Chapter 2: A Clash of Rights

Here is the plot line of a political drama. A newspaper in a Western European country, Denmark, has published a set of cartoons offensive to many Muslims. Middle East governments publicly demand that the country's government apologize for the cartoons. In response, the prime minister of the Western European country declares. No apology. No punishment of the newspaper for publishing the cartoons. No restrictions on future publications. No discussion.

Political leaders in the Middle East and Denmark square off. They assume the role of duelists each defending the honor of their side's values. Governments famous for their opposition to anything they see as foreign interference in their intrinsic affairs demand the right to intervene in the affairs of another country. The prime minister of a country committed to the principle of free speech vetoes any meeting with representatives of other countries who want to speak to him about the issue – and this is an especially neat twist -- on the grounds that he is unconditionally committed to freedom of speech. Political leaders on both sides swear their fidelity to the highest principles. All play roles, we may be forgiven for observing, that coincide with their political self-interest - perhaps a happy coincidence, perhaps not. No doubt, politicians have principles. Then again, there is no doubt that politicians on all sides are stirring the pot to their advantage.

Then the pot boils over. Mass protests are held in Muslim countries. Danish embassies are set ablaze. Imams issue fatwas calling for assassination of the cartoonists. Boycotts are launched against Danish companies and products. On the other side, answering volleys of Danish protest led by the prime minister himself; an avalanche of editorials and arguments urging uncompromising defense of a foundational value of democratic politics, freedom of

speech; and, naturally, politician after politician queuing up to denounce interference by foreign governments on behalf of, of all things, a foreign religion.

A witch's brew: each side demanding that their values take priority over the others'; Muslim countries aggrieved and insistent on a Danish apology; Danes angry in their turn at the intervention of Muslim countries and their insistence on a Danish apology; and inside Denmark, Muslim imams – only a few in number, we want to make plain, but regrettably those dominating media attention - denouncing Danish values in the name of Islam.[1] Yet, we shall demonstrate that Danes impressively lined up in support of the civil rights of Muslims. Our task is therefore a doubly unusual one: first, to show that what informed opinion, not to mention common sense, says should happen, did not happen; and then, to explain why what should have happened, did not happen.

Ours is a study of the Crisis and therefore necessarily a study of Denmark alone. So to set our study in context, we begin by comparing and contrasting attitudes towards immigrants in Denmark with attitudes towards them in comparable countries. Then we turn to the all-important question. Did the fear and anger that Danes almost universally felt of Islamic fundamentalists spillover and undercut support for the civil rights of Muslims?

How could Muslims escape being scapegoats for the acts of Islamic terrorists? That seems almost a rhetorical question. It was not just the years of terror and the immediate threat of Islamic terror. There was also the flame-throwing rhetoric of some Danes acting, wittingly or not, as political provocateurs. One example should suffice. "There are only two possible reactions if we want to stop this bomb terror," radio host Kaj Vilhelmsen declared, "either to drive away all foreign Mohammedans from Western Europe so that they cannot place bombs, or to exterminate the fanatic Mohammedans, that are still a large part of the Mohammedan

immigrants. But if the governments and the authorities do not want to react to the Mohammedan terror and crush it with power, then the citizens have to do it themselves."[2]

Explaining why, even in the cauldron of a crisis over the claims of Islam, fear and anger of Islamic fundamentalists did not spillover onto Muslims in Denmark is the task of this chapter. Our specific concern: support for civil rights of Danish Muslims. Our strategy: to abstract away from the details of the crisis and indeed of Danish politics. Instead, we shall advance a theory of group categorization and civil rights

Our theoretical premise is that it is not possible to form individualized judgments about the civil rights to which each and every group is entitled. It is not possible for ordinary citizens; it is not possible for political theorists, for that matter. All of us must simplify, and we simplify by organizing groups into a small number of categories – indeed, as an empirical matter, two. Muslims are assigned to one category, Islamic fundamentalists to a quite different one. We are not suggesting, to borrow a simile, that the two are assigned to separate watertight compartments. But we mean to show that ordinary citizens drew a clear distinction between them. The public at large – routinely derided as so ill-informed about politics and incoherent in their thinking as to be unable to discharge the duties of democratic citizenship – in fact treated Muslims as they would treat groups that are controversial but undeniably legitimate . Ours, then, is a story of ordinary citizens keeping their moral balance from the crisis at its height to its end.

I. Hostility to Immigrants: A Comparative Perspective

Every country is like every other in at least one way. Every country is also unlike every other,

almost always in more than one way. For our story, the way that counts more than any other is how similar – or dissimilar – Denmark is to other Western European countries in its fears about foreign immigrants. Are Danes, perhaps, more hostile, less ready to accept immigrants? Or are they more accommodating, less ready to reject them? Or, yet again, are they more or less like citizens elsewhere, neither more inclusive nor more intolerant?

The European Social Survey (ESS) affords a panoramic view of popular attitudes toward immigrants in Western Europe. The ESS administers a common questionnaire to representative samples of citizens, in an array of countries, on a regular basis. Among the areas it investigates are attitudes towards immigrants. The focus of our study is the reactions of Danes to the crisis. So it is necessary to see if their attitudes were much like – or quite unlike – citizens elsewhere in Western Europe before the crisis. Accordingly, Table 2.1 presents an overview of attitudes toward immigrants in six countries– Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and, of course, Denmark.

{Table 2.1 about here}

Sweden stands out. Time after time, it shows itself to be the most tolerant country. The differences between Sweden and the other countries are not always large. But they are consistent. The most eye-popping example is opposition to the idea that "If a country wants to reduce tensions, it should stop immigration." Support for raising the drawbridges to bring immigration to a stop is at least twice and more often three times larger in all the other countries as in Sweden. In Denmark, for example, 47 percent agree with the proposition "If a country wants to reduce tensions it should stop immigration;" in Sweden, in contrast, only 16 percent agree. Other indicators in Table 2.1 point in the same direction. Swedes are the most open to cultural diversity, the least in favor of residential segregation, the least opposed to intermarriages

with immigrants. All in all, if it is an exaggeration to speak of Swedish exceptionalism, it is a pardonable one.

Sweden aside, the striking feature of the results of Table 2.1 is the pattern of similarity all in all across countries. One country is more tolerant according to one indicator, another country more tolerant according to a different indicator, and still another country by yet another indicator. Consider attitudes about immigrants who commit a serious crime should be deported. Approximately eight in ten in Denmark agree. For all intents and purposes, the balance of opinion is the same in the U.K., the Netherlands – and for that matter Sweden. However, support for deportation is even higher in Germany on the order of nine in ten in favor of evicting immigrants convicted of a serious crime.

A stereotype leaps to mind: Deutschland über alles. But the other results in Table 2.1 make plain why, when drawing conclusions, caution trumps speed. Look at reactions to the question of whether "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions." Germany ties with Sweden for the lowest level of agreement. Denmark, the Netherlands, and the U.K. fall in the middle of the pack while France displays the highest level of agreement with the principle of cultural homogeneity. Yet again it pays to look before leaping. France is second only to Sweden (and not by much) in rejecting the proposition that immigrants take more than they contribute to society. In sum, according to some criteria one country is more tolerant than the others, though usually by a small margin; but according to other criteria, a different country is more tolerant, again by a small margin.

How, then, should Denmark be characterized? Opinion about immigrants is more negative there than in most other countries in some respects, for example: immigration being bad for the economy; opposition to inter-marriage with immigrants; and support for racial

integration. More often, though, the balance of opinion in Denmark seems in line with that of other countries, for example, in perceptions of immigrants as welfare exploiters or opposition to multiculturalism. All in all, our judgment is that Denmark tends to score toward the higher end of opposition to immigrants, but not markedly or distinctively more so than comparable countries.

II. Islamophobia and the "Categorization" Hypothesis

What drove the Cartoon Crisis? Muslims – or to be more precise, their self-appointed spokesmen and Middle East governments – demanded that freedom of expression take second place to the prevention of blasphemy and mocking of Islam. How did Danes see their demands? Common sense would suggest that to ask this question is to answer it. Muslims are demanding that "their" values take priority over "ours." To add insult to injury, "we" must apologize to "them." Considering the levels of suspicion and resentment against immigrants shown in Table 2.1 three years before the Crisis, was a reaction against Muslims in Denmark not inevitable?

The answer is surely yes, according to informed opinion. Dread and dislike of Muslims, it is agreed, "have existed in western countries and culture for several centuries. In the last twenty years," expert opinion holds that "the dislike has become more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous. It is an ingredient of all sections of our media and is prevalent in all sections of our society. Within Britain" [and, presumptively, Western Europe generally] "it means that Muslims are frequently excluded from the economic, social and public life of the nation … and are frequently victims of discrimination and harassment."[3]

Spillover is the metaphor: "dread or hatred of Islam and therefore, fear and dislike of all Muslims."[4] The last two decades have seen large-scale bombings, attempted bombings, and

assassinations in England, Spain, Germany, and France, among other countries, and – immediately relevant for us – Denmark as well. In the circumstances, it would be understandable, albeit regrettable, that Islamic radicalism and Muslims have become closely coupled in the minds of the ordinary citizen; so closely that when many see one, they see the other.

How could it be otherwise? Radical Imams have become the public face of Islamic fundamentalism. They denounce Western society and its values. A liberal society, they preach, is an incitement to abandon the ways of the true faith; its open and relentless advertisement of sexuality an abomination; its failure to condemn Israel and to support the cause of Palestine proof of its implacable hostility to Islam. Islamic fundamentalists do not speak for all Muslims, it should be unnecessary to say. But their voices are the loudest. When Danish citizens hear Imams justify bombings or assassination attempts, how can they not feel that Islamic radicals are a threat to their safety and way of life? And could their fear and anger at Islamic radicals not spillover into resentment and rejection of Muslims in Denmark?

Islamophobia is contagious. "[D]read or hatred of Islam …" spills over into "… fear and dislike of all Muslims."[5] And here common sense is supported by the results of both quantitative and qualitative research. The "Spillover" hypothesis follows directly from the core concept of ethnocentrism, that is, the tendency of dislike and disdain of one out-group to be correlated with dislike and disdain of others.[6] Moreover, researchers deeply informed by the study of the history and culture of other countries contend that the "Spillover" hypothesis holds, possibly with special force, for Danes. Commenting on reactions to the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in 2004, a political analyst noted for his sensitivity to complexity and context, Gilles Kepel judged that the murder "struck an even deeper chord of fear and distrust in the Danish population [than

in the Dutch]… ” “A number of Danes,” he went on to observe, “began to think of Muslims as religious fanatics who abused political asylum, engaged in nefarious activities such as drug trafficking, and sometimes conspired to commit heinous crimes.”[7]

(i) Civil rights and the Categorization of Groups

Our concern is the support for the rights of democratic citizenship for minority groups in Western Europe. The plural noun “groups” dominates the adjective “different.” Experts as well as citizens at large cannot formulate a separate judgment of the rights of each and every social and political group. There are simply too many, far too many, to make and remember individualized judgments about each. Reducing the number of them by remarking similarities among them is the way out. In fewer words, categorization is necessary.[8]

In making judgments about political rights, it is our hypothesis that citizens make use of two distinct categories.[9] One category is groups whose views are at odds with those of the larger society. Typically, they present a critique of society or the economy. They wish it to be different, and not by a small degree but fundamentally. They are in the business of advocating change, often loudly, sometimes dramatically. But they are not in the business of attempting or threatening to achieve change by force. Groups like this we label “out-of-the-mainstream.”

A second category of groups does not aim simply at persuading or cajoling their fellow citizens to see the larger society as they do. Nor are they willing to settle for the larger society tolerating their views. They are adversaries, not just critics. They have aggressively pitted themselves against the larger society. Membership in these groups is not, in and of itself, against the law. But members of them have a record of going beyond the limits of the law or moral

norms. Accordingly, we refer to these groups as "transgressive."

How does the distinction between out-of-the-mainstream and transgressive categories map onto categorization of Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists? The issues raised by the Muslim community in Denmark have been low voltage issues - Halal food in kindergartens, as one example; establishment of separate showers for Muslim children in connection with Physical Education classes in schools, for another. Most of these concerns were easy to meet and have been met. Nor should the conduct of the largest number of Danish Muslims in response to the publication of the cartoons be neglected. A small demonstration in Copenhagen; a few press releases and emails; a call for a "sleep-in" and strike that was ignored – hardly a firestorm of reaction within Denmark.[10] For that matter, during the crisis itself, a then prominent member of the Social Liberal party, Naser Khader, who is of Syrian origin, founded Democratic Muslims to promote the idea that Islam is reconcilable with democracy. Yes, Muslims in Denmark excite controversy. But no, they have not as a community pitted themselves against the larger society.

In contrast, consider the record of Islamic fundamentalists in Denmark. The most prominent group of Islamic fundamentalists is the Danish branch of the international organization Hizb ut Tahrir. Its avowed aim is to abolish democracy in favor of a caliphate.[11] Its leader has been convicted of racism for anti-Semitic statements. Hizb ut Tahrir also has a reputation for being a sect and leaning hard on members wanting to leave the organization. During the Cartoon Crisis, leading figures of the Copenhagen based organization Islamisk Trossamfund won media exposure by taking part in a delegation travelling to the Middle East to whip up popular anger. Subsequent terrorist plots have cemented the reputation of Islamic fundamentalists as transgressive radicals.[12]

The boundary between the two categories – out-of-the-mainstream on one side of the

line, transgressive on the other -- is thus grounded in behavior. This conceptualization though not precisely the same, follows the spirit of the distinction between democratic and anti-democratic groups that Sullivan and his colleagues drew in their seminal study of political tolerance, apart from our emphasis on actual behavior.[13] Transgressive groups have a reputation for violating legal or moral limits of society.

The phrase, "reputation for violating," should sound an alarm for anyone committed to freedom of thought and expression. To say that a group is associated with violence is not to say that many, let alone most, of its members have broken or will break the law. That Islamic terrorists are Islamic fundamentalists is not to say that many, let alone most, Islamic fundamentalists are terrorists. But the record of Islamic terror attacks is real. So, too, is the assaultive rhetoric of the most visible – because most provocative – Imams. And the consequence, we hypothesize, is that Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists are placed in different categories. Citizens will draw a sharp distinction between the claims to political rights of the two groups.[14] It is not merely that they will give more support to Muslims than to Islamic fundamentalists. It is that the difference between the levels of support for the rights of the two groups will be so large as to approximate a difference in kind, not merely degree. We call this the "Categorization" hypothesis.[15]

III. Public Support for Political Rights: Islamic fundamentalists vs. Muslims

To assess levels of support for the political rights of a variety of groups, we conducted the Group Categorization experiment. Here is how the Group Categorization experiment works. Respondents are asked whether a group is entitled to have the set of political rights, the particular

group they are asked about being decided on a random basis. Two of the groups that we asked about were Islamic fundamentalists and Muslims.

Political rights differ in standing. Some rights are integral to liberal democracy, and therefore less readily contestable. Others are more peripheral, and therefore more readily contestable. Our strategy, accordingly, is to investigate support for both integral and peripheral political rights. Two integral rights are the right to take part in public debate and the right to demonstrate. Two more peripheral rights are a right to privacy and a "right" to speak in high schools. Respondents were asked about each of these rights. The wording of the questions was always the same. The order of the questions was always the same. But crucially, the group that they were asked about was decided on a purely random basis.

Three points about this design deserve underlining. First, thanks to the experimental randomization, respondents asked about Islamic fundamentalists are like respondents asked about Muslims in every respect, chance differences aside. Second, respondents asked about Islamic fundamentalists had no way to know that other respondents were being asked about Muslims and vice versa. And third, since they were asked about one or the other group but not both, the views they expressed about one group could not influence the views they expressed about the other.

Table 2.2 shows the levels of public support for civil rights for Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists. Consider reactions to the two fundamental rights, the right to demonstrate and the right to take part in public debate.[16] 81 percent support the right of Muslims to demonstrate; just 61 percent support the right of Islamic fundamentalists to do so. The same pattern applies to freedom of expression. 71 percent support the right of the former to take part in public debates; only 51 percent support the right of the latter to do so. In short, consistent with the

Categorization hypothesis, ordinary citizens draw a clear distinction between Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists even on civil rights integral to democratic politics.

{Table 2.2 about here}

And they draw an even sharper distinction when it comes to more peripheral civil rights. As the third column of Table 2.2 shows, 74 percent support the "right" of Muslims to address high school students, compared to only 44 percent willing to welcome Islamic fundamentalists. To be sure, to speak of a "right" to speak at a school will sound, to non-Danish ears, a misuse of the concept of right. What is at issue is not whether any and all person should have the right to demand to address high school students, but rather whether or not specific groups should a priori be excluded from being invited to address high school students if the headmaster or a teacher at the school should wish to extend such an invitation. The question, naturally, arises as to why anyone would wish to invite contentious groups to speak at a high school. The answer lies in the openness of the Danish democratic tradition. It is quite common for high schools to invite members of minority groups and/or parties to talk to the students in order to broaden their horizons and introduce them to different views in society. A gaudily notorious example illuminates the practice. In the 1990s, a leader of the Danish Hell's Angels gave several talks at high schools. He did so before a subsequent gang war broke out, it is true. Then again, he gave his talk while on leave from prison where he was serving his 16-year sentence for the murder of a rival biker president. If a person who is an acknowledged gang leader and a convicted murderer may be invited to give a talk to high school students, others may reasonably presume they should be allowed to do so, too.

Finally, consider reactions to a proposal to enlarge the authority of the police to engage in wiretapping (fourth column Table 2.2). Danish law has permitted wiretapping for a long time,

and indeed parliament has broadened the authority of police to tap telephones as part of post 9/11 anti-terrorism measures.[17] Approving of wiretapping, it follows, is not in and of itself, evidence of opposition to the civil rights of a particular person or group. But previous research has also shown that a readiness to approve of wiretaps tends to go along with a readiness to approve of limitations on civil rights.[18] Approval of wiretapping is thus an indicator – albeit a systematically ambiguous one – of a lack of support for political rights. Granting the ambiguity, we ourselves are struck by the magnitude of difference between the levels of opposition to wiretapping Islamic fundamentalists vs. wiretapping Muslims is striking. Only 18 percent are opposed to the police having broader power to wiretap Islamic fundamentalists. In contrast, 51 percent oppose it for Muslims.

What, then, do these initial results from the Group Categorization experiment show? A crisis, the most serious since World War II the prime minister declared, had erupted. No one could be ignorant of it. No one could ignore it. If they did not bring it up in conversations with friends, family, or co-workers, friends, family, or co-workers would bring it up for them. No Dane had experienced anything like the international political backlash against Denmark as governments in the Middle East furiously protested, while others enjoyed the pleasures of self-righteousness, a memorable example being Bill Clinton's declaration that "None of us are totally free of stereotypes about people of different races, different ethnic groups, and different religions ... there [is] this appalling example in Northern Europe, in Denmark ... these totally outrageous cartoons against Islam."[19] Yet, notwithstanding this storm of criticism, Danes kept their political balance. They drew a clear line between Islamic fundamentalists and Muslims. Decisive majorities stood up for the civil rights of Muslims in Denmark, with the exception only of wiretapping.[20]

These are important results, we believe. "Islamophobia" has become a fashionable concept, almost a branding strategy to advertise a specialized form of prejudice.[21] Anger and resentment of Islamic fundamentalists must spillover and color feelings about Muslims in some degree. Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that Danes reacted quite differently to Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists, as our results indicated, as though they belong to two quite different and distinct categories of groups.

Which carries us some distance, but not across the goal line. To observe that Danes gave more support to the rights of Muslims than they did to those of Islamic fundamentalists is not evidence that they treated Muslims well.

IV. The Distinctness of Category Boundaries

The first part of the Categorization hypothesis holds that citizens assign controversial groups to two distinct and different categories: (i) "Out-of-the-mainstream" groups, that is, groups whose views are at odds with those of the larger society but nonetheless manifestly have a legitimate place in it; and (ii) "Transgressive" groups, that is, groups that are not merely critical or out-of-step with the society, but actively pit themselves against it. A second prediction thus follows from the Categorization hypothesis. It is not only that Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists are treated differently, but also that Muslims are treated as well as Danish groups that may be contentious but are indisputably legitimate.

What is the ideal group to test this prediction? Christian fundamentalists, or as they more commonly are called in Denmark Born Again Christians. This may surprise those unfamiliar with contemporary Danish life – and perhaps some who are. By law, Denmark is a religious

society. Its constitution, while guaranteeing freedom of religion, stipulates that the Protestant Lutheran Church is the state church. The Monarch is the head of it. Far and away most Danes are members of it, [22] even though this requires them to pay an extra tax of about one percent of their income. All of this gives the appearance of a dedicated Christian country. But appearance is what this is. Typically, Danes attend church only for ceremonial events and Christmas, while the last half-century or so has seen a profound liberalization of social norms regarding abortion, pornography, couples living together and having children out-of-wedlock, among many other things. Denmark has become a secular society through-and-through.

It is, however, one of the more piquant ironies that a commitment to a secular society invigorates religious traditionalists. Precisely in response to the secularity of modern Denmark, Born Again Christians, often organized in so-called frikirker – i.e. free churches existing outside the state church – are fighting to restore the old values and way of life. This strain of Christianity is deeply moralistic and restrictive. It has fought tough-as-nails against the liberalization of the larger society, above all, on issues of abortion, pornography, and homosexuality. In the thoroughly secular society of contemporary Denmark, Born Again Christians are an out-of-the-mainstream group. Yet, they indisputably have a legitimate place in Danish society. How indisputably? Under Danish law, they may establish their own schools and receive public funding for them as a matter of law.[23]

Other examples of out-of-the-mainstream groups are the Far Left and the Far Right in politics. Both denounce the contemporary society as unjust, albeit from diametrically opposing standpoints. Both the Far Left and Far Right are advocates for radical changes to the status quo, albeit in diametrically opposing directions. It is one thing to advocate radical change, though. It is quite another to throw oneself in opposition to the society, to reject its rules, to challenge its

jurisdiction, and to violate the limits of its laws. To be sure, tiny groups at both ideological extremes are willing to breach accepted boundaries. But these minute factions aside, the Far Left and Far Right are active participants in Danish politics, competing in every election for the support of voters. They are deeply critical of values and practices of contemporary society. But they make their case accepting its rules. Born Again Christians, the Far Left, and the Far Right thus fall in a common category. If our reasoning is right, so, too, do Muslims.

What groups are similar to Islamic fundamentalists? Transgressive groups pit themselves against the society. They are adversaries, not advocates. Their members regularly break the moral norms and sometimes the legal ones as well. "Bikers" in Denmark are a window display example. Think of Hell's Angels but add two things. They deploy a larger arsenal -- including armor-piercing rockets as well as bombs – and operate on a smaller stage. They thus enjoy -- if that is the right word – a prominence in Denmark that their counterparts do not enjoy in the United States, for example.

Another example of a transgressive group is the Autonome a Danish contribution to the list of quasi-revolutionary leftist groups found all over Western Europe. As the name suggests, the Autonome is a loose grouping of anarchist youth. Like anarchists in other countries they demonstrate and stage happenings, but that does not always satisfy their spleen. An example: in 2007, the Autonome engaged in battle with the authorities over their fortified headquarters in Copenhagen. The streets of Copenhagen were turned into a war zone of burning cars and looted shops for a number of days. A final example of a transgressive group is Neo-Nazis. They are politically impotent in contemporary Danish politics.[24] But this does not lessen that fact that they are morally transgressive. They have chosen to identify themselves explicitly with a movement that broke all bounds of morality and humanity and their links with football hooligans

certainly don't help their image either.

A premise of the Categorization hypothesis is that "like" are seen as alike. It follows that, just as Muslims and Born Again Christians should be seen as like, Islamic fundamentalists and Bikers or the Autonome or even Neo-Nazis should be seen as alike. If both are not true, the Categorization hypothesis is not true. We therefore commissioned a study to test this prediction on a data set separate from the one that suggested it.[25]

A representative sample of the Danish general population was asked to rate a number of groups on their respect for democracy and their propensity for violence.[26] These two attributes track the distinction that we have drawn between groups that are contentious but legitimate and those that are transgressive. Following what is our standard practice, the scale used for measuring Danes' perceptions has 11 points, and has been rescored to run from 0 to 1.

Figure 2.1 presents the ratings of the eight groups. One could not hope for a more clean-cut differentiation. The groups unmistakably fall into two separate clusters. The mean score on the Violence scale for the grouping on the right – Neo-Nazis, Bikers, the Autonome, and, Islamic fundamentalists - is .81; while their mean rating on the Respect for Democracy scale is just the reverse, .19. By any standard, these groups are not perceived as merely out-of-the-mainstream but as transgressive and out-of-bounds. In contrast, the four groups on the left in Figure 2.1 – Muslims, Born Again Christians, the Far Right, and the Far Left – are placed near the mid-point of both scales. Their mean score on the respect for democracy scale is .44. Their mean score on the violence scale is .49. They are rated more favorably than groups on the right, though they are not rated all that favorably. They are indeed out-of-the-mainstream.

{Figure 2.1 about here}

Two points were at issue. First, would the eight groups fall into two distinct categories?

The answer is yes. Second, would Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists again be assigned to two distinctly different categories? The answer also is yes.

V. Discrimination or Equal Treatment?

Figure 2.1 supplies evidence of how the groups are perceived, not how they are treated. The two are not the same. It is one thing to see Muslims as similar to Born Again Christians. It is quite another to treat them the same as Born Again Christians. Fortunately, the Group Categorization experiment was designed to determine just this.

How then do our respondents behave in the Group Categorization Experiment? Specifically, do they treat Muslims the same as Danish groups who have a legitimate place in Danish life as the Categorization hypothesis predicts? Panel A of Table 2.3 compares levels of support for the political rights of the "out-of-the-mainstream" groups -- Born Again Christians, the Far Left and the Far Right with support for the rights of Muslims.

{Table 2.3 about here}

The pattern is clear-cut. Compare responses to Muslims and Born Again Christians: 81 percent support the rights of the former to demonstrate, compared to 83 percent for the latter; 71 percent support of the right of the former to take part in public debate, compared to 68 percent. The other figures tell the same story. Danes treat Muslims as they treat other controversial but legitimate groups, lining up in support of their civil rights and civil liberties, and what is more, by an overwhelming majority on three of four of our measures.

Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the level of support for the rights of Islamic fundamentalists and our three other exemplars of transgressive groups: Bikers, the Autonome,

and Neo-Nazis. Comparing Panel B to Panel A, the most obvious difference is that levels of support for civil rights of transgressive groups are markedly lower than for those of out-of-the-mainstream groups. Commonsensical as this is, it is reassuring all the same. Had it not been so, it would have made no sense to speak of two distinct groups.

Judging from the results of Panel B of Table 2.3, Islamic fundamentalists fall in the middle of the category of transgressive groups. On the one hand, there is more support for the right of Bikers to demonstrate (73%) than for Islamic fundamentalists (61%) to do the same. On the other hand, there is more support for the right of Islamic fundamentalists to demonstrate than for Neo-Nazis (59%) to do the same. In only one respect do Islamic fundamentalists stand out. There is less opposition to tapping their telephones than to wiretapping those of any of the other groups. To our minds, this is no more than a commonsensical result. The more relevant point, for the analysis of civil rights in general, is that there is not a lot of opposition to wiretapping any of the other groups.

What does this add up to? On the one hand, our findings are a 'good' news story. Danes treat Muslims as well as fellow Danes. On the other hand, they are a 'bad' news story. Danes treat Islamic fundamentalists the same as they treat Bikers or other groups whose members have a reputation of breaking the moral or legal norms of the larger society. Here is the first of our two paradoxes – the Categorization paradox. The same rule of judgment in categorizing groups that helps provide necessary protection of the civil rights of Muslims strips Islamic fundamentalists of the protection necessary for their civil rights.

VI. The 'Just Below the Surface' Hypothesis

It was not unreasonable to fear that the Cartoon Crisis would trigger a backlash against Muslims, though in fact it did not.[27] It was not unreasonable because fear of a backlash is grounded, not only in reality-oriented anxiety about the reactions of ordinary citizens to events since 9/11, but in a deep concern about their underlying susceptibility to prejudice against Muslims, among many other minorities, that long predated 9/11. For a generation now, a dominant theme in social science has been the illusion of tolerance. Western democracies appear more tolerant of minorities than a half century ago. But expressions of support for tolerance in the judgment of many social scientists,[28] often go only skin deep. They reflect not a change of feelings toward minorities, but a change in societal norms of what it is socially acceptable (and unacceptable) to say. Under the pressure of these new norms, large numbers of ordinary citizens suppress the antipathy they still feel toward minorities or find ways to express it subtly. But their resentment and anger and disdain toward minorities lurk just below the surface. Given the opportunity, and they are vigilant in spotting one, to express their hostility, they will seize it, and their hostility to minorities will break through their veneer of tolerance. Accordingly, we call this the 'Just Below the Surface' hypothesis.

The Just Below the Surface hypothesis tends to be treated as though its validity is self-evident, and for a principled reason: a deep concern about the horrific power of prejudice. It is, arguably, moral vanity to presume to rank the horrors of the long twentieth century; arguably, we say because the singular lesson of the Holocaust is that there are no limits to the evil that one group will do to another. Then, too, the distinctively American sin of entrenching racial immiseration has taught a universal lesson about liberal democracy's susceptibility to violations of its own values, and no less, the barrier that these values can put up to overcoming inequality. It thus only appears to be a contradiction that progress in combating prejudice spurs an insistence

on the persistence of prejudice. Fearing the ever present risk of falling backwards, and all too painfully aware of the continuing effort necessary to go forward, the best in us leads us to believe the worst of others.

Given the apparently self-evident validity of the Just Below the Surface hypothesis, the question for those concerned about the values of liberal democracy was not whether the Cartoon Crisis would trigger a backlash against Muslims. It was how far-reaching that backlash would be. But we have seen that there was not a backlash. The question therefore becomes, Is the apparently self-evident valid Just Below the Surface hypothesis in fact valid?

To test the hypothesis, we take advantage of a 15-year sequence of public opinion surveys that included questions assessing attitudes toward immigrants. The sequence begins in 1993 and continues at tightly packed intervals.[29] Obvious though it is, it is worth saying explicitly that this sequence of studies starts before 9/11 and covers all of the subsequent years in which there has been a steady stream of terrorist threats and attacks.

If the 'Just Below the Surface' hypothesis is correct, we will observe spikes in hostility to immigrants, perhaps after 9/11, perhaps after the first London bombing, but in any case at some point in time during this fifteen year period of Islamic terror. For that matter, the Cartoon Crisis itself is custom-tailored to test the idea that many are just waiting for a convenient pretext to express their true feelings towards minorities. If an attack on the foundational value of freedom of expression does not qualify as a socially acceptable opportunity for the presumed prejudice that lies just beneath the surface to express itself publicly, we are at a loss to say what does.

Figure 2.2 displays responses to questions aiming at measuring hostility to immigrants in this series of studies. Consider first attitudes to discrimination in the labor market. The question is: "If there are not enough jobs, employers should employ Danes ahead of immigrants." Rather

than increasing over time as the threat of Islamic radicals became increasingly salient, or even spiking during the Cartoon Crisis, opposition to a Danes First policy steadily grows. A substantial majority always rejected this policy. Nonetheless, we see a steady increase in the numbers opposing it, from two in three to four in five. If intolerance towards immigrants was 'Just Below the Surface,' there was an excess of events to legitimize an eruption of hostility towards immigrant minorities. In fact, the trend is toward a society progressively more tolerant of them.

{Figure 2.2 about here}

Stare at enough trend lines, and one is likely to come up with evidence for any idea one favors. It is essential, therefore, to determine how representative this result is. As Figure 2.2 shows, there has been a steady trend in attitudes toward allowing immigrants access to social security. Once again, it is in exactly the opposite direction that 'Just Below the Surface' would predict. The proportion of the public agreeing with this policy has increased, not decreased. All these changes are modest in size, we would emphasize. The dominant pattern in Figure 2.2 is stability. Consider perception of cultural threat. The numbers rejecting the idea that "immigration poses a serious threat to our national character" are statistically interchangeable over this whole period. So, too, with a few minor exceptions, are the numbers rejecting the view that "foreigners should only be able to receive Danish citizenship after they have learnt to act like a Dane." And again with only minor qualification, so, too, are the numbers who support the proposition that "immigrants must be able to preach and practice their religion in Denmark freely." Nor, we want to underline, can the absence of either a long-run trend or sharp spikes in hostility to immigrants be explained by a lack of attention to events in the outside world. On the contrary, to cite only one example, Figure 2.2 shows that as the situation in Kosovo worsened in

1999 and refugees started arriving in Denmark, there was a marked increase in support for the view that "Special measures should be taken to help unemployed refugees find employment so that they can be integrated in Danish Society more easily."[30]

Looking at the five trend lines in Figure 2.2 we can find no evidence of resentment towards immigrants lurking in the shadows, then irrupting when a horrific event provides socially acceptable cover. Fifteen years is a considerable period of time. Tragically, it also is a period with no shortage of events that could serve as a pretext to express hostility to Muslims. Yet, the level of intolerance has not risen; indeed, in certain aspects, it has decreased. We cannot ourselves think of a way to reconcile the results in Figure 2.2 with the Just Below the Surface hypothesis.

There is a world of difference, however, between saying that there has been no upsurge in intolerance and that there is no problem of intolerance. For example, as Figure 2.2 unmistakably shows, there no shortage of opposition to immigrants having freedom of religion, surely an integral civic right. Moreover, large numbers of Danes believe that immigrants should only be able to receive Danish citizenship when they have learnt to behave like a Dane. To say that there has not been a surge in intolerance is not at all to say that there is a shortage of it.

VII. The Pattern of Media Coverage and Political Parties

(i) A Surge in Media Attention

The publication of the cartoons depicting Mohammed ignited a political fire-storm. The high drama of confrontations between Middle Eastern governments and the Danish government,

featured emotional and literal incendiary protests (including mass demonstrations and the burning of Danish embassies). Yet, we have seen that Danes drew a clear distinction between Islamic fundamentalists and Muslims. No less striking, they backed the civil rights of Muslims as fully as they did Danish groups – most strikingly, Born Again Christians.

Political crises have a life history, though. The standard life history of a crisis goes as follows. The crisis erupts without warning. It immediately captures massive media coverage. The public, for once fully attentive to politics, is alarmed. Then, the public drama of the crisis typically plays itself out, usually within a relatively short period of time, sometimes weeks, sometimes months.

Everyone can call to mind a crisis that fits this template. Yet just as individuals have their distinct life histories, so, too, do crises. Figure 2.3 traces the media biography of the Cartoon Crisis, tracking the number of newspaper articles in the major newspapers dealing with the central issue from the Danish point of view – freedom of speech.

{Figure 2.3 about here}

A moment's glance at Figure 2.3 makes plain that the Cartoon Crisis went through three phases.[31] The issue of freedom of speech, in the form of a concern about self-censorship, had gradually become a subject of attention before the publication of the Cartoons. With their publication, the level of media attention picked up, which cannot be a surprise. What should be a surprise is that it stayed at a relatively low level, on the order of 200 articles per month, for nearly three months after their publication.

This slow take-off pattern is the opposite of the stereotypical image of a crisis erupting like a volcano. Why did what one might well expect to happen not happen? Because something else that one might stereotypically have expected to happen did not happen. Yes, a small number

of Imams gave inflammatory interviews. Sheikh Hlayhel, a local firebrand, declared that "democracy as practiced in Denmark is worth nothing to Muslims" and demanded an apology and retraction by the newspaper. [32] But all in all, the reaction of Muslims in Denmark was remarkably restrained: a demonstration in Copenhagen; a few press releases and emails; a call for a "sleep-in" and strike that was ignored; a moderate reaction in other words.

The self-restraint of Danish Muslims is all the more noteworthy in the face of what, from the point of view of many of them was blasphemy; still more so viewed against the harsh rhetoric of the Danish People's Party. For example, a year before the issue of free speech topped the agenda, Mogens Camre, a member of the European Parliament for the Danish People's Party declared that:

> *"Islam does not belong in Europe, and our first priority must be to repatriate the Muslims. Islam is a threat to our future and we want to prevent Islam from setting any agenda in Europe. That faith belongs in a dark past and its political objective is just as destructive as that of Nazism. Islam must not be allowed the possibility to take Europe from us."*[33]

Many, perhaps most, Danes take exception to the DPP. Yet, what is telling is that their spokespeople feel free to be highly provocative. Coupling Islam and Nazism would end the career of a politician in America. Doing so in Denmark is a way of making a career. In a time and place where political leaders can publicly argue against the legitimacy of Islam as a religion, the restrained response of Muslims in Denmark during the Cartoon Crisis deserves all the more to be underlined.

Phase II of the Crisis dramatically differed from Phase I. As Figure 2.3 shows, there is a stunning spike in media attention. Beginning in late November, the number of articles referring to freedom of speech leaps from approximately 200 per month to 1600 per month in February 2006.

What brought the issue of the Cartoons to crisis levels of attention? Mid-November, several Pakistani imams offered bounties, which got wide circulation on the Internet for the assassination of the cartoon illustrators. Twice in December, a delegation of Imams from Denmark went to Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, appealing for support. Weirdly, a word that does not quite capture what happened, they brought with them – in addition to the 12 original cartoons – other alleged depictions of the prophet Mohammed. One of the other pictures presented Mohammed as a pedophile rapist. Another depicted a French pig-squealing contestant accompanied by the caption, "Here is the real image of Muhammad." They added these to their dossier as though they were cartoons that had been published in the Danish newspaper. Subsequently, partly in response to a reprinting of the cartoons in Sweden, a boycott of Danish products was launched in the Middle East. Three weeks later, the Danish embassies in Damascus and Beirut were attacked and burned. Several days later, mass demonstrations in Middle East countries were mounted.

The sharp spike in the number of articles referring to freedom of speech in Danish newspapers was a response to Muslims outside, not inside, Demark who had launched demonstrations and took violent actions -- with the acquiescence, and sometimes at the prompting, of governments in the Middle East, above all Egypt. In contrast, in Denmark, not only were Muslim immigrants not marching or demanding apologies, the association Democratic Muslims was established specifically devoted to the mission of promoting reconciliation. But

center-stage from mid-January through late February was dominated by the boycott of Danish goods in the Middle East; the desecration of the Danish Flag on the West Bank; and mass demonstrations of up to 700,000 participants across the Muslim world.

Then, almost as suddenly as the crisis erupted, the political fever broke. From a high of 1600 articles per month referring to freedom of speech, the number dropped to 200 in April, then fell off sharply over the next two months, virtually disappearing by August 2006. Phase III, the disappearance of the issue of freedom of speech from the public agenda, was thus the mirror image of Phase I, the appearance of the issue on the public agenda. A metaphorical summary of the salience of the crisis – expressed in terms of the absolute number of articles published on free speech – is thus an initially low-grade fever, erupting suddenly, spiking relatively briefly, then breaking and falling off.

(ii) Partisan Elite Framing

In crises, ordinary citizens take their lead from political elites. If the parties react with competing interpretations of what is happening and what should be done about it, citizens will tend to stand with the party they identify with. On the other hand, if the parties present a united front disregarding partisan considerations, the public will tend to follow their lead also disregarding partisan considerations.[34]

How, then, did the leaders of the political parties react to the crisis? To provide a systematic picture of their reactions, we conducted a separate content analysis of the two leading national newspapers, one leaning to the right, the other to the left, focusing now on articles covering the reactions of the politically influential to the crisis.[35] Specifically, for each party

leader, we identified articles in the relevant time period where the party leader was directly quoted with a statement on the crisis. Next, we coded each of these articles for the presence of one or more specified frames (e.g., free speech frame, tolerance frame). Thus, the unit of analysis is each statement by a party leader.[36] This procedure provides a precise mapping of how each party attempted to frame the Cartoon Crisis.

Panel A of Figure 2.4 shows a politically focused analysis of the reactions of the leaders of the political parties. The issue did erupt rapidly, rising from 50 articles (quoting a party leader) in January to 200 in early February. In terms of elite politics, however, rather than spiking briefly, it stayed for a period of months on the front pages. Then, consistent with the national interest, the attention of party leaders to the issue dropped rapidly.

{Figure 2.4 about here}

The crux of the matter, though, is not how often party leaders spoke about the issue, but what they said about it. Broadly, two themes were available to them. The crisis could be framed in terms of a defense of the principle of freedom of speech. Alternatively (but not mutually exclusively), it could be framed in terms of the importance of tolerance. The politics of the crisis obviously differ depending on how the issue is framed. Panel B of Figure 2.4 accordingly tracks the salience of the two frames over the life history of the crisis.

The "Free Speech" frame always was the dominant theme. The only qualification is that the two become trivially comparable in frequency of appearance at the end of the crisis – trivially comparable, we say, because of the infrequency of the appearance of both. Even so, it is worth noting that the tolerance frame increased at roughly the same rate as the free speech frame as the crisis approached its high point. We read this as an indication that Danish party leaders saw the dangers of a backlash against Muslims from the start of the crisis, and stepped up their efforts to

thwart it off as the crisis heightened. As the crisis played itself out, the free speech frame again dominated the tolerance frame.

What politicians were talking about is important, but which ones were talking about what is even more so. Figure 2.5 displays, in the form of bars, the proportion of times that the leaders of the political parties framed their remarks in terms of free speech or tolerance.

{Figure 2.5 about here}

Some differences in the reactions of the political parties can be detected, provided one examines Figure 2.5 with microscopic attention. Looking to the left in the figure, as well as the political landscape, the Red-Green Alliance placed the most emphasis on the value of tolerance. In fact, they were the only party to talk more about tolerance than free speech during the crisis. For all other parties the balance of the rhetoric went the other way.

Of more importance politically, the party that placed the least emphasis on freedom of expression was the party that, by virtue of forming the government, was charged with protecting it, namely the Liberals. This may appear paradoxical. After all, during the Crisis they were taking credit for defending freedom of expression, with the prime minister even refusing to hold a courtesy meeting to discuss the issue because, he said, his commitment to the value of free speech was not negotiable. But the appearance of paradox dissolves when the strategic position of the Liberals in the Danish party system is taken into account. They were the dominant party in the center-right coalition that held power. The leader of their party was the prime minister. He was the political figure driving public debate. In the early phases, he framed the issue as one of protecting free speech, to his political advantage. However, when the Crisis exploded, he was the one with the responsibility of calming down tempers on both sides of the debate. Hence the greater attention compared to other party leaders that he paid to the value of tolerance.

These qualifications noted, the dominant feature of Figure 2.5 is consensus. With the exception of the smallest party in parliament, the freedom of speech frame dominated the tolerance frame for parties ranging from the left through to the party farthest to the right (DPP). In other words, when Danes looked to their political leaders for guidance about what was at stake in the crisis, 'freedom of speech' was the answer they got.

VIII. Top-Down Politics and the Subsiding of a Rally in Defense of Democratic Values

How did Danes respond to the challenge of the Cartoon Crisis? They defended democratic rights, including those of Muslims. But is this a story about citizens, or alternatively, about opinion leaders?

Our stream of data on popular support for political rights began at the height of the crisis and continued through its disappearance from the public agenda. We have no comparable measures before the Crisis and, therefore, cannot see how citizens reacted as the mass media and politicians concentrated their attention on the Crisis.[37] And we have seen that, throughout this period, there was a barrage of messages in support of liberal democratic values. Two values in particular were the focus of attention. One was freedom of speech, invoked in defense of the right of newspapers to publish on controversial subjects. The other was tolerance, invoked in defense of the right of immigrants in Denmark to be accepted as part of the larger society.

Not surprisingly, the public debate was one-sided. We coded the valence or direction of each statement framed in terms of free speech or tolerance. In almost all cases the presence of a given frame means unconditional support for free speech or tolerance, respectively. The only instances of qualified support for free speech are two statements by the Red-Green Alliance and

for unconditional support of tolerance are three statements from the Danish People's Party.

Most studies of political rallies of public opinion concentrate on the surge phase – the initial shift of public opinion in response to elite influence – in order to demonstrate the influence of top-down politics. Lacking measures of public opinion before the Crisis, we shall look at their subsiding phase – the subsequent shift of public opinion as elites and the media turn their attention to other issues on the agenda. To catch a glimpse of public opinion as the crisis receded, we have divided the data into two time periods, when the media focus on freedom of speech and tolerance was at its height and when the issue had effectively fallen off the public agenda, for all intents and purposes. The first comprises respondents interviewed in March and April; the second those interviewed between May and July.

Two measurement limitations deserve emphatic emphasis. The first is temporal. The time period our study covers is more limited than it appears: the bulk of the interviews were done over the three month stretch from the beginning of March through the end of May.[38] The second is methodological. Respondents interviewed toward the end of a survey tend to be those who have been most difficult to contact or persuade. They may, and often do, differ from more cooperative respondents in a number of respects, some of which may bear on any differences observed between them.[39] Accordingly, in estimating levels of support for civil rights, we have controlled for gender, age, county of residence, education, political knowledge, and political interest. The risk of invalid inference cannot be eliminated, but this rare opportunity to catch sight of a rally of the public as it subsides persuades us that the risk is worth taking.

Table 2.4 shows the mean levels of support in the two time periods for the quartet of rights we tracked in the two time periods. Support levels for three of the four values are essentially the same in the two time periods.[40] For example, support for the right to demonstrate

stayed at precisely the same level. In March and April, it was 73 percent; in May through July, 73 percent again. The one exception to the pattern of stability is the right to take part in public debate. In March and April, the level of support for freedom of speech, averaged across the eight groups, was 74 percent. In May-July, it was 62 percent. In short, we observe change between the two time periods in the positions of the public on only one political right, namely, freedom of speech.

{Table 2.4 about here}

Table 2.4 summarizes support for civil rights averaged across the eight groups. A question therefore springs to mind: Is the change in support for free speech driven by large changes for only a few groups or does the shift in media attention affect Danes' views on the rights of all (or nearly all) of our groups. The answer can be found in Table 2.5 which breaks down the first row of Table 2.4 group by group. With one exception, the pattern is clear. For seven of the eight groups there was a drop in support for the group's freedom of speech of at least 10 percentage points. The only exception is the group for which support started out at the lowest level: Neo-Nazis. For this group we record a small increase in support for their freedom of speech from the height to the aftermath of the crisis. The change is neither substantively nor statistically significant, however. These findings suggest that the strong focus on the right of freedom of speech found in elite discourse during the crisis boosted public support for this core democratic right across the range of contentious groups in society although again we want to underline our lack of evidence of levels of support for freedom of speech before the Crisis.

{Table 2.5 here}

The specificity of the public's reaction, with a change evident only with respect to the value immediately bound up in the Crisis, speaks to the terms in which the interactions between

voters and elites should be understood. Traditionally, the emphasis in the study of elections was bottom-up: candidates and parties responded to the preferences of voters. Recently, more attention has been given to top-down models.[41] The premise of such models is that the supporters of candidates and parties are dutifully responsive to persuasive communications of political elites.[42] Like most formulations, it can be offered in an extreme or moderate version. In the more extreme version, it is as though political elites are puppet masters pulling the strings of puppet voters. In the more moderate version, it is more a matter of voters picking up the positions of candidates that they themselves already were predisposed to hold.

Our findings are both consistent with, and point to the limits of, moderate versions of top-down models. The pressure to support the principle of freedom of speech was intense, as we have seen. And so far as our study can speak to the responsiveness of mass publics to elite communications, it supports the hypothesis of top-down influence. Contrary to what could have been expected, the majority of Danes did not show signs of a backlash against Muslims. If anything, they increased their support for the right of Muslims to take part in public debate. At the same time, we only saw an increase in support for the particular value that was the focal point of elite communications. One might have supposed that the closest kindred of the value of freedom of speech – namely, freedom of assembly – might have picked up some support, too, and yet it did not. This suggests that top-down influence tends to be specific, not diffuse. It also suggests that the effects of elite communications tend to be short-lived, persisting only as long as the communications continue.[43] Levels of political tolerance soon returned to the – lower – equilibrium level we suspect that we would have found in the months leading up to the crisis.[44]

Top-down influence is not a synonym for elite manipulation of citizens' views, we want to emphasize. The framing of the crisis dominant in elite discourse resonated with many

citizens' pre-existing views of valuing free speech also for minority groups, even before the crisis (cf. Table 2.5).[45] Yet the role of elite communications is an important part of our story about the Cartoon Crisis. We can only speculate what would have happened to levels of tolerance – specifically, to the reaction towards Muslims in Denmark – if elites had chosen to frame the Crisis as an irresolvable conflict between cultures. Playing on prejudice against out-groups as a political strategy has worked before. It will work again.

IX. An Alternative Interpretation: The Logic of Reciprocity

The question that we have asked is whether there was a backlash against the minority. It is the key question because its answer speaks to the democratic character of Danish society. There was every reason to believe that the assaultive reactions of Islamic radicals and Muslim governments to the publication of the cartoons would ignite a firestorm of reaction against Muslims in Denmark – a demonization of Muslims and a denial of their civil rights. In fact, the majority drew a sharp distinction between Islamic fundamentalists and Muslims and gave as much support to the civil rights of Muslims as to other admittedly contentious but undeniably legitimate groups in Danish society.

The fact that Danes kept their democratic balance in a political storm speaks to the capacity of ordinary citizens to discharge the duties of democratic citizenship, we believe. But our findings can be given an interpretation quite different from ours. It was the majority's rights – above all, their right to freedom of speech – that was being challenged. Is it not possible that their support of the rights of the Muslim minority was the price of their supporting their own rights? How could they justify their having a right to freedom of expression without

acknowledging that the Muslim minority had this right, too? We shall call this the "Reciprocity" hypothesis.

The premise of the Reciprocity is that Danes supported the rights of Muslims in order to cement their claim to the same rights. On its face, there is something curious about this reasoning. Consider the well-documented reactions of Americans to rights of communists and other suspect groups during the McCarthy era. They did not at all presume that, to be secure in their civil rights, they must swarm to the defense of the rights of communists and atheists and the like. Quite the contrary. All the evidence backs the view that, to the extent they made a connection between the two, it was that subversive groups were all the more dangerous if they had the same rights as loyal citizens. Indeed, that was precisely the point of denying that they had a right to freedom of expression and assembly. For if they were free to propagate their ideas, they would be all the more of a threat. There is a different way to put the same point. If there is one proposition securely established by research on political tolerance, it is this: the more threatening a group is perceived to be, the less support there will be for its enjoying political rights.[46] On either line of reasoning, Danes should give less support to the rights of Muslims than to those of fellow Danes under the strain of a real crisis. But we know that, on the contrary, they give as much support to the rights of Muslims as to those of fellow Danes.

We can bring more evidence to bear. If the reactions of Danes fit the usual pattern of clashes over civil rights, Danes should be more likely to perceive – and be willing to say that they perceived – Muslims as a threat when the Crisis was at its most tense than when it was over. On the other hand, if our narrative is right, the reactions of Danes should not fit the standard pattern precisely because they perceived Muslims not to be transgressive and therefore not to be a threat. And to put our reasoning to a still stiffer test, Danes should be no more (or not much

more) likely to perceive Muslims to be a threat when the clash was at its most intense than when it had faded from public attention.

Table 2.6 accordingly presents how threatening Muslims (and other groups) were perceived to be to Danish society in the earlier part of our study, March and April, when the Crisis was at the forefront of attention, and in the latter part of our study, May through July, when it was yesterday's news. Consistent with our argument, so far from responding with alarm to Muslims when the crisis erupted, Danes viewed Muslims as among the least threatening groups (M=.45) both when the clash was most intense and when the tension had largely dissipated (M=.45)

{Table 2.6 about here}

Yet one more line of evidence can be brought to bear. Almost by construction, one can say that a person who feels threatened will favor measures to control or preferably eliminate the threat. One way to do so is for the police to keep a closer eye on the threatening group, for example, in the form of increased tapping of their telephones. It follows that, if the standard story of top down influence is the whole story of the Cartoon Crisis. there should be less opposition to police tapping of the phones of Muslims during the crisis than when it has receded from public attention. In Table 2.7 we submit this implication to a test.

{Table 2.7 here}

Focus on Muslims. The numbers in Table 2.7 record the level of opposition to wiretapping. In March-April, 58 percent opposed wiretapping Muslims; by May-July, only 46 percent opposed it. In a word, support for the civil rights was higher when the Crisis was at its height than when it abated. Examine now responses to the other groups. Levels of opposition to wiretappng either didn't change between March/April and May/July – Born Again Christians,

Autonome, and Bikers – or they increased. Muslims are the only group that enjoyed more support for its right to privacy when the Crisis was at its peak than when it had faded away.

What does the evidence boil down to? Danes gave the same level of support for the civil rights of Muslims as they did to fellow Danes; and one reason they were able to do so is because they did not perceive Muslims as a threat. But does this mean that the finding that we have attached so much importance to – that there was a solid wall of support for the rights of Muslims – really was only to be expected?[47] Not at all. The whole point is that, notwithstanding the crisis atmosphere; the very real threats made and carried out during the crisis; the striking level of fear of Islamic fundamentalists;[48] the widespread fear and resentment and hostility towards immigrants[49] before the Crisis; the perception of ordinary citizens of Muslims nonetheless remained reality-anchored. Muslims were not a threat. And they were not perceived as a threat.

X. A Last Word

When it counted most, when the clash was most intense and the outcome most uncertain, a decisive majority of ordinary citizens stood behind the civil rights of Muslims; indeed, gave them fully as much support as they did to fellow Danes like Born Again Christians. We know of no one, very much including ourselves, who predicted this response to the Crisis. Indeed, we are not aware of anyone, now excluding ourselves, who subsequently have realized that. It is a striking example of ordinary citizens coming up to the mark. It is deeply instructive that Danes treat Muslims the same they treat Danish groups like Born Again Christians. It is still more instructive that they do so even though so many of them dislike and resent and disdain immigrants. But, in truth, it is only the beginning of an argument in behalf of the democratic

faith.

In T.S. Eliot's play, Murder in the Cathedral, Thomas Becket, once Chancellor of England and closest friend of Henry V, King of England, but now Archbishop of Canterbury and accordingly at odds with his king, seeks sanctuary in a church. Banging on the church door and demanding admission are four knights from Henry's court, who have come to kill Becket because they believe Henry wishes his death. Before deciding to open the door, Becket is presented with four temptations, the last being that in opening the door, he may be willing his own martyrdom, and he responds:

The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.

So it is here. In supporting Muslims' claims to civil rights every bit as fully as they support the rights of other controversial but legitimate groups, even at the height of a crisis over the legitimate place of Islamic values in the Danish culture, Danish citizens "did the right deed." But it can still be asked, did they do it for the right reason?[50]

[1] As mentioned below, however, the situation also prompted the formation of an organization of 'Democratic Muslims' as a counterweight to the more radical imams.

[2] Bech Thomsen 2006, 22.

[3] Runneymeade Trust 1997, 1. Italics ours.

[4] For a qualitative analysis of the reactions of young Muslims to the connection between terror and Islam, see Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009. For a quantitatively-grounded study, see

Hussain and Miller 2006.

[5] Runneymeade Trust 1997, 1.

[6] See the discussion in Kinder and Kam 2009.

[7] Kepel 2008, 219.

[8] The classic study is Rosch and Mervis 1975. We are following the specific lead of Nicholson and his collaborators. See Heit and Nicholson 2010; Nicholson et al. 2011.

[9] For altogether obvious reasons, we are excluding from consideration groups whose claim to rights is uncontroversial.

[10] Klausen 2009, 87 notes the irony that the imams circulated the cartoons they regarded as blasphemous to the Muslim community in Denmark in order to mobilize it.

[11] That is, an autocracy with a religious leader.

[12] The first decade of the 21st Century has also seen a number of court cases against alleged terrorists all of which have been apprehended before they could carry out any attacks. Three cases have concerned actual plans to carry out a terrorist act and two of them have led to convictions (in one case with sentences up to 12 years imprisonment). A fourth case led to the conviction of a fairly prominent Islamist publisher for providing assistance to Al Qaida e.g. in the form of materials to be used for recruiting new terrorists. The publisher – known in Denmark as 'the book seller from Brønshøj' – has previously been involved in court cases and has therefore, and because of his contacts to radical Islamists abroad, attracted some media interest. His presence in Denmark is the perhaps most prominent example of the mind-set that prevailed pre-9/11. Thus, his views and contacts have been known for quite some years, but particularly in the early 90s he was allowed to go about his business without any interference by the authorities.

[13] Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982. See also Petersen et al. 2010a.

[14] The literature on political tolerance towards different groups is voluminous; thus we cannot cite it all. Core contributions can, however, be found in Gibson 1998; 2006; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Mondak and Sanders 2003; Rohrschneider 1996; Sniderman et al. 1989; and Sniderman et al. 1996.

[15] We hasten to add that, although we cannot, due to data limitations, show that the two categories – transgressive and out-of-the-mainstream – are exhaustive in the sense that all controversial groups can be placed in either, we do in fact believe them to be. Thus, our conjecture is that they form a set of natural categories. It is, however, for subsequent research using an encompassing list of groups to show that this is indeed so.

[16] As is clear from Table 2.2, three of the rights items are phrased in the positive, while the debate item is phrased in the negative. The figures in the table are, for all four items, the percentage tolerant responses.

[17] One example of the contents of the new law is that the police was given the ability to obtain court orders pertaining to tapping all phone calls from a given individual rather than tapping only specific telephone numbers.

[18] Sniderman et al. 1996, 26-36.

[19] Clinton was speaking at an economic conference in Doha on January 30 2006, see *Jyllands-Posten*, January 31 2006.

[20] Superficially, our results may appear at odds with other research. So we have scrutinized the leading work, Davis 2007, Kalkan, Layman and Ushlaner 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Brooks and Manza, 2013. In fact, the disjunction in responses to Muslims and Islamic

fundamentalists is consistent with the conclusions of all studies, whose primary focus is transgressive groups.

[21] Runnymeade 1997, 1.

[22] According to Statistics Denmark 81.5 percent (www.statistikbanken.dk, Table KM1).

[23] Under the rules regulating *friskoler*, schools' budgets are 75 percent publicly funded, even though they operate outside the state system and have wide discretion regarding their curriculum. Nonetheless, Christian schools modeling their curriculum after Born Again Christian schools in the United States have provoked controversy for failing to meet curriculum requirements and teaching standards, and at least one such school has had its funding removed. This is not a right restricted to Born Again Christians, it should be emphasized. Muslims, for example, qualify, too.

[24] Even though they have on occasion run for municipal elections in one community they receive only very few votes and are generally viewed as a political joke.

[25] The Group Categorization Study was conducted as a web survey by the Zapera polling agency in December 2008. The respondents were recruited from 18-70 year-olds in Zapera's standing so called 'Denmark Panel'. Out of the 2,766 respondents contacted answers were obtained from 1,023 yielding a response rate (AAPOR RR1) of 37%. The data was subsequently weighted on gender, age, and region of residence to conform to the relevant population. Details on the representativeness of the survey are available in the online appendix.

[26] See Figure 2.1 for question wording.

[27] See for example comments by Sociology Professor Peter Gundelach in *Jyllands-Posten*, February 26, 2006.

[28] A classic study is Jackman and Muha 1984. See also studies on symbolic racism such as Kinder and Sears 1981 and Kinder and Sanders 1996.

[29] The median time between data points is one year. In addition – and to show the generality of the results – we also include measures from the Danish National Election Study. Some questions were asked in all, or nearly all, of the studies. Their wording, moreover, is identical over this period as are the response formats -- but for our survey, which supplies the 2006 observations, and the Danish National Election Study. Both, thus, use a neutral alternative, (neither/nor) on the standard (Likert) response scale – an option that was not present in the other surveys. For comparability, we have excluded the neutral category from the percentage base.

[30] See Togeby 2004, 62. Likewise, there was an increase in the support for "Denmark receiving more refugees than we do today" in response to the event op. cit., 58.

[31] More formally, the shape of the distribution is distinctly leptokurtic.

[32] We quote here Klausen 2009, 87.

[33] Excerpt from Camre's speech at the DPP annual meeting in 2004. Quoted in Seidenfaden and Larsen 2006, 27.

[34] The discovery of the two forms that partisan top-down influence takes and their impact on public opinion was made by Brody 1991. Its seminal exposition is Zaller 1992.

[35] The right-of-center newspaper was *Jyllands-Posten*, which published the cartoons; the left-of-center paper was *Politiken*.

[36] This means that some articles were coded in relation to two or more party leaders (and are thus counted two or more times in the content analysis). For details of this analysis, see the online appendix.

[37] Cf. Figure 2.4.

[38] Support for civil rights was measured only in the second survey (running from March 2 to August 20, 2006), and the bulk of interviews in this round were done March 2 through May 31 (n = 1,798; 91.4 %). The last group of interviews (n = 169) were conducted in June through August as the polling company had to draw a new sample of individuals from the Central Person Registry because the response rate turned out to be a bit lower than expected.

[39] Appendix C contains a close comparison of the two subsamples. The analyses reveal that the polling agency concentrated its efforts in different geographical parts of the country during the two periods. This has advantages as well as disadvantages. On the positive side, it means that the two subsamples differ less in terms of their composition of easy and hard to reach respondents simply because most respondents in the second subsample were not contacted in March-April. On the negative side it also means that there is a large geographical difference between the two subsamples. In addition, there are some minor differences in terms of age, education, and political interest. Hence the controls mentioned in the text.

[40] There is an arguable exception. In March and April, 60 percent supported the rights of groups to speak at high schools; in May through July the number was 54 percent. We do not want to make too much of this, partly because the 'right' to speak at schools has at best a highly derivative claim to be a right; particularly because the drop in support is not obviously politically significant.

[41] The term "top-down" model is systematically ambiguous, it should be remarked. The term sometimes has a deliberately narrow meaning, referring specifically to the role of partisan elites in defining the menu of alternatives on offer to citizens. For theoretical discussion, see

Sniderman 2000, and Sniderman and Bullock 2004. For an empirical test, see Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010. Still more often, it is used about elite definition of the alternatives on offer and implies a claim that voters take the positions they do in response to the cues or persuasive communications of political elites. The seminal work is Zaller 1992.

[42] Bullock 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Lenz 2009; Slothuus 2010; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010.

[43] Chong and Druckman 2010.

[44] Analyses of aggregate public opinion over time by Page and Shapiro 1992 and Togeby 2004, are consistent with this interpretation.

[45] In this sense, the Cartoon Crisis is parallel to, what as an experiment could be labeled, a "facilitative design," where participants are exposed to "a directional force in the form of a relevant reason to do what people are already predisposed to do" (Sniderman 2011,108).

[46] John Sullivan, James Piereson, and George Marcus are responsible for generating this hypothesis and assembling a compelling body of evidence in support of it (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982). James Gibson has also made seminal contributions (see, e.g., Gibson 2006; Gibson and Gouws 2003).

[47] There is an important sense in which our findings were to be expected. *Contrary to an impression of our findings being at odds with previous research, they are consistent with it.* Conditional on knowing that Muslims were not perceived as a threat, and setting aside the quite reasonable expectation that prejudice toward them and the spillover of hostility to Islamic radicals, the prediction should be support for the rights of Muslims.

[48] On the perceived threat scale, which runs from 0 to 1, the mean score for Islamic

fundamentalists is .8; the median is .9; and the mode is 1.

[49] Immigrant is not an exact synonym for Muslim. Yet, it is largely so. In a confirmatory factor analysis we have found a clearly unacceptable fit for a model forcing attitudes to immigrants and Muslims to load on the same dimension. A model with separate factors for immigrant and Muslim attitudes yields a clearly superior fit, albeit the two factors correlate at .85.

[50] For an answer to this question, see Chapter 5.

be making their decision to immigrate in order to exploit these programs; then, taking up their lives in their new country, enjoying its benefits while shirking its responsibilities. Immigrants are in fact disproportionately likely to be on welfare. Since the stereotype of immigrants as shirkers is in some degree reality-grounded which – which again we emphasize – is not the same thing as reality-warranted. Still, it provides a socially defensible justification for a position that immigrants are not entitled to the same measure of welfare assistance as fellow Danes.

This is the truth of the matter, our results show, yet it misses the heart of the matter. The moral premise, duties come before rights, imposes a temporal logic on decisions about entitlements to welfare benefits. A person must first have a fair opportunity to fulfill his duty, before he can be charged with failing to perform it. Young immigrants, it follows, must have the same benefits as young Danes – for example, special assistance for the young mother so she can attend a job training program. How could she be judged to have failed to meet her duty to contribute to the larger society if she is denied the means to do so?

A different logic, the logic of self-interest, may be at work, it may reasonably be objected. If immigrants don't receive training and educational opportunities, they are more likely to wind up on welfare. Danes, it follows, may be as ready to provide supportive benefits for young immigrants as for fellow Danes, not out of a commitment to a social covenant but out of self-interest. They don't want to pay taxes to support immigrants because they didn't get the assistance necessary when they were younger to support themselves.

On its face, the self-interest hypothesis is credible. Suppose it is not merely credible but correct – that it is self-interest, not a commitment to moral principle, that underpins equal assistance for young immigrants and young Danes to be able to further their education. Then, though Danes may be as willing to provide the same assistance to young immigrants to get ahead

as to fellow Danes, it will be a different matter when it comes to the requirements for staying on welfare. They will be more likely to impose strict requirements on immigrants to continue to receive welfare. But, in fact as we saw, there is no double standard. Danes treated young immigrants and young fellow Danes alike.

The temporal sequencing, duties before rights, cuts just the other way for older immigrants, however. They both have, and in still greater measure are perceived to have, stayed out of the labor force, many surely for reasons that have nothing to do with their character or faith – a lack of education or facility in speaking the language of their new country, to mention two of the most obvious. But the stereotype of them as shirkers opens the door to a presumption that an older immigrant has not met his or her obligation to the larger society and, even so, is seeking to obtain benefits from it. The verb "opens the door" deserves italics. The maxim underpinning the welfare state, duties before rights, does not stimulate punitive responses to older immigrants.[12] It does, however, legitimize them.

Hence the Covenant Paradox: the moral covenant underpinning the welfare state promotes equal treatment for younger immigrants but legitimizes discrimination against older ones.

IV. Democratic Values as a Positive Force: Inclusive Tolerance

Gunnar Myrdal's, *An American Dilemma*,[13] defined the understanding of race in America until the mid-1960's. It then was subjected to withering criticism, and now is largely forgotten.

Why did Myrdal's monumental work suffer this fate? The struggle for racial equality would be long and hard, he recognized. The outcome was uncertain. But he was optimistic. In

the end, he believed the force of the Democratic Creed – liberty, equality, fair play – would win out. In the mid-sixties, however, Myrdal's focus on values as a force for change and racial progress came to be viewed by both academics and activists as simple-minded – "sunshine sociology" was one characterization.[14] A nice touch: just as the Civil Rights Movement reached its peak of success thanks in significant measure to its appeal to the values of liberty and equality, then social scientists concluded that values were of no consequence.

And, in the very next season of intellectual fashions, political scientists turned Myrdal up-side down. The new racism, they maintained, once again had become an over overpowering force in American politics precisely because it had the backing of traditional American values. To be sure, they did not have in mind the same traditional American values as Myrdal. Myrdal meant liberty, equality, and fair play. They mean individualism, among other values.[15] But the pirouette is complete all the same. Rather than core American values being a reason for hope, they are reason for pessimism.

It was and remains right to recognize the continuing force of racial prejudice and intolerance more generally in shaping how the majority treats minorities. Indeed, it has been a focus of our own research.[16] But a defining aim of this study is to recover Myrdal's insight. The values of liberal democracy have a propulsive force, he contended. We are in a position, however, to examine only a circumscribed version of his insight. We focus on only one moment in time; so at most we can show that democratic values are a positive force for equality, not that they are propulsive ones. No less consequentially, we focus on only one value of a democratic politics, tolerance.

Our choice of tolerance as a focal point may seem perverse. For tolerance has become a synonym for toleration. It goes no further than accommodation, many theorists of democracy

agree; hence the patronizing references to "mere" tolerance. It is possibly instructive that "mere" tolerance is demoted to the second rank of democratic values just when intolerance once again has become among the most pressing problem in contemporary Western European politics. But our objective is not to criticize contemporary democratic theory. Our aim is recover an older, more positive understanding of tolerance – namely, to support, to nourish, to sustain.[17] This form of tolerance is affirmative, supportive, inclusive; hence our baptizing it inclusive tolerance.

What does inclusive tolerance require? Merely thinking well of a minority is insufficient; it is necessary to treat them well. And what does treating minorities well call for – their inclusion as full members of a common community. This seems to us the right standard. Just so far as the majority treats a minority as a member of a common community, the distinction between in-group and out-group is erased. Even so, it is not appropriate to simply discard the insight that tolerance requires overcoming a reason not to be tolerant.[18] Accordingly, for a person to qualify as inclusively tolerant she must treat minorities as members of a common community *in spite of having immediately available and salient a socially acceptable reason to treat them differently and worse*. There is a final consideration. The same act can be done for different reasons, and the meaning of what was done hinges on the reason for doing it. Therefore, treating minorities well for a variety of socially acceptable or even praiseworthy motives – compassion, generosity, and charity – does not qualify as instances of inclusive tolerance. For a person to qualify as inclusively tolerant, she must treat minorities well because she thinks well of them. She must treat them well because she thinks of them as equals who deserve respect, not as powerless objects who should be pitied.

Meeting these three requirements is a minimal standard of inclusive tolerance, to be sure. More demanding ones are conceivable – providing immigrant minorities help above and beyond

what one would provide a native Dane because of the additional obstacles that immigrants inevitably must overcome. But a standard of "extra" help is inherently vague and vagueness invites an excess of moral ambitiousness. Hence our choice of standards of inclusion: treating minorities as members of a common community – hardly a niggardly standard, we would add, in a welfare state. And using equal treatment as a standard pays a bonus. Instead of having to rely on reports of subjective feelings or intent, how people are treated is open to objective measurement. Thanks to randomized experiments, one can assess not only whether but also to what degree immigrants and native citizens, in exactly the same circumstances, are treated the same. Just so far they are treated the same, immigrants are being included in the larger society on the same terms as native citizens.

Our aim has been to determine whether there is a positive force working in favor of minorities in addition to the negative forces working against them. Our results are consistent with this view of the ethos of contemporary liberal democracies. We are not at all suggesting that the forces working for inclusion are off-setting, still less that they are prevailing over, the forces working for exclusion. On the contrary, consistent with previous research, our results document strong anti-immigration sentiments. First, in the beginning of Chapter 2, we saw that such sentiments were widespread in Denmark. Not much more widespread than in comparable countries but widespread nonetheless. Second, in Chapter 3, we investigated the conditions under which immigrant minorities are treated differently and worse. Thanks to the use of randomized experiments, we showed that when there is socially defensible opportunity for treating immigrants differently and worse, a larger portion of the public favors a double standard than favors inclusion. Third – and as a last example – our goal in Chapter 4 was to show that the ideological sources of anti-immigration sentiments are even stronger than has been supposed. A

vast amount of evidence has established a close connection between right wing social values and aversion to immigration. Views about economic redistribution, this research has also suggested, are not associated with such aversion. Yet, analysis of our data, backed up by analyses of every comparable data set available, shows that a commitment to egalitarianism when *combined* with right wing social values – as it frequently is – is in fact not only associated with aversion to immigration but boosts the level of hostility to even higher levels. That a commitment to a greater measure of economic equality can, in this way, strengthen the forces of exclusion is arguably yet another paradox of contemporary liberal democracy.

When we ourselves scrutinize our results, we can see no way of avoiding the conclusion that the force of ill will towards immigrants outweighs that of good will. It is thus all the more remarkable that, in the face of demands by Muslims in other countries that the values of their faith take precedence over the values of liberal democracy, ordinary citizens nonetheless provided a solid wall of support for the civil liberties and civil rights of Muslims.

[1] For example, consistent with previous research, over-time analysis of the three surveys we conducted documented the restraining influence of elites political and social. Also, consistent with previous research, the level of support for the civil liberties of Muslims and Islamic Fundamentalists is correlated with the degree to which each is perceived to be a threat. Finally, and again consistent with previous research, when we repeated previous analyses of the ideological sources of hostility to immigration, our results duplicated the findings of previous studies.

[2] For exceptions, see Davis 1975 and Nunn et al. 1978; but also see Brooks and Manza 2013;

Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood 1995; and Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus 1982.

[3] We quote here Klausen 2009, 87.

[4] Pia Kjærsgaard, DPP (Weekly newsletter, June 13, 2005); quoted in Seidenfaden and Larsen 2006, 224-225.

[5] Klausen 2009, 32.

[6] See Table 2.1

[7] See Table 2.3

[8] The categorization of Neo-Nazis is especially instructive, since it allows to distinguish between categorization on the basis of a group being transgressive and categorization on the basis of a group being threatening. Most Danes view Neo-Nazis with anathema but Neo-Nazis do not remotely match the Autonome's and bikers' records of rioting and violence, and are in no serious sense a threat to safety or order. But Neo-Nazis are manifestly transgressive, and so they are grouped with other transgressive groups, most obviously, the Autonome and Hell's Angels.

[9] It is support for core democratic rights – freedom of speech most notably – that we have investigated. The War on Terror has rightly raised concerns about the public's reactions to an array of issues where what is normatively right is deeply contestable. Support for the Patriot Act., for example, surely reflects in some measure a lack of commitment to civil liberties. But just as surely, the public's reactions in some measure reflect the reality of the threat and the legitimacy of the law-making process. Civic responsibility, in democratic politics, can turn into a cat's cradle, but the standards citizens must satisfy to meet the responsibilities of democratic citizenship have to be set at a defensible level For an example that highlights the complexity of public attitudes on issues of security and civil liberties, see Brooks and Manza, (2013) p. 71.

[10] We are thinking here particularly of Sides and Gross' 2013 reporting of an absence of a difference in evaluations of 'dangerousness' of Muslims and Muslim Americans. This does not match the contrast between Islamic fundamentalists and Muslims, but their findings give reason to highlight the risk of the distinction we have drawn being erased by virtue of Muslims being demonized, which is a risk that should be dismissed. Even for our results, it should be unnecessary to say, though to be on the safe side we will, that our own results show that: (i) not everyone draws a bright line distinction between Muslims and Islamic Fundamentalists; (ii) a non-trivial number – on our measures, on the order of one in three -- dislike Muslims; and (iii) a comparable proportion perceive Muslims to be a threat. Indeed, it is not least because all three things are true that observing as much support for the civil rights of Muslims as for Danish groups that are out of the mainstream is so striking a result.

[11] Here again the absence of a "before" measurement stymies the inferences we can draw. Still, far better to have data from when the Cartoon Crisis dominated public attention to when it had receded from public notice than to have only the "after" measurements typical in studies of unanticipated crises.

[12] See the discussion, below, of Inclusive Tolerance, in particular, the finding that it is those who dislike and disdain immigrants who take advantage of an opening to treat them differently and worse.

[13] Myrdal, 1944.

[14] The phrase "sunshine sociology" is taken from Southern, who used it to characterize the emerging critique of Myrdal's work among academics (Southern, 1995). Much has been lost in the dismissive rejection of Myrdal's focus on values. It does, for us, put the issue in a different

context if you know that he hit upon the conception of the American Creed when, in Sweden, he was attempting to stiffen Swedish resistance to Nazi demands. "Sunshine sociology" does not do justice to Myrdal's views, still less his courage.

[15] Near the top of their list are "obedience and discipline" – possibly traditional Prussian values, hardly traditional American ones (e.g., Kinder and Sears, 1981, p. 416).

[16] See, for example, Petersen et al., 2011b; Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 2002; Sniderman & Haagendorn 2007; Stubager, 2010.

[17] Again we acknowledge our indebtedness to our colleague, Josiah Ober.

[18] This requirement is the heart of the approach of Sullivan and his colleagues. In their framework, for a person to qualify as tolerant requires her to affirm the civil rights of the group she most dislikes.

Appendix A: Timeline of the Cartoon Crisis

September 30, 2005:	Jyllands-Posten's publication of the 12 cartoons.
October 12, 2005:	11 ambassadors from Muslim countries request a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister.
October 21, 2005:	The Prime Minister rejects the ambassadors' request.
October 29, 2005:	The Egyptian ambassador, Mona Omar, calls on the international society to take action.
November 14, 2005:	Pakistani bounty placed on the heads of the cartoonists.
December 3, 2005:	The first delegation of Danish imams travels to the Middle East to garner support for their opposition to the cartoons.
December 7, 2005:	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expresses concern over cartoons.
December 17, 2005:	A second imam delegation travels to the Middle East.
January 7, 2006:	Reprinting of the cartoons in Sweden.
January 20, 2006:	Boycott of Danish commodities initiated in the Middle East.
January 26 2006:	Recalling of Muslim ambassadors from Denmark is initiated by Saudi Arabia.
January 29, 2006:	Desecration of the Danish flag on the West Bank.
February 1, 2006:	Reprinting of the cartoons across Europe.
February 4, 2006:	The organization Democratic Muslims is founded. The Danish embassy in Damascus, Syria is attacked.
February 5, 2006:	The Danish consulate in Beirut, Lebanon is set afire.

February 9, 2006:	Demonstrations with up to 700,000 participants are held across the Muslim world.
February 13, 2008:	Reprinting of the cartoons in Danish media as a response to a failed assassination attempt on Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist who drew the picture of Mohammed with a bomb in his turban.
June 2, 2008:	The Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan is attacked by a car bomb. Al Qaeda claims responsibility, saying it is revenge for the cartoons.
January 1, 2010:	Kurt Westergaard is attacked in his home by an axe wielding man. He survives by hiding in his bathroom.

Table 2.1. Immigrant attitudes in Denmark, Germany, France, the U.K., the Netherlands and Sweden. Percent Intolerant Responses.

	DK	*D*	*F*	*UK*	*NL*	*S*
If immigrants commit a serious crime, they should be made to leave. (Strongly agree + agree)	80	91	67	79	76	75
It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions. (Strongly agree + agree)	46	39	54	46	44	37
If a country wants to reduce tensions it should stop immigration. (Strongly agree + agree)	47	47	34	44	37	16
Preferring to live in an area where almost nobody was of a different race or ethnic group from most [nationals of country] (Rather than in areas where some people were of a different race or ethnic group from most [nationals of country] or many people were of a different race or ethnic group)	37	24	23	26	32	20
Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On average, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out? (Scores 0-4 on 0 (Generally take out more) to 10 (Generally put in more) scale)	53	56	41	56	47	40
Would you say it is generally bad or good for	41	31	28	44	34	27

[country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries? (Scores 0-4 on 0 (Bad for the economy) to 10 (Good for the economy) scale)						
Are [country's] crime problems made worse or better by immigrants? (Scores 0-4 on 0 (Crime problems made worse) to 10 (Crime problems made better) scale)	70	76	60	61	81	69
And now thinking of immigrants who are of a different race or ethnic group from most [nationals of country]. How much would you mind or not mind if someone like this married a close relative of yours? (Scores 6-10 on 0 (Not mind at all) to 10 (Mind a lot) scale)	32	23	30	23	26	17

Source: European Social Survey, Round 1, 2002.

Note: DK: Denmark (N: 1,362-1,456), D: Germany (N: 2,797-2,909), F: France (1,475-1,494); UK: The United Kingdom (N: 1,995-2,043), NL: The Netherlands (N: 2,288-2,354), S: Sweden (N: 1,880-1,963).

Table 2.2. Support for Civil Rights of Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists. Percent.

	Debate	*Demonstrate*	*Speak at High Schools*	*Oppose Telephone Tapping*
Muslims	71	81	74	51
Islamic fundamentalists	51	61	44	18

Note: N varies from 466 to 503. The standard errors of the entries vary from 1.7 to 2.3.

Question wording:

1. Representatives for [group] should not be allowed to express themselves in public debate.

2. The police should have better opportunities for tapping telephones owned by [group].

3. Representatives for [group] should have the right to speak at high schools.

4. Also [group] should be allowed to hold demonstrations.

The response categories were: completely agree; somewhat agree; neither/nor;, somewhat disagree; completely disagree; don't know.

Entries are the sums of 'completely' and 'somewhat disagree' for the debate and wiretap items and of 'completely' and 'somewhat agree' for the right to speak at high schools and demonstration items.

Table 2.3. Support for the Rights of Target Groups. Percent.

	Debate	*Demonstrate*	*Speak at High Schools*	*Oppose Telephone Tapping*
Panel A: 'Out-of-the-Mainstream' Groups				
Muslims	71	81	74	51
Born Again Christians	68	83	64	50
Far Left	76	81	72	49
Far Right	73	77	61	36
Panel B: Transgressive Groups				
Islamic fundamentalists	51	61	44	18
Autonome	71	76	48	36
Bikers	59	73	52	24
Neo-Nazis	53	59	31	24

Note: N varies from 439 to 503. The standard errors of the entries vary from 1.7 to 2.4. See Table 2.2 for question wording, etc.

Table 2.4. Political Tolerance by Time of Interview. Average for All Groups. Percent.

	March-April	*May-July*	*Difference (p-value in parentheses)*	
Debate	74	62	-11	(.<001)
Demonstrate	73	73	0	(.909)
Speak at High Schools	60	54	-6	(.029)
Oppose Telephone Tapping	40	40	0	(.816)

Note: N varies from 1,774 to 1,794. Entries are percentage tolerant responses after controls for gender, age (categorized into 1-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-70), county of residence (based on the 15 pre-2007 counties), education (categorized into only primary, vocational upper secondary (i.e. craftsmen), short-cycle tertiary (further vocational training), medium-cycle tertiary (e.g. school teacher, nurse), and long-cycle tertiary (MA-level and beyond), political knowledge (low, medium, or high), and political interest ('very', 'somewhat', 'only slightly' or 'not at all interested'). See Table 2.2 for wording of the rights questions.

Table 2.5. Change in Support for Free Speech of Groups from the Height of the Crisis to its Disappearance from the Public Agenda. Percent.

	March-April	*May-July*	*Difference (p-value in parentheses)*	
Muslims	77	62	-15	(.002)
Born Again Christians	80	68	-11	(.026)
Far Left	86	74	-12	(.009)
Far Right	82	72	-10	(.027)
Islamic fundamentalists	62	48	-14	(.007)
Autonome	81	71	-10	(.037)
Bikers	64	50	-15	(.006)
Neo-Nazis	54	57	+4	(.509)

Note: N varies from 433 to 486. Entries are percentage tolerant responses after controls for gender, age, county of residence, education, political knowledge, and political interest (cf. Table 2.4). See Table 2.2 for wording of the rights question.

Table 2.6. Change in Perception of Threat from Groups from the Height of the Crisis to its Disappearance from the Public Agenda. Scale Scores.

	March-April	*May-July*	*Difference (p-value in parentheses)*	
Muslims	.45	.45	0	(.885)
Born Again Christians	.45	.42	-3	(.037)
Far Left	.42	.38	-4	(.003)
Far Right	.54	.47	-6	(<.001)
Islamic fundamentalists	.78	.78	0	(.835)
Autonome	.50	.49	-1	(.527)
Bikers	.55	.55	0	(.828)
Neo-Nazis	.65	.65	0	(.749)

Note: N varies from 1,765 to 1,864. Entries are mean scores on 0-1 scale after controls for gender, age, county of residence, education, political knowledge, and political interest (cf. Table 2.4).

Question wording: "I will now list a number of groups in Denmark and ask how great a threat you believe each of them pose to Danish society. Please respond on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 indicating that the group is not threatening at all, 10 indicating that the group is very threatening." Answers were rescaled to run from 0 to 1.

Table 2.7. Change in Opposition to Telephone Tapping of Groups from the Height of the Crisis to its Disappearance from the Public Agenda. Percent.

	March-April	*May-July*	*Difference (p-value in parentheses)*	
Muslims	58	46	-11	(.032)
Born Again Christians	53	55	+2	(.690)
Far Left	62	48	-14	(.014)
Far Right	37	42	+5	(.347)
Islamic fundamentalists	16	23	+7	(.052)
Autonome	40	42	+2	(.706)
Bikers	27	30	+2	(.620)
Neo-Nazis	19	31	+11	(.016)

Note: N varies from 436 to 482. Entries are percentage tolerant responses after controls for gender, age, county of residence, education, political knowledge, and political interest (cf. Table 2.4). See Table 2.2 for wording of the rights question.



Figure 2.1. Perceptions of Target Groups' Democratic Commitment and Use of Violence. Scale Scores.

Note: N varies from 890 to 997. Standard errors vary from 0.006 to 0.01.

Question wording:

Violent: "Here is a list of groups in Denmark. For each group please indicate how violent you think the group is." The scale ran from '0 not at all violent' to '10 very violent'. The answers were rescaled to run from 0 to1.

Democratic: "Here is a list of groups in Denmark. For each group please indicate whether you think the group respects the rules of democracy." The scale ran from '0 does not at all respect the rules of democracy' to '10 completely respects the rules of democracy.' The answers were rescaled to run from 0 to 1.

Both items also included 'don't know'options.



Figure 2.2. Immigrant Attitudes in Denmark Over Time. Percent Tolerant Responses. 1993-2007.

Sources: Data for the items about immigration as a cultural threat and immigrants' access to social security come from the Danish Election Study (see Stubager, Holm and Smidstrup 2011). Data for the three remaining series comes from Togeby (2004) as well as our core survey (the 2006 observations).

Response categories were: completely agree; somewhat agree; somewhat disagree; completely disagree. For the data that does not appear in Togeby 2004, a 'neither/nor' category was also

included. To ensure comparability, this category has (along with ‘don’t knows’) been excluded from the percentage base. The population is restricted to 18-70 year olds.



Figure 2.3. Press Coverage of the Issue of Free Speech. August 2005-August 2006. Number of Articles.

Note: The figure displays the monthly number of articles in the *Infomedia* database from the newspapers *Jyllands-Posten* and *Politiken* and for *Ritzaus Bureau* news wires containing the word "*ytringsfrihed*" (freedom of speech). The three sources are chosen on the grounds that *Politiken* is a large newspaper to the left of the middle on the Danish political spectrum, *Jyllands-Posten* is to the right of the middle, while *Ritzaus Bureau* can be seen as representing all of the smaller newspapers.

Panel A: Number of Party Leader Statements on the Crisis.



Panel B: Prevalence of Free Speech and Tolerance Frames in Party Leader Statements.



Figure 2.4. Party Leader Reactions to and Framing of the Cartoon Crisis. January-June 2006. Number of Statements.

Note: Panel A shows the number of articles in the newspapers *Politiken* and *Jyllands-Posten* where party leaders were directly quoted with a statement on the cartoon crisis. Panel B shows the number of statements where the "free speech frame" and the "tolerance frame", respectively, were present. See the online appendix for procedure, coding, etc.



Figure 2.5. Party Leaders' Framing of the Cartoon Crisis. January-June 2006. Percent of Statements.

Note: The figure shows the percentage of each party leader's statements that contained each of the two frames. See Figure 2.4 and the online appendix for procedure, coding, etc.