

The Role of Energy Efficiency in Productivity: Evidence from Canada

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Outline

- 1 Motivation
- 2 Data
- 3 Framework
- 4 Model
- 5 Results
- 6 Conclusion

Why Study Energy Misallocation?

- Resource misallocation → major source of productivity loss.
- Prior work: Focusing mainly on capital and labor misallocation.
- Energy: a central input in all sectors, yet much less studied.
- Increasingly important for both productivity and climate policy.

Sources: Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Restuccia and Rogerson (2017); Bartelsman et al. (2013); Chen and Irarrazabal (2015); Asker et al. (2019); Choi (2020); Tombe and Winter (2015).

Share of Manufacturing Sector

- ... However, most studies focus on manufacturing sector and firm level input inefficiencies.

| Country | Manufacturing Share (% of GDP) |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| China (2023) | 25.5 |
| India (2023) | 13.0 |
| USA (2023) | 10.3 |
| Canada (2014–2020 avg.) | ~10.0 |

Source: World Bank

- I rather examine **economy-wide** estimate of energy misallocation at **sector-by-province** level.

Why Canada? & Why Province-Sector Level?

- Provinces differ in energy policy
→ fragmented markets.
- High variation in energy prices, infrastructure, and regulation.
- Limited interprovincial trade → persistent inefficiencies.
- Internal trade studies show sizable productivity losses (3–7%).^a
- Rich provincial input–output data (2014–2020).

^aAlbrecht and Tombe (2016); Alvarez et al. (2019)

Canada's Input Shares (Sector Level)

| Input | Share (%) |
|---------|-----------|
| Labor | 60–65 |
| Capital | 25–30 |
| Energy | 5–10 |

Author's calculations.

Preview of the Results

- $\sim 5\text{--}8\%$ potential TFP gains overall (2014–2020)
- **Decomposition: Most misallocation (more than half) comes from within-sector differences across provinces**
 - Capital dominates between-sector losses: $\sim 1\text{--}4\%$ output loss
 - Energy accounts for $\sim 1\text{--}2\%$ output loss (disproportionately large relative to its small share $\sim 8\%$)
 - Labor accounts for less than $\sim 1\%$ output loss
- Per dollar, energy is more distortionary than capital or labor.
- Bottom line: Energy inefficiency acts as a persistent bottleneck, offsetting efficiency gains elsewhere.

Contribution

- Connects **output gaps and climate goals**: efficient energy use boosts **productivity** *and* reduces **emissions**.
- I focus on **energy** as an essential input and show its disproportionately large effect on aggregate productivity → **equally (even more) important to capital or labor**.
- First **economy-wide** estimate of energy misallocation (sector \times province data).
- Quantifies productivity loss from energy misallocation across **regions** and sectors → **spatial dimension**
- Uses a tractable, flexible, and generalizable model → policy insights on energy pricing, infrastructure, climate policy.

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Data Sources & Features

- Statistics Canada **Provincial Input–Output Tables** (2014–2020).
- Sectors: 230+ sectors, covering entire economy.
- Inputs: energy, capital, labor.
- Sector-by-province level variation.
- Energy share in inputs varies widely by province.
- Detailed enough (more than 230+ sectors for 10 provinces).

Who's Who in the Data: Energy Sectors

- 10 - Oil and gas extraction (except oil sands)
- 11 - Oil sands extraction
- 12 - Coal mining
- 22 - Natural gas extraction
- 23 - Support activities for oil and gas extraction
- 24 - Support activities for mining
- 25 - Electric power generation, transmission and distribution
- 30 - Transportation engineering construction
- 31 - Oil and gas engineering construction
- 57 - Petroleum refineries
- 58 - Petroleum and coal product manufacturing (except petroleum refineries)
- 148 - Crude oil and other pipeline transportation
- 149 - Pipeline transportation of natural gas

Who's Who in the Data: Capital and Labor

Capital:

- Single row: Gross Mixed Income

Labor:

- Two rows:
 - Wages and salaries
 - Employers' social contributions

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Conceptual Framework

- Build on Hsieh–Klenow (2009) misallocation model.
- Provinces/sectors face distortions \rightarrow marginal revenue products differ.
- Extend to include **energy** alongside capital and labor.
- Compare observed allocation vs. efficient benchmark.
- Fully tractable and flexible model allowing for clean decomposition: **within-sector (across provinces)** vs. **between-sector (within provinces)** misallocation.

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Aggregate Output and Sectoral Shares

- National output is CES over sectoral outputs:

$$Y = \prod_{s=1}^S Y_s^{\theta_s}, \quad \theta_s = \frac{P_s Y_s}{P Y}, \quad \sum_s \theta_s = 1$$

- Each sector s is CES across provinces i :

$$Y_s = \left(\sum_i Y_{si}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

- Associated price index:

$$P_s = \left(\sum_i P_{si}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- Sector–province production follows Cobb–Douglas with three inputs:

$$Y_{si} = A_{si} K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{\beta_s} E_{si}^{\gamma_s}, \quad \alpha_s + \beta_s + \gamma_s = 1$$

- Inputs: capital K , labor L , energy E .
- Distortions enter as wedges on input prices.

Profit Maximization with Distortions

- Each sector s in province i maximizes profits:

$$\max_{K,L,E} P_{si} Y_{si} - (1 + \tau_K) r K - (1 + \tau_L) w L - (1 + \tau_E) p_E E$$

- τ are wedges capturing distortions.
- Leads marginal revenue products (MRPs) to be distorted.

Marginal Revenue Products

From first-order conditions:

$$MRPK_{si} = \alpha_s \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si}} = (1 + \tau_{K_{si}})r$$

$$MRPL_{si} = \beta_s \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{L_{si}} = (1 + \tau_{L_{si}})w$$

$$MRPE_{si} = \gamma_s \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{E_{si}} = (1 + \tau_{E_{si}})p_E$$

- Equalization across provinces and sectors implies efficiency.
- Dispersion reflects misallocation.

Productivity Measures

- Physical TFP (TFPQ):

$$TFPQ_{si} = \frac{Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{\beta_s} E_{si}^{\gamma_s}}$$

- Revenue TFP (TFPR):

$$TFPR_{si} = \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{\beta_s} E_{si}^{\gamma_s}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} TFPR_{si} &\propto (MRPK_{si})^{\alpha_s} (MRPL_{si})^{\beta_s} (MRPE_{si})^{\gamma_s} \\ &\propto (1 + \tau_{K_{si}})^{\alpha_s} (1 + \tau_{L_{si}})^{\beta_s} (1 + \tau_{E_{si}})^{\gamma_s} \end{aligned}$$

- Key insight: TFPR dispersion \Rightarrow misallocation.

Sectoral Productivity under Misallocation

- **Sector TFP with distortions:**

$$A_s = \left[\sum_i \left(A_{si} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPK}_s}{MRPK_{si}} \right)^{\alpha_s} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPL}_s}{MRPL_{si}} \right)^{\beta_s} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPE}_s}{MRPE_{si}} \right)^{\gamma_s} \right)^{\sigma-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

- **Efficient benchmark (no distortions):**

$$A_s^* = \left(\sum_i A_{si}^{\sigma-1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$\frac{A_s}{A_s^*} = \left[\sum_i \left(\frac{A_{si}}{A_s^*} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPK}_s}{MRPK_{si}} \right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPL}_s}{MRPL_{si}} \right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPE}_s}{MRPE_{si}} \right)^{\gamma} \right)^{\sigma-1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

Productivity Decomposition

- National productivity loss decomposed into:

$$\frac{A}{A^*} = \underbrace{\prod_s \left(\frac{A_s}{A_s^*} \right)^{\theta_s}}_{\text{Within-sector misallocation}} \times \underbrace{\prod_s \left(\left(\frac{k_s}{k_s^*} \right)^{\alpha_s} \left(\frac{l_s}{l_s^*} \right)^{\beta_s} \left(\frac{e_s}{e_s^*} \right)^{\gamma_s} \right)^{\theta_s}}_{\text{Between-sector misallocation}}$$

- Within-sector: across provinces in a sector (interprovincial).
- Between-sector: across sectors in the economy (intersectoral).
- Can further decompose by input: capital, labor, energy.

Measuring Input-Specific Distortions

- Recall that (under Cobb-Douglas):

$$MRPK_{si} = \alpha_s \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si}} = (1 + \tau_{K_{si}}) r$$

- Taking logs and subtracting $\ln(r)$ and rearranging:

$$\underbrace{\ln(MRPK_{si})}_{\epsilon_{si}} - \underbrace{\ln(r) - \ln\left(\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\right)}_{\beta_0} - \underbrace{\ln(\alpha_s)}_{\text{sector FE}} = \ln\left(\frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{r K_{si}}\right)$$

- Regression:**


$$\ln\left(\frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{r K_{si}}\right) = \beta_0 + \sum_s \beta_s \gamma_s + \epsilon_{si}$$

- Interpretation:** Dependent variable = revenue-to-capital ratio; intercept = common parameters; sector FE absorb averages; residuals ϵ_{si} capture dispersion \Rightarrow variance of residuals measures misallocation.

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
Dispersion of MRPs, 2014 vs. 2020



- Labor dispersion consistently lowest.
- Capital allocation improves modestly over time.
- Energy dispersion remains high \Rightarrow persistent inefficiency.

Sector-Level Changes in MRP Dispersion

Top 30 Sectors: Change in Within-Sector Variance Across Provinces



Relative TFPR Dispersion by Province


Recall that:

$$\begin{aligned}TFPR_{si} &\propto (MRPK_{si})^{\alpha_s} (MRPL_{si})^{\beta_s} (MRPE_{si})^{\gamma_s} \\ &\propto (1 + \tau_{K_{si}})^{\alpha_s} (1 + \tau_{L_{si}})^{\beta_s} (1 + \tau_{E_{si}})^{\gamma_s}\end{aligned}$$


- TFPR = geometric average of MRPs under Cobb–Douglas.
- Measure dispersion relative to sectoral average.
- Higher dispersion \Rightarrow greater productivity loss.

TFPR Dispersion Insights

TFPR Dispersion by Prov. - 2014 (Trimmed bottom and top 1%)



TFPR Dispersion by Prov. - 2020 (Trimmed bottom and top 1%)



- ON, QC: lowest misallocation, though QC worsens over time.
- AB, BC: some improvement.
- NB, MB, SK: persistently higher misallocation.
- Dispersion differs by up to $\approx 20\%$ from sectoral average.

Aggregate Productivity Gains ($\sigma = 3$)

Table: TFP Gains from Input Reallocation (in %), 2014–2020, $\sigma = 3$

| Component | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Total Misallocation | 8.05 | 6.46 | 4.90 | 4.84 | 5.28 | 5.74 | 5.08 |
| Between-sector Misallocation | 3.96 | 2.25 | 1.27 | 1.53 | 1.53 | 1.96 | 1.63 |
| Capital | 1.80 | 1.22 | 0.55 | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.88 | 0.83 |
| Labor | 0.78 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.46 |
| Energy | 1.43 | 0.55 | 0.36 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.73 | 0.34 |
| Within-sector Misallocation | 4.26 | 4.31 | 3.67 | 3.37 | 3.81 | 3.86 | 3.50 |
| Capital | 1.33 | 1.27 | 1.75 | 1.36 | 1.71 | 1.85 | 1.33 |
| Labor | 2.55 | 2.76 | 1.26 | 1.54 | 1.69 | 1.54 | 1.73 |
| Energy | 1.53 | 1.67 | 1.14 | 0.93 | 1.09 | 0.98 | 0.81 |

- Potential gains: 8% (2014) \rightarrow 5% (2020).
- Most loss from within-sector (interprovincial) misallocation.
- Capital and energy are the largest contributors.

Aggregate Productivity Gains ($\sigma = 7$)

Table: TFP Gains from Input Reallocation (in %), 2014–2020, $\sigma = 7$

| Component | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Total Misallocation | 9.40 | 7.51 | 5.81 | 5.72 | 6.85 | 6.52 | 5.81 |
| Between-sector Misallocation | 3.96 | 2.25 | 1.27 | 1.53 | 1.53 | 1.96 | 1.63 |
| Capital | 1.80 | 1.22 | 0.55 | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.88 | 0.83 |
| Labor | 0.78 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.46 |
| Energy | 1.43 | 0.55 | 0.36 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.73 | 0.34 |
| Within-sector Misallocation | 5.66 | 5.39 | 4.60 | 4.26 | 5.40 | 4.65 | 4.25 |
| Capital | 5.12 | 3.30 | 4.89 | 4.29 | 7.28 | 4.41 | 3.51 |
| Labor | 5.85 | 5.51 | 3.35 | 4.21 | 5.49 | 3.75 | 3.82 |
| Energy | 3.27 | 3.36 | 2.36 | 2.23 | 3.37 | 2.07 | 1.85 |

- Potential gains: 9.4% (2014) \rightarrow 5.8% (2020).
- Within-sector misallocation rises significantly.
- Energy misallocation peaks at 3.4pp in 2018.

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Key Takeaways

- Energy misallocation plays outsized role despite its small ($\leq 10\%$) input share.
- Labor allocation relatively efficient.
- Interprovincial distortions (trade, regulation) = major driver.
- Policy takeaway: energy coordination + market integration could yield sizable productivity gains.

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Thank You! 😊

Questions and comments are very welcome.

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