To find seller's expected revenue from a sealed bid auction (e.g. bidders simultaneously submit their bids in sealed envelopes without knowing the bids of others) with symmetric bidders with valuation drawn from a uniform distribution, there are two different approaches:

- One approach is to derive each bidder's expected payment as a function of her valuation and then integrate this expression using the PDF to get the ex-ante expected payment of each bidder which can then be added together to find seller's expected revenue.
- However, a more simple approach is to for N number of bidders to calculate the
 expected highest value (first-price sealed bid auction) or the expected
 second-highest value (second-price sealed bid auction). Plugging the value into
 the bid-function gives the seller's expected revenue.

Deriving the optimal bid-function is a prerequisite for both approaches.

First, let $X=x_1,x_2,...,x_N$ be N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from the **standard uniform distribution** $x \sim U(0,1)$. The highest draw Y_1 and the second-highest draw Y_2 of all N draws are expected to be:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{1}] = \frac{N}{N+1}, \text{ where } Y_{1} = \max(X)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{2}] = \frac{N-1}{N+1}, \text{ where } Y_{2} = \max(X \neq Y_{1})$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{1}] = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{1}] = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{1}] = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{2}] = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{2}] = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{3}] = \frac{1}{4}$$

2

First, let $X=x_1,x_2,...,x_N$ be N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from the *standard* uniform distribution $x\sim U(0,1)$. The highest draw Y_1 and the second-highest draw Y_2 of all N draws are expected to be:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = \frac{N}{N+1}, \text{ where } Y_1 = \max(X)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_2] = \frac{N-1}{N+1}, \text{ where } Y_2 = \max(X \neq Y_1)$$

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$$\mathbb{E}[Y_2] = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_3] = \frac{1}{4}$$

Generalized, let $X=x_1,x_2,...,x_N$ be N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from a uniform distribution $x\sim U(a,b)$. The highest draw Y_1 and the second-highest draw Y_2 of all N draws are expected to be:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = a + (b-a)\frac{N}{N+1}, \qquad \text{where } Y_1 = \max(X)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_2] = a + (b-a)\frac{N-1}{N+1}, \qquad \text{where } Y_2 = \max(X \neq Y_1)$$

E.g. for N=1, $\mathbb{E}[Y_1]$ simply collapses to the expression for the expected mean, μ :

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = a + (b-a)\frac{N}{N+1} = a + (b-a)\frac{1}{1+1} = \frac{2a}{2} + \frac{b-a}{2} = \frac{a+b}{2} \equiv \mu$$

Applied to auctions: Consider N number of bidders where each bidder i has the value v_i that is independently drawn from the same uniform distribution $v_i \sim U(a, b)$.

 $1^{\rm st}$ step: The highest value Y_1 and the second-highest value Y_2 for all N bidders are expected to be:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = a + (b - a) \frac{N}{N+1}, \quad \text{where } Y_1 = \max(V), \ V = v_1, v_2, ..., v_N$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_2] = a + (b - a) \frac{N-1}{N+1}, \quad \text{where } Y_2 = \max(V \neq Y_1)$$

 2^{nd} step: To calculate the seller's expected revenue, insert the expected highest value $\mathbb{E}[Y_1]$ (first-price sealed bid auction) or the expected second-highest value $\mathbb{E}[Y_2]$ (second-price sealed bid auction) in the derived bid-function.

4

Proof: [only for those interested] Let $X = x_1, x_2, ..., x_N$ be N independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from a uniform distribution $x \sim U(a, b)$. Denote the highest draw $Y_1 = max(X)$. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Y_1 is: $G(x) = \mathbb{P}[Y_1 < x]$

 $= \mathbb{P}[x_1 \leq x, x_1 \leq x, ..., x_N \leq x], \qquad \qquad \text{since } Y_1 \text{ is the max of } X$

$$= \mathbb{P}[x_1 \le x] \times \mathbb{P}[x_1 \le x] \times ... \times \mathbb{P}[x_N \le x], \quad \text{since draws are independent}$$

 $= F(x) \times F(x) \times ... \times F(x) = (F(x))^{N}, \qquad F(x) \text{ is the CDF of } x : F(x) = \frac{x - a}{b - a} \text{ (*)}$

The first-derivative of the CDF gives the probability density function (PDF) of
$$Y_1$$
:
$$g(x) = \frac{\delta G(x)}{\delta x}$$
$$= F'(x)N(F(x))^{N-1}$$
$$= f(x)N(F(x))^{N-1}, \qquad f(x) \text{ is the PDF of } x: f(x) = \frac{1}{h-2} \ (**)$$

The expectation to Y_1 is found by integrating x times the PDF of Y_1 , g(x):

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = \int_a^b x \cdot g(x) \, dx$$
$$= \int_a^b x \cdot f(x) N(F(x))^{N-1} \, dx$$

 $=\int_a^b x\cdot \frac{1}{b-a}N\left(\frac{x-a}{b-a}\right)^{N-1}\ dx, \qquad \text{using $(**)$ and $(*)$}$ While the general solution isn't too obvious, the integral solves easily for $x\sim (0,1)$: $\mathbb{E}[Y_1]=\int_0^1 x\frac{1}{1-a}N\left(\frac{x-0}{1-a}\right)^{N-1}dx=\int_0^1 xNx^{N-1}dx=\int_0^1 Nx^Ndx=\left[\frac{N}{N+1}x^{N+1}\right]_0^1=\frac{N}{N+1}$