

# Module 1: What is the Hospital Objective Function?

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Econ 771

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# Motivation

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# Ownership types

1. Private not-for-profit: About 60%
2. For-profit: About 20%
3. State and local gov't: About 20%

Source: [AHA Fast Facts](#)

# Policy effects

Understanding how hospitals might respond to changes in policy or how they will strategically respond to each other requires that we know something about their objective function.

1. All for profit?
2. Profit motive with some charitable "mission"?


# Not-for-profit Hospitals

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# Non-profit hospitals in theory


- Hospital assumed to maximize some objective function,  $u(q, z)$ , subject to a production constraint
- $q$  denotes quantity of care and  $z$  denotes quality of care
- Production is constrained by the break-even condition

# Non-profit hospitals in theory, Newhouse (1970)





# Non-profit hospitals in theory, Newhouse (1970)



# Non-profit hospitals in practice

- Profits must be re-invested into the hospital
- Must show "community benefit" (no consensus definition...includes uncompensated care, services to Medicaid, and certain specialized services that are generally unprofitable)
- No taxes! and tax-free bonds


# Non-profit hospitals and tax benefits

- \$24.6 billion in tax exemptions in 2011
- \$62.4 billion in "community benefits"
- [Washington Post Article](#)

What do you think? Are these community benefits measured appropriately?

# An aside on hospital pricing

*What is a hospital price? A defining characteristic of hospital services is, it's complicated!*



1/04/11	1	0416826	SET CLEARLINK DDO-VENT	17.00
1/04/11	1	0406462	TUBE CONNECTING STERIL 6FT	27.00
1/04/11	1	0406462	TUBE CONNECTING STERIL 6FT	27.00
1/05/11	1	3005741	ACCU-CHEK CCRV	18.00
1/05/11	1	3019692	SURGICEL 2X14 STRIP EACH	451.00
1/05/11	1	3005741	ACCU-CHEK CCRV	18.00
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1/05/11	1	3005741	ACCU-CHEK CCRV	18.00
1/05/11	10	2900025	OXYGEN HOURLY	560.00
1/05/11	1	0402230	LEUKINS TUBE SPECIM TRAP	77.00
1/05/11	1	0416826	SET EXTENSION 1-VALVE	12.00
1/05/11	1	0406793	SUCTION YANKAUER	44.00
1/05/11	1	0416818	SECOND SET SET LUER LOCK	5.00
1/05/11	1	0416818	SECOND SET SET LUER LOCK	12.00

Brill, Steven. 2013. "Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills are Killing Us." \*Time Magazine\*.


# An aside on hospital pricing

Lots of different payers paying lots of different prices:

- Medicare fee-for-service prices
- Medicaid payments
- Private insurance negotiations (including Medicare Advantage)
- But what about the price to patients?

Price  $\neq$  charge  $\neq$  cost  $\neq$  patient out-of-pocket spending

# An aside on hospital pricing



Source: Health Care Pricing Project

# What is a hospital price?

Not clear what exactly is negotiated...

## Fee-for-service

- price per procedure
- percentage of charges
- markup over Medicare rates

## Capitation

- payment per patient
- pay-for-performance
- shared savings

# An aside on hospital pricing


A few stylized facts:

1. Hospital services are expensive
2. Prices vary dramatically across different areas
3. Lack of competition is a major reason for high prices



# An aside on hospital pricing


Hospital Prices for Hip Replacement  
Atlanta, GA HRR, 2008-2011



**Note:** Each column captures a hospital's negotiated transaction price and Medicare reimbursement. Prices are averaged from 2008-2011 and presented in 2011 dollars. CoV captures the coefficient of variation of hospital negotiated transaction prices within the HRR. Max/Min captures the max/min ratio of hospital's negotiated transaction prices within the HRR. Horizontal lines indicate average rates and prices within the region.

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Hospital Prices for Lower Limb MRI  
Atlanta, GA HRR, 2008-2011



**Note:** Each column captures a hospital's negotiated transaction price and Medicare reimbursement. Prices are averaged from 2008-2011 and presented in 2011 dollars. CoV captures the coefficient of variation of hospital negotiated transaction prices within the HRR. Max/Min captures the max/min ratio of hospital's negotiated transaction prices within the HRR. Horizontal lines indicate average rates and prices within the region.

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# What is a non-profit hospital?

The real question is...what is the hospital's objective function?

- For-profit in disguise
- Output maximizers
- Tax-benefit maximizers
- Social welfare maximizers

Most empirical evidence doesn't find much of a difference between FP and NFP hospitals, except FPs have higher prices. Why is that?

# For Profit Hospitals

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# For-profit hospitals

These are easier to study theoretically...just a standard profit maximizing firm.

- $\pi = P(q)q - C(q)$ , where  $q$  denotes quantity of care
- Firm has some market power and so faces a downward sloping demand curve

# Cost Shifting

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# What is cost-shifting?

The process by which hospitals increase prices for private insurance patients in response to lower reimbursements from other patients

# Theory of cost-shifting, Dranove (1988)

Objective is to maximize some function of profits and quantity of care provided, denoted by

$$U(\pi_j = \pi_{i,j} + \pi_{g,j}, D_{i,j}, D_{g,j}),$$

where  $\pi_j$  denotes total profits for hospital  $j$  and  $D_{i,j}$  denotes hospital demand from insurer  $i$ .

- $p_j$  is exogenous and determined by a public payer
- hospital sets price for private insurance customers,  $p_i$

# Theory of cost-shifting, Dranove (1988)

The hospital chooses  $p_i$  such that

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial p_i} = U_1 \pi_1^i + U_2 \frac{\partial D_i}{\partial p_i} = 0,$$

where  $U_1$  denotes the derivative of  $U(\cdot)$  with respect to its first argument and similarly for  $U_2$ .



# Theory of cost-shifting, Dranove (1988)

How does the choice of  $p_i$  change with  $p_j$ ?

$$\frac{dp_i}{dp_j} = - \frac{U_{11}\pi_1^i\pi_1^j + \frac{\partial D_i}{\partial p_i}U_{12}\pi_1^j}{\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial p_i^2}}$$

# Cost-shifting in practice

- Can it happen? Not theoretically supported if hospitals are for-profit. Supported if something other than profits actually drives a hospital's decisions
- Does it happen? Empirically, some evidence of cost-shifting but likely small with heterogeneous effects
- Some people **really** don't think cost-shifting happens, [incidental economist blog](#).

# Physicians' Cooperative

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# Hospitals as a physicians' cooperative

- Physicians as the owners of the hospital
- Divide operational profits among themselves
- In practice: physician owned hospital or simply medical staff of the hospital with some control over physician admitting privileges


# Physicians' cooperative objective function

Physicians maximize income,


$$y_m = \frac{1}{m}(px - wL - cK),$$

where  $L$  is the amount of non-physician labor,  $w$  is the wage of those employees,  $K$  is the capital purchased for price  $c$ , and  $px$  reflects the total revenue (to both the hospital and physician) based on a quantity of  $x$  and price of  $p$

# Physicians' cooperative graphically



# Physicians' cooperative with physician supply



# Takeaways

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# Different predictions

- Not-for-profit hospitals will respond differently to price changes and changes in competition
- In practice, hospitals may have a blend of different objectives...very hard to predict behavior theoretically

# Why does this matter?

A few reasons for going through this stuff:

1. Understand the basic models in the literature
2. Cost-shifting is an important policy question and a good story of bias in the literature
3. Ultimately, identifying the "true" objective function is an empirical question (and maybe impossible)