The Role of Energy Efficiency in Productivity: Evidence from Canada

(Job Market Paper)

Anil Gogebakan
University of Calgary
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

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Research Question

 What are the productivity losses from energy misallocation, and how do they compare with those from capital and labor?

Why Study Energy Misallocation?

- Capital & labor misallocation → drivers of productivity loss.
- Prior work: Focusing mainly on capital and labor misallocation.
- Energy: a central input in all sectors, yet much less studied.
- Increasingly important for both
 - Productivity
 - Climate policy.



Share of Manufacturing Sector

• ... However, most studies focus on manufacturing sector and firm-level input misallocation.

Country	Manufacturing Share (% of GDP)
China (2023)	25.5
India (2023)	13.0
USA (2023)	10.3
Canada (2014–2020 avg.)	∼10.0

Source: World Bank

 This paper covers entire economy with provincial input-output tables to examine energy misallocation at sector-by-province level.

Why Canada? & Why Province-Sector Level?

- Provinces differ in energy policy
 → fragmented markets.
- High variation in energy prices, infrastructure, and regulation.
- Limited interprovincial trade → persistent spatial misallocation.
- Rich provincial input-output data (2014–2020).
- Internal trade studies show sizable productivity losses (3–7%) → Spatial dimension is important in this context.^a

Canada's Input Shares (Sector Level)

Input	Share (%)	
Labor	60–65	
Capital	25-30	
Energy	5–10	

Author's calculations.

a See Key Literature

Preview of the Results

- \bullet ~5–8% potential TFP gains overall (2014–2020)
- Decomposition: Most misallocation (more than half) comes from within-sector differences across provinces
 - ullet Capital dominates between-sector losses: \sim 1–4% output loss
 - Energy accounts for \sim 1–2% output loss \rightarrow disproportionately large relative to its small input share.
 - Labor accounts for less than ${\sim}1\%$ output loss
- Per dollar, energy is more distortionary than capital or labor.
- Bottom line: Energy misallocation acts as a persistent bottleneck, offsetting productivity gains elsewhere.

Contribution

- First comprehensive estimate of energy misallocation (sector × province data).
- I focus on energy as an essential input and show its disproportionately large effect on aggregate productivity → equally (even more) important to capital or labor.
- Quantifies productivity loss from energy misallocation across regions and sectors → adding spatial dimension
- Connects output gaps and climate goals: Optimal energy use boosts productivity and reduces emissions.
- Uses a tractable, flexible, and generalizable model

 → policy insights on energy pricing, infrastructure, climate policy.

Data Sources & Features

- Statistics Canada Provincial Input—Output Tables (2014–2020).
- Sectors: 230+ sectors, covering entire economy.
 - Detailed enough (more than 230+ sectors for 10 provinces).
- Inputs: Money spent on
 - Energy (Oil and Gas, Electricity, Coal etc.),
 - Capital (Gross mixed income),
 - Labor (Wages and salaries, Employers' social contributions).
- Sector-by-province level variation.
- Energy share in inputs varies widely by province and sector.

Conceptual Framework

- Natural extension of Hsieh–Klenow (2009) misallocation model

 → Extend to include energy alongside capital and labor.
- Provinces/sectors face distortions instead of firms → marginal revenue products differ at province-sector level.
- Compare observed allocation vs. efficient benchmark.
- Fully tractable and flexible model, HK(2009), allowing for clean decomposition of misallocation:
 - Within-sector (across provinces)
 - Between-sector (within provinces).

Economic Environment Assumed

 National output is single final good produced by Cobb-Douglas technology over sectoral outputs:

$$Y = \prod_{s=1}^{S} Y_s^{\theta_s}, \quad \theta_s = \frac{P_s Y_s}{PY}, \quad \sum_s \theta_s = 1$$

• Each sector s is CES across provinces i:

$$Y_s = \left(\sum_i Y_{si}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

 \rightarrow Note that σ is constant and representing Imperfect substitution parameter between provinces.



Production Technology

 Sector-by-province output also have Cobb-Douglas technology with three inputs:

$$Y_{si} = A_{si} K_{si}^{\alpha_s} L_{si}^{\beta_s} E_{si}^{\gamma_s}, \quad \alpha_s + \beta_s + \gamma_s = 1$$

• Inputs: capital K, labor L, energy E. Then profit, π_{si} , is given by:

$$\pi_{\mathit{si}} = P_{\mathit{si}} Y_{\mathit{si}} - (1 + au_{\mathit{Ksi}}) \mathit{rK} - (1 + au_{\mathit{Lsi}}) \mathit{wL} - (1 + au_{\mathit{Esi}}) \mathit{p_EE}$$

- Distortions enter as wedges on input prices.
 - \rightarrow Marginal revenue products (MRP) are distorted.

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Productivity Measures

Physical TFP (TFPQ):

$$TFPQ_{si} = rac{Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{lpha_s} L_{si}^{eta_s} E_{si}^{\gamma_s}}$$

Revenue TFP (TFPR):

$$TFPR_{si} = rac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si}^{lpha_s} L_{si}^{eta_s} E_{si}^{\gamma_s}}$$

$$egin{aligned} TFPR_{si} &\propto (\textit{MRPK}_{si})^{lpha_s} (\textit{MRPL}_{si})^{eta_s} (\textit{MRPE}_{si})^{\gamma_s} \ &\propto (1+ au_{K_{si}})^{lpha_s} (1+ au_{L_{si}})^{eta_s} (1+ au_{E_{si}})^{\gamma_s} \end{aligned}$$

• Key insight: TFPR dispersion ⇒ misallocation.

Sectoral Productivity under Misallocation

Sector TFP with distortions:

$$A_{s} = \left[\sum_{i} \left(A_{si} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPK_{s}}}{MRPK_{si}}\right)^{\alpha_{s}} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPL_{s}}}{MRPL_{si}}\right)^{\beta_{s}} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPE_{s}}}{MRPE_{si}}\right)^{\gamma_{s}}\right)^{\sigma-1}\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

Efficient benchmark (no distortions):

$$A_s^* = \left(\sum_i A_{si}^{\sigma-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$\frac{A_s}{A_s^*} = \left[\sum_{i} \left(\frac{A_{si}}{A_s^*} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPK_s}}{MRPK_{si}} \right)^{\alpha} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPL_s}}{MRPL_{si}} \right)^{\beta} \left(\frac{\overline{MRPE_s}}{MRPE_{si}} \right)^{\gamma} \right)^{\sigma - 1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}$$

Productivity Decomposition

National productivity loss decomposed into:

$$\frac{A}{A^*} = \underbrace{\prod_{s} \left(\frac{A_s}{A_s^*}\right)^{\theta_s}}_{\text{Within-sector misallocation}} \times \underbrace{\prod_{s} \left(\left(\frac{k_s}{k_s^*}\right)^{\alpha_s} \left(\frac{I_s}{I_s^*}\right)^{\beta_s} \left(\frac{e_s}{e_s^*}\right)^{\gamma_s}\right)^{\theta_s}}_{\text{Between-sector misallocation}}$$

- Within-sector: across provinces in a sector (interprovincial).
- Between-sector: across sectors in the economy (intersectoral).
- Can further decompose by input: capital, labor, energy.

Measuring Input-Specific Distortions

Recall that (under Cobb-Douglas):

$$MRPK_{si} = \alpha_s \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \frac{P_{si} Y_{si}}{K_{si}} = (1 + \tau_{K_{si}})r$$

• Taking logs and subtracting ln(r) and rearranging:


$$\underbrace{\ln(\textit{MRPK}_{\textit{si}})}_{\epsilon_{\textit{si}}} - \underbrace{\ln(r) - \ln(\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma})}_{\beta_0} - \underbrace{\ln(\alpha_{\textit{s}})}_{\text{sector FE}} = \ln\left(\frac{P_{\textit{si}}Y_{\textit{si}}}{rK_{\textit{si}}}\right)$$

Regression:

$$\ln\left(\frac{P_{si}Y_{si}}{rK_{si}}\right) = \beta_0 + \sum_{s} \beta_s \gamma_s + \epsilon_{si}$$

• Interpretation: Dependent variable = revenue-to-capital ratio; intercept = common parameters; sector FE absorb averages; residuals ϵ_{si} capture dispersion \Rightarrow variance of residuals measures misallocation.

Dispersion of MRPs, 2014 vs. 2020



- Labor dispersion consistently lowest.
- Capital allocation improves modestly over time.
- Energy dispersion remains high \Rightarrow persistent inefficiency.


Relative TFPR Dispersion by Province


Recall that:

$$egin{aligned} extit{TFPR}_{si} &\propto (extit{MRPK}_{si})^{lpha_s} (extit{MRPL}_{si})^{eta_s} (extit{MRPE}_{si})^{\gamma_s} \ &\propto (1+ au_{ extit{K}_{si}})^{lpha_s} (1+ au_{ extit{L}_{si}})^{eta_s} (1+ au_{ extit{E}_{si}})^{\gamma_s} \end{aligned}$$

- TFPR = geometric average of MRPs under Cobb-Douglas.
- Measure dispersion relative to sectoral average.
- Higher dispersion ⇒ greater productivity loss.

TFPR Dispersion Insights





- ON, QC: lowest misallocation, though QC worsens over time.
- AB, BC: some improvement.
- NB, MB, SK: persistently higher misallocation.
- Dispersion differs by up to $\approx 20\%$ from sectoral average.

Aggregate Productivity Gains $(\sigma = 3)$

Table: TFP Gains from Input Reallocation (in %), 2014–2020, $\sigma=3$

Component	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total Misallocation	8.05	6.46	4.90	4.84	5.28	5.74	5.08
Between-sector Misallocation	3.96	2.25	1.27	1.53	1.53	1.96	1.63
Capital	1.80	1.22	0.55	0.66	0.71	0.88	0.83
Labor	0.78	0.50	0.36	0.37	0.39	0.37	0.46
Energy	1.43	0.55	0.36	0.50	0.45	0.73	0.34
Within-sector Misallocation	4.26	4.31	3.67	3.37	3.81	3.86	3.50
Capital	1.33	1.27	1.75	1.36	1.71	1.85	1.33
Labor	2.55	2.76	1.26	1.54	1.69	1.54	1.73
Energy	1.53	1.67	1.14	0.93	1.09	0.98	0.81

- Potential gains: 8% (2014) \rightarrow 5% (2020).
- Most loss from within-sector (interprovincial) misallocation.
- Capital and energy are the largest contributors.

Aggregate Productivity Gains $(\sigma = 7)$

Table: TFP Gains from Input Reallocation (in %), 2014–2020, $\sigma=7$

Component	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total Misallocation	9.40	7.51	5.81	5.72	6.85	6.52	5.81
Between-sector Misallocation	3.96	2.25	1.27	1.53	1.53	1.96	1.63
Capital	1.80	1.22	0.55	0.66	0.71	0.88	0.83
Labor	0.78	0.50	0.36	0.37	0.39	0.37	0.46
Energy	1.43	0.55	0.36	0.50	0.45	0.73	0.34
Within-sector Misallocation	5.66	5.39	4.60	4.26	5.40	4.65	4.25
Capital	5.12	3.30	4.89	4.29	7.28	4.41	3.51
Labor	5.85	5.51	3.35	4.21	5.49	3.75	3.82
Energy	3.27	3.36	2.36	2.23	3.37	2.07	1.85

- Potential gains: 9.4% (2014) $\rightarrow 5.8\%$ (2020).
- Within-sector misallocation rises significantly.
- Energy misallocation peaks at 3.4pp in 2018.
- Capital + energy = key sources of inefficiency.

Measurement Error

Table: Regression of Revenue on Input, 2014–2020

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error			
Constant	-0.0590	0.0031			
log(inputs)	0.9694	0.0011			
Observations	13594				
R^2	0.982				

Notes: The table reports coefficients from regressing log revenue, $\ln(P_{si}\,Y_{si})$, directly on log inputs, $\ln((rK_{si})^{\alpha_s}(wL_{si})^{\beta_s}(p_EE_{si})^{\gamma_s})$. All years are pooled for estimation. All variables are measured relative to the sectoral mean, with sectors weighted by value-added shares. This suggests that measurement error is responsible for up to 3 % of the estimated productivity gap in main results, suggesting that measurement error is not driving the results. See Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for more details.

Measurement Error




Figure: Log Coefficients vs Log(TFPR) by Decile

Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients estimated from regressing revenue growth, $\Delta \ln(P_{si}Y_{si})$, on input growth, $\Delta \ln((rK_{si})^{\alpha_s}(\mu L_{si})^{\beta_s}(p_E E_{si})^{\gamma_s})$, across deciles of log TFPR. All years are pooled for estimation and plotting. All variables are measured relative to the sectoral mean, with sectors weighted by value-added shares. While measurement error appears to be more of a concern in the lowest and highest TFPR deciles, this is addressed in the main analysis by trimming the top and bottom 1% of the distribution, reducing concerns about measurement error by handling outliers in the data. See Bils et al. (2021) for further details.

Key Takeaways

- Energy misallocation plays outsized role despite its small $(\leq 10\%)$ input share.
- Labor allocation relatively efficient.
- Interprovincial distortions (trade, regulation) = major driver.
- Policy takeaway: energy coordination + market integration could yield sizable productivity gains.

Thank You! ©

Questions and comments are very welcome.

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Key Literature

- Restuccia and Rogerson (2008); Hsieh and Klenow (2009);
 Jones (2011); Bartelsman et al. (2013); Chen and Irarrazabal (2015); Restuccia and Rogerson (2017); Gopinath et al. (2017);
 Restuccia (2019); Carrillo et al. (2023).
- Tombe and Winter (2015); Choi (2020)
- Albrecht and Tombe (2016); Alvarez et al. (2019)



