## Perpetual Youth Model

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### Perpetual youth

- ▶ The standard growth model is very tractable.
- But it has an important limitation: all households are identical.
- For some questions, it is important to have households of different ages:
  - ▶ fiscal policies that redistribute across ages
  - models with life-cycle features: job search, matching, ...
- ► An analytically tractable version of the OLG model is the Blanchard-Yaari model of perpetual youth.

#### Poisson Process

The Poisson process is the continuous time analog of i.i.d.

It is a counting process: it describes the distribution of the **number** of events occurring during a particular time interval.

$$\Pr(N(t) = n) = \frac{(vt)^n}{n!} e^{-vt}$$
 (1)

The parameter v > 0 is the arrival rate:

$$\mathbb{E}\left\{N(t)\right\} = vt\tag{2}$$

#### Mental image:

- randomly distribute points on a real line
- ightharpoonup on average, there are v points per unit length
- as time passes, move along the line and count the points

#### Poisson Process

The probability of an event over a short period  $\varepsilon$  is  $v\varepsilon$ .

▶ to show this: evaluate  $\partial \mathbb{E} \{N(t+\varepsilon) | N(t)\} / \partial \varepsilon = v$ 

The probability of **no event** over a period of length  $\tau$  is  $\exp(-v\tau)$ .

▶ the continuous time analogue of  $(1-p)^t$ 

## **Demographics**

At t = 0, there are L(0) = 1 identical persons.

► They are all newborns.

At each instant, nL(t) identical persons are born.

 $\triangleright$  *n* is the Poisson arrival rate of newborns

Each person dies at each instant with Poisson probabilty v.

The population growth rate is n - v > 0:

$$L(t) = \exp([n - v]t) \tag{3}$$

### Demographics

▶ The mass of persons at t aged  $t - \tau$  is

$$L(t|\tau) = \exp(-v(t-\tau)) \times n \exp((n-v)\tau)$$
  
= Pr(live beyond  $t-\tau$ )  $nL(\tau)$ 

Notation:  $x(t|\tau)$  means x at t for those born at  $\tau$ .

#### Preferences

Households are indexed by i.

Conditional on surviving, households utility at date t is  $e^{-\rho t} \ln (c_i(t))$ .

The probability of being alive after t "periods" is  $\exp(-vt)$ .

Expected utility for date t is  $e^{-vt}e^{-\rho t}\ln(c_i(t))$ .

Expected lifetime utility is

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-(\rho+\nu)t} \ln\left(c_i(t)\right) dt \tag{4}$$

Interesting: mortality simply increases the discount factor:  $\rho + v$ .

#### **Endowments**

Households work 1 unit of time.

Newborn households do not own any assets.

This is now age matters: older households are richer.

## Technology

The resource constraint is

$$\dot{K} + C = F(K, L) - \delta K$$

In per capita terms

$$\dot{k} = f(k) - c - (n - \nu + \delta)k \tag{5}$$

ightharpoonup k = K/L is capital per capita and capital per worker.

#### Markets

#### Competitive markets for

- ▶ goods (numeraire)
- ► labor rental: w
- capital rental: q
- annuities...

### **Annuities**

The problem: what to do with the wealth of households who die?

"accidental bequests"

Assumption: households buy fair annuities.

Each cohort  $\tau$  household gives  $a(t|\tau)$  to the insurance company. He gets paid:

- 1. interest  $r(t)a(t|\tau)$
- 2. an equal share of accidental bequests of his own cohort:

$$z(a(t|\tau)|t,\tau) = va(t|\tau)$$
 (6)

Effectively, the interest rate, conditional on survival, is r(t) + v.

#### **Firms**

- ► A representative firm solves the standard problem.
- ► Factor prices are

$$q = f'(k)$$
  
$$w = f(k) - f'(k)k$$

### Equilibrium

#### Definition

A CE is an allocation  $[K(t), L(t), C(t), c(t|\tau), a(t|\tau)]_{t=0, \tau \le t}^{\infty}$  and a price system [w(t), q(t), r(t)] such that:

- 1.  $c(t|\tau)$  and  $a(t|\tau)$  solve the household's problem for cohort  $t-\tau$ .
- 2. w(t) and q(t) solve the firm's problem.
- 3. markets clear (below).
- 4. identities: L(t), C(t),  $r(t) = q(t) \delta$

Important: we have to keep track of assets and consumption by age.

### Equilibrium

#### Market clearing:

- ▶ labor: implicit
- ► capital:  $K(t) = \int_0^t L(t|\tau) a(t|\tau) d\tau$ .
- goods: same as resource constraint.

#### Identities:

 $C(t) = \int_0^t L(t|\tau) c(t|\tau) d\tau$  etc

## Math Digression: Leibniz's Rule


We want to differentiate an integral Given

$$F(\theta) = \int_{a(\theta)}^{b(\theta)} f(x, \theta) dx \tag{7}$$

We have

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial \theta} = f(b(\theta), \theta)b'(\theta) - f(a(\theta), \theta)a'(\theta) + \int_{a(\theta)}^{b(\theta)} f_{\theta}(x, \theta)dx \quad (8)$$

## Leibniz's Rule



### Households

The representative member of cohort  $\tau$  solves

$$\max \int_{\tau}^{\infty} e^{-(\rho+\nu)(t-\tau)} \ln(c(t|\tau)) dt$$

subject to

$$\dot{a}(t|\tau) = [r(t) + v]a(t|\tau) - c(t|\tau) + w(t)$$
(9)

### Household solution

This is a standard problem with Euler equation

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t|\tau)}{c(t|\tau)} = [r(t) + v] - [\rho + v] = r(t) - \rho \tag{10}$$

budget constraint and TVC

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} D_{t,\tau} a(t|\tau) = 0 \tag{11}$$

where

$$D_{t,\tau} = \exp\left(-\int_{\tau}^{t} [r(z) + v] dz\right) \tag{12}$$

#### Notation

- $\triangleright$   $D_{t,\tau}$  discounts a date t payment to  $\tau$ .
- ▶  $D_{\tau,t} = 1/D_{t,\tau}$  discounts a date  $\tau$  payment to t.
- $ightharpoonup PV(x,t) = \int_{s=t}^{\infty} D_{s,t}x(s) ds$  is the present value of x.

#### Household: PIH

Claim: the household consumes a constant fraction of wealth:

$$c(t|\tau) = (\rho + \nu)[a(t|\tau) + \omega(t)]$$
(13)

Human wealth is the present value of lifetime earnings

$$\omega(t) = PV(w,t) = \int_{t}^{\infty} D_{s,t}w(s) ds$$
 (14)

Note: all persons alive at t have the same  $\omega$ . Intuition...

#### Proof: PIH

Claim: We have a standard present value budget constraint:

$$PV(c(.|\tau),\tau) = a(\tau|\tau) + \omega(\tau)$$
(15)

In words: present value of c= present value of earnings + initial assets.

Claim:

$$PV(c(.|\tau),\tau) = \frac{c(\tau|\tau)}{\rho + \nu}$$
 (16)

Together, these imply  $c(\tau|\tau) = (\rho + v)[a(\tau|\tau) + \omega(\tau)].$ 

From the derivation, we see that this holds for any age, not just for  $t = \tau$ .

### Present value of consumption I

Integrate the Euler equation to get consumption:

$$c(t|\tau) = c(\tau|\tau) \exp\left(\int_{\tau}^{t} [r(z) - \rho] dz\right)$$
 (17)

Verify by differentiating and comparing with Euler.

Multiply both sides by  $D_{t,\tau}$ :

$$D_{t,\tau}c(t|\tau) = c(\tau|\tau) \exp\left(\int_{\tau}^{t} [r(z) - \rho - r(z) - \nu]dz\right)$$

$$= c(\tau|\tau) \exp\left(-[\rho + \nu][t - \tau]\right)$$
(18)

In words: The present value of  $c(t|\tau)$  grows at a rate the equals the difference between the consumption growth rate and the interest rate.

## Present value of consumption II

Present value of consumption

$$\int_{\tau}^{\infty} D_{t,\tau} c(t|\tau) dt = c(\tau|\tau) \int_{\tau}^{\infty} e^{-(\rho+\nu)t} dt = \frac{c(\tau|\tau)}{\rho+\nu}$$
 (20)

### Lifetime Budget Constraint

Claim:

$$D_{t,\tau}a(t|\tau) = a(\tau,\tau) + \int_{\tau}^{t} D_{z,\tau}[w(z) - c(z|\tau)] dz$$
 (21)

In words: The present value of "terminal" assets  $a(t|\tau)$  equals initial assets + the present value of savings.

Take  $\lim_{t\to\infty}$  and the LHS goes to 0 due to TVC.

That gives the lifetime budget constraint b/c the RHS is  $\omega - PV(c)$ .

### Lifetime budget constraint

To show that the claim implies the flow budget constraint: Multiply by  $D_{\tau,t}$ :

$$a(t|\tau) = a(\tau|\tau)D_{\tau,t} + \int_{\tau}^{t} D_{z,t}[w(z) - c(z|\tau)]dz$$
 (22)

Differentiate with respect to *t* and check that the flow budget constraint

$$\dot{a}(t|\tau) = [r(t) + v]a(t|\tau) - c(t|\tau) + w(t)$$
(23)

emerges.

## Lifetime Budget Constraint

$$\dot{a}(t|\tau) = a(\tau|\tau) \frac{\partial D_{\tau,t}}{\partial t} + D_{t,t} [w(t) - c(t|\tau)] + \int_{\tau}^{t} \frac{\partial D_{z,t} [w(z) - c(z|\tau)]}{\partial t} dz$$

and note that

- 1.  $\frac{\partial D_{\tau,t}}{\partial t} = D_{\tau,t}[r(t) v]$ , so that the first term becomes  $(r(t) + v) a(\tau | \tau) D_{\tau,t}$
- 2.  $D_{t,t} = \exp(0) = 1$ , so that the second term becomes  $w(t) c(t|\tau)$
- 3. the 3rd term is

$$[r(t) + v] \int_{\tau}^{t} D_{z,t} [w(z) - c(z|\tau)] dz = [r(t) + v] [a(t,\tau) - a(\tau|\tau) D_{\tau,t}]$$

Add all that up and the flow budget constraint emerges.

### Summary

We now have a solution for the individual consumption function:

$$c(t|\tau) = (\rho + \nu)[a(t|\tau) + \omega(t)]$$
(24)

To characterize equilibrium, we need the aggregate consumption function:

$$c(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{t} L(t, \tau)c(t|\tau)d\tau/L(t)$$
 (25)

A nice feature of this model: we can aggregate with paper and pencil.

### Aggregation

$$c(t) = \int_{-\infty}^{t} L(t,\tau)c(t|\tau)d\tau/L(t)$$

$$= (\rho + \nu)[a(t) + \omega(t)]$$
(26)

where a(t) and  $\omega(t)$  are defined analogously.

This is a form of **aggregation**: Aggregate consumption behaves like individual consumption.

As if a single individual made the choice.

The budget constraint aggregates in the same way. How general is this?

### Equilibrium Dynamics

#### It would be tempting to say:

- Euler is unchanged relative to growth model
- Resource constraint is unchanged
- Everything behaves like the growth model

#### But this would be wrong:

- each person has an Euler equation that looks "standard"
- that does not mean that aggregate consumption also behaves that way

## Equilibrium Dynamics

- $\blacktriangleright$  We have a system in  $c, a, \omega$ .
- Equations: consumption function, budget constraint, def of lifetime wealth:

$$c(t) = (\rho + v)[a(t) + \omega(t)]$$

$$\dot{a}(t) = (r(t) - (n - v))a(t) + w(t) - c(t)$$

$$\omega(t) = \int_{t}^{\infty} \exp\left(-\int_{t}^{s} [r(t) + v]dt\right) w(s)ds$$

▶ The strategy: Derive an Euler equation for aggregate consumption by differentiating the c(t) equation.

### Equilibrium Dynamics

Differentiate the consumption function:

$$\dot{c} = (\rho + v)[\dot{a} + \dot{\omega}] \tag{28}$$

- ► Sub in budget constraint for *a*.
- $\triangleright$  Differentiate def of  $\omega$  (Leibniz's rule next slide):

$$\dot{\omega}(t) = (r(t) + v)\omega(t) - w(t) \tag{29}$$

 $\triangleright$  Sub that into  $\dot{c}$  and collect terms:

$$\dot{c}(t) = [r(t) - \rho] c(t) - (\rho + v) na(t)$$
(30)

Sub in k(t) = a(t) and the firm foc for r(t):

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = f'(k(t)) - \delta - \rho - (\rho + \nu) n \frac{k(t)}{c(t)}$$
(31)

# Intuition for $\omega(t)$

Think of human wealth as an asset with price  $\omega(t)$ . Its instantaneous payoff consists of:

- 1. "dividend" w(t)
- 2. capital gain  $\dot{\omega}(t)$

The asset price equals [required rate of return]  $\times$  [dividend + capital gain]

Required rate of return is r(t) + v.

$$[r(t) + v] \omega(t) = w(t) + \dot{\omega}(t)$$
(32)

# Note: Differentiating $\omega(t)$

$$\omega(t) = \int_{t}^{\infty} \exp\left(-\int_{t}^{s} [r(t) + v] dt\right) w(s) ds$$
 (33)

 $\dot{\omega}(t)$  has 2 pieces:

- 1. Effect of changing lower bound of integral is integrand evaluated at s = t: w(t).
- 2. Derivative of integrand w.r.to t:  $-[r(t)+v]\omega(t) = \int_t^\infty w(s) \frac{d}{dt} \exp(-\int_t^s [r(t)+v] dt) ds.$

Now note that

$$\frac{d}{dt}\exp\left(-\int_t^s \left[r(t)+v\right]dt\right) = \exp\left(-\int_t^s \left[r(t)+v\right]dt\right) \times \left[-\left(r(t)+v\right)\right].$$

## Phase diagram

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = f'(k(t)) - \delta - \rho - (\rho + \nu) n \frac{k(t)}{c(t)}$$
(34)

$$\dot{k} = f(k) - c - (n - \delta - v)k \tag{35}$$

with boundary conditions k(0) given and TVC (which is not so obvious...)

This looks a lot like a standard growth model...

# Steady state

$$\dot{c} = 0 \Longrightarrow c = \frac{(\rho + v)n}{f'(k) - \delta - \rho}k \tag{36}$$

#### Properties:

- 1.  $k \longrightarrow 0 \Longrightarrow c \longrightarrow 0$  [as  $f' \longrightarrow \infty$ ]
- 2.  $k \longrightarrow k^{MGR}$  where  $f'(k^{MGR}) = \delta + \rho \Longrightarrow c \longrightarrow \infty$
- 3. c''(k) > 0 [verify]

## Steady state

$$\dot{k} = 0 \Longrightarrow$$

$$c = f(k) - (n + \delta - v)k \tag{37}$$

Properties: as the standard growth model.

### Steady state

Solution for steady state  $k^*$ 

$$\frac{f(k^*)}{k^*} - (n - \nu + \delta) - \frac{(\rho + \nu)n}{f'(k^*) - \delta - \rho} = 0$$
 (38)

Unique steady state  $k^*$ :  $f(k)/k \setminus in k$ .  $-1/f'(k) \setminus in k$ .

## Dynamic efficiency

Golden Rule maximizes

$$c^* = f(k^*) - (n + \delta - v)k^*$$
 (39)

$$f'(k_{GR}) - \delta = n - v \tag{40}$$

Steady state:

$$f'(k^*) - \delta > \rho \tag{41}$$

[otherwise c/k < 0]

- ▶ There can be overaccumulation relative to the Golden Rule.
- This happens when households are sufficiently impatient (high  $\rho$ ).
- Similar to the finite lifetime OLG model.

### Dynamic efficiency

Modified Golden Rule for planner with discount factor ρ [effects of mortality and "annuities" cancel]:


$$f'(k_{MGR}) - \delta = \rho \tag{42}$$

- Equilibrium avoids overaccumulation relative to MGR.
- ▶ This is not a robust feature of the model.
- Giving households a stronger motive to save for "old age" can lead to overaccumulation.
- Example: labor efficiency declines with age.

## Dynamic efficiency

- Finite lifetimes are not necessary to generate overaccumulation.
- ▶ In this model, it is the presence of overlapping generations that destroys the welfare theorems.

# Phase diagram



### Phase diagram

- ▶ The dynamics closely resemble the growth model.
- ▶ A unique, globally saddle path stable steady state exists.
- Convergence is monotone.
- An analytically tractable model with OLG.

### Where Is This Used?

#### Models of human capital

- combine the convenience of an infinitely lived decision maker
- capture that only young invest in education
- Akyol and Athreya (2005)

#### Models of income / wealth distribution

- a version of perpetual youth: agents age stochastically
- Castaneda et al. (2003)

## Reading

- ► Acemoglu (2009), ch. 9.7-9.8.
- ▶ Blanchard and Fischer (1989), ch. 3.3

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