

Property 1 and 2: User creation and authentication

5 Points No Apparent Vulnerability

Property 3: Integrity preservation in the simple secure client

1 Point

- There is no integrity check in case of *User* structures. A random manipulation can change any underlying field resulting in an incorrect authentication later on.
- Method of checking the integrity of *struct File* during *LoadFile()* is weak. Its possible that a tamper changes everything apart from stored "Public Key".
- **Key Value Swap Attack:** An adversary whose access to a file was earlier revoked, can still swap multiple blocks of file_data corresponding to a file, resulting in incorrect order for next *LoadFile()* invocation.

Property 4: Confidentiality in the simple secure client

4 Points

- The unencrypted *username-User* look-up table leaks the number of users registered and the location of User structs.
- The unencrypted *username filename-File* look-up table leaks the total number of files and their individual locations.

Property 5: AppendFile implementation and efficiency

5 Points: No apparent vulnerability

Property 6: Sharing implementation

4 Points

- There is no encryption of the auth token to be shared through a medium susceptible to *Man in the Middle attack*. Hence, an adversary can learn about the location of shared file and launch a personalized attack.

Property 7: Revocation implementation

5 Points: No apparent vulnerability

Overall: Clarity of Design Document

4 Points

- The design greatly exceeds 2 page limit, could have been restricted with simple L^AT_EX hacks.
- *User structure is stored in DataStore using needed fields*. But how is the key generated?