

# Assignment 3

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## Question 1

### (a) Why linear programming is suitable for this case study

- Linear programming is suitable in this case study since we are trying to find the optimized solution, in this case, minimizing the cost of acquiring two component A and B, all the while making sure all constraints are met.
- From the given problem, we want to minimize the cost of A (4\$/L) and B (12\$/L) per week, making the objective function a linear combination of A and B cost. The beverage mix of A and B must satisfy these conditions:
  - Orange constraint: There must be at least 5 Litres of Orange per 100 Litres of beverage mix.
  - Mango constraint: There must be at least 5 Litres of Mango per 100 Litres of beverage mix.
  - Lime constraint: There must be at most 6 Litres of Lime per 100 Litres of beverage mix.
  - Customer constraint: There must be 140 Litres of beverage mix produced per week.

### (b) Formulate LP model for the factory

Decision variables: Let  $x_A$  and  $x_B$  be the amount of product A and product B required per week (in Litres), respectively.

Our objective function is to minimize the total cost of producing the beverage per week:

$$\text{minimize } z = 4x_A + 12x_B$$

Subjected to:

- The orange constraint:

$$\frac{\frac{6}{100}x_A + \frac{4}{100}x_B}{x_A + x_B} \geq \frac{5}{100}$$

$$\implies x_A - x_B \geq 0$$

- The mango constraint:

$$\frac{\frac{4}{100}x_A + \frac{8}{100}x_B}{x_A + x_B} \geq \frac{5}{100}$$

$$\implies -x_A + 3x_B \geq 0$$

- The lime constraint:

$$\frac{\frac{2}{100}x_A + \frac{7}{100}x_B}{x_A + x_B} \leq \frac{6}{100}$$

$$\implies -3x_A + x_B \leq 0$$


- The customer constraint:

$$x_A + x_B \geq 140$$

- Non-negativity constraint (since cost cannot be negative):

$$x_A, x_B \geq 0$$

(c) Graphical Solution



- We first graph the constraints on 2D-plane. This will give us the feasible region (gray) that a solution is acceptable. To rewrite each constraints to line function, we replaced  $x_A$  to  $x$ , and  $x_B$  to  $y$ .
- After graphing the objective function, we can look for the iso-cost lines, which is a line parallel to the objective function and first come into contact with the feasible region. (red)
- From the graph, we can see that the point where  $x_A = 105$  and  $x_B = 35$  is the optimal solution. It is also the intersection between the customer constraints and mango constraints. Therefore, the optimal cost for product A and B is  $4 * 105 + 12 * 35 = 840$  dollars per week.

**(d) Range of product A so that optimal solution remains unchanged**

We denote  $c_A$  as the cost of product A such that the optimal solution remains unchanged.

The objective function  $z = c_A x_A + 12x_b$  can be graphed using the line function  $y = -\frac{c_A}{12}x - z$ .

Visually, we can see that this line can be pivot around the point (105, 35) and limited by the customer constraint (clockwise) and mango constraint (anti-clockwise). The slope for customer and mango constraints can be deduce by:

$$\begin{aligned}x + y &\geq 140 \implies y \geq -x + 140 \\-x + 3y &\geq 0 \implies y \geq \frac{1}{3}x\end{aligned}$$

Therefor, the slope of the objective function must be within  $[-1, \frac{1}{3}]$ . Moreover, **cost of product A must be non-negative**:

$$-1 \leq -\frac{c_A}{12} \leq \frac{1}{3}$$

$$\implies 12 \geq c_A \geq -4$$

$$\implies 0 \leq c_A \leq 12$$

The cost for product A in the range of  $[0, 12]$  will make the optimal solution remains unchanged.

## Question 2

**(a) Formulate LP problem**

Decision Variables:

- $x_{CS}, x_{CA}, x_{CW}$ : Tons of **Cotton** used for Spring, Autumn, and Winter.
- $x_{WS}, x_{WA}, x_{WW}$ : Tons of **Wool** used for Spring, Autumn, and Winter.
- $x_{SS}, x_{SA}, x_{SW}$ : Tons of **Silk** used for Spring, Autumn, and Winter.

Sales:  $60(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS}) + 55(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA}) + 65(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW})$

Purchase price:  $30(x_{CS} + x_{CA} + x_{CW}) + 45(x_{WS} + x_{WA} + x_{WW}) + 50(x_{SS} + x_{SA} + x_{SW})$

Production costs:  $5(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS}) + 3(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA}) + 8(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW})$

Objective function:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{maximize } z &= \text{Sales} - \text{Purchase Costs} - \text{Production Costs} \\&= (60(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS}) + 55(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA}) + 65(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW})) \\&\quad - (30(x_{CS} + x_{CA} + x_{CW}) + 45(x_{WS} + x_{WA} + x_{WW}) + 50(x_{SS} + x_{SA} + x_{SW})) \\&\quad - (5(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS}) + 3(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA}) + 8(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW})) \\&\implies \text{maximize } z = (25x_{CS} + 10x_{WS} + 5x_{SS} + 22x_{CA} + 7x_{WA} + 2x_{SA} + 27x_{CW} + 12x_{WW} + 7x_{SW})\end{aligned}$$

Constraints:

1. Proportional Constraints:

- For **Spring**:

$$x_{CS} \geq 0.55(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS}), \quad x_{WS} \geq 0.30(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS}), \quad x_{SS} \geq 0.01(x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS})$$

- For **Autumn**:

$$x_{CA} \geq 0.45(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA}), \quad x_{WA} \geq 0.40(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA}), \quad x_{SA} \geq 0.02(x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA})$$

- For **Winter**:

$$x_{CW} \geq 0.30(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW}), \quad x_{WW} \geq 0.50(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW}), \quad x_{SW} \geq 0.03(x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW})$$

2. Demand Constraints:

$$x_{CS} + x_{WS} + x_{SS} \leq 3200, \quad x_{CA} + x_{WA} + x_{SA} \leq 3800, \quad x_{CW} + x_{WW} + x_{SW} \leq 4200$$

3. Non-Negativity:

$$x_{CS}, x_{CA}, x_{CW}, x_{WS}, x_{WA}, x_{WW}, x_{SS}, x_{SA}, x_{SW} \geq 0$$

(b) Solve the problem with R

The optimal profit is **203,620\$**. The corresponding values of the decision variables are:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{CS} &= 2208, & x_{CA} &= 2204, & x_{CW} &= 1974 \\ x_{WS} &= 960, & x_{WA} &= 1520, & x_{WW} &= 2100 \\ x_{SS} &= 32, & x_{SA} &= 76, & x_{SW} &= 126 \end{aligned}$$

These values represent the tons of each material (cotton, wool, silk) allocated to Spring, Autumn, and Winter, maximizing the profit.

### Question 3

(a) Formulate the payoff matrix for the game and identify possible saddle points

- Each player have a sequence of selected move (first chip, second chip, third chip). In total, there are 6 permutation of chip selection. The payoff matrix is a 6x6 matrix, each cell represent the final payoff of player 1 if the corresponding sequence was played by player 1 (row) and player 2 (column).

	RWB	RBW	WRB	WBR	BRW	BWR
RWB	0	0	0	75	-75	0
RBW	0	0	75	0	0	-75
WRB	0	-75	0	0	0	75
WBR	-75	0	0	0	75	0
BRW	75	0	0	-75	0	0
BWR	0	75	-75	0	0	0

- From a pure strategy viewpoint,
  - the lower value (maximum security level for player 1 or L) is -75
  - the upper value (maximum security level for player 2 or U) of the game U is 75
- Therefore, pure strategy will not result in equilibrium (saddle point)

**(b) Linear Programming Formulation**

**(b.1) For Player 1 Decision Variables:**

1.  $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6$ : Probabilities that Player 1 plays each sequence  $RWB, RBW, WRB, WBR, BRW, BWR$
2.  $v$ : Minimum payoff for player 1

**Objective Function:**  $\text{maximize}(z) = v$

**Constraints:**

**1. Payoff Constraints:**

$$v + 75x_4 - 75x_5 \leq 0$$

$$v + 75x_3 - 75x_6 \leq 0$$

$$v - 75x_2 + 75x_6 \leq 0$$

$$v - 75x_1 + 75x_5 \leq 0$$

$$v + 75x_1 - 75x_4 \leq 0$$

$$v + 75x_2 - 75x_3 \leq 0$$

**2. Probability Sum Constraint:** Probabilities for Player 1's strategies must sum to 1:

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5 + x_6 = 1$$

**3. Non-Negativity Constraint:** Probabilities cannot be negative:

$$x_k \geq 0 \quad \forall k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$$

**(b.2) For player 2** This formulation is for Player 2, who aims to minimize the maximum payoff ( $v$ ) that Player 1 can secure. It uses the payoff matrix constraints but flipped to reflect Player 2's perspective.

**Decision Variables:**

1.  $y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, y_5, y_6$ : Probabilities that Player 2 plays each sequence ( $RWB, RBW, WRB, WBR, BRW, BWR$ ).
2.  $v$ : maximum payoff for player 1

**Objective Function:**  $\text{minimize}(z) = v$

**Constraints:**

**1. Payoff Constraints:**

$$v - 75y_4 + 75y_5 \geq 0$$

$$v - 75y_3 + 75y_6 \geq 0$$

$$v + 75y_2 - 75y_6 \geq 0$$

$$v + 75y_1 - 75y_5 \geq 0$$

$$v - 75y_1 + 75y_4 \geq 0$$

$$v - 75y_2 + 75y_3 \geq 0$$

**2. Probability Sum Constraint:** Probabilities for Player 2's strategies must sum to 1:

$$y_1 + y_2 + y_3 + y_4 + y_5 + y_6 = 1$$

**3. Non-Negativity Constraint:** Probabilities cannot be negative:

$$y_k \geq 0 \quad \forall k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$$

**(d) Solve the game**

**(d.1) Player 1** The optimal mixed strategy and payoff for Player 1 is:

$$x_1 = 0.33, x_2 = 0, x_3 = 0, x_4 = 0.33, x_5 = 0.33, x_6 = 0, v = 0$$

This indicate that player 1 should split their plays between strategy 1 (RWB), 4 (WBR), 5 (BRW) equally (33.33%). The minimum payoff or security level for them would be maximized to  $v = 0$ . This is a fair game. The expected payoffs can be calculated:

Expected payoff when Player 2 Plays Strategy 1 ( $j = 1$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot -75) + (0.33 \cdot 75) + (0 \cdot 0) = 0$$

Expected payoff when Player 2 Plays Strategy 2 ( $j = 2$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot -75) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 75) = 0$$

Expected payoff when Player 2 Plays Strategy 3 ( $j = 3$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 75) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot -75) = 0$$

Expected payoff when Player 2 Plays Strategy 4 ( $j = 4$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 75) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot -75) + (0 \cdot 0) = 0$$

Expected payoff when Player 2 Plays Strategy 5 ( $j = 5$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot -75) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 75) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) = 0$$

Expected payoff when Player 2 Plays Strategy 6 ( $j = 6$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot -75) + (0 \cdot 75) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0 \cdot 0) = 0$$

Since expected payoffs are all zeroes, we can expect the total expected payoffs to be 0, no matter which mixed strategy player 2 deploys.

**(d.2) Player 2** The optimal mixed strategy and payoff for Player 2 is:

$$y_1 = 0.33, y_2 = 0, y_3 = 0, y_4 = 0.33, y_5 = 0.33, y_6 = 0$$

This indicates that Player 2 should split their plays between strategy 1 (RWB), 4 (WBR), and 5 (BRW) equally (33.33%). The maximum payoff or security level for their opponent would be minimized to  $v = 0$ .

Expected Payoff when Player 1 Plays Strategy 1 ( $i = 1$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) = 0$$

Expected Payoff when Player 1 Plays Strategy 2 ( $i = 2$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 0) = 0$$

Expected Payoff when Player 1 Plays Strategy 3 ( $i = 3$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot -75) + (0.33 \cdot 75) = 0$$

Expected Payoff when Player 1 Plays Strategy 4 ( $i = 4$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot -75) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 75) = 0$$

Expected Payoff when Player 1 Plays Strategy 5 ( $i = 5$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 75) + (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot -75) = 0$$

Expected Payoff when Player 1 Plays Strategy 6 ( $i = 6$ ):

$$\text{Expected Payoff} = (0.33 \cdot 0) + (0.33 \cdot 75) + (0.33 \cdot -75) = 0$$

Since all expected payoffs are zero, we can expect the total expected payoffs for Player 2 to be 0, no matter which mixed strategy player 1 deploys.



**(d.3) Infinite solutions** Since for both player 1 and 2, the payoff  $v = 0$  means that there exist no mixed strategy where a player can gain an edge on the other, making this a fair game. We can simplify the payoff constraints

1.  $75x_4 + -75x_5 \leq 0 \implies x_4 \leq x_5$
2.  $75x_3 + -75x_6 \leq 0 \implies x_3 \leq x_6$
3.  $-75x_2 + 75x_6 \leq 0 \implies x_6 \leq x_2$
4.  $-75x_1 + 75x_5 \leq 0 \implies x_5 \leq x_1$
5.  $75x_1 - 75x_4 \leq 0 \implies x_1 \leq x_4$
6.  $75x_2 - 75x_3 \leq 0 \implies x_2 \leq x_3$

Which implies:

- $(1), (4), (5) \implies x_1 = x_4 = x_5$
- $(2), (3), (6) \implies x_2 = x_3 = x_6$
- as well as  $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5 + x_6 = 1$
- and  $x_i \geq 0$  for all  $i = 1, 2, \dots, 6$

There are infinite combination of solutions. For example,  $x_1 = x_4 = x_5 = x_2 = x_3 = x_6 = \frac{1}{6}$  is another solution to the problem. Another solution can be  $x_1 = \frac{6}{30}, x_2 = \frac{4}{30}, x_3 = \frac{4}{30}, x_4 = \frac{6}{30}, x_5 = \frac{6}{30}, x_6 = \frac{4}{30}$