

KAIST Summer Session 2018

Module 2. Causal Inference with STATA

## Replication (3) Instrument Variable

**KAIST College of Business** 

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# **Two-Stage Least Squares**





#### Let's Replicate the Work of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)

[ Journal of Political Economy, 2005, vol. 113, no. 5] © 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/2005/11305-0002\$10.00

#### **Unbundling Institutions**

Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This paper evaluates the importance of "property rights institutions," which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and "contracting institutions," which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history and document strong first-stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization) and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variables approach, we find that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of financial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often find ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions but find it harder to mitigate the risk of expropriation in this way.




Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S., 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), pp.949-995.



#### Let's Replicate the Work of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)

#### • Research question:

Do contracting and property rights institutions matter for economic growth?








Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S., 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), pp.949-995.




## (1) Designing the Identification Strategy

- Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) using instrument variables (IVs)
  - ➤ How to address endogeneity
    - Legal origins as instruments for legal formalism (contracting institutions)



- Mortality rates and colony population as instruments for property rights institutions

For the identification assumption, the authors use the data on excolonial countries







#### • [STATA Practice] Instrumenting for contracting institution

You need to set the directory where your files are located.

TABLE 3
FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS FOR CONTRACTING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (OLS, Sample of Ex-Colonies)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Panel A. Measure of Contracting Institutions						
	Dependent Variable: Legal able: Proce Formalism Complex		ocedural	Dependent Vari- able: Number of Procedures			
English legal origin	-1.98	-1.79	-2.28	-2.24	-11.29	-12.39	
Log settler mortality	(.23) .09 (.09)	(.20)	(.34) 08 (1.32)	(.29)	(3.31) 1.59 (1.29)	(2.88)	
Log population density in 1500	(100)	.04 (.06)	(2102)	13 (.86)	(2120)	38 (.84)	
$R^2$ in first stage	.64	.58	.47	.47	.23	.22	
Observations	53	64	60	68	61	69	

cd "E:\Desktop"
use "STATA\_Lab3\Unbundle.dta", clear

reg sdformalism sjlouk logem4 if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & conssj7000~=.

reg sdformalism sjlouk lpd1500s if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & conssj7000~=.

reg ecproccompindex sjlouk logem4 if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & conssj7000~=.

reg ecproccompindex sjlouk lpd1500s if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & conssj7000~=.


reg ecnumprocedures sjlouk logem4 if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & conssj7000~=.

reg ecnumprocedures sjlouk lpd1500s if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & conssj7000~=.





• [STATA Practice] Instrumenting for contracting institution



cibar sdformalism, over1(sjlouk) cibar ecproccompindex, over1(sjlouk) cibar ecnumprocedures, over1(sjlouk)





#### • **[STATA Practice]** Instrumenting for property right institution

TABLE 3
FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS FOR CONTRACTING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (OLS, Sample of Ex-Colonies)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Par	nel B. Mea	asure of Pro	operty Rigl	hts Institutio	ons
	Depende able: Co on Exe	nstraint	Depende able: Pro agai Exprop	nst	Depende able: Pr Propo	rivate
English legal origin	002 (.48)	.05	.60	.87 (.30)	.72 (.22)	.73 (.18)
Log settler mortality	66 (.19)	(.10)	71 (.12)	(100)	30 (.09)	(.10)
Log population density in 1500	,,	40 (.13)	,/	36 (.09)	,,	29 (.05)
$R^2$ in first stage	.21	.15	.50	.35	.37	.47
Observations	51	60	51	57	52	60

NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are cross-sectional OLS with one observation per country. For detailed sources and definitions, see App. table A1.

reg xcon1990sj sjlouk logem4 if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & sdformalism~=.

reg xcon1990sj sjlouk lpd1500s if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & sdformalism~=.

reg avexpr sjlouk logem4 if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & sdformalism~=.

reg avexpr sjlouk lpd1500s if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & sdformalism~=.


reg efhrpr7 sjlouk logem4 if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & sdformalism~=.

reg efhrpr7 sjlouk lpd1500s if ex2col==1 & loggdppc1995~=. & sdformalism~=.





#### • **[STATA Practice]** Instrumenting for property right institution



graph twoway (lfitci conssj7000 logem4) (scatter conssj7000 logem4) graph twoway (lfitci conssj7000 lpd1500s) (scatter conssj7000 lpd1500s)

graph twoway (lfitci avexpr logem4) (scatter avexpr logem4) graph twoway (lfitci avexpr lpd1500s) (scatter avexpr lpd1500s)

graph twoway (lfitci efhrpr7 logem4) (scatter efhrpr7 logem4) graph twoway (lfitci efhrpr7 lpd1500s) (scatter efhrpr7 lpd1500s)





## (3) Second-Stage Estimations

#### • **[STATA Practice]** Effect of institutions on economic growth

TABLE 4 Contracting vs. Property Rights Institutions: GDP per Capita and Investment-GDP Ratio (2SLS)

	(	GDP RATIO	(2SLS)					
		Instrument for Property Rights Institutions						
	Log Settler Mortality (1)	Log Population Density (2)	Log Settler Mortality (3)	Log Settler Mortality (4)	Log Settler Mortality (5)	Log Settler Mortality (6)		
	1	Panel A. Dependent Variable: Log GDP per Capita, Second Stage of 2SLS						
Legal formalism	.05 (.24)	002 (.21)			.35 (.15)	.85 (.45)		
Procedural complexity	(123)	(-1-)	.097 (.17)		(1117)	(1117)		
Number of procedures			. ,	.02 (.04)				
Constraint on executive	.99 (.29)	.88 (.27)	.84 (.18)	.88 (.23)				
Average protection against risk of expropriation					.99 (.16)			
Private property						2.45 (.81)		
		Results in Equivalent OLS Specification						
Measure of contracting institutions	16 (.10)	13 (.10)	050 (.07)	013 (.009)	.11 (.09)	.01 (.10)		
Measure of property rights institutions Observations	.31 (.07) 51	.29 (.07) 60	.34 (.06) 60	.32 (.06) 61	.63 (.08) 51	.74 (.14) 52		
COSCIVATIONS	31	- 00	00	01	91	34		

ivreg2 loggdppc1995 (sdformalism xcon1990sj = sjlouk logem4) if ex2col==1, first robust

ivreg2 loggdppc1995 (sdformalism xcon1990sj = sjlouk lpd1500s) if ex2col==1, first robust

ivreg2 loggdppc1995 (ecproccompindex
xcon1990sj = sjlouk logem4) if ex2col==1 , first
robust

ivreg2 loggdppc1995 (ecnumprocedures xcon1990sj = sjlouk logem4) if ex2col==1, first robust

ivreg2 loggdppc1995 (sdformalism avexpr = sjlouk logem4) if ex2col==1, first robust

ivreg2 loggdppc1995 (sdformalism efhrpr7 = sjlouk logem4) if ex2col==1, first robust









#### **Internal Instruments**

- In most cases, it is quite challenging to find relevant instrument variables.
- Internal variables can be a useful "Plan B" for addressing endogeneity.
  - This method does not allow us to control for full endogeneity but for a weak type of it." (Levine et al. 2000, p. 50)
- Dynamic panel model
  - Controlling for lagged dependent variable
     : "The key insight is that lagged outcomes are a function of both observable covariates and unobservables." (Keele 2015, p. 322)
  - Using lagged independent variable as internal instruments





$$y_{i,t} = \rho y_{i,t-1} + \beta x_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$(1 \times K) (K \times 1)$$

- Difference GMM
  - To remove fixed effects, take a first-difference in equation

Differenced Equation: 
$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \rho \Delta y_{i,t-1} + \beta' \Delta x_{i,t} + \Delta \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Using lagged level of variables as internal instruments

- System GMM
  - ➤ If the variables persist over time, lagged level will be weak instruments for first-differences -> Add another level equation

Differenced Equation: 
$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \rho \Delta y_{i,t-1} + \beta' \Delta x_{i,t} + \Delta \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Level Equation : 
$$y_{i,t} = \rho y_{i,t-1} + \beta x_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Lagged difference of variables as internal instruments





- **[STATA Practice]** Difference GMM / System GMM
  - ➤ Estimation setup this dataset is modified for the goal of STATA hands-on, from the work of Park et al. (2018).

```
cd "E:\Desktop"
use "STATA_Lab3\Cloud Computing", clear
encode(NAICS), gen(industry)
xtset industry Year
tab(NAICS), gen(i)
tab(Year), gen(dum_year)
gen Non_IT=Total-IT
gen OtherInt= Intermediate - Energy- Data_Out-
System_Out
```

```
gen lnGO=ln(GO)
gen lnIT=ln(IT)
gen lnNon_IT=ln(Non_IT)
gen lnEnergy=ln(Energy)
gen lnLabor=ln(Labor)
gen lnData_Out= ln(Data_Out)
gen lnSystem_Out= ln(System_Out)
gen lnOtherInt= ln(OtherInt)
gen lnIT_L=ln(IT/Labor)
gen lnNon_IT_L = ln(Non_IT/Labor)
gen lnData_Out_L= ln(Data_Out/Labor)
gen lnSystem_Out_L= ln(System_Out/Labor)
gen lnOtherInt_L= ln(OtherInt/Labor)
gen Price_ratio = Outputprice/Energyprice
gen lnPrice_ratio = ln(Price_ratio)
```





• [STATA Practice] Difference GMM / System GMM

ssc install xtabond2 ssc install sfpanel sfpanel lnEnergy lnGO lnIT L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L lnData Out L lnSystem Out L lnPrice ratio dum year\*, model(tfe) cost robust predict efficiency, ilms xtreg efficiency lnIT L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L lnData Out L lnSystem Out L dum year\*, fe xtreg efficiency lnIT L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L lnData Out L lnSystem Out L dum year\*, robust fe xtpcse efficiency lnIT L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L lnData Out L lnSystem Out L dum industry\* dum year\* xtscc efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, fe xtgls efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_industry\* dum\_year\*, p(h) c(p) xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L lnData Out L lnSystem Out L dum year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT L lnData Out L, lag(2 3)) iv(lnSystem Out L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L dum year\*) nolevel xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT L lnData Out L, lag(2 3)) iv(lnSystem Out L lnNon IT L lnOtherInt L dum year\*)





#### **Check Lists for Dynamic Panel Model**

- Serial correlation
  - ➤ Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences should be significant
  - $\triangleright$  Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences should not be significant

```
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -3.15 Pr > z = 0.002 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 1.21 Pr > z = 0.225
```

- Over-identification tests
  - $\blacktriangleright$  Hansen test of over-identification restrictions should not be rejected (p > 0.05)

```
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(78) = 104.46 Prob > chi2 = 0.024
(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)

Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(78) = 45.77 Prob > chi2 = 0.999
(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)
```





## **Check Lists for Dynamic Panel Model**

- Problem of too many instruments
  - ➤ Too many instruments in difference and system GMM may lead to implausibly high p-value of over-identification J tests. That is, the Hansen test cannot detect the problem of over-identification in these cases (Roodman 2009).
  - More seriously, different numbers of instruments, along with the inability of Hansen test, could arrive at different conclusions, possibly due to overidentification.

"Researchers should report the number of instruments generated for their regressions. In system GMM, difference-in-Hansen tests for the full set of instruments for the levels equation, as well as the subset based on the dependent variable, should be reported. **Results should be aggressively tested for sensitivity to reductions in the number of instruments.**" (Roodman 2009, p. 156)



Roodman, D., 2009. A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), pp.135-158.

#### **Check Lists for Dynamic Panel Model**

• Example: Cloud computing and energy efficiency (Park et al. 2018)

Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis to Instruments in System GMM Estima

Dependent variable: Energy efficiency	Standard instruments			Collapsed instruments			
Length of lags as instruments:	One	two	three	One	two	three	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Lagged efficiency	0.755***	0.751***	0.747***	0.944**	* 0.930***	0.847***	
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.055)	
IT intensity	0.005	0.005	0.000	0.024	0.015	0.013	
	(800.0)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.029)	
Non-IT intensity	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.007	
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	
Other intermediate	-0.010	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.018	-0.020	-0.022	
intensity	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	
Data processing and	0.013***	0.010***	0.008***	0.035**	0.034**	0.035**	
hosting services	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
IT systems design services	-0.009**	-0.008**	-0.005**	-0.027	-0.024	-0.023	
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Number of instruments	116	161	203	26	29	32	
Serial correlation test	0.458	0.459	0.454	0.449	0.439	0.445	
Instrument validity test	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.810	0.444	0.184	
Observations	952	952	952	952	952	952	

"Roodman (2009b) argues that instrument proliferation, possibly resulting from a long panel, may weaken the Hansen test's ability to detect the problem of overidentification; note that this does not indicate that the condition of overidentification restrictions is violated.

Following the recommendation of Roodman (2009a, 2009b), we check the sensitivity of our findings to the number of instruments." (p. 24)



Park, J., Han, K. and Lee, B., 2018. An Empirical Analysis of Cloud Computing and Energy Efficiency: A Stochastic Frontier Approach. KAIST Working Paper.



- **[STATA Practice]** Difference GMM / System GMM
  - Roodman (2009) suggests that collapsing instruments provides "the basis for some minimally arbitrary robustness and specification tests for difference and system GMM" (p. 149).

xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT\_L lnData\_Out\_L, lag(2 2)) iv(lnSystem\_Out\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L dum\_year\*) xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT\_L lnData\_Out\_L, lag(2 3)) iv(lnSystem\_Out\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L dum\_year\*) xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT\_L lnData\_Out\_L, lag(2 4)) iv(lnSystem\_Out\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L dum\_year\*)

xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT\_L lnData\_Out\_L, coll lag(2 2)) iv(lnSystem\_Out\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L dum\_year\*) xtabond2 efficiency L.efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT\_L lnData\_Out\_L, coll lag(2 3)) iv(lnSystem\_Out\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L dum\_year\*) xtabond2 efficiency lnIT\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L lnData\_Out\_L lnSystem\_Out\_L dum\_year\*, robust gmm(efficiency lnIT\_L lnData\_Out\_L, coll lag(2 4)) iv(lnSystem\_Out\_L lnNon\_IT\_L lnOtherInt\_L dum\_year\*)



Roodman, D., 2009. A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), pp.135-158.



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