Gender, Violence, and International Crisis

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Women work for peace, and men wage war—cooperative women, conflictual men. These images pervade conventional wisdom about the efficacy of women in leadership roles and decision-making environments, but imagery is not always grounded in reality. Feminist international relations literature is examined to understand how domestic gender equality may help predict a state's international crisis behavior. The authors use the record of female leaders as primary decision makers during international crises and then test the relationship between domestic gender equality and a state's use of violence internationally. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and multinomial logistic regression are used to test the level of violence exhibited during international crises by states with varying levels of domestic gender equality. Results show that the severity of violence in crisis decreases as domestic gender equality increases.

Women work for peace, and men wage war—cooperative women, conflictual men. These images pervade conventional wisdom about the efficacy of women in leadership roles and decision-making environments. Imagery, however, is not always grounded in reality. We examine the constructs of feminist international relations literature to understand how domestic gender equality may predict a state's international behavior. Following an illustrative examination of female leaders as decision makers during international crises, we build our analysis on and extend the recent work of Caprioli (2000). That work shows that states with higher levels of domestic gender equality are less likely to use violence during interstate conflict than states with lower levels of domestic gender equality. In addition, this study complements the work of Tessler and Warriner (1997) and Conover and Sapiro (1993), who suggested that women tend to be more peace oriented than men in some Western states. This scholarship draws from a wide array of contemporary international relations literature that asserts that domestic values and political behavior are mirrored in a state's international interactions. We offer a rigorous test of the relation between gender equality and a state's use of violence internationally. We use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and run a

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multinomial logistic regression to test the international crisis behavior of states with varying levels of domestic gender equality.

At the outset of our discussion, it is important to note the great diversity in what political scientists often aggregate under the heading of feminist theory. Accordingly, we acknowledge that we examine only a small subset of feminist literature and use *feminist theory* as a general term while still recognizing the varying feminist perspectives and the dialogue between feminist theorists within and across disciplines. In the theoretical and conceptual discussion that follows, we build on scholarship from feminist anthropology, business, communications science, political science, and psychology to understand better how the diversity of feminist approaches can inform our understanding of international crisis behavior.

In spite of this diversity within feminist literature, it is possible to identify a variety of themes that suggest differences in how women and men conceptualize peace and security. A significant amount of scholarship has shown, for instance, that women are more peaceful than men and less likely to support the use of international violence (de Boer 1985; Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; Frankovic 1982; McGlen and Sarkees 1993; Mueller 1973, 1994; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Smith 1984; Togeby 1994; Tessler and Warriner 1997; Conover and Sapiro 1993).[1] Other studies suggest that women are more likely to use a collective or consensual approach to problem solving and conflict resolution than an approach that focuses on the unilateral imposition of solutions (Gidengil 1995; Welch and Hibbing 1992; Miller 1988; White 1988; Rosenthal 1998). Ample work also exists within the feminist literature to provide expectations that women will behave differently than men regarding the sanctioning of a state's use of violence as a means of conflict resolution (Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; Gallagher 1993; Mueller 1973, 1989, 1994; Welch and Thomas 1988; Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996). These gender-based value differences to international relations and foreign policy find their genesis in contrasting values and conceptions of politics and security, language, and power.

GENDER AND CONFLICT

One of the universal, cross-cultural ways to classify differences in political beliefs is to examine gender, understood here as the dichotomy between men and women. Feminist literature is rife with accounts of differences between the genders. Of particular interest to this project are those characteristics that account for differences in foreign policy preferences. One study has found that "in practically all realms of foreign and domestic policy, women are less belligerent than men" (Page and Shapiro 1992, 295). This relative pacifism can be traced to socialization processes and resultant values, which explain differences in language; conceptions of power, politics, and secu-

1. It should be noted that one recent study of the women and peace hypothesis (Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999) found that the tendency for women to espouse more pacific attitudes toward conflict did not hold up in samples of women from Middle Eastern countries (including Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon). This research suggests that religious and conflict-specific attitudes may cause the results from these samples to be different from the findings for samples of Western women (see Tessler and Warriner 1997).

rity; and the identified gender gap over support for the use of force in foreign policy (see Caprioli 2000). In general, women are thought to be less competitive and more focused on issues of interdependence and egalitarianism (Gidengil 1995; Welch and Hibbing 1992; Miller 1988), even if some of these differences must be further understood as part of the organizational context within which women and men make decisions (Rosenthal 1998). According to White (1988), males engage in power struggles for personal gain, whereas females attempt to minimize power differences, share resources, and treat others equally. Rosenthal's (1998) work suggested that such differences can be attributed to the differing preparatory experiences men and women bring to similar organizational settings. In other words, faced with the same organizational context at time period X, women may be more collaborative than men because of the different experiences they had earlier in their careers at time period $X-1$ or before.

Some scholars, when examining male and female levels of aggression and support for the international use of force, identify a gender gap between men and women based on physiological differences. These scholars argue that women have an essential nature that is based on their natural reproductive capacity (Daly 1984; Elshtain 1986; Griffin 1981; Ruddick 1989). According to this perspective, women's behavior is instinctive and not learned, even if this view runs counter to the dominant view held in educational psychology (see Reis 1998). According to the physiological view, then, the inclusion of women in foreign policy decision making would alter policy output, not women's nature.

It is difficult, though not impossible, to compare male and female leaders' level of aggression during crisis situations. Only 24 states have placed a female leader in office since 1900. For the purposes of this study, a female leader is defined as the president, prime minister, or any other decision maker who is essentially the "decision maker of last resort" on decisions to use force and other high-level international decisions. Thus, Edith Cresson, who was premier of France from 1991 to 1992, was not included on our list because that position is one of significantly lesser importance than that of the French president. Even though Table 1 identified 24 female leaders since 1900 (there were none prior to 1945), there are only 10 crises in which female leaders were present. Of those 10 cases, there are only four different leaders: (1) Golda Meir in 7 cases, (2) Indira Gandhi in 1 case, (3) Margaret Thatcher in 1 case, and (4) Benazir Bhutto in 1 case. These data are displayed in Table 1; a superscripted a indicates a female leader who was involved in an ICB-identified crisis. Only 16.6% of the countries led by a woman were involved in international crises at any point during the period of female leadership, and none of these female leaders initiated the crises.

To test the specific behavior of female leaders during crises, we would need a large sample of female leaders as decision makers within crises, which history cannot provide. Thus, we have a small sample of female leaders as decision makers during international crises. Moreover, all of those 10 crises dealt with military/security issues—a subset of crises noted for a higher propensity of violence. Further confounding any effort to study female leaders is the current political environment. If women are by nature more pacific than men but must operate in a social and political environment that has been defined, structured, and dominated by men for centuries, it may not be plausible to understand the true implications of women as leaders in any conflictual

TABLE 1
States with Female Leaders from 1900 to 1994

State	*Leader*	*Years in Office*
Argentina	Isabel Perón	1974-76
Bangladesh	Khalida Zia	1991-96
Bolivia	Lidia Gueiler Tejada	1979-80
Burundi	Sylvie Kingi	1993-94
Canada	Kim Campbell	1993
Central African Republic	Elisabeth Domitien	1975-76
Dominica	Mary Eugenia Charles	1980-95
Haiti	Ertha Pascal-Trouillot	1990-91
India[a]	Indira Gandhi	1966-77, 1980-84
Israel[a]	Golda Meir	1969-74
Lithuania	Kazimiera Prunskiene	1990-91
Malta	Agatha Barbara	1982-87
Netherlands Antilles	Maria Liberia-Peters	1984-85, 1988-94
Nicaragua	Violeta Chamorro	1990-97
Norway	Gro Harlem Brundtland	1981, 1986-89, 1990-96
Pakistan[a]	Benazir Bhutto	1988-90, 1993-96
Philippines	Corazon C. Aquino	1986-92
Poland	Hanna Suchocka	1993
Portugal	Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo	1979
Rwanda	Agathe Uwilingiyimana	1993-94
Sri Lanka	Sirimavo Bandaranaike	1960-65, 1970-77
Turkey	Tansu Ciller	1993-96
United Kingdom[a]	Margaret Thatcher	1979-90
Yugoslavia	Milka Planinc	1982-86

a. Leader in office in a country involved in an International Crisis Behavior–identified crisis.

situation, especially when we take Rosenthal's (1998) findings about the impact of organizational factors to heart. We do, however, present an illustrative description of the record of female decision makers in crises in Table 2, which offers a summary of selected crisis attributes for those 10 cases.[2]

It is worth noting again that none of the female leaders initiated any of the crises. When examining the summary attributes in Table 2, one first recognizes the relatively violent nature of all 10 cases and the high stakes at play in each case. The propensity for violence in these cases is higher than the average of the 895 cases coded between 1900 and 1994 by ICB. All cases were focused on military and security issues, 6 out of 10 cases had violent or military triggers to the crises, and the gravity of the values threatened in the crisis (not shown in Table 2) is quite high in every case. Wilkenfeld (1991) found that violence in the trigger begets violence in the response and affects the

2. The data for Table 2 were compiled from case profiles run from the International Crisis Behavior data set. The discussion below integrates those raw data with the material found in the case summaries for the 10 cases in Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997).

TABLE 2
Summary of Crises and Selected Attributes

Actor	*Crisis Name*	*Start Year*	*Crisis Trigger*	*Crisis Triggering Entity*	*Crisis Issue*	*Severity of Violence*
India	Bangladesh	1971	Nonviolent military act	Pakistan	Military-security	Full-scale war
Israel	War of attrition	1969	Violent act	Egypt	Military-security	Full-scale war
Israel	War of attrition	1969	External change	USSR	Military-security	Full-scale war
Israel	Black September	1970	Indirect violent act	Syria	Military-security	No violence
Israel	Libyan plane	1973	External change	Libya	Military-security	Serious clashes
Israel	Israel mobilization	1973	Nonviolent military act	Egypt	Military-security	No violence
Israel	October Yom Kippur War	1973	Nonviolent military act	Egypt and Syria	Military-security	Full-scale war
Israel	October Yom Kippur War	1973	Violent act	Egypt and Syria	Military-security	No violence
Pakistan	Kashmir III–nuclear	1990	Political act	India	Military-security	Serious clashes
United Kingdom	Falklands/ Malvinas	1982	External change	Argentina	Military-security	Full-scale war

entire character of the crisis. Thus, we would expect these crises to have higher propensities toward violence with or without female leaders in charge. So even if female leaders were less aggressive in general, this pacifism may not manifest itself during crisis situations.

An examination of the actions taken by the female-led crisis actor shows that the violent character of most of these crises is maintained, and the use of violence as a crisis management technique escalated in many instances, even though the female leaders initiated none of these crises. The continued propensity toward violence during these crises is supported by the summary column for the severity (intensity) of violence within the crisis. No conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview of crisis attributes for female-led countries in crisis. At a fundamental level, the limited number of women as leaders during crises may reduce the analysis to idiosyncratic factors rather than those inherent to women.

From a social and interpersonal level, as discussed conceptually above, female leaders who have risen to power through a male-defined and male-dominated political environment may well need to be more aggressive in crises than their male counterparts. Thus, the violent responses and overall violence seen in these 10 cases may be the result of female leaders trying to prove themselves as heads of state in a hostile, male-defined, and male-dominated international political environment. Moreover, women may also work harder to "win" in crises for the same reasons, because to appear and act feminine (and therefore weak) would be political suicide both domestically and internationally.

Although differences have been found to exist in male and female leadership styles (Astin and Leland 1991), some argue that women in positions of power are compelled to use a style that conveys strength in traditional male terms (Sykes 1993). This might help explain the historical record of female leaders during crisis sketched in Table 2. Women who emulate men, in the way, according to many, that Thatcher, Gandhi, and Meir did, are more likely to succeed as national political leaders and more likely in male-dominated societies to gain political power (Astin and Leland 1991; Fukuyama 1998; Sykes 1993). In other words, female leaders must emulate male gender stereotypes partly to overcome stereotypes about female leadership weaknesses because female leaders are often perceived as weaker at realpolitik issues of security, defense, and economics (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Kahn 1992, 1994; Leeper 1991).

This need to conform to traditional male styles may explain why McGlen and Sarkees (1993), in a study of women in foreign policy decision-making roles in the United States, found varying degrees of a gender gap among the masses but none among women working within the State Department or the Defense Department. In addition, leaders must set priorities among political and cultural concerns, and a majority of female leaders attach greater importance to political objectives and avoid gender-related issues so as not to undermine national or communal solidarity (Hawkesworth 1990; Jayawardena 1986; Peteet 1991).

Female leaders must also contend with negative perceptions from male negotiating opponents. For example, gender was a factor in the events and resolution of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. President Yahya Khan of Pakistan stated that he would have reacted less violently and been less rigid as the leader of Pakistan in the conflict with India if a male had headed the Indian government (Stoessinger 1990, 135-36). Indeed, President Khan was quoted as saying, "If that woman [Indira Gandhi] thinks she is going to cow me down, I refuse to take it" (Malhotra 1989, 137). Gender stereotypes, therefore, have a dual impact on female leaders. They have an impact on the effect of stereotypes about women's political and leadership abilities on women's behavior in conforming to traditional male leadership styles and on the behavior of male leaders when faced with a female opponent. This is the macho image to which some male leaders seem compelled to adhere, which makes them unwilling to "lose" to a woman lest their masculinity be questioned.

The factors and descriptive analysis above lead us to expect few observable differences in the level of violence used in international crises by male and female leaders. Crisis behavior of states should, however, differ based on the level of gender equality within a state as Tessler and Warriner's (1997) and Caprioli's (2000) research led us to hypothesize. Moreover, the factors identified above that potentially negate differences between male and female leaders would not be intervening factors when male leaders are in power in more egalitarian states.

We are thus left with two main propositions based on the surveyed literature.

- All things being equal, female leaders will be less likely to use violence than male leaders, for women are less aggressive than men.
- Gender is not a major factor in predicting state violence, but gender equality is an important predictive element in state use of violence during crises.

Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to test the first proposition systematically because the historical record provides only four countries that were led by women during times of crisis. This *N* is far too small to draw any statistical conclusions and can hardly be generalized to women as a group. We can, however, systematically analyze the international behavior of states during crisis as it relates to the level of gender equality that exists within a country and thus focus on the second proposition.

Although research exists that has identified a gender gap in support of the use of international violence as discussed above, Tickner (1992, 138-39) argued that the gender gap and the inherent masculinity of international relations is at least partly a function of defining citizenship along the lines of "warrior patriot." Therefore, if citizenship were reoriented toward a conception of "citizen defender," we could begin to view international relations through a more gender-neutral lens. Indeed, a more pacific view of conflict resolution has been linked to gender-neutral value systems during interstate disputes (Caprioli 2000; Tessler and Warriner 1997). Furthermore, Tessler and Warriner (1997) argued that no evidence exists that women are by nature less militaristic than men or more oriented toward diplomacy and compromise in their judgments about security. They did find, however, that those who are more supportive of equality between women and men are also more favorably disposed toward diplomacy and compromise. A norm of equality among individuals, therefore, translates into equality and more restrained treatment for other political communities and countries (Caprioli 2000).

This suggests that the relationship between more pacific attitudes and international conflict rests on the degree of gender equality that characterizes a society. Those who express greater concern for the status and role of women, particularly for equality between women and men, are more likely than other individuals to believe that the international disputes in which their country is involved should be resolved through diplomacy and compromise.[3] We would, therefore, expect states that exhibit higher levels of gender equality to be less likely to use violence to resolve crises than those with less egalitarian societies.

Some scholars argue that a conception of power as domination and control is used as the rationale for female subjugation, thus leading to greater societal violence. Iannello (1992, 43) argued that power should be conceptualized as a divisible, infinite resource and the ability to reach goals. Values that emphasize equality and interdependence, therefore, would translate into an understanding of power as an infinite resource and would lead to unique conceptions of politics and security that are not necessarily the same concepts widely accepted in the international political system today. These values of equality and interdependence are not necessarily unique to women. Indeed, we use the term *feminist* to represent those people, both men and women, who are not hampered by socially constructed gender values and subscribe to values of equality and interdependence. Theoretically, gender-neutral societies would free both men and women from social constraints of the "male" and the "female," and each gen-

3. Among others cited earlier, see also Boling (1991), Cook and Wilcox (1991), Conover (1988), and Dietz (1985).

der would represent a continuum of values on which the more pacific of both genders were those who subscribe to feminist and gender-equality values.

The feminist view of politics and security rejects the Hobbesian description of the state of nature, wherein distrust and fear are presumed to be the dominant emotions and forces for political action. Feminism concerns itself with a "*common security* to envisage a type of security that is global and multidimensional with political, economic, and ecological facets that are as important as its military dimensions" (Tickner 1992, 22). According to Tickner (1992), feminism, in opposition to realism, defines security as the elimination of routine violence and unjust social relations, highlights the importance of cooperation and interdependence, and stresses social concerns over military prowess. For example, delegates at the 1985 Women's International Peace Conference "agreed that security meant nothing if it was built on others' insecurity" (Tickner 1992, 54-55).

Feminism also involves a commitment to freedom, equality, and self-government (Dietz 1985) and rejects hierarchical domination, the use of military force, and other forms of exploitation (Brock-Utne 1985). Competition, violence, intransigence, and territoriality are all associated with a male approach to international relations. According to this literature, feminists would be less likely to see crisis negotiation as a competition and also less likely to advocate the use of violence as a solution, which would be focused on conceptions of common security and lasting peace. As this review of feminist writings suggests, although some research exists concerning the impact of gender-neutral value systems on international behavior, there is little empirical work in the international relations field that has attempted to examine the impact of gender-neutral value systems on crisis behavior.

WOMEN AND CRISES

We have purposely chosen to study women in crisis as a "tough case" test for the feminist constructs of international relations. By definition, crises are foreign policy events that possess three basic characteristics: (1) a threat to the basic values of the crisis actor(s), (2) decision-making time pressure, and (3) an increased probability of military hostilities (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). As this definition and the wealth of literature in the field demonstrate, crises are time periods during which tempers often flare and violence is more likely to occur than in the normal flow of international events because of the stressful nature of the situation. As a result, we examine situations in which states have the highest propensity for using violence. The likelihood of armed conflict, then, is a powerful motivation for the use of coercive and aggressive tactics by any leader who seeks to preserve the integrity of his or her state (Tedeschi 1984; White 1983). According to the literature cited above, state behavior in international crises should differ based on the level of gender equality within a state. By focusing on the effect of domestic gender equality on state use of force during crises, we offer a rigorous test of the literature, which already confirms the significance of gender-neutral societies on state use of violence during militarized interstate disputes.

This analysis focuses on the unique characteristics of the crisis situation to discover the scope of the impact of gender-neutral societies on state foreign policy behavior.

HYPOTHESIS

Based on our previous discussion, we have formulated the following hypothesis to test the severity of violence employed by the crisis actor as a means for managing the crisis:

- The higher the level of domestic gender equality, the lower the severity of violence in international crises.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Multinomial logistic regression is used to test the impact of more gender-neutral societal values on the behavior of crisis actors. We use the actor-level portion of the ICB data set to focus on the decisions taken by individual states in crisis. As a result, each state in a crisis comprises an individual case, and the variables are coded separately for each case. For example, the Falklands/Malvinas crisis is composed of two actor-level crises: one for Argentina and the other for the United Kingdom.

Neither autocorrelation nor multicollinearity was significant in this analysis. To measure the crisis behavior of more gender-neutral states, we examine the record of crisis behavior from 1945 to 1994, because data on women prior to 1945 are either nonexistent or unreliable. The 1994 endpoint is a constraint of the ICB data set.

We use political equality, measured as the percentage of women in parliament, as a measure of gender equality within a society. We make the assumption that the election of women to the legislature reflects a certain level of gender equality by the fact that women are considered fit for office and are presumably elected to office by both men and women. In theory, we might also measure social, political, or economic gender equality, thereby capturing different aspects of equality. In practice, however, the three measures are highly correlated, for social, political, and economic access are interdependent. If a woman has low social and/or economic standing, for example, she is unlikely to gain political office. As a result, differing measures of gender equality do not represent discrete measures of social, political, or economic equality but a combination of all (see Caprioli 2000).

We also include in our model a measure of the number of years women have had the right to vote at the time of the crisis. Although female suffrage may be a rough gauge of gender equality within society by identifying extremely unequal societies, the female suffrage variable is, in many ways, a control variable. Our model must control for the proposition that women as a gender are more peaceful than men are. By gaining political influence through voting, women's values should influence leaders' decisions. The length of female suffrage, therefore, should reflect the potential influence of women in democratic societies, because democratic leaders would have to maintain or earn the

support of a broad electorate, which would include the interests of women in such societies. The more politically powerful women are as a group, the more influence they should have on the decisions of leaders, at least in democratic states. This influence would result in leaders balancing both male and female values and thereby represent a certain level of gender neutrality, however imperfect.

It is equally important to control for female leaders in our model based on two major and contending theories. First, both reason and scholarship suggest that female leaders may be more aggressive than male leaders and elicit higher levels of aggression on the part of their opponent. Alternatively, female leaders may be less aggressive and thus help to de-escalate the tense situations that crises are. As a result, we specifically control for the potential impact of female leadership in the 10 cases identified above.

With these various conditions in mind, our variables are operationalized below.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Severity of violence. This allows us to analyze the intensity of violence employed by the crisis actor in its efforts to manage the crisis. It is coded 1 (no violence), 2 (minor clashes), 3 (serious clashes), and 4 (full-scale war) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Percentage of women in the legislature. This is our measure of gender equality within society. This variable was coded from data compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995). It is a simple percentage of women holding seats in the legislative upper house.

In theory, gender equality may be measured based on political, economic, or social equality. In practice, however, these three measures of equality are highly interdependent.[4] Although a woman's social status determines access to both the political and economic spheres (United Nations 1984, 17), social status is difficult to measure directly as it is nearly impossible to weigh the impact of social pressures on women's "decisions" concerning employment and political participation. We may, however, capture aspects of social equality through measures of political equality. For example, we would expect women with high social status to be more likely to gain political office than women with low social status. The percentage of women in the legislature serves as a direct measure of women's political equality and an indirect measure of women's social status and, to a lesser extent, economic status. We would, therefore, expect women's political power to increase with their overall level of equality within society.

Duration of women's suffrage at the onset of the crisis. This variable serves as a crude measure of gender equality and a control for the "nature" argument that women are innately more peaceful than men. This variable was coded from the Inter-

4. For a thorough discussion of different measures of women's equality, see Caprioli (2000).

Parliamentary Union (1995). The year of suffrage was subtracted from the start date of the crisis, thus showing how long women have had the opportunity to formally affect politics.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Female leaders in crisis. This is used to control for the potentially more aggressive actions of female leaders operating in a male-dominated global culture. It is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a female leader is the leader of any crisis actor in a single international crisis and 0 if a female leader is not leading any of the crisis actors (created from Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

Initiator. This is used to control for the potentially more violent crisis behavior of the crisis initiator or at least the state that set the crisis in motion. It is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the actor was the triggering entity for the crisis and 0 if not (created from Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

Democracy score. This is used to control for the impact of democratic values and institutions on crisis behavior, particularly in light of the democratic peace literature. The variable for democracy is calculated from Jaggers and Gurr's Polity III data set (1995, 1996) and is a continuous term from –10 through 10, with 10 being the highest score for *democracy.* The continuous score was calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score [(democracy score) minus (autocracy score)].

Trigger. This is used to control for the impact of the violence-begets-violence findings discussed earlier. This variable refers to the specific act, event, or situational change that leads decision makers to perceive a crisis situation has developed. Coding is 1 (verbal act), 2 (political act), 3 (economic act), 4 (external challenge), 5 (other nonviolent act), 6 (internal challenge to regime or elites), 7 (nonviolent military), 8 (indirect violent act), or 9 (violent act) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

Gravity. This is used to control for the importance and intensity of the crisis actor's values threatened during the crisis. This variable identifies the object of gravest threat during a crisis. It is coded 1 (economic), 2 (limited military), 3 (political), 4 (territorial), 5 (threat to influence), 6 (threat of grave damage), 7 (threat to existence), or 8 (other) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

Power discrepancy. This is used to control for the impact of differences in power relationships among crisis actors and the impact such relationships might have on the ability of crisis actors to employ military force in crises. This variable represents a power score that was determined for the crisis actor and its principal adversary (whether or not the latter was a crisis actor) on the basis of the total of six separate scores that measure size of population, GNP, territorial size, alliance capability, military expenditure, and nuclear capability at the onset of the crisis. The power of the

TABLE 3
Impact of Gender Equality on Severity of Violence in International Crises, 1945-94

Percent women in legislature	−0.0277*	(0.0141)
Years of female suffrage	−0.0082	(0.0058)
Female leaders in crisis	1.3423**	(0.4575)
Initiator	0.4023	(0.2365)
Democracy score	−0.0304*	(0.0143)
Trigger	0.1931***	(0.0332)
Gravity	0.2200**	(0.0678)
Power discrepancy	0.0061	(0.0071)
Intercept	−1.3549***	(0.3411)
Intercept 2	−2.1575***	(0.3506)
Intercept 3	−3.4783***	(0.3740)
Log-likelihood differential test $\chi^2 = 74.2235$		
Model significance = $p < .0001$		

NOTE: The SAS statistical package was used to run the logistic regression. The table includes parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The parameter estimates have been multiplied by −1 to aid in interpreting the results and to conform with other statistical packages (see Tabachnik and Fidell [1996, 609-33] for further explanation of this procedure).
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

crisis actor and the power available to it from tight alliance partners (if any)—immediately prior to the crisis actor's major response—were then compared to the power of its principal adversary or adversaries to create a final power discrepancy score. Negative scores mean that the crisis actor is weaker than its adversary, and positive ones mean that the actor is stronger than its adversary (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

Table 3 displays the results of the logit model for severity of violence, which confirms our hypothesis that states characterized by higher levels of gender equality are less likely to employ severe levels of violence in crises. The model shows the percentage of women in the legislature and the incidence of female leaders in crisis to be statistically significant and correlated in the hypothesized direction. Put simply, as the percentage of women in the legislature increases, the violence is less severe. Even in the "tough-case" crisis environment where violence begets violence, the hypothesized positive impact of domestic gender equality on state tendencies toward more peaceful means of conflict and crisis resolution is shown to be valid. Indeed, as the percentage of women in the legislature increases by 5%, a state is nearly 5 times (4.86) less likely to use violence. At a normative level, this also suggests that the pursuit of gender equality in societies throughout the world may have positive effects for the lessening of violence at national, transnational, and international levels. It also points to several interesting lines for future research, including ones that have direct policy implications regarding the need to promote gender equity throughout the world.

In the opposite direction and as explained by the above discussion, the presence of a female leader increases the severity of violence in a crisis. This may be explained by the need of women leaders to prove themselves or the need of male leaders in the same

crises wanting to avoid "losing" to a woman. This result may also highlight the personality of individuals and/or the unique characteristics of the particular state and crisis. As you may recall, women led only four states involved in crisis during the time period of this study. Thus, we must be very careful in extending the logic derived from this result too far without additional data points and analysis. Last, the results of the model show the significance of democratic values on decreasing the severity of violence in crises.

Although we find support for our central hypothesis that states with higher levels of gender equality exhibit lower levels of violence during crises, our results also support the existing crisis literature by showing the impact of the crisis trigger and the gravity of the value threatened on the severity of violence during crises. In line with the earlier ICB-based findings of Wilkenfeld (1991), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997), and Trumbore and Boyer (2000), the more violent the trigger and the more grave the threat, the more likely it is that violence will be employed. Although this is an intuitively appealing and empirically validated relationship, it is also worth noting its robustness when included in a model with other independent variables and controls. Three other control variables (female suffrage, crisis initiator, and power discrepancy) were not significant.

CONCLUSIONS

States that are characterized by higher levels of gender equality use lower levels of violence during crises than those with lower levels of gender equality. This finding supports and extends the existing literature that tests similar hypotheses concerning the international behavior of states during international disputes. Our data highlight the impact of domestic gender equality on the level of violence employed by a state in an international crisis. Although the most powerful causal factors are embedded in the action-reaction processes that characterize crises in international affairs and in the values threatened during the high-stakes environment of international crises, the severity of violence in crises does decrease as domestic gender equality increases. Our research thus adds to the growing body of literature that identifies the myriad of domestic influences on international behavior. In particular, our results have direct implications for understanding the impact of domestic sociopolitical gender equality and how that might translate into international policy decision outputs.

The robustness of the gender equality findings is also noteworthy when accounting for the fact that crisis by its very nature places leaders in one of the most heated decision-making environments possible. In other words, even in an environment that exhibits a high propensity toward violence, higher levels of gender equity decrease the tendency toward violence. These results may be even more robust after examining data over a time period long enough for societal values to become truly gender neutral, as the percentage of women in parliament for any state remains small in almost all instances. Given the continuing gains made by women worldwide, it is possible that greater percentages of women in the legislature could produce even more striking results in years to come.

Our focus on gender equality represents a domestic norm of tolerance and equality that seems to be mirrored in states' international behavior at least with respect to the level of violence used during international crises. This strengthens the argument made by Caprioli (2000) regarding the association of gender equality and level of violence used during militarized interstate disputes. We cannot, however, draw any conclusions about the relationship of female leaders and international crisis violence. The data on female leaders are too few to conduct accurate statistical analyses, even if violence overwhelmingly marks the cases we have to study. As the four women leaders we examined in Table 2 have ably demonstrated for the historical record, women leaders can indeed be forceful when confronted with violent, aggressive, and dangerous international situations. Although our research suggests that international goals of peace may find some basis in issues of domestic gender equality, continued research in this area must broaden its focus and examine the impact of gender on state use of violence in all aspects of its foreign policy behavior. Such research will have broad normative and policy implications for societies around the globe.

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