of IOM research-related downloads by region



Source: IOM.

Notes: Only publications downloaded more than 1,000 times in a year have been included (downloads for 2015 have been prorated, as data for the entire year are not available). Downloads could be classified by more than one region. n=5,547,808 downloads.

“LAC” means Latin America and the Caribbean. Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3 appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Blogs

As part of the broader tendency towards greater interest in migration and migration-related research, there has been a concomitant rise in the number of blogs that feature articles on migration. While the growth and utility of blogging was addressed in chapter 4 of the *World Migration Report 2018*,^a it is well beyond the scope of this chapter to examine in detail the changes in blog publishing specifically on migration; however, examples of widely read migration articles are provided below. They show that some blog articles can reach large audiences and, because of this, are likely to be influential in informing discussions on migration.^b It is also important to acknowledge that some argue that blogs tend to be written on “hot” or controversial migration topics, such as irregular or mass migration, refugees and asylum seekers, while less controversial topics are often neglected.^c

Examples of migration-related articles published on blogs

Canada wants to take in more than 1 million new immigrants in the next 3 years, by Kate Whiting, published by the World Economic Forum's Agenda blog on 3 December 2018 – **102,224 views**.

Why accepting refugees is a win-win-win formula, by Dany Bahar, published by Brookings's Up Front blog on 19 June 2018 – **24,094 views**.

Trump and AMLO are headed for a U.S.-Mexico blow-up, by Shannon O'Neil, republished by the Council on Foreign Relations' blog on Latin America's Moment (with permission from Bloomberg) on 30 July 2018 – **11,536 views**.

Beware the notion that better data lead to better outcomes for refugees and migrants, by Jeff Crisp, published by Chatham House's Expert Comment blog on 9 March 2018 – **4,991 views**.

The journey across America: understanding a nation's immigration experience, by Katy Long, published by the Overseas Development Institute, 2018 – **1,200 views**.

Note: The number of reads or views and related analytics were provided by the relevant blog editor in April 2019.

a IOM, 2017e.

b Aldred et al., 2008.

c Ozimek, 2012.

Conclusions

Building on the *World Migration Report 2018*, this chapter provides an overview of the key contributions of some of the main producers of migration research and analysis during the last two calendar years (2017 and 2018). We found that the long-term trend of increased output of migration research was further extended in 2017 and 2018, which saw the largest amount ever of academic output on migration published in 2017 and equalled in 2018 (see figure 1). Further, these two years saw tremendous activity by intergovernmental organizations, with a large number of global reports on aspects of migration having been published (see table 3 for examples).

The increase in material published is undoubtedly related to the salience of migration in policy, political as well as public spheres. We have witnessed the increasing use of migration – or more correctly at times, anti-immigration – as a political tool, despite the existing evidence base showing that there has not been substantive changes in migration (levels or processes) to warrant such significant shifts in the public debate (see chapter 5 of this report for discussion). It is understandable that researchers, working on academic or applied research, or in white or grey literature, have been inspired to seek and report the truth during a period in which we witnessed “fake news” and “disinformation” increasingly take hold in public debates on migration globally.

Consistent with the findings of *World Migration Report 2018*, there is certainly a strong case to be made for playing to the strengths of the different types of research published on migration. Some of the highest quality blogs on migration, for example, are based on carefully elaborated and conducted studies, and insightful analysis drawing on years of research. They also are able to garner significant interest, with data clearly showing extended reach to wider audiences that lay beyond the scientific. The use of blog platforms by influential migration academics to communicate their empirical and theoretical research findings to policy and general audiences demonstrates the relevance of the form. We are also seeing recognition of this in the calculation of how research impact is measured. The growing use of altmetrics, for example, which measure a journal article's reach in non-academic publishing, points to the increasing need to extend knowledge based on rigorous research and analysis into wider audiences. However, this should not be at the expense of the bedrock provided by scientific research, with its focus on meeting high quality standards.

In this chapter we examined research and analysis output from a geographic perspective for the first time. Previous IOM research projects conducted in partnership with academic and applied researchers around the world had brought disparities into sharp relief.⁶⁸ Our examination of the selected journals and IOM publications for 2017 and 2018 showed that there are indeed significant differences in focus, volume and author affiliation when published material is analysed by geographic region. As we have commented elsewhere, this is undoubtedly related to research funding sources (direct and indirect), with most sources emanating from wealthier countries. More effort, on a sustained basis, is needed to better support research institutions and researchers in developing countries, including by confronting some of the structural impediments that exists to funding and capacity. Analysis of IOM's own research publications confirmed anecdotal evidence that an important part of IOM's role is its focus on research concerning parts of the developing world, especially in Africa. Even greater effort to support research in developing States, however, is warranted as the vast majority of countries around the world work toward the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration – endeavours that would greatly benefit from the input of academic and applied researchers.

Finally, we again encourage policymakers, practitioners, researchers and others to access and digest the great wealth of written material on migration with a critical eye. We also underscore the importance of activities and initiatives that bring together migration scholars, practitioners and policymakers, including through workshops, conferences, briefing sessions and related consultations. While it may be difficult at times to do so, bridging the gaps that exist between policy, practice and research when done thoughtfully can reap enormous dividends for all.

68 See, for example, IOM, 2017d, McAuliffe and Lazcko, 2016 and Triandafyllidou and McAuliffe, 2018.

PART II

COMPLEX AND EMERGING MIGRATION ISSUES





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5

REFLECTIONS ON MIGRANTS' CONTRIBUTIONS IN AN ERA OF INCREASING DISRUPTION AND DISINFORMATION¹

Introduction

A glance through previous World Migration Reports, and other policy and scientific publications on international migration, shows that at least two observations have been prevalent over time: i) recognition that migration, particularly immigration, has emerged as a prominent international and national policy issue; and ii) that the public discourse on migration has increasingly become polarized with the space for balanced, rigorous, and evidence-based analyses having diminished over time.² While the nature of the public discourse has changed over time, there is widespread recognition that the “toxicity” of the migration debate has further intensified over the last few years, with the politics of fear and division increasingly framing discussions.³ Disruption and disinformation are increasingly being deployed as part of tactical pursuits of power, with negative impacts on public, political and social media discourse, on societal values, and on public policy issues such as migration, displacement and migrants (including refugees).⁴

In the face of often negatively skewed discussions on migration and migrants, one can lose sight of the fact that human endeavours to improve peace and prosperity in modern times that are underpinned by migration have been on the whole successful, and in specific key areas very successful (such as the eradication or control of specific, deadly diseases and the dramatic decline in infant mortality following the efforts of Nations under the 2000–2015 Millennium Development Goals).⁵ Migrants provide a source of dynamism globally, and are overrepresented in innovation and patents, arts and sciences awards, start-ups and successful companies. Such historical and contemporary contributions have become increasingly overlooked or ignored in recent discussions on international migration, with many contributions being “normalized” over time but nevertheless evident (at times conspicuously so).

It is also easy to lose sight of the fact that international migration remains a relatively uncommon phenomenon, with a mere 3.5 per cent of the world’s population being international migrants (see chapter 2 of this report for details). Notwithstanding this small proportion, the total number of international migrants has increased in recent decades to reach as high as 272 million, or close to the national population of Indonesia (269 million).⁶ What we currently know is that mobility, as opposed to migration, is becoming much more prevalent, making some argue that now is the time to rethink how we conceptualize and discuss these issues.⁷

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² GCIM, 2005; Martin, Larkin and Nathanson, 2000; McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017.

³ Fisher, 2017; Kaufmann, 2017; Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019.

⁴ Morgan, 2018.

⁵ Mathers et al., 2018.

⁶ UN DESA, 2019.

⁷ Deutschmann and Recchi, 2019; Skeldon, 2018. See also the discussion on mobility in chapter 1.

In this context, revisiting the many ways in which migrants have contributed – at the transnational, national and local levels – is important in presenting a balanced discussion on migration. This is not to suggest that international migration and displacement do not pose challenges for communities in origin, transit and destination countries (as well as migrants) – many other chapters in this report are focused on such challenges. However, in writing this chapter, we acknowledge that the many ways in which migrants contribute to societies are currently being overlooked, downplayed or taken for granted, and it is the purpose of this chapter to bring these contributions of migrants to the forefront.

The next section describes key concepts related to contributions, providing an analytical framework for this chapter in the context of a rich body of academic and policy work on the topic. We then go on to describe and analyse migrants' contributions globally, with reference to sociocultural, civic–political and economic aspects. The chapter then discusses emerging impediments to the recognition of migrants' contributions globally, before outlining the implications for policy deliberations and for further research.

What are “contributions”?

To contribute means to give something – money, time, ideas, labour, material goods – in order to achieve something with other people.⁸ Outside of personal relationships, such as those with family and friends, and in the context of sociology and social change theory, “contributions” are part of broader interactions and engagement with individuals, groups and institutions in society. In other words, contributions occur as part of broader structural settings and social processes that support and shape societies. They can be broadly categorized as being in sociocultural, civic–political or economic domains (see text box for definitions).

Sociocultural relates to different groups of people in society and their habits, traditions and beliefs.

Civic–political relates to participation in civic duties in the context of accepted authority of the State.

Economic relates to aspects concerned with trade, industry or money.

Sources: Cambridge Dictionary, 2019; Almond and Verba, 1963.

As the salience of migration has risen in public policy and research spheres, there has been a new and greater focus on migrants per se – as distinct subpopulations within larger national populations, with reference to the structural settings they encounter, especially in the destination countries.⁹ The way in which people enter, stay and settle in a new country occupies the time of an increasing number of researchers, policymakers and those in the media:¹⁰ the first focusing on understanding the demographic, geographic, economic, legal/

⁸ Cambridge Dictionary, 2019.

⁹ Dennison and Drazanova, 2018.

¹⁰ Chapter 4 quantifies the increase in research output; chapter 11 discusses global migration governance.

policy and other factors;¹¹ the second on how best to meet policy objectives (however defined); and the third scrutinizing and commenting on both. Research continues to explore the dynamic relationships that exist between migrants (including potential migrants) and migration processes and related factors. We know from existing evidence and analysis, for example, that the contributions migrants are able to make in destination as well as origin settings do partly depend on legal–policy frameworks, such as those impacting the ability of both regular and irregular migrants to stay, participate in civic activities, work lawfully and send remittances, as well as to return home (see chapter 6 of this report).¹² Contributions are also related to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, with those who choose to migrate having higher skills, education and opportunity, ultimately also reflecting a greater likelihood of contributing in origin and destination countries in a variety of ways.¹³

Consistent with migration research more generally (see chapter 4 of this report), there is recognition that much of the analysis on migrants has been undertaken from a destination country perspective,¹⁴ with some arguing that the most significant immigration country in the world – the United States – has disproportionately influenced the study of migrants globally.¹⁵ With this in mind, this chapter attempts to reflect broader experiences of international migrants' contributions by incorporating recent research and analysis focusing on destination *and* origin.¹⁶ In scoping and presenting the chapter in this way, we acknowledge that we are not seeking to summarize all existing literature, nor are we suggesting that the findings highlighted in the chapter are representative. What we do recognize, however, is the importance of encapsulating a reasonable geographic and thematic *diversity* of research and analysis on the topic in what, after all, would make a migration report truly a *World Migration Report*.

Importantly, this chapter does not assess the overall impacts of migration in these settings. Studies on the impacts of migration are numerous and well documented (see examples in the text box below);¹⁷ they provide important insights and analyses. This body of work is focused mainly on economic impacts rather than sociocultural or civic–political impacts, including because economic variables are to a greater extent standardized, thereby supporting comparative analysis. Some examples of recent publications on the economic impacts of migration, including some empirical estimates, are included in the text box below.

¹¹ See, for example, writings on cumulative causation (Massey, 1990), neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1989), world system theory (Wallerstein, 1974; Portes and Walton, 1981), new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985) and social network theory (Boyd, 1989).

¹² Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Kanko and Teller, 2014; Shah, 2009.

¹³ Goldin, 2018; Hunt, 2010.

¹⁴ Carling, 2015; Castles, 2010; McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016; Morawska, 2008.

¹⁵ FitzGerald, 2014.

¹⁶ While this chapter focuses on *international* migration, we acknowledge that it may also be relevant to internal migration in some countries. See Weiner (1978) for examples of disruptions and disinformation leading to conflict and discrimination faced by inter-State migrants within India.

¹⁷ See also the *World Migration Report 2005* (IOM, 2005).

Assessing the economic impacts of migration

Estimating overall economic impacts of migration is a topic of intense debate in political and policy circles. Some recent publications on the topic include:

- *Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future*, by Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, shows that there is broad consensus among economists that, for destination countries, immigration is a catalyst for economic growth at an aggregate level and produces net economic benefits. However, the authors also acknowledge that there are ongoing debates on how to measure these effects.^a
- The McKinsey Global Institute's report, *People on the Move: Global Migration's Impact and Opportunity*, echoes these findings, showing that migrants contributed over 9 per cent, or USD 6.7 trillion, to global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015.^b
- *International Migration: Recent Trends, Economic Impacts, and Policy Implications*, by the International Monetary Fund, concludes that the economic impacts of migration vary across countries, and that, while migration brings challenges, it also confers benefits to origin and destination countries.^c
- *Migration and the Economy: Economic Realities, Social Impacts and Political Choices*, by Goldin et al., affirms that immigration impacts positively on economic growth, and that this happens in a number of ways: many migrants are comparatively younger than local populations and thus have a significant positive impact on both GDP per capita and overall (aggregate) GDP; migration enhances output per worker by increasing human capital; and migration bolsters total factor productivity as well as innovation. The report finds that, had immigration to the United Kingdom and Germany ceased in 1990, both countries' real GDP in 2014 would have been lower by GBP 175 billion and GBP 155 billion, respectively.^d
- The impacts on labour markets, including on wages, vary widely, are often negligible and are largely driven by how complementary migrants' skills are to those of local workers;^e these may be reversible in the longer run, as economies adjust to immigration, as Ruhs argues in *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration*.^f
- *The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access*, by Clemens, Huang and Graham, suggests that most evidence shows that the average effect of refugee inflows is on labour markets for both developed and developing countries is small or null.^g

a Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, 2011.

b McKinsey Global Institute, 2016.

c IMF, 2015.

d Goldin et al., 2018.

e Ibid.

f Ruhs, 2013.

g Clemens, Huang and Graham, 2018.

The next section of this chapter discusses sociocultural contributions, and is followed by sections covering civic-political and then economic contributions. The chapter then examines recent evidence on how public migration debates are changing, including through the (mis)use of social media platforms for misinformation and disruption with transnational reach. The final concluding section summarizes the implications of current evidence for policy, practice and research.

Migrants' sociocultural contributions

The sociocultural contributions of migrants are felt by many of us on a daily basis, even though we may not be conscious of it. Simple activities – such as shopping for groceries at our local market, eating out at a restaurant or ordering take-away food, visiting a place of worship, attending a musical performance or watching a sporting match – are likely to have been influenced or enriched (or, in some cases, made possible) by migrants who have brought with them customs and traditions.

Perhaps one of the most significant and highly visible contributions of migrants to the sociocultural dimensions of societies throughout the world has been the sharing of food and culinary traditions, resulting in the tremendous increase in food diversity in modern times. The highly social aspect of sharing food is a distinctly human trait of considerable cultural importance, and it has provided an opportunity for social bonding in private and public settings.¹⁸ The power of sharing and valuing such intimate and historical cultural conditions as the preparation of food allows for migrants' contributions to be understood as more profound than the superficial so-called "sushiology" of migration.¹⁹ Food can lie at the heart of integration experiences, which are often depicted as two-way processes:

Immigrants travel with their culinary practices and habits, while acquiring new food customs that they adapt naturally to their new life and, occasionally, import to their countries of origin. This mixing takes place, therefore, in both directions, as a reflection of human beings' need to share and dialogue, expressed through food.²⁰

Food also acts as a catalyst for cultural fusion and new experience, as many of the world's so-called "global cities" can show.²¹ Recent research shows that, globally, we are now more connected in culinary terms than ever before. A study of crop origins has found that the most important primary regions of diversity contributing to a country's modern food system are more often located elsewhere around the planet.²² Immigration, mobility and trade links have helped facilitate the development of the modern food system. Cuisines such as "Indian curry" or the "chicken tikka masala" (which rose to the status of being called Britain's national dish) have been a widely acknowledged aspect of the Indian-Pakistani-Bangladeshi diaspora's contribution to bringing diverse people together both "on the table" and "inside the kitchen".²³

Food culture can also be enriched by migrants returning home. In Belize, for example, its diversity and emigration patterns have allowed for the development of a rich food culture that draws on a variety of

¹⁸ Pilcher, 2017.

¹⁹ Skerry, 2002.

²⁰ Oussedik, 2012:55.

²¹ Kershen, 2002.

²² Khoury et al., 2016.

²³ Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.

cuisines and ingredients that are brought home to the country by migrant workers.²⁴ There are many countries throughout the world that can claim their cuisines have been enriched by international migration and the transfer of related cultural practices, especially those situated along sea and land trade routes or part of long-term migration corridors, such as Malta and Singapore. Recent studies have found a strong relationship between diversity of modern cuisines and migration.²⁵

In recent years, the arenas of professional and representational sport at the international level have become important in anti-racism and counter-xenophobia campaigns. The highly competitive and elite nature of this sector, as well as its high profile, has meant that migrants are often centre-stage for predominantly positive reasons.²⁶ In many ways, elite sports allow migrants to "transcend" discrimination and other negative issues because of the extraordinary talent they display and the admiration they may invoke. Programmes such as the European Sport Inclusion Network, the Social Inclusion and Volunteering in Sports Clubs in Europe, and "Welcome Football" (Australia) have sought to acknowledge and utilize migrant sports stars as positive role models, including to encourage integration through sports activities.²⁷ And yet, research has pointed to issues of inequality in the international sphere of elite sports, whereby migrants from countries of considerable, long-standing talent at the representative level have not necessarily been able to support vibrant sporting systems. Or, put another way, "during the 2002 soccer World Cup, 21 out of 23 players on the team from Senegal... played in the French league... real Senegalese football is not therefore played within Senegal, but in the clubs of Europe".²⁸ At the local level in Australia, Sudanese migrants have established basketball teams at local sports clubs as a way of encouraging teenagers from the community – African-Australian and others – to leave street culture behind.²⁹ Australia is a sporting country, and the discourse on sports and migration has been reasonably strong, with policy and programming including sporting activities as a means of integration. However, recent research has found that migrants' cultural contributions can be both an asset to, and a source of exclusion from, sport participation.³⁰ This depends, in part, on the majority-minority aspects of the sports activity and the extent to which the specific cultural capital of migrants can be flexibly incorporated into sporting systems.³¹ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, overall, migrants have made significant positive contributions in sports at local, national and global levels. See, for example, the text box below on the "Salah effect".

24 Wilk, 1999.

25 Sajadmanesh et al., 2017.

26 Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.

27 Atkinson, 2015; CMY, n.d.; SPIN, n.d.

28 Simiyu Njororai, 2010:449. This was also the case for the 2018 World Cup, in which the winning French team was almost entirely comprised players of African origin (McPartland, 2018).

29 Hinds, 2018.

30 Smith, Spaaij and McDonald, 2018.

31 Ibid.

The Salah effect

Besides his second-minute penalty for Liverpool FC against Tottenham Hotspur FC in Madrid on 1 June, Egyptian football striker Mo Salah may have also scored a goal against prejudice, according to a new study.

On the pitch, Salah often celebrates goals by dropping to his knees and touching his forehead to the grass in the sujood (an Islamic prayer position), while Liverpool fans have a chant that goes: “If he scores another few, then I’ll be Muslim, too.” But the Salah effect is having an impact beyond the stadium walls, say researchers from Stanford University, who found a drop in hate crimes around Liverpool since Salah signed with the club in June 2017. Islamophobia – or anti-Muslim racism – has been on the rise in the UK since the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001, according to think-tank Runnymede Trust. There are generally spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes between 24 to 72 hours after a terrorist attack by Islamic fundamentalists, such as the attack at Westminster in London in March 2017.

The report examined data from police departments around England, including Merseyside, the UK county in which Liverpool is located. It found hate crimes there were “significantly lower” – dropping by 18.9% since Salah joined the club – than would be otherwise expected.

“The observed decrease is larger in Merseyside than in all placebo counties, suggesting the result is not merely due to chance,” wrote the researchers. They noted that the trend has not coincided with a general decline in crime: “There is a larger relative decline in hate crimes than in any other crime category.” Not only that, but after studying 15 million tweets by UK football fans, the researchers found Liverpool supporters had halved the number of anti-Muslim tweets they were posting.

In the Stanford study, a survey of more than 8,000 Liverpool fans suggested the reason for the reduction in prejudice towards Muslims in Merseyside was because Salah was familiarizing his fans with Islam, through his observation of the faith, while his image as a bubbly father, friend and fantastic footballer was breaking down stereotypes of “threatening Muslims”. Through his now-famous goal celebration, his social media posts, his pitch-side interviews and seeing his wife Magi cheering him in a veil, Salah’s fans have been invited into his public and private lives. “These findings suggest that positive exposure to outgroup celebrities can reveal new and humanizing information about the group at large, reducing prejudiced attitudes and behaviours,” the researchers concluded. And they hope the Salah effect will offer up “new potential avenues for building social cohesion around the globe”.

Salah was named one of Time magazine’s 100 most influential people of 2019, described by HBO host John Oliver as “a humble, thoughtful, funny man who isn’t taking any of this too seriously”. Perhaps the last word should go to his Liverpool manager, Jurgen Klopp, who praised the athlete’s recognition in Time, noting, “Mo is a very smart person and his role is very influential. In the world at the moment, it is very important that you have people like Mo.”

Abridged excerpt of Whiting, 2019.

Just as extraordinary sporting talent has been found to enable individuals to transcend aspects of racism, migrants possessing exceptional artistic ability have been able to gain popularity and achieve success, thereby providing diverse role models for others in their communities. This is not to say that discrimination is overcome, but that social norms are able to be shaped over time in positive and constructive ways through admiration and respect (as highlighted in the text box above). In popular culture, difference is an asset, providing an “edge” in highly competitive talent and consumer-driven markets, making migrants from diverse backgrounds often overrepresented in entertainment sectors.³² In the creation of pop music, migrants can contribute fresh ideas:

Artistic production is an endeavour in which innovation is highly prized. This may give migrants and their ambivalently native born yet not-quite-native children some ironic advantages... Bringing different frames, tastes and repertoires from their cultures of origin may give migrants something new to add to the creative mix.³³

Cultural traditions can also be shared experiences as well as form the basis of resilience and strength in foreign (sometimes hostile) environments. A recent line of analysis has focused on “super-diversity” and the benefits as well as challenges highly diverse communities can present as a result of international migration, including in relation to cultural fusion and social cohesion, but also social tensions and xenophobia.³⁴ The notion of “super-diversity” often relates to cities as the main site of increasingly diverse populations³⁵ and, relatedly, of diversity of sociocultural settings and experiences.

Migrants have also made significant sociocultural contributions to countries of origin. It has long been observed that migrants bring with them new ideas, values and practices, sometimes referred to as “social remittances”.³⁶ These types of remittances are transferred or exchanged in various ways, including “when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin, when non-migrants visit those in the receiving country, or through the exchange of letters, videos, cassettes, emails, blog posts and telephone calls”.³⁷ Importantly, not all social remittances are positive. The ideas and practices that migrants bring with them can have both positive and negative effects.³⁸ For example, migrants have helped to shape gender norms in countries of origin by supporting and arguing for greater gender equity after experiencing it in other countries. Returning migrants have been found to have contributed positively to the empowerment of women and girls in their home countries.³⁹ One recent migration study found migrants in countries with gender parity are likely to promote gender equality in the social institutions in countries of origin, with women being greater agents of change than men.⁴⁰ However, those who migrated to countries with lower ratings of gender equality tend to bring back more conservative gender norms.⁴¹ A similar trend has been observed in relation to fertility rates. A 2013 study examining the relationship between international migration and the fertility rates of countries of origin at the macroeconomic level found that migration to countries with lower

³² Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.

³³ Kasinitz and Martinello, 2019:858.

³⁴ Vertovec, 2007; Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014. Noting that the empirical basis of the term has been questioned by empirical findings showing that in some locations (such as the United States), migration has increased but there has been a narrowing of diversity of immigrants (Czaika and de Haas, 2014).

³⁵ Nicholls and Uitermark, 2016.

³⁶ Levitt, 1998.

³⁷ Lamba-Nieves and Levitt, 2011.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2010; Lafleur and Duchesne, 2017; Grabowska and Engbersen, 2016; Kenny and O'Donnell, 2016.

⁴⁰ Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015.

⁴¹ Ibid.

fertility rates is associated with a reduction in fertility rates at home, while migration to destinations with high fertility rates tends to result in the reverse.⁴²

Migrants' contributions in civic–political terms

Migrants can be important contributors to civic–political life. In destination countries, for example, migrants can be involved in governance and politics at different levels (such as community/local areas, national levels), undertake volunteer work, and support fellow migrants (especially those who are newly arrived) as they integrate into new communities. Chapter 6 of this report discusses aspects of these issues from an integration and social cohesion perspective, including the extent to which migrants are able to wholly engage in political processes (such as democratic elections).

Perhaps more than sociocultural and economic contributions, the extent to which migrants are able to make civic–political contributions depends on policy settings of the country, including at the national, subnational and local levels; this topic is discussed in chapter 6 of this report and is not repeated here. However, the key factors influencing migrants' contributions have been neatly summarized in a publication on migrants' civic–political contributions (see table 1). This summary table shows the complexity of factors affecting the extent to which migrants are able to contribute in the civic–political sphere, which include structural settings but extend to other factors, including cultural and demographic aspects.

Table 1. Factors influencing immigrants' civic–political contributions

Global level	National level (origin and destination)	Local level (external and intragroup)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transportation and communication technology • International laws and treaties on human rights • International power politics, pressures and conflicts involving immigrants' home country/region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographic proximity between origin and destination • Structure and dynamics of the economy • State–national model of civic–political integration • Civic culture/practice of inclusion–exclusion (multiculturalism) • State of Nation-building process • Immigration/emigration policies and citizenship • State-to-State bilateral relationship • Patriarchal/egalitarian gender relations in private and public spheres 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structure and dynamics of the economy • Civic culture/practice of inclusion–exclusion (multiculturalism) • Extent of residential segregation • Intergroup relations • Proportion of foreign-born • Immigrant/ethnic group size and residential concentration • Sojourn/diaspora mentality • Immigrant/ethnic group sense of civic entitlement • Internal organization and leadership

Source: Adapted from Morawska, 2013, p. 142.

42 Beine, Docquier and Schiff, 2013.

As can be seen from table 1, normative or policy settings at all three governance levels (global, national and local) are important in circumscribing migrants' civic-political contributions. For example, the right to vote, hold public office, or join a political party or a trade union may be set by (or rely upon) regulations at different levels, determining the extent and nature of related engagement. In some places, for example, migrants are able (and expected) to contribute actively, including through voting in democratic elections (e.g. New Zealand), although this is still relatively uncommon for national elections. (See the text box on "Countries where migrants can vote in national elections" in chapter 6 of this report.) The ability to vote in democratic elections is often linked to naturalization, so that migrants who become citizens are able to vote as well as stand for public office. In the United States, for example, the November 2018 elections for the 116th Congress delivered the most racially and ethnically diverse Congress in the country's history, and 13 per cent of its members are first- or second-generation migrants.⁴³ In other locations, such as Gulf States, migrant workers make up very significant proportions of workforces and yet are banned from contributing to the protection of workers' rights through collective/trade unionism, let alone able to naturalize (see chapter 6 of this report).⁴⁴

The role of diaspora has received significant attention in research and policy communities, and the extent to which diaspora groups are able to engage in the political processes of origin countries varies widely, and can be contested and sensitive.⁴⁵ Recent Turkish elections (Parliamentary, and a referendum on the Constitution), for example, showed a high rate of participation by the Turkish diaspora and were also the subject of controversy, namely the extent of election campaigning by political parties targeting Turks living in Europe.⁴⁶ There are also some specific limitations on diaspora engagement that are set at the international level, such as limits on the most extreme forms of political insurgency conducted by banned organizations operating transnationally.⁴⁷ Experiences in destination countries can also shape the political ideals of migrants as they witness different systems in action and become integrated into host societies. Migrants can bring back political ideologies to origin countries when they return, temporarily or permanently. Research has found that returning Filipino migrants from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, for example, showed a higher commitment to democracy, while returnees from Saudi Arabia expressed more ambivalence towards it.⁴⁸ Migrants, including refugees, can also be important agents of change in peacebuilding and reconstruction processes, bringing their experiences, skills and resources to the rebuilding of infrastructure, social cohesion and political processes in post-conflict settings, as shown in the text box below.⁴⁹

43 Bialik, 2019; Geiger, Bialik and Gramlich, 2019.

44 ILO, 2019; Khadria, 2016.

45 Pan, 1999; Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.

46 Adamson, 2018.

47 Clarke, 2017.

48 Rother, 2009.

49 Bradley, Milner and Peruniak, 2019; Jacobsen, Young and Osman, 2008; Milner, 2011.

Diaspora building peace

Diaspora involvement in the conflict ‘back home’ can be both positive and negative because of the diversity within the diaspora. Diaspora individuals and organisations often have conflicting roles: some contribute to the conflict and prolong the conflict through the provision of financial, material and political support that is used for military purposes and decreases the parties’ incentives to negotiate. Others contribute to peace and the resolution of conflict through the provision of financial, material and political support that can put pressure on parties to engage in negotiations to bring about a political solution.^a

Until recently, the dominant discourse on diaspora engagement in peacebuilding primarily focused on the negative aspects of diaspora engagement in conflict and post-conflict contexts, namely, the coercive power of diaspora groups. Diasporas were viewed as fuelling conflict and exacerbating tensions; however, diasporas often contribute positively towards peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries. The challenge is how to inspire diasporas to direct their energy to the promotion of a sustainable peace.

A Diaspora peacebuilder must be dexterous, informed, connected, passionate and courageous. No-one embodies this more than Stéphanie Mbanzendore, founder member of the organisation Burundian Women for Peace and Development (BWPD).^b During the Diaspora Academy,^c Stéphanie emphasised the value of soft power when sharing her experience as a diaspora peacebuilder actively engaged in peace work in the Netherlands and Burundi. Soft power as a strategy requires careful and clear consideration of people, issues and processes. It also involves taking decisions that allow the peace potential of a situation to manifest gracefully through nuance engagement in navigating a challenging reality. Stéphanie demonstrates the skilful use of soft power in planning a trip home. In July 2004, she participated in a trip to Burundi aimed at introducing the Burundian diaspora to the new Burundian government, to build relations, and to assess the situation; this was her first visit home in nine years. There was a great deal of planning, strategising and preparation beforehand to make the trip a success.

After 2004, Stéphanie did lots of capacity-building^d trainings^e focused on building peace in Burundi, and a campaign to educate girls. A practical consideration (the high cost of hiring training venues) led to the idea of possibly building a training centre. In Stéphanie’s own words, “At first, I doubted it is possible, but when you don’t ask, you don’t get.” On her return to the Netherlands, Stéphanie approached the Dutch Government with the idea to build a centre, and received a positive response. She then asked counterparts in Burundi what their contribution would be to this project, and the local municipality gave the land for the building. The Multi-Purpose Centre of Kirundo was built; it has a large hall that seats 250, a library, training room, two offices, a computer room, and a large inside compound. The First Lady of Burundi officially opened the centre on 11 March 2011. The staff of the Centre has an orange uniform to acknowledge and thank the Netherlands for its contribution.

- a Smith and Stares, 2007.
- b Burundian Women for Peace and Development was established in 2001 with seven women. Stéphanie Mbanzendore is a founding member. Available at www.bwpd.nl.
- c Stéphanie participated in the Diaspora Academy as an expert.
- d Capacity-building training was held on the topics of: conflict resolution, gender-based violence, domestic violence, leadership, self-esteem, elections and campaigning, HIV/AIDS and youth.
- e Stephanie says, "At the end of every training, all participants received a new bicycle. They need means to travel. They are very happy with that. They say, "We've got somebody who understands our concern."

Abridged excerpt of Nordien, 2017.

The economic contributions of migrants

In terms of economic contributions, there is a very substantial and growing body of evidence on the centrality of migrants' remittances to support families and local communities in origin countries.⁵⁰ International remittances – in contrast to overseas development assistance and, to a lesser extent, direct foreign investment – are localized contributions made through personal transactions, typically helping families to meet basic household needs (such as food and shelter) and alleviate poverty.⁵¹ The money that migrants send home can be important buffers against unexpected costs, supporting household financial stability and resilience.⁵² Money can also support access to health services and investment in education of immediate and extended family members, as well as provide the ability to invest in businesses, property and other assets.⁵³ The introduction and expansion of "mobile money" apps over the last decade has allowed for migrants' contributions in the form of remittances to better support their families and friends. An example from Kenya illustrates:

As of 2013, 93 per cent of the adult population in Kenya is registered for M-Pesa, and 60 per cent actively use the service. The impact of the M-Pesa is much broader as it has facilitated the creation of thousands of small businesses and gave nearly 20 million Kenyans access to financial services, particularly low-income Kenyans. The percentage of people living on less than \$1.25 a day using M-Pesa grew from less than 20 per cent in 2008 to 72 per cent in three years.⁵⁴

In addition to enhanced financial inclusion, "mobile money" also provides lower money transfer costs and reduces the risk of exploitative practices. There is, however, recognition that both access rates and usage differ socioeconomically and demographically within local communities. Recent research in Ghana, for example, has found that women display different financial behaviours and are more likely to save in household settings using mobile money, and yet have more limited access to information and communication technology (ICT).

⁵⁰ de Haas, 2005; Mohieldin and Ratha, 2019; OECD/ILO, 2018.

⁵¹ IOM, 2016; Skeldon, 2018.

⁵² Beaton, Catão and Koczan, 2018.

⁵³ UNDP, 2011.

⁵⁴ Shrier, Canale and Pentland, 2016:10. M-Pesa, which stands for Mobile Money, is a platform that makes it possible for users to store and transfer money to other users using mobile phones. See Suri and Jack, 2016.

The researchers subsequently recommended that “efforts should be geared towards the provision of mobile phones (and other ICTs) to women to help them to be financially included to achieve development”.⁵⁵ A similar study in Uganda found that poor households would benefit from tailored programmes and additional assistance to support greater access to mobile money services.⁵⁶ In some countries, various laws and regulations have limited ICTs for cross-border financial flows. While it is important to ensure digital security and prevent illicit financial transfers, overly cumbersome and rigid regulations have often driven up the cost of sending remittances, for example, and slowed the uptake of new technologies needed to enhance financial inclusion.⁵⁷

Legal status can have a profound effect on the ability to contribute economically to families and communities back home. Irregularity and precariousness are linked to more limited options to remit, and higher costs in doing so. Irregularity in destination also often translates into lower wages with greater risk of exploitation, higher relative living costs and reduced choice, which can in turn translate into a lower capacity to remit.⁵⁸ In addition, studies have found that greater precariousness associated with working as an irregular migrant in informal settings results in workers ensuring they have enough money to deal with uncertainties, which again negatively affects their ability to remit.⁵⁹ This is in the context of recognition that irregular migrants – even more so than other migrants – will be key contributors to societies of the type of labour least favoured by the native-born: the so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous, demanding) jobs.⁶⁰ The “winners” in all this, some argue, are the receiving countries, who are able to benefit from a steady supply of workers in the informal economy and so keep wage costs down,⁶¹ while also not benefiting from income tax revenues. This is not uniform, however, and certain sectors in many economies (such as the agricultural, fishery and care sectors) rely more heavily on irregular migrant workers, resulting in labour market segmentation. Employers in these sectors may operate as “bad actors” by exploiting irregular migrant workers, who are more likely to accept lower pay and bad working conditions out of desperation.⁶² As one means of addressing these issues, some countries implement regularization programmes periodically so that those who are in irregular situations can gain lawful status and (re)enter the formal economy.⁶³ However, more systematic responses focusing on decent work for native-born and migrants alike will ensure people performing low-/semi-skilled work are able to improve their ability to contribute.

⁵⁵ Osabuohein and Karakara, 2018.

⁵⁶ Murendo et al., 2018.

⁵⁷ Cooper, Esser and Peter, 2018; IFAD and the World Bank Group, 2015.

⁵⁸ Baldwin-Edwards, 2008; Kanko and Teller, 2014; Shah, 2009.

⁵⁹ Schluter and Wahba, 2009.

⁶⁰ Shah, 2009; Khadria, 2009.

⁶¹ Shah, 2009.

⁶² Papademetriou, 2014.

⁶³ Triandafyllidou, Bartolini and Guidi, 2019.

More than a worker...

While we often think of international migrants as primarily a source of labour, they are more than just workers, playing diverse economic roles in origin and destination countries, including:

- As **workers**, migrants are part of, but also have an impact on, the labour market; they also alter the country's income distribution and influence domestic investment priorities.
- As **students**, migrants – or their children – contribute to increasing the stock of human capital and diffusing knowledge.
- As **entrepreneurs and investors**, they create job opportunities and promote innovation and technological change.
- As **consumers**, they contribute to increasing the demand for domestic – and foreign – goods and services, thus affecting the price and production levels, as well as the trade balance.
- As **savers**, they not only send remittances to their countries of origin but also contribute indirectly, through the bank system, to fostering investment in their host countries.
- As **taxpayers**, they contribute to the public budget and benefit from public services.
- As **family members**, they support others, including those who need care and support.

Source: OECD/ILO, 2018 (adapted).

Migrants have made and continue to make significant economic contributions, in both countries of origin and destination. Migrants' monetary remittances to their countries of origin are among the most widely researched and scrutinized economic contributions. As the amount of money sent in the form of remittances has sharply increased over the years, so has the interest from policymakers and academics in understanding how remittances contribute, both positively and negatively, to recipient countries. In 2018, global remittances amounted to USD 689 billion, whereas flows to low- and middle-income countries alone rose to a record USD 529 billion, up from USD 483 billion in 2017.⁶⁴ The significance of remittances to countries of origin cannot be overstated; remittances to low- and middle-income countries, except for China, exceeded foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 2018,⁶⁵ a reflection of increased international migration, as well as new and relatively lower cost channels for international money transfers.⁶⁶ More information on remittances is provided in chapters 2 (global overview) and 3 (regional developments) of this report.

While migrants' other aggregate contributions to countries of origin are not as well documented as remittances, a growing body of evidence is providing a sharper focus on these benefits. One such contribution is financing

⁶⁴ World Bank Group, 2019.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Meyer and Shera, 2017.

through instruments such as diaspora bonds. For struggling and cash-strapped countries, diaspora bonds are a relatively inexpensive way to raise funds, including during periods of financial stress⁶⁷ and after disasters; they have been a key alternative to borrowing funds from more expensive lenders such as other governments, financial institutions or capital markets. Borrowing at an attractive rate from their citizens abroad, governments have also been able to pursue large development projects. Meanwhile, diaspora bonds have provided citizens and former citizens abroad with the opportunity to be development actors back home – to tangibly contribute to their origin countries' economies, particularly as disaster management initiatives after calamities such as earthquakes and floods have struck their "homelands". In 2017, for example, Nigeria issued its first diaspora bond, raising USD 300 million to fund infrastructure projects.⁶⁸ Armenia, a country with a large diaspora, also established government-issued diaspora bonds in 2018.⁶⁹ But India and Israel are perhaps the most successful examples of countries that have reaped benefits from diaspora bonds, with both countries raising billions of dollars over the decades.⁷⁰ India has also been offering differential and tax-free interest rates on fixed deposits in Indian banks made by non-resident Indians.⁷¹ Since 1951, Israel has raised more than USD 40 billion through this financing mechanism.⁷²

In addition to diaspora bonds, migrants have contributed to their home countries' economies by directly investing in or starting new businesses. Several studies have demonstrated that returned migrants are more likely to start businesses than are people who never left their countries.⁷³ Indeed, in some countries, diaspora-owned companies make up a significant share of FDI. In Georgia, for example, an estimated 17 per cent of private sector firms belong to the country's diaspora.⁷⁴ Diaspora entrepreneurship has not only helped to build physical capital in countries of origin, but also continues to enhance economic productivity as well as contribute to job creation. But the economic contributions migrants make to countries of origin extend beyond financing and entrepreneurship; by establishing migration networks across countries, migrants have reduced information barriers and have helped to boost trade and investment flows between countries of origin and destination.⁷⁵ A recent study, exploring if the presence of migrants has an impact on FDI investment decisions, found that immigration does indeed reduce information asymmetries and positively affects outgoing FDI stocks from destination to countries of origin.⁷⁶ The presence of a large number of migrants can also establish a market for products manufactured in their countries of origin and thus enhance trade flows between economies.⁷⁷ Offshore business process outsourcing and back-office operations are significant ventures in India, started by returnees by raising venture capital at times of economic downturns in the developed countries, particularly the United States, that drove them back home in the first place.⁷⁸ Among the most important contributions that migrants make to their countries of origin is their influence on human capital stocks. This is done either directly when they return with new knowledge and skills, or indirectly

⁶⁷ Ratha and Ketkar, 2011.

⁶⁸ Brookings Institution, 2018.

⁶⁹ Lieberman, 2018.

⁷⁰ Strohecker, 2016.

⁷¹ A variety of bank accounts are offered by the Indian banking system. See Khadria, 2009, 2012.

⁷² Strohecker, 2016.

⁷³ OECD, 2016; Demurger and Xu, 2011; Naudé, Siegel and Marchand, 2015.

⁷⁴ OECD, 2016.

⁷⁵ IMF, 2015.

⁷⁶ Fensore, 2016.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Khadria, 2009.

by incentivizing citizens to acquire or enhance their human capital, bolstering a country's overall skills.⁷⁹ Innovative engagement of expatriate doctors and nurses in a perceived "United Nations Healthkeeping Force" (emulating the United Nations Peacekeeping Force) to provide free or low-cost medical care to unskilled and irregular immigrants among their own diaspora, as well as in low-Human Development Index third countries, has been suggested.⁸⁰ However, a recurring concern among policymakers is that emigration, particularly of high-skilled migrants, can come at a cost. "Brain drain" and "brain waste", or the loss/under-utilization of high-skilled human capital, are commonly raised and widely debated issues.⁸¹

The economic contributions of migrants in destination countries have been examined in depth over time. A large body of evidence exists on how both low- and high-skilled migrants have rectified labour shortages, which may relate to particular occupation groups, sectors or specific professions.⁸² In countries with large shares of high-skilled natives, low-skilled migrant workers have complemented the skills of natives by occupying jobs in sectors where citizens are in short supply; in many cases, these are also sectors that native workers consider unattractive.⁸³ This not only addresses labour gaps in industries such as construction and agriculture,⁸⁴ but also allows native workers in high-skilled sectors to further specialize in their work. This complementarity of skills has been significant for native, high-skilled women. As migrants have filled jobs in childcare and housekeeping, female native workers have been able to increase their workplace participation and productivity. For example, a study conducted in Italy found that, when there was a large supply of immigrants who provided household services, native Italian women spent more time at work.⁸⁵ A 2011 study in the United States drew the same conclusion, suggesting that by lowering the costs of household services, low-skilled immigration increases the labour supply and average hours of market work of high-skilled native women.⁸⁶

Some countries are almost entirely dependent on migrant workers, especially in industries such as construction, hospitality and retail. In the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, for example, international migrants make up significant proportions of their national populations (88% and 76%, respectively).⁸⁷ And for countries undergoing population decline, migrants can be essential in offsetting some of the negative economic consequences associated with a shrinking population, which can stymie a country's overall economic productivity and growth. As fertility rates tumble across regions such as Europe, migrants remain significant contributors to population growth and labour supply.⁸⁸ In the European Union, natural population change (births and deaths) only contributed 20 per cent to population growth from 2012 to 2016, while net migration added 80 per cent to total population increase.⁸⁹

In terms of their broader economic contributions with large-scale and long-term externalities to societies, migrants have long been drivers of entrepreneurship and innovation. Migrants, unlike people who have never

⁷⁹ McKinsey Global Institute, 2016.

⁸⁰ Khadria, 2012.

⁸¹ "Brain drain" is defined as the migration of high-skilled people from poorer to wealthier countries, while "brain waste" refers to a downgrading of skills, where migrants end up working in occupations that require skill levels lower than those they had acquired in their countries of origin. See Docquier and Rapoport, 2011; Pires, 2015.

⁸² Khadria, 2012; Ruhs, 2013; Goldin et al., 2018; Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, 2011; IMF, 2015.

⁸³ Constant, 2014.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Barone and Mocetti, 2010.

⁸⁶ Cortés and Tessada, 2011.

⁸⁷ UN DESA, 2019.

⁸⁸ See the discussion on migration and population change in world regions in chapter 3 of this report.

⁸⁹ Eurostat, 2019.

lived outside of their home countries, are much more willing to take business risks. This, as some researchers have observed, may be because migrants have already taken the risk of leaving their countries of origin to pursue opportunities in new places and are thus well-primed to be risk takers.⁹⁰ By overcoming obstacles and the challenges that come with moving to a new country, they develop the so-called “growth mindset”, which allows them to be adaptable, more confident and to have a higher tolerance for uncertainty.⁹¹ Recent studies, however, have cautioned against seeing migrants as “super-entrepreneurs” compared with natives when aggregate data are patchy at best.⁹² Additionally, migrant entrepreneurs continue to face significant challenges, which can result in the collapse of their enterprises. The failure to access credit is among the most important constraints on migrant entrepreneurship, and while this is not unique to migrants, they have greater difficulty acquiring business loans than those who are native born.⁹³ Factors such as lack of collateral, shorter credit histories, possible discrimination and credit institutions’ unfamiliarity with migrants all make them less likely to receive credit from lending institutions.⁹⁴ Other obstacles – including limited rights to start a business, lack of local networks, unfamiliarity with the local business environment and language and cultural barriers – remain significant constraints on migrant entrepreneurship.⁹⁵

Perhaps more than in any other developed country, immigrants have significantly contributed to driving innovation and entrepreneurship in the United States. While immigrants represented only 13 per cent of the population in a country of more than 300 million people, they comprised nearly 30 per cent of all entrepreneurs.⁹⁶ In addition to their disproportionate contribution toward entrepreneurship, recent research suggests that businesses founded by immigrants in the United States were not only more likely to survive, but also tended to outperform those started by native citizens when it came to employment growth over three- and six-year periods.⁹⁷ However, the same study did find that, in terms of growth in wages, immigrant-founded companies did not perform any better than those started by natives and may in fact underperform their native peers.⁹⁸ The success and contribution to innovation is most visible in the engineering and technology industries; in about one quarter of engineering and technology firms founded in the United States from 2006 to 2012, for example, at least one main founder was an immigrant.⁹⁹ Silicon Valley is often cited as the hub of such successful migrant innovators and entrepreneurs.¹⁰⁰ Yet this trend is not limited to the United States. Globally, migrants continue to help create jobs as well as contribute to destination countries’ economic growth through entrepreneurship. A 2012 survey of 69 economies by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor demonstrated that immigrants had higher entrepreneurial activity compared with natives.¹⁰¹ Moreover, while there is a dearth of research on the contributions of migrants to entrepreneurship in low-income countries, emerging studies, particularly those focused on refugees, show that where they are given the opportunity to work, refugees make positive contributions to destination economies. In Uganda, a country that hosts one

⁹⁰ Goldin et al., 2018.

⁹¹ Kelly, 2018.

⁹² Naudé, Siegel and Marchand, 2017.

⁹³ Desiderio, 2014.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ UNCTAD, IOM and UNHCR, 2018.

⁹⁶ Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2017.

⁹⁷ Kerr and Kerr, 2016.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2014.

¹⁰⁰ Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.

¹⁰¹ Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2013.

of the largest refugee populations in the world, refugees – those residing in both cities and in rural areas – are highly entrepreneurial and have created jobs not just for themselves but also for Ugandan nationals.¹⁰² Research conducted on refugee entrepreneurs in Kampala, showed that refugees employ 2.4 people on average in the city.¹⁰³ A similar trend has been observed in South Africa, whose self-settlement approach to refugees allows them not only to move freely, but also to find work and to be self-employed. However, because many refugees struggle to find employment in the formal economy, many choose to start their own enterprises in the informal sector. A recent report on “refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban South Africa” found that refugee enterprises have contributed to the country’s economy by creating jobs;¹⁰⁴ an estimated 52 per cent and 45 per cent of businesses in the provinces of Cape Town and Limpopo, respectively, employ people in their enterprises, with around 50 per cent of these businesses more likely to employ South Africans.¹⁰⁵

Migrants as innovators

The contributions that migrants make toward innovation, particularly in destination countries, have received much attention in recent years. There is little dispute and widespread consensus that migrants are significant drivers of innovation globally. A recent report identifies four ways through which migrants enhance innovation: (a) migrants’ higher concentration in economic sectors that tend to be more innovative; (b) through patents and as entrepreneurs; (c) their greater contribution to business start-ups compared with natives; and (d) by fostering investment, trade and technology linkages.^a The United States is the most salient example of migrants’ innovation. For example, migrants have long been linked to an increase in patents in the United States.^b In fact, given their concentration in fields such as science and engineering, migrants in the United States have been shown to patent twice as much as natives.^c A recent study, which sought to determine how high-skilled immigration affects “product reallocation” in the United States, found that “a 10 per cent increase in the share of H-1B workers is associated with a 2 per cent increase in product reallocation rates”.^d In other words, companies that hired more highly skilled, college-educated foreign workers created more new products.^e Product reallocation, which is another measure of innovation, is defined as the entry of new products into the market and exit of older products.^f

A separate 2018 study determined that, despite comprising a relatively small share of the country’s population, migrants have accounted for 30 per cent of aggregate innovation in the United States since 1976.^g The contribution of immigrants to United States innovation is evident in the number of Nobel Laureates and members of the National Academy of Sciences who are immigrants, which is triple that of natives.^h Although most studies on innovation have focused on the United States, a growing body of work is exploring how migrants have made contributions in this area in other countries. A study assessing migrants’ contribution to the increase in patents in the United Kingdom, France and Germany determined that, similar to the United States, there is a positive correlation between high-skilled migrants and innovation.ⁱ

102 Betts et al., 2014.

103 Ibid.

104 Crush et al., 2017.

105 Ibid.

- a Goldin et al., 2018.
- b Rassenfosse and Pellegrino, 2019; Moser, Voena and Waldinger, 2014; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010.
- c Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010.
- d Khanna and Lee, 2018.
- e Ibid.
- f Ibid.
- g Bernstein et al., 2018.
- h Goldin et al., 2018.
- i Venturini, Montobbio and Fassio, 2012.

New impediments to the recognition of migrants' contributions

In previous sections, we have seen that there have always existed obstacles, major and minor, to migrants being able to contribute in origin and destination settings, typically related to policy settings stemming from a range of legal contexts. Many obstacles, for example, are based on the application of laws regulating societies more broadly, such as those related to labour law, property law, criminal law, tax law and such. Likewise, we have seen that changes in structural/policy settings and new technology (such as mobile money) have been successfully adopted to facilitate migrants' contributions in specific ways. The issue of maximizing or optimizing contributions and creating the right conditions for opportunities to be realized in the pursuit of peace and prosperity is, of course, not specific to migrants, but remains at the heart of policymaking in most countries throughout the world as it relates to all residents (citizen and non-citizens). However, the relationships between policymaking and politics have also evolved, bringing them much closer together over time for a range of reasons, including the 24/7 media cycle, the shift from "expertise and analysis" to "opinion", the very significant changes in expediency and delivery at the expense of critical reflection and adjustment, among others.¹⁰⁶

Combined with seismic geopolitical events – such as the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, the 2015/16 large-scale movements of people to and through Europe – more recent policy environments have had to increasingly accommodate a more brutal form of politics and respond to the pressing issue of migration. This is most apparent in Western democratic countries, but is by no means limited to them. In a 2014 big data study on media depictions of migration and migrants in 10 countries,¹⁰⁷ one of the key findings was that politicians were by far the most dominant voices in the media in all countries. This was the case in Afghanistan, just as it was in Sri Lanka, Canada and the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁸ Immigration is increasingly being used as a political reference point, and as a way of defining values (and in democratic systems, as a means of appealing to the electorate). Some studies have found that "political conflict over immigration follows a political logic and must be attributed to parties and party competition rather than to 'objective

106 Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 2005; Weinberger, 2011.

107 McAuliffe and Weeks, 2015. The 10 countries in scope were Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

108 Ibid.

pressures".¹⁰⁹ The role of far-right parties in politicizing immigration for political expediency is a recurring theme in recent studies.¹¹⁰ In other words, in many countries "anti-immigration" rhetoric has become a central plank of political branding in the quest for market share, regardless of the significance (or otherwise) of the substantive issue itself. What was once "dog-whistling" on anti-immigration has become a central theme in political messaging. Politics itself is becoming a significant impediment to balanced policy on immigration and the contributions of migrants.

Politics and migration

Among the old stalwarts of the centre-left, there is a simple explanation for the decline of the parties they used to lead: immigration... Hardly a week passes without some candidate or columnist declaring that liberals will only regain power when they lock down the borders. The obsession with immigration is not an accident. It reflects a widely held belief that the decline of the grand parties of the centre-left across Europe... has been caused by the rise of the new parties of the populist radical right, who have "stolen" the old working-class vote with a nativist, even authoritarian, message.

...

But since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, these worries have escalated into a panic, as the leaders of Europe's social democratic parties scramble to show their concerns over immigration... [A] dramatic shift in the rhetoric of ostensibly centre-left parties is part of a larger panic over how to halt the spread of right-wing populism across the west in recent years.

...

...the recent growth of populist radical-right parties – unlike their initial expansion in the 1990s – has not been driven by winning over more of the working class. The real story is that responses to events such as 9/11 and the "refugee crisis" by mainstream commentators and politicians brought the arguments of the populist radical right more into the mainstream discussion – and their "solutions" consequently became acceptable to broader sections of the public. As a result, the most successful populist radical-right parties now are Volksparteien – "people's parties", rather than "workers' parties" – and do not represent just the working class.

...

Academic research consistently shows that when mainstream parties move to the right in an attempt to co-opt the issues of the radical right, it does not hurt populist right parties – in fact, it often helps them.^a Moreover, other research shows that it does not stop the electoral bleeding of social democratic parties either.^b This makes perfect sense. By prioritising immigration as an issue – and reinforcing the negative depiction of migrants and migration – mainstream parties only help to boost the main issue and frame of the populist radical right. Moreover, populist radical right voters are not only nativist, they are also populist, which explains why the "immigration realism" of social democratic parties is ultimately not effective.

a Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018.

b Abou-Chadi, 2018.

Abridged excerpt of Mudde, 2019.

109 Grande, Schwarzbözl and Fatke, 2018.

110 Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018; Abou-Chadi, 2018; Mudde, 2019.

We must also recognize that the fundamental ways in which public debates occur has changed. By this we mean that the “who, what, where and how” of public discourse are manifestly different in a world that has recently experienced a rapid transformation in transnational connectivity. The ability to access information and opinion from different locations globally has massively expanded. We are also able to (self) publish our own views largely without restraint, a development made possible by relatively new social media platforms. By using these platforms, organized groups, regardless of their numeric size, are increasingly able to utilize open, real-time (un-curated) publishing to distort narratives in attempts to realize changes in political (and policy) decisions.¹¹¹ Overall, the way we – as countries, as communities, and increasingly as transnational value-based groups – describe and discuss migration to ourselves and to others is being shaped by the massive changes in the media landscape. Recent research on these changes has been undertaken utilizing big data analysis on Twitter, for example, finding that some groups are engaging in “entanglement” of messaging in order to portray refugees and other migrants as negative, regardless of the facts (see text box below).

Transnational tribalism, immigration and social media platforms

A big data study of Twitter during the peak of the so-called refugee crisis (October 2015 to May 2016) analysed almost 7.5 million tweets collected through hashtags such as #refugee, #refugeecrisis and #flüchtlinge.^a The study examined the framing of refugees in the Twittersphere, and the extent to which the frames represented alternative voices. The analysis found that, overall, dominant frames revolved around security and safety on the one hand and humanitarianism on the other. The study also identified some explicitly racist hashtags linked to some of the security and safety frames. Linking any new issue to pre-existing hashtags—for example, #refugees and #tcot – points to an emerging dynamic in which new issues are subsumed and used for different political purposes. The researchers found that Twitter is no longer a social media platform that operates as a levelling field; rather, the long-standing presence of some has already conditioned the medium, “socializing” new tags in their own way and “broadcasting” to millions of followers. This points to the instrumentalization of Twitter, where it is used strategically to achieve certain political ends by specific interests, such as far-right activists. There was evidence of increasingly strident anti-immigration voices in Europe. Overall, the refugee debate on Twitter was caught between the security and racist frames on the one hand, and humanitarian responses on the other.

It is understandable that European activists were found to be present in the study, given the events that were taking place at the time in Europe. The relationship to these events and the rise of transnational tribalism through social media platforms as well as traditional media, spearheaded by political leaders, is a topic of intense interest to many political scientists. Migration features prominently in these analyses, which is often characterized as “battles”, “struggles” and “hostilities”.^b The main actors in the battle are based in Europe, the United States and Australia, and are able to connect via unprecedented transnational communication.^c Rather than predominantly economic issues, the battle is over societal attitudes between “nationalism and protectionism” and “integration and openness”.^d Immigration policy has regrettably become the centrepiece of this transnational struggle for political power.^e

¹¹¹ McAuliffe, 2018; Siapera et al., 2018; Suiter and Culloty, 2019.

- a Siapera et al., 2018.
- b Mounk and Foa, 2018.
- c Zemandl, 2018; Suiter and Culloty, 2019.
- d Kaufmann, 2017; Zemandl, 2018.
- e McAuliffe, 2018.

Concluding observations on the challenge ahead

In an ideal world, there would be no need for this chapter to be written. The topic itself would be so obvious and uncontroversial as to render it irrelevant. And yet, it is more important now than at any other time in modern, post-war history to reflect on migrants' contributions to countries and communities around the world. Simply put, this is because it is becoming increasingly difficult to hear balanced perspectives in public debates on important policy issues, such as international migration.

Given this context, this chapter is not about quantitative cost-benefit analyses of migration. Instead, the chapter has looked at the often neglected but core determinant of the migrant(s) as contributors to communities of destination as well as those back in their places of origin.

With this perspective, we have focused on three central domains of what makes a good society: sociocultural, civic-political and economic contributions. Today in the twenty-first century, migrants may be better able to make contributions to these domains than they were in the last century (or prior) largely because of the phenomenal improvements in development that have taken place in most countries, as well as strong recognition of the need to ensure that global development and stability are underpinned by human rights.¹¹² Yet, this chapter also drives home the point that the contributions of migrants to societies, polities and the economies globally have not only been largely overlooked, downplayed and taken for granted, but also hindered, through proliferation of disruption and disinformation against migrants. Recent research and analysis show that some forms of technology are impacting our media, social and political interactions, and are becoming more pressing for governance, both in relation to the regulation of newer forms of technology and how they are shaping democratic processes.¹¹³

The question therefore remains as to what would be a balanced strategy to make the contributions optimally, if not maximally, visible, acknowledged and accepted on the global and national policy agendas.

While some activists and advocates argue for adopting political responses,¹¹⁴ and others engage in countering negative images only by putting forward positive "idealized" representations of migrants, others argue that we need to be cautious, as these approaches risk further polarization in public discussions that are increasingly influenced by inflammatory (and sometimes inaccurate) social media commentary.¹¹⁵ With this context in mind, the following implications for policy, practice and research are offered:

¹¹² See, for example, the United Nations Human Development Index results over time, which show significant improvements in the level of development in most countries globally.

¹¹³ Morgan, 2018.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Crawley and McMahon, 2016.

¹¹⁵ Kaufmann, 2017; Alfred, 2017.

- Balanced public discussions require greater scrutiny of “fake” social media content, including by promoting a better understanding of the responsibilities that go hand-in-hand with free speech. This is currently a “hot” issue in many parts of the world, with stricter regulatory regimes being actively considered, or having been put in place.¹¹⁶
- There is clearly a place for greater emphasis on migrant-centric research and analyses, as well as research on the social media activists’ influence on bolstering unbalanced political discourse (and ultimately political decisions). Ideally, this research would examine the impacts of a wide range of distorted messaging, noting that existing studies outlined in this chapter indicate that the negative, anti-migrant interest groups appear to be increasingly using social media platforms to great effect, at times regardless of accuracy or truthful representations.
- Both historically and contemporarily, there is strong evidence that migrants have made substantial contributions in a variety of settings and in a variety of important ways. However, it is also clear that there are structural limits that act to circumscribe migrants’ contributions in ways that are counterproductive for communities, States and migrants. The most obvious examples exist with respect to irregular or undocumented migrants who may be doing low-prestige, underpaid work that is, in many cases, nevertheless much needed. Structural reforms combined with migration policy initiatives (such as regularization and enhanced regular pathways) offer the opportunity to optimize migrants’ contributions and support sectors and communities.¹¹⁷
- There is room to build on innovations delivered by new technology – such as mobile money apps – to help facilitate migrants’ contributions in origin and destination settings. Migrant tech has the ability to support migrants all the way through the migration cycle, including as a means of supporting safe, regular and orderly migration. Further support of migrant tech start-ups is one practical approach, noting the work already underway in this area.¹¹⁸
- There is considerable room to improve recognition of the enormous value of sociocultural and civic-political contributions of migrants in societies and globally, including in political, media and research spheres. While this can be challenging, the tendency to focus on economic issues without fully acknowledging the importance of other aspects leads to a transactional view of societies and nation States. Expanding research, for example, on the influence migrants can have as positive leaders (for example, the “Salah effect”), as well as on the relationship between culinary knowledge transfer and health and well-being, would enable policymakers and general audiences to better appreciate the important contributions migrants have already made to modern life globally, as well as what further contributions they will offer.

¹¹⁶ BBC, 2019; Tusikov and Haggart, 2019.

¹¹⁷ Triandafyllidou, Bartolini and Guidi, 2019.

¹¹⁸ See, for example, “Start-ups Without Borders” available at <https://startupswb.com/>.



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6

MIGRATION, INCLUSION AND SOCIAL COHESION: CHALLENGES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES¹

Introduction

The relationship between migrants and the communities in which they reside forms an integral and important part of the migration cycle.² This relationship takes the form of psychological and sociological processes of adaptation between migrants and receiving communities, which affect the degree of inclusion migrants will experience, including their sense of belonging. Settling in a new community – either temporarily or permanently – may require migrants to adapt to a new culture, customs, social values and language. The extent to which migrants will in turn be progressively included in their destination country also depends on the attitudes of receiving communities, including their openness to migration and migrants.

Migrants' inclusion has always been an important part of the migration phenomenon; however, it is today a particularly complex issue. In an increasingly globalized world, the growth in the absolute number of migrants over the past 50 years and the diversification of migrants' origins, socioeconomic backgrounds and reasons for migrating have led to more social, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in receiving societies.³ As a result, the impact of migration and diversity on social cohesion has become an important concern.⁴ This is illustrated by inclusion policies adopted by some States to frame the relationship between migrants and receiving communities and preserve social cohesion. These inclusion policies have taken multiple forms over time in different countries, reflecting societal values, including attitudes on immigration and diversity.

While the question of how to live together in increasingly diverse communities has become central, the challenges in addressing migrants' inclusion have been compounded by the many opinions and voices on the topic. Alongside migrants and States, a wide array of actors – such as civil society organizations, communities and local authorities – now play increasingly important roles in migrants' inclusion. In addition, virtually everyone today has the ability to express publicly their opinions on immigration and migrants' inclusion.⁵ The politicization of migration for electioneering purposes has elevated the issues to become a matter of public concern. Due in part to negative portrayals made by political parties and reported by the media,⁶ migrants have in some countries been presented as a challenge to national identity, values, economic stability and security, as well as, more broadly, a threat to social cohesion.⁷ Despite migrants' important social and

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² While this chapter focuses on destination countries, the process of migrants' inclusion also occurs in transit countries, as well as in countries of origin for returning migrants. On migrants' reintegration, see Newland, 2017.

³ Appave and David, 2017.

⁴ Demireva, 2017.

⁵ See, for instance, the survey on attitudes of Europeans towards migration and inclusion carried out in 2017 in the 28 member States of the European Union (European Commission, 2018).

⁶ Crawley, McMahon and Jones, 2016. On narratives of negativity in the media, see most notably Allen, Blinder and McNeil, 2017.

⁷ Appave and David, 2017; Papademetriou, 2012.

economic contributions (see chapter 5 of this report), anti-immigration sentiment has resulted in instances of intolerance, discrimination, racism, xenophobia and even acts of violent extremism towards migrants, especially in countries where nationalism, patriotism and populism have been on the rise.

Despite these challenges, States have recently reaffirmed the centrality of migrants' inclusion and social cohesion by making them a stand-alone objective in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.⁸ The Global Compact on Refugees likewise promotes the inclusion of refugees in the receiving country through durable solutions, such as local integration.⁹

In order to better understand what migrants' inclusion entails and the challenges and opportunities it may bring, the remainder of this chapter is organized into three main parts. The first part introduces the notions of inclusion and social cohesion, before turning, in the second part, to inclusion outcomes and obstacles. The third part then explores what "the situation on the ground" is, most notably through the role played by local actors and by migrants themselves. The conclusion discusses some implications for policy responses that may help further foster migrants' inclusion and social cohesion.

Inclusion and social cohesion: Key concepts and definitions

Defining "migrants' inclusion" and "social cohesion" is a difficult task, as there are no universally recognized definitions. The ambiguity of these notions is exacerbated by the frequent use of various closely related terms, and the difficulty in distinguishing them (see appendix A for an illustrative list and suggested definitions of these concepts).¹⁰

In broad terms, social cohesion can be defined through the notions of "solidarity", "togetherness", "tolerance" and "harmonious co-existence".¹¹ It is not necessarily related to migration and migrants, but is more generally about the bonds tying a community together through trust and common social norms. While these bonds can be undermined by disparities in wealth and income, poverty, or intercommunal, ethnic or racial tensions, the impact of migration, and especially of diversity, on social cohesion has been increasingly questioned.¹² However, empirical evidence has so far not been conclusive. If some studies suggest a negative impact of diversity in countries such as the United States of America, research in the United Kingdom and, more generally, in Europe, finds that income inequality and deprivation have a greater impact on social cohesion than does diversity.¹³

While the impact of migration and diversity on social cohesion is not clear-cut, social cohesion and migrants' inclusion are closely related. Social cohesion cannot be achieved if part of the population, including migrants, is excluded in a given neighbourhood, community, city and/or country.¹⁴ As a result, and despite the lack of a

⁸ UNGA, 2018a: Annex, Objective 16.

⁹ UNGA, 2018b: paras. 97–99.

¹⁰ The choice of the terms "inclusion" and "social cohesion" in this chapter is in line with the terminology used in the Global Compact for Migration (UNGA, 2018a) and with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNGA, 2015).

¹¹ Demireva, 2017. See also Fonseca, Lukosch and Brazier, 2018; Forrest and Kearns, 2001.

¹² Zetter et al., 2006.

¹³ Demireva, 2017.

¹⁴ See Jenson, 1998, where inclusion is listed among the different dimensions of social cohesion.

universal definition, inclusion can be summarized as consisting of social cohesion and migrants' incorporation in the various societal areas, such as education, health, employment, housing, and civic and political involvement.¹⁵

Who is a migrant? An inclusion perspective

As noted in chapter 2 of this report, there are no universally agreed definitions of a migrant, but multiple understandings depending on the policy and analytical contexts. For instance, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) defines a migrant for statistical purposes as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence”.^a

When talking about inclusion, the understanding of who is a migrant is often broader and extends to migrants' descendants born in the receiving country. Although they have not migrated themselves, migrants' descendants may still be perceived as migrants by the receiving society and self-identify as such. This is especially the case of so-called “second-generation migrants”, who may embrace both the identities of their receiving country and of their parents' country of origin.^b These multiple identities are well illustrated in the testimony of Jenan, who was born in the United States to two migrant parents:

Being the daughter of two immigrants, I feel I have to work twice as hard as my friends whose families have been here for generations just so I can prove to my family it was worth it for them to come here and to make this journey and start their lives all over again. Being a child of immigrants, it means balancing two different cultures. Growing up I had a hard time accepting that I was part of these two different worlds that are so conflicting.^c

^a UN DESA, 1998.

^b Vathi, 2015.

^c Available at <https://iamamigrant.org/stories/united-states/jenan>.

Against this background, inclusion entails a process of mutual adaptation between migrants and receiving communities. The degree of migrants' inclusion depends on the individual concerned and the context in which adaptation takes place. Factors affecting migrants' process of inclusion include their demographic and personal characteristics (such as age, gender, level of education and language ability), social networks, and ability to exercise agency.¹⁶ Inclusion remains a highly personal and individualized experience, as it differs among migrants and family members, and can be different for various “groups” of migrants, such as refugees, high- or low-skilled migrant workers, victims of trafficking or migrants' descendants.¹⁷ Likewise, the context influences one's degree of inclusion, in terms of both geographical location and timing. Each country, society and community will necessarily approach inclusion differently, as it depends on their respective historical,

¹⁵ Faist, 2018. For another definition, see Charsley and Spencer, 2019. This chapter focuses on the inclusion of migrants without prejudice to the fact that some nationals may face similar inclusion challenges.

¹⁶ Castles et al., 2002; Fokkema and de Haas, 2011; Charsley and Spencer, 2019.

¹⁷ On the difference between the inclusion of refugees and other migrants, for instance, see Castles et al., 2002. See also Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017; and Vathi, 2015 concerning different migrant generations.

economic, sociocultural and political contexts. Their resulting attitudes towards migration and diversity can change over time, determining in turn the type of migration and inclusion policies States will adopt.¹⁸

As a psychosociological process, inclusion is inherent to the migration experience.¹⁹ Although research focuses primarily on the “Global North”, inclusion transcends any North–South divide because it concerns all countries. The fact that some countries have not adopted inclusion policies, as seen mostly in the “Global South”, does not necessarily imply that migrants’ inclusion – or exclusion – does not occur in practice. It simply means that the State has not set a nationwide strategy for migrants’ inclusion. This may be because inclusion is not among the priorities of policymakers. For example, this is the case in West African countries, where other socioeconomic challenges are more pressing or resources are insufficient.²⁰

Nonetheless, as acknowledged in the Global Compact for Migration, inclusion policies can constitute important tools for countries to support migrants’ inclusion and foster social cohesion.²¹ By contrast, the absence of inclusion policies may be costly, not only for migrants who may face discrimination and be marginalized, but also more broadly for social cohesion, with a heightened risk of tensions, riots and civil unrest.²² As part of (im)migration or stand-alone policies, migrants’ inclusion can take different forms to frame how it should take place in a particular country according to its own values. The most prevalent national policy models of inclusion have been those of assimilation, multiculturalism and integration which, as summarized in table 1, can be differentiated according to the expected degrees of adaptation by migrants and of accommodation by the society.

18 Castles et al., 2002; see also Silver, 2015; Landau and Bakewell, 2018.

19 See most notably Berry, 1997.

20 Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012.

21 UNGA, 2018a: para. 32(c).

22 Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012.

Table 1. Summary of the main inclusion models²³

Inclusion model	Degree of adaptation by migrants	Degree of accommodation by society	Examples of policies
Assimilation	High	Low	White Australia policy, 1901–1966 ^a Restricting “non-white” immigration and assimilating “white” immigrants ^b
Multiculturalism	Low	High	Canada, multiculturalism policy, 1971–present ^c Recognizing that “multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society” ^d
Integration	Medium	Medium	European Union Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2016 ^e Considering integration as a “dynamic two-way process” ^f

Source: (a) National Museum Australia, n.d.; (b) Ibid.; Berndt, 1961; (c) Government of Canada, 2018; (d) Ibid., 1985; (e) European Commission, 2016; (f) Ibid.

Assimilation considers diversity as a risk for social cohesion and requires the highest degree of adaptation by migrants and a low degree of accommodation by the receiving society. It consists of a one-way policy where migrants must fully embrace the receiving society’s national identity and values, to the detriment of their original ones.²⁴ By contrast, multiculturalism values diversity and expects a low degree of adaptation by migrants – who can retain their cultural identities – and a high degree of accommodation by the receiving society.²⁵

While assimilation has been referred to as a “melting pot”, multiculturalism has often been associated with a “salad bowl”: a melting pot contains ingredients that melt together and become indistinguishable, whereas a salad bowl is made of diverse ingredients which co-exist side by side harmoniously. While assimilation was already the rule in Latin American countries, such as Argentina, during the mass migration of Europeans in the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century,²⁶ these two models were particularly prevalent in traditional immigration countries during the twentieth century. In broad terms, the focus was placed on assimilation from the 1920s to the 1960s, and shifted to multiculturalism in the 1970s due to the

23 This summary table notably builds on the work of Berry, 1997 and 2006.

24 IOM, 2019, in appendix A.

25 Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014.

26 See, for instance, Acosta, 2018; Bailey, 1979; Bjerg, 1988; and Sánchez Alonso, 2002.

inability of the assimilationist model to accommodate increasingly diverse societies.²⁷ Although it is still followed by some States, including Canada,²⁸ some have disavowed multiculturalism since the mid-1990s because it has been considered unable to counter migrants' exclusion and perceived as a threat to national identity and values.²⁹

As a result, different models have been embraced to restore a balance between diversity and unity, claimed by some to have been lost because of multiculturalism.³⁰ At the national level, the model predominantly relied on today is that of integration, which stands in between assimilation and multiculturalism. It expects medium degrees of adaptation by migrants and accommodation by the receiving society.³¹ Although no commonly agreed definition exists, it is generally accepted to be a two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live.³² At the local level, an interculturalist approach to inclusion has developed, which emphasizes the importance of contacts and bonds between individuals of different backgrounds, both migrants and nationals. It relies on the idea that diversity is an advantage and aims to create mutual understanding and a culture of diversity to combat discrimination and inequalities.³³ This policy narrative finds its origins in Quebec in the 1980s in response to the Canadian multicultural policy, and has since been taken up in an increasing number of cities and neighbourhoods, in countries such as Spain or Italy.³⁴

Inclusion outcomes: Challenges and policy responses

Measuring the level of migrants' inclusion in receiving societies (so-called "inclusion outcomes") is complex given the various individual and contextual factors influencing inclusion (see text box below). It is nevertheless important to identify potential obstacles and design and/or re-evaluate policy responses to more effectively support migrants' inclusion.

Measuring migrants' level of inclusion through indicators

Indicators of integration have been developed to measure the degree of migrants' inclusion in certain countries and rank these countries according to the effectiveness of their inclusion policies. These most notably include:

- The *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015* (MIPEX 2015), co-financed by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, European Union (EU), and led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and the Migration Policy Group (2015);^a and

²⁷ Castles, 2004; Castles and Davidson, 2000.

²⁸ Joppke, 2014.

²⁹ Kymlicka, 2012; Joppke, 2010. But also see Modood, 2013.

³⁰ Zapata-Barrero, 2017.

³¹ Bivand Erdal and Oeppen, 2013; see also Favell, 2005.

³² IOM, 2019.

³³ Zapata-Barrero, 2017.

³⁴ Ibid. On interculturalism in Italian cities, see for instance Caponio and Donatiello, 2017.

- The immigrants' indicators developed in 2012 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with the latest edition *Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration* jointly produced with the EU.^b

Inclusion being highly contextual, these indicators reflect a particular understanding of what "successful integration" means.^c Both sets of indicators were devised in the context of traditional destination countries. Thus, they may not be applicable in other geographical locations, including in the increasing number of States worldwide that have also become countries of destination.

Comparisons between the countries covered through rankings or indexes also remain delicate, as the understanding of inclusion and the objectives of inclusion policies differ even among traditional destination countries. A multiculturalist inclusion policy will not have the same objectives as one that tends to be more assimilationist. It is thus difficult to compare how effective inclusion policies are between countries with different inclusion objectives.^d

Although not focused on inclusion, the Migration Governance Indicators also provide a useful tool for States to assess the comprehensiveness of their migration policies, including their inclusion policies. The Migration Governance Indicators are an IOM initiative, implemented with the support of the Economist Intelligence Unit, to support States in implementing the Migration Governance Framework, adopted by IOM Member States in 2015 (Council Resolution No. 1310 of 4 December 2015 on the Migration Governance Framework).^e With its 90 indicators, the Migration Governance Indicators help States identify potential gaps in their migration policies, future priorities, and good practices for well-managed migration policies, including with respect to migrants' rights and their well-being, which are key dimensions for migrants' inclusion.

a Huddleston et al., 2015.

b OECD and EU, 2018. For previous editions, see OECD, 2012; OECD and EU, 2015.

c Castles et al., 2002.

d Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003.

e See <https://migrationdataportal.org/overviews/mgi#0>.

This section explores migrants' inclusion outcomes and challenges in some key policy areas of inclusion, namely, language, education, labour market inclusion, family reunification, political participation and naturalization. The focus on these specific policy areas is without prejudice to the importance of others, such as health or housing. While health is subject to a specific chapter in this report (see chapter 7), housing is also an important aspect of migrant inclusion because its affordability and quality influence migrants' well-being and social inclusion.³⁵ If housing inclusion can be assessed on the basis of access to homeownership for some migrants,³⁶ for others, such as refugees, mere access to decent housing is already an issue, as illustrated by the so-called migrant "crisis" in Europe in 2015–2016, which has been considered by some as a "housing crisis".³⁷

³⁵ Phillips, 2006.

³⁶ See, for instance, Darden, 2015.

³⁷ Penny, 2016.

As detailed in appendix B, all the policy areas examined in this section reflect human rights to which all individuals are entitled, including migrants, with the principle of non-discrimination constituting a central pillar of migrants' inclusion. However, migrants' inclusion outcomes in these different policy areas remain dependent on their immigration status. While legal residence is a major first step towards inclusion, the type of permit dictates additional rights and entitlements, such as access to work and study. As it will appear, and similarly to human rights, all these policy areas are also interrelated, as each may impact on one another. Despite the emphasis sometimes placed on labour market inclusion,³⁸ this reflects the need for holistic inclusion policies, covering all dimensions of migrants' inclusion.

Language

Language is considered one of the most central aspects for migrants' inclusion by both the receiving society and migrants themselves. In Europe, for instance, 95 per cent of Europeans are of the opinion that a certain command of the national language is important for migrants to integrate.³⁹ While language can facilitate inclusion prior to departure, without or with insufficient knowledge of the language upon arrival, migrants often identify language barriers as one of the first challenges they face. For instance, after migrating from Cambodia to Thailand for a work opportunity, Sophal notes: "The first three months proved to be very difficult due to the language barrier. I couldn't communicate with people and I was not familiar with the food."⁴⁰ In addition to facilitating social interactions, language is important for helping migrants navigate a new environment, including access to health care, housing and other services. It also improves their access to education, increases their likelihood of being employed, and leads to better self-reported health outcomes.⁴¹

With such a pivotal role for migrants' inclusion, language often constitutes an important area of government policy. National or local authorities sometimes support language acquisition through language courses, which can be mandatory for migrants. These language courses are at times freely available to migrants together with civic/social orientation courses (for example, in Sweden and Canada).⁴² In addition, language proficiency can be a requirement for entry or stay depending on the residence permit sought (such as family reunification) and for naturalization. For instance, as reported by the MIPEX 2015, countries with language requirements for permanent residence increased from one EU country in 1990 to 18 in 2014.⁴³

While States' support to language acquisition is key, language requirements – on which are conditioned entry, stay or naturalization in a country – may be counterproductive for migrants' inclusion. In fact, countries with lower language requirements turn out to be the most favourable for migrants' inclusion. Language tests can indeed deter migrants from applying for a particular status, rather than motivating them to master the language.⁴⁴ These tests can also exacerbate vulnerability faced by some migrants who are unable to pass them

³⁸ Castles et al., 2002.

³⁹ European Commission, 2018. The survey was undertaken in the 28 member States of the European Union from 21 to 30 October 2017, with some 28,080 residents interviewed.

⁴⁰ See <http://iamamigrant.org/stories/cambodia/sophal>. On the importance of and barriers to language learning for refugees, see Morrice et al., 2019.

⁴¹ Chiswick, 2016; Aoki and Santiago, 2018.

⁴² Regarding Sweden, see Wiesbrock, 2011. Concerning Canada, see <https://settlement.org/ontario/education/english-as-a-second-language-esl/linc-program/what-is-the-language-instruction-for-newcomers-to-canada-linc-program/>.

⁴³ Huddleston et al., 2015.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

due to different factors, such as age, literacy, as well as health, family or economic reasons. For instance, evidence supports that age is negatively correlated with one's ability to learn a new language.⁴⁵

Research highlights a paradox in focusing on national language acquisition in societies that increasingly promote multilingualism.⁴⁶ In certain cities of the United States, for instance, such as Miami, Spanish may be more important than English to work in some sectors.⁴⁷ In some communities, research has found that moving away from language assimilation to a multilingualistic approach in schools supports migrant students' educational outcomes and, ultimately, decreases the likelihood of discrimination and improves their sense of inclusion.⁴⁸

Education

Along with work prospects, migration can be motivated by migrants' willingness to access higher quality education in another country.⁴⁹ Education has a positive influence on migrants' employment and social participation in the receiving society, which tends to view migrants more positively when they have attained higher educational qualifications.⁵⁰ For migrant children, access to primary education is a fundamental human right, regardless of their migration status (see appendix B). However, migrants' educational outcomes are still lower than those of their native counterparts, especially for first-generation migrants. The educational performance of migrants depends on a range of factors, including their language skills, socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, and age at migration.⁵¹

While policy responses are important in improving migrants' education levels, the MIPEX 2015 notes that "[e]ducation emerges as the greatest weakness in integration policies in most countries".⁵² Beyond countries covered in MIPEX 2015, there more generally remain issues in migrants' access to education. This is especially striking for refugee children. Four million refugee children were out of school in 2017 out of the 7.4 million of school age under UNHCR mandate – more than half of all refugee children worldwide.⁵³ As for migrant children, their full inclusion in national education systems is important, including for those whose education tends to be left to the humanitarian sector in countries with high numbers of refugees. With 1 million refugees of school age in 2018, Turkey has committed to include all Syrian refugee children previously attending temporary education centres into its national education system by 2020.⁵⁴

Challenges in accessing education also exist for other migrant children. Administrative formalities in some countries may pose obstacles for migrants to enrol their children at school, especially if they lack some documentation or are in an irregular situation. Schools' obligations to report irregular migrant children to the authorities or provide government authorities with access to children's data may further deter migrant

45 Isphording, 2015.

46 Ros i Sole, 2014; Krüger Dias and Plaza Pinto, 2017.

47 Lewis, 2013.

48 Somers, 2018; Panagiotopoulou and Rosen, 2018.

49 Hagelskamp, Suárez-Orozco and Hughes, 2010; Bakewell and Bonfiglio, 2013.

50 See UN CESCR, 1999; UNESCO, 2018.

51 Filsí, Meroni and Vera-Toscano, 2016; Corak, 2011; UNESCO, 2018.

52 Huddleston et al., 2015.

53 UNHCR, 2018.

54 UNESCO, 2018.

children from attending school due to fear of deportation.⁵⁵ To ensure migrant children's enrolment and attendance, some countries have established firewalls between immigration authorities and schools.⁵⁶ In Germany, for example, the obligation for schools to disclose pupils' data to the police was abolished in 2011.⁵⁷ Simplified formalities for school enrolment, including for migrant children lacking certain identification documents, have also been put in place in some countries, such as Thailand.⁵⁸

Challenges for migrant children's education go beyond access to school. Other obstacles to improve their education outcomes include the lack of education tailored to their needs and, less commonly, their segregation from natives in classrooms.⁵⁹ The composition of classrooms plays a role, as a high concentration of migrant children negatively influences their educational outcomes. Research also suggests that digital technologies could help reduce the gap in educational achievements between migrant and native children by supporting migrant children in doing their schoolwork at home, including through access to educational material in their native language.⁶⁰

More generally, migrant children may experience prejudice and discrimination at school. Schools can, however, serve as spaces for promoting tolerance and social cohesion. An increasing number of countries are integrating diversity into their curricula, but teachers still need support and training to teach effectively in diverse classrooms,⁶¹ including through induction or mentorship programmes.⁶²

Labour market inclusion

With 164 million migrant workers worldwide in 2017, representing 59.2 per cent of all international migrants and 70.1 per cent of those of working age, labour market inclusion is a key policy area for States.⁶³ Its importance is increasingly emphasized in terms of migrants' economic contributions to receiving and origin societies (see chapter 5 of this report). It has, for instance, been estimated that, while migrants contributed 9.4 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015, better inclusion, including in terms of employment, could add an additional USD 1 trillion per year to the global GDP.⁶⁴ For migrants, just as it is for non-migrants, labour market inclusion brings greater economic security, and enhances their well-being and sense of belonging in receiving societies.⁶⁵

Labour market inclusion consists of different dimensions, ranging from access to employment and general or targeted support, to protection of migrant workers.⁶⁶ Among these, access to employment is an important factor. Migrants' employment rates are commonly lower than those of non-migrants. In the European Union,

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ UN HRC, 2018.

⁵⁷ FRA, 2011.

⁵⁸ IOM, 2011.

⁵⁹ UNESCO, 2018; De Paola and Brunello, 2016.

⁶⁰ Rodrigues, 2018.

⁶¹ UNESCO, 2018.

⁶² PPMI, 2017.

⁶³ ILO, 2018. See Huddleston et al., 2015.

⁶⁴ McKinsey Global Institute, 2016.

⁶⁵ Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

⁶⁶ Huddleston et al., 2015.

for instance, the unemployment rate of migrants was 13.3 per cent in 2017, compared with 6.9 per cent for the native-born.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, substantial differences exist between countries and groups, as labour market inclusion depends on the socioeconomic situation and policies of each country, as well as on migrants' demographic and individual characteristics (such as age, gender, language skills or qualifications) and the circumstances of their migration. Overall, for example, refugees and those who migrated for family reunification have a lower likelihood of finding a job than other migrants.⁶⁸ To improve the employment rate of refugees, Switzerland launched a new Artificial Intelligence pilot programme in 2018. This programme relies on an algorithm that determines in which area of the country a particular asylum seeker should be placed to maximize his/her employment likelihood.⁶⁹

General and targeted support for migrants is important for improving migrants' access to employment. In addition to language training, vocational training has been found to be effective in improving access, especially if it encompasses a practical on-the-job training component.⁷⁰ Other tools considered effective include job search assistance programmes and wage subsidy programmes (that is, subsidized employment in the private sector).⁷¹

The inability to have qualifications recognized or skills validated also remains an issue, as it restricts access to certain jobs and leads to overqualification in lower-skilled positions.⁷² Working below skill level may also increase the risk of distress for migrants and result in lower psychosocial well-being.⁷³ This issue is not only linked to the absence of recognition programmes, but also to the lack of awareness and information about such programmes or to their cost and complexity.⁷⁴ The establishment of a one-stop shop for recognition in some countries, such as in Denmark, can be valuable to simplify and centralize recognition programmes under one roof.⁷⁵

The feminization of migration: Calling for a gender-sensitive approach to inclusion

The feminization of migration is reflected in the increasing number of female migrants^a and changing migration patterns. Female migrants are not only migrating as part of a household, but exercise increased agency in migrating on their own, as migrant workers, students or refugees, for instance.

This feminization of migration has, however, not been accompanied by more gender-targeted policies for migrant inclusion, which would reflect the particular obstacles faced by female migrants.^b These barriers are particularly apparent when it comes to labour market inclusion. In the European Union,

⁶⁷ Eurostat, 2018. In the United States of America, however, the unemployment rate of migrants (defined as foreign born) was lower (4.1%) than that of the native-born (4.4%) in 2017 (United States Department of Labor, 2018).

⁶⁸ Lens, Marx and Vuji, 2018; Cangiano, 2014.

⁶⁹ Stanford University, 2018.

⁷⁰ Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.

⁷¹ Kluge, 2010; Card, Kluge and Weber, 2010; Butschek and Walter, 2014.

⁷² See OECD, 2014; Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

⁷³ Espinoza-Castro et al., 2018.

⁷⁴ IOM, 2013; Huddleston et al., 2015.

⁷⁵ IOM, 2013.

for instance, 54 per cent of women born outside the EU were employed in 2017, compared with 73 per cent of men born outside the EU and 68 per cent of women born in the reporting country.^c Among employed women migrants, 40 per cent were overqualified for their positions,^d with a high number engaged in domestic work.^e Refugee women are even worse off in terms of labour market inclusion, given their more precarious status and situation.^f

Lower educational levels and the younger age of female migrants may in part account for the difference in employment rates between female migrants and their native-born counterparts.^g Compared with male migrants, female migrants may also have childcare responsibilities, which they may accommodate by not working or taking on part-time or even informal employment.^h This impacts not only their labour market inclusion, but also their potential to act as sponsors of relatives for family reunification, because they may not have the minimum salary required to do so.ⁱ The influence of cultural norms may also play a role for female migrants coming from countries where female economic participation is low.^j

The adoption of policies addressing the particular structural obstacles and inequalities faced by female migrants can improve their inclusion, not only in the economic sphere but also in other policy areas.^k Such policies can also protect female migrants from experiencing vulnerable situations that may put them at heightened risk of violence, abuse and exploitation.^l

a See chapter 2 of this report.

b Integration of migrant women: A key challenge with limited policy resources. European Commission. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/feature/integration-of-migrant-women>.

c Ibid.

d Ibid.

e ILO, 2015; IOM, 2017a.

f Liebig and Rose Tronstad, 2018.

g Barslund and Laurentsyeva, 2018.

h Kontos, 2011.

i Huddleston and Pedersen, 2011. See the section below on family reunification.

j Barslund and Laurentsyeva, 2018.

k Integration of migrant women: A key challenge with limited policy resources. European Commission. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/feature/integration-of-migrant-women>.

l See Hennebry, 2017.

Family reunification

Family reunification is a central component of the right to family life. On this basis, nationals and migrants, including refugees, can act as “sponsors” of family members living abroad in order for them to be reunited. Although not all migrants want to be reunited with their families in the receiving country,⁷⁶ for those who wish to do so, family reunification can play an important part in their inclusion. Family reunification is not only about improving family life, but also social inclusion (through engagement with schools or community-

76 See Mazzucato and Schans, 2011.

based associations) and political participation.⁷⁷ Evidence also indicates that family reunion enhances migrants' labour market inclusion.⁷⁸ According to a longitudinal survey of immigrants in Canada, family members play a particularly important role in supporting and facilitating migrants' entry and inclusion into the labour market, especially during the first four years after arrival.⁷⁹

Family reunification has become an important component of many States' policies, especially in Western countries. Family migration accounted for 38 per cent of all permanent migration in OECD countries in 2016, representing 1.8 million family migrants, of which 1.6 million were registered under family reunification and the remainder as accompanying migrant workers.⁸⁰ Family reunification is often limited to certain types of family members and subject to specific conditions.⁸¹ It is usually restricted to the immediate family members (such as spouses, children below the age of 18 and dependent relatives), which may not reflect the social configurations of migrants' families.⁸² The sponsor is often required to provide proof of sufficient financial means to support his/her family members.⁸³ As this income requirement may raise difficulties for refugees, some countries have exempted them or lowered the minimum salary required.⁸⁴

While these conditions typically relate to migration management, other requirements for family reunification that are adopted for the declared purpose of ensuring migrants' inclusion can be counterproductive. Pre-entry language tests that sponsored family members are sometimes required to pass to be able to reunite with migrants in the receiving country are a case in point.⁸⁵ These tests can be prepared with prior language courses, but they are usually expensive, not easily accessible in rural areas of the country of origin and have a disproportionate negative impact on some family members, such as the elderly or refugees, who are less likely to succeed due to their vulnerable situations.⁸⁶ Rather than improving the educational achievements and labour market inclusion of sponsored migrants, they may discourage migrants from applying for family reunification or delay family reunion. Delays can undermine the potential benefits for migrants' inclusion, as family reunion will raise more difficulties for families when occurring after a long period of separation between sponsors and their relatives.⁸⁷

Political participation

Migrants' participation in the political life of their receiving countries can take different forms, ranging from voting in local, national or regional elections and standing as candidates in local elections, to joining associations and political parties or being consulted through local, national or regional consultative bodies.⁸⁸ Compared with other policy areas of inclusion, such as language or employment, less attention has been

77 Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012; Block, 2015; Bauder, 2019.

78 Spitzer, 2018.

79 Li, 2007.

80 OECD, 2018a; see also Hooper and Salant, 2018.

81 Block, 2015.

82 Huddleston et al., 2015; Mustasaari, 2015; Spitzer, 2018. Spouses also include couples in same-sex partnerships in some countries.

83 Huddleston et al., 2015.

84 Nicholson, 2018.

85 Huddleston et al., 2015.

86 Huddleston and Pedersen, 2011.

87 Oliver, 2013; Huddleston et al., 2015; Spitzer, 2018.

88 Huddleston et al., 2015; Martiniello, 2006.

devoted to political participation in policymaking and research.⁸⁹ However, migrants' political participation can help States maintain the legitimacy of their democratic systems, realize migrants' inclusion and promote social cohesion.⁹⁰ It gives migrants the opportunity to have a say on policies that concern them and can increase their feeling of belonging in the receiving society.⁹¹

Migrants are not significantly less politically active than nationals. Their level of political participation depends on a range of factors, including contextual/structural and individual ones. The degree of political participation that migrants can exercise depends first on the receiving country.⁹² While most countries do not currently give migrants the right to vote (especially in Africa and Asia), some offer voting rights in national elections (see text box below), and an increasing number provide them with the right to vote in local elections (for example, in Europe, the Americas, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). By contrast, the right to stand in elections is more limited, even for countries offering the right to vote. In addition to differing political opportunities across countries, migrants' political participation is influenced by the culture of political participation in the receiving country and the level of participation and democratic tradition in migrants' countries of origin.⁹³

Countries where migrants can vote in national elections

Offering voting rights to migrants in national elections is much more unusual than in local ones. Only five countries in the world enfranchise migrants in national elections, regardless of their nationality: Chile, Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand and Uruguay.^a The length of residence required to participate in national elections varies from 1 year in New Zealand to 15 years in Uruguay. Beyond these five countries, many others entitle migrants only of certain nationalities to vote in national elections. This is the case in the United Kingdom (where Commonwealth as well as Irish citizens can vote), most Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean (for other Commonwealth citizens), Ireland (where United Kingdom nationals can vote), and reciprocally between Brazil and Portugal.^b

^a Arrighi and Bauböck, 2016.

^b Ibid.

Individual factors that influence migrants' political participation include migrants' demographic and personal characteristics, especially as the level of participation increases with age and the level of education. The duration of residence and naturalization also positively impact on migrants' political participation, and second-generation migrants are thus often more active than the first generation.⁹⁴

While it is difficult to measure the impact of policies on migrants' political participation, MIPEX 2015 suggests that countries with inclusive naturalization policies tend to have stronger political participation policies.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

⁹⁰ Huddleston, 2017; Thorkelson, 2015.

⁹¹ Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.

⁹² Huddleston et al., 2015.

⁹³ Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Huddleston et al., 2015.

In general, however, there remains a clear discrepancy between the high diversity of receiving societies and migrants' representation at different political levels.⁹⁶ Beyond the State, political parties thus have a particular role to play in increasing migrants' political representation and diversity.

Naturalization

Naturalization is the process and acquisition of nationality by a non-national. Migrants can become naturalized if they meet legal criteria and apply through appropriate channels. Although naturalization is often considered a milestone for migrants' inclusion in the receiving country, it is not an end in itself because inclusion remains an ongoing process.⁹⁷ That said, naturalization often provides migrants' full access to entitlements in receiving countries (such as voting and candidacy rights). Evidence demonstrates that naturalization increases migrants' labour market and social inclusion,⁹⁸ their level of political participation,⁹⁹ and their sense of belonging in the receiving country.¹⁰⁰

Given the importance of naturalization for migrants and their inclusion, it comes as no surprise that a large share of migrants are or want to become citizens of their receiving countries.¹⁰¹ However, not all migrants want to be naturalized, as it depends on a range of individual and contextual factors. Most notably, migrants from developing countries have a greater propensity to naturalize, because it ensures security to remain and eliminates the risk of being forced to return to their countries of origin, especially when these are characterized by a lower level of development, political instability or a non-democratic regime.¹⁰²

The most significant factor influencing migrants' likelihood to naturalize remains the receiving country's citizenship policies: the more inclusive such policies are, the higher the likelihood of naturalization will be.¹⁰³ In contrast to migration/inclusion policies, all countries have adopted nationality laws regulating the acquisition of nationality by descent, birth and/or naturalization. As citizenship is closely linked to national identity, naturalization can be politically controversial in some countries.¹⁰⁴ In countries that do not allow individuals to hold dual nationality, migrants may have to relinquish their nationality of the country of origin to obtain that of the receiving country, which may deter them from naturalizing.¹⁰⁵ Naturalization can be even more politically delicate with large flows of migrants, including refugees, although the United Republic of Tanzania has succeeded in naturalizing more than 170,000 Burundian refugees since 2007.¹⁰⁶

While a few countries grant citizenship to migrants in exchange for financial investments (such as Antigua and Barbuda, and Malta),¹⁰⁷ in most countries, naturalization is subject to specific conditions. These requirements

96 Huddleston, 2017; Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

97 Long et al., 2017; Bauböck et al., 2013.

98 Gathmann and Keller, 2016; OECD, 2011.

99 Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono, 2015.

100 Bauböck et al., 2013; Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012; Bakkaer Simonsen, 2017.

101 Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

102 Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015; Logan, Oh and Darrah, 2012; Dronkers and Vink, 2012.

103 Huddleston et al., 2015; Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.

104 Long et al., 2017.

105 Reichel, 2011. This also depends on whether dual nationality is allowed by the country of origin.

106 See Long et al., 2017; Kuch, 2018.

107 Long et al., 2017. For Malta, see the Citizenship by Investment Program: www.maltaimmigration.com/.

commonly include a minimum duration of legal residency, knowledge of national language(s) and, sometimes, culture, evidence of good character and the payment of fees for the naturalization process. The length of residence required differs from one State to another. While it is on average of 7 years in countries covered in MIPEX 2015, it goes as high as 35 years in the Central African Republic.¹⁰⁸ In addition to the high fees sometimes required for naturalization, the most contentious requirement relates to mandatory language and civic tests that migrants must pass in some countries.¹⁰⁹ These tests sometimes require knowledge about the receiving country that even some nationals may not possess.¹¹⁰

Situation on the ground: The role of local actors and migrants

While States can foster migrants' inclusion through national measures and policies, inclusion happens first and foremost "on the ground". This section first presents the role of the local level, especially cities, where everyday practices may be disconnected from national inclusion policies. While the local level is key for realizing migrants' inclusion, the section also highlights the role of migrants themselves, who are essential actors of their own inclusion.

The role of local actors

As inclusion primarily occurs at the local level, local actors can play an important role in supporting and fostering migrants' inclusion. These local actors are of a different nature and can range from local communities, including local resident and diaspora communities, and local civil society organizations to local authorities. Community centres provide spaces for interactions between locals and migrants in a given neighbourhood, and give access to a wide range of services and activities within the community. The Neighbourhood Houses in Greater Vancouver, for instance, provide support for employment, day and after-school care, activities for seniors, parent groups or sociocultural events.¹¹¹ In Europe, civil society organizations were important in assisting and sustaining longer-term initiatives for the inclusion of the increased number of migrants who arrived in 2015–2016 in countries such as Austria, Germany and Sweden. This is notably illustrated by the European Prize for Civil Society, which rewards initiatives taken by organizations, including local non-profit foundations and associations, in the field of identity and integration, and which in 2016 received a total of 284 applications from organizations in 26 EU member States.¹¹²

Alongside the involvement of local communities and civil society organizations, the role of local governments, especially cities, in migrants' inclusion has attracted increased attention due to migration patterns and processes of urbanization. Urban areas are the main destinations for migrants across the world, given the high return for migrants' human capital.¹¹³

108 Huddleston et al., 2015; Manby, 2016.

109 Long et al., 2017. As of 2015, half of the countries included in MIPEX 2015 required migrants to pass citizenship tests (Huddleston et al., 2015).

110 Banulescu-Bogdan, 2012; Bauböck et al., 2013; Long et al., 2017.

111 Schmidtke, 2018.

112 EESC, 2017.

113 Duncan and Popp, 2017.

Cities have an important role to play as spaces of inclusion, because they are the main sites of migration/inclusion policy implementation. They are the ones giving life to a greater or lesser extent to States' international obligations and commitments, especially with regard to housing, health, employment and education.¹¹⁴ Some cities deliver services to all migrants, regardless of their migration status, ensuring access to housing, health, employment and education. For instance, some cities, such as New York, have ID cards granted to all residents ("nationals" and migrants alike, including irregular migrants), which facilitate access to numerous services and serve as means of identification.¹¹⁵

Some cities also increasingly rely on innovative and pragmatic solutions to improve migrants' inclusion. For instance, this is the case in European cities, such as in Austria or the Netherlands, which have taken initiatives driving policy changes at the national level.¹¹⁶ Some cities in Flanders, Belgium, have developed Centres for General Welfare to respond to the increasing number of migrants and care for their needs. These centres combine a variety of services centralized under the same roof, such as housing, health care and psychosocial support for migrants.¹¹⁷ A similar one-stop shop model has been applied in Lisbon, Portugal, to improve migrants' access to public services that are key for their inclusion.¹¹⁸

Cities may also positively impact on migrants' inclusion through multicultural urban planning, when undertaken to strengthen the inclusion and resilience of diverse communities.¹¹⁹ However, urban planning for migrants' inclusion may raise more difficulties in informal urban spaces that have developed with rapid urbanization, such as (peri-urban) slums.¹²⁰ More generally, slums often escape the reach of national and local authorities, resulting, for instance, in lack of access to basic services for residents, including migrants. As illustrated in the text box below, in the specific context of Africa, these informal settlements have predominantly been formed in cities of the Global South, although peri-urban areas are developing in the Global North as well, such as in Lisbon, Athens and Rome.

Migration and inclusion in the context of urban transformation in Africa

Urbanization is a significant process in Africa. In 1995–2015, Africa had the highest rate of urban change of all continents, recorded at 3.44 per cent, with an urban growth 11 times quicker than in Europe.^a Across the continent, rural–urban migration rates are high, with increasing rates of international migration as well. For example, in 2013, 72.3 per cent of the resident population of the Dakar area was born outside the region.^b However, countries were relatively unprepared to plan for the impact of rural–urban migration. In 2016, 67.8 per cent of the entire urban population in Africa lived in informal urban settlements. Compared with State-led urban planning, local initiatives appear to have the highest impact on urban space. There is thus a growing recognition of the need for a more coherent urban governance and national development plans in African countries.^c

¹¹⁴ Robinson, 2014; Crawford, 2016; OECD, 2018b.

¹¹⁵ Medina, 2015.

¹¹⁶ Scholten et al., 2017.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ One-Stop Shop: Mainstreaming Integration. Cities of Migration. Available at http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/one-stop-shop-mainstreaming-integration/.

¹¹⁹ UN-Habitat, 2016a.

¹²⁰ Duncan and Popp, 2017.

Research in West Africa shows that migrants are not disadvantaged compared with non-migrants, and that inclusion in urban areas concerns locals as much as migrants.^d Other research is pointing to gated communities as one of the key phenomena of urbanization in Africa. After first appearing in South Africa, these gated communities have rapidly spread across the continent. Current research is focusing on the influence of these communities on achieving inclusive and sustainable urban transitions.^e They also raise the question of their impact on overall community cohesion, including for migrants' inclusion, as they reinforce segregation by increasing social differences between migrants and non-migrants.^f

a UN-Habitat, 2016b.

b Okyere, 2016.

c Oyefara, 2018.

d Beauchemin and Bocquier, 2003.

e Klaufus et al., 2017.

f Ibid.

Despite the role played by cities, their importance for migrants' inclusion, including in policy development, has yet to be duly acknowledged at the national level.¹²¹ Some cities have developed their own policies and actions to foster inclusion, in recognition that inclusion needs to be supported at different governance levels within a country. From this perspective, the interculturalist approach taken by some cities has been depicted as "a policy rebellion of cities against the state domination of policy in recent decades".¹²² Far from individual instances of rebellion carried out by a few cities, the idea of interculturalist cities has gained traction over the last decade. In 2008, for instance, the Council of Europe launched the Intercultural Cities programme for supporting cities in capitalizing in diversity.¹²³ At the time of writing, the programme totalled 135 participating cities in country members of the Council of Europe, as well as in Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Morocco and the United States of America. Participating cities are indexed according to their intercultural policies, governance and practices.¹²⁴ Research on the results of the Intercultural Cities Index suggests a positive correlation between the scores cities obtain and local well-being: the more intercultural policies are, the better the quality of life is.¹²⁵ While some national governments consider municipalities as key actors in policymaking and governance of migrants' inclusion, as is the case in Turkey,¹²⁶ in other countries, the proactive role of cities has led to frictions between city and national levels. This has been the case, for instance, with sanctuary cities that have adopted their own policies and measures to protect migrants, including those in an irregular situation.¹²⁷ These policies have at times been adopted in reaction to restrictive national migration and citizenship policies, and have established cities as spaces of inclusion.¹²⁸

121 Ibid.

122 Zapata-Barrero, 2017.

123 About Intercultural Cities. Council of Europe. Available at www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/about.

124 For the list of participating cities, see www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/participating-cities. On the Intercultural Cities Index, see www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/about-the-index.

125 Joki and Wolffhardt, n.d.

126 Duncan and Popp, 2017.

127 Lippert and Rehaag, 2013.

128 Bauder and Gonzalez, 2018; see also Pearson, 2015.

While cities are active players in the global governance of migration,¹²⁹ national governments are key in scaling up initiatives developed by cities and sharing good practices globally. The role of cities in organizing appropriate services to care for migrants' needs is increasingly recognized by States in global initiatives, such as in the New Urban Agenda following the Habitat III Conference in Ecuador in 2016.¹³⁰ Through a whole-of-government approach, the importance of the local level is also explicitly acknowledged and mainstreamed throughout the Global Compact for Migration.¹³¹ Objectives 15 and 16 are of particular relevance, as they both emphasize the role of the local level (including local authorities) for providing migrants' access to basic services and empowering them and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion (see chapter 11 of this report).

Recognizing migrants' agency

Beyond the State and local levels, migrants play a crucial role, not just as passive subjects of inclusion policies, but also as active actors of their own inclusion. Migrants' entrepreneurship is perhaps one of the most obvious illustrations of their agency for their economic inclusion. Beyond success stories such as that of Silicon Valley in California, where half of the high-tech companies were founded by migrants,¹³² there exist many examples of migrants' entrepreneurship (see chapter 5 of this report). For instance, Syrian refugee-owned companies have developed in response to refugees' lack of formal employment opportunities and the need to make a living.¹³³

Migrants are not only agents of their own inclusion but also actively support other migrants, while striving, more generally, for social cohesion. Among many other examples of migrants' initiatives, a school established by Congolese refugees in a Ugandan refugee camp has been depicted as a success for migrant children's inclusion. Since its creation in 2009, some 800 pupils have progressed to secondary school and 40 study in universities around the world. As the founders put it, "we realize that through education you can never be called a refugee forever".¹³⁴ Technology has also been used by migrants to support the inclusion of other migrants in receiving countries through YouTube videos to counter xenophobia and discrimination¹³⁵ or with the development of smartphone applications, as illustrated in the text box below.

¹²⁹ See also the Global Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development, Available at www.migration4development.org/en/events/global-mayoral-forum; and the Global Parliament of Majors Initiative, Available at <https://globalparliamentofmayors.org/>.

¹³⁰ Duncan and Popp, 2017.

¹³¹ UNGA, 2018a.

¹³² Wadhwa et al., 2007. Among the 126 companies that reported for this study, 52.4 per cent indicated that they had been founded by migrants.

¹³³ MEDAM, 2018. For more illustrations, see UNCTAD, IOM and UNHCR, 2018.

¹³⁴ Onyulo, 2018.

¹³⁵ IOM, 2018.

Migrants' use of technology for inclusion

Today, tech innovations are used to foster migrants' inclusion, as illustrated by the many smartphone applications developed to help migrants find their way in their country or connect with diaspora communities. The potential of these "apps" has not escaped migrants' attention, as evidenced, for instance, by the video game Survival, available on Android and iOS.



Survival was developed by young migrants, refugees and Spanish people in the Gibraltar Strait, with the support of the Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations and Omnium Lab Studios.^a Through this game, they share their experience of migration in the form of an "odyssey of social inclusion, going through all stages of the Migration trip".^b The objective of this game app is to "educate the player about the reality of thousands of people who are facing the tragedy of migration", putting him/her "in the shoes of these people, to try to change the focus, the perspective with which this problem is analysed in our social contexts".^c

a Available at <http://omniumlab.com/trabajos/detalle/survival>.

b Available at <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.omniumlabstudios.peaceapp.survival&hl=en>.

c Ibid.

Migrants' inclusion in communities and countries does not require relinquishing one's identity or ties with communities and countries of origin. Migrants increasingly act as transnational actors,¹³⁶ as explained by Daniel from Guatemala, who has been living for 30 years in Costa Rica:

My home could be a Guatemalan territorial space but with windows and doors open to Costa Rica. My home became a place where both visions and cultures can grow and live together.

That is the biggest challenge of living in another country: living a little here and a little there. You live the two visions of the world every day, one from the home country and the other one from the host country. Expressions, food, culture, world vision: the two countries intersect in everyday life.¹³⁷

Migrants' transnational lives can nonetheless be at odds with expectations of migrants as "settlers", and can result in their allegiance to the receiving country being called into question.¹³⁸ They may be perceived as a threat to social cohesion, with the risk of being discriminated against and excluded. However, migrants' discrimination and exclusion can entail a high cost for both migrants and receiving societies. For instance, migrants' exclusion can affect their own well-being, as illustrated by a study on the effects of discrimination

136 See Castles, 2003; Levitt, 2004; Vertovec, 1999.

137 Available at <http://iamamigrant.org/stories/costa-rica/daniel-matul-0>.

138 Appave and David, 2017.

at work on the well-being of Russian and Estonian migrants in Finland. Perceived discrimination accordingly predicts negative outcomes in terms of general and mental health for both groups of migrants.¹³⁹ Migrants' exclusion can also negatively impact on their contributions to trade, skills and labour supply, cultural transfer and exchange, which all consist of major benefits for receiving societies (see chapter 5 of this report).

More generally, migrants' exclusion constitutes a risk for social cohesion. On rare occasions, social exclusion can act as a driver of radicalization to violent extremism.¹⁴⁰ Although the likelihood remains low as terrorist attacks have not been primarily perpetrated by migrants,¹⁴¹ such consequences and costs entailed by migrants' social exclusion are arguably too high and have to be addressed. These constitute an additional factor to be taken into account to strengthen migrants' inclusion, in order to reduce the risk of radicalization for the well-being of societies and communities.

The various costs of exclusion and migrants' agency support the need to more fully involve migrants in the formulation of migration/inclusion policies. These policies could benefit from better understanding how migrants view their inclusion process, what their needs are and what potential policy responses could more effectively support their inclusion.¹⁴² More active involvement of migrants at the policy level would also be in line with the Global Compact for Migration, which emphasizes the need to empower migrants to achieve full inclusion and social cohesion.¹⁴³

Migrants' views to inform inclusion policies: The potential of migrant surveys

While research increasingly incorporates migrants' voices to better understand the impact of migration on their identities and sense of belonging, more insights would be needed on migrants' views of their inclusion process, needs and aspirations to inform and evaluate the effects of inclusion policies on migrants' lives.

Migrant surveys are useful tools to get a sense of migrants' views on their inclusion, as illustrated by the multiple references to the *Immigrant Citizens Survey* in this chapter. Piloted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, the survey was conducted with 7,473 migrants born outside the European Union and residing in 15 cities in seven EU member States. While the main findings of the survey are reproduced in appendix C, the survey concludes by pointing out that "surveyed immigrants today are generally as satisfied with their lives as most people in the country where they live". This positive note should not, however, obscure the challenges to inclusion identified by migrants in the survey, and can hopefully motivate similar endeavours in the future, as attitudes towards migrants are likely to have considerably evolved since the survey was concluded in 2012.

See Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012. The main findings of the *Immigrant Citizens Survey* are reproduced in appendix C.

¹³⁹ Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liedkind and Perhoniemi, 2007.

¹⁴⁰ Koser and Cunningham, 2017.

¹⁴¹ Duncan and Popp, 2017.

¹⁴² Mustafa, 2018.

¹⁴³ UNGA, 2018a.

Conclusion

This chapter offers an overview of what migrants' inclusion entails in policy and practice, the factors and obstacles thereto, and how it is approached by different stakeholders. However, it also illustrates the difficulty to address the question of migrants' inclusion at the global level, as it intrinsically remains a national issue. This is reflected in the Global Compact for Migration, where the actions linked to Objective 16 on empowering migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion remain largely aspirational (see chapter 11 of this report).

While there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach to inclusion, due to its highly personal and contextual nature, three main policy implications can be drawn from this chapter to foster migrants' inclusion and social cohesion:

- **The adoption of holistic inclusion policies has the potential to improve the effectiveness of policy responses in the field of inclusion.** As seen in this chapter, despite the emphasis sometimes placed on labour market inclusion, the different policy areas are closely interdependent, as inclusion outcomes in one specific policy area will likely impact on others. Conversely, the absence of holistic inclusion policies may be costly for both migrants and receiving societies. Single policy responses in one specific policy area will likely be ineffective in improving migrants' overall inclusion if not complemented by measures in other areas and supported by a coherent policy strategy. The risk is not only for migrants to end up being excluded and marginalized, but to create social tensions undermining social cohesion in the receiving society.
- **More inclusive policy responses in a wide range of related policy areas leads to deeper and more sustainable inclusion outcomes.** While this may sound logical, it is particularly striking with regard to language requirements, political participation and naturalization. By contrast, more restrictive policies have the risk of being counterproductive, especially when used for migration management purposes. Conditions for family reunification that are meant to ensure that reunited family members will integrate in the receiving society, especially pre-entry language tests, can in practice limit the number of migrants benefiting from family reunification at the expense of supporting the inclusion of migrant sponsors and their relatives.
- **The important role already played by local actors and migrants calls for further strengthening their involvement in developing and (re-)evaluating national inclusion policies.** Increased involvement and empowerment of cities would help in mitigating tensions between local and national levels, because of discrepancies in how inclusion is approached. As the spaces where inclusion primarily occurs, cities and other local authorities are also the best placed to inform about the challenges of inclusion and good practices that can be implemented. As for migrants, their involvement in policymaking has so far not reflected how active they have been in practice for their own inclusion and that of other migrants. If their voices are increasingly heard today, their inclusion needs and aspirations are yet to be more thoroughly explored and taken into account to improve the effectiveness of inclusion policies.

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7

Migration and health: current issues, governance and knowledge gaps¹

Introduction

There is a dynamic and complex relationship between migration and health. Migration can lead to greater exposure to health risks, such as those migrant workers working in conditions of precarious employment with limited access to affordable health care. Migration can also be linked to improved health – for instance, after moving from a context of persecution and fear of violence to a safe environment. In this chapter, we examine the four key aspects of migration and health: (a) the health of individual migrants (“migrant health”); (b) the ways in which migration can affect the health of populations (“public health”); (c) health-care systems responses; and (d) the global governance of migration and health.

The first aspect – migrant health – can be defined as the differences in health found between migrants and populations at both origin and destination, and across different migration settings, such as labour migration, international and internal displacement, or irregular migration. Whether individual migrants will experience improvements or declines in their health status will depend partly on their interactions with the multiple factors that determine their health before, during and after their migration journey. Such factors – known as the social determinants of health – include access to safe transit, quality housing and health care.

The second issue – public health – focuses on how migration can affect the health of populations, including the ways in which healthy migrants can promote social and economic development and progress towards the global target of universal health coverage (UHC), which aims to ensure access to affordable and quality health care for all.² However, if poorly managed, migration can negatively affect populations’ health. For example, a migrant mother struggling to access documentation may be unable to access timely health care for her child – including vaccinations – for fear of arrest, detention or deportation. This could contribute to the spread of communicable diseases, such as measles, across and within borders, with negative health effects for the entire population.

The third issue concerns systems responses to migration and health. The development of migrant-sensitive health-care responses and the monitoring of migrant health, through a Migration and Health in All Policies (MiHiAP) approach, can address the health needs of migrants. Poorly managed, inadequate or discriminatory immigration and health system responses can have multiple negative consequences for the health of migrants and the communities with which they interact.

The fourth issue is the global governance of migration and health. This involves a focus on the ways in which migration and health can be mainstreamed into global governance processes, including identifying key strategic opportunities to do so.

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² UHC2030, 2017.

The chapter examines these four key issues. It starts with a brief overview of definitions and determinants. It then provides an overview of the factors that determine the health vulnerabilities and resilience factors of diverse migrant groups. Systems responses, and an overview of current approaches to the governance of migration and health, are then outlined. Key evidence gaps are highlighted, and the chapter concludes by emphasizing the importance of investing in effective migration and health governance, and how current approaches could ideally be strengthened.

Migration and health: Key facts

- **Good health encompasses mental, social and physical well-being.**^a The field of migration and health encompasses health concerns arising from human mobility, such as the transmission of infectious diseases, and should engage with all aspects of well-being in the context of migration and with all who are affected, including families of migrants and the public health of communities with whom migrants interact during all phases of the migration journey.^b
- **People who move are often healthier than those who stay behind and may display what is known as the “Healthy Migrant Effect”.** This means that those who move tend to be healthier and live longer than people living in both the communities they leave and those to which they arrive.^c Health vulnerabilities and resilience factors are dynamic and change over time, and this elevated health status – if migration is not managed properly – can be eroded due to the poor living and working conditions experienced post-migration.^d
- **Migrants are not automatically vulnerable to poor health outcomes.** It is the conditions associated with different phases of the migration journey (pre-migration, transit, arrival and return) that may negatively or positively affect health.^e
- **Many migrants struggle to access health care.** Despite human rights norms on the right to health, and promotion of UHC for all, States are only obligated to provide a minimum basic package of emergency medical care to irregular migrants.^f Even regular migrants sometimes face legal barriers, racism and corruption, which inhibits health-care access.^g Plus, migrants often underutilize health-care services and delay seeking health care.^h
- **Healthy migration can benefit the health of communities.** For example, ensuring the good health of migrant workers can – through remittances sent home – enhance the socioeconomic status of family members, therefore promoting access to health care and education.
- **Health-care providers face challenges in managing care for migrants,** including: language and cultural barriers, resource constraints within health systems to deliver services, and the contradiction between professional norms/ethics and domestic laws that limit migrants' right to health care.
- **Strategic leadership and investment in building alliances between migration management systems and the health sector is needed.** Multisectoral action is needed to support alliance-building between immigration and health actors across multiple governance groups: the State, civil society – including migrant groups – the private sector and academia.ⁱ

- **Investment in the field of migration and health supports social and economic development.** Investment in monitoring and mitigating health risks is key to maintaining the health of migrants which, as a result, supports progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and global health targets.
- **Migration and health research capacity needs to be built globally, particularly within low- and middle-income countries.** Existing research output focuses disproportionately on a few categories of migrants and health concerns, and on migration to and from high-income countries.^j

a WHO, 1946.

b Wickramage et al., 2018b.

c Aldridge et al., 2018.

d Ibid.

e IOM, 2004.

f Lougarre, 2016.

g Migrating out of Poverty, 2017.

h Suphanchaimat et al., 2015

i Khan et al., 2016; Vearey et al., 2019; Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018.


j Sweileh, 2018.

Definitions and determinants

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines good health as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.³ This recognition of mental and social well-being, in addition to physical well-being, is critical, and emphasizes the importance of viewing health holistically. The state of a person’s health is shaped not only by one’s access to health services, but by a multitude of factors, which are termed the “determinants of health”. Figure 1 shows how the determinants of health can be applied to migrants across the migration cycle. Individual determinants are factors such as age, sex and genetic predisposition to disease, and the epidemiological profile of a given context and the disease exposures associated with it. Structural determinants are usually politically mediated – such as legal frameworks and societal attitudes towards migrants – and can result in a range of inequalities in socioeconomic status. For migrants, structural determinants of health include the conditions associated with the different phases of their migration journey – pre-migration, movement, arrival and integration, and (for some) return.

³ WHO, 1946.

Figure 1. The determinants of migrant health throughout the migration cycle



Source: Adapted from Gushulak, Weekers and MacPherson, 2009; IOM, 2008.

The various legal frameworks associated with different phases of the migration journey are important structural determinants of migrant health. This is because a migrant's legal status in a country can determine, for example, the extent to which they can access safe working conditions as well as the quality and affordability of health care. As illustrated in figure 1, there are multiple determinants of health – both individual and structural – that can have both positive and negative effects on health. An irregular migrant, for example, is unlikely to find work in the formal sector, and has to rely on the precarious informal sector, where work can be both unsafe and – often – illegal. As a result, irregular migrants may experience greater vulnerabilities to poor health, including increased exposure to infectious diseases, violence and injury. They are likely to face many challenges in accessing quality health-care services, and have very limited (if any) access to social protection services.

Migrant health

The field of migration and health explores the patterns in health found between migrants and the host population, and across different migrant groups, including in contexts where the host population may be struggling to meet its own mental, social and physical well-being needs.⁴ Exploring these patterns is important for several reasons. Firstly, the development of public health strategies over many decades recognizes the need for inclusiveness – the need to incorporate whole societies when addressing communicable disease control, such as through immunization programmes. The exclusion of subpopulations – such as migrant groups – must be avoided.⁵ There is a significant burden of tuberculosis (TB), HIV, hepatitis B, hepatitis C and vaccine-preventable diseases in migrant populations. Addressing this important group in surveillance, screening and linkage to care is crucial to meet the public health targets of countries and regions.⁶ Secondly, some health-related interventions developed for specific subpopulations, such as migrant groups, can provide or lead to health benefits for the whole population.⁷ Thirdly, ensuring the best possible health of migrants before, during and following their migration journeys enables them to maximize their inclusion and contributions to their host society, facilitate their support to families of origin, and minimize potential health-related costs borne by both the destination country and migrants themselves.⁸ Even in acute displacement situations, such as large-scale refugee flows, immediate health issues (along with food and shelter) are of primary concern, and dedicated resources are needed to meet these critical needs for the good of individuals, local communities and the broader society.⁹

Understanding health vulnerability and resilience is central to the field of migration and health. Migrants are not a homogenous group, nor are their needs, health vulnerabilities and resilience factors. Gender is a key dimension that particularly needs to be considered (see the text box below).

⁴ Lee, Sim and Mackie, 2018; Thomas, 2016.

⁵ Thomas, 2016.

⁶ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2018.

⁷ Chung and Griffiths, 2018; Thomas, 2016; Wild and Dawson, 2018.

⁸ Lu and Zhang, 2016; Wickramage et al., 2018b.

⁹ Abbas et al., 2018; Griswold et al., 2018.

Gender dimensions in mortality and abuse in “low-skilled” labour migrants

Globally, there is a higher proportion of male (58.4%) than female (41.6%)^a international migrant workers. Males dominate manufacturing and construction jobs, while female migrant workers work mainly in service sector jobs (nearly 74%), such as domestic services – often in conditions of precarious employment.^b Systematic reviews indicate a range of health vulnerabilities of female domestic workers, including poor access to sexual and reproductive health services.^c Poor work and living conditions, particularly restrictions on mobility and non-payment of wages, further exacerbate difficulties encountered by female domestic workers.

There is also limited empirical research on female migrant worker abuse, despite the phenomenon being widely reported in the media. Studies have shown that female migrant worker abuse manifests in multiple ways, including physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, spiritual and verbal abuse, and in terms of financial exploitation.^d

a ILO, 2018.

b ILO, 2015.

c Benach et al., 2011; Malhotra et al., 2013; Senarath, Wickramage and Peiris, 2014.

d Benach et al., 2011; Malhotra et al., 2013; Murty, 2009; Senarath, Wickramage and Peiris, 2014; IOM, 2017b.

Health vulnerability can be defined as the degree to which an individual is unable to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of diseases or epidemics.¹⁰ While most often associated with low socioeconomic status, health vulnerability can also arise when people are isolated, insecure and defenceless in the face of risk, shock or stress, including during and following migration journeys. Health resilience, on the other hand, results from individuals having access to the resources needed to cope with a threat to health or to resist the impact of a health hazard. Such resources can be physical or material, but they can also be found in the skills or attributes of individuals and their social networks.

Some migrants are healthier than the communities they leave and the communities to which they arrive, displaying levels of resilience to the health challenges encountered.¹¹ However, these health benefits can rapidly wear away, and migrants may struggle to access positive determinants of health, resulting in a range of health vulnerabilities that are more pronounced than those of the local population. For example, prenatal and postnatal health complications are often worse in migrant women. Not only are experiences with pregnancy-related health care more likely to be negative, there is an increased risk of mental health disorders, maternal mortality and premature births.¹² A systematic review of perinatal health outcomes and care among asylum seekers and refugees reported that perinatal mental health disorders such as postnatal depression were more frequent in migrant women than in women from host countries. The study also reported a twofold relative risk of mortality of migrant women related to preeclampsia/eclampsia and thrombosis.

10 Grabovschi, Loignon and Fortin, 2013.

11 Spallek et al., 2016.

12 Heslehurst et al., 2018.

As outlined in table 1, those migrants with the greatest health vulnerabilities are those in situations that diminish their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the changes and challenges associated with the different phases of the migration process. Some migrants can be exposed to trauma, exploitation and abuse during perilous journeys. They may experience psychosocial stressors, nutritional deficiencies, dehydration, exposure to infectious diseases, a lack of health-care services or continuation of treatments, and face the unhealthy consequences of certain settings, such as immigration detention centres or informal and illegal work environments. The literature on these issues is predominantly from high-income destination countries, focusing on specific health issues, categories of migrants, and source countries.¹³ Some literature combines different migrant groups together into descriptive studies, and most do not have comparisons with the host populations. For these reasons, it can be difficult to generalize from the limited data, but many of these health issues are consistent across studies, as summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Summary of main health concerns of selected migrant groups in vulnerable situations

Irregular migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited/no access to health-care services • More limited ability to pay for preventative and primary health care • Limited/no access to safe and legal work • Fear of deportation has multiple effects on emotional well-being and mental health, and impacts willingness to seek health-care services^a
Migrants in detention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conditions of detention are often punitive, jail-like conditions with limited access to medical care • Indefinite nature of detention contributes to the extreme distress, and cognitive, physical and emotional deterioration • Dramatically increased rates of depression and suicidal thoughts • Child migrants may be held in detention alongside their parents or separated from their families, and experience a lack of education or play opportunities^b
Child migrants and unaccompanied minors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preventative health interventions such as immunizations may be interrupted • Social isolation and separation from family members seriously limits ability to seek health care when needed • Persistence of mental health disorders even after settling • Age determination processes used as for immigration application resolution are controversial and fraught with imprecision and ethical challenges^c
Children “left behind”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential benefit of remittances that can allow for money to purchase food and for educational benefit • Increased risk of anxiety, depression, suicidal ideas, substance abuse and growth disorders^d

13 Sweileh et al., 2018.

Adult caregivers “left behind”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elderly caregivers take on a disproportionate burden of care for the children left behind, with negative psychosocial and physical health consequences • Left-behind elderly caregivers experienced higher levels of depression, loneliness, cognitive impairment and anxiety, and had lower scores on psychological health compared with older parents with no migrant children^e
LGBTI migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration can be undertaken to leave violence, discrimination or persecution • Trauma associated with need to continuously prove gender and sexual identity for asylum claims • High levels of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidality and substance abuse^f
Survivors of human trafficking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High levels of physical and sexual violence, and workplace injury • High rates of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, attempted suicide • Chronic threats, excessive work hours, poor living conditions and severe curtailment of freedoms^g

Source: (a) Hacker et al., 2015; Martinez et al., 2015; Winters et al., 2018; (b) Filges et al., 2015; Robjant, Hassan and Katona, 2009; Sampson et al., 2015; (c) ISSOP, 2018; Jensen, Skårdalsmo and Fjermestad, 2014; (d) Fellmeth et al., 2018; (e) Graham, Jordan and Yeoh, 2015; Siriwardhana et al., 2015; Migration Policy Institute, 2015; Thapa et al., 2018; (f) White, Cooper and Lawrence, 2019; (g) Kiss et al., 2015.

Note: Migrant groups are not mutually exclusive (can be overlapping). What is meant by “irregular migrant” is discussed in chapter 2 of this report.

Public health

The second aspect related to migration and health is on how migration can affect the health of populations (public health). As outlined above, migrants can face challenges in addressing their mental, social and physical well-being needs. Migrants who have limited or no ability to access positive determinants of health (see figure 1) can experience poor health outcomes, with various consequences for public health. This situation could itself be the result of difficulties faced in accessing a secure income, perhaps associated with challenges involved in obtaining the necessary documentation to work legally. Should they be unable to access timely testing and treatment, chances for onward transmission of the disease to others within the community would increase, as would the likelihood of unnecessary costs being incurred by the host health-care system as a result. It is important to recognize that popular representations of migration and health tend to be exaggerated by the media, sometimes as part of anti-immigrant political agendas, in which migration is positioned as a threat to public health.

Regardless of the setting, if migrants access health care only when they are very sick, additional costs will burden the health-care system. In contrast, health-care services – both preventative and curative – that are easily accessible enable the health needs of migrants to be addressed before they become very sick, reducing overall costs to health-care systems. When considering infectious diseases, delays in seeking treatment or challenges encountered when attempting to continue treatment for chronic infectious diseases such as TB

and HIV can have negative effects for populations, as the potential for onward transmission of infection may increase. This is particularly true in the case of movement across international borders, where delays in seeking care are associated with multiple factors, including the fear of engaging with public services when one is without legal status, or the outright denial of access to care by health-care providers. The emergence of “sanctuary cities” in countries with restrictive immigration regimes has in part stemmed from a need to ensure that health-care services are available regardless of a person’s migration status. The “sanctuary cities” movement is based on human rights principles and health equity approaches that prioritize access to health care for undocumented migrants.¹⁴ For instance, no significant differences in reports of physician communication, or in measures of diabetes management between undocumented and documented immigrants, existed among Mexican immigrants receiving care in two immigration sanctuary areas in the United States where people seeking health services are not asked about immigration legal status, nor is immigration status reported to immigration officials. Undocumented immigrants achieved comparable clinical outcomes and reported similar experiences of health care as documented immigrants and United States-born Mexicans.¹⁵

Some groups of migrants – including refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants – may be particularly vulnerable to infectious diseases and experience worse health outcomes than the host population, or come from locations where certain infectious diseases are of high prevalence; these groups can benefit from targeted screening and interventions.¹⁶ Their journeys from one place to another – including forced movements from conflict zones with severely compromised health-care services – may result in interruptions in vaccination schedules, with potentially negative public health implications for both individual migrants and communities affected by migration.¹⁷

Migration, both within a country and across national borders, is a key consideration in the control of infectious diseases. One such example is the case of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 (see text box below). Another example relates to interventions to address malaria. These require careful consideration of migration, which has been shown to affect diagnosis and negatively impact access to treatment and continuity of care. This may contribute to the spread of antimalarial drug resistance.¹⁸ Additionally, the reintroduction of malaria in countries reaching elimination through inbound migration presents further challenges to cross-border malaria control.¹⁹ Recognizing its importance in the control of infectious diseases, migration has been enshrined within the International Health Regulations and key disease control programmes in global health.²⁰ For example, the WHO framework for the global post-2015 “End tuberculosis (TB) Strategy” has identified migration and cross-border issues as a priority action area for countries with a low incidence of TB.²¹

¹⁴ Aboii, 2016.

¹⁵ Iten et al., 2014.

¹⁶ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2018.

¹⁷ Hui et al., 2018.

¹⁸ Lynch and Roper, 2011.

¹⁹ Cotter et al., 2013; Jitthai, 2013; Pindolia et al., 2012.

²⁰ Lönnroth et al., 2015; Wickramage et al., 2013; WHO, 2015.

²¹ Lönnroth et al., 2015.

Migration and disease control – The case of Ebola

Internal migration and cross-border mobility for purposes of formal/informal trade, cultural events, employment, education and health remain an essential part of life for many communities in West Africa, where the free movement of people, goods and services is considered key for regional integration, prosperity and development.^a The Kissi Triangle cross-border region at the intersection between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, critical for trade and commerce, became the epicentre for the spread of the Ebola virus in 2014. The Forécariah–Kambia axis between Guinea and Sierra Leone was another corridor of human mobility that sustained transmission of the virus. During the month of July 2015 alone, four of the seven transmission chains of positive Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases identified in Kambia (Sierra Leone) were linked with positive EVD cases in Forécariah (Guinea). Communities residing on both sides of the border share strong familial ties. Cross-border movement is a part of these communities' daily lives and takes place mostly through unregulated border crossing points. Restrictions to human mobility were enforced by authorities in some settings to inhibit cross-border movements with the rationale of containment of the spread of EVD. The impact on trade and on the economy in the West African region was estimated at USD 1.6 billion (12% of the combined GDPs the three most affected countries).^b Health systems weakened through decades of conflict, and deficits of human resources for health and disease surveillance along mobility pathways, undermined effective disease control measures. The need to adopt evidence-informed methods to determine corridors of population movements and for understanding the primary drivers of human mobility is vital for targeted disease prevention, detection and response efforts, especially at border areas, while safeguarding countries' trade and economic interests.

IOM, with the support of government authorities and local communities, started mapping cross-border and in-country population flows between Guinea and Mali as early as December 2014. This information was then mapped against epidemiological data, enabling further analysis of vulnerabilities of travellers along their mobility continuums. Similar initiatives were subsequently set up at the Forécariah–Kambia border between Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as at the Liberia–Sierra Leone border. Mobility mapping has since been expanded to include several sea landing points along the shores of Freetown and Port Loko, as well as internal movement between Kambia and Port Loko Districts in Sierra Leone. In all these locations, health screening and installation of infection prevention control measures were established, boosting the surveillance and response capacity of these three worst-affected countries and their neighbours.

a IOM, 2016.

b World Bank Group, 2015.

Health systems responses

The third aspect of migration and health is how health-care systems respond to migration and health. The health-care system is itself a determinant of health and, depending on the policies and legal frameworks of individual States, migrants may not be granted adequate, equitable and affordable access to health services, and/or local health systems may not have sufficient capacity to manage migrant health needs. For example, in countries of protracted crisis, migrant children fleeing conflict settings and seeking asylum with their families are more likely to have not met their vaccination targets due to disruptions in health-care delivery in countries of origin. Where health services are available, certain migrant groups may find it difficult to express symptomology and understand treatment instructions due to language barriers. Different cultural constructs of illness causation, such as those concerning mental health, challenge effective clinical management.²² They may also have difficulty with navigating unfamiliar health and welfare systems – especially when coming from countries with severely disrupted health systems.

A systematic literature review of reported challenges in health-care delivery to migrants and refugees in high-income countries identified three main topics of challenges in health-care delivery: communication, continuity of care and confidence.²³ Communication is critical for obvious diagnostic and treatment trajectories. The availability of trained interpreters from migrant communities was described as a key aspect in providing migrant-sensitive care. Training of such interpreters to ensure an ethical and professional approach to medical consultations was also highlighted. Continuity of care related to factors such as migrant understanding of the health-care system, integration and case management across different parts of the health-care system. Confidence was the third most common topic mentioned and related to trust in the health-care provider, ensuring cultural sensitivity in care provision and the ability to have agency. Studies indicated that, in cases where no trustful relationship was established, patients resorted to using traditional medicine and trusted “their own resources” from their community for treatment. Conversely, a systematic review that investigated the perceptions, attitudes and practices of health providers in the provision of health-care services for migrants found they were challenged not only by language and cultural barriers, but also by resource constraints within their workplaces, and incoherence between professional ethics and domestic laws that limited migrants’ right to health care.²⁴ Health-care providers used innovative means to ensure care provision in managing such clinical cases with civil society groups.

A key component of improved systems responses is the development of “migrant-sensitive health systems and programmes which aim to incorporate the needs of migrants into all aspects of health services, financing, policy, planning, implementation, and evaluation”.²⁵ As outlined in appendix A, this includes measures to: ensure culturally sensitive and linguistically diverse health service provision; enable access to primary health care; include non-citizen groups within national disaster preparedness and response plans; and establish reporting mechanisms within routine health information systems to ethically harness data to plan for migrant needs.²⁶ Often, migrants/“non-citizens” are excluded within preparedness and response strategies at national levels.²⁷

²² Fortier, 2010.

²³ Brandenberger et al., 2019.

²⁴ Suphanchaimat et al., 2015.

²⁵ Siriwardhana, Roberts and McKee, 2017.

²⁶ Mladovsky, 2013; Pottie et al., 2017; WHO, 2010b.

²⁷ Guinto et al., 2015; Wickramage et al., 2018a.

Migration and health indicators and metrics

Accurate data on the health status, outcomes, and social determinants of migration health are an essential precondition for ensuring better monitoring and improving health and providing appropriate and accessible health service. The World Health Assembly (WHA) resolutions on migration health (61.17, 2008; 70.15, 2017) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration²⁸ call on governments to better harness migration health data in order to formulate evidence-informed policy and practice interventions. However, the 2nd Global Consultation on Migration Health (2017)²⁹ and subsequent academic commissions³⁰ have indicated migration health data availability, quality and linkage to be highly variable, especially in low-to-middle-income countries. Little progress has also been made by member States and international organizations on advancing initiatives to improve migration health data collection and analysis at national, regional and global levels.

Sources of health data at country level are derived from multiple sources. First are health data derived from institutional registries or census-based data sources. These include, for example, birth and death registries capturing vital statistics and disease-specific registries, such as those for cancer, tuberculosis and malaria. A second source is through health survey data that may be collected periodically – for instance, demographic and health surveys. Research data are another major source providing specific information about specific communities or disease gradients. The final category includes a diversity of sources, such as those data from migration health assessments, health information systems at refugee camp settings, and big data projects such as the Global Burden of Disease project.³¹

A narrative review of migration health data collection practices in Europe revealed that most European Union countries do not collect data on migrant health in health-care utilization or disease registers, and those that do use different categorizations and definitions, so that data are not always comparable across countries.³² Health information systems, surveillance systems and disease registries do not systematically capture migration variables.³³ Migration modules have been tethered in only a few countries undertaking demographic and health surveys, such as Colombia and Ecuador, which capture data by place of birth. An exceptional case is that of Sweden, which in its annual survey of living conditions includes disaggregated data based on migration or residence status. People are classified either as first- or second-generation migrant, or non-migrant.³⁴

28 Objective 1 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration underlines the need to collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies; in addition, Objective 3 underscores the need to provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration. The Compact explains that investing in improved methods for migration data collection “fosters research” and “guides coherent and evidence-based policy-making and well-informed public discourse” – allowing for effective monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of commitments over time.

29 IOM, 2017c.

30 Abubakar et al., 2018.

31 Available at www.healthdata.org/gbd (accessed 24 July 2019).

32 Rechel, Mladovsky and Devillé, 2012.

33 Giorgi Rossi et al., 2017; Riccardo et al., 2015.

34 Mladovsky, 2013.

Principles of data protection and ethical considerations are paramount for the collection, analysis, dissemination and linkage of migration health data – not only due to historical framing on race, ethnicity and health³⁵ and potential for stigmatization, exclusion or, in the case of undocumented migrants, deportation.³⁶ Efforts to capture the extent of migrant integration within health systems, and therefore capture measures of health equity, are exemplified by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Health Strand project (see text box below). MIPEX Health Strand offers a survey instrument designed to investigate the degree to which policies affect migrant health and promote equity, allowing for comparison between different country contexts.³⁷

Migrant Integration Policy Index Health Strand

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Health Strand is a survey instrument designed to investigate the degree to which policies affect migrant health and promote equity.^a It captures four dimensions considered critical for ensuring health equity: (a) entitlements to health-care coverage based on domestic legal and policy frameworks; (b) accessibility to health services; (c) responsiveness, such as on issues of language and cultural sensitivity; and (d) measures to achieve change, such as data collection and research to better inform services. Intersectoral application of the “Health in All Policies” (HiAP) principle, as well as mainstreaming of migrant health policies, are also included. A scoping review of available evidence on the association between health outcomes and integration policies conducted in 2017^b showed a majority of studies included MIPEX as a measure of national migrant integration policies. Data showed that health disparities between migrants and citizens, and between migrant groups, were generally reduced in countries with a strong integration policy.^c

a IOM, 2017a.

b Siriwardhana, Roberts and McKee, 2017.

c Ingleby et al., 2018.

In the context of health systems, a MHiAP response – modelled on the WHO Health in All Policies (HiAP) approach³⁸ and drawing on the MIPEX Health Strand³⁹ – aims to engage all the crucial governance actors and sectors involved in the field of migration and health. An example of this in action is the development of the National Migration Health Policy and action framework in Sri Lanka (see text box below).

35 Bhopal, 1997.

36 Hiam, Steele and McKee, 2018.

37 IOM, 2017a.

38 Juárez et al., 2019; WHO, 2014.

39 IOM, 2017a.

Lessons from advancing a National Migration Health Policy and action framework in Sri Lanka

Migration continues to be a catalyst to Sri Lanka's development within the South Asian region. Sri Lanka is both a labour-sending country (with over 2 million of its citizens working abroad), and a labour-receiving one – with a growing number of migrant workers from countries such as India and China arriving to work on large-scale infrastructure projects, such as new highways, seaports and airports. Such development is projected to further increase population mobility into and within the island. The end of a protracted civil war led to a return of Sri Lankan refugees from India and other countries, with many more internally displaced persons returning to their places of origin.

Addressing the health challenges of a dynamic range of population flows therefore becomes important. In recognizing the intersectoral nature of addressing migration and health, a participatory “whole-of-government” approach – which included civil society, the United Nations, academia and migrant advocates – was adopted by the Government of Sri Lanka to advance a National Migration Health Policy and Action Plan, which was launched in 2013. Sri Lanka is one of the few countries to have a dedicated migration health policy framework inclusive of all migrant typologies.^a The process was led by the Ministry of Health under auspices of an interministerial mechanism with technical partnership from IOM. A hallmark of Sri Lanka’s policy development was an emphasis on an evidence-informed approach to guiding interventions/policy formulary. A national Migration Health Research Commission was undertaken over a three-year period, engaging local and international researchers to identify gaps in knowledge, conduct empirical research and gather data on migration health across inbound, internal and outbound flows. A pragmatic, action-oriented approach was adopted. For example, a National Border Health Strategy was developed to enhance point-of-entry capacities to enable better preparedness and response for health security risks, and capacities to address enhanced psychosocial support for returning female migrant workers.

Key lessons for advancing the National Migration Health Policy include:

- (a) Invest in an evidence-informed approach;
- (b) Ensure intersectoral coordination;
- (c) Engage diverse stakeholders from civil society, academia, industry and migrants themselves via participatory approaches;
- (d) Harness the network to be responsive to emergent issues (focus not only on policy formulary);
- (e) Embed an accountability framework;
- (f) Ensure global health diplomacy and engagement in regional and global processes.

An expanded case study is in appendix B.

a Wickramage, De Silva and Peiris, 2017.

The migration of health professionals

Health worker migration in response to the global shortage of health professionals demands dedicated and effective management, including building the capacity of health systems in origin countries, promotion of good practices and prevention of negative effects of health worker migration. There is a global imbalance between the availability of health workers and the burden of disease. For instance, sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest density of doctors and nurses, and the highest disease burden.⁴⁰ Well-managed migration of health workers can play a key role in development overall, as well as in building capacity of health systems, not only in receiving countries, but also in countries of origin.⁴¹ Global health tools such as the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel provide an evidence-based framework to promote good practices and prevent negative effects of health worker migration. As outlined in the WHO Global Code of Practice, there are strategies for both sending and destination countries to decrease reliance on foreign-trained health workers and mitigate the negative effects of health personnel migration on the health systems of developing countries. These may include, for instance: aligning government educational spending with employment opportunities; not hiring directly from countries with the lowest health-care worker-to-population ratios; and adopting innovative financing mechanisms, allowing local and private entities to provide complementary funding to government subsidies to health worker training.

The global governance of migration and health

Governance is central to the development and implementation of any response to migration and health.⁴² Migration governance rests primarily upon the fulcrum of national sovereignty,⁴³ and ensuring that positive health outcomes require well-managed migration. However, there is often limited engagement from health authorities in high-level migration governance decisions beyond issues concerning global health security – including quarantine and border-health management – and migration is frequently forgotten in the development of health programmes.⁴⁴ Many countries have explicitly stated before international human rights bodies that they cannot, or do not wish to, ensure health protection, including the provision of essential health services, to migrants, and especially to irregular migrants.⁴⁵

A range of governance agendas on the domains of migration and health have developed in recent years, providing important opportunities for garnering political support for intervention (see figure 2). These agendas bridge the fields of migration governance, development and global health governance, and include: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; the Global Compact on Refugees; the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); UHC; World Health Assembly processes; disease prevention and control programmes (including for malaria, HIV and TB); and the Global Health Security Agenda.⁴⁶ Effective governance requires strategic leadership and investment to build alliances between migration management systems and the health sector.

40 Crisp and Chen, 2014.

41 IOM, 2018.

42 By “governance”, we mean the ways in which an entity functions to develop and implement policy and practice, incorporating the State, civil society, the private sector and other key actors, such as international organizations.

43 Wickramage et al., 2018a.


44 Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018.

45 IOM, 2013.

46 IOM, 2017c; UHC2030, 2017; United Nations, 2015; WHO, 2007, 2010a; World Health Assembly, 2008, 2017.

The SDGs suggest multiple demands to bring the migration, development and health sectors together to develop and implement unified and coordinated responses.⁴⁷ Target 3.8 of the SDGs calls for universal health coverage (UHC) – a key SDG target providing a strategic opportunity to improve responses to migration and health which will, by ensuring the good health of migrant workers and the associated flow of remittances, indirectly benefit social and economic development.⁴⁸ Migrants unaccounted for in UHC programmes are often missed in discussions about UHC goals at the country level.⁴⁹

Figure 2. Global agendas for advancing migration and health goals



47 United Nations, 2015.

48 UHC2030, 2017.

49 Guinto et al., 2015.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration – discussed in chapter 11 of this report – features health as a cross-cutting priority with references to health and health-care access in several objectives. Key health-related objectives within the Global Compact for Migration with commitments and actions relevant to health are presented in appendix C. A number of experts have commented on weaknesses in the Global Compact in its realization of the right to health of migrants, including its absence on reproductive health and access to safe maternity care, which directly impacts newborn and child health.⁵⁰ Despite these limitations, the Global Compact for Migration does provide the health community the opportunity to use it as a tool to advance migrant-sensitive health policies and services within discussions on migration governance, where health often remains left behind.⁵¹

Gaps in migration and health research

Globally, various research initiatives are underway to assist in developing improved understanding of – and responses to – migration and health, with a focus on the implementation of evidence-informed interventions to improve the health and well-being of both migrants and communities affected by migration.⁵² While this field of research is growing, efforts to improve understanding of migration and health, and examples of migration and health programming, remain limited.⁵³ As outlined in the text box below, the existing literature on international migration and health is limited in scope. It focuses on (a) high-income receiving contexts of Europe and North America; (b) specific health conditions such as mental health, HIV and TB; and (c) specific migrant groups, including migrant workers, child migrants, unaccompanied minors and “left-behind” children, women, refugees and (female) survivors of human trafficking.⁵⁴ This highlights the need to improve research capacity in low- and middle-income country contexts, where the majority of migration takes place globally, and to increase the scope of research beyond the current focus on mental health and psychosocial well-being. Contextually relevant research agendas need to be set at the national and regional levels, through consultation with migrant communities, policymakers, practitioners, civil society and researchers.

50 Bozorgmehr and Biddle, 2018; Devakumar et al., 2018.

51 Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018.

52 Abubakar et al., 2018; Griswold et al., 2018; IOM, 2017c; Pottie et al., 2017; Wickramage et al., 2018b.

53 Ho et al., 2019; Sweileh et al., 2018.

54 Sweileh et al., 2018.

Global distribution of international migration and health research in peer-reviewed publications

By international migrant category:

- Refugees and asylum seekers (25.4%)
- Migrant workers (6.2%)
- Human trafficking and smuggling (3.2%)
- International students (2.1%)
- Patient mobility across international borders (0.1%)

By country income classification (based on World Bank Classification)

- Low-income countries (0.8%)
- Middle-income countries (9.6%)
- High-income countries (89.6%)

By thematic research areas:

- Mental health and psychosocial well-being literature (47.0%)
- Communicable diseases (13.7%)
- Non-communicable diseases (8.9%)

Source: Sweileh et al., 2018.

Note: A total of 21,547 documents were retrieved and reviewed. The variables are not necessarily exclusive, so percentages may not total 100 per cent.

Conclusion: Investing in migration and health to support social and economic development

Investment – by way of both financial and human resources, and political will – by States in the development of evidence-informed migration and health interventions will not only address the health needs of individual migrants, it will also improve public health and support efforts towards achieving UHC. This investment is particularly important for low- and middle-income country settings, where significant levels of migration take place.

Good health is a prerequisite for optimizing the benefits of migration (e.g. in the form of remittances); investment in migration and health therefore contributes to social and economic development in both migrant sending and receiving areas.⁵⁵ Policymakers, civil society, the private sector and researchers all have

⁵⁵ Abubakar et al., 2018; IOM, 2017c; Onarheim et al., 2018; Trummer et al., 2016; Tulloch, Machingura and Melamed, 2016; Vearey et al., 2019; Wickramage et al., 2018b.

important roles to play – globally, regionally and nationally – in understanding and responding to migration and health, and migrants themselves must be involved in the development and implementation of policies and programmes.⁵⁶

To achieve this, investment in research capacity is first needed to improve understanding of the four key aspects associated with the field of migration and health that were outlined in this chapter – migrant health, public health, health systems responses and global governance opportunities. Research is needed to generate evidence-informed and context-specific interventions to address migration and health, which will, in turn, support UHC. Through partnerships with international organizations and academics, a new generation of migration and health scholars can be supported to develop new research approaches and monitoring systems to improve migration and health responses globally.⁵⁷ Additional research beyond the current focus on refugees and asylum seekers, and on mental health and psychosocial well-being, is needed to better inform improvements in health systems and services.

At the global level, improvements in understanding of the implications of human mobility in order to support and improve public health preparedness planning – including developing responses to infectious disease outbreaks or other health emergencies – are needed, requiring investment in building research capacity, particularly in low- and middle-income country contexts.⁵⁸ Working within the framework of a national migration and health policy process, the private sector can also support the development of programmes to improve the health of, for instance, migrant workers. The role of the private sector has been overlooked in the governance of migration and health and, among many other innovative roles, this can include sponsorship for building research capacity and interventions designed to address the health needs of migrant workers. Such programming will benefit the health of both individual migrant workers and their families, both in the origin and destination countries.

Frameworks that can provide guidance and indicate strategic opportunities to support migration and health interventions include: the 2008 World Health Assembly (WHA) resolution “Health of migrants”; the 2017 WHA resolution “Promoting the health of refugees and migrants”; the declarations made at two Global Consultations on Migration and Health; the WHO (draft) Global Action Plan on the Health of Migrants; and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which features health as a cross-cutting priority.⁵⁹ These can be used by academia, United Nations bodies, civil society and government actors to mobilize action, including within the private sector. Policymakers – with the support of researchers – need to identify how both the migration and health sectors can strengthen their engagement with migration and health through a MHiAP approach. As the integration and inclusion of migrants and migration are a vital component of global disease control programmes – such as those for TB and malaria – and global health security agendas, health should form a key pillar in the development of migration governance.

At regional levels, consultative processes to support the development of coordinated approaches to migration and health are needed. This could be achieved through integrating health into existing regional consultative processes on migration and development, and should include collaborations for disease surveillance and

⁵⁶ IOM, 2017c; Wolffers, Verghis and Marin, 2003.

⁵⁷ The Migration Health and Development Research Initiative (MHADRI) Available at <https://mhadri.org/> (accessed 25 July 2019)) is a recently established global research network that seeks to address these issues and promote shared research activities and approaches in migration health.

⁵⁸ IOM, 2017c; Wickramage et al., 2018b.

⁵⁹ IOM, 2017c; WHO, 2010b, 2017, 2019; World Health Assembly, 2008, 2017.

interventions to support continuity of care across national borders. To operationalize these suggestions, States should consider identifying a national focal point that can drive the development of a national migration and health policy, and lead engagements at regional and global levels. This would require an evidence-informed, intersectoral, participatory approach, the development and adoption of an accountability framework, and centring of global health diplomacy. By investing in evidence-informed interventions, States will be better equipped to develop responses to migration and health at the local, regional and global levels. This will have positive impacts on the health of individual migrants, support efforts to achieve UHC by 2030, and – ultimately – ensure that individuals, communities and States can access the social and economic development benefits associated with healthy migration.



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8

CHILDREN AND UNSAFE MIGRATION¹

Introduction

Child migration is a significant contemporary phenomenon. It is likely to increase in both scale and salience as the mobility of young people grows, a result of more affordable travel, climate change, growing technology-mediated connectivity, increasing global inequality in the distribution of opportunity, security and access to employment, and the diffusion of a global cultural commons.

Like the migration patterns of other age groups, child migration spans a broad range of phenomena. To start with the term itself, a child is defined in international law as “every human being below the age of 18 years, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.² Data on youth migration do not always use this cut-off point, however, so reference is often made to “youth migration”. The broad term “migration” can cover both international and domestic human mobility – movement that is of short duration or lifelong – and both one-way and circular journeys. It can span the range from unproblematic family relocation to traumatic forced displacement caused by the violence of war, attempts at ethnic cleansing or State disintegration. The migration of children includes both journeys where children accompany adult relatives and situations where children need to undertake journeys alone; it includes situations that result in enduring improvements to the quality of children’s lives, in terms of educational opportunity or familial security, and situations where exposure to exploitation or risk leads to enduring trauma.

Child migration is not a new phenomenon, but one that has a history dating back to ancient times. Children, both boys and girls, have always migrated with or following their families, to pursue opportunities or increase their safety away from home. Much of this migration is unproblematic. After a period of adjustment to a new context, and with the exception of situations where enduring racial or religious discrimination prevents this, most children, along with their families, integrate into their new societies. This chapter, however, focuses on child migration that does not conform to that pattern – migration that is unsafe, irregular, exploitative. And it focuses on international migration. This is not to suggest that other aspects related to child migration are not important. However, the urgent need to better understand *unsafe* international child migration, in its various dimensions, stems from the fact that this aspect of child migration requires greater engagement and support from governments and international actors, to ensure children the protection they are entitled to.

Accounts abound over the centuries of the unmet protection needs of both male and female children separated from their families by wars, famine and environmental disaster; of trafficked children transported from home by exploitative masters (slave owners, religious orders, warlords); of unaccompanied children received after forced exile by unfamiliar, even unrelated careers (foster families, refugee agencies, and educational or

¹ Jacqueline Bhabha, Professor of the practice of health and human rights, School of Public Health, Harvard University; Guy Abel, Professor in the School of Sociology and Political Science, Shanghai University.

² 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1.

correctional institutions).³ But, despite this long history, the challenge of protecting the safety and best interests of migrant children has been neglected.

One reason for recent increased attention to the phenomenon is its current magnitude. As figures 1 and 2 show, there were 37.9 million migrants under the age of 20 in 2019, 14 per cent of the world's migrants. This reality has urgent implications for educational, child welfare and migration authorities.

Another factor galvanizing increased political will and public concern about child migration is the peculiarly newsworthy and compelling nature of child suffering. The tragic September 2015 drowning of Alan Kurdi and the international outrage provoked by the United States Government's 2018 southern border family separation policy exemplify this. So does the growing acknowledgement of the life-changing impact of aspects of the migration process for very large numbers of child migrants.⁴ Policies that separate parents from their children at borders or through deportation proceedings, as well as protracted administrative procedures that prevent children from reunifying with parents for years, can be devastating for the health and well-being of affected children.⁵ Dramatic impacts for children also flow from other migration-related contexts: the absence of life-saving rescue procedures to pre-empt child drowning or fatal dehydration during migration journeys;⁶ educational shortcomings in refugee camps;⁷ State inaction in the face of evidence of migrant child sexual exploitation;⁸ and unmet physical and mental health needs for displaced children.⁹

This chapter examines unsafe international child migration, and the ongoing tension between migration governance and child protection imperatives.¹⁰ The chapter starts by detailing the different types of child migration globally, including their drivers, and issues related to the data on child migration. Next, it discusses key protection challenges affecting child migrants before going on to address current issues and evolving policies relating to them. The chapter then explores the main emerging challenges confronting child migrants. It concludes by reflecting on achievements and priorities still in need of attention.

Types of child migration

Definitional confusion has long bedevilled discussion of child migration. Like the deficiencies related to data that are discussed in what follows, not all aspects of this challenge are specific to children. Facile dichotomies of forced versus economic migration are widely deployed in the migration field, and complicate the imperative of foregrounding rights considerations for vulnerable populations who may be in urgent need of protection. The dearth of child migration research from a child- rather than State-centric perspective contributes to this.¹¹

³ For a seminal overview of the migration history of unaccompanied children, see Ressler, Boothby and Steinbock, 1998. For three specific histories of child migration, see Bhabha, Kanics and Senovilla (eds.), 2018. See also Humphreys, 1994.

⁴ IOM, 2017a.

⁵ For a study of the risks associated with different forms of family separation, see UNHCR, 2018.

⁶ IOM, 2019; INEE, 2018; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2018; Ní Raghallaigh, 2018.

⁷ Sirin and Rogers-Sirin, 2015.

⁸ Digidiki and Bhabha, 2017.

⁹ Watters and Delynn, 2018; Kohli, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018a.

¹⁰ See OHCHR, 2016.

¹¹ Some notable exceptions, research driven by the child migrant's perspective, include chapters in Part VI of Bhabha, Kanics and Senovilla (eds.), 2018.

Like adults, children's migration is not usefully divided into "forced" or "voluntary", but rather viewed as a combination of elements of compulsion and choice, which may change over time. Because of the large variety of relevant situations, child migrants are now commonly referred to as "children on the move", a phrase that has the advantage of not precluding a transition from one migrant category to another, but the disadvantage of obscuring the challenges arising after settlement.

Children embark on a broad range of different types of migration. Some migration journeys are highly gendered, such as the long-standing exploitative transportation of Nigerian girls to Europe to work in the sex industry, or the self-initiated migration of North African adolescent boys in search of opportunity. Many other migrations, the majority, include both boys and girls, though sometimes in different ratios, depending on country of origin. Much child migration, particularly outside the context of conflict or disaster, is safe and undertaken as part of a family unit. However, there is an increasing tendency for children to be involved in migration that jeopardizes their safety and violates their rights. Examples of this type of migration include not only the obviously life-threatening forced migrations across treacherous routes – such as the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, where drownings are frequent – but also migrations where children are routinely exposed to physical and/or sexual violence. Unsafe migration also includes situations where children rely on exploitative intermediaries who take advantage of the need for migration assistance to extract labour or other types of services from children in their custody. The discussion focuses on these aspects of child migration.

Children may be internal or international migrants. Children whose migration is internal include internally displaced persons, seasonal migrants or rural-to-urban migrants.¹² Internal migration may be cyclical, and it may be a prelude to international movement. All three categories comprise large groups of children, some of them in very precarious situations.

International child migration includes children who travel for family reasons, for safety or survival, at the behest of traffickers, for opportunity, and frequently for more than one of those reasons. This chapter focuses on unsafe child migration across borders. The following factors are particularly significant for understanding children's distinctive needs, particularly in relation to safety:

- (a) *Who is the child travelling with?*¹³ Is he or she accompanied by parents or caregivers (including customary caregivers), travelling unaccompanied (alone), or travelling separated (in the company of extended family members, strangers, traffickers or mere acquaintances)?¹⁴ A child might start the migration accompanied and then become separated from family, so that his or her needs change at different stages of the journey.¹⁵
- (b) *Whether or not the child's migration is authorized* (by a visa or other legal provision). Children travelling without a regular migration status are at higher risk of exploitation, detention and other harms.¹⁶ Again, a child's legal status can change from regular to irregular during migration, as when an asylum claim

12 Khadria, 1995, 1996.

13 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) first published disaggregated data on child asylum seekers and refugees in 1994, and on unaccompanied and separated children in 2001.

14 UNHCR was the first agency to specifically focus on the needs of this population, through its *Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum* (UNHCR, 1997). Others followed rapidly, including the European Union, with its "Resolution on Unaccompanied Minors who are Nationals of Third Countries", and the national authorities, including Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. See Bhabha, Kanics and Senovilla (eds.), 2018.

15 Kara, 2009; Peyroux, 2018.

16 Bicocchi, 2011; Kanics, 2018; Rozzi, 2018.

is refused but the child remains in the destination State without legal authorization. The converse is also true, as when an undocumented child receives a legal status. An example is the procedure in the United States, whereby an unaccompanied migrant child who has been abused, abandoned or neglected is granted Special Immigrant Juvenile Status.¹⁷

- (c) *Whether the child is migrating to escape child-specific persecution*, such as recruitment as a child soldier or gang member, child abuse or child marriage. Timely access to legal representation and guardianship is a protection priority in this type of migration situation.¹⁸
- (d) *Whether the child is migrating following a family decision* or without family knowledge or support. Many migrants from countries where adult responsibilities vest at an early age exercise their own decision-making agency. Afghan males, Eritrean male and female teenagers, and Central American boys and girls are cases in point. Acting like adults, even though classified as “children” under international law, many seek out opportunities to support themselves or their families by migrating.¹⁹ Children in West and Central Africa also move to pursue religious education, and are entrusted to a religious leader or figure who is meant to take care of their religious education and well-being, though often for lack of means end up being their exploiter.²⁰ There is no international uniformity about the age when a child’s decision has legal force. Domestic standards vary, depending on the activity in question.²¹

Central American children fleeing gangs

Central American children have been fleeing extreme violence in their home countries for decades, but the rate of this forced migration has increased rapidly since 2014. Though the majority of these child asylum seekers, both unaccompanied and in families, seeks protection in the United States, asylum applications from the so-called Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala) have increased dramatically throughout Central America.^a Unaccompanied child asylum seekers who make their claims in the United States have difficulty accessing a lawyer or guardian, despite the best efforts of a web of specialist organizations, including KIND, LIRS and the Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights’ Child Advocate Program. As a result, large numbers of children are held in detention, over 14,000 in November 2018, according to official government figures.^b

^a UNHCR, 2018.

^b Kopan, 2018.

¹⁷ Thronson, 2018.

¹⁸ IOM, 2017b; UNHCR, 2018.

¹⁹ Timera, 2018.

²⁰ UNICEF, 2011.

²¹ Wide disparities exist between decision-making domains (for example, voting, driving, criminal, contractual and health care) and jurisdictions. For interesting discussions about child agency in relation to asylum decisions, see the United States Appeals Court decision *Polovchak v. Meese* (1985); see also *Gonzalez Ex Rel. Gonzalez v. Reno*, United States Appeals Court (2000).

A self-initiated migration strategy can include entering into relationships with adults who facilitate cross-border movement in return for services rendered.²² Adolescents also adopt income-generating opportunities, including in deeply exploitative situations of labour and sex trafficking, to generate resources for migration.²³ Because of the absence of legal migration routes, many adolescents eager to exercise their mobility have no safer alternatives.²⁴ Europol reports that 28 per cent of identified victims of trafficking globally are children.²⁵ States have obligations to address these hazardous situations, through robust search-and-rescue operations and livelihood opportunities that might forestall perilous journeys.²⁶

Afghan unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in Sweden

Afghanistan has been the site of violent conflict and ensuing population displacement for over 35 years. In 2015, Sweden received over 35,000 asylum claims lodged by unaccompanied minors; 66 per cent of these claims, totalling over 23,000, were from Afghans, the majority male and fleeing political violence at home. Relying on information gleaned in the course of their long international journeys (on average seven months long), many chose Sweden, with its educational opportunity and generous, rights-respecting approach to child migrants, as their destination of choice.^a As asylum seekers, in line with Sweden's obligations under international law, they were initially permitted to remain within the country pending a decision on their case, and were thus lawfully present. For those whose asylum claims were successful, a grant of refugee status converted their temporary legal status into a permanent permission to remain, and related to that the opportunity to apply for family reunification for immediate relatives (or for less closely related family members in proven compassionate cases).^b For those whose asylum claims were unsuccessful, removal notices were issued, converting the young Afghans' status from that of temporary lawful residents to overstayers, irregularly on the territory and thus liable to deportation. Some of these unsuccessful asylum claimants have been granted subsidiary humanitarian protection, a status that is temporary and carries with it limited family reunification options.^c

Four changes in Swedish migration procedure in 2016, at the height of political concern about the increasing numbers of arriving asylum seekers, accompanied this change of status, lowering the chances of a positive outcome to the asylum claims lodged. In early 2016, age assessments based on knee or teeth x-rays were introduced, leading to a rise in findings that young asylum claimants were in fact over 18 years of age.^d In June 2016, the practice of granting humanitarian leave to rejected unaccompanied Afghan asylum seekers was withdrawn, leading to the issuance of deportation orders; in the same year, Sweden, alongside other European Union member States, signed a readmission agreement with Afghanistan ensuring the safe reception of returnees; finally,

²² Vacchiano, 2018.

²³ Europol, 2018; Digidiki and Bhabha, 2017.

²⁴ Bhabha, 2014.

²⁵ Europol, 2018. See also Sigona, Chase and Humphris, 2017b.

²⁶ IOM, 2019. The Mexican delegate to the Day of General Discussion acknowledged such responsibilities when reporting on her country's federal and local mechanisms designed to protect domestic children from perilous journeys and migrant children from dangers at the northern and southern Mexican borders. See United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2012.

policies to more rigorously enforce deportation orders were enacted, to ensure that those with rejected claims were removed from Swedish territory.^e

a UNHCR, 2015.

b Swedish Migration Agency, 2017. The authors are grateful to Jonathan Joseffson for his guidance on Swedish policy.

c Ibid., 2019.


d Dononi, Monsutti and Scalettaris, 2016.

e European Commission, 2017a. There are currently no statistics on the ages of forced returnees.

Data issues in measuring the scale of child migration


Two propositions about child migration are widely accepted: that the scale of child migration is increasing, and that the data on child migration are incomplete. Figures 1 and 2 give a snapshot of the migration of under-20-year-olds since 1990. In the absence of data limited to children, these data, which extend from 2 years to beyond 18, must be relied on. They draw on census data, one of the most reliable sources, and show a steady increase in absolute numbers, but a decline in the proportion of under-20s as a share of global migration.

Figure 1. Global migrants under 20 years of age



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Figure 2. Share of global migrants under 20 years of age



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Concerns about the inadequacy of data – lack of sources and deficits in reliable, up-to-date and disaggregated data – are not peculiar to the child migration context; they exist for the migration field as a whole, and are referenced throughout this report. But the data deficiencies regarding child migrants are of particular concern, because they hamper timely and adequate protection and care for a group of migrants that may be especially vulnerable and dependent on government support. Remarkably, only 56 per cent of refugee-related data and 20 per cent of internally displaced person (IDP)-related data include age-disaggregated information; even migrant stock data include information about age in only 80 per cent of countries.²⁷ The absence of age disaggregation is not the only concern. Others include broad gaps in data on gender, problems relating to the double-counting of children who move between and within countries, and deficient methods for ascertaining age.²⁸

The most recent global estimate for the total number of child migrants is approximately 31 million.²⁹ This is a “stock” figure, one that represents the total number of people under 18 born in a country other than the one where they are living. Though it gives a snapshot of the magnitude of the issue, it is of limited accuracy and use, because it does not describe which country the migrant children have come from, what their legal status is, how long they have been where they are or what the children’s date of birth is.


27 UNICEF et al., 2018; UN DESA, 2019b.

28 IOM, 2016.

29 UNICEF, 2018b.

An additional complexity arises from the technical fact that a child, in international law, is defined as "any human being below the age of 18", whereas census data are based on the age groups 0–4, 5–9, 10–14 and 15–19 years of age; the global figure just cited is based on a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimation of the size of the last of these groups, which applies to people under 18.³⁰ To this figure can be added others. UNICEF has calculated – using United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) data, combined with evidence from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and Eurostat – that approximately one in eight migrants is a child, the majority of them being regular migrants who travel with a regular status and the necessary protection. However, large numbers do not enjoy that safety. There are approximately 13 million child refugees, 936,000 asylum-seeking children, and 17 million children who have been forcibly displaced inside their own countries.³¹

Figure 3. International migrants (millions) under 20 years of age, by region




Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

30 United Nations, 1989; Singleton, 2018.

31 UNICEF, 2018b.

Figure 4. Share of international migrants under 20 years of age, by region



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

These regional stock data graphs complement the global picture presented earlier, in figures 1 and 2. They show that some regions (most dramatically, Asia) have experienced a sharp increase in the numbers of young migrants. They also highlight large differences between the regions in the proportions of children within their migrant stocks – nearly 30 per cent in Africa, compared with less than 10 per cent in Europe and North America.

In addition to these sources, there is also a proliferation in the availability of new data mining techniques that have the potential to generate better information in the future. They include geospatial mapping, satellite nightlights and analysis of changing smartphone location in real time. A word of caution is in order, however. The proliferation of and access to personal information, including biometric indicators, may generate risks rather than protections for child migrants. So more rather than less data should not be a goal in and of itself, unless privacy protections and other ethical concerns are carefully attended to. In particular, due diligence in the implementation of “firewalls” to prevent the use of personal data for punitive or immigration enforcement goals is an essential correlate of ethical and rights-based data collection.³²

32 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2005.


Data on vulnerable populations, such as displaced child migrants, are particularly useful when they are specific and have the potential to contribute to policy challenges. One example is the following details on the distribution of young Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, where over 50 per cent of the child population is still out of school. In this context, up-to-date age and gender details can appropriate expansion of school programmes and skill training.

Table 1. IOM/UNHCR/education sector – Rohingya child and youth population in Cox's Bazar Refugee camps, Bangladesh, January 2019

Population	Total	Ages 3–5	Ages 6–14	Ages 15–18	Ages 19–24
Population in need	518,404	105,433	235,638	74,773	102,559
Currently enrolled in school	222,916	84,619	133,638	4,048	611
Currently outside school	192,084	20,814	102,000	70,725	101,948
Target goal for 2019 (% of the total population)	393,012 (75.8%)	105,433 (100%)	235,638 (100%)	44,864 (60%)	7,077 (6.9%)

Source: UNHCR, 2019a.

Figure 5. Demographic breakdown of Myanmar refugees in Bangladesh




Source: UNHCR, 2019b.

Another example of specific age- and gender-disaggregated data that provide a useful basis for the development of protective child migrant policy concerns the extensive and rapid recent forced migration of Venezuelans into neighbouring Latin American countries. The contrast in age distribution between Rohingya and Venezuelan refugee populations in these figures is noteworthy. It illustrates significant differences in the age composition of the populations prior to their forced migration, with Rohingya estimated to have had one of the highest birth rates of all ethnic groups in Myanmar.³³

There are also likely to be differences related to the nature of the displacement events. For the Rohingya, lethal ethnic violence prompted entire communities to flee for survival in a short period. For the Venezuelans, economic crisis and ongoing instability initially compelled adults of working age to move in search of alternative sources of income to support families left behind. However, over time, this has become a more pervasive displacement situation as the crisis has deepened and whole families, including children, have moved.

Figure 6. Demographic breakdown of Venezuelans in Colombia



Source: Government of Colombia, 2018.

Note: The split in child migrant age groups is estimated using the overall gender split reported for the total child data.

33 Bomquist and Cincotta, 2016.

Key child protection challenges affecting child migrants

Large-scale child migration inevitably places complex demands on States, obligated as they are to address needs and provide services as required by international and domestic legal standards. Following are some of the key current challenges concerning child migration.

Education

States are mandated to provide education to all children in their jurisdiction without discrimination.³⁴ For any migrant child, few State services are more important. Not only does education generate portable individual skills and capital that impact central aspects of the life course, it also provides the context for social inclusion, peer group encounters and new cultural and language acquisition. Many examples exist of innovative educational provision directed at generating robust multicultural environments responsive to different pedagogic and emotional needs.³⁵

This is a context where scarce resources and a perception that outsiders are being privileged can generate acute resentment towards newcomers, unless investment also targets domestic populations in need.³⁶ Challenges also arise in identifying accurately the needs of migrant or refugee children, taking account of their prior educational experience and their linguistic competencies.³⁷

Bangladesh: Rohingya children's access to education

As of October 2018, over 900,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar were living in 30 temporary camps located in the Cox's Bazar coastal region of south-eastern Bangladesh. According to UNICEF, approximately 620,000 were between 4 and 14 years of age. They are being provided with a range of humanitarian services, including education in 1,898 learning centres that cater to the needs of children their age. These centres provide access to non-formal educational activities for over 140,000 children. Impressive though this effort is, it still leaves almost 482,000 Rohingya children without any educational access. The situation of adolescents and youths is particularly challenging: 98 per cent of Rohingya aged 15 to 24 years have received no education at all; girls of all ages and disabled children are also disproportionately disadvantaged.^a Many of the children in the learning centres had been out of school for at least two years prior to their admission to the centres, as a result of events in Myanmar and the dislocations related to their exodus into Bangladesh.

³⁴ United Nations, 1989.

³⁵ Ensor and Goździak, 2016.

³⁶ Theirworld, 2017.

³⁷ Dryden-Peterson, Dayya and Adelman, 2017.

Instruction is provided in classrooms where two female teachers, one from the host community and one Rohingya, cover a standardized curriculum delivered in English and Burmese. No instruction is permitted in Bangla, the national language of Bangladesh (a local dialect of which, Chittagonian, is the Rohingya language) because of the expectations that this population will not remain permanently.^b Instruction is divided into four levels, catering to children aged, respectively, 4–6 years (level 1); 7–8 years (level 2); 9–10 years (level 3); and 10–14 years (level 4). As of January 2019, curricular materials were only available for level 1 and 2 students.^b

a UNICEF, 2018a; Strategic Executive Group, 2018.

b FXB Field Visit January 2019; contemporaneous notes on file with the author.

Guardianship

Whereas some State services, such as education, are essential for all migrant children, others only apply to some. A case in point is the need for appointment of a guardian responsible for the child's care where children are unaccompanied or separated, or otherwise at risk, a measure called for by both international and regional policies on child migration. Only a minority of States have incorporated this recommendation into their domestic legal obligations. Among them is Italy (see text box below).

Italy's protection measures for unaccompanied minors

Italy promulgated a law in May 2017 on "Protection Measures for Unaccompanied Minors", which obliges the police to immediately report the presence of an unaccompanied minor to the relevant judicial authority, who in turn has 48 hours in which to appoint a guardian.^a The law requires comprehensive protection to be speedily put in place for unaccompanied child minors. In practice, underfunding and other capacity deficits have resulted in frequent delays before a guardian is appointed (up to 11 months in some reported cases) and in the allocation of large numbers of unaccompanied children per guardian (often public officials), complicating or even eliminating the development of the close and parental relationship envisaged. A case in point was the reported allocation of 850 unaccompanied children to the same guardian, the Welfare Councillor of Palermo. To address these staffing challenges, the 2017 law also calls for the compilation of lists of "volunteer guardians", selected and trained by the Regional Ombudsperson for Children, and then allocated as mentors for individual children. Ensuring quality control and consistency in such a setting is difficult. The challenge of securing individualized child protection arrangements for all migrant children who need them thus remains a work in progress.

a Law no. 47/17, often referred to as the "Zampa law" after the name of the MP who introduced the bill to Parliament.

Several acute child protection challenges have emerged where unaccompanied minors outside family care or any institutional framework providing shelter have set up home in informal unauthorized camps created by refugees and migrants, often as a prelude to further migration to join family members elsewhere.

Current issues and evolving policies

While the majority of children who migrate do so through safe migration processes as part of family units, many other child migrants do not. Some continue to lack effective protection from harm and face sustained human rights violations at all stages of their journeys, in the country of origin at departure, en route through transit regions and seas, on arrival at their temporary or permanent destination and, with growing frequency, in the country to which they are returned if their migration journey is curtailed.

Many agencies have called attention to this substantial protection deficit, highlighting urgent challenges.³⁸ Of immediate concern as key priorities are the risk of exploitation and abuse, the negative impact of detention, the effect of family separation, the inadequate access to education and health care, the lack of attention to drivers of forced child migration and, finally, discrimination. To these urgent issues could be added others confronting millions of child migrants. One is the absence of adequate legal pathways for the exercise of child and youth mobility, a shortcoming of the contemporary migration framework that renders so much child migration unsafe. Another is the pervasive and underaddressed stigma surrounding undocumented child migrants, whatever their length of residence at destination. Yet another concern relates to the absence of safety and child protection guarantees in asylum seeker and refugee camps or shelters. Finally, there are serious deficits in access to guardianship and legal representation for unaccompanied and separated child migrants.³⁹

International initiatives to improve protection of child migrants

Alongside these continuing challenges, one finds a rich body of recent international work, setting out principles and implementing policies that improve the circumstances surrounding child migration. At the international level, there have been a number of developments regarding child migration. A landmark document is the international synthesis of rights relevant to child migrants set out in the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 2005 *General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin*.⁴⁰ The General Comment was followed by a second important international effort regarding child migration, the 2012 Committee on the Rights of the Child *Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion: The Rights of All Children in the Context of International Migration*.⁴¹ A practical outcome of the Day of General Discussion was the creation of an Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move focused on mainstreaming child protection concerns into the migration agenda. The group produced a widely endorsed set of recommended principles for child migrants targeting some of the key enduring protection challenges.⁴²

³⁸ For an example of the impact of these deficits in practice, see Human Rights Watch, 2018b.

³⁹ Save the Children, 2017; UNHCR, 2018; Save the Children, Plan International and World Vision International, 2018; Harvard FXB Center for Health and Human Rights and UNHCR, 2017.

⁴⁰ United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2005.

⁴¹ Ibid., 2012.

⁴² OHCHR, 2016.

Most recently, other initiatives have built on the conclusions and principles of the initiatives just described, as well as the inter-agency position on migrant and refugee children for the two compacts and the work of the Inter-Agency Working Group to end Child Immigration Detention.⁴³ Two United Nations treaty bodies adopted additional General Comments on the topic of child migration in 2017 and consolidated their efforts into the first Joint General Comment on the subject in the same year, namely the *Joint General Comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 22 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the General Principles regarding the Human Rights of Children in the Context of International Migration*.⁴⁴ The Joint General Comment also stresses the importance of according relevant State authorities – whether of origin, transit, destination or return – a leading role, “with clear decision-making power”, on policies and practices pertinent to migration-affected children.⁴⁵ Central among such practices are the conduct of best interests assessments and determinations, individualized procedures that need to be conducted by trained and accountable personnel, where appropriate at different stages of the decision-making procedure. UNICEF consolidated much of this policy work by releasing a “six point plan to keep refugee and migrant children safe” in 2017.⁴⁶

Together these initiatives have created a useful action framework for States. By highlighting needs for specially targeted protection measures – including access to free legal representation, integrated services including in relation to education, and to protections from exploitation and trauma – these frameworks have given a welcome impetus to policy reform. They have stimulated measures that take note not just of the vulnerability and dependence, but also the resilience and agency of young migrants, including States’ duties to “prepare and accompany children through the journey to adulthood, rather than threatening them with abrupt change as soon as they reach the age of maturity”.⁴⁷

However, effective implementation of these recommendations has been mixed. All the documents just referenced stress the imperative to issue birth registration and concomitant proof of identity for all children in the territory, because these documents provide critical tools for reducing statelessness, exploitation and abuse of child migrants, and for increasing access to State facilities such as health care and education.⁴⁸ But many groups of migrant and refugee children continue to lack these documents. They include Syrians born in exile, and Rohingya in Myanmar and abroad.⁴⁹

Integration of migrant children outside of family care within the national childcare or child protection agency is still not the norm. Research has identified a policy and practice gap in the protection and support apparatus related to the transition to adulthood, with obvious implications for both mental health and well-being.⁵⁰ There are, however, some examples of good practice, such as Italy and Turkey.⁵¹

⁴³ Inter-Agency Working Group to End Child Immigrant Detention, n.d.; Bhabha and Dottridge, 2017; Theirworld, 2019.

⁴⁴ United Nations Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 2017.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ UNICEF, 2017a.

⁴⁷ OHCHR, 2016.

⁴⁸ UNICEF, 2013; Bhabha, 2011.

⁴⁹ Blitz, 2011.

⁵⁰ Chase, 2017; Sigona, Chase and Humphris, 2017a.

⁵¹ Law 47/2017 (the so-called Zampa Law) heralded an innovative volunteer guardian programme, run by the Italian Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents, to train volunteer guardians as both legal and humanitarian mentors for up to two migrant and refugee children; AGIA, 2017.

European States have made considerable, if uneven, progress in instituting access to legal representation for unaccompanied and separated children, and in reducing the reliance on detention, but this is not the case in other jurisdictions, such as the United States.⁵²

Much of the agenda laid out by these normative frameworks remains to be implemented. Several recent mass forced exodeses of children have demonstrated the dearth of services available. Mental health needs among millions of displaced Syrian children are acute and mainly unattended to; educational needs among Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh are challenging and not fully met, particularly for the older cohorts of children.⁵³ Another area where the gap between normative exhortation and implementation is evident is protection of migrant children following repatriation. Returned children rarely encounter reintegration assistance, or the rehabilitative services called for by standard-setting initiatives.⁵⁴

Regional initiatives to improve protection of child migrants

Several significant regional initiatives on child migration have been developed in recent years. Three are noteworthy – those in the European Union, in West Africa and in Latin America – and are discussed in turn below.

The European Union has witnessed large-scale flows of child migrants in recent years. In 2015, for example, 31 per cent of the refugees arriving in the European Union by sea were children, and in early 2016 the proportion of children among sea arrivals in Greece was up to approximately 40 per cent.⁵⁵ European institutions have been at the forefront of some of the most impactful policy and practice advances in respect of migrant and refugee children.

The European Court of Human Rights has played an important if cautious role, providing a critical forum of last instance for particularly egregious State behaviour.⁵⁶ It has prohibited the placement of asylum-seeking children (including where accompanied by their parents) in reception conditions likely to generate “a situation of stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences”, an all-too common occurrence, particularly in Southern Europe;⁵⁷ it has ruled against the detention of migrant children, even for short periods, where alternative and less restrictive strategies should have been considered, or where the detention conditions, when inflicted on children, whether in terms of length of time in custody or level of provision within the institution, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment;⁵⁸ and it has, albeit in a limited fashion, prevented family expulsions with far-reaching consequences for the care or well-being of affected children.⁵⁹

European Union measures are also noteworthy. On 12 April 2017, the European Commission adopted a “Communication on the protection of children in migration”, articulating a comprehensive programme of protective action for child migrants at all stages of their migration.⁶⁰

52 Crea, 2018; International Detention Coalition, 2018.

53 Save the Children, 2017; Ruhani, 2017.

54 Harvard FXB Center for Health and Human Rights and IOM, 2019.

55 European Commission, 2018.

56 Smyth, 2018; the following discussion on the court’s jurisprudence relies on this chapter.

57 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12, Judgment of 4 November 2014; V.M. and others v. Belgium, Application no. 60125/11, Judgment of 7 July 2015.

58 Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011; Application No. 39472/07, Judgment of 19 January 2012; Mayeka and Mitunga v. Belgium, Application No. 13178/03, Judgment of 12 October, 2006.

59 Kaplan v. Norway, Application no. 32504/11, Judgment of 24 July 2014.

60 European Commission, 2017b.

But adequate or integrated responses to this ambitious programme are still elusive. "Reconciling child protection and migration control goals, already difficult at national level, may become all the more difficult across borders. In practice transnational cooperation frequently focuses first and foremost on which State should have the child within its jurisdiction, rather than centring on a proper joint assessment of the best interests of the child".⁶¹ Integration across all European Union member States in respect of child protection obligations has not been effective so far.⁶²

West Africa is another region with a well-established system of cross-border free movement of persons, promoted in part by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional grouping of 15 West African States founded in 1975. The region has a long tradition of mobility, driven by a range of factors, including economic self-improvement, environmental hardship, conflict and escape from abuse of harmful traditional practices (including early marriage and witchcraft). Rates of child migration are high: a 2016 UNICEF report notes that 1 in 45 children in the world today are on the move, with Africa home to 1 in 5 of these child migrants.⁶³ In this region, most migration is intraregional, and children travel as much as adults, many of them unaccompanied or separated, often considered de facto adults with attendant responsibilities. While some of this child movement is self-initiated and generative of opportunities and life enhancements, a significant portion is coerced or abusive, and places child migrants in situations of high risk and scarce protection.⁶⁴

Child protection implementation for migrants has lagged far behind norm-setting standards. Domestic social and child protection structures are minimal, and transnational mechanisms are practically non-existent.⁶⁵ By contrast with the European Union, ECOWAS has not promulgated any coordinated protective transnational measures for child migrants. Early protective efforts in the region, taking note of widespread child trafficking, resulted in misplaced efforts to stop child migration, described by experts as "an attempt to pour water uphill", as most intercepted and returned children embarked on migration again within weeks.⁶⁶

From 2005 onwards, ECOWAS has collaborated with partners in the region in forming the West African Network (WAN), specifically geared to generating protective interventions and effective referral mechanisms for the benefit of child migrants in the region, particularly those travelling unaccompanied. WAN reports delivering assistance to over 6,500 child migrants since its inception.⁶⁷ WAN's work has included early identification of vulnerable child migrants and provision of emergency support where needed, as well as the consistent use of best interests assessments, which consider alternatives to migration, family and community support measures to assist reintegration where appropriate.⁶⁸

A third region where child migration has been the focus of multi-State attention is Latin America. Among various regional initiatives, the most notable is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2014 Advisory Opinion on the needs of children in international migration.⁶⁹ The opinion draws attention to the urgent

⁶¹ O'Donnell, 2018.

⁶² For a useful overview, see European Commission, 2018.

⁶³ UNICEF, 2016b.

⁶⁴ Timera, 2018; Vacchiano, 2018.

⁶⁵ Geissler and Laganju, 2018.

⁶⁶ Dottridge and Feneyrol, 2007.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2014.

and unmet need for international protection, and describes applicable procedures relevant to the treatment of both asylum-seeking and irregular child migrants, highlighting principles such as the non-detention of children based on an irregular migratory situation. Mexico has taken a lead in implementing protective services for unaccompanied child migrants, including those returned by the United States. Measures to decrease the reliance of detention are being considered (see the text box below on recent progress).

Two examples of recent progress in protecting child migrants

1. Mexico: Implementation of a 2014 law that includes child migrant protections, including the appointment of 300 dedicated child protection officers, who assisted 130,000 child migrants, 50 per cent of them unaccompanied, in 2017. It has developed a model of alternative, non-custodial care and a family foster care pilot for the placement of child victims of violence, and is in the process of designing a national action plan to increase alternatives to detention. Mexico is collaborating with Save the Children on a regional project to improve local conditions and educational access in the Northern Triangle countries.^a At the same time, externalization of United States migration control is generating hazardous situations at Mexico's northern border for minors attempting to lodge asylum applications in the United States. A limited quota system for asylum applicants forces thousands, including unaccompanied minors, to spend months in dangerous limbo on the Mexican side of the border, out of the reach of effective child protection services.^b
2. Turkey: Since 2014, successful implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which permits access to protection, education and health care for children under international or temporary protection on equal grounds to Turkish children. This has resulted in improved access for migrant and refugee children to education and to needed health services and medicines.^c Despite these positive developments, however, Syrian refugee children continue to face challenges in securing the health and educational opportunities they need. The Temporary Education Centres established for Syrians, an important transitional step in securing schooling for Syrian children in Arabic, were not initially accredited and delayed adaptation to and inclusion in the host community. Recruitment of Syrian doctors and teachers has eased the language challenges facing the refugees, but some have no access to appropriate service providers or linguistic support. In addition, some of the Turkish teachers recruited to meet the increased school population were inexperienced and lacked the skills or support needed to manage complex classrooms with highly traumatized children.^d

a Information received by the Mexican Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, thanks to Mirela Shuterqui.

b UNICEF, 2016a; Campoy, 2016.

c Aida, 2018.

d Aras and Yasun, 2016; Çelik and İçduygu, 2018; Uyan-Semerci and Erdoğan, 2018. The authors are grateful to Deniz Yilmaz for these references.

Emerging issues

At its important convening in September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) issued a landmark statement, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, announcing the launch of two non-binding Global Compact processes, one for refugees and one on migration.⁷⁰ It stated: “We will protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all refugee and migrant children, regardless of their status, and giving primary consideration at all times to the best interests of the child. This will apply particularly to unaccompanied children and those separated from their families”.⁷¹

A central goal of the Global Compact for Migration is to advance the important Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on migration. This SDG, identified as SDG Target 10.7, calls on States to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.⁷²

The Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts, a multi-stakeholder effort to highlight child migrant issues, identified several priority areas for making SDG Target 10.7 a reality for children. Among them is the meticulous generation of accurate, targeted and disaggregated empirical data to anchor the process of evaluating compliance with the Global Compact for Migration’s child migrant protection goals.

An emerging child migration issue is the growing political heft of an organized movement of child migrants themselves. In the spring and summer of 2017, a group of young Afghan migrants led protests in Sweden’s capital Stockholm against the Government’s threat to deport them back to Afghanistan, culminating in a 1,000-person-strong demonstration in the city centre.⁷³ The protests were successful, forcing the Government to withdraw deportation notices issued to some of the unaccompanied Afghan asylum seekers whose claims for protection had been denied. Another instance is the United States-based “Dreamers” organization, a group of young migrant activists who have embarked on “a gesture of civil disobedience that defied immigration enforcement policies and sought to re-shape legislation on citizenship”.⁷⁴ A very large constituency of children and young people, many of them United States residents since infancy, this group has succeeded in bringing to public attention the compelling merits of their case for legalization. Deeply affected in all areas of their lives by their irregular migration status, the group has organized public events drawing attention to the pervasive consequences of being undocumented.⁷⁵ Broader alliances demanding legalization for undocumented youths have also developed, including United We Dream, a national youth-led advocacy network that brings together over 50 affiliates. The future of the so-called “DACA-mented” youths – those who have benefited from former President Obama’s “Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA)” executive order deferring deportation and permitting employment for 800,000 eligible undocumented children and young people – remains deeply uncertain.

⁷⁰ UNGA, 2016.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² SDSN, 2019.

⁷³ *The Local*, 2017.

⁷⁴ Terrio, 2018.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Deportation and forced removal of unaccompanied child migrants and refugees is an issue of growing concern.⁷⁶ This large-scale repatriation process, a consequence of vigorous regional border enforcement policies, particularly in Europe and North America, externalizes the protective responsibilities owed child migrants to jurisdictions poorly able to shoulder them. Human rights organizations have drawn attention to significant child protection concerns related to these policies, including the absence of any systematic scrutiny of the best interests of children or the likely risks back home.⁷⁷ In 2017, UNICEF reported that 9 per cent of the estimated 400,000 migrants stranded in Libya were children, 14,000 of them unaccompanied.⁷⁸ By May 2018, Amnesty International reported the existence of over 33 active detention centres in Libya with over 7,000 migrants (many of them children) detained in them. In the absence of relocation opportunities in Europe or elsewhere, the European Union, the African Union and United Nations agencies have directed their efforts to the repatriation of migrants wishing to exit from the detention facilities and return home. IOM has facilitated the return of over 23,000 migrants from Libya, including a small number of children. Efforts are being made to ensure that assessments of the best interests of repatriated children are conducted prior to return, and to address the lack of support to returnees or their families once they arrive in the country of return.⁷⁹

A final emerging issue, and one that may dwarf the others, is the growing impact of climate-related mobility on the lives of children and their families (see chapter 9 of this report). In addition to the general issues, a few child-specific points arise. Children rarely make decisions about how or when to move in climate-related mobility contexts, nor are they generally involved in any way in the programming of such moves. This participation failure can exacerbate the feeling of disorientation and loss associated with forced uprooting from one's home, one's peer group and one's anchoring sense of belonging.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter has been on the subset of international child migrations that generate protection concerns, migrations that require greater public engagement and support.

Increased attention to the scale and modalities of contemporary child migration has generated policy reforms, several of them detailed above, that are beginning to result in improved protections for child migrants and refugees. For example, many countries to which large numbers of unaccompanied children have migrated have instituted guardianship schemes and free legal representation services. And indeed, even where policy implementation is still incomplete or inconsistent, there is a growing consensus about minimum standards that should apply to child migrants. Thus, it is widely accepted that child migrants should not be subject to detention, that the agency, participation and resilience of child migrants should be attended to as much as their vulnerability and dependence, that migrant and refugee children should be mainstreamed into domestic educational and child protection services, and that unaccompanied and separated children should be the focus of dedicated measures. Both early childhood development and adolescent child welfare experts are gradually including the special considerations relevant to child and refugee migrants in their programing and training.⁸⁰

76 Chase and Sigona, 2017.

77 UNICEF, 2018b.

78 UNICEF, 2017b.

79 Harvard FXB Center for Health and Human Rights and IOM, 2019.

80 Bernard van Leer Foundation, 2013; UNFPA, 2018.

However, considerable implementation gaps remain, illustrated by recent incidents described above, such as family separation and child migrant detention in the United States, and the need to expand educational provision for Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh. Very large numbers of forcibly displaced children, both inside the borders of their own countries and in camps adjacent to them, continue to lack access to basic services such as primary health care and education, and to experience repeated threats to their physical and mental well-being. Exploitation and exposure to violence en route remain common incidents of contemporary child migration. Overall, the imperative of attending to the needs and rights of child migrants, and of developing a child-centric approach to research and planning, is still imperfectly realized, and data that are necessary to demonstrate the urgency of this situation remain inadequate.

This chapter has pointed to several hopeful developments, including the more vigorous engagement of a range of actors in the improvement of child migrant protection, the production of useful guidelines for policy development, the growing intersectoral convergence of professionals working with child migrants, and the increasing activism and leadership developing within the child migrant community itself.

Finally, it bears repeating that serious protection challenges remain, challenges that are likely to persist unless concerted steps are taken to counter some worrying trends. Among them, most critical perhaps, is the persistent evidence of violence targeting migrant communities including young migrants, whether in the course of their journeys or on arrival in their new host countries. Children who have survived the challenges of life in refugee camps or perilous border crossings need inclusive measures, stability and opportunity if they are to overcome the searing legacy of the past. For those who enjoy the benefits of supportive familial or community settings, this may well ensue, provided their societies engage actively with the prevention of xenophobic aggression and the diffusion of hate – in the classroom, football field or housing complex. For those child migrants who have travelled alone, more may be necessary to ensure resilience, to ensure that their voices are heard, and to support their prospects of success. Child welfare and migration governance systems need to converge and build the capacity to collaborate with greater consistency, to facilitate the inclusion of migrant children into domestic child protection structures, to incentivize greater knowledge of and understanding towards children's needs and rights in the migration system, and to thoroughly implement non-discrimination obligations in respect of all migrant children within the jurisdictions.



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9

HUMAN MOBILITY AND ADAPTATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE¹

Introduction

Millions of men, women and children around the world move in anticipation or as a response to environmental stress every year. Disruptions such as cyclones, floods and wildfires destroy homes and assets, and contribute to the displacement of people. Slow-onset processes – such as sea-level rise changes in rainfall patterns and droughts – contribute to pressures on livelihoods, and access to food and water, that can contribute to decisions to move away in search of more tenable living conditions. Advances in meteorological and other sciences which inform about the dynamics and pace of climate change indicate that disruptions ranging from extreme weather events to large scale changes in ecosystems are occurring at a pace and intensity unlike any other known period of time on Earth.² Anthropogenic climate change is expected to increasingly affect migration and other forms of people moving to manage these changing risks.³

This chapter provides an up-to-date overview of environmental change and the spectrum of human mobility. It first explores different perspectives on environmental change and migration, ranging from the view that human mobility including migration is a security issue, that it is an issue of protection, and that it is a matter of adaptation and managing risks associated with environmental change. The chapter then provides examples of environmental migration from empirical research around the world. It then summarizes recent developments in the international policy sphere on the topic. The conclusion draws out the implications for research, policy and practice.

Understanding the links between environmental change and migration

The mechanisms through which environmental impacts contribute to migration are complex.⁴ Over the last decade, it has become accepted that links between the environment and migration are rarely linear. Some literature frames the issue as a normal and neutral social process and other articles refer to the “migrancy problematic”.⁵ Economic, political, cultural and demographic factors interact with environmental drivers to shape intentions of people to move or stay in a given location. These interactions can contribute to building

¹ Robert Oakes, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security; Soumyadeep Banerjee, International Organization for Migration; and Koko Warner, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat.

² NASEM, 2016; IPCC, 2014.

³ Since the end of the twentieth century there have been estimates of the future numbers of people who will move due to climate change (Myers, 1993; Stern et al., 2006). While policy circles may embrace such estimates, academia has been critical of the assumptions necessary to produce models, in particular the lack of consideration given to non-migratory adaptation measures (Gemenne, 2011). Nonetheless, these approaches, and the numbers they generate continue to influence media and policy discourses (Rigaud et al., 2018).

⁴ Siddiqui et al., 2019.

⁵ Castles, 2010; Hall, 2015.

pressure – sometimes referred to as tipping points – after which remaining in situ becomes less attractive than leaving.⁶ Whether and when these intentions are manifested into actions is partially dependent on the material ability to move,⁷ with some immobile populations labelled as “trapped”.⁸ Immobility is not necessarily related to material conditions, and also relates to psychological and cultural limitations and preferences.⁹

Numerous terms have been used to describe people who move as a result of environmental and climate change. This chapter uses terms such as “human mobility” in the context of climate change, which refers to a broad spectrum of people movement. It covers migration, displacement and planned relocation, as well as “environmental migrants”, including in relation to extreme events and other environmental stressors. Three main framings of environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change have emerged in academia, the media and in policy circles: (a) irregular migration related to environmental change and resource shortages as a border security issue, particularly for areas of destination; (b) protection of environmental migrants; and (c) environmental migration as a form of adaptation and climate risk management (see table 1), reflecting the political sensitivities of migration.

Table 1. Three different ways of framing interactions between environmental change and migration

	Securitization	Protection	Adaptation and climate risk management
<i>Key concepts</i>	Irregular migration	Human rights	Adaptive capacity; Remittances; Averting, minimizing and addressing the adverse impacts of climate change.
<i>Migrants as:</i>	Factor of instability in the face of resource shortages (climate as a threat multiplier)	Lacking agency	Agential.
<i>Normative implications</i>	National borders should be controlled to reduce risks to society, resources, and culture in areas of destination	If people move they must be able to do so in dignified, safe conditions within protection frameworks	Human mobility can be one of a spectrum of responses to climate impacts and risks.

6 McLeman, 2018.

7 Black et al., 2011.

8 Black and Collyer, 2014.

9 Ayeb-Karlsson, Smith and Kniveton, 2018; Oakes, 2019.

<i>Policy arenas</i>		Platform on Disaster Displacement; Global Compact on Refugees.	UNFCCC Cancun Agreement; UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement; Global Compact for Migration.
<i>Examples in reports and literature</i>	IPCC AR5 chapter on human security and migration; UNSG Climate as a threat multiplier.	Kelman et al., 2015; Nansen protection framework.	McLeman and Smit, 2003; IPCC special report on land and climate change; IPCC AR6.

Notes: UNFCCC is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; AR5 is the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report; AR6 is the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report; UNSG is the United Nations Secretary-General.

The first type of framing tends to emphasize environmental migrants as part of a wider “threat multiplier” landscape as either explicitly or implicitly a threat to security in areas of destination,¹⁰ and has been argued as being related to a focus on national borders and resource control.¹¹ In policy, these ideas can translate into border security discussions and measures. The second framing tends to represent environmental migration as a phenomenon associated with vulnerable people moving in adverse circumstances and who need protection. Protection approaches share commonalities with approaches that highlight human rights related to rights to work, education, health care, food and water, and other rights that environmental shocks can disrupt. Protection approaches place the needs of the affected people who may be moving at the centre. The protection framing is evident in the work of the Platform on Disaster Displacement.¹²

The securitization and protection framings have been critiqued as they have not sufficiently acknowledged the agency of the people affected by environmental change, emphasizing threats without fully acknowledging opportunities that may also play a role in environmental migration. The third type of framing views human mobility ranging from migration, displacement, and planned relocation as a set of possible adaptive responses to climate impacts and risks. In climate policy, human mobility appeared for the first time in the Cancun Adaptation Framework and currently features in a dedicated workstream on human mobility as well as the Task Force on Displacement. This framing recognizes the possibility of reducing exposure and vulnerability to physical disruptions associated with climate and other environmental stressors.¹³ It also emphasizes the pursuit of approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change. The following section briefly sets out the evolution of the framing of migration as a form of adaptation.

10 Baldwin, 2013; Bettini, 2013.

11 Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat, 2018.

12 PDD, 2016.

13 Adger, Campos and Mortreux, 2018.

Understanding migration as a possible response to climate impacts and risks

Though outcomes are context specific, some understanding has emerged over the last decade of the opportunities migration presents in the face of environmental disruptions.¹⁴ When voluntary migration is considered, people may be able to protect or use their assets and health, decide on who in the household moves and how, as well as when and where they will go. In this manner, migration is part of a suite of adaptation measures, which people use to deal with climatic and environmental change and reduce poverty and boost resilience.¹⁵ Where households are more resilient, younger, better-educated migrants improve the condition of the household through remittances used to pay for education, health care or livelihood diversification. Where households are in a more precarious position, migrants might be the household heads and outcomes can be described as surviving through securing food, or cash to acquire food.¹⁶ The distinction between voluntary and forced migration is somewhat arbitrary and has been described as more accurately resembling a continuum from entirely voluntary to entirely forced.¹⁷ In responding to environmental issues, even "voluntary" migration can involve some degree of pressure. Supportive policies and legal pathways therefore act as an enabling factor for migration in these situations, with the effect of facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration that is better able to be managed.

Once adaptation possibilities (both *in situ* and *ex situ* strategies) and community resilience have been exhausted, an entire community may have to relocate as a last resort.¹⁸ The resulting change in circumstances means that the consequences of the move could be considered adaptive under certain circumstances. In the case of planned relocation, outcomes may be adaptive if processes are participatory and include acceptance among both areas of origin and areas of destination from an early stage, and when suitable livelihood opportunities are available for people who may move.¹⁹

Critiques and nuances

The questions of framing environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change as part of a threat multiplier (security) discourse, as a protection framework issue, and as an issue of risk management has a significant subjective element. Migration has been explained as a failure to adapt or a strategy of last resort.²⁰ The "environmental refugee" literature that emerged further reinforced this framing which depicted the prospect of climate change causing large-scale movements to urban areas and from developing to developed countries.²¹ The term "adaptation" has been critiqued as some uses emphasize the role of individuals and households over responsibility to the political and economic structures that foster

14 Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.

15 ADB, 2012.

16 Warner and Afifi, 2014.

17 Hugo, 1996.

18 ADB, 2012.

19 Brookings Institution and UNHCR, 2015.

20 Baro and Deubel, 2006; Adamo, 2008; Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and Thompson, 2013.

21 El-Hinnawi, 1985; McLeman, 2016.

vulnerability.²² The concept of migration as adaptation has been challenged as ignoring political economic realities,²³ and some literature claims that the migration as adaptation framing obscures the discourse about climate change and migration along ethnic and racial lines.²⁴ The emphasis of positive outcomes in the migration as adaptation framing has been criticized by some scholars as not reflective of migrants' realities.²⁵ Further, planned relocation processes have proven to be complex, and can also affect the relationship between governments and subnational jurisdictions in urban and rural areas, so are sometimes not considered as adaptation to climate change.²⁶

Moving may reduce vulnerability in the short-term, but contribute to further problems in the medium-term, as populations may recreate exposed and vulnerable conditions in new sites.²⁷ Migration for work may help migrant-sending households to manage environmental shocks and stressors in the short-term. However, it could expose migrant workers, and thereby migrant-sending households, to shocks and stressors in the medium- or long-term.²⁸ Consideration of the "who" and "when" of adaptation reveals that adaptation is experienced subjectively; in the last decade there has been an increase in research which highlights the subjective nature of climate risk,²⁹ and subjective barriers to both climate change adaptation and potentially adaptive migration.³⁰

Data and knowledge on environmental mobility

Research on environmental mobility is still developing and while advances have been made in the two decades there are various data and knowledge gaps that persist.^a Increasingly reliable figures for the number of new internal displacements related to rapid onset environmental disruptions are produced each year. But there are difficulties in obtaining reliable numbers of migration when it is not forced; for example, it is difficult to compute reliable estimates for the numbers of people moving in anticipation of or response to slow-onset processes such as desertification or sea-level rise.^b There is also a need for the assessment of the economic and other costs associated with migration.^c Research on this theme continues to be about the Global South and by researchers from the Global North.^d There is scope for South–South and South–North capacity-building and improved integration of research and local knowledge.

a Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017; PDD, 2016.

b IDMC, 2019.

c Ibid.

d Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat, 2018.

22 Ribot, 2011.

23 Felli and Castree, 2012; Bettini, 2014;

24 Baldwin, 2017.

25 Ranson-Cooper et al., 2015.

26 Arnall, 2019.

27 Adger et al., 2015.

28 Banerjee, 2017.

29 Adger et al., 2013.

30 Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Adams, 2016; Oakes, 2019.

Evidence of migration and environmental change

The following section presents examples of migration and environmental change drawn from around the world. It builds on the three ecological zones identified in the Foresight Report (i.e. mountainous, dryland and coastal) which face disruption related to climate change.³¹ The examples address a variety of adaptive responses to these environmental disruptions, ranging from migration for work to diversify income to national policy to promote anticipatory forms of migration (table 2).

Table 2. Examples from empirical research

Ecology	Geographical focus	Migration pattern	Geographical focus	Migration pattern
<i>Mountains</i>	Himalayas and Central Asia	Circular migration and pastoralists	Peru	Circular migration
<i>Drylands</i>	Senegal	International migration for remittances	Mexico	Migration possibly beneficial to health
<i>Coastal areas and islands</i>	Pacific Islands	Migration with dignity	United States of America	Planned relocation
<i>Urban areas</i>	Kenya	Resilient cities to cope with urbanization	Bangladesh	Urbanization brings employment and agency for women

Mountains

A diverse range of human migration pathways in the context of environmental change have been documented in mountainous regions: displacement, labour migration, planned relocation and transhumance.³² Changes in climate adversely affect transhumant movements between summer and winter pastures of herders in high mountains.³³ Herders in Afghanistan, Nepal and Pakistan perceive negative changes in vegetation composition as a result of erratic snowfall patterns and a decrease of rainfall.³⁴ Livestock deaths due to heavy snowfall and water scarcity in traditional water sources along migration routes have been reported across

31 Black et al., 2011.

32 IDMC, 2016; Brandt, Kaenzig and Lachmuth, 2016; Liu et al., 2018; Namgay et al., 2014.

33 Namgay et al., 2014.

34 Shaoliang, Ismail and Zhaoli, 2012; Joshi et al., 2013; Gentle and Thwaites, 2016.

the Hindu Kush Himalayan region.³⁵ At the same time, an increase in temperature, with its effects on snow cover, have had some positive impacts such as an early start of seasonal migration from winter to summer pastures and lengthening of residence in summer pasture.³⁶ Pastoral communities also face complications from other factors which interact with climate change, such as conflict with sedentary communities, institutional barriers, market forces and inadequate policy support.³⁷ Different adaptation measures have been adopted by pastoral communities to manage environmental shocks and stressors. In the Himalayan region, herders have incorporated changes in their movement (such as shifting grazing areas, change in routes and reducing the length of stay at different locations on the route), and in a few cases have relocated families or entire villages. Herders have also adopted in situ measures such as stall-feeding animals, changing types of livestock, temporary ban on livestock sale, and digging ponds to store water.³⁸

Migration for work, particularly circular and seasonal migration, is a traditional strategy of mountain people to manage the risks posed by environmental hazards to farming and livestock rearing. Transitioning from farm-based income to labour migration and associated remittances was one of the ways in which communities in Naryn River Basin in Kyrgyzstan, particularly those located in the downstream region, responded to changes in water supply.³⁹ Remittances finance relief during disasters and support recovery and reconstruction in their aftermath. Migrants and diaspora in the United States of America were actively involved in sending money to support their families and relief efforts after the 2015 earthquake in Nepal.⁴⁰ The extent of remittances' positive or negative impacts on recipient households and origin communities varies from one context to another.⁴¹ For example, the effect of remittances on vulnerability to extreme weather events is non-linear. Remittance-recipient households in drought affected rural communities in South-west China have less adaptive capacity than non-recipient households. However, remittance-recipient households that received remittances over longer periods were found to have improved adaptive capacity.⁴² In Tajikistan, families have a high dependency on migrant remittances and also largely lack understanding of possible adaptation responses that lower their capacity to adapt to environmental and climate stressors.⁴³

In many mountain regions, migration for work is a gendered process. Women left behind bear the responsibility of taking care of children and the elderly, managing household assets and responding to new challenges.⁴⁴ Factors such as social and cultural norms, access to information and institutional issues act as barriers to adaptation for women.⁴⁵ In Nepal remittance-recipient households are more likely to invest a part of their savings in flood preparedness if women left behind have access to capacity-building interventions that aim to strengthen autonomous adaptation measures such as precautionary savings and flood preparedness.⁴⁶

³⁵ Shaoliang, Ismail and Zhaoli, 2012; Gentle and Thwaites, 2016.

³⁶ Joshi et al., 2013; Shaoliang, Ismail and Zhaoli, 2012.

³⁷ Shaoliang, Ismail and Zhaoli, 2012; Gentle and Thwaites, 2016.

³⁸ Aryal, Maraseni and Cockfield, 2014; Banjade and Paudel 2008; Moktan et al., 2008; Ingty and Bawa, 2012.

³⁹ Hill et al., 2017.

⁴⁰ Shivakoti, 2019.

⁴¹ Barnett and Webber, 2009; de Haas, 2012.

⁴² Banerjee et al., 2018.

⁴³ Babagaliyeva et al., 2017.

⁴⁴ Resurrección et al., 2019.

⁴⁵ Jones and Boyd, 2011; Singh, Osbahr and Dorward, 2018; Achandi et al., 2018.

⁴⁶ Banerjee et al., under review.

Drylands

In drylands around the world, environmental change is increasingly contributing to human migration.⁴⁷ In particular, changes in rainfall are contributing to pressures on livelihoods, including those supported by agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries. These factors have a potentially serious and difficult-to-predict impact on different ethnic groups. For example, insufficient information exists about indigenous communities in Australia, their responses and the way that local knowledge may contribute to different forms of adaptation, including migration.⁴⁸ In Central America, a significant relationship has been found between changes in rainfall in dry Mexican states and human flows to the United States.⁴⁹ Other authors have highlighted the relationships between food security, migration and violence in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.⁵⁰

There is evidence of diaspora investment into dryland areas. In the Senegal River Valley, migration is related to environmental change and water extraction.⁵¹ The new mosques and schools that have been built in the Podor Department in the Senegal River Valley are illustrations of diaspora funding to contribute to community resilience and development.⁵² A joint project of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification was successful in encouraging investment by diaspora communities in sending areas of Burkina Faso, the Niger and Senegal. This money was used for investments in sustainable land management and to formalize networks between communities in Milan, Italy, and areas of origin.⁵³

Movements from the Senegal River Basin to Saint-Louis, in part driven by drought and water extraction in the last quarter of the twentieth century may have seemed adaptive initially. But, after the end of a dry cycle, newly settled areas of the city, which were previously subject to flash floods, were once more inundated.⁵⁴ One response to this risk has been the creation of an early warning mobile app through which users are informed of likely flood risks when mobile signals are attenuated due to atmospheric water.⁵⁵ This shows the need to consider the combination of slow- and rapid-onset hazards. Migration from densely populated areas to more sparsely populated agricultural frontiers in Dagara, Ghana, contributed to reducing the pressure on the land in sending areas and resulted in increased remittances which facilitated the purchase of bullock and ploughs. On the other hand, it also facilitated the continuance of potentially unsustainable agricultural practices in sending areas.⁵⁶ International movements related to environmental change may increase due to reduced costs and development of (regular and irregular) routes and of networks to support cross-border movements.⁵⁷

47 Rigaud et al., 2018.

48 Carson et al., 2014.

49 Nawrotzki, Riosmena and Hunter, 2013.

50 IOM and WFP, 2016; IABD et al., 2017.

51 Madgwick et al., 2017.

52 Ibid.

53 IOM, 2014; IOM and UNCCD, 2019.

54 Diagne, 2007.

55 Ouedraogo et al., 2018.

56 Van der Geest, 2011.

57 Donato and Massey, 2016.

Slow-onset processes

Dry regions are at risk of slow-onset processes, such as land degradation and desertification, changes in rainfall and drought. It may be possible to evacuate from a cyclone, return home and continue with a livelihood such as fishing. When a livelihood is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, in situ adaptation may be more problematic when precipitation or access to water slowly decreases over time. As such mobility related to slow onset processes can take on a more permanent profile with related impacts on livelihoods, health and human rights. The longer lead time relative to sudden-onset hazards can also provide scope for all forms of adaptation, in situ and through mobility. On the other hand, slow-onset processes may also erode people's ability to move and this can make people more vulnerable with respect to the impacts of sudden-onset hazards.^a

a Black et al., 2011.

Coastal areas and islands

Historically, migration has been a way of life in many islands around the world, and these processes are accelerating under the influence of a changing climate.⁵⁸ Coastal and island communities face increasing exposure to the impacts of tropical storms and sea-level rise.⁵⁹ In addition, many coastal regions and islands are adversely impacted by a shortage of freshwater sources, compounded by changes in rainfall patterns and salinization caused by flooding.⁶⁰ The prospect of disappearing land, islands and freshwater poses serious challenges and a range of human mobility patterns are emerging in this context, including a range of solutions to protect the well-being of those moving.⁶¹

In Pacific small island developing States (SIDS), research has shown that migration (related to anticipated climate impacts) results in remittances, more opportunities for younger people and is complementary to other adaptive measures.⁶² Because migration is not an option available to all, moving and flows of remittances can recreate or enhance vulnerabilities and inequalities, as was the case in Tonga.⁶³ Coastal fishing communities can have their homes and livelihoods affected by climate change. Declining fish populations and biodiversity related to overfishing and increased sea temperatures have forced artisanal fishers in Senegal to fish further out in sea or seek work as fishing labourers. Some fishers could fund building homes away from the encroaching ocean with the money they had made from international migration.⁶⁴

Deltaic regions provide fertile land and access to water for irrigation, fisheries and trade. Climate change has put them at risk of sea-level rise and flooding as they are located at meeting points of rivers and coasts. This

58 Kirch, 2017.

59 IPCC, 2014.

60 Oakes, Milan and Campbell, 2016.

61 Van der Geest et al., 2019.

62 Shen and Gemenne, 2011; Goldsmith, 2015; Ash and Campbell, 2016.

63 Le De, Gaillard and Friesen, 2013.

64 Zickgraf, 2018.

is contributing to flows of migration and, in Viet Nam, migration from the Mekong Delta was found to be related to higher incomes and employment.⁶⁵ In Jamalpur, Bangladesh, dry spells and drought have impacted farming and people have responded by switching livelihoods and moving, often to the capital, Dhaka. Often it is the young who move and the remittances they send can contribute to the development of new livelihoods and enterprise facilitated through the purchase of a water pump.⁶⁶

Perceptions of adaptive mobility in the Marshall Islands

The Republic of the Marshall Islands is exposed to a variety of environmental risks as livelihoods and infrastructure are affected by sea-level rise, heat stress and drought. As the impacts of climate change increase, the Marshallese may have to decide whether to stay on their islands or to move. The United States is the most popular destination as the Marshallese can work and live there under the Compact of Free Association. A recent study suggests that environmental pressures are already contributing to the decision to move to the United States.^a For example, a respondent in a field interview stated:

"If more people leave there will be less people and more jobs open then my husband will be able to find a job."

Another participant explained the tangible benefits of migration in the context of challenging environmental and economic conditions:

"By going abroad for a short time this can prevent the migrant or the person moving from losing his or her lands and houses".

When asked about the potential threats to Marshallese culture for migrants in the United States, another participant responded:

"I disagree because I see Marshallese on Facebook singing Marshallese songs and dancing Marshallese dances."

^a Van der Geest et al., 2019.

In Haiti, the "Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy" (MECLEP) project found that seasonal migration might have a beneficial impact on household vulnerability.⁶⁷ Accordingly, the new migration policy of Haiti developed within the project recognizes the positive outcomes of migration and how it can lead to adaptation through the transfer of skills, money and knowledge. Migration has been integrated into urban development, adaptation and disaster risk reduction programmes. Questions related to migration and environmental change have now been added to the census.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ IOM, 2017.

⁶⁶ Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2016.

⁶⁷ IOM, 2017.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Relocation of some coastal and island communities has begun. One study projects that over 400 towns, villages and cities in the United States, including a large number of coastal indigenous communities, will need to relocate by the end of the century as a result of environmental change.⁶⁹ Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana will be the first community to receive federal funds and support for relocation. Residents have worked with local non-governmental organizations to plan a new sustainable community and settlement using modern technology and innovative use of wetlands and parklands to protect against flooding while maintaining fishing livelihoods. A significant challenge will be to incorporate the history, traditions and culture of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe.⁷⁰ The full involvement of affected communities in decision-making on matters including access to resources, where the new settlement will be sited and when and how the project develops plays an important role in community relocation.⁷¹

Migration with dignity

Pacific small island developing States (SIDS) leaders have coined the term “migration with dignity” to envisage a situation in which people have control over whether, when, where and how they can move, or stay if that is their wish. The idea centres on boosting education standards so that migrants can compete in the international labour markets and on strengthening networks with the diaspora in the region to create new opportunities and support new arrivals.^a It is hoped that such flows of people could reduce the strain on households and environmental resources, and provide financial and social remittances to enable other forms of adaptation.

In the absence of overarching global frameworks to promote and ensure adaptive forms of migration, innovative, more flexible arrangements will be necessary.^b Regional frameworks can build on existing bilateral agreements. Such plans could be successful with the support of regional economic powers willing to open borders to migrants. For example, countries in South America have introduced a non-binding agreement on the protection of persons displaced by disasters across borders and migrants in countries affected by disasters.^c

State-level planning for environmental migration is also emerging. Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guidelines state that relocation is a last resort, to be considered “after all other feasible adaptation options have been explored”.^d Should it occur, it needs to ensure long-term economic sustainability, support and services, and the protection of the rights and well-being of vulnerable groups. The Guidelines describe the steps that should be taken, such as consultations with all affected stakeholders, including people moving, host communities and those choosing not to move.^e

a Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017.

b Barnett and McMichael, 2018.

c CSM, IOM and PDD, 2018.

d Government of Fiji, 2018.

e Ibid.

69 Maldonado et al., 2013.

70 King, 2017.

71 Ibid.

Urban areas

While it is important to consider areas of origin, it is also vital to analyse areas of destination when assessing the outcomes of environmental migration. For example, after three years of drought in Mexico, increased flows of people from rural to urban areas have been documented.⁷² Such movements can be adaptive or maladaptive. Cities are often situated in areas prone to hazards, such as on the low-lying coastal areas or in areas of geological hazards, such as landslides, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In cases where migrants settle in areas exposed to hazards, such as in slums on hillsides or in flood-prone regions, these populations may be more exposed and vulnerable to environmental and climatic disruptions in the future. It is possible that more environmental hotspots will emerge in the future with a population subject to a triple jeopardy of population growth, increased vulnerability and exposure to more severe and frequent and climate events.⁷³

Urban settings can magnify the differences in the experiences of women and men, highlighting the gendered aspects of migration and environmental disruption. Women are considered to be more vulnerable than men before, during and after moving, with implications for their safety and security, psychological needs and access to services and property rights.⁷⁴ Migration in the wake of disasters can also increase risks of trafficking.⁷⁵ However, migration, and even displacement, can also bring opportunities for women. In the Philippines, women took on roles as camp managers in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.⁷⁶ Women leaving environmentally marginal areas in Bangladesh have the potential to find employment in the Dhaka garment industry where they are perceived favourably by potential employers in comparison to men. Women must weigh benefits of being able to send remittances to sustain families against possible stigma of migration. These factors make women less likely to move in the context of environmental impacts.⁷⁷

Minority migrant groups in urban settings are most affected by risks to critical infrastructure.⁷⁸ They are often portrayed as a vulnerable group in the face of a hazard (see chapter 10 of this report). However, recent research has shown that linguistic minority immigrants and refugees might be resilient because of the challenges they have experienced in the past.⁷⁹ For example, urban residents who have left Pacific SIDS, where they experienced floods and cyclones, were better placed to cope with new urban risks in destination, such as the Wellington earthquake.⁸⁰

States are beginning to plan for resilient and transformative settlements. Kenya's National Adaptation Plan explicitly mentions that climate change places a strain on urban infrastructure. The Plan states that droughts drive urbanization which places people – especially vulnerable groups such as children, persons with disabilities and the aged – in marginal lands prone to flooding. It therefore recognizes the need for climate-resilient urban development.⁸¹ In Bangladesh, State actors are planning to encourage people to move to climate-resilient and migrant-friendly urban centres. These urban areas need to be developed through a combination of bottom-up

⁷² Nawrotzki et al., 2017.

⁷³ Hugo, 2011.

⁷⁴ Sierra Club, 2018.

⁷⁵ IOM, 2016.

⁷⁶ Sherwood et al., 2015; Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.

⁷⁷ Everts and Van der Geest, 2019.

⁷⁸ Garschagen and Sandholz, 2018.

⁷⁹ Uekusa and Matthewman, 2017.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Government of Kenya, 2016.

participatory processes to address the local needs and contexts and top-down planning and support.⁸² This concept fits into Bangladesh's Seventh Five Year Plan, which focuses on "transformative adaptation".⁸³

Policy frameworks

As outlined in chapter 11 of this report, there have been substantial developments in global migration governance in recent years. However, an overarching framework has not yet fully emerged to provide policy guidance where human mobility and environmental stressors, including climate change, intersect. A number of different global governance mechanisms exist, having emerged in different contexts and with varying emphasis on the mobility aspects of climate change. The chapter briefly describes two key mechanisms that seek to address environmental change, migration and aspects of adaptation and climate risk management: the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention's climate negotiations and the recently adopted Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Beyond the Global Compact for Migration, there are, however, much more international considerations of, and policy approaches to, this highly topical issue. A summary of international policy aspects beyond these two mechanisms is outlined in appendix A.

Global climate change negotiations and human mobility

Human mobility – migration, displacement and planned relocation – has been framed as an issue of climate risk management under the UNFCCC, particularly in the work conducted under the adaptation and loss and damage work streams. The framing of risk management has evolved between the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) in 2007 and the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP24) in 2018. Figure 1 highlights decision milestones and progress.

Figure 1. Emergence of human migration as a risk management topic in international climate policy



Source: Warner, 2018.

82 ICCCAD, 2018.

83 GED, 2015.

The first time that the issue was recognized in international climate policy was at COP16 (2010) when Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Cancun Adaptation Framework.⁸⁴ It included paragraph 14(f), which laid out the range of movements people may take, what measures should be taken, and at what level these actions could be taken:

14. Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework ... by undertaking, inter alia, the following: ... (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels

In 2013, at COP19, Parties to the UNFCCC established the Warsaw International Mechanism to explore arrangements to manage residual risks, including those related to human mobility.⁸⁵ Ongoing work under the UNFCCC process, including the Warsaw International Mechanism, aims to bolster the capacity of countries to make risk-informed decisions about pre-emptive activities, planning, and contingency arrangements that affect where and how people live.

At COP21, a turning point occurred when the Paris Agreement established a Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism, mandated to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change.⁸⁶ The Task Force is comprised of States, technical experts from different groups under the UNFCCC, United Nations organizations and representatives from civil society. The Task Force produced comprehensive recommendations that touched upon the whole human mobility spectrum, such as encouraging countries to integrate climate change and migration concerns when formulating national laws, policies and strategies, and supporting the facilitation of regular and safe migration pathways.⁸⁷ In parallel, the Warsaw International Mechanism also endorsed a five-year work programme where one work stream relates to migration, displacement and human mobility.⁸⁸

COP24 adopted the Task Force on Displacement recommendations in 2018 and extended the Task Force mandate for another two years.⁸⁹ The text box below summarizes the types of recommendations addressed to countries, United Nations agencies and stakeholders.

⁸⁴ UNFCCC, 2010.

⁸⁵ UNFCCC, 2013.

⁸⁶ UNFCCC, 2015.

⁸⁷ Ionesco and Traore Chazalnoel, 2018.

⁸⁸ UNFCCC, 2017.

⁸⁹ UNFCCC, 2018.

UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement

Recommendations were made by the Task Force to countries parties to the UNFCCC as well as United Nations and other stakeholders. They were ultimately adopted at COP24. The following are examples of recommendations made by the Task Force.

Countries:

- Laws, policies, strategies to avert, minimize and address displacement;
- Research, data collection, risk analysis including community participation;
- Strengthen preparedness (early warning, contingency planning, evacuation planning, resilience-building, innovative approaches like forecast-based finance);
- National planning processes;
- Find durable solutions;
- Facilitate safe, orderly, regular migration and mobility of people.

United Nations agencies and stakeholders:

- Provide support (finance, technology, capacity-building) including to affected communities;
- Enhance regional, subregional and transboundary cooperation;
- Develop and share good practice (understanding risk, accessing support, assistance and protection, international legal instruments and normative frameworks);
- Invite the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct a system-wide strategic review and facilitate integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement in the envisaged high-level panel on internally displaced persons.

Note: The full decision text is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp24_auv_ec%20wim.pdf.

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Ahead of deliberations on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development made mention of migration, although the connection between migration and the environment was not explicitly stated. That said, the Agenda for Sustainable Development and its related goals for 2030 have paved the way for linking migration and the environment in future frameworks. Of particular note is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which is a legally non-binding agreement by States that is directly linked to target 10.7 of the Agenda for Sustainable Development:

10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

The Global Compact for Migration sets out 23 objectives in a comprehensive approach to optimize the benefits of migration while addressing its risks and challenges, including those relating to climate stressors and disaster. The Global Compact states that migration is “a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development”.⁹⁰ Nonetheless, when environmental migration is mentioned, it is mainly presented in the context of vulnerability as opposed to beneficial outcomes. Four objectives of the Global Compact for Migration are especially relevant to climate and disaster risks. In particular, Objective 2 is about minimizing the adverse drivers that compel people to move and includes a standalone section dedicated to climate change and disasters. In that respect, the text recognizes that climate change adaptation and resilience measures in countries of origin need to be prioritized to minimize the adverse drivers of migration. However, the text also acknowledges that adaptation in situ or return of migrants might not be possible in some cases and mentions the need to consider planned relocation and visa options (Objective 5 on enhancing availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration). Objective 7 of the Global Compact for Migration aims to address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration. Finally, Objective 23 commits to international and regional cooperation in the context of disasters.

Overall, the Global Compact for Migration articulates a comprehensive set of potential responses to address the adverse drivers of migration and make migration a choice rather than a desperate necessity. However, due to the non-legally binding nature of the Compact, some States may decide to only take limited action to address environmental migration challenges.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of three prominent framings of environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change: securitization, protection, and adaptation and climate risk management. The chapter has also highlighted existing evidence of patterns of human movements – ranging from migration, displacement and planned relocation – in different settings, principally mountainous areas, drylands, coastal zones and urban areas. This evidence illustrates some of the trade-offs people make as they weigh the realities and potential risks of staying or moving away in the face of environmental and climate stress. It has also highlighted the relevance of context, as it relates to environmental settings but also how different communities are able to demonstrate resilience as well as adaptive capacities.

The chapter has also reviewed two key mechanisms in international policy where discussions about environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change are taking place (with additional material in the appendix). There has been growing recognition in recent years of the need to better integrate migration into global climate and environmental mechanisms, and for climate change mechanisms to incorporate human mobility aspects. Significant steps have been taken to ensure that the issue of human mobility in the context of environment and climate change receives greater consideration at the international level. And yet, its inherent sensitivities – as reflected, for example, in the different framings discussed above – means that there is still more work to be done in the development of cohesive

⁹⁰ UNGA, 2018: annex, preamble para 8.

policy approaches. Nevertheless, the ultimate success of these frameworks and guidelines relies on the degree to which recommendations are implemented by States and other actors through migration, development, risk and environmental policies in addition to mainstreaming into other programming.

In conclusion, climate science suggests that the magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events are rising, exposing more people and their assets to adverse impacts. The places people currently live and work in are under increasing pressure from environmental and climate change. Migration, displacement and planned relocation are capturing increased attention from research, policy and practice as people attempt to move away from stress and risk, and towards safety or opportunity. In this context, measures are needed with the following characteristics:

- people are enabled to choose whether, when, and with whom to move (existing networks and dignified options appropriate to cultural contexts and preferences);
- people who move can access livelihood opportunities and remit resources that enhance adaptation; and
- people who move can do so in a dignified, safe and regular manner.

The literature and cases examined in this chapter indicate a need for research, policy and practice on which adaptive options can help people move towards well-being even in the face of growing environmental and climate risks.

The importance of environmental, climate change and disaster drivers will continue to be a key area for future research and policy developments in the international migration governance debate. The reality of how slow and sudden-onset hazards impact people's livelihoods and influence their migration strategies, as much as the significance of the political questions around migration and climate change issues will continue to position environmental migration at the forefront of these debates.



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10 MIGRANTS CAUGHT IN CRISES: CONTEXTS, RESPONSES AND INNOVATION¹

Introduction

The situations of people who have moved from their countries of origin only to find themselves caught in a crisis that threatens their security and ability to thrive are of growing concern to the international community. While crises affect both nationals and non-nationals, the ability of migrants to cope with their impacts may be reduced, due to conditions of vulnerability associated with migrants' legal, economic and social status, as well as practical challenges, such as linguistic differences, geographic displacement and even cultural context, which can limit access to timely and understandable information, services, resources and safety. While not all migrants are equally affected in times of crisis, they are often among the most vulnerable, at increased risk and in need of specific support.²

Addressing the needs of migrants living in places affected by crisis has become a priority of policy forums at both global and regional levels. Recent initiatives and policy processes include regional dialogues on migration in Africa, the Americas, and Central and South-East Asia; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030; the Paris Agreement; and the World Humanitarian Summit. The Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative and the development of the set of Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster³ provide concrete examples of efforts to improve current practice.⁴ The situation of migrants in crisis contexts is also acknowledged in the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, where it is highlighted as an essential element for the achievement of objective 2 on minimizing the drivers of forced migration, and objective 7 on reducing migrants' vulnerability.

Despite the existence of relevant policies, questions remain on the effectiveness of current efforts to address migrants' vulnerability and support their capacity before, during and after crises. This is due, in part, to the fact that, although there is growing recognition at regional and global levels of the need to respond to the particular situation of migrants in crisis contexts, the needs and safety of migrant populations may not be a priority for affected countries. Moreover, in some cases, migrant-specific crisis response measures have focused primarily on returning migrants to their countries of origin. While evacuations or returns may in some instances be the only life-saving option for migrants caught in crisis contexts, this focus can come at the expense of other effective support mechanisms that may better meet migrants' immediate post-crisis recovery and longer-term interests and needs.⁵ Ensuring appropriate responses requires a clear understanding of migrants' interests and priorities across different geographical and sociopolitical contexts.

¹ Nassim Majidi, Founder and Director of Samuel Hall; Heaven Crawley, Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University and Lorenzo Guadagno, International Organization for Migration; and Camille Kasavan, Samuel Hall.

² MICIC, 2016. For the purposes of this chapter, migrants include tourists, business travellers, foreign students, temporary workers and permanent residents, as well as asylum seekers and refugees.

³ MICIC, 2016.

⁴ Martin, 2016.

⁵ The focus on evacuation of migrants to their countries of origin as a response to crisis, in a global context of return as the "go-to" policy response (Shaw, 2018), reflects a limited interest in, and use of, alternative responses that are more cognizant of migrants' capacities and aspirations.


Reflecting these concerns, this chapter focuses on the experiences of migrants in crisis contexts, and the local, national and international responses to address their conditions and needs. This is important for three main reasons: (a) to better understand the ways in which migrants are affected by situations of crisis that occur in the countries in which they live or through which they are travelling; (b) to reflect on the effectiveness of efforts that focus on the needs of migrants in crisis contexts; and (c) to identify the ways in which actions by a range of stakeholders involved in any crisis situation can ensure that the needs and interests of migrants are taken into account.

The chapter is organized into four sections: (a) the next section draws on the framework provided by the MICIC Initiative to examine the varying contexts, responses, gaps and lessons learned in crisis preparedness, emergency response and post-crisis recovery; (b) the section that follows provides an overview of existing data on migrants in countries at risk of or affected by crisis, and assesses data needs and gaps; (c) innovative responses for supporting migrants caught in crises are discussed in the section that follows; and (d) the final, concluding section reflects on policy and practice implications.

Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or National Disaster

The MICIC Initiative, a State-led process launched in 2014, was designed to engage a wide audience on the topic of protecting migrants in crisis contexts. Through a series of multi-stakeholder consultations, the Initiative developed a set of voluntary Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or National Disaster. Published in 2016, the Guidelines represent a non-binding collection of principles, recommendations and practices that can guide efforts by all stakeholders to reduce the vulnerability of migrants in times of crisis.

Cycles and steps in crisis management, as defined in the MICIC framework



Key contexts and crisis phases

Crises – defined as situations “in which there is a widespread threat to life, physical safety, health or basic subsistence which is beyond the coping capacity of individuals and the communities in which they reside”⁶ – are associated with a wide range of phenomena. They can be triggered by environmental hazards, conflicts and terrorism, as well as complex emergencies, failures of political and economic management, epidemics and pandemics, and global financial cycles.

In recent years, flooding in Bangladesh and Thailand, major hurricanes in North America, conflicts in Libya and Yemen, as well as political and economic crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, have created the need for emergency assistance and urgent protection of migrants. Each of these places hosted migrants prior to and during the crisis, including permanent residents, temporary workers, business travellers, tourists and students, as well as asylum seekers and refugees.

The issue of migrant vulnerability in crisis contexts has been brought to the attention of the international community following large humanitarian emergencies. Lower-intensity (but often higher-frequency) events – such as urban fires and accidents, localized landslides and episodes of violence – can also disproportionately affect migrants, who may be living in areas more susceptible to these hazards. Experience from all crisis events shows that patterns of marginalization and exclusion increase migrants’ vulnerability to most hazards. Different crises, whether large- or small-scale, affect migrants in different ways (see appendix A), and will result in different operational interventions or actions.

Taking specific operational contexts into account: The example of health crises

Health crises have their own unique markers, which include clear protocols and preparedness procedures as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). Migrants are rarely included in relevant planning mechanisms, with significant impacts on migrant and host communities alike. This has human rights as well as health implications, and means that health-care practitioners need to have an understanding of the social dimensions of human mobility. Shared learning between health-care and humanitarian practitioners, as well as migrant communities, is a priority.^a

a See key informant interviews with Hui (2019); and Wickramage (2019).

Migrants may experience greater obstacles accessing protection and support, particularly where an individual has limited social networks. Depending on the circumstances, numerous other factors (such as gender, age, race and ethnicity, sexual orientation or disability status) compound vulnerability and the ability to cope in crisis contexts. At the same time, and as discussed in this chapter, migrant and local capacities before, during and after crises can inform and strengthen response beyond a vulnerabilities-centric approach, to one geared to understanding migrant capabilities. Recognizing the diversity of migrant profiles and supporting migrants to respond to crises are essential to reducing risks. Migrants may find themselves facing situations in which they are more vulnerable or more empowered. When the 2011 Brisbane floods occurred in Australia,

6 Martin, Weerasinghe and Taylor, 2014.

for instance, the role of culturally and linguistically diverse community leaders in immigrant and refugee communities was essential, as they acted as gatekeepers and communicated emergency responses to the disaster to their communities.⁷ While in Thailand, restrictions on mobility stemming from administrative barriers limited the mobility of many migrant workers affected by floods, who had to choose between staying in flooded, risky areas or face possible loss of legal status, arrest and deportation.⁸

Coordination, planning, and preparedness

Effective coordination, planning and preparedness require clear identification of the roles of various stakeholders. This begins with the fundamental obligation of States under international human rights law to protect the life and dignity of everyone – both citizens and non-citizens – living within their borders.

Countries of origin most often respond to the needs of their nationals caught in crises abroad through consular assistance. The rights and responsibilities of consular services to exercise their consular prerogatives in times of crises are delineated in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). In practice, however, the ability of States to act effectively in these contexts depends on resources, capacity, political will, effective planning and preparation.

The right to consular protection

The responsibility of consular services to assist their citizens abroad is a recognized norm, enshrined in the national laws of at least 45 countries.^a The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not explicitly obligate States to provide support to nationals affected by crises abroad. However, article 5 of the Convention lists a number of functions States can exercise in another State's territory, including (a) the protection of the interest of its nationals, and (e) the disaster assistance a State can provide to its nationals abroad. Article 36 also obligates host countries to allow consular officials to communicate with – and provide support and protection to – their nationals, to the extent allowed under the national laws of the host country.

a Warren, 2018.

Beyond consulates, other institutions in migrants' countries of origin can provide support in crisis contexts. For instance, the Government of the Philippines has integrated measures to protect its nationals abroad in its policies, institutional structures and mandates, which may directly and indirectly support migrants caught in crisis.⁹ Key to the country's system is the Overseas Preparedness and Response Team, established in 2011 and comprising representatives of several ministries. The team's objective is to develop preparedness strategies aimed at supporting Filipinos abroad, including destination-specific contingency plans in case of crisis, to be updated every six months.¹⁰ This is complemented by a variety of programmes and services that aim to support the ability of migrants to address challenges they may face.

7 Shepherd and Van Vuuren, 2014.

8 Guadagno, 2015.

9 Battistella, 2012.

10 Government of the Philippines, 2011.

Philippine consular support for migrant workers caught in conflict

The preparedness arrangements of the Philippines' consular authorities were tested during the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. Due to escalating violence, a rapid response team composed of staff from the Foreign Affairs, Labour and Interior ministries was deployed to assist the embassy in Damascus in repatriating 8,000 Filipino workers.^a For example, Ruth Pana, 29, domestic worker for a Syrian family, fled her employer's house because she was fearful of being caught in the crossfire between government troops and rebel forces in 2012. When her employer and his family moved to a rented house, she contacted the Philippine Embassy, which sent a car that took her into the care of Filipino personnel until she and the others were repatriated. Pana said her employer initially did not want her to leave, saying she was still under contract, but then relented.^b

^a Government of the Philippines, 2011.

^b Teves, 2012.

Where States cannot respond effectively, international organizations have sometimes stepped in to fill gaps and support the implementation of support mechanisms for migrants. This was seen most clearly in Libya during the conflict that broke out in 2011. Between 1.5 million and 3 million migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, were estimated to be living in the country at the time of the civil war,¹¹ and most were unable to access services provided by Libyan or home country authorities when the conflict escalated, as there were no contingency plans for migrants. Bordering countries promptly opened their borders to migrants escaping Libya, and non-governmental and international organizations also supported relief efforts, notably in the form of international evacuations to home or third countries.¹² Coordination of these operations was initially developed on an ad hoc basis. In March 2011, IOM and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) coordinated evacuation efforts and set up the Humanitarian Evacuation Cell. This Cell sought to support the management and use of assets and in-kind contributions received from 19 countries for the evacuation of migrants, totalling an estimated USD 23 million, and was supported by the European Union (EU) Monitoring and Information Centre, which assisted in transmitting requests for assets and in collecting offers from EU member States. The ad hoc nature of these operations highlighted the need for stronger preparedness mechanisms to manage large-scale international evacuations out of crisis areas.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are also key service providers in crisis contexts, often acting as a bridge between migrant communities and State actors.¹³ During the 2006 war in Lebanon, for instance, CSOs supported migrant domestic workers, forming a consortium to work with the Lebanese Government to address the needs of this group. CSOs made the case for better cooperation and coordination with intergovernmental organizations and State actors, which were their main allies during the crisis.¹⁴ In the United States, civil society efforts such as the California Farm Worker CARE Coalition have also played a role in ensuring that migrant workers had access to information and support during the California wildfires (see box below).

¹¹ Mainwaring, 2012.

¹² Aghazarm, Quesada and Tishler, 2012; Zampagni et al., 2017.

¹³ MICIC, 2017.

¹⁴ Mansour-Ille and Hendow, 2017.

California Farm Worker CARE Coalition: Civil society coordination

Following the 2007 California wildfires, the California Farm Worker CARE Coalition developed a structure to better coordinate and communicate with (and assist) migrants in emergencies. The structure leverages existing community networks, and peer educators known as *promotoras*, and includes local response organizations, other domestic NGOs and media (including Spanish language media). As part of this work, the Coalition has built the capacity of its members to prepare for and respond to emergencies, and has developed a formal emergency preparedness plan that is now integrated in official crisis management arrangements.^a

a Martinez, Hoff and Núñez-Alvarez, 2009; Martinez, 2017.

Emergency responses and lessons learned

The effectiveness of responses is to a large extent dependent on the preparedness of key stakeholders, and their ability to include and coordinate plans with migrant communities. Regardless of the level of preparedness, many crises require flexibility, ad hoc arrangements and quick decision-making. The availability of and rapid access to crisis funding, information and flexible migration policies can significantly affect the effectiveness of response efforts targeting migrant populations.

Responses to the needs of migrants in the contexts of large humanitarian crises have mostly been financed through traditional funding streams. Evidence from past crises suggests that these can be narrowly or politically focused. In the 2011 Libyan context, for instance, there is evidence that funding was used primarily for evacuation and returns to home countries, rather than on supporting those migrants who wished to remain, or providing options to stay in safe third countries.¹⁵ Moreover, these traditional funding streams may be difficult to access, or slow to activate, significantly impacting on the lives and well-being of migrants. Again, there is evidence that administrative and bureaucratic obstacles delayed and limited the timeliness of support operations during the crisis in Libya. By November 2011, IOM had formally received USD 111 million from donors and USD 23 million in in-kind donations.¹⁶ At the height of evacuation operations, up to USD 4 million were required every day to charter planes to destinations as far away as Bangladesh or Viet Nam.¹⁷ Administrative issues delayed access to the funding and, in turn, evacuations.¹⁸ Following the experience of large-scale migrant evacuations in response to the Libya crisis, IOM set up a Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism, with Member States' support, to cover the cost of international transport for migrants affected by crisis. The purpose of the fund is to jump-start the emergency response while waiting for donor funding to be received, in order to avoid the delays similar to those experienced during the evacuations from Libya.

There have been efforts by international organizations such as the World Bank and IOM to improve direct cash assistance. In 2011, the World Bank granted a loan of USD 72 million to the Government of Bangladesh

15 Perchinig, Rasche and Schaur, 2017.

16 Aghazarm, Quesada and Tishler, 2012.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

to repatriate and provide transitional assistance to over 36,000 Bangladeshi migrant workers who escaped the crisis in Libya.¹⁹ The assistance was provided directly to returnees, through a one-time cash grant to cover immediate basic needs and partial expenses associated with the initial restoration of livelihoods.²⁰

At the national level, India has established Community Welfare Funds, which levy small fees from consular services to support Indian nationals caught in crisis or other emergency situations abroad.²¹ These funds allow consulates to have rapid access to resources in emergency cases, which in turn allows for the launch of rapid responses.²² This has been further strengthened through the institutionalization of State capacity to repatriate nationals in times of need. In addition to emergency response services such as repatriation, the funds can fund a range of support services aimed at addressing migrant vulnerability and capabilities, including providing boarding and lodging for migrants in need, emergency medical care and provision of legal assistance.²³

New avenues for cooperation could usefully be developed between the private sector and other non-traditional actors, including diaspora populations, providing material support, communications resources, translation or shelter to migrants in crisis contexts.²⁴ The role of private sector actors in supporting migrant resilience and their capacity to face crisis effectively was highlighted during the MICIC Initiative's consultations.²⁵ In 2016, IOM moved forward with private sector partnerships, including partnerships with media or partners within the technology sector working on effective information sharing.²⁶ Such partnerships may serve as models for better integration of community and private sector actors in backing or initiating activities that may directly or indirectly better support migrants' capacity to handle a crisis. Research is needed to ensure that best practices are successfully identified and adapted to specific contexts. Diaspora populations may also have an important role to play in improving emergency response capacity and coordination, notably through their provision of more reactive funding streams.²⁷

Access to services, information and social networks is also critical in times of crisis, for ensuring migrant safety and decision-making. However, access to information for migrants can be challenging, and is often hampered by a failure to take account of migrants in emergency communication plans, as well as their limited language skills, local knowledge and lack of opportunity of access to local social networks.

This problem could be seen during the 2011 floods in Thailand. Emergency services in Thailand were informed by census data that was unable to adequately capture a large population of migrants with irregular status.²⁸ In addition, limitations on migrant worker movement, as well as conflicting information from the Government concerning support to migrants, was a source of confusion and uncertainty for migrants and national aid workers.²⁹ Migrants' awareness, access to knowledge and preparedness for the floods thus depended on their level of integration in their host society, especially their ability to speak and understand Thai.³⁰

¹⁹ Munier, 2017.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Khadria, 2009.

²² MICIC, 2016.

²³ Government of India, 2012.

²⁴ MICIC, 2015.

²⁵ IOM, 2016.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Samuel Hall, 2018.

²⁸ Bravi et al., 2017.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Perchinig, Rasche and Schaur, 2017.

The existence of migrant groups and community networks can mitigate the negative impacts of a crisis. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Japan during the 2011 earthquake. Prior to the earthquake, the Bayanihan Kesennuma Filipino Community collective was already an active group, bringing together Filipino women living in Kesennuma (mostly married to Japanese men), who provided guidance and support to newcomers. The strength of these existing networks meant that the group was able to ascertain the status and safety of families and individuals during the earthquake, provide information to the Embassy of the Philippines, and support response actions and aid distribution.³¹

In addition, there is clear evidence that migration status can also have a significant impact on the ability of migrants to deal with crisis, and that flexible immigration and visa policies enable migrants to both keep themselves safe in times of crisis and more easily recover from its impact. For example, the Government of Tunisia led the way in allowing the movement of migrants and other affected persons out of Libya in 2011. Thousands of migrants who were unable to return to their countries of origin were assisted by Tunisian institutions, civil society and the population, with the Tunisian Red Crescent playing a central role.³² Similarly, the Government of Djibouti has played a key role in facilitating the evacuation of migrants trapped in Yemen en route to Gulf States during the conflict.³³ Moreover, flexibility of visa and work permit policies can ensure that migrants who have lost documents are able to renew them.

Post-crisis actions: Reintegration and reconstruction

Policy revisions and reflections after a crisis ensure that lessons are learned and can enhance response capacity and preparedness. The MICIC Initiative itself reflected a growing global concern to address the situation of migrants in times of crisis.

A critical gap in post-crisis action concerns the support that is provided to returnees and host communities. Although repatriation is common in many crisis scenarios, returns can challenge the absorption capacity and resilience of households, communities and societies in the country of origin. It is notable that no long-term positive examples of reintegration were identified during the review undertaken for this chapter. Indeed, most literature points out that migrants often receive little or no long-term assistance after being returned to their countries following a crisis.³⁴ The majority of reintegration efforts – where they existed – were short-lived, with longer-term crisis responses hindered by lack of funding and the absence of future-oriented perspectives.³⁵

The failure to institute effective reintegration structures raises important questions about the extent to which it is appropriate to focus on return when addressing the needs of migrants in countries facing crisis. Returns are often a highly visible sign of action, but they are also expensive and politically sensitive. Returns – if combined with a long-term reintegration strategy, and made to a location where conditions are safe and amenable to the pursuit of a dignified life – can be appropriate. However, returns may also render migrants considerably worse off. For instance, Cameroonian and Chadians who were working in the Central African

³¹ MICIC, 2017.

³² Zampagni et al., 2017.

³³ Veerassamy, 2017.

³⁴ Kleist, 2017; Hendow et al., 2018; Zampagni et al., 2017.

³⁵ Ibid.

Republic in 2012 were mainly self-employed business people working in trade, and generally better off than the average local population. Most returned to their countries of origin because of the 2012 crisis, funded by donor States. However, the return and reintegration support that was available was often lacking. The returnees who had previously found success working in urban areas in the Central African Republic were frustrated to find themselves in rural surroundings upon return. When assistance to returnees dried up due to donor interests shifting to the insurgency in the Lake Chad region and resulting displacement, Chad was unable to continue to support returnees, and the reintegration support effectively ended.³⁶

Thailand: Migrants' involvement in emergency management as a driver of integration

Although migrants caught by the floods in Thailand were a particularly vulnerable group, they also were active members of their communities, providing relief and clean up services where needed and supporting preparedness, response and recovery efforts. This, in turn, made them feel more integrated in their host community. As one male migrant commented: *"Do you know, I even helped the soldiers and Thai citizens make dams against the flood? I lived like a Thai citizen and felt like I had a responsibility to support neighbours to prevent the flood."*

Local Thai CSOs reported the involvement of migrants in supporting the communities they lived in, including support for host community members: *"In Samut Sakhon, some groups of migrant workers tried to form support networks and mobilized monks to collect alms as a fund for relief supplies. These were mostly Burmese, but they did it to support all flood victims, not just their compatriots."*

Source: The above is an abridged extract of the Thailand Case Study (Bravi et al., 2017).

At the same time, there are examples of migrants choosing to stay, sometimes successfully, in their host countries, despite the existence of crisis. In some cases, this resulted in a strengthened sense of community, due to the involvement of migrants in response and recovery efforts. In Lebanon, for example, those in the migrant community who remained found themselves turning to each other for support and information after the 2006 war.³⁷ Once migrants started to work together with their embassies and with NGOs to support domestic workers affected by the conflict, they better understood the importance of coordination and community solidarity. Migrant workers reportedly went from feeling helpless and disconnected prior to and during the crisis, to being a largely connected and stronger force on the ground.³⁸ After the crisis, migrant domestic workers maintained strong networks and established the Domestic Workers' Union. In this particular case, the lack of international or government support for migrants was seen as the trigger for building more active grassroots support networks within migrant communities themselves, as they worked to create activist groups and build their own resilience and coping mechanisms.³⁹

³⁶ Zampagni et al., 2017.

³⁷ Mansour-Ille and Hendow, 2018.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

Learning from migrant and local capacities

There is much to learn from migrants at all stages of crisis management, from preparedness planning to post-crisis reflection. Afghan, Somali and Iraqi refugees were able to contribute and be an integral part of community rebuilding after the 2011 Canterbury earthquakes in New Zealand.⁴⁰ Likewise for Filipino migrants in the wake of the 2011 Tohoku disaster, affected migrant women spoke about the empowerment and the increased social capital they gained in the aftermath of the disasters, as they participated in reconstruction efforts.⁴¹

During the 2011 floods in Brisbane, Australia, migrant representatives acted as intermediaries between local authorities and their communities. They supported response efforts through translation and appropriate information dissemination, supporting relief agencies in identifying affected persons in need of support, and advocating with local authorities on behalf of their fellow nationals to ensure that official assistance received was adequate and culturally appropriate.⁴² Furthermore, following the 2015 Hurricane Stan, efforts by the Government of Mexico to have a line of direct communication with local stakeholders and representatives from migrant and host communities marked a clear shift in approach, leading to the Reducing the Vulnerability of Migrants in Emergencies project. The IOM-led project mainstreams migration in national disaster response policies and plans, while also creating a space for participation of migrants in policymaking.⁴³

These examples highlight the opportunities that exist to re-centre conversations at the local level and on migrant capabilities, and ways to actively include civil society in conversations related to crisis response. It remains the case, however, that more can be done to ensure that recommendations of the MICIC Guidelines⁴⁴ are implemented beyond the national level at the subnational and local levels.⁴⁵

Using data to address challenges

Data on population mobility (such as those available in the UN DESA and World Tourism Organization (WTO) databases⁴⁶) highlight the fact that global mobility trends are wide ranging: when combined with data on hazard exposure or risk, these can support planning, preparedness and effective response measures. As can be seen in table 1, crisis affects countries regardless of development levels, with both developed and developing countries exposed to significant risks of crises that can affect migrants. Correlating data on migrant stocks, hazard exposure and risk levels allow for the identification of countries where crisis may particularly affect migrant populations.

Table 1 correlates data on migrant stocks, hazard exposure and risk levels to show that crises may affect countries regardless of development levels, and that in both developed and developing countries, potential crises may affect large numbers of migrants. All countries can therefore benefit from more immediate and robust inclusion of migrants in emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction planning: the existing data can inform these decisions at the national or regional levels.

⁴⁰ MICIC, 2017.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Multicultural Development Association of Queensland, 2011; Shepherd and Van Vuuren, 2014; MICIC, 2017.

⁴³ MICIC, 2017.

⁴⁴ MICIC, 2016.

⁴⁵ MICIC, 2017.

⁴⁶ Available at, respectively, UN DESA: www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/index.asp; and UNWTO: www2.unwto.org/content/data (both accessed 16 July 2019).

Table 1. International data on migrants and crises


Country	HDI rank, 2018	Exposure to natural hazards, 2018	Exposure to human hazards, 2018	Risk class, 2018	International migrants, 2019
Australia	3	5.7	0.1	Low	7,549,270
Canada	12	5.0	0.4	Low	7,960,657
United States of America	13	7.0	6.6	Medium	50,661,149
Belgium	17	1.6	5.5	Low	1,981,919
Japan	19	8.4	0.6	Low	2,498,891
Israel	22	4.5	4.1	Low	1,956,346
Italy	28	4.8	1.7	Low	6,273,722
United Arab Emirates	34	5.8	0.1	Low	8,587,256
Chile	44	6.7	2.0	Low	939,992
Russian Federation	49	6.3	6.9	Medium	11,640,559
Malaysia	57	5.1	1.1	Low	3,430,380
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	60	7.0	5.5	Medium	2,682,214
Costa Rica	63	6.3	0.1	Low	417,768
Turkey	64	5.9	8.0	Medium	5,876,829
Serbia	67	4.8	3.9	Medium	820,312
Mexico	74	7.0	9.0	High	1,060,707
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	78	6.0	5.7	Medium	1,375,690
Lebanon	80	4.1	7.0	High	1,863,873
Thailand	83	6.4	4.1	Medium	3,635,085
Ukraine	88	3.1	9.0	High	4,964,293
Libya	108	4.5	10.0	High	818,216

Country	HDI rank, 2018	Exposure to natural hazards, 2018	Exposure to human hazards, 2018	Risk class, 2018	International migrants, 2019
South Africa	113	4.7	5.3	Medium	4,224,256
Egypt	115	5.5	7.0	Medium	504,053
Indonesia	116	7.8	6.2	Medium	353,135
Tajikistan	127	6.0	5.0	Medium	274,071
India	130	7.6	6.4	High	5,154,737
Bangladesh	136	8.2	6.6	High	2,185,613
Congo (the)	137	3.2	4.3	High	402,142
Kenya	142	4.9	6.5	High	1,044,854
Nepal	149	5.6	4.8	High	490,802
Pakistan	150	7.2	8.0	High	3,257,978
Syrian Arab Republic	155	5.3	10.0	Very High	867,848
Nigeria	157	2.6	10.0	Very High	1,256,408
Sudan	167	4.1	9.0	Very High	1,223,092
Côte d'Ivoire	170	2.6	6.4	High	2,549,141
Ethiopia	173	3.8	9.0	Very High	1,253,083
Democratic Republic of the Congo (the)	176	3.3	9.0	Very High	963,833
Yemen	178	2.9	10.0	Very High	385,628
Mali	182	3.1	8.0	High	468,230
Chad	186	3.4	7.0	Very High	512,230
South Sudan	187	3.3	10.0	Very High	865,552
Low human development		High exposure to natural hazards	High exposure to man-made hazards	High number of migrant residents	
A high value means:		Low exposure to natural hazards	Low exposure to man-made hazards	Low levels of risk	Low number of migrant residents
A low value means:					

Sources: UNDP, 2018; UN DESA, 2019; IASC, 2018.

Notes: This is a non-comprehensive list of countries included both in the Human Development Index (HDI) and Inform Risk Index. Inform's "hazard exposure" indices express on a scale from 0 to 10 the likelihood that a given country is affected by either a natural hazard (such as an earthquake, flood, tsunami, cyclone or drought) or a human hazard (such as conflict or violence). The risk classification is based on consideration of each country's hazard exposure, vulnerability (resulting from such factors as inequality, aid dependency and composition of the country's population) and capacities (resulting from governance levels, quality of local infrastructure and access to health, among others). The following thresholds are defined to assign each country's risk index (from 0 to 10) to a given risk class: 0–1.9 = very low; 2.0–3.4 = low; 3.5–4.9 = medium; 5.0–6.4 = high; 6.5–10 = very high.

Figure 1. Migrant routes in Mexico, cyclone risk and past earthquakes



This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.


Sources: IOM, 2018; USGS, 2019; and UNISDR, 2019.

Figures 1 and 2 provide examples of how information on key hazards can be superimposed onto data relating to migrant stocks and flows in Mexico and Libya, respectively. These kinds of mapping exercises allow the identification of high-risk areas within countries, which are also characterized by a significant presence of migrants (including those in transit). Since migrants' presence is not always captured comprehensively and in a timely fashion by census and population statistics, this kind of local-level disaggregated migration data, where they exist, can be integrated into assessments for a more accurate picture of hazard exposure and risk.

Effective crisis management should build on precise, local-level information. Disaggregating migration and risk data at the subnational level is essential for informing emergency management in ways that better include migrants. Focusing on the more localized administrative level (such as within a district or municipality) can help improve the effectiveness of crisis management measures. This level of data correlation and analysis enables relevant institutions to: (a) tailor warnings and emergency communications to the specific and appropriate requirements of migrant populations; (b) stockpile or deliver food and non-food items that may be essential to specific migrant groups; and (c) deploy multilingual or culturally competent personnel in crisis

areas with high migrant presence. When informed by specific and localized data, responses can effectively address the specific needs of at-risk and affected migrant communities.

Figure 2. Migrant presence and transit through Libya, and occurrence of violence



This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

Sources: IOM, 2019 and ACLED, 2019.

There are, however, challenges to collecting robust, reliable and comparable data,⁴⁷ and official migration statistics are likely to be conservative estimates that do not fully capture the extent of movements. Foreign embassies, missions and consulates rarely have comprehensive information about their nationals abroad. Data on asset, livelihood and other material and opportunity losses incurred in crises are often not categorized or disaggregated. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to quantify (a) the true loss suffered by migrants, (b) their vulnerability in comparison with other affected groups, and (c) any extraordinary losses unique to migrants.

⁴⁷ Global Migration Group, 2017.

Gathering data through key informants

Surveying key community informants is an effective way to gather information on numbers, demographic and socioeconomic profiles, and characteristics of migrants in a given area. It helps avoid challenges and sensitivities linked with the collection of individual data, and allows for the inclusion of particularly hard-to-reach groups, such as transit or irregular migrants. Networks of key informants provide the data for IOM's assessments of presence and movements of migrants in Libya and refugees in Cox's Bazar (Bangladesh) – which are then used to inform humanitarian interventions, preparedness planning and urban development. Similarly, the City of Bergen (Norway) collects information on its neighbourhoods and their population through a network of trained "street mediators", and uses this to deliver local public services in a more inclusive manner.^a

a Displacement Tracking Index, Available at www.globaldtm.info/; MICIC, 2017.

In the absence of comprehensive and up-to-date datasets, it is important to utilize a variety of information sources and data collection mechanisms. Academic institutions, international organizations, civil society and private sector actors provide some of the most detailed and useful stand-alone data sets, but taken together, these may still be patchy or disconnected. Significant resources may be required to systematically gather, update and safely store relevant, appropriate and timely data.

It should also be noted that loss data do not always capture longer-term well-being impacts, particularly as they relate to a less effective, slower recovery – which may be particularly relevant for migrants, who are often excluded from longer-term financial, housing and livelihood assistance after crises. In addition, whenever migrants are affected in a crisis, loss estimates should also account for impacts suffered in distant locations. The impacts migrants suffer may be felt by: (a) their families and communities in countries of origin, in the form of psychological impacts, missing remittance transfers and inability to pay off debts; and (b) people in places migrants return to or move to as a consequence of a crisis, in the form of increased pressures on labour markets and availability of services, land and housing.⁴⁸

Information on migrants' language proficiency, preferred communication channels, cultural sensitivities relevant to the provision of emergency services, levels of trust towards responders, and existing capacities at the community level would allow for stronger and more inclusive crisis planning and response. The limited degree to which these kinds of data currently exist and inform crisis management is one of the elements compounding migrants' vulnerability in times of crisis.

Innovative responses and ways forward

One of the key components of innovation is finding ways to enable people to work together. Innovations can lead to partnerships that support the implementation of guidelines and principles outlined in international protection frameworks and non-binding agreements. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

48 Pailey et al., 2016.

Development (OECD) *Oslo Manual 2018: Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation*⁴⁹ provides a framework for identifying the range of innovations that can be adapted to support migrants in crisis contexts (table 2).

Table 2. The OECD guidelines on innovation adapted for responses to migrants caught in crisis

Product	<p>Product innovation increases the type of and access to products and services for migrants caught in crisis, including products that may increase access to information and support networks.</p> <p><i>Examples:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing new – or improving accessibility to – existing tools that support migrant decision-making in crisis situations. This may include subscriber identification module (SIM) cards or virtual information delivery systems (such as apps or crowdsourced platforms, and translation platforms), or the creation of migrant support groups.
Process	<p>Process innovation is needed for migrants to access two-way communication channels, in particular for migrant groups who are most marginalized from mainstream services and support, such as irregular migrants or domestic workers.</p> <p><i>Examples:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing new funding streams that can support individuals, households and communities. Inclusion of migrants in crisis preparedness, emergency response and monitoring. Ensuring flexibility of immigration and visa policies in emergencies.
Organizational	<p>Organizational innovation refers to the way an organization evolves in its mandate, mission and methods.</p> <p><i>Examples:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creation of new operational frameworks, such as IOM's Migration Crisis Operational Framework and the Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism. Increased involvement of and coordination with non-traditional actors (such as private actors and companies, diasporas, student networks, trade unions and faith-based organizations).
Outreach and visibility	<p>Innovation in outreach refers to the way uptake of solutions by migrants and host communities are enhanced for greater inclusion and protection.</p> <p><i>Examples:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awareness-raising campaigns advocating for migrant inclusion and against xenophobia, including, for example, essay writing contests and dissemination on public platforms. Context-specific campaigns (for example, IOM's "Aware Ramadan" campaign on internal displacement). Original and innovative uses of media and other platforms to communicate information both to and from migrants.

This section focuses on innovative responses that aim to better connect migrants with information, services and social networks, as these have been shown to deliver better outcomes and can be delivered without requiring government support or elaborate systems of financial assistance. There are two interventions that provide a foundation for improved communication and mobilization: (a) improvements in knowledge and data on migrants living in the contexts of crisis, and (b) the use of technology in responding to crisis.

The establishment of regular data standards in tandem with expansion of data collection is necessary to ensure effective and long-term analysis of the impacts of policies and practices intended to address the needs of migrants in crisis contexts. Information is needed about the number of migrants present in a specific area – especially at the subnational level – in order to enhance preparedness and response. More rigorous analysis is also needed on the impacts of crises in migrant communities. Although some reports exist on these impacts,⁵⁰ they remain the exception rather than the rule, and stand as good practices to be scaled and replicated. For example, in north-eastern Nigeria, questions on language and communication needs were included in IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix surveys as a way to fill the information gap that existed concerning the languages spoken and understood by those displaced by conflict.⁵¹

Technology has the potential to assist migrants affected by crises. At a 2018 Techfugees Global Summit in Paris, 25 start-ups from across the world presented social enterprise initiatives for addressing the needs of migrants. The use of these technologies needs to be mainstreamed into global, regional, national and local crisis response policy and practice, with attention paid to sensitization programmes, culturally friendly trainings and workshops, to ensure uptake. Trust-building during the preparedness phase, through community-led efforts, can ensure that migrants have the impulse, during emergencies, to rely on technologies that they are familiar with.⁵²

Innovative initiatives that may be scaled to assist migrants in crisis and address current limitations include, but are not limited to, the following:

Translation and digital information services: Translators Without Borders has developed freely downloadable multilingual glossary apps accessible online and offline, and has worked with Refucomm to test the distribution of mother tongue information on legal and asylum procedures via micro-SD cards to recently arrived migrants in Greece.⁵³ Other apps, such as IOM's MigApp, help migrants make informed decisions throughout their migration process (for example, on health and travel requirements, visa application processes and remittances), and provide migrants a platform to share their experiences.⁵⁴ Accessible digital translation and information initiatives can bridge the information gap migrants experience due to language barriers and lack of tailored communications.

Enhancing accessible communication media: Sri Lanka's SIM card scheme for workers going abroad is one model for ensuring access to communication options for migrants. The existence of hotlines in countries of destination to recover and communicate information that can support migrants is another example. The Sendai International Relations Association set up one such multilingual information hotline in 2011.⁵⁵

50 See, for example, the literature examining unmet needs of immigrant communities in the Metro New York area after Hurricane Sandy (Make the Road New York, 2012; New York Women's Foundation, 2015).

51 Translators Without Borders, 2017b.

52 Ogie et al., 2018.

53 Translators Without Borders, 2017a.

54 IOM, n.d.

55 UNISDR, 2015.

Crowdsourcing platforms to address discrimination against migrants: The African Centre for Migration and Society at Wits University in Johannesburg and the technology website iAfrikan launched a crowdsourcing platform called Xenowatch to monitor efforts related to violence against migrants. People can report xenophobic threats or violence to Xenowatch online, by SMS or email. Reports are verified, anonymized and documented on a map using the Ushahidi platform, and shared with the police and UNHCR. Crowdsourcing platform initiatives are a real-time resource for organizations to advocate for and enhance migrant rights, security, inclusion and community engagement.⁵⁶

Looking ahead and policy implications

Migrants may face particular challenges in accessing documentation, information, resources and assistance in crisis situations, and may be exposed to additional precariousness and to discrimination.⁵⁷ Responses have not systematically addressed this range of challenges before and during crises, and further information and data at the local levels are needed in order to support effective planning and preparedness. However, information without funding, political will and the participation of migrants would not suffice to support preparedness. In most of the examples reviewed, cooperation sprang up spontaneously or as a result of a top-down decision by governments or international organizations. The role and inclusion of grassroots organizations, employers, technology partners and the diaspora in situations of emergencies and post-crisis recovery merit greater attention than they have received to date. At the governance level, the implementation of the MICIC Initiative can inform and accompany the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.⁵⁸ The inclusion of human rights frameworks, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Principles and Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations,⁵⁹ can strengthen initiatives and facilitate discussions between State and non-State actors.

Our analysis in this chapter has a number of implications for future policy and practice in this area. These support the 15 guidelines of the MICIC Initiative, emphasizing that:

- Before, during and after crises, stronger preparedness and post-crisis actions are needed. Most large-scale interventions in assistance to migrants in crisis have taken place in an unplanned manner. Instead, more systematic efforts are required to build on and develop capacities of emergency management actors, foreign embassies, consulates and missions, as well as local institutions and migrants themselves. Involving non-traditional stakeholders and migrants in the response and coordination mechanisms is key to enhancing flexible, effective funding and response.
- Funding schemes need to be diversified and strengthened to support greater preparedness and coordination. Flexible and diverse funding can provide new avenues for support systems that can integrate migrants in a non-discriminatory manner. This includes the exploration of linkages with the private sector and diaspora networks, engaging with and sensitizing donors, while also scaling up initiatives for flexible donor and government financing of emergency funds for crises response.

⁵⁶ Alfred, 2016.

⁵⁷ Hendow et al., 2018; MICIC, 2015.

⁵⁸ ICMPD, 2017.

⁵⁹ OHCHR, 2018.

- Post-crisis reflections can be enhanced, with responses beyond return to be explored, including local integration and resettlement. Returns are not the only solution and should not necessarily be the preferred one, given that there is often a lack of support after return. Where migrants are returned, long-term efforts to measure reintegration and monitor protection outcomes are critical to ensuring that migrants do not return to situations of greater harm or find themselves back in crisis situations.
- Addressing gaps and shortages of data will enable more effective coordination, preparedness, communication and provision of assistance. While anecdotal evidence may be available, larger data gaps prevent effective coordinated responses, whether between governments of origin and destination, or other stakeholders. The lack of impact evaluation data impedes the ability to identify fully what makes a response effective, while the lack of local level, disaggregated data does not allow for an understanding of the loss experienced by migrants. Enhancing transnational learning can lead to the scaling up of successful practices.
- Developing a road map for innovations in response to migrants caught in situations of crisis, which takes into account the above recommendations, can support the elaboration of specific responses, stronger processes, organizational effectiveness and outreach that are more inclusive, both of migrants' vulnerabilities and their capacities.
- Finally, and fundamentally, human rights considerations and the humanitarian imperative to save lives should inform the development of emergency preparedness frameworks, and operational protocols and practices, during disasters. Supporting humanitarian and human rights-based responses requires cooperation of State- and non-State actors, who may hold differing priorities and agendas. It is important to ensure that responses in crises situations are primarily and substantively human rights-based, rather than based on political considerations or populist expediency. In order to uphold international human rights obligations, it is crucial that respect for the human rights of all migrants, irrespective of status, should be on par with the maintenance of the rights of citizens.⁶⁰ Greater flexibility on visa policies and removal of administrative and security restrictions are known to improve migrant protection and community resilience. These should be recognized as exceptional measures needed in times of crisis. Support for coordination, negotiation and diplomacy with relevant countries affected by crisis is necessary in order to ensure that rules are made flexible to empower migrants to have a broader range of options and make informed decisions.

60 Ibid.



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11

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION: AN UPDATE TO THE WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018¹

Introduction

By their very nature, international migration and displacement are transnational issues concerning origin and destination States, as well as States through which migrants may travel (often referred to as “transit” States) or in which they are hosted following displacement across national borders. And yet, somewhat paradoxically, the majority of migration governance has historically remained with individual States, their policies and regulations on migration typically made at the national level.^{2,3} For the most part, migration governance has been closely associated with State sovereignty. States retain the power of deciding on the entry and stay of non-nationals because migration directly affects some of the defining elements of a State.⁴ Bilateral and multilateral arrangements are features of migration governance, and there are several global arrangements in the form of international treaties in which States have reached agreement on the application of human rights and the related responsibilities of States in specific areas. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) are two significant examples, notable for being widely ratified. Other migration conventions have not been so broadly accepted, such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which still has no traditional countries of destination among its States parties. Beyond this, there have been numerous multilateral and global initiatives, dialogues and processes on migration over several decades (see Appendix A for a tabular summary). The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Compact for Migration) is another milestone, as the first internationally negotiated statement of objectives for migration governance striking a balance between migrants’ rights and the principle of States’ sovereignty over their territory. Although it is not legally binding, the Global Compact for Migration was adopted by consensus in December 2018 at a United Nations conference in which more than 150 United Nations Member States participated and, later that same month, in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), by a vote among the Member States of 152 to 5 (with 12 abstentions).

In the absence of a coherent international regime on migration, unexpected large-scale migration events of significance, as well as seismic geopolitical events,⁵ can have dramatic impacts on global migration governance, operating as “calls to action” within the international community. Such events have also brought into sharp

¹ Kathleen Newland, Senior Fellow and Co-Founder, Migration Policy Institute; Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Policy Research Division and Céline Bauloz, Senior Research Officer, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM.

² Several political systems, such as federations, also have aspects of migration, particularly those related to integration, regulated at the subnational level (for example, the provincial level, such as in Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States). Increasingly, aspects of international migration are also managed at the city level (see, for example, Duncan and Popp, 2017; and the *World Migration Report 2015* on migrants and cities).

³ McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

⁴ For example, a permanent population and a defined territory, as per article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.

⁵ By seismic, the authors mean large-scale transnational conflict, or profound events, such as the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.

relief some of the gaps that exist within a fragmented global migration governance framework, and the need for more action to develop a much more coherent international approach to migration for the betterment of States, societies and migrants. In 2015 and 2016, for example, the mass movement of more than 1 million people to and through Europe (including Syrian and other refugees) provided some of the impetus for the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (New York Declaration), adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016.⁶ The making of the New York Declaration signalled an important point in the history of global migration governance. All 193 United Nations Member States unanimously affirmed their support for upholding the rights of migrants and refugees, and committed to a process of intergovernmental negotiations in order to reach agreement on a Global Compact for Migration⁷ as well as on a Global Compact on Refugees.⁸ Importantly, the two compacts build upon years of structured dialogues, initiatives and cooperation between States, regionally and at the international level.

The *World Migration Report 2018* included a chapter on global governance of migration, which provided the background and context to the adoption of the New York Declaration. It was the first chapter in Part II on complex and emerging migration issues, and was designed to provide a critical overview of existing global governance architecture and recent developments.⁹ The key elements of that chapter included:

- Discussion of the concept of “governance”;
- The benefits and barriers to global migration governance;
- Norms and institutions;
- Efforts to improve global governance (2001–2016).

Chapter 5 of the *World Migration Report 2018* also laid the foundation for the remaining chapters in Part II of the 2018 report by providing a context for governance at the global level, in part by highlighting the key thematic areas in migration that have been the subject of international cooperation in recent times. We encourage readers interested in foundational aspects and contemporary developments of global governance of migration to refer to this chapter in the *World Migration Report 2018*.

So much has happened in the sphere of global migration governance in the two years since the publication of the *World Migration Report 2018* that the editors felt it important to have an update on the topic for readers of the *World Migration Report 2020*. This chapter provides a descriptive analysis that is specific to a point in time¹⁰ – the implementation and evolution of the system will continue well into the future. In picking up from where the *World Migration Report 2018* left off, the next section walks through the development and adoption of the two global compacts. The third section offers a brief analysis of the complementarity, coherence and gaps between the two global compacts. The fourth section outlines an assessment of how the global compacts affect global migration governance architecture. The final section then looks to the future by outlining the implications of these recent developments as well as the challenges for implementation of the global compacts. The chapter builds on information from the policy sphere, academic commentaries and opinion pieces. At the time of writing, very little new academic research had been published on the

⁶ UNGA, 2016.

⁷ UNGA, 2018a.

⁸ UNGA, 2018b.

⁹ Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017.

¹⁰ This chapter refers to information and events up until the end of June 2019.

adoption and implementation of the two global compacts, which is a reflection on the time frames involved in academic peer-reviewed publications (see chapter 4 of this report). We expect new academic publications on the compacts will increase from the last quarter of 2019.

The development and adoption of the global compacts

The two global compacts sprang from a widespread sense of crisis, as the world faced large-scale movements involving people in several locations throughout the world. These events – most spectacularly in the Mediterranean, but also in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea and the Bay of Bengal – led to the making of the New York Declaration. The Mediterranean crisis was notable not only for the huge numbers of people involved, but also for its visibility, unfolding as it did within sight of major Western news outlets. The movements brought home to the governments of wealthy European States (the intended destinations of migrants) that even these States, with all their legal and financial resources, could not cope with flows of this magnitude without cooperation among themselves and with countries of origin and transit.¹¹

The United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants in September 2016, convened in the shadow of the crisis, produced a Declaration of commitment on the part of States, the most significant elements of which were pledges to negotiate the two global compacts. The initial conception was of a single compact that would cover both refugees and migrants. Several obstacles to this plan presented themselves, including a fear that, on the one hand, a dual-purpose compact would dilute the protection to which refugees are entitled under the Refugee Convention and, on the other hand, that equating refugees and migrants would entail stronger obligations toward migrants than States were willing to accept. Most destination countries, by and large, would have been content to have one global compact that dealt only with refugees, but other States, most notably countries of the Global South, insisted on a Global Compact for Migration as well. Both compacts were envisaged as being legally non-binding, unlike an international treaty that obligates all State parties to implement its provisions.¹²

In addition, conceptual discussions and debates on the various definitions of “refugees” and “migrants”, as they relate to the New York Declaration and during the development of the two compacts, were prominent.¹³ While the New York Declaration noted that “refugees and migrants have the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms”,¹⁴ a distinction between the two was upheld, as summarized in the Global Compact for Migration:

Migrants and refugees are distinct groups governed by separate legal frameworks. Only refugees are entitled to the specific international protection as defined by international refugee law.¹⁵

¹¹ See, for instance, European Commission, 2015.

¹² There is a question as to whether the Global Compact for Migration could be interpreted as “soft law” (Chetail, 2019; Allinson et al., 2019).


¹³ See, for instance, Klein Solomon and Sheldon, 2018.

¹⁴ UNGA, 2016: para. 6.

¹⁵ UNGA, 2018a: para. 4.

As a result, the two compacts embrace a residual understanding of “migrants”, as people living outside their countries of origin who are not refugees (figure 1): “a diverse, residual category of people who are united by the feature of not being refugees”.¹⁶ By contrast, the United Nations Population Division uses an inclusive definition whereby any person residing outside his or her country of origin is a migrant.¹⁷

Figure 1. What does “migrant” mean?



Source: Carling, 2017 (adapted).

The processes leading to the two compacts were very different. The Global Compact on Refugees was drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the lead-up to the September 2016 United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants, and during UNHCR’s piloting of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).¹⁸ UNHCR organized a series of thematic discussions with States and other stakeholders, and then entered into consultations with States (see figure 2). It received in total more than 500 written contributions from United Nations Member States and other stakeholders throughout the process.¹⁹ UNHCR produced the final draft, which was adopted during the seventy-third session of the United Nations General Assembly in December 2018 after a vote in the Third Committee, with 176 in favour, 1 against (the United States of America) and three abstentions.^{20,21}

¹⁶ Carling, 2017.

¹⁷ UN DESA, 1998.

¹⁸ On the development of the New York Declaration and the CRRF, see Ferris, 2016.

¹⁹ See www.unhcr.org/595259bd4, accessed 1 June 2019.

²⁰ Eritrea, Liberia and Libya.

²¹ Türk, 2018.

Figure 2. Summary of the compacts and United Nations Network process timelines

United Nations General Assembly, September 2016 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants - IOM becomes a United Nations-related organization 		
Global Compact on Refugees	Global Compact for Migration	United Nations Network on Migration
<i>Jan. 2017 – Thematic Dec. 2017 consultations</i>	<i>April 2017</i> United Nations resolution on the modalities of the Compact process	
<i>June 2017</i> NGO consultations	<i>April 2017 – Nov. 2017</i> Informal consultation phase; 6 thematic sessions	
<i>Dec. 2017 – Stocktaking Jan. 2018 consultations</i>	<i>Dec. 2017 – Jan. 2018</i> Stocktaking phase	<i>Dec. 2017</i> Secretary-General initiates internal United Nations consultations
<i>Feb. 2018 – Formal July 2018 consultations</i>	<i>Dec. 2017</i> Secretary-General's report (<i>Making migration work for all</i>) published	<i>May 2018</i> Executive Office of Secretary-General decision on proposed model
	<i>Feb. 2018 – July 2018</i> Intergovernmental negotiation phase	<i>June 2018</i> Deputy Secretary-General briefs Member States on United Nations Network
		<i>July 2018</i> Final Global Compact for Migration text welcomes Secretary-General decision to establish the Network
		<i>Oct. 2018</i> United Nations framing meeting on the Network
		<i>Nov. 2018</i> Network Terms of Reference adopted
<i>Dec. 2018</i> General Assembly adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees	<i>Dec. 2018</i> International conference to adopt the Global Compact for Migration and then General Assembly endorsement of the Global Compact for Migration	<i>Dec. 2018</i> Secretary-General launches Network at international conference
<i>Sept. 2016 – Dec. 2018</i> Application of CRRF		<i>Jan. 2019</i> United Nations Network in place; successor to the United Nations Global Migration Group

The Global Compact for Migration process, by contrast, was firmly in the hands of States, although with the close involvement and support of the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration. Two States, Mexico and Switzerland, were appointed as co-facilitators of the process, and they took responsibility for drafting the Compact. The first stage of development consisted of six months of consultations at the global, regional and country levels, followed by a stocktaking exercise.

The co-facilitators produced a first draft of the Compact, and chaired six rounds of informal consultations at the United Nations over the course of six months.²² The final version of the text was formally agreed at the end of the final round in July 2018, and was adopted at a special conference in Morocco in December 2018, five months after the conclusion of negotiations. The United Nations General Assembly in New York formally endorsed the outcomes of the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, with the results of the General Assembly vote as follows: 152 States in favour, 5 against and 12 abstentions. The United States withdrew from the process before intergovernmental negotiations commenced and voted against the Compact at the General Assembly (along with the Czechia, Hungary, Israel and Poland). The countries that abstained were Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland.²³

The rise of nationalism, far-right political parties and anti-migrant sentiment, especially in destination countries, contributed to several countries withdrawing support for the Compact, which at times involved rhetoric based on misrepresentation of the Compact and its effects.²⁴ For example, the former Immigration Minister of Canada under the Conservative Harper Government, Chris Alexander, publicly denounced comments made by opposition leader Andrew Scheer on the impact of the Compact by stating: "Scheer's statement is factually incorrect: this Compact is a political declaration, not a legally binding treaty: it has no impact on our sovereignty".²⁵

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

The Global Compact for Migration has four major elements. The first consists of the early paragraphs that set out the Compact's vision of better cooperation among States to improve the governance of international migration.²⁶ They reiterate the principles on which the Compact is built, one of which is that it "reaffirms the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law".²⁷ The preamble to the Compact acknowledges the related human rights instruments, other agreements and the outcomes of prior United Nations meetings on migration.

The second element is the heart of the document, which consists of 23 objectives that offer a fairly comprehensive approach to international cooperation on migration (see box below). Each objective has several associated actions from which countries will draw in order to realize their commitment to the stated goal. This is central to the Compact, which reaffirms the sovereignty of States over their migration policies.²⁸

²² See UNGA, 2017a setting out the modalities for the intergovernmental negotiations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

²³ A number of countries were not in the room for the vote (Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Dominican Republic, Guinea, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, the Federated States of Micronesia, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Slovakia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Vanuatu).

²⁴ Kaufmann, 2017; Mudde, 2019; Zalan, 2018.

²⁵ Zimonjic, 2018.

²⁶ UNGA, 2018a: paras. 1–15.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Makooi, 2018.

Global Compact for Migration's 23 objectives for safe, orderly and regular migration

1. Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies.
2. Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin.
3. Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration.
4. Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation.
5. Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.
6. Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment, and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work.
7. Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration.
8. Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants.
9. Strengthen the transnational response to the smuggling of migrants.
10. Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration.
11. Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner.
12. Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral.
13. Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives.
14. Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle.
15. Provide access to basic services for migrants.
16. Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion.
17. Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration.
18. Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences.
19. Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries.
20. Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances, and foster financial inclusion of migrants.
21. Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration.
22. Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits.
23. Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration.

The Global Compact for Migration's 23 objectives can be thought of as falling into three "baskets": (1) specific and relatively straightforward measures; (2) specific but contested issues; and (3) very broad and aspirational goals.

Table 1. Global Compact for Migration objectives by category

1. Specific and relatively straightforward measures	2. Specific but contested issues	3. Very broad and aspirational goals
Improving migration data and research (Objective 1)	Opening wider legal pathways for migrants (Objective 5)	Reducing the negative drivers of migration (Objective 2)
Providing accurate and timely information at all stages of migration (Objective 3)	Managing borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner (Objective 11)	Addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration (Objective 7)
Ensuring that migrants have proof of their legal identity (Objective 4)	Using detention only as a last resort, and seeking alternatives (Objective 13)	Empowering migrants and societies for full social inclusion and cohesion (Objective 16)
Facilitating fair and ethical recruitment and conditions for decent work (Objective 6)	Providing access to basic services for migrants (Objective 15)	Eliminating all forms of discrimination and promoting evidence-based public discourse (Objective 17)
Saving lives and coordinating efforts on missing migrants (Objective 8)	Investing in skills development and mutual recognition (Objective 18)	Creating conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development (Objective 19)
Strengthening the transnational response to smuggling (Objective 9)	Facilitating return and reintegration (Objective 21)	Strengthening international cooperation and global partnerships (Objective 23)
Preventing, combating and eradicating trafficking in persons (Objective 10)		
Strengthening migration procedures (Objective 12)		
Enhancing consular services for migrants (Objective 14)		
Facilitating remittance transfers (Objective 20)		
Supporting portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits (Objective 22)		

Some of the objectives are relatively straightforward with wide support, and are subject to immediate implementation – indeed, implementation has already begun on some, including on data collection and research, ethical recruitment and remittances, among others. Others – such as enhanced legal pathways for migration, better border management, and cooperation on return and reintegration – are specific but contested and will require further negotiation, commitment of resources and summoning of political will.

Others, such as those in the third category in table 1, are very long-term propositions, notwithstanding the high degree of agreement on the need for positive change on these issues.²⁹ Their goals are quite far-reaching, so they will indeed take time to realize. For example, the protection of migrants in vulnerable situations (Objective 7) now extends beyond traditional vulnerability categories (for example, women and girls, children and trafficking victims) to more broadly cover vulnerabilities arising “from the circumstances in which they travel or the conditions they face in countries of origin, transit and destination”.³⁰ The realization of some of these objectives is also closely interlinked with the implementation of other initiatives related to development, environment or, more generally, the protection of migrants caught in crises. For instance, Objectives 2 and 19 explicitly refer to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development.³¹

The third element of the Global Compact for Migration deals with implementation. It is clear that States have the primary responsibility for implementing the 23 objectives of the Compact. To support their efforts, a “capacity-building mechanism” was envisaged, consisting of a knowledge platform, a connection hub and a start-up fund for projects.³² Importantly, in this section, States pledge to work on implementation with other stakeholders, including migrants, civil society, the private sector, trade unions, local authorities and others. The Compact also welcomes the Secretary-General’s decision to establish a United Nations Migration Network, coordinated by IOM, to foster effective, coordinated support to States from the many United Nations entities that work on migration issues. The Secretary-General is asked to draw on the Network to prepare a biennial report to the General Assembly on United Nations activities to support implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. The final paragraph on implementation recognizes that State-led processes, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the regional consultative processes on migration, have important roles to play in furthering international cooperation on migration.

Finally, the fourth element of the Global Compact for Migration relates to follow-up and review.³³ Progress on implementation of the Compact’s objectives will be examined every four years in the General Assembly, starting in 2022, in an “International Migration Review Forum”, which will replace the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.³⁴ Regional reviews are to take place every four years alternately with the Review Forum, starting in 2020. The Compact foresees contributions to these reviews from other State-led processes, such as those mentioned above, as well as IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration. It also encourages States to institute national-level reviews.

29 Newland, 2018.

30 UNGA, 2018a: para. 23.

31 UNGA, 2018a.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 UNGA, 2019.

The Global Compact on Refugees

The New York Declaration explicitly recognized the pressing need for more cooperation in distributing the responsibility of hosting and supporting the world's refugees, who are mainly situated in neighbouring countries (most of which are low- or middle-income countries). The Declaration states:

To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.³⁵

Unlike the proposed Global Compact for Migration, involving intergovernmental negotiations to reach agreement on a Member State document, the New York Declaration envisaged the Global Compact on Refugees emerging from a process led by UNHCR. The emphasis would be on the further development and practical implementation of an existing response to refugee issues, the CRRF, with a particular focus on responding to large movements of refugees (including in protracted situations). The CRRF, therefore, as outlined in Annex 1 of the New York Declaration, is central to the Global Compact on Refugees. The key elements of the CRRF, developed by UNHCR in close coordination with stakeholders and implemented in multiple countries³⁶ during the Global Compact on Refugees process (see table 2), included reception and admission, support for ongoing needs, support for host countries and communities, and durable solutions. The core CRRF objectives are to: (1) ease pressure on the host countries involved; (2) enhance refugee self-reliance; (3) expand access to third-country solutions; and (4) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.³⁷ In addition to the CRRF, the Global Compact on Refugees includes a Programme of Action that builds on the CRRF and sets out measures for States and other relevant stakeholders designed to ensure better responses to refugee displacement (table 2).

Table 2. Thematic areas of focus in CRRF and Programme of Action

CRRF pillars	Programme of Action	
	Areas of support	Indicative sub-areas
Reception and admission	Reception and admission	Early warning, preparedness and contingency planning Immediate reception arrangements Safety and security Registration and documentation Addressing specific needs Identifying international protection needs

³⁵ UNGA, 2016: para. 68.

³⁶ The 16 roll-out countries included: Afghanistan, Belize, Chad, Costa Rica, Djibouti, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Panama, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. The United Republic of Tanzania was initially a roll-out country but later withdrew.

³⁷ See CRRF Global Digital Portal, Available at www.globalcrrf.org (accessed 2 June 2019).

CRRF pillars	Programme of Action	
	Areas of support	Indicative sub-areas
Support for immediate and ongoing needs	Meeting needs and supporting communities	Education Jobs and livelihoods Health Women and girls Children, adolescents and youths Accommodation, energy and natural resource management
Support for host countries and communities		Food security and nutrition Civil registries Statelessness Fostering good relations and peaceful coexistence Support for countries of origin and voluntary repatriation
Durable solutions	Solutions	Resettlement Complementary pathways for admission to third countries Local integration Other local solutions

Providing adequate funding for host countries and to resettle refugees are two concrete expressions of responsibility-sharing, but they have both proved challenging throughout the Global Compact on Refugees process and will likely continue to be so in the future. It has been difficult to secure funding to enable the full roll-out of the CRRF, with inadequate donor support hampering the implementation of the framework in several countries, including Uganda and Ethiopia.³⁸ Likewise, the very small number – compared with the need for refugee resettlement places and other durable solutions for the displaced – will remain challenging for the CRRF/Global Compact on Refugees.³⁹ While neither of these challenges is in any way new to the international refugee system, or to UNHCR as the mandated United Nations agency and its chief guardian, the Global Compact on Refugees process has served to highlight the enduring difficulties in these two matters, while attempting to garner more support from the international community to enable more practical results to be realized.

To address these two challenges and, more broadly, support Member States' commitments, the Global Compact on Refugees sets up different follow-up, review and implementation mechanisms. A Global Refugee Forum is to be convened every four years, with the first one scheduled for December 2019. The objective of this Forum is, first, for United Nations Member States to make formal pledges and contributions in the form of financial, material or technical assistance or resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission, and then report on key achievements and good practices.⁴⁰ This global arrangement for international cooperation

³⁸ Siegfried, 2017; see also Hansen, 2018.

³⁹ Angenendt and Biehler, 2018.

⁴⁰ UNGA, 2018b; see also UNHCR Global Refugee Forum, Available at www.unhcr.org/global-refugee-forum.html (accessed 2 June 2019).

is complemented by national arrangements that can be established by host countries to coordinate the measures taken by relevant stakeholders working toward achieving a comprehensive response.⁴¹ To avoid future “refugee crises”, a Support Platform can also be activated upon the request of the host country(ies) or country(ies) of origin in two cases:

- A large-scale and/or complex refugee situation where the response capacity of a host State is or is expected to be overwhelmed; or
- A protracted refugee situation where the host State(s) require(s) considerable additional support, and/or a major opportunity for a solution arises (for example, large-scale voluntary repatriation to the country of origin).⁴²

Led by a group of States, Support Platforms can initiate solidarity conferences for a particular situation in order for States and relevant stakeholders to contribute financially, materially and technically, or provide resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission.⁴³

The non-binding nature of the Global Compact on Refugees and the focus on implementation and action have resulted in some commentators pointing to worrying signs for the likelihood of sustainable change, given that States will be able to pick and choose the approaches that are more attractive to them at a time when the current geopolitical climate on refugees and displacement is unfavourable.⁴⁴ Other concerns have related to the focus on the Refugee Convention as the core of the Global Compact on Refugees, or the relative neglect of related rights expressed in other key instruments, as well as aspects of displacement not covered by the existing refugee regime.⁴⁵

Complementarity, coherence and gaps between the two global compacts

Notwithstanding the high profile of the 2016 New York Declaration, and the related commitment of all States to finalize the two global compacts, the content of the compacts did not spring out of nowhere. There has been a much longer lead time in developing the ideas and approaches in the compacts than may first appear. As highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, the two compacts build upon years of structured dialogues, initiatives and cooperation between States, regionally and at the international level. The Global Compact for Migration in particular builds on recent global and regional migration initiatives and processes,⁴⁶ including

⁴¹ UNGA, 2018b.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Angenendt and Biehler, 2018; Hathaway, 2018.

⁴⁵ Aleinikoff and Martin, 2018; Chimni, 2018; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2018.

⁴⁶ For an historical overview of previous global migration initiatives and processes, see Newland, 2010; Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017; Betts and Kainz, 2017.

by addressing thematic areas where States' interests have converged⁴⁷ (see appendix B for more detail). As for the Global Compact on Refugees, it focuses on "translat[ing] [the] long-standing principle [of] international cooperation enshrined in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention into concrete and practical action" for "predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing".⁴⁸ The Global Compact on Refugees reinforces and strengthens previous efforts, including, for instance, by answering the repeated calls for international cooperation made by the UNHCR Executive Committee,⁴⁹ as well as by consolidating UNHCR-led initiatives for specific cases of ad hoc responsibility-sharing.⁵⁰

The two global compacts are not mutually exclusive, but have been designed to complement one another in recognition of the "many common challenges and [...] similar vulnerabilities" of migrants and refugees.⁵¹ The two compacts are considered by UNHCR and IOM to be functionally coherent when it comes to the common challenges they seek to address.⁵² The Global Compact for Migration is broader in scope than the Global Compact on Refugees, "addressing migration in all its dimensions". Thus, it complements the more limited focus of the Global Compact on Refugees on the specific challenges of large movements of refugees, including situations of protracted displacement.⁵³ Offering a "360-degree vision of international migration",⁵⁴ the Global Compact for Migration addresses issues throughout the migration cycle, be it upon departure from the country of origin; during migrants' journeys, including in transit countries; upon arrival and stay in the country of destination; or upon return to the country of origin. In their early drafts, neither global compact addressed displacement associated with the impact of climate change and environmental degradation. Some stakeholders hoped that protection of people displaced by these forces would be included in the Global Compact on Refugees, but States did not agree. The final text of the Global Compact for Migration did, however, include a subsection on "natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation" under Objective 2 (Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin).⁵⁵

The different scope and purposes of the two compacts avoided contradictions between them and achieved general coherence. But the two left another important area of potential overlap unresolved: mixed flows of refugees moving onward from countries of first asylum with other migrants in large-scale movements.⁵⁶ The unplanned arrival of large numbers of people, including some who have solid claims for international refugee protection and some who do not, places huge demands on national asylum systems and humanitarian institutions. Even those who are not refugees may be in desperate need of assistance and protection, such as unaccompanied children, and the Global Compact for Migration addresses their needs in Objective 7 (Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration). But neither compact comes to grips with the phenomenon of "secondary movements" by refugees.

⁴⁷ Neither the Compact on Refugees nor the Global Compact for Migration deals with internally displaced persons (IDPs) – of whom there are twice as many as there are refugees. Some participating Member States in the Second Thematic Consultation held at United Nations Headquarters in New York in May 2017, had argued for IDPs to be included in the Global Compact for Migration, but others were opposed to it. Acknowledging the international and internal migration linkage, the moderators, co-facilitators and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, however, clarified that IDPs were not within the mandate of the Global Compact for Migration (Khadria, 2017).

⁴⁸ UNGA, 2018b: paras. 2 and 3. See the fourth preambular paragraph of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

⁴⁹ Dowd and McAdam, 2017.

⁵⁰ Such as the 1989 International Conference on Central American Refugees and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees. On these actions plans, see Betts, 2006; Newland, 2011.

⁵¹ UNGA, 2016: para. 4.

⁵² Türk, cited in Leone, 2018.

⁵³ CRRF, annexed to UNGA, 2016; and UNGA, 2018b.

⁵⁴ UNGA, 2018a: para. 11.

⁵⁵ Ibid: paras. 18(h)–(l).

⁵⁶ See, for instance, Ndonga Githinji and Wood, 2018.

One of the key lessons from the 2015–2016 movements to and through Europe is the number of refugees who were able to travel on from the first country they reached after being displaced from their countries of origin, in search of greater safety or more promising prospects. In Europe in 2015–2016, the volume of secondary movements was partly due to geography (particularly the close proximity of Turkey and Greece) and crowded conditions in first countries of asylum, but also because of more fundamental changes in technology (including that used by smugglers), “mobile money” and information exchange.⁵⁷ The story of Paolina Roccanello (see below) highlights just how much the world has changed since the end of the Second World War: while refugees had at that time a limited capacity to move by themselves beyond the confines of Europe, this is no longer the case.

Migration before appification

The world has changed fundamentally in the almost 70 years since the largest refugee crisis in Europe following the aftermath of World War II when the Refugee Convention was being developed.^a Back then, there was no Internet, there were no mobiles or fax machines, and postal services were slow and often disrupted. Telegram and telephone communication was limited and costly. Paolina Roccanello arrived in Melbourne in April 1947 from Italy with her mother on the *SS Misr* in the shadow of the war.^b They were lucky to be reunited with her father who had emigrated to Australia eight years before, expecting his family to follow soon after. For all their war-time separation they received only one of his letters, which had taken five years to reach them. Such were the times.

After World War II refugee movements beyond war-torn Europe were regulated by States (including under the United Nations). The UN coordinated repatriation, returns and resettlement of refugees to third countries. In today’s terms, movements were slow, highly regulated and very selective. Information for refugees was largely the monopoly of states and opportunities for migrating to other regions were limited to formal channels. Things are very different now.

a Nebehay, 2015.

b Huxley, 2007.

Excerpt of McAuliffe, 2016.

Some refugees are now able to migrate on their own, exercising a degree of self-agency.⁵⁸ Contrary to the “binary construct” between forced and voluntary migration,⁵⁹ refugees often move for mixed motivations, meaning that:

They may have left their home countries because of conflict or persecution, but they have chosen a destination country because of the economic opportunities it affords. They may well fit the refugee definition and cannot be returned home.⁶⁰

57 McAuliffe, Goossens and Sengupta, 2017; Triandafyllidou, 2017.

58 On self-agency, or “free will”, see Akesson and Coupland, 2018; McAuliffe et al., 2017.

59 Ibid; see also de Haas, 2011; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1998.

60 Martin, 2014.

Many people (including refugees) are unable to move directly to their preferred destinations, for lack of visa access, for instance, and may first travel through one or more transit countries to reach their preferred destination, or end up in countries that are not their first choice of destination.⁶¹ While this complex reality of “mixed motive” migration is becoming more common and raises challenges to States in terms of secondary refugee movements, it is largely beyond the ambit of the two global compacts. As previously noted, and despite its broad scope, the Global Compact for Migration is limited to migrants in the “residual” sense – that is, migrants who are not refugees.⁶² The Compact refers to “mixed movements”, which do not explicitly acknowledge that many people have mixed motives for migration, but rather concern the mixed nature of movements involving migrants and refugees.⁶³ Before the Global Compact for Migration’s text was finalized, it referred to the provision to migrants of “information on rights and obligations in migration laws and procedures, including on *access to the right to seek asylum or other adequate forms of protection*”,⁶⁴ indicating that some migrants may have a claim to refugee status. That language was dropped from the final text, indicating the sensitivities and complexities of this issue. This grey area is one that has the potential to result in confusion or even gaps.⁶⁵ That said, the frameworks of the compacts do not prevent cooperation between States on mixed motive migration, and specific parts of the Global Compact for Migration encourage cooperation that would assist in addressing this issue (for example, Objective 5: Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration). Similarly, the Global Compact on Refugees seeks pathways beyond conventional resettlement of refugees to move from host countries in order to pursue, for example, educational or career opportunities. In addition, there already are many measures in place to accommodate this increasingly important aspect of migration – one of the most pertinent being regional free movement agreements with eligibility based on nationality rather than policy category or reason for migrating.

How do the global compacts influence the global migration governance architecture?

Despite their common origin in the 2015 migration crises and the New York Declaration, the two global compacts occupy quite different positions in the architecture of global migration governance. The Global Compact on Refugees is grounded in established international law, specifically in the widely ratified Refugee Convention. Although migrants are entitled to the same protections that apply to others under international human rights law (as are refugees), there is no equivalent to the Refugee Convention for migrants. Consequently, and even though it is not legally binding, the Global Compact for Migration represents more of an innovation in global governance of migration than does the Global Compact on Refugees.

The Global Compact on Refugees is all about implementation: how to create mechanisms of burden- and responsibility-sharing that will strengthen the refugee regime by giving more support to host countries and fostering refugee self-sufficiency. While the Global Compact on Refugees does not aspire to change refugee law, it does represent a substantial change of emphasis for UNHCR. The refugee agency has traditionally seen its role primarily as the guardian of the Refugee Convention, overseeing States’ fulfilment of their obligations

⁶¹ Legomsky, 2003; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; McAuliffe et al., 2017.

⁶² UNGA, 2018a; Carling, 2018.

⁶³ UNGA, 2018a.

⁶⁴ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018b: Objective 12, para. 27(e).

⁶⁵ Carling, 2018.

to protect refugees and seeking durable solutions that allow refugees to stop being refugees. It has also assumed a major role in marshalling humanitarian assistance. The Global Compact on Refugees places much greater emphasis on support for host country governments and communities, recognizing the service they provide, not only to refugees, but to the international community as a whole – which should be the basis for much more robust solidarity expressed as burden – and responsibility-sharing.

The system the Global Compact on Refugees lays out for achieving greater solidarity with refugee hosts presents a further shift of the refugee regime by giving actors other than States a more central role. Non-governmental humanitarian organizations have long played a major part in protecting and assisting refugees, but the Compact envisages more active engagement with the private sector, subnational authorities and other stakeholders. The addition of a regular review event is an additional architectural element, which should make it harder for prolonged refugee situations, or those that do not make the headlines, to drop off the international agenda. The uneven distribution of resources among host countries has undermined the stability of the refugee regime. The inclusion of an academic network signals a positive move toward evidence-based responses to coincide with greater involvement of non-State actors in the implementation of the CRRF. However, some have raised concerns about the nature, scope and focus of the network, raising questions about how it would be managed and what value it would add.⁶⁶

While acknowledging the importance of non-State actors through its whole-of-society approach, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration frames the construction of cooperation on migration among States, but the roof and walls and floors will have to be added by States in the course of implementation. Since there has never been such a construct, it is difficult to foresee how heavily States will invest in bringing the Global Compact's objectives to life. With 23 objectives and 187 specific actions, implementing the Global Compact for Migration will not be easy. No country has the capacity to work on all the recommended actions, and almost all will find some actions they would prefer not to take. The strength of the Compact is that it has something for everyone; that inclusiveness is fundamental to the compromises the Compact struck in order to get near-universal agreement.

Institutional architecture

The global migration governance chapter of the *World Migration Report 2018* provides an overview of the international institutional arrangements, with particular reference to three agencies involved in migration – IOM, UNHCR and the International Labour Organization (ILO) – as well as the United Nations' Global Migration Group and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration.⁶⁷ The last two years have seen significant change in institutional settings within the United Nations system, most of which relates directly to supporting States' implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. The mandate of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration came to an end at the end of 2018 and has not been renewed; IOM has entered the United Nations system, and the Global Migration Group has been succeeded by the United Nations Network on Migration. The reformation of the institutional architecture was instigated by the Secretary-General following the consultation and stocktaking phases of the Global Compact for Migration, and highlighted specifically in his report *Making Migration Work for all*, in which he stated:

⁶⁶ Crisp, 2018; Chimni, 2018.

⁶⁷ Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017.

I will initiate internal consultations on how best to configure the United Nations system, including IOM, to coordinate the actions of the Organization on migration. I am determined to ensure that the system is fully positioned to respond promptly and effectively in supporting implementation of the global compact, once it is adopted. In conducting these consultations within the system, I will place a premium on drawing on existing expertise, ensuring operational deliverables in response to the needs of the Member States and ensuring efficiency.⁶⁸

One major outcome of the consultations within the United Nations system initiated by the Secretary-General was the recommendation to create a United Nations Network on Migration. It was accepted by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the United Nations Executive Committee in May 2018, and formally launched by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2018, the eve of the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.⁶⁹ It has been presented as part of broader United Nations reforms. The Network is a successor to the Global Migration Group, and has the following features:

- A clear focus on ensuring effective and coherent system-wide support to the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration;
- Direct reporting to the Secretary-General on its activities, who will, in turn, report to the Member States as required;
- Core membership and an extended membership, with the former comprising those United Nations entities with clear mandate-driven relevance and capacity, and now referred to as the Executive Committee;
- Working groups based on the Global Compact for Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and responsive to the needs of Member States;
- Periodic meetings of the Network's extended membership, together with other stakeholders, for information-sharing and agenda-setting;
- IOM as Network coordinator and Secretariat.⁷⁰

The Network's Executive Committee comprises IOM, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), ILO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with the Director General of IOM as the Network Coordinator. The extended Network membership includes the Executive Committee entities plus an additional 30 United Nations entities.⁷¹ The Network, therefore, is larger than its predecessor, the Global Migration Group, which grew over time to include 22 entities. However, the establishment of an Executive Committee of eight, together with a single Coordinator and reporting arrangements that involve the Secretary-General, indicate that the emphasis on deliverable achievements and United Nations coherence have featured heavily in the thinking underpinning the Network's construction.

⁶⁸ UNGA, 2017b: para. 74.

⁶⁹ UNGA, 2018a.

⁷⁰ United Nations, 2018.

⁷¹ United Nations Network on Migration, 2018.

At a time when nationalism is on the rise in key locations, and the support for multilateralism has been challenged, the pressure on the Network to succeed will be great. The focus on clearer management and coordination processes that underpin the Network is in contrast to those processes of the Global Migration Group, as articulated in their respective terms of reference.⁷² But coordination is not the main function of the Network; rather, it is to support Member States in implementing the Global Compact for Migration. On many of the issues for which that support will be needed, no single United Nations entity has the necessary expertise and capacity; these entities will need to join forces in implementing actions and projects, collaborating in Network working groups, to bring their combined capacities to bear. Some projects will be supported by the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, which was established on 8 May 2019 by the principals of the eight United Nations entities of the Network's Executive Committee and launched on 16 July 2019. The Fund is embedded in the United Nations Migration Network to support Member States' implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, primarily at the country level.⁷³ Notwithstanding these fundamental changes to how the United Nations responds to and coordinates on Global Compact for Migration implementation, the core principles guiding the operation of the Network remain as they were for the Global Migration Group – specifically, the focus on migrants' rights and well-being – but with the additional focus on implementation within communities of destination, origin and transit.⁷⁴

The current phase in the evolution of migration global governance: Implications for the future

The global compacts mark a new phase in international cooperation to manage and respond to the movement of people. Although they are not legally binding, they represent a near-universal consensus on the issues that require cooperation, and on actions to move toward achieving the objectives laid out in the compacts.

The Global Compact on Refugees, if implemented consistently, will reinforce the willingness of States to host refugees, by breaking their sense of abandonment when their burdens are not shared with others. If the commitment of other States and a wider group of stakeholders is consolidated through Comprehensive Refugee Response Frameworks for all host countries, the fundamental condition for protection – access to territorial asylum in another country – will be immeasurably reinforced.

United Nations Member States crafted the Global Compact for Migration with an eye to the long term, but it already has one accomplishment to its credit: it has brought one of the last outstanding global issues into the United Nations in a formal, negotiated manner. For decades, the international system has had standards and institutions to facilitate cooperation and the maintenance of order on issues of finance and trade, arms control and refugees, and many other issues. More recently, it has developed a framework for dealing with climate change. But international migration remained a patchwork of unilateral, bilateral and regional policies, long considered too divisive for general debate within the United Nations as a stand-alone issue beyond its interrelationship with development. With the Global Compact for Migration, a framework of common expectations and obligations has at long last emerged.

⁷² GMG, n.d.; United Nations Network on Migration, 2018.

⁷³ See the terms of references: UNDP, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, 2019.

⁷⁴ United Nations Network on Migration, 2018.

The very first draft of the Global Compact for Migration identified a “coherent UN system” as necessary for effective implementation. As mentioned, the Compact welcomed the Secretary-General’s decision to replace the Global Migration Group of United Nations agencies, with a United Nations Migration Network with clearer and consistent leadership from IOM and a small group of United Nations entities that have movement of people as an important part of their mandate or capacities. The agreement that brought IOM into the United Nations system as a related organization in 2016 gives the United Nations system unprecedented capacity to help its members address migration issues. The United Nations has also strengthened its capacity by establishing the Network on Migration. With this structure in place as of December 2018, the United Nations system should be positioned to offer coherent and comprehensive support to States as they set about implementing their commitments to safe, orderly and regular migration.

While the Global Compact for Migration may not be legally binding on States, it can be construed as a “political commitment” creating an expectation of implementation.⁷⁵ The Compact is the first agreement that has been negotiated intergovernmentally at the global level, and heralds a significant step forward in international cooperation. The negotiations followed a series of thematic consultations and a stocktaking exercise that in many ways were similar to previous international and regional dialogues, meetings and other events on international migration over recent years. The intergovernmental negotiations phase, however, represented the first time that States sat side-by-side to negotiate and agree upon a specific text on international migration. The significance of this cannot be overstated; it has taken place in an environment increasingly challenged by toxic political discourses that can at times result in misrepresentation of key facts on migration, confounding and confusing members of a public concerned about the impact of seemingly uncontrolled migration on their lives and the future of their communities.

One of the challenges will be how the United Nations and its Member States deal with the expected shifts in political support and changing commitments to implementation of the global compact. Unlike processes related to the adoption and implementation of treaties (as well as withdrawal), which are necessarily long and involved, support for the non-legally binding compacts is first and foremost political. It is likely that, as governments at the national level change over time, which they inevitably will do, there will be a “moving feast” of State support, particularly in relation to key destination countries. Implementing positive and constructive policies and practices on international migration as complexity increases and fragmentation becomes more deeply embedded will take leadership and unwavering commitment on the part of the vast majority of States, the United Nations system and the many other actors involved. The most likely forms of cooperation among States on the specific issues addressed in the two compacts were identified by the late Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration Peter Sutherland as being coalitions of States with strong, overlapping interests in a given issue.⁷⁶ It is possible to imagine States with different starting points converging on actions to tackle a problem such as lack of legal identity of migrants, or obstacles to return, and readmission in safety and dignity. Such “mini-multilateralism” may emerge as a preferred mode of collaboration on an issue that has eluded effective cooperation among States for too long. This type of approach produced the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Guidelines.⁷⁷ Commentators are urging all parties and onlookers to maintain reasonable expectations as Global Compact for Migration implementation will undoubtedly involve long-term, incremental advances.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, “even small

⁷⁵ Chetail, 2019.

⁷⁶ UNGA, 2017a.

⁷⁷ See the chapter in this report on migrants in countries in crises for more detail.

⁷⁸ Gallagher, 2018.

progress under the umbrella of this ‘new deal’ for migrants will help to move us forward – towards a world where the movement of people across international borders is safer, better regulated and widely embraced as mutually rewarding for everyone involved”.⁷⁹

79 Ibid.



Appendices

Chapter 3

Appendix A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Regions and Subregions

Please note that this table reflects the UN DESA geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Africa				
Eastern Africa ^a	Middle Africa ^b	Northern Africa ^c	Southern Africa ^d	Western Africa ^e
Burundi	Angola	Algeria	Botswana	Benin
Comoros	Cameroon	Egypt	Eswatini	Burkina Faso
Djibouti	Central African Republic	Libya	Lesotho	Cabo Verde
Eritrea	Chad	Morocco	Namibia	Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia	Congo (the)	Sudan	South Africa	Gambia (the)
Kenya	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Tunisia		Ghana
Madagascar	Equatorial Guinea			Guinea
Malawi	Gabon			Guinea-Bissau
Mauritius	São Tomé and Príncipe			Liberia
Mayotte				Mali
Mozambique				Mauritania
Réunion				Niger (the)
Rwanda				Nigeria
Seychelles				Saint Helena
Somalia				Senegal
South Sudan				Sierra Leone
Uganda				Togo
United Republic of Tanzania				
Zambia				
Zimbabwe				

a Eastern Africa has been combined with the Southern Africa subregion in the chapter, although the countries/territories/areas within remain the same.

b This subregion has been renamed "Central Africa" in the chapter and combined with Western Africa.

c This subregion renamed "North Africa".

d This subregion has been combined with Eastern Africa.

e This subregion has been renamed "West Africa" and combined with Central Africa (UN DESA Middle Africa) in the chapter.

Asia				
Central Asia	Eastern Asia	South-Eastern Asia ^f	Southern Asia	Western Asia ^g
Kazakhstan	China	Brunei Darussalam	Afghanistan	Armenia
Kyrgyzstan	China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	Cambodia	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan
Tajikistan	China, Macao Special Administrative Region	Indonesia	Bhutan	Bahrain
Turkmenistan	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Lao People's Democratic Republic	India	Cyprus
Uzbekistan	Japan	Malaysia	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Georgia
	Mongolia	Myanmar	Maldives	Iraq
	Republic of Korea	Philippines (the)	Nepal	Israel
		Singapore	Pakistan	Jordan
		Thailand	Sri Lanka	Kuwait
		Timor-Leste		Lebanon
		Viet Nam		Oman
				Qatar
				Saudi Arabia
				Syrian Arab Republic
				Turkey
				United Arab Emirates
				Yemen

f This subregion renamed "South-East Asia".

g This subregion renamed "Middle East".

Europe ^h			
Eastern Europe ⁱ	Northern Europe	Southern Europe	Western Europe
Belarus	Channel Islands	Albania	Austria
Bulgaria	Denmark	Andorra	Belgium
Czechia	Estonia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	France
Hungary	Faroe Islands	Croatia	Germany
Poland	Finland	Gibraltar	Liechtenstein
Republic of Moldova	Iceland	Greece	Luxembourg
Romania	Ireland	Holy See	Monaco
Russian Federation	Isle of Man	Italy	Netherlands (the)
Slovakia	Latvia	Malta	Switzerland
Ukraine	Lithuania	Montenegro	
	Norway	North Macedonia	
	Sweden	Portugal	
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	San Marino	
		Serbia	
		Slovenia	
		Spain	

^h Some countries in this subregion, particularly members of the European Union, may have been included both in the discussion of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, as well as the subregional discussion on Northern, Western, and Southern Europe within the chapter.

ⁱ Northern, Western and Southern Europe are combined in the chapter, excluding the following countries in Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia, which have been included in South-East Europe in the chapter, under the subregion South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

Latin America and the Caribbean		
Caribbean	Central America^j	South America
Anguilla	Belize	Argentina
Antigua and Barbuda	Costa Rica	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Aruba	El Salvador	Brazil
Bahamas	Guatemala	Chile
Barbados	Honduras	Colombia
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba	Mexico	Ecuador
British Virgin Islands	Nicaragua	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Cayman Islands	Panama	French Guiana
Cuba		Guyana
Curaçao		Paraguay
Dominica		Peru
Dominican Republic		Suriname
Grenada		Uruguay
Guadeloupe		Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Martinique		
Montserrat		
Puerto Rico		
Saint Kitts and Nevis		
Saint Lucia		
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Turks and Caicos Islands		
United States Virgin Islands		

^j The subregion “Central America” has been combined with Mexico and the Caribbean in this chapter.

Northern America	
Bermuda	
Canada	
Greenland	
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	
United States of America	

Oceania			
Australia and New Zealand	Melanesia	Micronesia	Polynesia
Australia	Fiji	Guam	American Samoa
New Zealand	New Caledonia	Kiribati	Cook Islands
	Papua New Guinea	Marshall Islands	French Polynesia
	Solomon Islands	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Niue
	Vanuatu	Nauru	Samoa
		Northern Mariana Islands	Tokelau
		Palau	Tonga
			Tuvalu
			Wallis and Futuna Islands

Legend:

Region
Subregionⁱ
Country/territory/area ^{ii,iii}

Note: For methodology as well as explanatory notes, see International Migrant Stock 2019: Documentation, available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/MigrationStockDocumentation_2019.pdf.

- i Subregions utilized within the chapter may differ from those utilized by UN DESA's Statistical Division either by name, or by countries/territories/areas included within.
- ii "The names of countries or areas refer to their short form used in day-to-day operations of the United Nations and not necessarily to their official name as used in formal documents. These names are based on the United Nations Terminology Database (UNTERM), which can be found at: <https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome> The designations employed and the presentation of material at this site do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations [or the International Organization for Migration (IOM)] concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries." For further information, see <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>.
- iii The entities included in this table, from which the previous chapter draws upon, include countries, as well as territories, areas and special administrative regions. Please note that this table is not intended to be fully comprehensive.

Chapter 4

Appendix A. A brief overview of academic publishing

The scholarly dissemination system rotates around a well-established gravitational centre: publication, with some forms of publication (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others (and within that, individual academic publishers have different standings). Publishing the results of research in academic journals is without any doubt the paramount objective of today's scholars.¹ Journals alone constitute about 40 per cent (books 16%) of the revenues of the broader scientific, technical and medical publisher's market, the size of which has been estimated at USD 25.2 billion in 2013.² Through academic publishing, scholars formally share their findings within the scientific community. This exchange enables other researchers to learn about the latest advancements, to design new studies for filling current knowledge gaps, to compare their findings with the ones of their peers and perhaps to avoid reinventing the wheel. Moreover, publication constitutes "...a permanent record of what has been discovered, when and by whom - like a court register for science".³ The world's first academic journal – *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* – appeared as early as of 1665, as an expression of the Royal Society's policy of promoting the progress of science through open sharing of results and ideas supported by empirical evidence. Since then, the number of active scholarly peer-reviewed English language journals had reached 28,100 in 2014,⁴ and it has been calculated that the global scientific output doubles every nine years.⁵ Many scholars today are overwhelmed by the mass of academic literature, and it is becoming impossible to find the time to read every piece of literature, even on the narrowest topic.

Publications are the core of career advancement for academics, whereas researchers working in applied research settings are not necessarily working under the same degree of pressure to publish. Overall, the academic reward system is responsible for the very significant increase in the number of publications but, arguably, a quantitative increase does not automatically lead to an increase in the average "quality" of published academic research.

Measuring quality is a complex and debated issue. In terms of the major form of output (journal articles), we can say that an article's quality is evaluated mainly *qualitatively before* publication, and mainly *quantitatively after* publication. The type of qualitative evaluation that occurs before publication in academic journals is called "peer-review". The term "peer" refers to the fact that the people performing reviews of the submitted article are meant to be of equal (or greater) expertise on a topic. Peer review in academia is almost always unpaid. Peer review of journal articles "...has traditionally been seen as part of the professional obligations of the researcher",⁶ and a large scale-survey amongst 40,000 research papers authors found that most of them considered peer review as "...essential to the communication of scholarly research". Ninety-one per cent of the respondents stated that "...the review process improved the quality of the last paper they published", and 86 per cent declared that "...they enjoy reviewing and will continue to review".⁷ The most tangible incentive for

1 Other means of scholarly communication include books, conference presentations, seminars, email lists and so forth.

2 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

3 Sense About Science, 2005.

4 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

5 Van Noorden, 2014.

6 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

7 Mulligan, Hall and Raphael, 2013.

reviewing is perhaps earning recognition: journals usually publish a yearly “reviewers thanksgiving” document in which they list the names of people who served as reviewers.⁸ Being on those lists can improve a researcher’s CV, especially if s/he plans to seek funding/job in that specific field. Reviewers thoroughly examine the methods, results and conclusions before submitting their recommendation (accept/review/reject) to the journal’s editor. The review process iterates until the editor is satisfied with the manuscript, which can finally enter the production pipeline (copy-editing, typesetting, online publication and possibly printing). Overall, the peer-review process lasts from a few weeks to several months, with considerable variance among disciplines and journals. After publication, abstracts are free of charge, while access to the full text may require access through academic libraries (that typically pay subscriptions to the publishers), or require pay-per-view fees. The “open access” publishing model grants free full-text access to anyone, courtesy of the author’s institution having paid publication fees to the publisher.

The peer-review process examines a piece of writing before publication using mainly a *qualitative* approach, while a *quantitative* approach dominates the assessment of material after publication. Citation – the act of quoting – is the single unit at the base of bibliometrics (the statistical analysis of written publications). Crudely put, the more the citations, the higher the impact, the better the supposed quality of a paper/article/book. Basic citation metrics for any publication can be obtained using Google Scholar, the most used search engine by academics worldwide. For instance, a search for “migration” in Google Scholar returned 3.8 million results and the following first page:⁹

Figure 1. Example of Google Scholar search results

Web Images More...
Google migration
About 3,800,000 results (0.03 sec)

Scholar

Articles *[highlighted]* The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces
Case law
My library

Any time
Since 2017
Since 2016
Since 2013
Custom range...

Sort by relevance
Sort by date
 include patents
 include citations
 Create alert

[highlighted] The migration of labor
O Stark - 1991 - JSTOR
"The economic theory of migration was recently enriched by placing the family, rather than the individual, at the center of the migration decision. In Oded Stark's work the new approach receives imaginative elaboration and fruitful applications to analyses of migration in LDCs.
Cited by 2110 Related articles All 6 versions Cite Save More

[highlighted] Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis
JR Iaria, MP Todaro - The American economic review, 1970 - JSTOR
Throughout many less developed economies of the world, especially those of tropical Africa, a curious economic phenomenon is presently taking place. Despite the existence of positive marginal products in agriculture and significant levels of urban unemployment, rural...

[highlighted] The perfect storm: The realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa
Southern African Migration Project... - 2009 - Inst for Democracy in South Africa
Cited by 168 Related articles All 8 versions Cite Save More

[highlighted] The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world
S. Castles, H. De Haas, M.J. Miller - 2013 - books.google.com
This leading text in the field provides a comprehensive assessment of the nature, extent and dimensions of international population movements and of their consequences. Thoroughly revised and updated, the 5th edition assesses the impact of the global economic crisis for...

8 See for instance <http://iovs.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2277067>.

9 Search results may vary depending on user settings (e.g. whether logged in to Google or not) and geographic ISP location.

You can see at a glance (figure 1, bottom-left) that the book “The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world” has been cited by more than 8,000 other publications. By clicking on “Cited by 8219” you can see all the citing publications since the first edition (1993). If you click on the author’s name (S. Castles) you will see the author’s citation indices.

Building on raw citation counts, various so-called “impact metrics” can be calculated at the publication level, author level, journal level and so forth. For instance, a journal’s Impact Factor (the *citations/publications* ratio) is widely used as a proxy for the relative importance of a journal, while the h-index¹⁰ provides a measure of a single author’s impact (though it can be also calculated for a department, institution or country). The citations/publications ratio most commonly involves examination of a two-year publishing cycle over three years. For example, for Journal X’s 2015 impact factor, 122 citations of articles published in 2013 and 2014 are divided by the total number of articles published in 2013 and 2014 (166), so that the 2015 impact factor for Journal X is 0.735 (or 122 citations divided by 166 articles).

The debate on the usefulness of impact metrics is still open, the aim being finding the right balance between research funders’ needs of measuring the impact of their spending, and academics’ desires for fair evaluation systems of their work (and consequent funding). Recently, alternative impact metrics (altmetrics) have been developed, taking into account, for instance, number of mentions in news articles and blogs, Twitter, Facebook and so forth.

The pressure to achieve within an academic reward system that values publication in peer-reviewed journals is acknowledged as having some serious downsides,¹¹ including in relation to quality. The “publish or perish” culture has been found to stifle research innovation,¹² lower research publication standards,¹³ encourage peer-review fraud¹⁴ and negatively affect the ability of researchers to work on applied research tailored to policymakers.¹⁵ At the same time, academics are under pressure to undertake innovative research, publish in the top journals and present evidence to policy audiences and ultimately influence policy.¹⁶

¹⁰ The h-index is the number of publications that have at least h citations. For instance, Author X has written 4 publications: A (cited by 27 others), B (cited by 14 others), C (cited by 2 others), and D (not yet cited). Author X’s h-index is 2 at present. In the future, the h-index may be 3, if publication C will be cited at least 1 more time.

¹¹ Smith, 2006.

¹² Foster, Rzhetsky and Evans, 2015.

¹³ Colquhoun, 2011.

¹⁴ Prosser Scully, 2015

¹⁵ Cherney et al., 2012.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Appendix B. Contributions from academic journals¹⁷

*International Migration*¹⁸

Chief Editor: Howard Duncan

2017 and 2018 were years during which the international community, with a degree of co-operation rarely seen in the field of migration, agreed to two sets of guiding policy principles, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. Never before have we witnessed such a testament to the global importance of migration nor such a widespread ambition to better management of international migration of all kinds and its effects on the migrants, their societies of destination, and their homelands. These agreements were borne out of a sense of crisis with a particular focus on the Mediterranean region; we now wait to see if the hope they inspire will bear tangible fruit. The owner of *International Migration*, the International Organization for Migration, was heavily involved in the effort to achieve these agreements, especially the Global Compact for Migration. Since the previous World Migration Report, the IOM has become a member of the United Nations family of organizations and, with a membership now of more than 170 states it is a truly global institution. This journal, appropriately, can also claim a global status in that its authors are from around the world and with authors from no single country dominating its contents. *International Migration* is pleased by its global reach which has been achieved despite the challenges associated with publishing double-blind peer-reviewed material from less developed countries.

The journal continues to regard its audience as both the global academic and policy communities, and it will retain its requirement of policy-related content in the articles it publishes. In 2017, *International Migration* took a further step in this direction by introducing a series of occasional interviews with senior policy officials, notably national Ministers responsible for managing migration. Three such interviews have appeared over the course of 2017-2018 with contributions from migration Ministers from Canada, Germany, and Australia. In keeping with our global aspirations, Ministers responded not only to questions about their country's domestic migration policies but about their approach to the discussions at the United Nations on the Global Compacts. Migration policy, like migration scholarship, can be fraught with controversy; these interviews did not shy away from contentious issues.

The previous two years have seen numerous special issues and special sections of regular issues, most of them proposed to us from members of the academic community. Topics and geographical coverage were widespread and included:

- Interculturalism in Times of Crisis (Bello and Bloom)
- Cultivating the Migration-Food Security Nexus (Crush and Caesar, eds.)
- Peace Processes and Durable Returns (Stefanovic and Loizides, eds.)
- Blessed Be the Ties: Health and Healthcare for Migrants and Migrant Families in the United States (Ervin, Hamilton and Lopez-Carr, eds.)
- Labour Migration in Europe: Changing Policies – Changing Organizations – Changing People (Laubenthal, ed.)
- Subjective Perceptions Related to Migration (Amit and Blum, eds.)

17 The contributions in this appendix have been submitted by each journal's respective chief editor(s), and have not been edited.

18 Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14682435>.

- Migration and Social Class (Bonjour and Chauvin, eds.)
- Precarity, Illegality, and Temporariness: Implications and Consequences of Canadian Migration Management (Hari and Liew, eds.)

Some selected thematic trends

The academic literature on migration responds in part to trends in migration phenomena and policy as well as to shifts in migration-related theory and previously published literature. Normally, there is a discernible time lag between the onset of a phenomenon and the appearance of scientific literature, this owing to the time required for research and then for publishing. The literature on the Syrian refugee crisis is now beginning to appear in significant amounts, and we can expect that the literature on the United Nations' Global Compacts will start appearing in 2019. But looking back only slightly, to 2017 – 2018, we see discussions of earlier trends and phenomena, some of which we have selected here.

Migrant vulnerability

To a large degree, the UN Global Compacts illustrate the current global concern over protecting the human rights of migrants. Although there is clear recognition of the benefits that migrants bring to both their destination and home societies, states are now being asked to foreground migrants' needs and to provide supports, especially as they relate to human rights. In tandem with this, many scholars looked at the vulnerabilities of migrants over the past two years, whether the vulnerabilities concern human trafficking (Rocha-Jiminez et al.), earnings gaps as compared to nationals (Wu et al.), discrimination in other forms (Gong), slave-like working conditions (Palmer), disparities in health care provision (Geeraert), the special vulnerabilities of refugees and women and children (Pavez-Soto and Chan), and even the vulnerabilities of migrant entrepreneurs who find themselves in competition with locals (Pineteh).

Families and migration

When Oded Stark and David Bloom published their now iconic article, "The New Economics of Labour Migration", in 1985, they not only created a new way of looking at migration economics but they launched continuing investigations into the relationship between migration and development, the role of remittances in migration, how people make decisions to migrate, and the role of their families in these decisions. The emphasis on families in the migration literature continues to grow, and *International Migration* has been among those journals to feel this emphasis. A major interest is with those family members who are left behind, the emotional difficulties they may face, as described by Fuller, despite modern ICTs; the effects on schooling as described by Yabiku and Agadjanian and, separately, by Kuépié; and the effects on marriages themselves which, as shown by Davis and Jennings and separately by Silver, et al., can be deeply troubling. But migration can itself be for marriage, and this phenomenon has received a great deal of attention, especially in Asia and especially in South Korea where marriage migration represents a high proportion of all migration to that country. The multicultural families that result are the object of Kim and Kilkey's study on integration outcomes for foreign brides to South Korea; Kim and Kilkey looked at the country's policy on multicultural families, regarding it as designed with the country's future population size in mind; and Cho considers cultural aspects of marriage migration to that country. The population prospects might not be as rosy as some hope, however, if what Mora, Fernandez, and Torre found regarding fertility rates of migrants to Spain and the US.

Migration and development

One of the more enduring areas of recent scholarship has been on the relationship between migration and development, a field that has been greatly stimulated by the discussion within the international community. The core feature of these studies remains remittances, both their effects and the propensity of migrants to send them. Diaspora philanthropy was the emphasis of Koff's study, while Petreski, Petreski, and Tumanoska considered the effects of remittances on household vulnerability. Urama et al. looked at the effects of remittances on the homeland labour supply; Akcay and Karasoy linked remittances to calorie consumption; Arouri and Nguyen found a strong connection to poverty reduction; Kumar et al. saw a strong correlation with long-term economic growth; Valatheeswaran and Khan noted the positive effects on the education of children left behind; and Agwu, Yuni, and Anochiwa found that remittances help close the gap between the lower and middle income segments of society.

Emerging areas of study: immigrant entrepreneurship; climate migration, cities

As we signal the economic benefits of migration to destination societies, most thought has been given to migrants as employees. Less attention has been given to migrant entrepreneurs, but it appears that it is a growing area of interest to scholars. Chavan and Taksa looked at Indian entrepreneurs with high human capital levels in Australia and suggested how policy could enhance even more their benefits to the Australian economy. ICT entrepreneurs in Italy are the subject of Brzozwski, Cuccelelli, and Surdej's exploration of transnational entrepreneurship. Less happily are the fortunes of Somali entrepreneurs in South Africa whose presence is seen as a threat, this forcing them to adopt specially-tailored defensive mechanisms.

It is no surprise that more scholars are writing of climate migration, some with an emphasis on atoll island states whose very existence could be threatened by climate change. Yamamoto and Esteban look at migration policy as an adaptive response to the effects of rising sea levels on these states. In a ground-breaking study, Rahaman et al. looked at the health effects on climate migrants living in slums which may become even more densely populated in areas near to where climate change will bring about more urbanization.

Cities are overwhelmingly the destination of most migrants and a great many articles refer to cities as a matter of course. One article from the last two years that received a great deal of attention was that by Bauder on Sanctuary Cities in which he compared self-described sanctuary cities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada and how they accommodate their undocumented populations. The concept of the sanctuary city he found to be highly ambiguous, and he parses the concept in its different locations in the search for commonalities and found that the ideas in one locale are often transferred to others whether by modern telecommunications or by travelling activists.

This brief survey does not claim to offer a comprehensive account of the issues covered by *International Migration's* authors. Although there are evident common themes, our authors also presented innovations and covered less often seen themes including migrants in private militaries, brain drain from developed economies, the relationship between natural disasters and human trafficking, slave like conditions faced by migrants in the fishing industry, and the relationship between attitudes towards migrants and the willingness to accept risks in life. We appreciate the work that our authors have done to stimulate our collective thinking about international migration, a subject of endless possibilities.

*International Migration Review*¹⁹

Chief Editors: Jamie Winders, Pieter Bevelander, Cynthia Feliciano, Filiz Garip and Matthew Hall

International Migration Review (IMR) focuses on the interdisciplinary study of international migration. It publishes 30 to 40 articles a year, along with shorter research notes and book reviews. Led by an interdisciplinary editorial team from economics, sociology, and geography and guided by an international and interdisciplinary editorial board, *IMR* seeks to publish articles that both are grounded in rich empirics and push the boundaries of how, where, and from what perspective we examine the complexities of international migration. The interplay between the two 'I' words associated with *IMR* – interdisciplinary and international – guides what we, as editors, seek in publications. Among the manuscripts submitted to *IMR*, we prioritize those that have reach beyond specific disciplines, perspectives, or methodological approaches and that situate their findings vis-à-vis wider international trends.

A close examination of *IMR* publications since 2016 (about 100 articles) identifies a number of trends.²⁰ First, in terms of geography, around 80% of articles focus on North America or Western Europe, with a significantly smaller percentage focused on Asia (just over 10%) and an even smaller number on Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa. This uneven geographic coverage reflects one of the main shortcomings of migration studies – limited attention to migration dynamics beyond North America and Western Europe. It also highlights the challenges that scholars writing about the wider geography of international migration face in attempts to situate their work in relation to hegemonic perspectives about two global regions.

Second, if we look at the populations studied in *IMR*, beyond a general focus on international migrants, we find equal attention to native-born and second-generation groups, a critical mass of articles focused on immigrant youth, but far less work on refugees. Thus, the issue of generation is central to *IMR* articles, but the distinctions *and overlaps* between different kinds of migrants (i.e., skilled migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) receive less analysis. Not surprisingly, much of the research on North America examines some aspect of Mexican migration, while much of the work on Western Europe analyzes the experiences of or attitudes toward Muslim migrants, making these two groups – Mexican and Muslim migrants – the lens through which much recent scholarship has examined the complexities of international migration.

Third, methodologically, *IMR* articles draw primarily on survey data, especially longitudinal administrative data and repeated survey data, approached in a range of ways. *IMR* also publishes rich ethnographic studies, if in smaller number, as well as work based on interviews and focus groups. Although not common, studies drawing on big data, satellite imagery, and field experiments round out a robust collection of methodologies represented in the journal. Finally, *IMR* publications address a diverse set of topics, from migrant welfare to immigrant health and stereotypes, but broadly speaking, pay particular attention to immigration policy, public attitudes, education, family and household activities, wages and employment trends, legal status, and gendered dynamics and ideologies.

Beyond this overall picture, what have been *IMR*'s key contributions since 2016? Here, we highlight a few such contributions that, in our view, epitomize *IMR*'s goal of pushing existing knowledge about international migration in a new or different direction. Some of that 'pushing' carries both a political and a policy component. Jean Beaman's 2016 article on the second generation in France, for example, showed that the adult children of

19 Articles cited in the journal editors' contribution can be found at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/home/mrx>.

20 This discussion is based on articles officially published in an *IMR* volume. It does not consider articles published 'early view' online but not yet assigned to a journal volume.

migrants from North Africa did not understand religious identity, especially Muslim identity, as incompatible with a French identity. Instead, these young adults saw themselves ‘as French as anyone else,’ thus challenging public and academic arguments about the mutually exclusive nature of religious and secular-national identity in Europe.

In a related policy vein, Marie-Laurence Flahaux (2017) looked at Senegalese return migration, finding that migrants were less likely to return to Senegal when the possibility of re-entering the host country was slim. As Flahaux’s work suggests and as was corroborated in a study by Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas (2017) of global migration and visa data, migration restrictions tend to decrease circular migration and to make migrants more likely to settle permanently in the host country, giving the *political* decision to tighten borders the unintended policy outcome of transforming circular migration into permanent settlement.

Other *IMR* articles jump into the interdisciplinary debate about assimilation, examining standard measures like marriage and language patterns, as well as less common measures, such as norms about body size (Altman, Van Hook and Gonzalez, 2017). Mieke Maliepaard and Richard Alba’s 2016 article on cultural integration among children born to Muslim parents in the Netherlands examined this group’s gender norms, concluding that an explanation of either assimilation toward a Dutch norm or maintenance of ‘traditional’ gender views was too simplistic to understand this group’s complex, sometimes-contradictory gender ideologies and highlighting the need to disaggregate internal dynamics within ethnic communities. Ayumi Takenaka and her co-authors (2016) took these ideas a step further in their examination of immigrant economic mobility in Japan. As they note, standard explanations of assimilation do not fully explain immigrant economic success or failure in Japan, demonstrating the need for a more diverse geographic base for migration theories.

Another key theme in *IMR* publications is interpersonal contact. Benjamin Schulz and Lars Leszczensky’s 2016 article on friendship dynamics between native-born and immigrant youth in Germany found that among the immigrant backgrounds studied (Yugoslavian, Southern European, Turkish, and Polish), different relationships between national identification with Germany and share of native friends emerged, driving home the need to critically interrogate group differences among immigrants. Judith Koops and her co-authors (2017) tweaked this model to study contact not only between ethnic minorities and the majority population but also *among* different immigrant groups, finding different patterns between these two sets of dynamics and arguing for attention to interactions among minority ethnic groups in the study of international migration.

Although many *IMR* articles focus on the national scale, others make strong arguments for attention to local dynamics. Andrew Felenor’s article (2017) analyzes health outcomes among Mexican immigrants in the United States, documenting a survival advantage among Mexican immigrants in new destinations and challenging universal claims about immigrant enclaves’ protective health effects. Amrita Pande (2018) takes an even finer-scaled approach in her study of domestic migrant workers in Lebanon, which argues for attention to the ‘intimate’ spaces of daily life which these migrant workers use to resist and complicate dominant images of domestic workers and their lived realities.

A number of *IMR* articles tackle foundational concepts like citizenship, examining how residential concentration and naturalization rates are linked (Abascal 2017) or offering synthetic overviews of citizenship scholarship in migration studies (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017). Others grapple with popular concepts like “crisis” in public discourse around international migration, highlighting the political work such terms do while also showing how a ‘crisis’ might feel quite ordinary to migrants already experiencing chronic and slowly unfolding ‘crises’ of their own (Bylander 2018).

Moving forward, we hope that *IMR* will continue to seek rigorous, innovative, and interdisciplinary research. Expanding the geographic coverage of *IMR* publications is a clear goal, as is attention to newer themes like forced and climate-related migrations, the impact of new media in migrant experiences, and the incorporation of data science into migration studies. As much as the detailed and thorough empirical research that sits at *IMR*'s heart remains a high priority, we also hope to see more agenda-setting pieces like Tomas Jimenez and his co-authors' recent discussion (2018) of the "next chapter" in the study of assimilation. The interplay between empirical investigation and theoretical engagement, between testing theories and proposing them, forms the core of interdisciplinary engagement and, we hope, will shape *IMR*'s trajectory until our next report.

*Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*²¹

Chief Editor: Anna Triandafyllidou

The JIRS is one of the few academic journals that has a double focus on both labour migrants and asylum seekers/refugees, and a truly interdisciplinary focus that spans from social work and social policy, to migration and ethnic studies, media and public discourses, to asylum policy and practice. The focus of the journal, originally North American, has now shifted to pay more attention to Europe but also Asia Pacific and to some extent South and East Asia. There has been also a clear increase in recent years of articles focusing on the Middle East and particularly on Turkey, and the Syrian conflict.

The contributions published in the journal can be organized along two main thematic axes.

The first thematic axis brings together a variety of quantitative and qualitative approaches for studying migrant/asylum seeker arrival, settlement, and integration processes. These include articles looking at resettlement policy and practice, and analyzing the work of non-governmental and governmental organisations and local authorities in providing arrival support and integration. Interestingly we have published articles that look at the challenges that social workers and civil society organisations face in their work but also papers that look at the integration barriers that migrants and settled refugees face once at the destination country. There is clearly a focus on the gender dimension and particularly on the challenges faced by women, but also on issues of parenting and on the special integration and belonging challenges faced by youth.

These research topics are valid across world regions and probably this is an important finding in meta-analysing immigration related research. Thus for instance in 2018, we published papers on refugee resettlement in North America and Australia ("My world is upside down" Transnational Iraqi Youth and Parent Perspectives on Resettlement in the United States; Integration or Building Resilience: what should the goal be in refugee resettlement?;) but also on how migrants activate their networks to find their place in their new home countries (A grounded theory of Korean Immigrants' experiences of re-establishing everyday activities in New Zealand; A Study on Transnational Communication among Iranian Migrant Women in Australia; Negotiating Refugee Empowerment in Resettlement Organizations (in the USA); or "Asking Around": Immigrants' Counterstrategies to renew their residence permit in times of economic crisis in Italy).

The JIRS offers a unique virtual transnational space where different systems of reception and integration and different populations coming into the host countries under a variety of regimes (labour or family migrants, asylum seekers or resettled refugees) may face similar challenges (including that of mental and physical

²¹ Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wimm20>.

health), learning the ropes in their new environment, activating their social capital resources, and eventually carving a place for themselves in their destination country, are discussed. The double background of the JIRS from social work/community studies, and from sociology/ethnic studies pays well in bringing these different topics together.

The second major topic that has occupied a salient position in our published research in both 2017 and 2018 is the governance of irregular migration and asylum seeking. During this period we published three special issues that actually develop different aspects of this theme.

Our second issue for 2017 was a Special Issue (guest editors, Alexandra Ricard-Guay, European University Institute, and Thanos Maroukis, University of Bath) focused on human trafficking in domestic work looking at severely exploited migrant women domestic workers in different European countries. Contributions to this special issue highlighted the gaps in human trafficking research that has focused typically on sex work overlooking 'shadow' areas such as live-in domestic work, au-pairs turned into slaves, and pointed to the gaps in national and European anti-trafficking legislation. Papers in this special issue showed how migrant domestic and care work is part and parcel of welfare systems in the ageing European societies and analysed both sociologically and legally the case of trafficking in domestic work. The findings highlighted how loose conditions surrounding domestic and care work in private homes can lead to vulnerability and severe exploitation. Indeed we could speak of a 'slippery slope' where migrant live-in workers are not aware of their rights and families who employ them are not aware of their obligations while the state fails both to monitor and control this sizeable labour market sector. Thus extra working hours and low payment, may slowly become no payment at all, restriction of one's privacy and liberty, severe physical and emotional abuse, thus raising a case of trafficking rather than simple exploitation.

During the same year we ran another special issue (guest editor Marie McAuliffe IOM research) focusing on irregularity and protection in southeast Asia. Building on the crisis in the Andaman sea in May 2015, contributions to this Special Issue pointed to the special features of irregular migration in southeast Asia and most notably the reluctance or inability of several host and origin countries to register their minorities and migrants and to provide them with a secure residence status. Indeed in southeast Asia the challenge of irregular labour migration or asylum seeking is particularly complex as several minority groups and most notably the Rohingya face problems of statelessness. This Special Issue sadly coincided with the new Rohingya crisis in summer and fall 2017 when Myanmar engaged into an ethnic cleansing strategy in the Rakhine state leading nearly 700,000 Rohingya to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh.

Third but no less important, we ran in early 2018 a double special issue (guest editors Michal Krzyzanowski, Orebro University, Anna Triandafyllidou, EUI, Ruth Wodak, University of Lancaster) analyzing the media coverage and political discourses on the Mediterranean 'refugee emergency' of 2014-2016. This special issue followed an imaginary path of discourses from Greece west and north along the Balkan route, to Central, Nordic, Western and Eastern Europe. It looked at how the whole issue was presented in the media and particularly how it was debate in Parliaments, by party leaders or in official Twitter accounts. Interestingly comparing the results of our country cases we found significant convergence among a solidarity/humanitarian and control/security frame which were at odds with one another. This tension was however solved with a discursive framing that privileged viable and sustainable responses to the refugee flows. Thus humanitarianism was brought together with realism, with 'rationality' being emphasized as the key quality of specific policy responses that aimed at reducing the flows. The notion of crisis was present in all the different country discourses examined and was used also among European countries to designate the 'bad' and 'good' Europeans.

Indeed these three special issues reflect the salience of the governance of irregular migration and asylum seeking issues not only among citizens and politicians but also within the academic community. The main difference of course between the two discourses (the public and the academic) being that the latter seeks to privilege in depth analysis that help us understand the causes, effects, dynamics of different phenomena, their legal and policy framework and of course the ways they can be portrayed as existential threats to the non-migrants or indeed as ethical and political obligations in building a fairer world.

Interestingly and perhaps reflecting the zeitgeist and the rise of both migrant/refugee flows and of related xenophobia and racisms, during these two years there has been in our journal a lesser attention to issues of employment or labour market integration or for instance on highly skilled migration or brain drain/brain circulation. Another thematic area that could attract more attention is intra-regional labour and asylum related migration flows and what is termed (perhaps erroneously) South-South migration.

Journal on Migration and Human Security²²

Chief Editor: Donald Kerwin

In 2013, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) established the *Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS)*, an online, peer-reviewed, public policy publication. *JMHS* draws on the knowledge, expertise and perspectives of scholars, researchers, public officials, faith communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business leaders and others. Its theme of human security is meant to evoke the widely shared goals of creating secure, sustaining conditions in migrant source communities; promoting safe, legal migration options; and, allowing immigrants to lead productive, secure lives and to participate fully in their new communities.

Without sacrificing academic and analytical rigor, *JMHS* papers take a human-centered approach to migration scholarship, focusing on (typically) at risk, vulnerable, and marginalized persons who are misunderstood and often scapegoated in migration policy debates. *JMHS* requires that each published paper begin with an executive summary and end with a series of policy recommendations. This increases the accessibility of *JMHS* papers to policymakers, policy influencers, and the general public. *JMHS* promises potential authors that their work will be rigorously reviewed, published in a timely fashion (if accepted), and distributed through research and university library databases, to *JMHS's* extensive dissemination list, and to tailored lists of policymakers, the press and others with a special interest in the topic. *JMHS* also publicizes its papers via social media, both upon their release and subsequently in response to news hooks and relevant policy discussions.

Many *JMHS* papers receive extensive media coverage and attention by policymakers. This has included a set of papers – authored by Robert Warren and occasionally co-authored by Donald Kerwin – based on CMS estimates of the US undocumented and other populations, derived from the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey. This series has documented the falling US undocumented population, their characteristics, and the fact that most newly undocumented residents enter the United States legally and overstay their visas, rather than illegally cross a border. The latter point – elaborated in several *JMHS* papers – has been referenced in more than a hundred discrete media outlets since 2017 and has become a staple of the public debate on the Trump administration's proposed US-Mexico border wall.

22 Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/home/mhs>.

JMHS has also published exhaustive profiles on other populations targeted by the Trump administration, including potential DREAM Act beneficiaries (undocumented persons brought to the United States as children), refugees, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients, persons with a close family relationship to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) that would potentially qualify them for a visa, and long-term residents who may be eligible to naturalize. These papers – which illustrate the deep and longstanding ties of these groups to the United States – have garnered substantial attention from national and local government officials, policymakers, academics, researchers, the business community, NGOs, and the press. Although extremist groups and politicians occasionally dispute (without evidence) CMS's estimates, the *JMHS* papers in this series offer a factual basis and rare common ground in the US immigration debate.

In its short existence, *JMHS* has proven to be an invaluable tool in addressing – whether through special collections or multiple papers on the same theme – public policy issues that raise human security themes. In 2016, for example, CMS hosted a three-day conference in anticipation of the UN Summit to Address Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. The Summit culminated in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which led to the adoption in 2018 of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The special collection of *JMHS* resulting from its conference – entitled *Strengthening the Global Refugee Protection System* – informed these processes. In particular, policymakers, academics and other leading authors contributed papers on:

- New frameworks for displaced persons not traditionally seen as meeting the international refugee definition (Susan Martin);
- Ethical perspectives on refugee protection (David Hollenbach, SJ);
- The challenge of inclusive communities (George Rupp);
- State responses to refugee influxes, with a focus on Lebanon (Ninette Kelley);
- Refugee responsibility sharing (Volker Türk);
- Matching systems for refugees (Will Jones and Alex Teytelboym);
- Safe and voluntary repatriation (Jeff Crisp and Katy Long);
- The right to remain in one's home community (Daniel Kanstroom);
- The externalization of migration controls (Bill Frelick, Ian Kysel and Jennifer Podkul); and deterrence strategies (Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas F. Tan) as barriers to refugee protection;
- Migrant smuggling research (Gabriella Sanchez);
- Detention by non-state actors (Michael Flynn);
- The perspectives of Central American child migrants (Susan Schmidt);
- Lessons from the large-scale migration of Central American women and children (Karen Musalo and Eunice Lee);
- US refugee protection legislation (Tara Magner);
- National security and refugee protection as complementary imperatives (Donald Kerwin);
- Public opinion data (Brad K. Blitz);
- Variations in refugee economic outcomes (Alexander Betts, Naohiko Omata, and Louise Bloom);
- The need for egalitarian, redistributive, long-term development for refugees and their host communities (Leah Zamore); and,
- Recommendations for the Global Compact on Refugees (Kevin Appleby).

This special collection followed an earlier *JMHS* collection consisting of 11 papers on reform of the US refugee protection system (*writ large*) which commemorated the Refugee Act of 1980 on its 35th anniversary. More

recently, in 2018, *JMHS* published a study on how 1.1 million refugees who resettled in the United States between 1987 and 2016 integrated and fared over time, compared to non-refugees, the foreign-born, and the overall US population.

Since January 2017, *JMHS* has extensively documented and critiqued the Trump administration's immigration policies. In January 2018, *JMHS* released a special collection of papers titled *The US Immigration System: Principles, Interests, and Policy Proposals to Guide Long-Term Reform*, which covered:

- The national interests and values that should guide long-term reform of the US immigration system (Donald Kerwin);
- Nativism and US immigration policies (Julia G. Young);
- The future of citizenship (Peter J. Spiro);
- Immigration federalism (Cristina Rodriguez);
- The effectiveness of border enforcement (Edward Alden);
- Restoring the rule of law to the removal adjudication system (Lenni B. Benson);
- The merits of a subject-centered approach to legal non-compliance (Emily Ryo);
- Post-deportation barriers to family reunification (Deborah A. Boehm);
- The case for family unity (Zoya Gubernskaya and Joanna Dreby);
- Creating cohesive immigration policies (Pia O. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny);
- Labor standards enforcement as an essential element of immigration reform (Janice Fine and Gregory Lyon);
- Economic development as an antidote to involuntary migration (John W. Harbeson);
- Possible directions for the US agricultural sector and workers (Philip Martin);
- The national interests served by US immigration policies, and how to replace an immigration system characterized by illegality with robust legal immigration policies (Donald Kerwin and Robert Warren).

In addition, a subsequent paper by Ruth Wasem examines the history of US immigration governance, identifies the many US immigration functions, and makes recommendations for reform.

JMHS also produced a special collection devoted to the US immigration enforcement system, *The Law That Begot the Modern US Immigration Enforcement System: IIRIRA 20 Years Later*. This collection covers the consequences of immigrant detention, criminal prosecution, and removal on deportees, US families and communities. It includes a study by Michael Coon on the impact of immigration enforcement by localities. More recently, *JMHS* published a study on US deportees in Mexico and the family members of deportees remaining in the United States. This report has been the subject of substantial roll-out, public presentations, and Capitol Hill briefings.

Immigrant detention – both from a US and global perspective – has been regularly covered in *JMHS*, most recently in an influential paper on the privatization of detention by D. Gilman and L.A. Romero. CMS has also begun to publish a series of papers — some of which will appear in *JMHS* — on the rule of law, access to justice and due process in the US removal adjudication system. These papers are dedicated to Juan P. Osuna, the former Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which oversees the US immigration court system.

While this short summary has highlighted special editions and thematic sets of papers, *JMHS* also accepts submissions on a range of issues which are poorly understood and often deliberately distorted in the public arena. The journal's growth and vitality will also increasingly be tied to papers with greater geographic and

topical diversity. To that end, JMHS has published important work on the negotiation process for the Global Compact on Migration, wage and income inequality among farmworkers, forced labor and human trafficking around the World Cup and other major sporting events, Europe's anti-smuggling initiatives, and different national responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. At a time of rising nationalism and hostility toward immigrants, JMHS plans to redouble its efforts to publish timely, fact-based, policy-relevant papers on human security themes.

*Migration Studies*²³

Chief Editor: Alan Gamlen

Migration Studies is an international refereed journal dedicated to advances in theory, methodology and comparative research concerning all forms of human migration. Published by Oxford University Press, each year it receives around 200 submissions from 70-80 countries. After blind peer review through a global editorial board representing each major social science discipline and each major world region, *Migration Studies* publishes around 20 full-length original research articles and half a dozen or so reviews of books, films and other media. We occasionally publish Research Notes and Special Issues. In 2017-18 the journal was included in the core journal collection of Oxford University Press journals available to many libraries around the world, which increased its visibility. It was also assigned an official SSCI Impact Factor, a credential that lets professional migration researchers to trust the journal with their best research.

Advances in theory, methods, and comparative data

In 2017-18 *Migration Studies* has covered most aspects of migration, from emigrant decision-making in origin places; to processes of movement through complex regulatory systems; to dynamics of immigrant adaptation; to practices of transnationalism. It has contributed to longstanding discussions on issues the relationship between forced and free migration, and the role of gender in migration dynamics, and to major contemporary discussion of the so-called 'European migration crisis', and the current evolution of a global regime to govern migration.

Migration research continues to focus heavily on the drivers of migration on one hand, and processes of immigrant adaptation on the other. In 2017-18, *Migration Studies* pushed forward scholarship on both fronts. We published several large-scale analyses on migration determinants. Matthew Hayes and Rocío Pérez-Gañán examined the under-researched case of North-South lifestyle and retirement migration to Ecuador, while Maryann Bylander compared two South-east Asian migration corridors, challenging the theory that "the poorest of the poor are generally less likely to migrate", and exposing the importance of "worker-borne costs" and levels of formalization of migration processes. Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Simona Vezzoli revealed that the closure of formerly open Caribbean colonial borders caused a strong increase, not a decrease, in emigration – towards a wider array of other destinations. Speaking to abiding concerns about the 'failure' of migration policies to impact migration, Jan-Paul Brekke, Marianne Røed and Pål Schøne showed that restrictions during the 2015 European migration crisis both reduced asylum outflows and deflected them other countries. Examining the integration strategies of Iranian students in Western Europe, Ahmad Karimi and Sandra M Bucerius argued that "the processes of immigration and integration begin long before emigration actually takes place".

23 Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <https://academic.oup.com/migration>.

In 2017-18 we also showcased work on various forms of *immigrant adaptation*, including several contributions to longstanding debates on labor market incorporation. Sukanya Basu examined the wage-assimilation profiles of 'new' and 'old' immigrant cohorts from Asian countries. Christel Kesler and Mirna Safi compared barriers to labor force participation and employment for immigrants France and the United Kingdom, while Ivana Fellini found that the European 'crisis' has changed the dominant patterns of labor incorporation in Italy and Spain. Karsten Paerregaard studied immigrant entrepreneurship amongst Peruvian migrants, while María Sánchez-Domínguez and Susanne Fahlén compared how different institutional contexts shape the ability of immigrant women in Spain and Sweden to move beyond and above ethnic niches.

Wider processes of immigrant reception and adaptation have also featured prominently. Several papers looked at adaptation in terms of class and capital accumulation. Maja Cederberg showed the complexity of class positioning among female migrants in the UK, and Suzanne Huot argued that immigrants experience "misrecognition" of their social and human capital, which drives them into specific occupations to compensate. Moving beyond economic outcomes, Silvia Maja Melzer and Ruud J. Muffels spoke to the growing literature on migration and happiness, using German panel data to examine subjective wellbeing in connection with east-west migration after reunification. In contributions to the literature on contexts of reception, Timothy B Gravelle examined why Canadians hold closed vs open views towards refugees and immigrants, while Roy Germano demonstrated the use of video methods "to promote empathy, reduce xenophobia, and illustrate concepts in the study of international migration".

Migration Studies has published groundbreaking studies on *processes of movement* itself, including how it is regulated and shaped by policies at various levels. Cecilia Menjivar, Juliana E Morris and Néstor P Rodríguez studied the far-reaching consequences of deporting Honduran migrants, while Nora El Qadim explored the symbolic nature of visa policies between Morocco and Europe. Basia D Ellis and Henderikus J Stam revealed how Polish migrants in Canada "learn to become 'irregular'", and Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp and colleagues exposed the underground market for immigrant papers in Cape Town. Marianne Takle focused on the contribution of migration statistics to the EU border control, and Sara Cosemans examined the phenomenon of post-colonial East African Asian diasporic refugees. In a significant contribution to the literature on migration governance, the journal ran a full special issue on migration regimes in November 2017, guest edited by Kenneth Horvath, Anna Amelina, and Karin Peters.

In 2017-18 Migration Studies also showcased new work on the topic of *transnationalism* that has dominated migration research in recent decades. For example, using Mexican data, Ana Isabel López García ascertained the varying effects of remittances on voter turnout in different migration contexts. Robtel Neajai Pailey studied the evolution of dual citizenship in Liberia, and Ali Chaudhary compared the transnational orientation of Pakistani immigrant organizations in London and New York. In a significant methodological contribution, John Gibson and David McKenzie demonstrated the reliability of survey methods for researching remittances.

Building migration management capacity

Through scholarship that is policy relevant but not policy driven, *Migration Studies* is one of a range of academic journals contributing to *building migration management capacity* in communities and governments around the world. The past several years have seen a worldwide proliferation of graduate programs and think tanks specializing in migration issues. At the same time, the rising political salience of migration has created a growing need for policy makers, journalists and NGO professionals in other areas to gain working familiarity with migration issues. In view of these trends, in the past two years *Migration Studies* has run two series

intended to contribute to the theory and practice of higher education on this topic. The first is a series called *Teaching Migration Studies*, involving brief descriptions and reflections on the professional practice of teaching about the topic in different parts of the world, written by senior scholars working in key graduate programs that prominently feature migration and related issues. The second series is entitled *Classics in Migration Studies*. Edited by Advisory Board member Robin Cohen, this series features reviews of canonical books and articles in the history of migration scholarship, written by leading migration scholars from around the world.

Through efforts like this, *Migration Studies* has contributed to a growing international community of migration experts. As well as concerning themselves with social scientific progress, many members of this community are deeply engaged in public debates about migration, and are contributing to public life by informing and impacting the thoughts and decisions of politicians, policy makers and practitioners of migration policy at every level, from local NGOs, to municipal governments, to national governments and international organizations. We are particularly pleased to have helped cultivate such community at a time when sound facts and rational arguments about migration are so urgently needed in public debates in so many countries.

Challenges ahead

As a journal, *Migration Studies* faces several challenges going forward. First is the need to connect with the growing community of natural scientists studying migration using methods such as genomic analysis. These methods enable previously unimaginable insights about the nature and history of human migration, but also raise profound ethical questions. As the field of genomic migration research develops, it should happen in closer dialogue with critical social scientists, who may help prevent the emergence of a new eugenics.

Second, *Migration Studies* needs to engage more deeply with migration research in psychology and the health sciences. Like the social sciences, these fields increasingly feature migration research, but because of their disciplinary position they largely remain ships passing in the night.

Third, *Migration Studies* faces the ongoing challenge of balancing disciplinary rigor and interdisciplinarity relevance in an increasingly commercial academic environment. A major question facing all academic journals is how to maintain scholarly standards as academic publishing continues to strain already-stretched researchers by demanding their free labor – particularly as peer-reviewed outlets face competition for clicks from a vast array of open source publications.

Finally, on a personal note, I would like to thank all the reviewers, authors, editors, advisors, production staff, publishing team members, and everyone else involved, for the expertise, energy, and enthusiasm they have contributed to the journal not only in the past two years, but since our founding in 2013 – itself the result of several years of collective preparation. It has been a great honor to lead the journal throughout this period, and as I prepare to hand over the reins to the next editor at the end of 2019, I am proud to reflect on the contributions that the journal makes towards understanding one of the most important issues of our time.

*Refugee Survey Quarterly*²⁴*Chief Editor: Vincent Chetail*

The *Refugee Survey Quarterly* published 44 articles in 2017 and 2018, focusing on the challenges of forced migration from multidisciplinary and policy-oriented perspectives with a broad range of academic backgrounds (such as sociology, political science, law, history, geography and economics). The diversity in scope and content of these articles is the result of an editorial re-orientation of the journal undertaken since 2010. While the journal has been published by Oxford University Press since its creation in 1982, it was previously managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). During that time, the journal primarily published bibliographies and official documents on the protection of refugees, especially those produced by UNHCR. It then included as well special issues dedicated to a particular theme and guest edited by experts in the relevant area.

When UNHCR pulled out of the journal in 2010, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* experienced a major turnaround to become a genuine academic publication and, today, a reference journal in the field of forced migration. In addition to the establishment of a rigorous blind peer review process, the journal started to welcome submissions on an ongoing basis. An editorial strategy was also put in place to diversify the scope and content of articles to better reflect the rapid developments in the field of refugee protection. This strategy has borne fruit as illustrate the articles published in 2017 and 2018.

First, the objective has been to broaden the geographical scope of submissions. Prior to 2010, articles tended to predominantly focus on refugee issues in the Global North, especially in Europe. A larger geographical coverage was thus needed to better account for the obstacles raised to international refugee protection worldwide. It is well-known indeed that the vast majority of refugees are hosted in the Global South, while some States have emerged as new destination countries for the past decades. In addition to articles on Africa which are regularly published in the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, the 2017 and 2018 contributions included papers on Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the Gulf countries, as well as on Latin America, such as El Salvador, Mexico and Brazil.

Particular efforts were also made in the past years to attract articles on Asia which tends to be underrepresented in the refugee literature. These efforts seem to have responded to a real need from readers as one of the articles published in 2018 and focusing on China has gathered almost 5,000 views and downloads at the time of writing (see L. Song, "China and the International Refugee Protection Regime: Past, Present, and Potentials", in Vol. 37(2), 2018, pp. 139-161; in open access). Despite the diversification of the journal's geographical scope, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* of course continues to publish articles on more "traditional" regions of asylum, such as North America and Europe.

Second, the editorial strategy for the past years has also been to widen the thematic focus of the journal. Despite its name, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* is not only about refugees. It is more generally concerned by all aspects relating to forced migration. Beyond more traditional questions of resettlement, protection or humanitarian assistance, the 2017 and 2018 contributions notably cover issues related to statelessness and internally displaced persons. Contributions also tackle the question of protection against climate change and disaster (see B. Burson, W. Kälin, J. McAdam and S. Weerasinghe, "The Duty to Move People Out of Harm's Way in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, Vol. 37(4), 2018, pp. 379-407), as well as gender, displacement

24 Articles cited in the journal editor's contribution can be found at: <https://academic.oup.com/rsq>.

and peacebuilding (see K.E. Atkinson, "Policy and possibilities of humanitarian development: Displaced Women and Peace-Building Features of the UNHCR", Vol. 37(4), 2018, pp. 408-439; freely available).

The content of the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* has also logically broadened as asylum and migration have become increasingly blurred in the past decades in both policy and practice. For instance, the special issue on "'Undesirable and Unreturnable' Aliens in Asylum and Immigration Law" tackles the question of asylum-seekers refused international protection for security reasons, but who are nonetheless unreturnable to their country of origin, especially due to the protection afforded by the principle of *non-refoulement* (guest edited by D.J. Cantor, J. van Wijk, S. Singer and M.P. Bolhuis, Vol. 36(1), 2017). The securitization of asylum was also the subject of other contributions, especially from the perspective of detention and its disastrous effects on asylum-seekers, alongside articles on the impact of border controls on refugee protection. The limits and dangers inherent to such a security approach are well exemplified by several case studies focusing on Australia, Canada and European States. Another interesting contribution analyses refugee policy in the United States as a reflection of its foreign policy when it comes to the resettlement of Iraqi and Afghan refugees (N.R. Micinski, "Refugee Policy as Foreign Policy: Iraqi and Afghan Refugee Resettlements to the United States", Vol. 37(3), 2018, pp. 253-278).

While the thematic coverage of the journal will continue to evolve with the new developments in forced migration, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* will remain dedicated to publish high quality and original articles on issues of both academic and policy interest. In this regard, the journal is thankful to peer reviewers who have kindly offered their time and expertise, despite the increasingly demanding workload entailed by academic positions. One of the main challenges for the years to come will be to further diversify the geographical origin of contributors to the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*. While efforts have been made in this sense in the past years, submissions are still dominated by scholars from the Global North. This is not peculiar to the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, but more broadly reflects the prevailing biases in academic research and publications.

In this field like in many others, the production of knowledge remains largely structured by the Western-centric priorities of research funding that is financed by wealthy states and fuelled by the dominant discourse of the governing elites. This trend is further exacerbated by the enduring misperceptions spread by mass media, as illustrated by the rhetoric – if not the obsession – about the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. While it may have less implications in other fields, the geographical representation of researchers is particularly crucial in migration to account for the multifaceted dimensions and challenges of such a worldwide phenomenon that concerns every region of the world. There is more than ever a vital need for developing a more nuanced, representative and comprehensive understanding of migration through independent and evidence-based knowledge.

International Journal of Migration and Border Studies

Chief Editor: Dr. Idil Atak

International Journal of Migration and Border Studies (IJMBS) is a peer-reviewed journal which offers a forum for disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research concerning conceptual, theoretical, empirical and methodological dimensions of migration and border studies. The journal brings together a diverse range of international scholars and practitioners to advance knowledge and improve practice. Over the past two years, the IJMBS contributions spanned many geographic regions and countries documenting and critically analysing migration

and border policies and practices as well as the experiences of migrants. IJMBS contributed knowledge in three interrelated areas, in particular: the criminalisation of migrants; borders as sites of deterrence and containment; and strategies to promote mobility and the human rights of migrants.

The criminalisation of migrants

The IJMBS contributions typically dealt with the current global and national contexts where migrants' mobility has been constrained by restrictive measures. States have resorted to the criminalisation of migration or crimmigration to deter and to punish asylum seekers and irregular migrants. The process involves an increased reliance on the criminal law to enforce immigration statutes. Violations of immigration law carry criminal consequences without the implementation of procedural protections applicable to criminal law. Problematic measures include arbitrary detentions, enhanced surveillance practices, interception strategies and deportations. States have also tightened the criteria for granting refugee status with a view to limiting the number of persons granted asylum with the pretext of deterring 'abuse'. Against this background, IJMBS explored important theoretical and empirical implications associated with crimmigration and how this phenomenon is constructed and challenged in diverse settings. To illustrate, a historical lens was used in a contribution to examine the ideological roots pertaining to the Belgian policy of migrants' deportation. Such an approach demonstrated how framing the foreigner as an unethical subject legitimised the exceptional power of deportation. Similarly, several authors adopted a comparative perspective to illuminate the commonalities between histories, rationales, and implementation of criminalizing policies in different jurisdictions. One such example is the safe country of origin criteria used in refugee status determination both in the European Union (EU) and in Canada as a tool to delegitimize certain refugee claims and to reduce the number of 'undesirable' asylum seekers.

A common theme across contributions is the impact of crimmigration on the human rights of migrants. Take the Canadian immigration detention regime where there are no clear statutory time limits or meaningful independent oversight. This situation clearly aggravates the risk for arbitrary and inhumane detention of migrants. The United States President Donald Trump's travel bans offer another illustration of how crimmigration violates individual rights like the right to privacy and the presumption of innocence. In addition, these travel bans require states to provide information relating to their citizens and resident foreigners to the United States authorities in return for being left off the list of banned countries. Indeed a number of contributions in IJMBS highlighted that migration management has become a major dimension of interstate relations. Destination countries increasingly cooperate with source and transit countries to enable them to efficiently control their borders and contain irregular migrants. Often characterised by an imbalance of power between states, the externalisation of migration controls has been detrimental to migrants' rights as exemplified in the case of smuggled asylum seekers in Indonesia. The 'illegality' of this population has been constructed as a result of Indonesia's enhanced cooperation with Australia. This had a transformative effect not only on Indonesian law but also on social attitudes towards asylum seekers in this country. Arrangements with third-countries are also part of the current [debates](#) at the EU level, with the aim to confine refugees in countries outside or on the periphery of the EU. In some instances, the strategic alliances between states were embedded in systems of reciprocal conditionalities. An example is the proactive engagement of North African and Sahel countries in the EU's immigration control efforts. This engagement was largely motivated by these countries' own interests and expectations from the EU, such as military assistance, financial support and regime legitimacy.

Exclusionary borders and transit migration

Borders are complex spaces that involve discursive, spatial, and temporal dimensions. The evolving nature of borders has been a main focus for IJMBS which systematically examines how border controls operate in practice. As highlighted in a contribution, border officials are confronted with tasks that entail both discretionary decision-making and coercive measures where they have to balance a professional ethos with their personal moral values.

Many IJMBS articles examined the shifting conception of borders as tools of governance and as boundaries of belonging. A perfect illustration is the ‘anticipatory interdiction’ measures implemented by Canada to manage the geopolitical ‘threat’ posed by asylum claimants from Mexico. Measures such as the United States-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, the Mexican visa imposition, and the safe country of origin scheme formed a virtual border to effectively filter and exclude migrants from Mexico. In a similar vein, the EU border control regime generated exclusion and precarity of migrants during the so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ in 2015. As an IJMBS contribution put it, when over a million people reached Europe, intense political debate on the ‘crisis’ has prevented public opinion from seeing how its root causes lie in the intrinsic weaknesses of the solidarity and responsibility sharing mechanisms in the EU. Indeed another article argued that the EU’s political priority to counter migrant smuggling affected the provision of humanitarian assistance and access to rights for irregular immigrants and asylum seekers. Civil society actors, especially those critically monitor and politically mobilise for the rights of migrants in Europe, have faced prosecutions and criminal convictions when assisting this population. Authors pointed almost invariably to the pressing issue of ensuring transparency and accountability at the border.

The IJMBS contributed to the understanding of how the logics of borders are confronted by migrant realities and everyday experiences. Research has documented the increasingly protracted nature of migrants’ journeys. Being in transit has become the daily lived reality of many people on the move. Accordingly, special attention was paid by IJMBS to the concept of transit as a space constructed through mobility restrictions regimes and the above-mentioned systems of reciprocal conditionalities. In particular, there has been a mounting pressure on the first countries of asylum to double efforts to locally integrate refugees they are hosting. However these countries struggle to meet the social and economic needs of refugees who often face discrimination. As described in an article, the desire to move on with their lives and escape the interminable temporariness in Turkey propelled some Syrian refugees to engage in secondary movements throughout the EU, despite the risks of the journey. For similar reasons, the vast majority of one million refugees who landed in Greece and Italy in 2015-2016, then engaged in secondary movements to escape the temporary status and the exploitative economies of transit. Another contribution shed light on the situation of asylum seekers confined in Indonesia and who hope to be resettled in Australia. It demonstrated that limbo in transit encouraged migrants to agree to assisted voluntary return, in many cases, to places where they may face persecution.

Migrant agency, the limits of resistance and the way forward

The resilience and the agency of migrants are among priority topics explored in IJMBS. As demonstrated in one of the contributions, young temporary migrants from China and Hong Kong, China in the United Kingdom have been able to deploy strategies such as marriage and the use of sexual capital to prolong their stay in this country. In other cases, migrants can manage their own migration trajectories through resourceful use of new technologies. Mobile technology can serve to shape routes, destinations and facilitate the financing of irregular migration. Sadly the IJMBS contributions also show the limits of resistance and the ways in which

migrant agency is harnessed by the state to justify further migration controls and denial of protection. A typical example is the precarious situation of unaccompanied minors who travelled from Mexico and Central America to the United States in 2014. The framing of children as 'illegal migrants' by the United States and Mexican authorities allowed increased deportations. As well, border controls were implemented under the guise of assisting minors, who were cast as agentless victims.

Many of the IJMBS articles touched on the counterproductive effects of border control regimes. In addition to the migrants' human rights violations, the proliferation of migrant smuggling and human trafficking had been a by-product of these regimes. As emphasized by an author, a meaningful attempt to address migrant smuggling requires states to develop legal and safe avenues for accessing countries of asylum. Indeed, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants called on states to ensure safe, orderly and regular migrations. The recent global compacts signal a move towards more inclusive and principled approaches to the governance of human mobility. As the Global Compact on Refugees underlined it, refugee resettlement policies are of key importance in this respect. An IJMBS special issue contributed to the debate by comparing and contrasting refugee resettlement in four major receiving countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Policies were examined in several key areas of settlement support, including employment, healthcare, education, social welfare and social security. The issue offered an in-depth discussion on whether and to what extent resettlement policies are adequate. It also critically analysed the policy variance among states and between areas of settlement policy. Policy recommendations formulated in the contributions inspire constructive change and inform policy makers and other stakeholders in the countries studied and globally. Importantly, a comparative analysis of resettlement policies shows that more solidarity with refugees and countries in the global South that are currently hosting them is possible.

Overall, the research published in IJMBS functions as a plea for the facilitation of human mobility across borders. It dispels the myth that migration can be regulated by deterrence-based policies. Contributions provide evidence that such policies are counterproductive and highlight the need for an effective human rights-based global framework that would enhance mobility.

Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales²⁵

Chief Editors: Emmanuel Ma Mung and Véronique Petit

The *European Review of International Migration* (REMI) is a specialised journal on international migration and inter-ethnic relations. Multidisciplinary (sociology, anthropology, demography, geography, history, political science, etc.), it publishes in French, English and Spanish in-depth articles of empirical or theoretical orientation, as well as research notes that present the first results of ongoing research. Each review number includes a thematic issue which is supplemented by varia. A legal chronical since 2016 takes into account the growing importance of legal issues related to international migration and migration policy issues. This reborn chronical is moderated by a group of specialised lawyers who are developing a network around issues such as international migration law (conventions, protocols), reception and protection conditions for unaccompanied minors, protection and promotion of the social rights of migrants, human rights as protection of migrants' rights, access to health, labour law for irregular migrants.

²⁵ Articles cited in the journal editors' contribution can be found at: <https://journals.openedition.org/remi/>.

REMI celebrated its 30th anniversary by publishing a special issue entitled "Renewing the Migration Issues" (32/3-4 2016). This special volume brought together original and diversified contributions. In addition to the classic articles, this issue features interviews with journal editors, researchers and artists. Through these exchanges, the function of scientific journals in a rapidly changing world of publishing and research, the use of categories and concepts in understanding migration issues and inter-ethnic relations, as well as the place of migration in multicultural societies are examined. Other articles deal with epistemological challenges by reporting on survey methods in an urban context (use of photography, sound recordings), the measurement of migratory flows, the mapping of migratory flows, the museography of migratory histories. Other articles analyse more current and topical situations: the United States' migration policy and the revival of the "Silk Road" between Asia and Europe.

The issue of violence is a recurring theme in the latest dossiers. The importance of this issue reflects the tragic consequences of migration policies in particular contexts or crises, and the emergence of work around migrants' journeys. The dossier "Speaking out against border violence. Putting into words migration to Europe" (33/2-3, 2017) coordinated by Cécile Canut and Anaïk Pian addresses border violence by adopting a language approach. Considering language practices as an integral part of migration practices in the context of migration to Europe, the articles analyse how the actors put into words death and violence at borders. Death is considered in multiple dimensions: social death, physical death, disappearance, institutional and security arbitrariness, etc. These language practices are understood at different sociological and political levels, whether it is their production from institutional spaces (international organisations, political spaces at European or state level) or their reception by migrants, during their life in Europe or afterwards when they arrive there, or when they return to their country after an expulsion. The language approach, corresponding both to a consideration of the discourses produced on migrants and of the narratives taken by migrants in plural discursive frameworks. This perspective makes it possible to think of the border object while offering a grid for interpreting socio-spatial inequalities in the era of globalization.

The issue of violence and migration routes is also addressed through the refugee situation. Karen Akoka, Olivier Clochard and Albena Tcholakova in the dossier "Recognised refugees and after? " (33/4, 2017) question the fate of refugees once they have obtained this status. Indeed, they start from the observation that research on recognised refugees remains too rare in studies on asylum conditions in Europe. The vast majority of academic work focuses on the situation of candidates for refugee status before their application is recognised or rejected. The articles presented in this dossier examine this "after" time. They question the widespread image that makes refugee status a kind of outcome and invite us to question its effects in terms of social, identity and political reconfigurations. Different case studies, referring to different populations and periods (Armenians, Africans, Cambodians, Tamils) shed light on the refugee status as an individual and collective experience.

The experience of exile and life after it is also examined in the dossier "Living, thinking, writing in exile" (33/1, 2017) coordinated by the historian Ralph Schor, who strives to understand the paths and identity choices of a particular category of exiles: writers and thinkers. Many of them left their homeland, voluntarily in the case of those on an unprecedented intellectual adventure, or forced in the case of political refugees. Articles in history or social science describe the living conditions of writers far from their country in order to understand the formation and expression of their thought. Some authors articulate a double corpus: discursive data from interviews with authors and migrants of the same origin, and a corpus constructed from their literary works. These articles examine the literary and anthropological writing of migration, the narrative of oneself and others, the expression of emotions and feelings, and the viewer's perspective. Some varia articles

focus on the links between film and migration experiences in countries with a film industry. In what way do cinema and photography open up new discursive spaces? A special richly illustrated dossier is devoted to the links between photography, migration and cities (32/3-4, 2016). How cinema and photography reflect migrants' migratory experiences, imaginations, living, housing and working conditions? These articles also show how images contribute to current events and the production of memory, instilling emotions, reflections, mobilizations and denunciations.

Contemporary situations are also examined through the lens of history, which makes it possible to grasp ruptures and continuities and to develop comparative perspectives. This was the case in the dossier on "Romanian Roma migration in Europe: inclusion policies, strategies for distinguishing and (de)building identity borders" coordinated by Mihaela Nedelcu and Ruxandra-Oana Ciobanu (32/1, 2016). It is also the perspective adopted in the dossier "Migratory movements of yesterday and today in Italy" coordinated by Paola Corti and Adelina Miranda (34/1, 2018) which critically reviews Italy's migratory history, at a time when this country is becoming increasingly present on the international scene due to policies of refoulement of foreigners at national borders. The analysis of the Italian case suggests, in the wake of the migration studies, that it is not possible to define the migration fields within which old and new protagonists move through the simple analysis of territorial trajectories. The research presented shows, on the one hand, that the adoption of a distant perspective is essential to relativize current analyses and, on the other hand, it shows the heuristic interest in varying the focus of the historical perspective on migration facts. Similarly, since it is no longer conceivable to use categories that semantically reflect the typologies used by a political discourse that instrumentalize them, it is useful to consider the various spatial-political scales - local, regional, national and international - while appropriating the subjective level to understand the complexity of the phenomenon. This historical perspective is also present in the dossier "Training elites: mobility of students from Africa north of the Sahara in the countries of the former socialist bloc" coordinated by Michèle Leclerc-Olive and Marie-Antoinette Hily (32/2, 2016), which sheds light on a forgotten part of our history, examines collaboration between countries in the name of an ideological project, and the "qualified migration" that these programmes generate between these States. The presentation of these experiences leads to a discussion of the descriptive categories of these "mobilities" and "elites".

Finally, the last dossier "Mental health in international migration" (34/2-3, 2018) coordinated by Véronique Petit and Simeng Wang is the first dossier that REMI has devoted to mental health. It is published at a time when migration policies in France and Europe, due to their deleterious effects, are undermining the rights, access to healthcare and health of many migrants. Articles provide empirical researches describing the use of care and therapeutic relationships in mental health for migrants at different points in their migration route. The mental health perspective renews the reading of the social relationships in which the migrant is inserted. It also makes it possible to analyse the social conditions of production, expression and management of psychological suffering at the micro, meso and macro- social levels. The methods of care (institutional, social, legal, health) for migrants diagnosed "as having mental disorders, psychological difficulties or in a state of suffering" link the effects of migration policies, the dynamics of reception and care of migrants, the organisation of care systems and the production of subjectivities and self-expression.

Chapter 6

Appendix A. Terms and definitions relating to migrants' inclusion and social cohesion

Various terms have been used to refer to migrants' inclusion in receiving societies and to social cohesion. The choice of one particular term depends on the interlocutor (who/which stakeholder), the particular period of time (when), and the historical, political, social, cultural and economic contexts of a particular host country or society (where).

The table below provides an illustration of some of the terms often used, together with a potential definition. These definitions are, however, only suggestions as to how these terms can be understood, as no universally agreed definitions exist.

Acculturation	<p>"[A]cculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups."</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Redfield, Linton and Herskovits, 1936, in Berry, 1997.</p>
Adaptation	<p>"The selective and often conscious attempt to modify certain aspects of cultural practice in accordance with the host society's norms and values."</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Castles et al., 2002.</p>
Assimilation	<p>"A one-directional policy approach to integration whereby an ethnic or social group – usually a minority – adopts the cultural practices of another – usually that of the majority ethnic or social group. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, mores and behaviour normally leading the assimilating party to become less socially distinguishable from other members of the receiving society."</p> <p><i>Source:</i> IOM, 2019.</p>
Cultural diversity	<p>"The diversity of forms of culture in a society composed of groups of people from many different cultural backgrounds."</p> <p><i>Source:</i> European Migration Network, 2014, in IOM, 2019.</p>
Exclusion	<p>"This can refer to denial of access to certain rights, resources or entitlements normally seen as part of membership of a specific society. Immigrants are often included in some areas of society (e.g. labour market) but excluded from others (e.g. political participation)."</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Castles et al., 2002.</p>

Inclusion	<p>“The process whereby immigrants or refugees become participants in particular subsectors of society: education, labour market, welfare system, political representation, etc. The emphasis is on active and conscious processes: that is policies of public agencies or employers, as well as on the role of the newcomers themselves. This is seen as the antithesis of exclusion and social exclusion.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Castles et al., 2002.</p>
Incorporation	<p>“Incorporation of immigrants is seen by some social scientists as a fairly neutral term to refer to the overall process by which newcomers become part of a society. It is seen as avoiding the normative implications of such terms as assimilation, integration and insertion.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Castles et al., 2002.</p>
Insertion	<p>“The process through which immigrants and refugees are brought into various social subsectors. The term originates in the French Republican Model of individual assimilation of immigrants, and carries the implication of being inserted into an unchanged social institution – in other words, that the immigrant has to assimilate to existing structures.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Castles et al., 2002.</p>
Integration	<p>“The two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities, and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> IOM, 2019.</p>
Interculturalism	<p> “[A] technique for bridging differences and creating bonds and social capital. That is, it promotes relations between people who share certain characteristics (bonds), as well as relations between individuals from different backgrounds (promoting interaction between people across different religions, languages, etc.) who are predisposed to respecting others’ differences [...] It is a way, then, to avoid the confinement and segregation of people, which may condemn them to a timeless social exclusion.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Zapata-Barrero, 2017.</p>
Multiculturalism	<p>“A model of integration policies that welcomes the preservation, expression and sometimes even the celebration of cultural diversity. This approach encourages migrants to become full members of society while retaining their cultural identities. It combines the recognition of varied backgrounds, traditions and ways of seeing the world with certain universalist values, such as the rule of law or gender equality, that override cultural differences and guarantee the same rights for all. The integration relationship is then best captured in the image of a mosaic enabling minority ethnic groupings to live side by side with the majority constituency.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> IOM, 2019, adapted from IOM, 2017b.</p>

Social cohesion	<p>“While there is no one universal definition, social cohesion is usually associated with such notions as ‘solidarity’, ‘togetherness’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘harmonious co-existence’ and refers to a social order in a specific society or community based on a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; where the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued; those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> IOM, 2019, adapted from Demireva (2017), citing Cantle, 2005.</p>
Social exclusion	<p>“Social exclusion pertains to a situation in which an individual or group suffers multiple types of disadvantage in various social sectors (e.g. education, employment, housing, health).”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Castles et al., 2002.</p>
Social inclusion	<p>“The process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> World Bank, 2013, in IOM, 2019.</p>
Transnationalism	<p>“Transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states.”</p> <p><i>Source:</i> Vertovec, 1999.</p>

Appendix B. The legal framework of migrants' inclusion

As introduced in chapter 6, the different key policy areas of migrants' inclusion correspond to and are grounded in some specific rights to which all individuals are entitled, including migrants. The figure in this appendix provides an overview of some of the rights that are essential for migrants' inclusion.

All these rights are based on specific international treaties, especially those part of international human rights law and international labour law. Without prejudice to other relevant international and regional instruments, these treaties include:

International human rights law	International labour law
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights • The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights • The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child • The 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) • The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)

While these treaties are only legally binding for the States that have ratified them, the two Covenants of 1966 have now been ratified by virtually all States.²⁶ Moreover, some of the rights in the figure below are commonly recognized to be part of customary international law. They are thus legally binding on all States, irrespective of their ratification of specific treaties or conventions. These customary rights most notably include the main pillar of migrants' inclusion: that is, the principle of non-discrimination, which ensures that the rights of all individuals, including migrants, are not nullified or impaired on the basis of "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status", including migration status.²⁷

²⁶ For the status of ratifications of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by 172 States, see https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND; for ratifications of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ratified by 169 States, see https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en.

²⁷ UN HRCttee, 1989: para. 7. However, as noted by the Committee: "Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]" (*ibid.*: para. 13). On the customary law nature of the principle of non-discrimination, see Chetail, 2019.



Appendix C. Main findings of the *Immigrant Citizens Survey*

The *Immigrant Citizens Survey*²⁸ was piloted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, and conducted in 2011–2012 with 7,473 migrants born outside the European Union and residing in 15 cities in seven EU member States. Survey questions concerned six dimensions of inclusion, resulting in the following key findings:

1. Employment

- Problems on the labour market are often local, from few legal contracts in Southern Europe to discrimination and distrust of foreign qualifications in Northern Europe.
- For immigrants, the major problem is job security.
- 25–33% of working immigrants feel overqualified for their job.
- Educated immigrants often get their foreign qualifications recognised if they apply, but few apply.
- Most working-age immigrants want more training.
- Immigrants have greater problems balancing training, work, and family life than most people do in the country.

2. Languages

- Immigrants generally speak more languages than the average person in their country of residence.
- For immigrants – like for most people – time is the major problem for learning a new language.
- Getting information on learning opportunities may be more difficult for immigrants than general public.
- Wide range of immigrants participated in language or integration courses.
- Participants highly value courses for learning language and often for socio-economic integration.

3. Political and civic participation

- Most immigrants are interested in voting (often as much as nationals are).
- Most immigrants want more diversity in politics – and many are willing to vote in support of it.
- Immigrants' broader participation in civic life is uneven from city to city and organisation to organisation.
- Whether immigrants know or participate in an immigrant NGO depends heavily on their local and national context.

4. Family reunion

- Only limited numbers of first-generation immigrants were ever separated from a partner or children.

²⁸ Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

- The majority of separated families have already reunited in most surveyed countries.
- Most separated immigrants today do not want to apply for their family, some because of family choices but others because of policy obstacles.
- Family reunion helps immigrants improve family life, sense of belonging and sometimes other integration outcomes.

5. Long-term residence

- 80–95% of immigrants are or want to become long-term residents.
- Most temporary migrants in new countries of immigration also want to become long-term residents.
- The average person applies not long after the minimum period of residence.
- Documents and powers of authorities cited as major problems for applicants in certain countries.
- Long-term residence helps most immigrants get better jobs and feel more settled.

6. Citizenship

- Around 3 out of 4 immigrants are or want to become citizens.
- The few uninterested in citizenship often either do not see the difference with their current status or face specific policy obstacles.
- Major reasons not to naturalise are difficult procedures in France and restrictions on dual nationality in Germany.
- Naturalisation more common among established immigration countries and among facilitated groups in Hungary and Spain.
- Immigrants who are eligible for naturalization often take years to apply.
- Citizenship helps immigrants feel more settled, get better jobs, and even get more educated and involved.

Source: Extracted from Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.

Chapter 7

Appendix A. Key priorities and actions for monitoring migrant health and developing migrant-sensitive health systems

Monitoring migrant health

Priorities to address	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure the standardization and comparability of data on migrant health. • Increase the better understanding of trends and outcomes through the appropriate disaggregation and analysis of migrant health information in ways that account for the diversity of migrant populations. • Improve the monitoring of migrants' health-seeking behaviours, access to and utilization of health services, and increase the collection of data related to health status and outcomes for migrants. • Identify and map: (a) good practices in monitoring migrant health; (b) policy models that facilitate equitable access to health for migrants; and (c) migrant-inclusive health systems models and practices. • Develop useful data that can be linked to decision-making and the monitoring of the impact of policies and programmes.
Key actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify key indicators that are acceptable and usable across countries. • Promote the inclusion of migration variables in existing censuses, national statistics, targeted health surveys and routine health information systems, as well as in statistics from sectors such as housing, education, labour and migration. • Use innovative approaches to collect data on migrants beyond traditional instruments, such as vital statistics and routine health information systems. • Clearly explain to migrants why health-related data are being collected and how this can benefit them, and have safeguards in place to prevent use of data in a discriminatory or harmful fashion. • Raise awareness about data collection methods, uses and data-sharing related to migrant health among governments, civil society and international organizations. • Produce a global report on the status of migrants' health, including country-by-country progress reports.


Migrant-sensitive health systems

Priorities to address	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that health services are delivered to migrants in a culturally and linguistically appropriate way, and enforce laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination. • Adopt measures to improve the ability of health systems to deliver migrant-inclusive services and programmes in a comprehensive, coordinated and financially sustainable way. • Enhance the continuity and quality of care received by migrants in all settings, including that received from NGO health services and alternative providers. • Develop the capacity of the health and relevant non-health workforce to understand and address the health and social issues associated with migration.
Key actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish focal points within governments for migrant health issues. • Develop standards for health service delivery, organizational management and governance that address cultural and linguistic competence; epidemiological factors; and legal, administrative, and financial challenges. • Develop frameworks for the implementation and monitoring of health systems' performance in delivering migrant-sensitive health services. • Develop methods to analyse the costs of addressing or not addressing migrant health issues. • Include diaspora migrant health workers in the design, implementation and evaluation of migrant-sensitive health services and educational programmes. • Include migrant health in the graduate, postgraduate and continuous professional education training of all health personnel, including support and managerial staff.

Appendix B. Lessons learned in advancing a National Migration Health Policy and action framework in Sri Lanka

Sustained economic growth and peace dividends since the cessation of protracted civil conflict in 2009 has re-established Sri Lanka as a booming economy in the South Asian region. International migration continues to be a catalyst to Sri Lanka's development. Sri Lanka is both a labour-sending country (with over 2 million of its citizens working abroad as labour migrants), and a labour-receiving one – with a growing number of migrant workers from countries such as India and China arriving to work on large-scale infrastructure projects such as new highways, seaports and airports. These developments will further increase population mobility into and within the island. The end of war also led to a return of Sri Lankan refugees from India, with many more internally displaced persons from other parts of the country, to their places of origin. Addressing health challenges of a dynamic range of population flows therefore becomes important.

Figure 1. Advancing a National Migration and Health Policy process in Sri Lanka



In recognizing the intersectoral nature of addressing migration and health, an evidence-informed, “whole-of-government” approach was adopted by the Government of Sri Lanka to advance the National Migration Health Policy process. The process was led by the Ministry of Health with technical partnership from IOM. Sri Lanka remains one of the few countries to have a dedicated National Migration Health Policy and Action Plan, which was launched in 2013.

Six key lessons in advancing the National Migration Health Policy

1. Adopt an intersectoral, participatory approach

An interministerial mechanism was established, led by the Minister of Health, to galvanize the migration and health agenda. The multisectoral coordination framework is comprised of three elements: (a) a dedicated secretariat within the Directorate of Policy and Planning to drive daily coordination; (b) a National Migration Health Taskforce (MHTF) to drive technical cooperation; and (c) a National Steering Committee to drive legal and executive level action. The MHTF enabled participation from civil society, the nongovernmental sector, academia and intergovernmental organizations, and migrants themselves.

2. Adopt an inclusive approach

After extensive deliberation, the MHTF targeted migrant categories across all three migration flows: inbound, outbound and internal. Inbound migrants include foreign migrant workers and returning refugees; outbound migration encompasses categories such as labour migrants, international students and military; and internal migrants include categories such as free trade zone workers, seasonal workers and internally displaced persons. Considering the large numbers of migrant workers, the left-behind children and families of international migrant workers were included as a dedicated fourth section for the policy.

3. Adopt a strong “evidence-informed approach”

A hallmark of Sri Lanka’s policy development was emphasis on an evidence-based approach to developing policy formulary and guiding interventions. A country migration profile was developed during the formative phase and a National Migration Health Research Commission was undertaken over a three-year period. Efforts were made to undertake multidisciplinary research studies that were not only rigorous but adopted high ethical standards. The findings were shared through a series of National Symposums on Migration Health Research, with the participation of government agencies, migrant community representatives, civil society, development partners, United Nations agencies, the private sector and academia.

4. Adopt a pragmatic and responsive approach

An important feature of the policy development process was the imperative placed on responding to any nationally important migration and health challenges the country would encounter, rather than remain a static process, only for purposes of policy formulation. The utility of an interministerial taskforce in taking practical action was recognized. For example, a National Border Health Strategy was developed to enhance point-of-entry capacities to better prepare, respond to and mitigate global health security risks, and improve disease surveillance and coordination at points of entry.

5. Embed an accountability framework

Tracking progress and sharing regular progress reports at the national, subnational and global levels is a key aspect of policy implementation. Sri Lanka formally reported progress made against the four intervention domains detailed in World Health Assembly resolution 61.17: Health of migrants, in 2010 and 2011. A national report card on migration and health was also developed by the MHTF, and can be read in full at

www.migrationhealth.lk. A recurrent challenge has been to sustain the coordination efforts both within the Ministry of Health and between ministries and partners.

6. Ensure global health diplomacy and engagement

In a globalized world, individual member States cannot “do it alone” in effectively advancing their national migration health agendas. Multilateral diplomatic efforts need to be made with both sending and receiving countries, recognizing that health vulnerabilities diffuse across all phases of migration and across borders.

Appendix C. Health in the implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Objective 1: Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies
The action on developing country-specific migration profiles with disaggregated data in a national context should include health data to develop evidence-informed migration policies. This can begin with practical platforms for connecting research experts, scholars and policymakers globally to strengthen information systems to analyse trends in migrants' health, disaggregate health information and facilitate the exchange of lessons learned.

Objective 7: Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration

The actions on addressing vulnerabilities in migration include provision of health care, and psychological and other counselling services, in particular for migrant women, adolescents, and for unaccompanied and separated children across the stages of migration. This would also require addressing migrant experiences, including xenophobia, migration restrictions for migrants with health needs, and other policy gaps and inconsistencies, as well as efforts to enhance migrant resilience, through adequate information, education and empowerment for self-help.

Objective 10: Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration

Protection and assistance for trafficked persons will require integration of measures for physical and psychological health, including service delivery and capacity development. This will require cross-border cooperation and partnerships to harmonize intersectoral policies and practices, and ensure continuity of care and health responses to particular health needs of women, men, girls and boys.

Objective 15: Provide access to basic services for migrants

This objective encourages governments to "incorporate the health needs of migrants in national and local health care policies and plans, [...] including by taking into consideration relevant recommendations from the WHO Framework of Priorities and Guiding Principles to Promote the Health of Refugees and Migrants", which were developed in collaboration with member States, IOM and other United Nations partners. These commitments are linked with governments' plans for health-related SDG results (SDG 3 and others), including strengthening migrant-inclusive health-care systems.

Objective 22: Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits

Inclusion of health-related actions in this objective will require assessment and enhancement of financial risk protection in health services, to reduce the burden of catastrophic health expenditures on migrants. Social protection in health should be an integral component of reciprocal social security agreements on the portability of earned benefits for migrant workers at all skill levels, for both long-term and temporary migration.

Chapter 9

Appendix A. Policy processes of significance for the governance of environmental migration

Beyond the UNFCCC and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, environmental migration continues to be discussed in various thematic policy processes. This includes but is not limited to, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the work under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the discussions conducted by the tripartite constituents of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee as well as IOM governing body mechanisms.²⁹ All these global policy spaces have devoted specific sessions to migration and displacement in the context of climate change, disaster and environmental degradation. Other processes – such as the small island developing States focused SAMOA Pathway or dealing with key environmental issues such as oceans, ecosystems or water – are also incorporating migration issues. The infographic below summarizes the main elements of the various policy forums and mechanisms.

Of particular note is the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), which is a State-led initiative that seeks to bring migration and environmental change together to address the protection gap for persons displaced across borders, and in particular to implement the Nansen Protection Agenda adopted by 108 countries in 2015.³⁰ The PDD focuses primarily on displacement and also has a work plan aimed at increasing adaptive capacity of all people who may move in relation to environmental stresses like disasters and climate change. For example, the PDD's recently updated strategy promotes managing displacement risks through moving "out of harm's way in a dignified manner, through the creation of pathways for safe, orderly and regular migration".³¹ The PDD's work plan states that migration can be a response to disaster risk.³²


²⁹ States have increasingly engaged at intergovernmental level on migration, environment and climate change within IOM's intergovernmental policy dialogues, including the International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) and the regular meetings of IOM's governing bodies (such as IOM Council), as well as regional policy discussions linked to regional migration consultative processes supported by IOM. See, for example, IOM, 2007.

³⁰ Nansen Initiative, 2015.

³¹ PDD, 2019.

³² Ibid.

Summary of migration and displacement in global policy processes



Source: Figure created by IOM's Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division.

National policy developments


A 2018 mapping conducted under the Task Force on Displacement workplan highlights that national policies on migration on the one hand, and climate change on the other hand, increasingly consider environmental migration issues.³³ Out of 66 countries and territories reviewed, 53 per cent made reference to climate change and environmental factors in their national migration and displacement frameworks. Out of 37 countries and territories having submitted national climate change adaptation policies, plans or strategies, 81 per cent referred to human mobility.

Different dimensions of human mobility are touched upon (migration, displacement and planned relocation), through a variety of thematic lenses (such as security, urbanization, labour, adaptation and health). This demonstrates an increased level of integration of the environment-migration nexus in national policies, in line with the greater awareness witnessed at the global level. However, gaps remain in terms of national policy coherence, although efforts are made to create synergies between climate/environmental and human mobility communities.

The full report is available at <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/iom-pdd-task-force-displacement-stakeholder-meeting>


Chapter 10

Appendix A. Different crisis situations, different impacts on migrants



Main sources

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- West Africa's Ebola epidemics: <https://bit.ly/2Ld9QvD>, <https://bit.ly/2RVVfaA>.
- Complex emergency in Yemen: <https://cnn.it/2lkVvRK>, <https://bit.ly/2UHvaxK>.
- Xenophobic attacks in South Africa: <https://nyti.ms/2C9D8s5>, IOM (2009). *Towards Tolerance, Law, and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign Nationals in South Africa*.
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Chapter 11

Appendix A. Timeline of main multilateral initiatives, processes, agreements and declarations devoted or relevant to migration³⁴

1985	Launch of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC)
1990	Creation of the Central American Commission of Migration Directors (<i>Comisión Centroamericana de Directores de Migración</i> (OCAM))
1993	Launch of the Budapest Process
	Cairo International Conference on Population and Development
1994	Start of negotiations on Mode 4 on the movement of natural persons of the General Agreement on Trade in Services during the Uruguay Round
	Launch of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM or Puebla Process)
1996	Launch of the Inter-governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC) Launch of the Pacific Immigration Directors' Conference (PIDC) Inclusion of Mode 4 commitments (on the movement of natural persons) under the Third Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
1998	Launch of the International Migration Policy Programme
1999	Appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
	Launch of The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration Launch of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MDSA)
2000	Launch of the South American Conference on Migration (SACM)/Lima Process Adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (Millennium Development Goals)

³⁴ As the focus of this timeline is on migration generally, it does not encompass – and is without prejudice to – other more specific initiatives, including initiatives relating to refugees per se, such as those of UNHCR or the Commonwealth of Independent States Conference (1996–2005).

	Creation of the Berne Initiative
	Launch of the IOM International Dialogue on Migration (IDM)
2001	World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban Conference I)
	Launch of the Cross-Border Co-operation Process (Söderköping Process)
	Launch of the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA) Process
	Launch of the Coordination Meeting on International Migration, United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs
2002	Launch of the Regional Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean (5+5 Dialogue)
	Launch of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime
	Delivery of the Migration Working Group's Report to the Secretary-General (Doyle Report)
	Establishment of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)
	Establishment of the Geneva Migration Group
2003	Launch of the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue (MTM)
	Launch of the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process)
	Launch of the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI)
2004	Adoption of the non-binding ILO Report VII Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy, International Labour Conference
	Adoption of the non-binding Berne Initiative International Agenda for Migration Management
	Establishment of the Global Migration Group (GMG, formerly the Geneva Migration Group)
2006	First High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2006 HLD)
	Appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration and Development by the United Nations Secretary-General
	Launch of the Euro–African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process)
	Adoption of the non-binding ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration
2007	Launch of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD)

	Launch of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD-RCP)
2008	Launch of the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (Abu Dhabi Dialogue)
2009	Durban Review Conference
2011	Launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Panel on Migration and Asylum (incorporating the Söderköping Process) Adoption of the Istanbul Declaration and Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries, Fourth United Nations Conference of the Least Developed Countries
2012	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20) Launch of the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement Launch of the Migration Dialogue for Central African States (MIDCAS) Adoption of the non-binding IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF)
2013	Second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2013 HLD) Launch of the Almaty Process on Refugee Protection and International Migration Launch of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) RCP – MIDCOM
2014	Launch of the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative Launch of the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development Adoption of the non-binding report Fair Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda, International Labour Conference Adoption of the non-binding SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway (SAMOA Pathway)
2015	Launch of the Intra-Regional Forum on Migration in Africa (IRFMA or Pan-African Forum) Launch of the Arab Regional Consultative Process (ARCP) Adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Adoption by the IOM Council of the Migration Governance Framework Adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development Adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction Adoption of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change Adoption of the non-binding Nansen Initiative's Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change

	World Humanitarian Summit and launch of the Grand Bargain
	Adoption of the <i>New Urban Agenda</i> , United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Development (Habitat III)
2016	Adoption of the non-binding MICIC Initiative's Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disasters
	Adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants by the United Nations Summit on Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants
2017	Informal consultations (April–November) and stocktaking phase (December) of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
	Thematic consultations (January–December), NGO consultations (June) and stocktaking phase (December) of the Global Compact on Refugees
2018	Launch of the United Nations Network on Migration (successor to the Global Migration Group)
	Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
	Endorsement of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration by the United Nations General Assembly
	Endorsement of the Global Compact on Refugees by the United Nations General Assembly

Source: Bauloz, 2017 (updated).

Appendix B. Convergence and divergence between the Global Compact for Migration and prior global migration initiatives and processes

The Global Compact for Migration builds on previous global migration initiatives and processes, including on thematic areas upon which these initiatives were already converging prior to the Compact. These areas of convergence are reproduced in the table below along three main thematic clusters: (a) minimizing the negative aspects of migration by addressing the drivers and consequences of displacement and irregular migration; (b) acknowledging and strengthening the positive effects of migration; and (c) protecting migrants' rights and ensuring their well-being.

The Global Compact for Migration also confirms thematic trends that have emerged through the years raising new migratory and policy challenges, such as environmental migration and the focus on sustainable development, as outlined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see table below).

Summary of key thematic convergences, trends and tension points in selected global migration initiatives prior to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Areas of convergence	Minimizing the negative aspects of migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tackling the drivers of forced and irregular migration: poverty, human rights violations and armed conflicts • Addressing irregular migration through effective border control policies • Cooperating in preventing and combatting human trafficking and smuggling • Ratifying and implementing the Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Protocols
	Strengthening the positive effects of migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving money transfers and lowering remittances fees • Ensuring fair recruitment practices, including reducing recruitment agencies' fees • Facilitating voluntary return and reintegration of migrants • Improving transfers of knowledge and skills of highly skilled and other migrants • Encouraging and creating opportunities for diaspora engagement in development
	For host countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capitalizing on (temporary) labour migration to meet labour market's needs • Attracting skilled migrant workers • Capitalizing on the skills and entrepreneurship of the diaspora • Interrelationship between migration and trade (Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS))

	Strengthening the positive effects of migration	In general	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrating migration issues into development planning • Need for more evidence-based research on the interrelationship between migration and development • Improving partnerships for managing labour migration, including with the private sector
Areas of convergence	Protecting migrants' rights and ensuring their well-being		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combating discrimination, racism and xenophobia • Securing migrants workers' rights and labour standards • Protecting migrants from abuses, exploitation and human trafficking • Ratifying and implementing core international human rights treaties, ILO conventions and instruments on human trafficking • Treating women and girls, children and victims of human trafficking as migrants in vulnerable situations requiring special protection • Integrating (long-term) migrants in society
Thematic trends			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental drivers of migration (for example, natural disasters, man-made catastrophes and environmental degradation) • From development to sustainable development and the role of migration • From brain drain to temporary and/or circular migration • Stranded migrants as migration in a vulnerable situation
Key tension points			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendation for opening up more legal avenues for migration • Consideration of low-skilled labour migration outside temporary migration policies • Ratification and implementation of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Member of Their Families

Source: Bauloz, 2017. This summary was made on the basis of a comparative thematic mapping of the following nine migration initiatives and processes: the Berne Initiative; the annual meetings of the International Dialogue on Migration; the 2002 Doyle Report; the Global Commission on International Migration established in 2003; the Global Migration Group; the 2006 and 2013 First and Second High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development; the Global Forum on Migration and Development; and the 2016 United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants.

However, if the Global Compact for Migration covers issues that were already ranking high on the global migration governance agenda before the adoption of the Compact, it also goes beyond previous endeavours by:

- Placing more emphasis on some specific thematic areas, including on:
 - Collecting and utilizing accurate and disaggregated data (Objective 1) to "foster [...] research, guide[...] coherent and evidence-based policy-making and well-informed public discourse [...]" and facilitate the effective monitoring and evaluation of the Compact's commitments.

- Enhancing the availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration (Objective 5), especially through labour migration and skills matching at all skills levels,³⁵ in addition to family reunification and academic mobility.³⁶ Regular avenues are also considered for migrants compelled to leave because of sudden-onset natural disasters and other precarious situations by providing, for instance, humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, access to education for children and temporary work permits.³⁷ It provides as well for planned relocation and visa options in the specific cases of slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation.³⁸
- Addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration (Objective 7), covering a broad illustrative list of migrants in a situation of vulnerability, regardless of migration status.³⁹
- Introducing one thematic area which was not covered in previous global migration initiatives:
 - Saving lives and establishing coordinated international efforts on missing migrants (Objective 8), nevertheless already reflected in the 2016 New York Declaration.⁴⁰

While these developments constitute steps forward in global migration governance, some Global Compact for Migration objectives, commitments and actions appear not to be as far-reaching as one would have expected. If one compares the final text of the Global Compact for Migration with its first draft,⁴¹ some issues seem to have been more delicate during States' negotiations. This is, for instance, the case of the detention of migrant children. The first draft referred in categorical terms to "ending the practice of child detention in the context of international migration",⁴² while States have only committed to "working to end the practice of child detention" in the final text of the Compact.⁴³ Similarly, two specific issues have not been included in the final text of the Compact:

The non-criminalization of irregular migration: Instead, the Global Compact for Migration provides for potential sanctions to address irregular entry or stay without expressly prohibiting criminal ones,⁴⁴ except for smuggled and trafficked migrants.⁴⁵

The regularization of undocumented migrants: Regularization is only indirectly envisaged by "facilitat[ing] access for migrants in an irregular status to an individual assessment that may lead to regular status, on a case by case basis and with clear and transparent criteria".⁴⁶

35 UNGA, 2018a. On regular pathways for low-skilled migrant workers, see Newland and Riester, 2018.

36 UNGA, 2018a.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 UNGA, 2016.

41 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018a.

42 Ibid., para 27(g).

43 UNGA, 2018a, para. 29(h).

44 UNGA, 2018a: Objective 11, para. 27(f). These sanctions nonetheless have to be "proportionate, equitable, non-discriminatory, and fully consistent with due process and other obligations under international law".

45 Ibid. This contrasts with the more straightforward commitment applying to both refugees and migrants in the New York Declaration (UNGA, 2016).

46 UNGA, 2018a: Objective 7, para. 23(i), contrasting with the express reference to regularization made in the Global Compact for Migration zero draft, (Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018a: para. 30(g)) on "[f]acilitat[ing] access to regularization options as a means to promote migrants' integration [...]. See also UNGA, 2016; Annex II, para. 8(p).



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Chapter 5

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Chapter 10

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