


# CS628 Assignment 1

## 2018-19 II Semester

### Design Report for Secure Key-Value File Sharing



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
February 15, 2019

# 1 A simple, but secure client


**Purpose:** To maintain Confidentiality and Integrity of data without any regards to Availability.

**NOTE:** *KeyAddr* field in every struct to protect against key-value-swap attack.

USER Structure



INODE Structure



## 1.1 InitUser (username string, password string)

1. Obtain  $key = \text{Argon2Key}(< password > + < username > ", " < username > + user", 10)$ . This will generate a 36 character key. This is where the value (User data) will be stored.
2. Generate an RSA Key-pair. Push the public key to the Public Key Server. Store the Private Key along with other fields in *User\_r* struct.
3. Generate a new  $key = \text{Argon2Key}(< username > + < password > ", " < username > ", 10)$  for symmetric encryption. Use this key to sign *User\_r.User* with HMAC scheme, store the signature in *User\_r.Signature*. Encrypt the json-marshalled *User\_r* struct data with AES-Cipher Feedback Mode using the same key as above.
4. Call *DatastoreSet(key, ciphertext)* to publish the encrypted User information in Data Server.

## 1.2 GetUser (username string, password string)

1. Get the "key" using above Argon2Key invocation. Errors suggest either incorrect username or password. Calculate the key for CFBDecrypter(), and obtain the decrypted *User\_r* structure.
2. Check HMAC hashes of *User\_r.User* and *User\_r.Signature* for any tampering. If all checks are satisfied, return the *User\_r.User* structure.

## 1.3 (User) StoreFile (filename string, data []byte)

1. Obtain  $key = \text{Argon2Key}(< password > + < filename > ", " < username > + < filename > ", 10)$ . This will generate a 36 character key. This is where the Inode structure for "Username"->"Filename" will be stored (Refer to the figure).
2. Generate a random address (key) and AES-CFB key for storing and encrypting *SharingRecord\_r* structure respectively. Fill the Inode structure. Sign it using Author's Private key and store RSA signature in *Inode\_r.Signature*. Encrypt *Inode\_r* with Author's Public key. Push (key, encrypted *Inode\_r*) to Data Server.
3. Check if a *SharingRecord\_r* structure exists. If it exists, delete all the existing data blocks and write the new data. Else, initialize a new *SharingRecord\_r* object.

4. Again generate a random address (key) and AES-CFB key for storing and encrypting the *Data\_r* structure. Store these in the relevant fields of *SharingRecord* structure. Sign with a predecided HMAC key and store in *SharingRecord\_r.Signature* field. Encrypt the Structure with the key decided at *Inode\_r* and push to Data Server.
5. Store the "data" at the "key" generated above, Encrypt it with *CFBEncrypter()* method. Sign it and store the data at the "key". Push to Data Server and return.

#### SharingRecord Structure



#### DATA Structure



### 1.4 (User) LoadFile (filename string)

1. Follow the method given in *StoreFile()* to reach, decrypt and verify the signature of the *SharingRecord\_r* structure corresponding to "filename".
2. Loop over the list of addresses of data chunks (via indirect pointers), decrypt and verify the HMAC signatures of each, reconstruct the entire data as a single byte array and return it.

### 1.5 (User) AppendFile (filename string, data []byte)

1. Follow the method given in *LoadFile()* to reach, decrypt and verify the signature of the *SharingRecord\_r* structure corresponding to "filename".
2. Create a new *Data\_r* block and append its generated encryption key and address to the appropriate list of keys and signatures in *SharingRecord* structure. Push the block to *DataStore* and return.
3. **NOTE:** We are not verifying the integrity of previous data blocks during *AppendFile()*, considering the unnecessary overhead of re-encryptions/decryptions.

## 2 Sharing and revocation

### 2.1 (User) ShareFile (filename string, recipient string)

1. Follow the method given in *LoadFile()* to reach, decrypt and verify the signature of the *SharingRecord\_r* structure corresponding to "filename".
2.  $collected\_info = Inode\_r.Inode.(Symmkey + ShRecordAddr)$ . Recieve the Public key of receiver from the Public Key Server.
3.  $sharing = PubKey_{recipient}(PrivKey_{user}(Hash(collected\_info)) + (collected\_info))$ , to maintain confidentiality and integrity in case of a **Man in the Middle attack** while sharing the message offline. Where  $PrivKey_{user}(Hash(collected\_info))$  is the signature of *collected\_info*.

## 2.2 (User) ReceiveFile (filename string, sender string, msgid string)

1. Decrypt "msgid" using Private Key of User, verify the integrity using Public Key of Sender. Obtain the Address and "key" for CFB-Decryption of SharingRecord structure of the concerned data(value) and proceed ahead.
2. Create an Inode for the receiver user using Argon2Key, with the method described in Store-File(). Store the info in the Inode, store the RSA signature and encrypt *Inode\_r* structure with Public key of User. Return.

## 2.3 (User) RevokeFile (filename string)

1. Go to the SharingRecord structure corresponding to "filename". **IMP:** After verifying the integrity, check if the User is **Original-Author** of the "filename". If not, return an error.
2. If so, from the Inode of original author, change the encryption key and the address of *SharingRecord\_r* structure and re-encrypt it with a new key. Similarly, change the address of the actual data (*SharingRecord\_r.Address*).
3. Iterate over all data-blocks and re-encrypt them with fresh symmetric keys. Also, store each of them at new addresses. Store these new keys and addresses in the corresponding *SharingRecord\_r* structure. **NOTE:** This is to prevent any further misuse by a distrusted user who knows the original keys and addresses of data blocks.