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Lecture notes, Now 19th, 2020
    CORRECTION:
                 Budget Constraint of hhld.
                                           c+a' ≤y+R·a
                                                    alternative: C + \frac{\alpha'}{R} \leq \gamma + \alpha
Firm Dynamics Model (Simplest version)
  tire is discrete, infinte horzon
  Fixed production factor : capital k
   production function
    competitive labor merket
 field were w constant over time

reviewe

max

| Y - w. | = profit (before tex)
                        \frac{\partial (\gamma N \cdot l)}{\partial (\gamma N \cdot l)} = 5 \cdot (l - w) \cdot k^{2} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} - w = 0 \quad (FONC)
                                                      5. (1-0) Ka = ) -4
                                                                      \int_{\mathbb{R}} = \left( \frac{2 \cdot (|\infty|) k_{\infty}}{M} \right) - \frac{\alpha}{1}
                                                                         = ( S. (I-m) ) x
                               = \underbrace{\left[ S \cdot \left( \frac{M}{2(1-m)} \right) \frac{1}{1-m} - M \cdot \left( \frac{M}{2(1-m)} \right) \frac{1}{1-m} \right]}_{f=g} \cdot K
= \underbrace{\left[ S \cdot \left( \frac{M}{2(1-m)} \right) \frac{1}{1-m} \cdot K \cdot K - M \cdot \left( \frac{M}{2(1-m)} \right) \frac{1}{1-m} \right]}_{f=g} \cdot K
= \underbrace{\left[ S \cdot \left( \frac{M}{2(1-m)} \right) \frac{1}{1-m} \cdot K \cdot K - M \cdot \left( \frac{M}{2(1-m)} \right) \frac{1}{1-m} \right]}_{f=g} \cdot K
                                                                                   Z(S, W) W - constent
S - Merker, exogenous
                                         1 T = Z-K - CRS, C-D production fration.
                                           \pi = z \cdot k^{\theta} - DRS (-1), \theta = s_1 \times s_1 + s_2 = s_2 = s_1 + s_2 = s_2 = s_1 + s_2 = s_2 = s_2 = s_1 + s_2 = s_
                               TL; DR: Z is exogenors. Morkov
                           6 = (1-8)k+ c
                        Thefor, Bollmon Gg. of firm? T k. 2
                               V(z,k) = \max_{k'} \left| \frac{\pi(z,k) - (k' - (LS)k)}{\pi(z',k')} + R\tilde{E}V(z',k') \right|
                                                                                                divided to shockelders (obsert hove to be non-regulative)
                                    firms: risk-neutral in this coise
                                   (implietly assuming Modeliani-Miller)
                                                               talence sheet: A = L + E hild by shockides
                                   Enter eq.? \beta \in \left[ \left( \frac{(-5) + \frac{3\pi^{1}}{2k!}}{2k!} \right) = 1
                                                        T(z,k) if z is i.i.d. => k' the some over (z,k)
                                                                                     if Zis Morker => K' is the some over K
                                                ORS production? T(2,k)=2,k 3/ = 2
                                               ORS production T(3, k) = 3. k2 37 = 2.3 k2-1
                                                                                                                                                  magnal profit is decr. over k
                                                                                                                             Book-to-Market Ratio. K
                                                                                                                                  (in data: market value: p.S)
                                            high q -> high value of investment
                                    \operatorname{project}(Q) \Rightarrow \frac{\partial V}{\partial K} \quad \text{vs.} \quad \frac{V}{K} \; \leftarrow \; \operatorname{average}(Q)
                                       Hayash: (1982)
                                               capital adjustment cost (quadratic)
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