## Comparative Dynamics

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Econ720

November 12, 2018

## Comparative Dynamics

- ► We use phase diagrams to uncover the dynamic response to shocks.
- ▶ We study tax changes in a growth model.

#### Model

#### The household solves

$$\max \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \tag{1}$$

subject to

$$\dot{k}_t = r_t k_t + w_t - c_t - \tau_t \tag{2}$$

and  $k_0$  given.

**Firms** produce output using F(K,L).

The **government** uses the tax revenue to finance government spending:  $G_t = \tau_t$ .

## Competitive Equilibrium

A competitive equilibrium consists of functions  $c(t), k(t), \tau(t), w(t), r(t)$  that satisfy:

1. Household: Budget constraint and

$$g(c) = \frac{r - \rho}{\sigma} \tag{3}$$

2. Firms:

$$r = f'(k) - \delta \tag{4}$$

$$w = f(k) - f'(k)k \tag{5}$$


3. Government:

$$\tau = G \tag{6}$$

4. Market clearing:

$$\dot{k} = f(k) - \delta k - c - G \tag{7}$$

# Phase Diagram



The only change relative to the model without government:

#### Permanent Tax Increase

Consider a permanent, unannounced increase in G.

In the phase diagram

- $ightharpoonup k_{ss}$  remains unchanged because the  $\dot{c}=0$  locus does not shift.

Dynamics: css drops to the new saddle path, then moves along it.

► How do I know this is true?

An interesting long-run result: full crowding out of consumption  $(\Delta c_{ss} = -\Delta G)$ .

Consider a temporary, unannounced increase in G.

• 
$$G_t = G^* + \Delta G$$
 for  $0 \le t \le T$ , but  $G_t = G^*$  for  $t > T$ .

- ▶ To find the dynamics, we work backwards.
- ► Changes occur at t = 0 and t = T.

Step 1: t = T. What happens?


#### Step 2: 0 < t < T:

- ▶ The phase diagram with taxes applies.
- ▶ But the economy is not on the saddle path (why not?).
- ▶ What is the right terminal condition for k(T)?

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Step 3: t = 0
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- ► The  $\dot{k} = 0$  locus shifts down.
- ightharpoonup Is  $c_0$  on the saddle path?

Consider  $k_0 = k_{ss}$ . What paths are feasible?




Consider  $k_0 < k_{ss}$ .

#### Announced Tax Cut

- Consider a surprise tax cut that is announced to take place at date T.
- At t = 0 the news arrives that taxes remain high until t = T, but then fall permanently.
- Again, we work backwards.
- ▶ Changes occur at t = T and t = 0.

#### Announced Tax Cut



#### Summary

#### To study the dynamic effects of shocks:

- 1. Find the phase diagram with and without shock.
- 2. Find the dates at which changes occur:
  - 2.1 when the shock hits: phase diagram changes the control (typically) does not jump
  - 2.2 when new info arrives: agents reoptimize the control jumps
- 3. Work backwards, starting at the last date at which a change occurs

Phase Diagram for a Simple Human Capital Model

#### A Human Capital Model

We study the decision of a household how much human capital to accumulate.

This example illustrates two complications:

- 1. finite horizons
- 2. binding inequality constraints.

#### Household problem

The household maximizes

$$\int_0^T e^{-\rho t} u(c(t)) dt \tag{8}$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$c(t) = w(t)h(t)[1 - \tau(t)v(t)]$$
(9)

the human capital technology

$$\dot{h}(t) = v(t) - \delta h(t) \tag{10}$$

and  $v \ge 0$ .

For simplicity, assume that  $v \leq 1$  never binds.

#### Household: Intuition

- Human capital acquired early is more valuable for two reasons:
  - 1. it lives longer (date *T* is farther off);
  - 2. its payoffs are discounted by less.
- ▶ We expect the optimal path for v(t) to be falling over time.
- ▶ When close to T, we expect  $v(t) \ge 0$  to bind.

#### Hamiltonian

$$H = u(wh[1 - \tau v]) + \lambda [v - \delta h]$$
(11)

First-order conditions

$$u'(c)wh\tau \ge \lambda$$
 (12)

with equality if v > 0 and

$$\dot{\lambda} = \rho \lambda - u'(c) w (1 - \tau v) + \lambda \delta \tag{13}$$

#### Summary

The solution to the household problem consists of functions  $(c,h,v,\lambda)$  that solve

1. The first-order conditions

$$u'(c)wh\tau \geq \lambda$$
 (14)

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda - u'(c)w(1 - \tau v) \tag{15}$$

with equality if v > 0.

2. The budget constraint

$$c(t) = w(t)h(t)[1 - \tau(t)v(t)]$$
(16)

3. The law of motion

$$\dot{h}(t) = v(t) - \delta h(t) \tag{17}$$

4. The boundary conditions:  $h_0$  given and  $\lambda_T = 0$ .

## Log utility

Assume 
$$u(c) = \ln(c)$$

Consider two regions of the phase diagram:

- 1. v = 0
- 2. v > 0

## Region v = 0

$$wh\tau \ge \lambda c \tag{18}$$

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda - w/c \tag{19}$$

$$c = wh \tag{20}$$

$$\dot{h} = -\delta h \tag{21}$$

Simplify:

$$\tau \ge \lambda \tag{22}$$

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda - 1/h \tag{23}$$

$$\dot{h} = -\delta h \tag{24}$$

Terminal condition: 
$$\lambda_T = 0$$


#### Region v = 0

- The shadow price λ is not large enough to cover the opportunity cost τ.
- The household does not invest in human capital.
- ► The laws of motion are:

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda - 1/h$$
 $\dot{h} = -\delta h$ 

- ►  $h \uparrow \Rightarrow \dot{\lambda} \uparrow$  and  $\dot{h} \downarrow$ .
- ► Hence,  $h(t) = h(t_0)e^{-\delta(t-t_0)}$ , where  $t_0$  is any date at which the economy is inside the region.

## Phase Diagram: Region v = 0



## Region v > 0

$$\frac{wh\tau}{c} = \lambda \tag{25}$$

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda - \frac{w(1 - \tau v)}{c} \tag{26}$$

$$c = wh(1 - \tau v) \tag{27}$$

$$\dot{h} = v - \delta h \tag{28}$$

#### Simplify:

$$\lambda = \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau \nu}$$

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta) \lambda - 1/h$$

$$\dot{h} = \nu - \delta h$$

# Region v > 0

The first-order condition for  $\nu$  holds with equality:

$$\lambda (1 - \tau v) = \tau$$

or

$$v = 1/\tau - 1/\lambda \tag{29}$$

Substitute  $\nu$  out of the law of motion:

$$\dot{h} = 1/\tau - 1/\lambda - \delta h \tag{30}$$

Keep

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda - 1/h \tag{31}$$


# Region v > 0

In this region, the shadow price of human capital  $(\lambda)$  equals the opportunity cost.

$$\lambda > au$$

- $\dot{h} = 1/\tau 1/\lambda \delta h = 0$ is upward sloping and starts at  $\lambda = \tau$ .
- $\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta)\lambda 1/h = 0$  is a downward sloping hyperbola (as in region  $\nu = 0$ ).
- $\blacktriangleright h \uparrow \text{ or } \lambda \downarrow \Rightarrow \dot{h} \downarrow.$

# Phase Diagram



#### Steady State

- Assume that w and  $\tau$  are constant over time and that  $T = \infty$ .
- ▶ Then h and v converge to stationary levels,  $h_{ss}$  and  $v_{ss}$ .
- ▶ We next determine those levels.
- $\lambda = 0$  implies

$$(\rho + \delta)h\lambda = (\rho + \delta)h\frac{\tau}{1 - \tau \nu} = 1 \tag{32}$$

$$v = \delta h \tag{33}$$

Combine both

$$h_{ss} = [\tau(\rho + 2\delta)]^{-1}$$
 (34)

# Steady State

#### It follows that

$$v_{ss} = \delta h_{ss} = \frac{\delta}{\tau[\rho + 2\delta]}$$


$$c_{ss} = \frac{(\rho + \delta)w}{(\rho + 2\delta)^2 \tau}$$

$$\lambda_{ss} = u' \left( \frac{(\rho + \delta)w}{(\rho + 2\delta)^2 \tau} \right) \frac{w}{\rho + 2\delta}$$

## Phase Diagram

- ▶ The phase diagram has two regions: v = 0 and v > 0.
- The region boundary occurs when the household just hits the constraint  $v \ge 0$ : at  $\lambda = \tau$ .
- $\blacktriangleright \text{ For } \lambda > \tau : \ \nu > 0.$
- For  $\lambda \leq \tau$ : v = 0.

# Phase Diagram



- Any path must end with  $\lambda_T = 0$  exactly at date T.
- ▶ It follows that the shaded region must never be entered.
- ▶ What happens as the steady state is approached with v > 0?
  - ► Since all the laws of motion are continuous,  $\dot{h} \rightarrow 0$  and  $\dot{\lambda} \rightarrow 0$ .
  - The steady state can never be reached.
  - But the economy can spend an arbitrarily long time arbitrarily close to the steady state.

- First consider  $h_0 < h_{ss}$ .
- $\triangleright \lambda$  depends on the horizon T.
- ightharpoonup Short T:  $\lambda$  is low.
  - ightharpoonup Start in region v = 0
  - ightharpoonup move south-west until  $\lambda_T = 0$ .

- ► To prove this, solve the two differential equations.
- $h(t) = h(t_0) e^{-\delta t}$ . Substitute this into the law of motion for λ to obtain

$$\dot{\lambda} = (\rho + \delta) \lambda - e^{\delta t} / h(t_0) \tag{35}$$


The solution to this differential equation is

$$\lambda(t) = e^{(\rho+\delta)(t-t_0)} \left[ \lambda(t_0) - \frac{\rho}{h(t_0)} \left\{ 1 - e^{-\rho(t-t_0)} \right\} \right]$$

- Imposing the boundary condition  $\lambda(T) = 0$  implies  $\lambda(t_0)h(t_0) = \rho \{1 e^{-\rho(T t_0)}\}.$
- ► For long  $T: \lambda(t_0) \to \rho/h(t_0)$  (unless the region v = 0 is left).
- ▶ But for a short T,  $\lambda(t_0) \rightarrow 0$ .

- ► Case:  $h_0 < h_{ss}$  and long T.
- ▶ Initially v > 0 and the economy moves south until it crosses into the v = 0 region.
- ▶ As  $T \rightarrow \infty$  something bizarre happens:
  - the economy approaches the steady state without ever reaching it.
  - It comes arbitrarily close and stays arbitrarily close for an arbitrarily long time.
  - But when the terminal date comes sufficiently close it leaves the steady state and moves south-west to reach  $\lambda_T = 0$ .

- ightharpoonup Case  $h_0 > h_{ss}$ .
- lnvestment is never large enough to increase h.
- The economy may move straight south-west if T is short or it may move towards the steady state, similar to the case where  $h_0 < h_{ss}$ .



## Reading

- Acemoglu, Introduction to modern economic growth, ch. 8.7.
- ► Hendricks, Lutz (2004). "Taxation and Human Capital Accumulation." *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 8(3): 310-334.
- Sheshinski, Eytan (1968), "On the Individual's Lifetime Allocation Between Education and Work," *Metroeconomica*, 20(1), 42-9.