

# ST308 - Lent term

## Bayesian Inference

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Hypothesis Testing - Prediction - Monte Carlo

# Outline

**Topics covered:** Bayes factors, Lindley's paradox, unit information prior, predictive distribution, Monte Carlo integration

- 1 Hypothesis testing
- 2 Prediction
- 3 Monte Carlo Integration

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# Hypothesis Testing problem

- Consider the **data**  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .
- Assign **model-likelihood**  $f(x|\theta)$  with some unknown parameters  $\theta$ .
- (In Bayesian Inference) Assign a **prior** on  $\theta$ .
- Consider  $H_0 : \theta \in \Theta_0$  and  $H_1 : \theta \in \Theta_1$ . Use the information from  $x$  to **choose** between them.
- The above can be extended to the case of **more than two** hypotheses.

## Bayes factor

Let  $\pi(\theta \in \Theta_0)/\pi(\theta \in \Theta_1)$  and  $\pi(\theta \in \Theta_0|x)/\pi(\theta \in \Theta_1|x)$  be the prior and posterior odds of  $H_0$ , respectively.

### Bayes factor

The **Bayes factor** in favour of  $H_0$  is the ratio of the corresponding posterior to prior odds

$$B_{01}(x) = \frac{\frac{\pi(\theta \in \Theta_0|x)}{\pi(\theta \in \Theta_1|x)}}{\frac{\pi(\theta \in \Theta_0)}{\pi(\theta \in \Theta_1)}}$$

**Note:** It is not hard to see that  $B_{10}(x) = 1/B_{01}(x)$ .

# Bayes factor motivation

For the case of **simple vs simple** hypotheses  $H_0 : \theta = \theta_0$  vs  $H_1 : \theta = \theta_1$ , Bayes factor reduces to the likelihood ratio test, i.e. the **most powerful** test for this case.

$$B_{10}(x) = \frac{\frac{\pi(\theta_1|x)}{\pi(\theta_0|x)}}{\frac{\pi(\theta_1)}{\pi(\theta_0)}} = \frac{\frac{\frac{1}{m(x)}f(x|\theta_1)\pi(\theta_1)}{\frac{1}{m(x)}f(x|\theta_0)\pi(\theta_0)}}{\frac{\pi(\theta_1)}{\pi(\theta_0)}} = \frac{f(x|\theta_1)}{f(x|\theta_0)}$$

In more general cases the above does not hold but it is still considered as the **default** criterion for Bayesian hypothesis testing

# Bayes factor - interpretation

In terms of interpretation the following guidelines are available

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$1 < B_{10}(x) \leq 3$	evidence against $H_0$ is <b>poor</b>
$3 < B_{10}(x) \leq 20$	evidence against $H_0$ is <b>substantial</b>
$20 < B_{10}(x) \leq 150$	evidence against $H_0$ is <b>strong</b>
$B_{10}(x) > 150$	evidence against $H_0$ is <b>decisive</b>

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## Example: IQ scores

Recall the IQ test example from last week. The **prior** was the  $N(110, 120)$  and the **posterior**  $N(102.8, 48)$ .

The student claims it was not his day and his genuine IQ is at least 105. So  $H_0 : \theta \geq 105$  vs  $H_1 : \theta < 105$ .

$$\pi(\theta < 105|x) = \pi\left(Z < \frac{105-102.8}{\sqrt{48}}\right) = \Phi(.318) = .625$$

$$\pi(\theta < 105) = \pi\left(Z < \frac{105-110}{\sqrt{120}}\right) = \Phi(-.456) = .324$$

So the **Bayes factor** against  $H_0$  is **3.47**. Substantial evidence against  $H_0$  (student's claim).



## General case

Suppose we want to test  $H_0 : \theta = 0$  vs  $H_1 : \theta \neq 0$ .

Note that for -say-  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$  or  $\theta \in [-1, 1]$ ,  $\pi(\theta = 0) = \pi(\theta = 0|x) = 0$ .  
Hence the Bayes factor is **indeterminate** in such cases.

A more general expression uses the **model evidence / marginal likelihood**:

$$B_{10}(x) = \frac{\frac{\pi(H_1|x)}{\pi(H_0|x)}}{\frac{\pi(H_1)}{\pi(H_0)}} = \frac{\frac{\pi(H_1|x)f(x)}{\pi(H_1)}}{\frac{\pi(H_0|x)f(x)}{\pi(H_0)}} = \frac{f(x|H_1)}{f(x|H_0)} = \frac{\int_{\Theta_1} f(x|\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta}{f(x|\theta=0)}$$

The hypothesis (model) with the **higher** model evidence is chosen.


# Notes on Bayes factors

- No control of **type I error** probability.
- **Compare**  $H_0$  with  $H_1$  unlike frequentist inference that focuses on  $H_0$ .
- Labels  $H_0$  or  $H_1$  **do not matter**.
- Except for some specific cases, require **proper** priors.
- It is easy to extend to **more** hypotheses.

# Bayesian Occam's razor

**Bayesian Occam's razor:** Models with more parameters (more complex models) will not necessarily have higher marginal likelihood.

**Conservation of probability mass:** More complex models will handle more complex datasets adequately. But the probabilities over all these datasets will have to sum to one.



**Figure 5.6** A schematic illustration of the Bayesian Occam's razor. The broad (green) curve corresponds to a complex model, the narrow (blue) curve to a simple model, and the middle (red) curve is just right. Based on Figure 3.13 of (Bishop 2006a). See also (Murray and Ghahramani 2005, Figure 2) for a similar plot produced on real data.

# Jeffreys-Lindley-Bartlett (Lindley) paradox - example 1

**Real data example:** A person claimed to possess extrasensory capacities (ESP) and can alter the outcome of a machine that output 0, 1 with probability  $\theta = 0.5$  ( $H_0$ ).  $H_1$  is  $\theta \neq 0.5$ .

In 104.490.000 trials, there were 52.263.471 ones.



# Jeffreys-Lindley-Bartlett (Lindley) paradox - example 1

Under frequentist inference we reject the null and **conclude ESP**;  $p\text{-value} \ll 0.01$ .

Bayes factor, under a  $\text{Uniform}(0, 1)$  prior on  $\theta$ , favours  $H_0$  therefore **rejecting** the ESP claim.

Maybe not a **paradox**. Frequentist testing asks the question is  $\theta = 0.5$ ?

Bayesian testing **compares** a model with  $\theta = 0.5$  and a model with  $\theta$  drawn uniformly from  $(0, 1)$  as to how they explain the data.

**Note on p-value:** A more careful study of the problem would also check the power and provide a much lower threshold for the p-value.

## Jeffreys-Lindley-Bartlett (Lindley) paradox - example 2

Let  $y = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$  iid from the  $N(\theta, 1)$  distribution, and consider testing  $H_0 : \theta = 0$  vs  $H_1 : \theta \neq 0$ .

The Bayes factor in favour of  $H_0$  is

$$B_{01} = \frac{\exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n)^2/2\}}{\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n - \theta)^2/2\} \pi(\theta) d\theta}$$

Assume the improper Jeffreys prior  $p(\theta) = c$ . Then

$$B_{01} = \frac{\exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n)^2/2\}}{c \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n - \theta)^2/2\} d\theta} = \frac{\exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n)^2/2\}}{c\sqrt{2\pi/n}}$$

The decision depends on the arbitrary constant  $c$ !

## Jeffreys-Lindley-(Bartlett) paradox - example 2 (cont'd)

Consider the **low informative** prior  $N(0, \tau^2)$  for some **big**  $\tau^2$ . The **Bayes factor** is

$$B_{01} = \frac{\exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n)^2/2\}}{\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \exp\{-n(\bar{y}_n - \theta)^2/2\} (2\pi\tau^2)^{-1/2} \exp(-\theta^2/2\tau^2) d\theta}$$

As  $\tau \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $B_{01} \rightarrow \infty$  regardless of  $\bar{y}_n$  (except if  $\bar{y}_n = 0$ ). So for a near-infinite value of  $\tau^2$  we will **always** choose  $H_0$ .

It is therefore clear that **more thought** should be put on the choice of  $\pi(\theta)$  when it come to testing.

If we don't have information we still need to put **some** information but not **too much**.

## Unit information priors

In the previous example the **unit information** prior is the  $N(\mu_0, 1)$ , i.e. putting the same prior variance as the variance of each data point.

The posterior is  $N(\mu_n, \tau_n^2)$  with

$$\mu_n = \frac{1}{n+1}(\mu_0 + n\bar{y}), \quad \tau_n^2 = \frac{1}{n+1}$$

This prior is like adding **one** more observation equal to  $\mu_0$ . In fact  $\sigma^2$  corresponds to **Fisher** information from **one** data point.

**Cheat** (add information), but as **little** as possible.



# Summary on Bayesian Hypothesis testing

- Use the **Bayes factor**. In most cases it requires **proper** priors.
- Bayes factor can be computed in two ways; either can be used. The **model evidence** is sometimes the only option and can be computationally expensive to compute.
- For testing **simple versus simple** hypothesis the prior plays **no role** so any prior can be used.
- For testing hypotheses with the  $\theta$  of **equal** dimension, e.g.  $H_0 : \theta < 0$  vs  $H_1 : \theta \geq 0$ , priors with big variance (in some cases even improper priors) are fine.
- But for testing hypotheses of **different** dimension, e.g.  $H_0 : \theta = 0$  vs  $H_1 : \theta \neq 0$ , such priors may lead to **Lindley's paradox**. Unit information priors are the recommended option then.

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# Prediction problem

- Consider the **data**  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .
- Assign **model-likelihood**  $f(x|\theta)$  with some unknown parameters  $\theta$ .
- (In Bayesian Inference) Assign a **prior** on  $\theta$ .
- Consider a **future** observation  $y$  from the **same** model  $f(y|\theta)$ .  
Provide
  - ▶ a point estimate (prediction) of  $y$
  - ▶ an interval for  $y$  with high probability (prediction interval)
  - ▶ choose between two or more hypotheses regarding  $y$ , e.g.  $y > 0$  or  $y \leq 0$ .

# Sources of uncertainty in prediction

Even under the assumption that the new observation follows the same adopted model there are still two sources of error:

- 1 Every future value is a random event on its own.
- 2 The parameters are unknown.

Frequentist inference takes into account 1 but it is not clear what to do for 2 (perhaps a bootstrap approach).

Bayesian Inference handles both 1 and 2 via the predictive distribution

$$f(y|x) = \int f(y|\theta)\pi(\theta|x)d\theta$$

In the presence of several models we can treat the model indicator as part of  $\theta$ . This is known as model averaging.

## Example: Exp-Gamma conjugate family

Let  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  be a random sample from an  $\text{Exp}(\lambda)$ . A  $\text{Gamma}(\alpha, \beta)$  **prior** on  $\lambda$  gives the **posterior**  $\text{Gamma}(n + \alpha, n\bar{x} + \beta)$ .

The **predictive** distribution (for  $y > 0$ ) is

$$\begin{aligned} f(y|x) &= \int \lambda \exp(-\lambda y) \frac{(n\bar{x} + \beta)^{n+\alpha}}{\Gamma(n + \alpha)} \lambda^{n+\alpha-1} \exp(-(n\bar{x} + \beta)\lambda) d\lambda \\ &= \frac{(n\bar{x} + \beta)^{n+\alpha}}{\Gamma(n + \alpha)} \int \lambda^{n+\alpha+1-1} \exp(-(n\bar{x} + \beta + y)\lambda) d\lambda \\ &= \frac{(n\bar{x} + \beta)^{n+\alpha}}{\Gamma(n + \alpha)} \frac{\Gamma(n + \alpha + 1)}{(n\bar{x} + \beta + y)^{n+\alpha+1}} \end{aligned}$$

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# Monte Carlo Integration

## Monte Carlo Integral

Let  $F(x)$  be a probability distribution and  $h(x)$  be a function such that  $E_X(h(X)) < \infty$ . Also let  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  be a sample from  $F$ . Then

$$E_X(h(X)) = \int_{\mathcal{X}} h(x) dF(x) \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n h(x_i)$$

**Implementation:** Draw  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  from  $F$  and calculate the integral using the above estimator. The error may become arbitrarily small.

## Monte Carlo Integration (cont'd)

- Note that  $\int_{\mathcal{X}} h(x) dF(x)$  covers both discrete and continuous RV cases. In the former case the integral is a sum and in the latter we can write

$$\int_{\mathcal{X}} h(x) dF(x) = \int_{\mathcal{X}} h(x) f(x) dx$$

- Proof:** Direct application of Strong Law of Large numbers:

$$I_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n h(x_i) \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} \int_{\mathcal{X}} h(x) dF(x) = I$$

- The speed of convergence depends on the variance of  $I_n$



# Importance sampler

Suppose that it is **difficult** to simulate from  $F$  (with density  $f$ ), but it is **easy** to generate from  $G$  (with density  $g$ ).

## Importance sampler

Let  $F(x)$  be a probability distribution and  $h(x)$  be a function such that  $E_X(h(X)) < \infty$ . Also let  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  be a sample from  $G$ . Then

$$E_X(h(X)) = \int_{\mathcal{X}} h(x) \frac{f(x)}{g(x)} g(x) dx \approx \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n h(x_i) \frac{f(x_i)}{g(x_i)}$$

Importance sampler will **improve** the stability of Monte Carlo integrals if  $f$  and  $g$  are similar.

# Monte Carlo integration in Bayesian Inference

If we **identify** the posterior distribution and we can **simulate** from it (directly or via importance sampling) Bayesian inference is straightforward.

- **Expectations** of functions of the posterior may be accurately approximated. Note that probabilities can be viewed as expectations of indicator functions.
- **Percentiles** can also be accurately approximated by **sorting** the simulated posterior draws.
- Posterior draws may be inserted in  $f(y|\theta)$ . This will provide draws from the **predictive distribution**.

# Percentiles from Expectations

Consider the **indicator** function  $I(\theta \in A)$  that takes the value 1 if  $\theta \in A$  and 0 otherwise.

For -say- the median  $\theta^{0.5}$  we can use the function  $I(\theta < \theta^{0.5})$ . Then the value of the **following** is

$$E_{\theta|x}(I(\theta < \theta^{0.5})) = P(\theta < \theta^{0.5}|x) = 0.5$$

To find  $\theta^{0.5}$  one needs to **solve** the following equation

$$E_{\theta|x}(I(\theta < \theta^{0.5})) = P(\theta < \theta^{0.5}|x) = 0.5 \tag{1}$$

## Percentiles from Expectations (cont'd)

Suppose that you have  $n = 100,000$  **draws** from  $\pi(\theta|x)$ , Denote by  $\theta_i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ .

Consider the **sample median** as an estimate  $\hat{\theta}^{0.5}$  for  $\theta^{0.5}$ . What is the value of  $E_{\theta|x}(I(\theta < \hat{\theta}^{0.5}))$ ?

$$P(\theta < \hat{\theta}^{0.5}|x) = E_{\theta|x}(I(\theta < \hat{\theta}^{0.5})) \stackrel{\text{Monte Carlo}}{\approx} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n I(\theta_i < \hat{\theta}^{0.5}) = 0.5$$

In other words,  $\hat{\theta}^{0.5}$  is a **numerical** solution to (1). For large  $n$  the Monte Carlo error goes to 0.

# Reading

J.O. Berger:

Sections 2.4.4, 2.4.4, 4.3.3, 4.3.4 and 4.4.3

Gamerman & Lopes:

Sections 3.1 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.4 5.1 and 5.2