

Redistribution in Microsimulation Models with Behavioral Responses

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What is this session about?

- ▶ **Redistribution:** “If top tax rate was 53 instead of 42 %, how would that affect net incomes, income inequality or work incentives?”
- ▶ **Microsimulation:** Ex ante analysis to evaluate counterfactual situations or policy reforms that are to be implemented in the future
- ▶ **Models:** Analysis starting from economic theory and theoretic models
- ▶ **Behavioral Responses:** Allows to study adjustments to changed incentives and predict responses to counterfactual situations

Motivation

- ▶ Why could this be interesting for inequality and welfare analysis?
 - ▶ Understand and predict behavioral responses to redistributive policies
 - ▶ Estimation of structural utility models allows various welfare analyses (Bargain, Decoster, Dolls, Neumann, Peichl and Siegloch, 2013, Bargain, Dolls, Neumann, Peichl and Siegloch, 2014a,b)
- ▶ Applied session
 - ▶ How do these models work?
 - ▶ How to estimate them?
 - ▶ How to predict behavior?
- ▶ Several references included (Creedy and Kalb, 2005, 2006, Aaberge and Colombino, 2014)

Outline

1. Short introduction and motivation
2. How to use these models?
 - 2.1 Basic workflow using such models
 - 2.2 Underlying theory and modeling assumptions
 - 2.3 Data and choice set construction
 - 2.4 How to estimate these models
 - 2.5 Using these models for policy analyses
3. Model extensions
4. Applied session
5. References

Basic workflow

1. Specify a theoretical model of individual labor supply behavior
 - ▶ E.g. $U = U(C, L)$, individuals maximize their utility over potential jobs
 - ▶ Jobs defined by wages w , working hours h and other characteristics ϵ
2. Find suitable data and set up the choice set
 - ▶ Identify chosen jobs (hours, wages and characteristics observed in the data)
 - ▶ Add counterfactual choices and simulate hypothetical hours and net incomes
3. Estimate the model using this choice set, obtain preference estimates
4. Hold preferences constant and simulate counterfactual scenarios
 - ▶ Study behavioral adjustments if tax/benefit system or wages were different
 - ▶ Calculate welfare measures (e.g. compensating variation, utility differentials)

Theoretical model

- ▶ Agents receive utility from consumption C and leisure L
 - ▶ Mainly two different classes of models have been used over the last decades
 - ▶ Classic models assume maximization over continuous range of working hours, i.e. $\max_{h=[0,60]} U(C[h], L[h])$ (Burtless and Hausman, 1978, Hausman, 1981)
 - ▶ More recent models usually assume discrete choice between different jobs, i.e. $\max_{j \in J} U(C_j, L_j)$ (Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm, 1995, van Soest, 1995, Hoynes, 1996)
 - ▶ Individual subscripts omitted, but no time subscripts: “steady-state” models
- ▶ Agents choose jobs and maximize utility. How does it look like?
 - ▶ Individual n 's utility of choosing job j is defined as $U_{nj} = U(C_{nj}, L_j, \epsilon_{nj})$
 - ▶ Researcher needs to identify form of U , distribution of ϵ_{nj} and job offers
 - ▶ Observed choices inform us about maximum utility and optimal working hours

Identification

- ▶ Wait, agents' labor supply is thus determined by consumption and leisure, both functions of working hours? Isn't that tautological?
 - ▶ Right. That's why econometricians care so much about identification
 - ▶ Non-parametric identification impossible with cross-sectional data (Manski, 2014)
 - ▶ But even cross-sectional data typically gives us variation in wages, non-labor incomes, taxes and transfers (=consumption) for given working hours
- ▶ Use structural model and impose specific functional form, e.g.
 - ▶ $U_{nj} = \alpha_1 \ln C_{nj} + \alpha_2 (\ln C_{nj})^2 + \alpha_3 \ln L_j + \alpha_4 (\ln L_j)^2 + \alpha_5 \ln C_{nj} \ln L_j + \epsilon_{nj}$
 - ▶ C_{nj} accounts for earnings $w_{nj}L_j$, non-labor income I and tax/benefit system
 - ▶ Assumes homogeneous preferences and specific functional form

Job offers and hours categories

► We assume that individuals choose among jobs, but what is a job?

- A job j is defined by hours h_j , wages w_{nj} and unobservables ϵ_{nj}
- Most often, job modeling boils down to three simple assumptions:
 1. Unobservables follow Gumbel distribution: $\epsilon_{nj} \sim GEV(0, 1, 0)$
 2. Wages assumed exogenous to hours or preferences: $w_{nj} = w_n$
 3. Hours discretized to interval means: $h_j \in [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60]$

(van Soest, 1995, Hoynes, 1996, Keane and Moffitt, 1998, Euwals and van Soest, 1999, Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir, 2000, van Soest, Das and Gong, 2002, Bargain, Orsini and Peichl, 2014)

- This simple model generates seven choices for each individual

► Modeling approach is rather restrictive. Alternative approaches:

- Define random choice-set instead of fixed hours (Aaberge, Colombino and Wennemo, 2009)
- Allow correlation between wages and preferences (Blundell and Shephard, 2012)
- Allow hours-dependent wages and flexible correlation (Löffler, Peichl and Siegloch, 2014)

Data sources

- ▶ What kind of data is required for the estimation?
 - ▶ The model requires information at least on wages and working hours
 - ▶ Ideally, the data also contains household characteristics, information on children, demographics, social background, occupational information, . . .
 - ▶ Most models based on cross-sectional data, but panel data highly useful
- ▶ Which data sets are used in practice?
 - ▶ Usually household surveys, only rarely administrative data because working hours are seldom reported in tax registers or social security records
 - ▶ EU: SILC, US: CPS, PSID, NLSY, Germany: SOEP, Britain: BHPS, . . .

Tax/benefit calculator

- ▶ What we need to do with the data
 - ▶ Clean up sample and keep only working-age population (or subgroups)
 - ▶ Create choice set according to job model (for now: simple approach)
 - ▶ Calculate individual wage rates (and impute wage for non-workers)
 - ▶ Duplicate individual observations by number of hypothetical choices
- ▶ How to create hypothetical job choices?
 - ▶ Define weekly/monthly working hours for every hypothetical job choice
 - ▶ Based on hypothetical hours and wages, calculate gross earnings for all jobs
 - ▶ Apply tax/benefit calculator to these hypothetical households with their hypothetical working hours and gross earnings to get disposable income
 - ▶ Popular calculators: EUROMOD for Europe, TAXSIM for the US, ...
- ▶ Observed working hours inform us about the job actually chosen

Browsing through the data

- ▶ The resulting data set should look somehow like this one:

#	id	hours	wage	gross	dpi	leisure	choice	...
1	1	0	7.5	0	400	80	0	...
2	1	10	7.5	300	500	70	0	...
3	1	20	7.5	600	600	60	1	...
4	1	30	7.5	900	700	50	0	...
5	1	40	7.5	1,200	800	40	0	...
6	1	50	7.5	1,500	900	30	0	...
7	1	60	7.5	1,800	1,000	20	0	...
8	2	0	9.7	0	400	80	0	...
9	2	10	9.7	388	550	70	0	...
10	2	20	9.7	766	700	60	0	...
11	2	30	9.7	1,164	850	50	0	...
12	2	40	9.7	1,552	1,000	40	1	...
13	2	50	9.7	1,940	1,150	30	0	...
14	2	60	9.7	2,328	1,300	20	0	...
...

Estimation approach

► Bringing the theory to the data

- We know the choice and we know the consumption and leisure for all jobs
- We want to outback the preference coefficients α of our utility function

► Recall the utility function we assumed for our model

$$\text{► } U_{nj} = \underbrace{\alpha_1 \ln C_{nj} + \alpha_2 (\ln C_{nj})^2 + \alpha_3 \ln L_j + \alpha_4 (\ln L_j)^2 + \alpha_5 \ln C_{nj} \ln L_j}_{V_{nj}} + \epsilon_{nj}$$

- Moreover we assumed that ϵ_{nj} is extreme value distributed
- Yields well known multinomial or conditional logit problem (McFadden, 1974)
- $P(U_{nj} > U_{nk} \forall k \neq j) = \frac{\exp V_{nj}}{\sum_{h \in J} \exp V_{nh}} \quad \forall \quad n = 1, \dots, N, \quad j \in J$
- We can estimate this model using maximum likelihood methods

Estimation using Stata

► Define the likelihood function of this simple model

- Log-likelihood given by: $\ln L = \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{j \in J} y_{nj} (V_{nj} - \ln \sum_{h \in J} \exp V_{nh})$
- Where $y_{nj} = 1$ if individual n chose alternative j and $y_{nj} = 0$ otherwise

► Turning to Stata

- The model defined above can be estimated using Stata's `clogit` command
- Call by: `clogit choice ln_dpi ln_leisure ... [fw=...], group(id)`

► Rather restrictive when it comes to more complicated models

- User-written command `lslogit` for labor supply estimation (Löffler, 2013)
- Supports often used specifications and extensions (Löffler, Peichl and Siegloch, 2014)
- Call by: `lslogit choice [fw=...], group(id) con(dpi) lei(leisure)`

Example output

```
. lslogit choice, group(id) c(dpi) l(leisure) boxcox cx(age*_m) lx1(age*_m)
```

Mixed Logit Labor Supply Model

Number of obs = 5761

LR chi2(2) = 171.99

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Pseudo R2 = 0.1456

Log likelihood = -1368.2779

(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on id)

	choice	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Cx	age_m	63.48062	10.78075	5.89	0.000	42.35074	84.6105
	age2_m	-8.688809	1.483041	-5.86	0.000	-11.59552	-5.782102
	_cons	-112.7283	19.40653	-5.81	0.000	-150.7644	-74.69218
CxL1	_cons	.0862592	.0578086	1.49	0.136	-.0270435	.1995619
L1x	age_m	1.314325	1.334258	0.99	0.325	-1.300773	3.929424
	age2_m	-.1787296	.1835297	-0.97	0.330	-.5384413	.1809821
	_cons	-2.32873	2.38518	-0.98	0.329	-7.003596	2.346136
	/l_C	.593499	.0875811	6.78	0.000	.4218433	.7651548
	/l_L1	-2.624566	.5228987	-5.02	0.000	-3.649429	-1.599704
[dudes]		.0341955					

Model: - Box-Cox utility function

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Postestimation

- ▶ Maximum likelihood gives us estimates for preference coefficients $\hat{\alpha}$
 - ▶ This allows us to predict utility levels \hat{V}_{nj} from choosing the different jobs
 - ▶ Call by: `predict util, xb`
 - ▶ Using these we can predict choice probabilities or utility maximizing choice
 - ▶ Call by: `predict prob, pc1`
- ▶ Enables us to check estimation fit by comparing observed and predicted choices

#	id	hours	choice	util	prob	...
1	1	0	0	1.0	0.100	...
2	1	10	0	1.5	0.165	...
3	1	20	1	2.0	0.271	...
4	1	30	0	1.5	0.165	...
5	1	40	0	1.0	0.100	...
6	1	50	0	1.0	0.100	...
7	1	60	0	1.0	0.100	...
...

Counterfactual analysis

- ▶ Holding preferences $\hat{\alpha}$ constant, we can simulate policy reforms
 - ▶ E.g. by calculating new disposable incomes for all job categories
 - ▶ `gen dpi2 = ...`
 - ▶ `replace dpi = dpi2`
 - ▶ `predict prob2, pc1`

#	id	hours	dpi	dpi2	choice	prob	prob2	...
1	1	0	400	300	0	0.100	0.07	...
2	1	10	500	400	0	0.165	0.10	...
3	1	20	600	500	1	0.271	0.14	...
4	1	30	700	700	0	0.165	0.14	...
5	1	40	800	900	0	0.100	0.20	...
6	1	50	900	1,100	0	0.100	0.18	...
7	1	60	1,000	1,300	0	0.100	0.18	...
...

Model extensions

- ▶ These are the basics. Model can be extended in several dimensions
 - ▶ Alternative representation of job offers (Aaberge et al., 2009, Dagsvik et al., 2014)
 - ▶ Different assumptions on the wage distribution and exogeneity (Löffler et al., 2014)
 - ▶ Functional form of the utility function (van Soest et al., 2002, Löffler et al., 2014)
 - ▶ Part-time restrictions and fixed costs (van Soest, 1995, Euwals and van Soest, 1999)
 - ▶ Random preferences and unobserved heterogeneity (van Soest, 1995, Pacifico, 2013)
 - ▶ Correlated wages and preferences (Breunig et al., 2008, Blundell and Shephard, 2012)
 - ▶ Welfare stigma from benefit participation (Hoynes, 1996, Keane and Moffitt, 1998)
 - ▶ Job offers and different economic sectors (Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006)
- ▶ Huge literature, but all follow the same outline and workflow
 - ▶ Good intro: “Labour supply and microsimulation” (Creedy and Kalb, 2005, 2006)
 - ▶ Handbook chapter: “Labour Supply Models” (Aaberge and Colombino, 2014)
 - ▶ Comprehensive sensitivity check with respect to assumptions (Löffler et al., 2014)

<https://github.com/mloeffler/course-it10/archive/master.zip>

Comments or questions? — loeffler@zew.de

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