

Redistribution in Microsimulation Models with Behavioral Responses

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What is this session about?

- ▶ **Redistribution:** “If top tax rate was 53 instead of 42 %, how would that affect net incomes, income inequality or work incentives?”
- ▶ **Microsimulation:** Ex ante analysis to evaluate counterfactual situations or policy reforms that are to be implemented in the future
- ▶ **Models:** Analysis starting from economic theory and theoretic models
- ▶ **Behavioral Responses:** Allows to study adjustments to changed incentives and predict responses to counterfactual situations

Motivation

- ▶ Why could this be interesting for inequality and welfare analysis?
 - ▶ Understand and predict behavioral responses to redistributive policies
 - ▶ Estimation of structural utility models allows various welfare analyses
- ▶ Applied session
 - ▶ How do these models work?
 - ▶ How to estimate them?
 - ▶ How to predict behavior?
- ▶ Several references included (Creedy and Kalb, 2005, 2006, Aaberge and Colombino, 2014)

Outline

1. Short introduction and motivation
2. How to use these models?
 - 2.1 Basic workflow using such models
 - 2.2 Underlying theory and modeling assumptions
 - 2.3 Data and choice set construction
 - 2.4 How to estimate these models
 - 2.5 Using these models for policy analyses
3. Model extensions
4. Applied session
5. References

Basic workflow

1. Specify a theoretical model of individual labor supply behavior
 - ▶ E.g. $U = U(C, L)$, individuals maximize their utility over potential jobs
 - ▶ Jobs defined by wages w , working hours h and other characteristics ϵ
2. Find suitable data and set up the choice set
 - ▶ Identify chosen jobs (hours, wages and characteristics observed in the data)
 - ▶ Add counterfactual choices and simulate hypothetical hours and net incomes
3. Estimate the model using this choice set, obtain preference estimates
4. Hold preferences constant and simulate counterfactual scenarios
 - ▶ Study behavioral adjustments if tax/benefit system or wages were different
 - ▶ Calculate welfare measures (e.g. compensating variation, utility differentials)

Theoretical model

- ▶ Agents receive utility from consumption C and leisure L
 - ▶ Mainly two different classes of models have been used over the last decades
 - ▶ Classic models assume maximization over continuous range of working hours, i.e. $\max_{h=[0,60]} U(C[h], L[h])$ (Burtless and Hausman, 1978, Hausman, 1981)
 - ▶ More recent models usually assume discrete choice between different jobs, i.e. $\max_{j \in J} U(C_j, L_j)$ (Aaberge et al., 1995, van Soest, 1995, Hoynes, 1996)
 - ▶ Individual subscripts omitted, but no time subscripts: “steady-state” models
- ▶ Agents choose jobs and maximize utility. How does it look like?
 - ▶ Individual n 's utility of choosing job j is defined as $U_{nj} = U(C_{nj}, L_j, \epsilon_{nj})$
 - ▶ Researcher needs to identify form of U , distribution of ϵ_{nj} and job offers
 - ▶ Observed choices inform us about maximum utility and optimal working hours

Identification

- ▶ Wait, agents' labor supply is thus determined by consumption and leisure, both functions of working hours? Isn't that tautological?
 - ▶ Right. That's why econometricians care so much about identification
 - ▶ Non-parametric identification impossible with cross-sectional data (Manski, 2014)
 - ▶ But even cross-sectional data typically gives us variation in wages, non-labor incomes, taxes and transfers (=consumption) for given working hours
- ▶ Use structural model and impose specific functional form, e.g.
 - ▶ $U_{nj} = \alpha_1 \ln C_{nj} + \alpha_2 (\ln C_{nj})^2 + \alpha_3 \ln L_j + \alpha_4 (\ln L_j)^2 + \alpha_5 \ln C_{nj} \ln L_j + \epsilon_{nj}$
 - ▶ C_{nj} accounts for earnings $w_{nj}L_j$, non-labor income I and tax/benefit system
 - ▶ Assumes homogeneous preferences and specific functional form

Job offers and hours categories

- ▶ We assume that individuals choose among jobs, but what is a job?

- ▶ A job j is defined by hours h_j , wages w_{nj} and unobservables ϵ_{nj}
- ▶ Most often, job modeling boils down to three simple assumptions:
 1. Unobservables follow Gumbel distribution: $\epsilon_{nj} \sim GEV(0, 1, 0)$
 2. Wages assumed exogenous to hours or preferences: $w_{nj} = w_n$
 3. Hours discretized to interval means: $h_j \in [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60]$

(van Soest, 1995, Hoynes, 1996, Keane and Moffitt, 1998, Blundell et al., 2000, Bargain et al., 2014)

- ▶ This simple model generates seven choices for each individual

- ▶ Modeling approach is rather restrictive. Alternative approaches:

- ▶ Define random choice-set instead of discretized hours intervals (Aaberge et al., 2009)
- ▶ Allow correlation between wages and preferences (Blundell and Shephard, 2012)
- ▶ Allow hours-dependent wages and flexible correlation (Löffler et al., 2014)

Data sources

- ▶ What kind of data is required for the estimation?
 - ▶ The model requires information at least on wages and working hours
 - ▶ Ideally, the data also contains household characteristics, information on children, demographics, social background, occupational information, . . .
 - ▶ Most models based on cross-sectional data, but panel data highly useful
- ▶ Which data sets are used in practice?
 - ▶ Usually household surveys, only rarely administrative data because working hours are seldom reported in tax registers or social security records
 - ▶ EU: SILC, US: CPS, PSID, NLSY, Germany: SOEP, Britain: BHPS, . . .

Tax/benefit calculator

- ▶ What we need to do with the data
 - ▶ Clean up sample and keep only working-age population (or subgroups)
 - ▶ Create choice set according to job model (for now: simple approach)
 - ▶ Calculate individual wage rates (and impute wage for non-workers)
 - ▶ Duplicate individual observations by number of hypothetical choices
- ▶ How to create hypothetical job choices?
 - ▶ Define weekly/monthly working hours for every hypothetical job choice
 - ▶ Based on hypothetical hours and wages, calculate gross earnings for all jobs
 - ▶ Apply tax/benefit calculator to these hypothetical households with their hypothetical working hours and gross earnings to get disposable income
 - ▶ Popular calculators: EUROMOD for Europe, TAXSIM for the US, ...
- ▶ Observed working hours inform us about the job actually chosen

Browsing through the data

- ▶ The resulting data set should look somehow like this one:

#	id	hours	wage	gross	dpi	leisure	choice	...
1	1	0	7.5	0	400	80	0	...
2	1	10	7.5	300	500	70	0	...
3	1	20	7.5	600	600	60	1	...
4	1	30	7.5	900	700	50	0	...
5	1	40	7.5	1,200	800	40	0	...
6	1	50	7.5	1,500	900	30	0	...
7	1	60	7.5	1,800	1,000	20	0	...
8	2	0	9.7	0	400	80	0	...
9	2	10	9.7	388	550	70	0	...
10	2	20	9.7	766	700	60	0	...
11	2	30	9.7	1,164	850	50	0	...
12	2	40	9.7	1,552	1,000	40	1	...
13	2	50	9.7	1,940	1,150	30	0	...
14	2	60	9.7	2,328	1,300	20	0	...
...

Estimation approach

► Bringing the theory to the data

- We know the choice and we know the consumption and leisure for all jobs
- We want to outback the preference coefficients α of our utility function

► Recall the utility function we assumed for our model

$$\text{► } U_{nj} = \underbrace{\alpha_1 \ln C_{nj} + \alpha_2 (\ln C_{nj})^2 + \alpha_3 \ln L_j + \alpha_4 (\ln L_j)^2 + \alpha_5 \ln C_{nj} \ln L_j}_{V_{nj}} + \epsilon_{nj}$$

- Moreover we assumed that ϵ_{nj} is extreme value distributed
- Yields well known multinomial or conditional logit problem (McFadden, 1974)
- $P(U_{nj} > U_{nk} \forall k \neq j) = \frac{\exp V_{nj}}{\sum_{h \in J} \exp V_{nh}} \quad \forall \quad n = 1, \dots, N, \quad j \in J$
- We can estimate this model using maximum likelihood methods

Estimation using Stata

- ▶ Define the likelihood function of this simple model

- ▶ Log-likelihood given by: $\ln L = \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{j \in J} y_{nj} (V_{nj} - \ln \sum_{h \in J} \exp V_{nh})$
- ▶ Where $y_{nj} = 1$ if individual n chose alternative j and $y_{nj} = 0$ otherwise

- ▶ Turning to Stata

- ▶ The model defined above can be estimated using Stata's `clogit` command
- ▶ Call by: `clogit choice ln_dpi ln_leisure ... [fw=...], group(id)`

- ▶ Rather restrictive when it comes to more complicated models

- ▶ User-written command `lslogit` for labor supply estimation (Löffler, 2013)
- ▶ Supports many heavily used utility specifications and extensions (Löffler et al., 2014)
- ▶ Call by: `lslogit choice [fw=...], group(id) con(dpi) lei(leisure)`

Example output

```
. lslogit choice, group(id) c(dpi) l(leisure) boxcox cx(age*_m) lx1(age*_m)
```

Mixed Logit Labor Supply Model

Number of obs = 5761

LR chi2(2) = 171.99

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Pseudo R2 = 0.1456

Log likelihood = -1368.2779

(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on id)

	choice	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Cx	age_m	63.48062	10.78075	5.89	0.000	42.35074	84.6105
	age2_m	-8.688809	1.483041	-5.86	0.000	-11.59552	-5.782102
	_cons	-112.7283	19.40653	-5.81	0.000	-150.7644	-74.69218
CxL1	_cons	.0862592	.0578086	1.49	0.136	-.0270435	.1995619
L1x	age_m	1.314325	1.334258	0.99	0.325	-1.300773	3.929424
	age2_m	-.1787296	.1835297	-0.97	0.330	-.5384413	.1809821
	_cons	-2.32873	2.38518	-0.98	0.329	-7.003596	2.346136
	/l_C	.593499	.0875811	6.78	0.000	.4218433	.7651548
	/l_L1	-2.624566	.5228987	-5.02	0.000	-3.649429	-1.599704
[dudes]		.0341955					

Model: - Box-Cox utility function

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Postestimation

- ▶ Maximum likelihood gives us estimates for preference coefficients $\hat{\alpha}$
 - ▶ This allows us to predict utility levels \hat{V}_{nj} from choosing the different jobs
 - ▶ Call by: `predict util, xb`
 - ▶ Using these we can predict choice probabilities or utility maximizing choice
 - ▶ Call by: `predict prob, pc1`
- ▶ Enables us to check estimation fit by comparing observed and predicted choices

#	id	hours	choice	util	prob	...
1	1	0	0	1.0	0.100	...
2	1	10	0	1.5	0.165	...
3	1	20	1	2.0	0.271	...
4	1	30	0	1.5	0.165	...
5	1	40	0	1.0	0.100	...
6	1	50	0	1.0	0.100	...
7	1	60	0	1.0	0.100	...
...

Counterfactual analysis

- ▶ Holding preferences $\hat{\alpha}$ constant, we can simulate policy reforms
 - ▶ E.g. by calculating new disposable incomes for all job categories
 - ▶ `gen dpi2 = ...`
 - ▶ `replace dpi = dpi2`
 - ▶ `predict prob2, pc1`

#	id	hours	dpi	dpi2	choice	prob	prob2	...
1	1	0	400	300	0	0.100	0.07	...
2	1	10	500	400	0	0.165	0.10	...
3	1	20	600	500	1	0.271	0.14	...
4	1	30	700	700	0	0.165	0.14	...
5	1	40	800	900	0	0.100	0.20	...
6	1	50	900	1,100	0	0.100	0.18	...
7	1	60	1,000	1,300	0	0.100	0.18	...
...

Model extensions

- ▶ These are the basics. Model can be extended in several dimensions
 - ▶ Alternative representation of job offers (Aaberge et al., 2009, Dagsvik et al., 2014)
 - ▶ Different assumptions on the wage distribution and exogeneity (Löffler et al., 2014)
 - ▶ Functional form of the utility function (van Soest et al., 2002, Löffler et al., 2014)
 - ▶ Part-time restrictions and fixed costs (van Soest, 1995, Euwals and van Soest, 1999)
 - ▶ Random preferences and unobserved heterogeneity (van Soest, 1995, Pacifico, 2013)
 - ▶ Correlated wages and preferences (Breunig et al., 2008, Blundell and Shephard, 2012)
 - ▶ Welfare stigma from benefit participation (Hoynes, 1996, Keane and Moffitt, 1998)
 - ▶ Job offers and different economic sectors (Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006)
- ▶ Huge literature, but all follow the same outline and workflow
 - ▶ Good intro: “Labour supply and microsimulation” (Creedy and Kalb, 2005, 2006)
 - ▶ Handbook chapter: “Labour Supply Models” (Aaberge and Colombino, 2014)
 - ▶ Comprehensive sensitivity check with respect to assumptions (Löffler et al., 2014)

Comments or questions? — loeffler@zew.de

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