


PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC: INFERENCE

- ① We want a ~~computationally efficient~~ way to determine whether $\alpha \models \beta$ for sentences $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma)$.  we'll settle for just a way

Revisiting our animal example, we could ask (for example):

$$(P \Rightarrow \neg F) \wedge (B \Rightarrow F) \stackrel{?}{\models} P \Rightarrow \neg B$$

Without resorting to enumerating ^{α} the truth table, how can we determine whether this entailment holds?

- ② Here is a helpful result:

Thm 1: For all $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma)$, $\alpha \models \beta$ iff $\mathcal{I}(\alpha \wedge \neg \beta) = \emptyset$.

Proof: (only if) Suppose $\alpha \models \beta$ and assume there exists a model $m \in \mathcal{I}(\alpha \wedge \neg \beta)$. Thus $m \in \mathcal{I}(\alpha)$ and $m \notin \mathcal{I}(\neg \beta)$, which means $m \notin \mathcal{I}(\beta)$.

Now $\alpha \models \beta$ means (by def'n) that $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) \subseteq \mathcal{I}(\beta)$, which means there is no model m' such that $m' \in \mathcal{I}(\alpha)$ and $m' \notin \mathcal{I}(\beta)$. Contradiction! So $\mathcal{I}(\alpha \wedge \neg \beta) = \emptyset$.

(if) Suppose $\mathcal{I}(\alpha \wedge \neg \beta) = \emptyset$. Thus $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) \cap \mathcal{I}(\neg \beta) = \emptyset$.

Now consider $m \in \mathcal{M}(\Sigma)$. If $m \in \mathcal{I}(\alpha)$, then we know $m \notin \mathcal{I}(\neg \beta)$, thus $m \in \mathcal{I}(\beta)$ by definition of \neg . So $\mathcal{I}(\alpha) \subseteq \mathcal{I}(\beta)$, which means $\alpha \models \beta$.

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③ Now we have a simple test for entailment:

does $\alpha \wedge \neg \beta$ have any models?

This means we can focus on finding an algorithm to determine whether an arbitrary sentence $\gamma \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma)$ is satisfiable (defined as $I(\gamma) \neq \emptyset$).

④ We'll begin by finding an algorithm for testing satisfiability that assumes the sentence γ has a particular form called Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), which means that it is a conjunction (i.e. ANDing) of disjunctions (ORs), like:

$$(\neg P \vee F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge (\neg B \vee \neg F \vee \neg P)$$

⑤ More formally, define the literals of signature Σ to be

$$\text{LITERALS}(\Sigma) = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \in \Sigma\} \cup \{\neg \sigma \mid \sigma \in \Sigma\}$$

We'll use the notation \bar{l} (for literal l) to mean:

$$\bar{l} = \begin{cases} \neg \sigma & \text{if } l = \sigma \\ \sigma & \text{if } l = \neg \sigma \end{cases}$$

The clauses of alphabet Σ are defined:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CLAUSES}(\Sigma) = & \{l_1 \vee \dots \vee l_k \mid k \geq 1, l_i \in \text{LITERALS}\} \\ & \cup \{\text{False}\} \end{aligned}$$

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- ⑥ A sentence is in CNF if it is a conjunction of clauses. CNF sentences have the benefit that they are somewhat intuitive to work with. Consider, for example, the sentence α :

$$(\neg P \vee F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge (\neg B \vee \neg F \vee P)$$

To show this is satisfiable, we need to find a satisfying model of α . In other words, we need $I(\alpha)$ to be nonempty:

$$\begin{aligned} I((\neg P \vee F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge (\neg B \vee \neg F \vee P)) \\ &= I(\neg P \vee F) \cap I(P \vee B) \cap I(\neg B \vee \neg F \vee P) \\ &= \underbrace{(I(\neg P) \cup I(F))}_{\substack{\text{models that} \\ \text{assign } P \rightarrow 0 \\ \text{or } F \rightarrow 1}} \cap \underbrace{(I(P) \cup I(B))}_{\substack{\text{models that} \\ \text{assign } P \rightarrow 1 \\ \text{or } B \rightarrow 1}} \cap \underbrace{(I(\neg B) \cup I(\neg F) \cup I(P))}_{\substack{\text{models that} \\ \text{assign } B \rightarrow 0 \text{ or } F \rightarrow 0 \\ \text{or } P \rightarrow 1}} \end{aligned}$$

So we can view each clause as a constraint on our model m :

$$\begin{aligned} \neg P \vee F &\leftarrow \text{m needs to assign } \underline{\underline{P \rightarrow 0}} \text{ or } F \rightarrow 1 \\ P \vee B &\leftarrow P \rightarrow 1 \text{ or } \underline{\underline{B \rightarrow 1}} \\ \neg B \vee \neg F \vee P &\leftarrow B \rightarrow 0 \text{ or } \underline{\underline{F \rightarrow 0}} \text{ or } P \rightarrow 1 \end{aligned}$$

From inspection we see that model $\{P \rightarrow 0, B \rightarrow 1, F \rightarrow 0\}$ satisfies α , so α is satisfiable.

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⑦ But how do we show a CNF sentence is unsatisfiable?

Somehow we need to prove that there's no possible assignment that satisfies the constraints.

One strategy is to show that the sentence α entails a sentence we already know is unsatisfiable. If we know β is unsatisfiable, and we show $\alpha \models \beta$, then:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \alpha \models \beta & \\ \text{implies } \mathbb{I}(\alpha) \subseteq \mathbb{I}(\beta) & \text{by def'n} \\ \text{implies } \mathbb{I}(\alpha) \subseteq \emptyset & \text{because } \beta \text{ is unsat.} \\ \text{implies } \mathbb{I}(\alpha) = \emptyset & \end{array}$$

So α is unsatisfiable.

⑧ Do we know any sentences that are unsatisfiable?

We definitely know one. The sentence

False

is unsatisfiable by definition, because $\mathbb{I}(\text{False}) = \emptyset$.

So we can show α is unsatisfiable by showing

$$\alpha \models \text{False}$$

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- ⑨ What we'd like are some sound rewrite rules so that if α can be rewritten as β according to those rules (written $\alpha \vdash \beta$), then $\alpha \models \beta$. Then we can show sentence α is unsatisfiable by showing:

$$\alpha \vdash \alpha_1 \vdash \dots \vdash \alpha_k \vdash \text{False}$$

since that means:

$$\alpha \models \alpha_1 \models \dots \models \alpha_k \models \text{False}$$

and thus:

$$I(\alpha) \subseteq I(\alpha_1) \subseteq \dots \subseteq I(\alpha_k) \subseteq I(\text{False}) = \emptyset$$

implies $I(\alpha) = \emptyset$.

- ⑩ Consider the example CNF sentence α :

$$(\neg P \vee \neg F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge F \wedge \neg B$$

As before, we can view each clause as a constraint on any model $m \in I(\alpha)$:

$$\neg P \vee \neg F$$

$$P \vee B$$

$$F$$

$$\neg B$$

m needs to assign

$$P \rightarrow 0 \text{ or } F \rightarrow 0$$

$$P \rightarrow 1 \text{ or } B \rightarrow 1$$

$$F \rightarrow 1$$

$$B \rightarrow 0$$

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⑪ IF we look at the first two clauses:

$$\begin{array}{l} \neg P \vee \neg F \\ P \vee B \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{P needs to assign} \\ P \rightarrow 0 \text{ or } F \rightarrow 0 \\ P \rightarrow 1 \text{ or } B \rightarrow 1 \end{array} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} P \text{ is either going} \\ \text{to be 0 or 1} \dots \\ \dots \text{if it's 0, then} \\ \text{we need } B \rightarrow 1 \\ \dots \text{if it's 1, then} \\ \text{we need } F \rightarrow 0 \end{array} \right.$$

We can infer that:

$$\alpha \models \neg F \vee B$$

Note that this also means:

$$\alpha \models (\neg F \vee B) \wedge \alpha$$

because for any sentence γ

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \models \gamma & \text{ implies } \mathcal{I}(\alpha) \subseteq \mathcal{I}(\gamma) \\ & \text{ implies } \mathcal{I}(\alpha) \subseteq \mathcal{I}(\gamma) \cap \mathcal{I}(\alpha) \\ & \text{ implies } \alpha \models \gamma \wedge \alpha \end{aligned}$$

⑫ We can continue this process:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\neg P \vee \neg F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge F \wedge \neg B \\ & \models (\neg P \vee \neg F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge F \wedge \neg B \wedge (\neg F \vee B) \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{by "resolving"} \\ \neg P \vee \neg F \text{ and } P \vee B \end{array} \right] \\ & \models (\neg P \vee \neg F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge F \wedge \neg B \wedge (\neg F \vee B) \wedge B \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{by "resolving"} \\ F \text{ and } \neg F \vee B \end{array} \right] \\ & \models (\neg P \vee \neg F) \wedge (P \vee B) \wedge F \wedge \neg B \wedge (\neg F \vee B) \wedge B \wedge \text{False} \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{by "resolving"} \\ \neg B \text{ and } B \end{array} \right] \\ & \models \text{False} \end{aligned}$$

And prove that α is unsatisfiable.

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- ⑬ The general version of this rewrite (called the Resolution Rule) can be defined in the base case as:

$$l, \wedge \bar{l}, \wedge \beta \vdash \text{False}$$

and in the general case as


$$(l, \vee \dots \vee l_i \vee \dots \vee l_m) \wedge (l'_1 \vee \dots \vee l'_j \vee \dots \vee l'_n) \wedge \beta \\ \vdash (l, \vee \dots \vee l_{i-1}, \vee l_{i+1}, \vee \dots \vee l_m \vee l'_1 \vee \dots \vee l'_{j-1}, \vee l'_{j+1}, \vee \dots \vee l'_n) \wedge \beta$$

for literals $l_1, \dots, l_m, l'_1, \dots, l'_n \in \text{LITERALS}(\Sigma)$ s.t. $l_i = \bar{l}'_j$ and arbitrary sentence $\beta \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma)$.

- ⑭ Soundness Thm: If $\alpha \vdash \gamma$, then $\alpha \models \gamma$.

Proof: (base) $\models (l, \wedge \bar{l}, \wedge \beta) = \models (l) \cap \models (\bar{l}) \cap \models (\beta) = \emptyset = \models (\text{False})$
so $l, \wedge \bar{l}, \wedge \beta \models \text{False}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(general)} \quad & \models ((l, \vee \dots \vee l_i \vee \dots \vee l_m) \wedge (l'_1 \vee \dots \vee l'_j \vee \dots \vee l'_n) \wedge \beta) \\ &= \models (l, \vee \dots \vee l_i \vee \dots \vee l_m) \cap \models (l'_1 \vee \dots \vee l'_j \vee \dots \vee l'_n) \cap \models (\beta) \\ &= (\models (l_i) \cup \models (l, \vee \dots \vee l_{i-1}, \vee l_{i+1}, \vee \dots \vee l_m)) \cap (\models (l'_j) \cup \models (l'_1 \vee \dots \vee l'_{j-1}, \vee l'_{j+1}, \vee \dots \vee l'_n)) \cap \models (\beta) \\ &= (\models (l_i) \cup \models (\gamma_i)) \cap (\models (\bar{l}_i) \cup \models (\gamma'_i)) \cap \models (\beta) \\ &\subseteq (\models (\gamma_i) \cup \models (\gamma'_i)) \cap \models (\beta) \\ &= \models ((\gamma_i \vee \gamma'_i) \wedge \beta) \end{aligned}$$



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⑮ So that means, if we can find a sequence of rewrites

$$\alpha \vdash \alpha_1 \vdash \dots \vdash \alpha_k \vdash \text{False}$$

then

$$\alpha \models \text{False}$$

But is it also true that if we can't find a sequence of rewrites s.t. $\alpha \models \text{False}$, then we can conclude $\alpha \not\models \text{False}$ (hence α is satisfiable)?

⑯ Surprisingly, yes. To show this, first define the resolution closure of a set of clauses S as the smallest set $RC(S)$ such that:

- $c \in S \Rightarrow c \in RC(S)$
- $c_1, c_2 \in RC(S)$ and $c_1 \wedge c_2 \vdash c \Rightarrow c \in RC(S)$

In other words, $RC(S)$ is the set of clauses you can derive through repeated application of the Resolution Rule.

⑰ For instance,

$$\text{if } S = \{A \vee B, \neg B \vee \neg C\} \text{ then } RC(S) = \{A \vee B, \neg B \vee \neg C, A \vee \neg C\}$$

$$\text{if } S = \{A \vee B, B \vee \neg C\} \text{ then } RC(S) = S.$$

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(18) Completeness Thm: If CNF sentence $c, \wedge \dots \wedge c_N$ is unsatisfiable, then $\text{False} \in \text{RC}(\{c_1, \dots, c_N\})$

Proof:

(i) We'll show the contrapositive, i.e. if

$\text{False} \notin \text{RC}(S)$ for $S = \{c_1, \dots, c_N\}$, then $c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_N$ is satisfiable.

Let $\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_M\}$

Assume $\text{False} \notin \text{RC}(S)$.

(ii) Let's construct a conjunction $l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_M$ of literals s.t. $l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_M \models c$ for every clause $c \in \text{RC}(S)$.

If we can do that, then

$$l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_M \models c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_N$$

so $I(l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_M) \subseteq I(c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_N)$, and since $I(l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_M)$ is nonempty, therefore $I(c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_N)$ is nonempty, $\therefore c_1 \wedge \dots \wedge c_N$ is satisfiable.

Examples:

(i) Let: $\Sigma = \{A, B, C\}$

$$S = \{c_1, c_2\}$$

where: c_1 is $\neg B \vee \neg C$

c_2 is $\neg A \vee C$

Thus:

$$\text{RC}(S) = \{\neg B \vee \neg C, \neg A \vee C, \neg A \vee \neg B\}$$

(ii) if we construct

$$A \wedge \neg B \wedge C$$

then:

$$A \wedge \neg B \wedge C \models \neg B \vee \neg C$$

$$A \wedge \neg B \wedge C \models \neg A \vee C$$

$$A \wedge \neg B \wedge C \models \neg A \vee \neg B$$

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(18) (cont.)

(iii) We'll initialize $l_0 = \text{True}$.

For $m=1$ to M , set $l_m \in \{\sigma_m, \neg\sigma_m\}$

(if possible) such that:

$l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_m \not\models \neg c$ for each clause $c \in RC(S)$
otherwise set $l_m = \sigma_m$.

(iii) $l_0 = \text{True}$

$l_1 = A$

$l_2 = \neg B$ (otherwise $A \wedge B \models \neg(\neg A \vee \neg B)$)

$l_3 = C$ (otherwise $A \wedge \neg B \wedge \neg C \models \neg C_2$)

(iv) For the sake of contradiction:

Assume m is the first iteration at which $l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_m \models \neg c$ for some clause $c \in RC(S)$.

We know $m > 0$, because $\text{True} \not\models \neg c$ for all c except False, which is not in $RC(S)$ by the premise in (i)

(v) At iteration m , there exist clauses $c_1, c_2 \in RC(S)$

s.t. $l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_{m-1} \wedge \sigma_m \models \neg c_1$

$l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_{m-1} \wedge \neg\sigma_m \models \neg c_2$

These clauses must have the forms:

$c_1: c'_1 \vee \neg\sigma_m$

$c_2: c'_2 \vee \sigma_m$

Otherwise:

$l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_{m-1} \models \neg c_1$

$l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_{m-1} \models \neg c_2$

which violates the assumption that m is the earliest iteration s.t. $l_0 \wedge \dots \wedge l_m \models \neg c$ for $c \in RC(S)$

(v) say at iteration 3, we

have $l_0 = \text{True}$

$l_1 = A$

$l_2 = B$

then:

$\text{True} \wedge A \wedge B \wedge C \models \neg c_1$

$\text{True} \wedge A \wedge B \wedge \neg C \models \neg c_2$

$\neg B \vee \neg C$

$\neg A \vee C$

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(18) (cont.)

(vi) Since $c_1, c_2 \in RC(S)$,
thus $c_1' \vee c_2' \in RC(S)$, since c_1 and
 c_2 resolve to $c_1' \vee c_2'$.

(vi) $\neg B \vee \neg C$ resolves with
 $\neg A \vee C$ to obtain
 $\neg A \vee \neg B$, which is in
 $RC(S)$.

(vii) $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \wedge \sigma_m \models \neg c_1$,
so $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \wedge \sigma_m \models \neg(c_1' \vee \neg \sigma_m)$
so $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \wedge \sigma_m \models \neg c_1' \wedge \sigma_m$ [De Morgan]
so $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \models \neg c_1'$

Analogously, $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \models \neg c_2'$

Therefore, $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \models \neg c_1' \wedge \neg c_2'$

$$\equiv \neg(c_1' \vee c_2') \text{ [De Morgan]}$$

Since $c_1' \vee c_2' \in RC(S)$, we obtain that
 $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_{m-1} \models \neg c$ for some $c \in RC(S)$,
which means m was NOT the first
iteration at which $\ell_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_m \models \neg c$.

— CONTRADICTION!

(viii) Thus, at every iteration m ,
 $\ell_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_m \models c \quad \forall c \in RC(S)$

So $\ell_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \ell_m \models c \quad \forall c \in RC(S)$

QED.

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19) So what have we shown so far?

(i) we want to compute whether

$$\alpha \models \beta$$

for any $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma)$



this is equivalent to showing whether $\alpha \vee \neg \beta$

is satisfiable

(ii) we want to compute whether

γ is satisfiable

for any $\gamma \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma)$
such that γ is in
CNF



this can be done using resolution

in a finite number of steps

20) We're missing one key piece to bring this home. Given a non-CNF sentence α , can we convert this into a CNF sentence β such that α is satisfiable iff β is satisfiable?

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21) The answer is yes. Let's go through the recipe, using example (non-CNF) sentence $(\text{Bird} \Leftrightarrow (\text{Penguin} \vee \text{Fly}))$

(i) Replace $(\alpha \Leftrightarrow \beta)$ with $((\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \Rightarrow \alpha))$:

$$((B \Rightarrow (P \vee F)) \wedge ((P \vee F) \Rightarrow B))$$

(ii) Replace $(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta)$ with $(\neg \alpha \vee \beta)$:

$$((\neg B \vee (P \vee F)) \wedge (\neg (P \vee F) \vee B))$$

(iii) Move \neg "inwards" with three replacements: $\neg \neg \alpha$ with α , $\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta)$ with $(\neg \alpha \vee \neg \beta)$, and $\neg(\alpha \vee \beta)$ with $(\neg \alpha \wedge \neg \beta)$:

$$((\neg B \vee (P \vee F)) \wedge ((\neg P \wedge \neg F) \vee B))$$

(iv) Distribute ands-over-ors and ors-over-and with two replacements: $(\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma))$ with $((\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma))$ and $(\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma))$ with $((\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma))$

$$((\neg B \vee (P \vee F)) \wedge ((\neg P \vee B) \wedge (F \vee B)))$$

└──────────┘

clause 1

└──┘

clause 2

└──┘

clause 3

$\neg B \vee P \vee F$

\wedge

$\neg P \vee B$

\wedge

$F \vee B$

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22) It is relatively straightforward to prove the correctness of this conversion by showing the correctness of each step. For instance, we can show that

$$I(\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta)) = I((\neg\alpha \vee \neg\beta))$$

as follows:

$$I(\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta)) = M(\Sigma) - I(\alpha \wedge \beta)$$

$$= M(\Sigma) - (I(\alpha) \cap I(\beta))$$

$$I(\neg\alpha \vee \neg\beta) = I(\neg\alpha) \cup I(\neg\beta)$$

$$= (M(\Sigma) - I(\alpha)) \cup (M(\Sigma) - I(\beta))$$



$$= I(\neg\alpha) \cup I(\neg\beta)$$

$$= I((\neg\alpha \vee \neg\beta))$$

