# PLSC 504 - Fall 2017 Cox's Proportional Hazards Model

September 26, 2017

# Cox (1972)

Basic idea:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\mathbf{X}_i \beta)$$

#### Note:

- $h_0(t) \equiv h(t|\mathbf{X} = 0)$
- Changes in X shift h(t) proportionally

# Cox (1972) (continued)

$$\mathsf{HR} = rac{h_0(t)\mathsf{exp}(X_1\hat{eta})}{h_0(t)\mathsf{exp}(X_0\hat{eta})} \ = \ \mathsf{exp}[(1-0)\hat{eta}] \ = \ \mathsf{exp}(\hat{eta})$$

# Cox (1972) (continued)

Also, because

$$S(t) = \exp[-H(t)]$$

then

$$S(t) = \exp\left[-\int_0^t h(t) dt\right]$$

$$= \exp\left[-\exp(\mathbf{X}_i\beta) \int_0^t h_0(t) dt\right]$$

$$= \left[\exp\left(-\int_0^t h_0(t) dt\right)\right]^{\exp(\mathbf{X}_i\beta)}$$

$$= \left[S_0(t)\right]^{\exp(\mathbf{X}_i\beta)}$$

#### Partial Likelihood

Assume  $N_C$  distinct event times  $t_i$ , with no "ties."

#### Then:

 $Pr(Individual \ k \ experienced \ the \ event \ at \ t_j \ | \ One \ observation \ experienced \ the \ event \ at \ t_j)$ 

$$= \frac{\Pr(\text{At-risk observation } k \text{ experiences the event of interest at } t_j)}{\Pr(\text{One at-risk observation experiences the event of interest at } t_j)}$$

$$= \frac{h_k(t_j)}{\sum_{\ell \in R_i} h_\ell(t_j)}$$

# Partial Likelihood (continued)

$$L_{i} = \frac{h_{0}(t_{j}) \exp(\mathbf{X}_{i}\beta)}{\sum_{\ell \in R_{j}} h_{0}(t_{j}) \exp(\mathbf{X}_{\ell}\beta)}$$

$$= \frac{h_{0}(t_{j}) \exp(\mathbf{X}_{i}\beta)}{h_{0}(t_{j}) \sum_{\ell \in R_{j}} \exp(\mathbf{X}_{\ell}\beta)}$$

$$= \frac{\exp(\mathbf{X}_{i}\beta)}{\sum_{\ell \in R_{j}} \exp(\mathbf{X}_{\ell}\beta)}$$

$$L = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left[ \frac{\exp(\mathbf{X}_{i}\beta)}{\sum_{\ell \in R_{j}} \exp(\mathbf{X}_{\ell}\beta)} \right]^{C_{i}}$$

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^{N} C_{i} \left\{ \mathbf{X}_{i}\beta - \ln \left[ \sum_{\ell \in R_{i}} \exp(\mathbf{X}_{\ell}\beta) \right] \right\}$$

#### Notes on Partial Likelihood

- PL is
  - Consistent
  - Asymptotically normal
  - Slightly inefficient (but asymptotically efficient)
- Considers <u>order</u> of events, but not actual duration
- Censored events: Modify R<sub>i</sub>
- No ties


## Example: Interstate War, 1950-1985

- Dyad-years for "politically-relevant" dyads
- N = 827, NT = 20448.
- Covariates:
  - Whether (=1) or not the two countries are *allies*,
  - Whether (=1) or not the two countries are contiguous,
  - The capability ratio of the two countries,
  - The lower of the two countries' (GDP) growth (rescaled),
  - The lower of the two countries' democracy (POLITY IV) scores (rescaled to [-1,1]), and
  - The amount of *trade* between the two countries, as a fraction of joint GDP.

#### The Data

```
> summary(OR)
    dyadid
                                   start
                                                   stop
                                                                 futime
                      year
Min.
       : 2020
                 Min.
                        :1951
                               Min. : 0.00
                                              Min.
                                                     : 1.00
                                                                    : 5.00
                                                              Min.
 1st Qu.:100365
                 1st Qu.:1965
                               1st Qu.: 5.00
                                              1st Qu.: 6.00
                                                              1st Qu.:23.00
 Median :220235
                 Median:1972
                               Median :11.00
                                              Median :12.00
                                                              Median :31.00
 Mean
       :253305
                 Mean
                        :1971
                               Mean
                                      :12.32
                                              Mean
                                                     :13.32
                                                              Mean
                                                                    :28.97
 3rd Qu.:365600
                 3rd Qu.:1979
                               3rd Qu.:19.00
                                              3rd Qu.:20.00
                                                              3rd Qu.:35.00
       :900920
                               Max. :34.00
                                              Max.
                                                     :35.00
 Max.
                 Max.
                        :1985
                                                              Max.
                                                                     :35.00
   dispute
                      allies
                                                      trade
                                      contig
 Min.
       :0.00000
                  Min.
                        :0.0000
                                Min.
                                         :0.0000
                                                  Min.
                                                         :0.00000
 1st Qu.:0.00000
                  1st Qu.:0.0000 1st Qu.:0.0000
                                                  1st Qu.:0.00000
 Median: 0.00000
                  Median :0.0000 Median :0.0000
                                                  Median: 0.00020
                  Mean :0.3563
                                         :0.3099
 Mean
       :0.01981
                                  Mean
                                                  Mean
                                                         :0.00231
 3rd Qu.:0.00000
                  3rd Qu.:1.0000
                                  3rd Qu.:1.0000
                                                  3rd Qu.:0.00120
       :1.00000
                        :1.0000
                                         :1.0000
 Max.
                  Max.
                                  Max.
                                                  Max.
                                                         :0.17680
    growth
                      democracy
                                       capratio
       :-0.264900
Min.
                   Min. :-1.0000
                                     Min. : 0.0100
 1st Qu.:-0.004800
                    1st Qu.:-0.8000
                                     1st Qu.: 0.0462
 Median: 0.014700
                   Median :-0.7000
                                     Median: 0.2220
 Mean
       : 0.007823
                   Mean
                          :-0.3438
                                     Mean
                                           : 1.6677
 3rd Qu.: 0.027800
                    3rd Qu.: 0.2000
                                     3rd Qu.: 1.1560
       : 0.164700
                   Max.
                          : 1.0000
                                            :78.9296
 Max.
                                     Max.
```

# The Data (Kaplan-Meier plot)



#### Software

#### R:

- coxph in survival (preferred)
- cph in design
- Plots: plot(survfit(PHobject))

#### Stata:

- Basic command = stcox
- stset first
- Options: robust, various methods for ties, postestimation commands

## Model Fitting

```
> ORCox.br<-coxph(OR.S~allies+contig+capratio+growth+democracy+trade,
             data=OR,na.action=na.exclude,method="breslow")
> summary(ORCox.br)
 n= 20448, number of events= 405
          coef exp(coef) se(coef) z Pr(>|z|)
allies
       -0.34849
                0.70576 0.11096 -3.141 0.001686 **
contig 0.94861
               2.58213 0.12173 7.793 6.55e-15 ***
growth -3.69487 0.02485 1.19950 -3.080 0.002068 **
trade
       -3.22857 0.03961 9.45588 -0.341 0.732776
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
```

## Model Fitting (continued)

```
exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
allies
           0.70576
                       1.4169 5.678e-01 8.772e-01
           2.58213 0.3873 2.034e+00 3.278e+00
contig
capratio
           0.80009
                       1.2499 7.231e-01 8.853e-01
growth
           0.02485
                     40.2402 2.368e-03 2.608e-01
democracy
           0.68254
                       1.4651 5.620e-01 8.289e-01
trade
           0.03961
                      25.2436 3.540e-10 4.433e+06
Concordance= 0.714 (se = 0.015)
Rsquare= 0.01 (max possible= 0.234)
Likelihood ratio test= 210.3 on 6 df.
                                       p=0
Wald test
                    = 159.8 on 6 df,
                                       0=q
Score (logrank) test = 185.8 on 6 df,
                                       p=0
```

# Interpretation: Hazard Ratios

$$HR = \exp[(\mathbf{X}_j - \mathbf{X}_k)\hat{\beta}]$$

#### Means:

- $HR = 1 \leftrightarrow \hat{\beta} = 0$
- $HR > 1 \leftrightarrow \hat{\beta} > 0$
- $HR < 1 \leftrightarrow \hat{\beta} < 0$

Percentage difference =  $100 \times \{\exp[(\mathbf{X}_i - \mathbf{X}_k)\hat{\beta}] - 1\}$ .

### Example: Hazard Ratios

#### From above:

```
exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
allies
           0.70576
                      1.4169 5.678e-01 8.772e-01
contig
           2.58213 0.3873 2.034e+00 3.278e+00
capratio
          0.80009 1.2499 7.231e-01 8.853e-01
growth
           0.02485 40.2402 2.368e-03 2.608e-01
democracy
          0.68254
                      1.4651 5.620e-01 8.289e-01
trade
           0.03961
                     25.2436 3.540e-10 4.433e+06
```

#### Interpretation:

- · Countries which are *allies* have an expected  $(0.706 1) \times 100) = 29.4$  percent lower hazard of conflict than those that are not.
- · Contiguous countries have  $(2.582 1) \times 100 = 158$  percent higher hazards of conflict than non-contiguous ones.
- · A one-unit increase in *democracy* corresponds to a  $(0.683 1) \times 100 = 31.7$  percent decrease in the expected hazard of conflict.

### Hazard Ratios: Scaling Covariates

It is good for one-unit changes to be meaningful / realistic...

```
> OR$growthPct<-OR$growth*100
> summary(coxph(OR.S~allies+contig+capratio+growthPct+democracy+trade,
               data=OR.na.action=na.exclude. method="breslow"))
         exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95
allies
           0.70576
                       1.4169 5.678e-01 8.772e-01
contig
           2.58213 0.3873 2.034e+00 3.278e+00
capratio
           0.80009 1.2499 7.231e-01 8.853e-01
growthPct
           0.96373 1.0376 9.413e-01 9.867e-01
democracy
           0.68254
                       1.4651 5.620e-01 8.289e-01
trade
           0.03961
                      25.2436 3.540e-10 4.433e+06
```


#### Note:

- · Previous HR for growth = 0.02485  $\rightarrow$  97.5 percent decrease in  $\hat{h}(t)$
- · HR for growthPct is now 0.964; 1 unit increase  $\rightarrow$  4% decrease in  $\hat{h}(t)$
- Same result, proportionally:  $0.96373^{100} = 0.02485$


#### Baseline Hazards

Because the Cox model is semiparametric, it uses a conventional / univariate (Nelson-Aalen) estimate of the "baseline" hazard:

OR.BH<-basehaz(ORCox.br,centered=FALSE)



## Comparing Survival Curves



Ties...

∃ ties...

Their presence biases  $Cox \hat{\beta}s$  toward zero.

- Call  $d_j > 0$  the number of events occurring at  $t_j$ , and
- $D_j$  the set of  $d_j$  observations that have the event at  $t_j$ .

## Ties (continued)

#### Means of handling ties:

· Breslow

$$L_{\mathsf{Breslow}}(\beta) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\exp\left[\left(\sum_{q \in D_{j}} \mathbf{X}_{q}\right) \beta\right]}{\left[\sum_{\ell \in R_{j}} \exp(\mathbf{X}_{\ell} \beta)\right]^{d_{j}}}$$

Efron

$$\ln L_{\mathsf{Efron}}(\beta) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i \in D_j} \left\{ \mathbf{X}_i \beta - \frac{1}{d_j} \sum_{k=1}^{d_j - 1} \ln \left[ \sum_{\ell \in R_j} \exp(\mathbf{X}_\ell \beta) - k \left( \frac{1}{d_j} \sum_{\ell \in D_j} \exp(\mathbf{X}_\ell \beta) \right) \right] \right\}$$

## Ties (continued)


"Exact" (partial likelihood)

$$\ln L_{\mathsf{Exact}}(oldsymbol{eta}) = \sum_{j=1}^J \left\{ \sum_{i \in R_j} \delta_{ij}(\mathbf{X}_i oldsymbol{eta}) - \ln[f(r_j, d_j)] 
ight\}$$

where

$$f(r,d) = g(r-1,d) + g(r-1,d-1) \exp(\mathbf{X}_k \boldsymbol{\beta}),$$
 $k = r$ th observation in  $R_j,$ 
 $r_j = \text{cardinality of } R_j, \text{ and}$ 
 $g(r,d) = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if } r < d, \\ 1 \text{ if } d = 0 \end{cases}$ 

### Ties: Example



# Ties: Example (continued)


```
Data$Tied<-round(Data$T,0)

DataT.S<-Surv(Data$Tied,Data$C)

DT.br<-coxph(DataT.S~X,data=Data,method="breslow")

DT.ef<-coxph(DataT.S~X,data=Data,method="efron")

DT.ex<-coxph(DataT.S~X,data=Data,method="exact")
```



#### Ties: Practical Advice

- All approx. are identical if ∄ ties
- Few ties = similar results
- When ties are present, Breslow < Efron</li>"Exact" methods
- If you want to learn more about ties in the Cox model, <u>read this</u>.

#### Cox vs. Parametric Models

#### Conceptual considerations:

- Theory
- Nature of h(t)
- Relative importance: Bias vs. efficiency
- Need / willingness for out-of-sample predictions / forecasting

### Cox, On His Model

Reid: "What do you think of the cottage industry that's grown up around [the Cox model]?"

Cox: "In the light of further results one knows since, I think I would normally want to tackle the problem parametrically... I'm not keen on non-parametric formulations normally."

Reid: "So if you had a set of censored survival data today, you might rather fit a parametric model, even though there was a feeling among the medical statisticians that that wasn't quite right."

Cox: "That's right, but since then various people have shown that the answers are very insensitive to the parametric formulation of the underlying distribution. And if you want to do things like predict the outcome for a particular patient, it's much more convenient to do that parametrically."

- From Reid (1994).

# Extensions (future classes)

- Cox Models for repeated events
- Models with "frailties"
- Competing risks / "cured" subpopulations
- etc.