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BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)

Abstract

This document defines enhancements to Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI, RFC8995) as BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM). BRSKI-PRM supports the secure bootstrapping of devices, referred to as pledges, into a domain where direct communication with the registrar is either limited or not possible at all. To facilitate interaction between a pledge and a domain registrar the registrar-agent is introduced as new component. The registrar-agent supports the reversal of the interaction model from a pledge-initiated mode, to a pledge-responding mode, where the pledge is in a server role. To establish the trust relation between pledge and registrar, BRSKI-PRM relies on object security rather than transport security. This approach is agnostic to enrollment protocols that connect a domain registrar to a key infrastructure (e.g., domain Certification Authority).

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1. Introduction

BRSKI as defined in [RFC8995] specifies a solution for secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrapping of devices (pledges) in a customer domain, which may be associated with a specific installation location. This includes the discovery of the BRSKI registrar in the customer domain and the exchange of security information necessary to establish trust between a pledge and the domain.

Security information pertaining to the customer domain, specifically, the customer domain certificate, is exchanged and authenticated through the use of signed data objects, namely the voucher artifacts, as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]. In response to a voucher-request, the

Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) issues the voucher and provides it via the domain registrar to the pledge. [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] specifies the format of the voucher artifacts, including the voucher-request artifact.

For the certificate enrollment of devices, BRSKI relies on Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST, [RFC7030]) to request and distribute customer domain specific device certificates. EST in turn relies for the authentication and authorization of the certification request on the credentials used by the underlying TLS between the EST client and an EST server.

BRSKI addresses scenarios in which a pledge initiates the bootstrapping acting as client (referred to as initiator mode by this document). BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM) defined in this document allows the pledge to act as server, so that it can be triggered externally and at a specific time to generate bootstrapping requests in the customer domain. For this approach, this document:

- defines additional endpoints for the domain registrar and new endpoints for the pledge to enable responder mode.
- introduces the Registrar-Agent as new component to facilitate the communication between the pledge and a domain registrar. The Registrar-Agent may be implemented as an integrated functionality of a commissioning tool or be co-located with the domain registrar itself. BRSKI-PRM supports the identification of the Registrar-Agent that was performing the bootstrapping allowing for accountability of the pledges installation, when the Registrar-Agent is a component used by an installer and not co-located with the domain registrar.
- specifies additional artifacts for the exchanges between a pledge acting as server, the Registrar-Agent acting as client, and the domain registrar acting as server toward the Registrar-Agent.
- allows the application of Registrar-Agent credentials to establish TLS connections to a domain registrar; these are different from the pledge IDevID credentials.
- also enables the usage of alternative transports, both IP-based and non-IP (e.g., Bluetooth-based or NFC-based communication), between the pledge and the domain registrar via the Registrar-Agent; security is addressed at the application layer through object security with an additional signature wrapping the exchanged artifacts.

The term endpoint used in the context of this document is equivalent to resource in HTTP [RFC9110] and CoAP [RFC7252]; it is not used to describe a device. Endpoints are accessible via Well-Known URIs [RFC8615].

To utilize EST [RFC7030] for enrollment, the domain registrar performs pre-processing of the wrapping signature before actually using EST as defined in [RFC7030].

There may be pledges that can support both modes, initiator and responder mode. In these cases, BRSKI-PRM can be combined with BRSKI as defined in [RFC8995] or BRSKI-AE [RFC9733] to allow for more bootstrapping flexibility. Providing information about capabilities of BRSKI components like the pledge or registrar is handled as part of the discovery. BRSKI-PRM relies only on a minimum necessary set of capabilities for the interaction and leaves the definition of more advanced mechanisms allowing to signal specific capabilities to [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document makes use of the terms defined in [Section 1.2](#) of [RFC8995]. The following terms are defined in addition:

authenticated self-contained object: Describes a data object, which is cryptographically bound to an end entity (EE) certificate. The binding is assumed to be provided through a digital signature of the actual object using the corresponding private key of the certificate.

CA: Certification Authority. An entity, which issues certificates and maintains certificate revocation information.

CMS: Cryptographic Message Syntax, as defined in [RFC5652].

Commissioning tool: Tool to interact with devices to provide configuration data.

CSR: Certificate Signing Request, as defined in [RFC2986].

Domain registrar: An entity in the customer domain, which facilitates the interaction of a pledge or Registrar-Agent with a manufacturer service (MASA). It operates as BRSKI-EST server for the pledge when requesting vouchers and certificates and acts as the client BRSKI-MASA client when requesting vouchers from the MASA. This component was introduced in [RFC8995].

Drop ship: delivery of a component or product. This component was introduced in [RFC8995].

EE: End entity, as defined in [RFC9483]. Typically, a device or service that owns a public-private key pair for which it manages a public key certificate.

EE certificate: the certificate of the EE signed by its owner (e.g., CA). For domain components, the EE certificate is signed by the domain owner. For the pledge, the EE certificate is either the IDevID certificate signed by the manufacturer or the LDevID certificate signed by the domain owner or an application-specific EE certificate signed by the domain owner.

endpoint: Term equivalent to resource in HTTP [RFC9110]. Endpoints are accessible via Well-Known URIs [RFC8615].

IDevID: An Initial Device Identifier X.509 certificate installed by the vendor on new equipment. This is a term from 802.1AR [IEEE-802.1AR].

LDevID: A Local Device Identifier X.509 certificate installed by the owner of the equipment. This is a term from 802.1AR [IEEE-802.1AR].

mTLS: mutual Transport Layer Security, refers to mutual authenticated TLS as specified in [\[RFC8446\]](#).

PER: Pledge Enroll-Request is a signature-wrapped CSR, signed by the pledge that requests enrollment to a domain via the Registrar-Agent.

POI: Proof-of-Identity, as defined in [\[RFC5272\]](#).

POP: Proof-of-Possession (of a private key), as defined in [\[RFC5272\]](#).

PVR: Pledge Voucher-Request is a signature-wrapped voucher-request, signed by the pledge that sends it to the domain registrar via the Registrar-Agent.

RA: Registration Authority, an optional system component to which a CA delegates certificate management functions such as authorization checks. In BRSKI-PRM, this is a functionality of the domain registrar, as in BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#).

Registrar-Agent: Component facilitating the data exchange between a pledge in responder mode and a domain registrar.

RVR: Registrar Voucher-Request is a signature-wrapped voucher-request, signed by the domain registrar that sends it to the MASA. For BRSKI-PRM, it contains a copy of the original PVR received from the pledge.

This document uses the following encoding notations in the given JWS-signed artifact examples:

BASE64(OCTETS): Denotes the base64 encoding of an octet sequence using the character set defined in [Section 4](#) of [\[RFC4648\]](#) and without the inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or other additional characters. Note that the base64 encoding of the empty octet sequence is the empty string.

BASE64URL(OCTETS): Denotes the base64url encoding of an octet sequence, per [Section 2](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#).

UTF8(STRING): Denotes the octet sequence of the UTF-8 [\[RFC3629\]](#) representation of STRING, per [Section 1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#).

This document includes many examples that would contain many long sequences of base64-encoded objects with no content directly comprehensible to a human reader. In order to keep those examples short, they use the token `base64encodedvalue==` as a placeholder for base64 data. The full base64 data is included in the appendices of this document. Note, base64-encoded values are mainly used for fields related to certificates like: `x5bag`, `x5c`, `agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert`, `p10-csr`

3. Scope of Solution

3.1. Supported Environments and Use Case Examples

BRSKI-PRM is applicable to scenarios where pledges may have no direct connection to a domain registrar, may have no continuous connection, or require coordination of the pledge requests to be provided to a domain registrar.

This can be motivated by pledges deployed in environments not yet connected to the operational customer domain network, e.g., at a building construction site, or environments intentionally disconnected from the Internet, e.g., critical industrial facilities. Another example is the assembly of electrical cabinets, which are prepared in advance before the installation at a customer domain.

3.1.1. Building Automation

In building automation, a typical use case exists where a detached building or the basement is equipped with sensors, actuators, and controllers, but with only limited or no connection to the central building management system. This limited connectivity may exist during installation time or also during operation time.

During the installation, for instance, a service technician collects the device-specific information from the basement network and provides them to the central building management system. This could be done using a laptop, common mobile device, or dedicated commissioning tool to transport the information. The service technician may successively collect device-specific information in different parts of the building before connecting to the domain registrar for bulk bootstrapping.

A domain registrar may be part of the central building management system and already be operational in the installation network. The central building management system can then provide operational parameters for the specific devices in the basement or other detached areas. These operational parameters may comprise values and settings required in the operational phase of the sensors/actuators, among them a certificate issued by the operator to authenticate against other components and services. These operational parameters are then provided to the devices in the basement facilitated by the service technician's laptop. The Registrar-Agent, defined in this document, may be run on the technician's laptop to interact with pledges.

3.1.2. Infrastructure Isolation Policy

This refers to any case in which the network infrastructure is normally isolated from the Internet as a matter of policy, most likely for security reasons. In such a case, limited access to a domain registrar may be allowed in carefully controlled short periods of time, for example when a batch of new devices are deployed, but prohibited at other times.

3.1.3. Less Operational Security in the Target-Domain

The registration authority (RA) performing the authorization of a certificate request is a critical PKI component and therefore requires higher operational security than other components utilizing the issued certificates. CAs may also require higher security in the registration procedures. There may be situations in which the customer domain does not offer enough physical security to operate an RA/CA and therefore this service is transferred to a backend that offers a higher level of operational security.

3.2. Potential Limitations

The mechanism described in this document presumes the ability of the pledge and the Registrar-Agent to communicate with one another. This may not be possible in constrained environments where, in particular, power must be conserved. In these situations, it is anticipated that the transceiver will be powered down most of the time. This presents a rendezvous problem: the pledge is unavailable for certain periods of time, and the Registrar-Agent is similarly presumed to be unavailable for certain periods of time. To overcome this situation, the pledges may need to be powered on, either manually or by sending a trigger signal.

4. Requirements Discussion and Mapping to BRSKI-PRM Functional Elements

Based on the intended target environment described in [Section 3.1](#), the following boundary conditions are derived to support bootstrapping of pledges in responder mode (acting as server):

- To facilitate the communication between a pledge in responder mode and a registrar, additional functionality is needed either on the registrar or as a stand-alone component. This new functionality is defined as Registrar-Agent and acts as an agent of the registrar to trigger the pledge to generate requests for voucher and enrollment. These requests are then provided by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar. This requires the definition of pledge endpoints to allow interaction with the Registrar-Agent.
- The security of communication between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge does not rely on Transport Layer Security (TLS) to enable application of BRSKI-PRM in environments, in which the communication between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge is done over other technologies like Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) or NFC, which may not support TLS protected communication. In addition, the pledge does not have a certificate that can easily be verified by [\[RFC9525\]](#) methods.
- The use of authenticated self-contained objects addresses both, the TLS connection establishment challenges and the technology stack challenge. Note that the chosen approach does not provide confidentiality for the self-contained object, which can be provided by employing TLS.
- By contrast, the Registrar-Agent can be authenticated by the registrar as a component, acting on behalf of the registrar. In addition, the registrar must be able to verify, which Registrar-Agent was in direct contact with the pledge.

- It would be inaccurate for the voucher-request and voucher-response to use the assertion type `proximity` in the voucher, as the pledge was not in direct contact with the registrar for bootstrapping. Therefore, a new assertion type is necessary for distinguishing assertions the MASA can state.

At least the following properties are required for the voucher and enrollment processing:

- POI: provides data-origin authentication of an artifact, e.g., a voucher-request or an Enroll-Request, utilizing an existing IDevID. Certificate updates may utilize the certificate that is to be updated.
- POP: proves that an entity possesses and controls the private key corresponding to the public key contained in the certification request, typically by adding a signature computed using the private key to the certification request.

Solution examples based on existing technology are provided with the focus on existing IETF RFCs:

- Voucher-Requests and Vouchers as used in [\[RFC8995\]](#) already provide both, POP and POI, through a digital signature to protect the integrity of the voucher, while the corresponding signing certificate contains the identity of the signer.
- Enroll-Requests are data structures containing the information from a requester for a CA to create a certificate. The certification request format in BRSKI is PKCS#10 [\[RFC2986\]](#). In PKCS#10, the structure is signed to ensure integrity protection and POP of the private key of the requester that corresponds to the contained public key. In the application examples, this POP alone is not sufficient. A POI is also required for the certification request and therefore the certification request needs to be additionally bound to the existing pledge IDevID credential. This binding supports the authorization decision for the certification request and may be provided directly with the certification request. While BRSKI uses the binding to TLS, BRSKI-PRM aims at an additional signature of the PKCS#10 using existing credentials on the pledge (IDevID). This allows the process to be independent of the selected transport.

4.1. TLS support required

As already stated in [\[RFC8995\]](#), and required by [\[I-D.ietf-uta-require-tls13\]](#), the use of TLS 1.3 (or newer) is encouraged. TLS 1.2 or newer is **REQUIRED** on the Registrar-Agent side. TLS 1.3 (or newer) **SHOULD** be available on the registrar, but TLS 1.2 **MAY** be used. TLS 1.3 (or newer) **SHOULD** be available on the MASA, but TLS 1.2 **MAY** be used.

[\[I-D.ietf-uta-require-tls13\]](#) allows for continued use of TLS 1.2 for operational reasons. [\[RFC8995\]](#) specified TLS 1.2 was the minimum, consistent with [\[RFC8996\]](#). [\[RFC8995\]](#) requires mutual TLS, and many frameworks, embedded SDKs and hardware load balancers did not, at the time of writing, have APIs that permitted mutual TLS to be done consistently across TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. While TLS 1.3 is common in browsers, the use of mutual TLS with 1.3 is uncommon in browsers, and so working support for mutual TLS in frameworks is also uncommon.

On the Registrar and MASA side, mutual TLS authentication combined with hardware TLS offload requires specific support for extensions such as [\[RFC9440\]](#) or an equivalent. TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 do client authentication at a different point in the state machine, and not all frameworks support both at the time of this writing.

Many security certification schemes, such as FIPS-140, do not certify source code, but rather the resulting binary executable. Even while TLS 1.3 source code is available, and new software can be added to existing platforms, replacing the TLS libraries on many embedded systems requires that the SDK vendor recertify the platform first. In industrial settings, these platforms have long lifecycles, and it takes some time to recertify all platforms.

Thus, [\[RFC8995\]](#) and this document can not turn off TLS 1.2 until all parts of the ecosystem can run TLS 1.3. That does not stop any of the parts of this ecosystem from deploying TLS 1.3 when possible, and for each part of the two or three transactions from negotiating TLS 1.3 in preference to TLS 1.2.

5. Solution Architecture

5.1. Overview

For BRSKI-PRM, the base system architecture defined in BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#) is enhanced to facilitate new use cases in which the pledge acts as server. The responder mode allows delegated bootstrapping using a Registrar-Agent instead of a direct connection between the pledge and the domain registrar.

Necessary enhancements to support authenticated self-contained objects for certificate enrollment are kept at a minimum to enable reuse of already defined architecture elements and interactions. The format of the bootstrapping objects produced or consumed by the pledge is usually based on JSON Web Signature (JWS) [\[RFC7515\]](#) and further specified in [Section 7](#) to address the requirements stated in [Section 4](#). In constrained environments, it may be based on COSE [\[RFC9052\]](#).

An abstract overview of the BRSKI-PRM protocol can be found on slide 8 of [\[BRSKI-PRM-abstract\]](#).

To support mutual trust establishment between the domain registrar and pledges not directly connected to the customer domain, this document specifies the exchange of authenticated self-contained objects with the help of the Registrar-Agent.

This leads to extensions of the logical components in the BRSKI architecture as shown in [Figure 1](#).

Note that the Join Proxy is not shown in the figure. In certain situations the Join Proxy may still be present and could be used by the Registrar-Agent to connect to the Registrar. For example, a Registrar-Agent application on a smartphone often can connect to local Wi-Fi without giving up their cellular network connection [\[androidnsd\]](#), but only can make link-local connections.

The Registrar-Agent interacts with the pledge to transfer the required data objects for bootstrapping, which are then also exchanged between the Registrar-Agent and the domain registrar. The addition of the Registrar-Agent influences the sequences of the data exchange between the pledge and the domain registrar described in [RFC8995]. To enable reuse of BRSKI defined functionality as much as possible, BRSKI-PRM:

- uses existing endpoints where the required functionality is provided.
- enhances existing endpoints with new supported media types, e.g., for JWS voucher.
- defines new endpoints where additional functionality is required, e.g., for wrapped certification request, wrapped CA certificates, and new status information.




Figure 1: BRSKI-PRM architecture overview using Registrar-Agent

Figure 1 shows the relations between the following main components:

- **Pledge**: Is expected to respond with the necessary data objects for bootstrapping to a Registrar-Agent. The protocol used between the pledge and the Registrar-Agent is assumed to be HTTP(S) in the context of this document. Any other protocol can be used as long as it

supports the exchange of the necessary artifacts. This includes CoAP or protocols to be used over Bluetooth or NFC connections. A pledge acting as server leads to the following differences compared to BRSKI [RFC8995]:

- The pledge no longer initiates bootstrapping, but is discovered and triggered by a Registrar-Agent as defined in [Section 6.1.2](#).
 - The pledge offers additional endpoints as defined in [Section 6.2](#), so that a Registrar-Agent can request data required for bootstrapping the pledge.
 - The pledge includes additional data in the PVR, which is provided and signed by a Registrar-Agent as defined in [Section 7.1](#). This allows the registrar to identify with which Registrar-Agent the pledge was in contact (see [Section 5.4](#)).
 - The artifacts exchanged between the pledge and the registrar via the Registrar-Agent are authenticated self-contained objects (i.e., signature-wrapped artifacts).
- Registrar-Agent: Is a new component defined in [Section 6.1](#) that provides a store and forward communication path to exchange data objects between the pledge and a domain registrar. This is for situations in which a domain registrar is not directly reachable by the pledge, which may be due to a different technology stacks or due to missing connectivity. A Registrar-Agent acting as client leads to the following new aspects:
 - The order of exchanges in the BRSKI-PRM call flow is different from that in BRSKI [RFC8995], as the Registrar-Agent can trigger one or more pledges and collects the PVR and PER artifacts simultaneously as defined in [Section 7](#). This enables bulk bootstrapping of several devices.
 - There is no trust assumption between the pledge and the Registrar-Agent as only authenticated self-contained objects are used, which are transported via the Registrar-Agent and provided either by the pledge or the domain registrar.
 - The trust assumption between the Registrar-Agent and the domain registrar may be based on EE certificates that are both signed by the domain owner.
 - The Registrar-Agent may be realized as stand-alone component supporting nomadic activities of a service technician moving between different installation sites.
 - Alternatively, the Registrar-Agent may also be realized as co-located functionality for a registrar, to support pledges in responder mode.
 - Join Proxy (not shown): Has the same functionality as described in [RFC8995] if needed. Note that a Registrar-Agent may use a join proxy to facilitate the TLS connection to the registrar in the same way that a BRSKI pledge would use a join proxy. This is useful in cases where the Registrar-Agent does not have full IP connectivity via the domain network or cases where it has no other means to locate the registrar on the network.
 - Domain registrar: In general fulfills the same functionality regarding the bootstrapping of the pledge in a customer domain by facilitating the communication of the pledge with the MASA service and the domain key infrastructure (PKI). However, there are also differences compared to BRSKI [RFC8995]:
 - A BRSKI-PRM domain registrar does not interact with a pledge directly, but through the Registrar-Agent as defined in [Section 7](#).

- A BRSKI-PRM domain registrar offers additional endpoints as defined in [Section 6.3](#) to support the signature-wrapped artifacts used by BRSKI-PRM.
- Vendor services: Encompass MASA and Ownership Tracker and are used as defined in [\[RFC8995\]](#). A MASA responsible for pledges that implement BRSKI-PRM is expected to support BRSKI-PRM extensions:
 - The default format for voucher artifacts (including voucher-request) is JWS-signed JSON as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#).
 - The Agent Proximity Assertion (see [Section 5.4](#)) requires additional validation steps as defined in [Section 7.3.1](#).

5.2. Nomadic Connectivity

In one example instance of the PRM architecture as shown in [Figure 2](#), there is no connectivity between the location in which the pledge is installed and the location of the domain registrar. This is often the case in the building automation use case mentioned in [Section 3.1.1](#).




Figure 2: Registrar-Agent nomadic connectivity example

BRSKI-PRM enables support of this case through nomadic connectivity of the Registrar-Agent. To perform enrollment in this setup, multiple round trips of the Registrar-Agent between the pledge installation location and the domain registrar are required.

1. Connectivity to domain registrar: preparation tasks for pledge bootstrapping not part of the BRSKI-PRM protocol definition, like retrieval of list of pledges to enroll.
2. Connectivity to pledge installation location: retrieve information about available pledges (IDevID), collect request objects (i.e., Pledge Voucher-Requests and Pledge Enroll-Requests using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in [Section 7.1](#) and [Section 7.2](#)).
3. Connectivity to domain registrar, submit collected request information of pledges, retrieve response objects (i.e., Voucher and Enroll-Response) using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in [Section 7.3](#) and [Section 7.4](#).
4. Connectivity to pledge installation location, provide retrieved objects to the pledges to enroll pledges and collect status using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in [Section 7.6](#), [Section 7.7](#), and [Section 7.8](#).

5. Connectivity to domain registrar, submit Voucher Status and Enrollment Status using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in [Section 7.9](#) and [Section 7.10](#).

Variations of this setup include cases where the Registrar-Agent uses for example, WiFi to connect to the pledge installation network, and mobile network connectivity to connect to the domain registrar. Both connections may also be possible in a single location at the same time, based on installation building conditions.

5.3. Co-located Registrar-Agent and Domain Registrar

Compared to [\[RFC8995\]](#) BRSKI, pledges supporting BRSKI-PRM can be completely passive and only need to react when being requested to react by a Registrar-Agent. In [\[RFC8995\]](#), pledges instead need to continuously interact with a domain registrar during onboarding, through discovery, voucher exchange, and enrollment. This may increase the load on the domain registrar, specifically, if a larger number of pledges onboards simultaneously.




Figure 3: Registrar-Agent integrated into Domain Registrar example

The benefits of BRSKI-PRM can be achieved even without the operational complexity of stand-alone Registrar-Agents by integrating the necessary functionality of the Registrar-Agent as a module into the domain registrar as shown in [Figure 3](#) so that it can support the BRSKI-PRM communications to the pledge.

5.4. Agent Proximity Assertion

"Agent proximity" is a statement in the PVR and the voucher that the registrar communicates via a Registrar-Agent as defined in [Section 7](#) and not directly to the pledge. It is therefore a different assertion than "network proximity", which is defined in [Section 3](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). Hence, [\[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis\]](#) defines the additional assertion type agent-proximity. This assertion type can be verified by the registrar and MASA during BRSKI-PRM voucher-request processing.

In BRSKI, the pledge verifies POP of the registrar end-entity (EE) credentials via the TLS handshake and pins that public key as the `proximity-registrar-cert` into the voucher request. This allows the MASA to verify the proximity of the pledge and registrar, facilitating a decision to assign the pledge to that domain owner. In BRSKI, the TLS session is considered provisional until the pledge receives the voucher to verify POI.

In contrast, in BRSKI-PRM the pledge has no direct connection to the registrar and **MUST** accept the supplied registrar EE certificate provisionally until it receives the voucher as described in [Section 7.6](#) to verify both POP and POI. The provisional registrar EE certificate is used for the object security along the authenticated self-contained objects that in BRSKI-PRM replace the direct TLS connection to the registrar available in BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#). See also [Section 5](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) on "provisional state".

For the Agent Proximity Assertion, the Registrar-Agent EE certificate and registrar EE certificate must be signed by the same domain owner, i.e., **MUST** possess a common domain trust anchor in their certificate chain. Akin to the Network Proximity Assertion in BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#), the Agent Proximity Assertion provides pledge proximity evidence to the MASA. But additionally, the Agent Proximity Assertion allows the domain registrar to be sure that the PVR supplied by the Registrar-Agent was in fact collected by the Registrar-Agent to which the registrar is connected by utilizing an agent-signed data object.

6. System Components

6.1. Registrar-Agent

The Registrar-Agent uses its own EE certificate and corresponding credentials (i.e., private key) for TLS client authentication and for signing agent-signed data objects.

The Registrar-Agent EE certificate **MUST** include a SubjectKeyIdentifier as defined in [Section 4.2.1.2](#) of [\[RFC5280\]](#), which is used as a reference within agent-signed data objects as defined in [Section 7.1.1.1](#). Note that this is an additional requirement for issuing the Registrar-Agent EE certificate. [\[RFC8995\]](#) has a similar requirement for the registrar EE certificate.

The SubjectKeyIdentifier is used in favor of providing the complete Registrar-Agent EE certificate in agent-signed data objects to accommodate also constrained environments and reduce bandwidth needed for communication with the pledge. In addition, it follows the recommendation from BRSKI to use SubjectKeyIdentifier in favor of a certificate fingerprint to avoid additional computations.

The provisioning of the Registrar-Agent EE certificate is out of scope for this document, but may be done using its own BRSKI run or by other means such as configuration. It is **RECOMMENDED** to use short-lived Registrar-Agent EE certificates in the range of days or weeks. This is to address the assumed nature of stand-alone Registrar-Agents as nomadic devices (see [Section 5.2](#)) and to avoid potential misuse as outlined in [Section 12.3](#).

Further, the Registrar-Agent requires the registrar EE certificate to provide it to the pledge. It **MAY** use the certificate verified during server authentication within an initial TLS session with the registrar; in this case, the Registrar-Agent **MUST** possess the domain trust anchor (i.e., CA certificate) for the registrar EE certificate to verify the certificate chain. Alternatively, the registrar EE certificate **MAY** be provided via configuration. The registrar IP address or hostname is provided either by configuration or by using the discovery mechanism defined in [\[RFC8995\]](#) (see [Section 6.1.1](#)).

In addition to the certificates, the Registrar-Agent is provided with the product-serial-number(s) of the pledge(s) to be bootstrapped. This is necessary to allow for the discovery of pledges by the Registrar-Agent using DNS-SD with mDNS (see [Section 6.1.2](#)). The list may be provided by prior administrative means or the Registrar-Agent may get the information via an (out-of-band) interaction with the pledge. For instance, [\[RFC9238\]](#) describes scanning of a QR code, where the product-serial-number would be initialized from the 12N B005 Product Serial Number data record.

In summary, the following information **MUST** be available at the Registrar-Agent before the interaction with a pledge:

- Registrar-Agent EE certificate and corresponding private key: own operational credentials to authenticate and sign agent-signed data
- Registrar EE certificate: certificate of the domain registrar to be provided to the pledge
- Serial number(s): product-serial-number(s) of pledge(s) to be bootstrapped; used for discovery

Further, the Registrar-Agent **SHOULD** have synchronized time. In case the registrar-agent does not have synchronized time, it may not be able to verify the registrar EE certificate during the optional TLS handshake. As the registrar-agent is recommended to utilize short-lived certificates in [Section 12.3](#), a registrar-agent may use the valid from time of its short-lived certificate for time synchronization.

Finally, the Registrar-Agent **MAY** possess the IDevID (root or issuing) CA certificate of the pledge manufacturer/vendor to validate the IDevID certificate on returned PVR or in case of optional TLS usage for pledge communication (see [Appendix B](#)). The distribution of IDevID CA certificates to the Registrar-Agent is out of scope of this document and may be done by a manual configuration.

6.1.1. Discovery of the Registrar

While the Registrar-Agent requires an IP address of a domain registrar to initiate a TLS session, a separate discovery of the registrar is likely not needed and a configuration of the domain registrar IP address or hostname is assumed. Registrar-Agent and registrar are domain

components that already have a trust relation, as a Registrar-Agent acts as representative of the domain registrar towards the pledge or may even be collocated with the domain registrar. Further, other communication (not part of this document) between the Registrar-Agent and the registrar is assumed, e.g., to exchange information about product-serial-number(s) of pledges to be discovered as outlined in [Section 5.2](#).

Moreover, the discovery described in [Section 4](#) of [RFC8995] and [Appendix A.2](#) of [RFC8995] does not support identification of registrars with an enhanced feature set (like the support of BRSKI-PRM), and hence that discovery is not applicable.

As a more general solution, the BRSKI discovery mechanism can be extended to provide upfront information on the capabilities of registrars, such as the mode of operation (pledge-responder-mode or registrar-responder-mode). Defining discovery extensions is out of scope of this document. For further discussion, see [\[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery\]](#).

6.1.2. Discovery of the Pledge

The discovery of the pledge by the Registrar-Agent in the context of this document describes the minimum discovery approach that **MUST** be supported. A more general discovery mechanism, also supporting GRASP besides DNS-SD with mDNS, is discussed in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery\]](#).

Discovery in BRSKI-PRM uses DNS-based Service Discovery [\[RFC6763\]](#) over Multicast DNS [\[RFC6762\]](#) to discover the pledge. Note that [Section 9](#) of [\[RFC6762\]](#) provides support for conflict resolution in situations when a DNS-SD with mDNS responder receives an mDNS response with inconsistent data. Note that [\[RFC8990\]](#) does not support conflict resolution of mDNS, which may be a limitation for its application.

The pledge constructs a Service Instance Name based on device local information (manufacturer/vendor name and serial number), which results in `<product-serial-number>._brski-pledge._tcp.local`. The product-serial-number composition is manufacturer-dependent and may contain information regarding the manufacturer, the product type, and further information specific to the product instance. To allow distinction of pledges, the product-serial-number therefore needs to be sufficiently unique.

Note that the service name definition is not fully inline with the naming recommendation of [\[RFC6763\]](#) due to the positioning of `_tcp`. However, the definition of the product-serial-number has to align with the allowed character set (see [\[RFC6763\]](#)) to avoid discovery problems. This check is necessary as the product-serial-number is also contained in the certificate as `X520SerialNumber`, that has a larger allowed character set. Using the product-serial-number as part of the service name allows to discover specific instances of a pledge.

The `_brski-pledge._tcp` service, however, targets machine-to-machine discovery.

For discovery the Registrar-Agent **MUST** use

- `<product-serial-number>._brski-pledge._tcp.local`, to discover a specific pledge, e.g., when connected to a local network

- `_brski-pledge._tcp.local` to get a list of pledges to be bootstrapped

if it does not support a more general discovery such as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery].

When supporting different options for discovery, as outlined in [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery], a manufacturer may support configuration of preferred options.

A manufacturer may allow the pledge to react on DNS-SD with mDNS discovery without its product-serial-number contained. This allows a commissioning tool to discover pledges to be bootstrapped in the domain. The manufacturer supports this functionality as outlined in Section 12.4.

Establishing network connectivity of the pledge is out of scope of this document but necessary to apply DNS-SD with mDNS. For Ethernet, network connectivity can be provided, e.g., via a switch to an operational network or to a specific VLAN for bootstrapping, depending on an operators security policy. For WiFi networks, connectivity can be provided by using a pre-agreed SSID for bootstrapping, e.g., as proposed in [I-D.draft-ietf-emu-eap-arpa]. The same approach can be used by 6LoWPAN/mesh using a pre-agreed PAN ID. How to gain network connectivity is out of scope of this document.

6.2. Pledge in Responder Mode

In BRSKI-PRM, the pledge is triggered by a Registrar-Agent to create the PVR and PER. It is also triggered for processing of the responses and the generation of status information once the Registrar-Agent has received the responses from the registrar later in the process.

To enable interaction as responder with a Registrar-Agent, pledges in responder mode **MUST** act as servers and **MUST** provide the endpoints "tpvr", "tper", "svr", "scac", and "ser" defined in Table 1 within the BRSKI-defined `/ .well-known/brski/` URI path. The optional endpoint "qps" **SHOULD** be supported. The endpoints are defined with short names to also accommodate for resource-constrained devices.

Endpoint	Operation	Exchange and Artifacts
tpvr	Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request	Section 7.1
tper	Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request	Section 7.2
svr	Supply Voucher to Pledge	Section 7.6
scac	Supply CA Certificates to Pledge	Section 7.7
ser	Supply Enroll-Response to Pledge	Section 7.8
qps	Query Pledge Status	Section 7.11

Table 1: Well-Known Endpoints on a Pledge in Responder Mode

HTTP(S) uses the Host header field (or :authority in HTTP/2) to allow for name-based virtual hosting as explained in [Section 7.2](#) of [\[RFC9110\]](#). This header field is mandatory, and so a compliant HTTP(S) client is going to insert it, which may be just an IP address. In the absence of a security policy the pledge **MUST** respond to all requests regardless of the Host header field provided by the client (i.e., ignore it). A security policy may include a rate limiting for requests to avoid susceptibility of the pledge to overload. Note that there is no requirement for the pledge to operate its BRSKI-PRM service on port numbers 80 or 443, so there is no reason for name-based virtual hosting.

For instance, when the Registrar-Agent reaches out to the "tpvr" endpoint on a pledge in responder mode with the full URI `http://pledge.example.com/.well-known/brski/tpvr`, it sets the Host header field to `pledge.example.com` and the absolute path `/.well-known/brski/tpvr`. In practice, however, the pledge is usually known by a `.local` hostname or only its IP address as returned by a discovery protocol, which will be included in the Host header field.

As BRSKI-PRM uses authenticated self-contained objects between the pledge and the domain registrar, the binding of the pledge identity to the voucher-requests is provided by the wrapping signature employing the pledge IDevID credential. Hence, pledges **MUST** have an Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) installed in them at the factory.

6.2.1. Pledge with Combined Functionality

Pledges may support both initiator and responder mode.

A pledge in initiator mode should listen for announcement messages as described in [Section 4.1](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). Upon discovery of a potential registrar, it initiates the bootstrapping to that registrar. At the same time (so as to avoid the Slowloris-like attack described in [\[RFC8995\]](#)), it **SHOULD** also respond to the triggers for responder mode described in this document.

Once a pledge with combined functionality has been bootstrapped, it **MAY** act as client for enrollment of further certificates needed, e.g., using the enrollment protocol of choice. If it still acts as server, the defined BRSKI-PRM endpoints to trigger a Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) or to provide an Enroll-Response can be used for further certificates.

6.2.2. Pledgestatus "reason-context" Values

The following table provides an overview of "reason-context" values and further details of pledgestatus data objects:

"reason-context" Value	Predef. Details	Description
pbs-details		Pledge bootstrap status details, Section 7.11.2.1
	factory-default	Pledge has not been bootstrapped
	voucher-success	Pledge processed voucher exchange successfully

"reason-context" Value	Predef. Details	Description
	voucher-error	Pledge voucher processing with error
	enroll-success	Pledge processed enrollment exchange successfully
	enroll-error	Pledge enrollment-response processing with error
pos-details		Pledge operation status details, Section 7.11.2.1
	connect-success	Pledge successfully establish connection to peer
	connect-error	Pledge connection establishment with error

Table 2: Pledgestatus "reason-context" values and details

Note that the predefined details listed in [Table 2](#) may be enhanced by other specifications if necessary. The currently defined details reflect the different stages during onboarding along the exchanges shown in [Figure 4](#).

6.2.3. Voucher Status and Enroll Status Telemetry "reason-context" Values

The following table provides an overview of "reason-context" values and further details of voucher status and enroll status telemetry data objects:

"reason-context" Value	Details type	Description
pvs-details	STRING	Pledge voucher status details, Section 7.6.2
pes-details	STRING	Pledge enroll status details, Section 7.8.2

Table 3: Voucher Status and Enroll Status Telemetry "reason-context" values and details

6.3. Domain Registrar

The domain registrar provides the endpoints already specified in [[RFC8995](#)] (derived from EST [[RFC7030](#)]) where suitable. In addition, it **MUST** provide the endpoints defined in [Table 4](#) within the BRSKI-defined /.well-known/brski/ Well-Known URI path. These endpoints accommodate for the authenticated self-contained objects used by BRSKI-PRM to provide Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) artifacts and signature-wrapped CA certificates via the Registrar-Agent.

Endpoint	Operation	Exchange and Artifacts
requestenroll	Supply PER to Registrar	Section 7.4

Endpoint	Operation	Exchange and Artifacts
wrappedcacerts	Obtain CA Certificates	Section 7.5

Table 4: Additional Well-Known Endpoints on a BRSKI-PRM Registrar

For the supply of the PVR to the registrar, the pledge uses the endpoint "requestvoucher", defined in [\[RFC8995\]](#) as described in [Section 7.3](#).

The registrar possesses its own EE certificate and corresponding private key for authenticating and signing. It **MUST** use the same certificate/credentials for authentication in the TLS session with a Registrar-Agent and for signing artifacts for that Registrar-Agent and its pledges (see [Section 7.3.6](#)).

According to [Section 5.3](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#), a domain registrar performs the pledge authorization for bootstrapping within its domain based on the Pledge Voucher-Request. For this, it **MUST** possess the IDevID trust anchor(s) (i.e., root or issuing CA certificate(s)) of the pledge vendor(s)/manufacturer(s). This behavior is retained in BRSKI-PRM.

In its role as EST server [\[RFC7030\]](#), the domain registrar **MUST** also possess the domain CA certificates as defined in [Section 5.9](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#).

Finally, the domain registrar **MUST** possess the Registrar-Agent EE certificate(s) to validate agent-signed data and to provide it to the MASA. The registrar **MAY** use the certificate verified during client authentication within the TLS sessions with the Registrar-Agent; in this case, the registrar **MUST** possess the domain trust anchor (i.e., domain CA certificate) for the Registrar-Agent EE certificate to verify the certificate chain. Alternatively, the Registrar-Agent EE certificate(s) **MAY** be provided via configuration or a repository.

6.3.1. Domain Registrar with Combined Functionality

A registrar with combined BRSKI and BRSKI-PRM functionality **MAY** detect if the bootstrapping is performed by the pledge directly (BRSKI case) or by a Registrar-Agent (BRSKI-PRM case) based on the utilized credentials for client authentication during the TLS session establishment and switch the operational mode from BRSKI to BRSKI-PRM.

This may be supported by a specific naming in the SAN (subject alternative name) component of the Registrar-Agent EE certificate, which allows the domain registrar to explicitly detect already in the TLS session establishment that the connecting client is a Registrar-Agent.

The registrar **MAY** be configured to only accept certain Registrar-Agents, which authenticate using the Registrar-Agent EE certificate.

Note that using an EE certificate for TLS client authentication of the Registrar-Agent is a deviation from [\[RFC8995\]](#), in which the pledge IDevID certificate is used to perform TLS client authentication.

6.4. MASA

The Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) is a vendor service that generates and signs voucher artifacts for pledges by the same vendor. When these pledges support BRSKI-PRM, the MASA needs to implement the following functionality in addition to BRSKI [RFC8995].

A MASA for pledges in responder mode **MUST** support the voucher format defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] to parse and process JWS-signed voucher-request artifacts and generate JWS-signed voucher artifacts.

Further, a MASA for pledges in responder mode **MUST** support the Agent Proximity Assertion (Section 5.4) through the validation steps defined in Section 7.3.1 based on the Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) and Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR) artifact fields defined in Section 7.1.2 and Section 7.3.4, respectively.

7. Exchanges and Artifacts

The interaction of the pledge with the Registrar-Agent may be accomplished using different transports (i.e., protocols and/or network technologies). This specification utilizes HTTP(S) as default transport. Other specifications may define alternative transports such as CoAP, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), or Near Field Communication (NFC). These transports may differ from and are independent of the ones used between the Registrar-Agent and the registrar.

Transport independence is realized through authenticated self-contained objects that are not bound to a specific transport security and stay the same along the communication path from the pledge via the Registrar-Agent to the registrar. [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] defines CMS-signed JSON structures as format for artifacts representing authenticated self-contained objects. This specification utilizes JWS-signed JSON structures as default format for BRSKI-PRM. Other specifications may define alternative formats for representing authenticated self-contained objects such as COSE-signed CBOR structures.

Figure 4 provides an overview of the exchanges detailed in the following subsections.




Figure 4: Overview pledge-responder-mode exchanges

The following subsections split the interactions shown in [Figure 4](#) between the different components into:

1. [Section 7.1](#) describes the acquisition exchange for the Pledge Voucher-Request initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.
2. [Section 7.2](#) describes the acquisition exchange for the Pledge Enroll-Request initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.
3. [Section 7.3](#) describes the issuing exchange for the Voucher initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar, including the interaction of the registrar with the MASA using the RVR [Section 7.3.4](#), as well as the artifact processing by these entities.
4. [Section 7.4](#) describes the enroll exchange initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar including the interaction of the registrar with the CA using the PER as well as the artifact processing by these entities.
5. [Section 7.5](#) describes the retrieval exchange for the optional CA certificate provisioning to the pledge initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the CA.
6. [Section 7.6](#) describes the Voucher exchange initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge and the returned status information.
7. [Section 7.7](#) describes the CA certificate exchange initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.
8. [Section 7.8](#) describes the Enroll-Response exchange initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge (containing a new pledge EE certificate) and the returned status information.
9. [Section 7.9](#) describes the Voucher Status telemetry exchange initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar, including the interaction of the registrar with the MASA.
10. [Section 7.10](#) describes the Enroll Status telemetry exchange initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar.
11. [Section 7.11](#) describes the Pledge Status exchange about the general bootstrapping state initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.

7.1. Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request

The Registrar-Agent begins the sequence of exchanges by sending the Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR). This assumes that the Registrar-Agent has already discovered the pledge, for instance as described in [Section 6.1.2](#) based on DNS-SD or similar.

TLS **MAY** be used to provide transport security, e.g., privacy and peer authentication, for the exchange between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge (see [Appendix B](#)).

[Figure 5](#) shows the acquisition of the Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 5: PVR acquisition exchange

The Registrar-Agent triggers the pledge to create a PVR via HTTP(S) POST to the pledge endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/tpvr`. The request body **MUST** contain the JSON-based Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR) artifact as defined in [Section 7.1.1](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/json` and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to `application/voucher-jws+json` as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#).

Upon receiving a valid tPVR, the pledge **MUST** reply with the PVR artifact as defined in [Section 7.1.2](#) in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. If the Accept header was not provided in the PVR, the pledge assumes that the accepted response format is `application/voucher-jws+json` and proceeds processing. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/voucher-jws+json` as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#).

Note that the pledge provisionally accepts the registrar EE certificate contained in the tPVR until it receives the voucher (see [Section 5.4](#)). The pledge will take the last received tPVR for the provisional accept of the received registrar EE certificate, if it does not have the capability to store more than one registrar EE certificate.

If the pledge is unable to create the PVR, it responds with an HTTP error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following client error status codes can be used:

- 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detects an error in the format of the request, e.g., missing field, wrong data types, etc. or if the request is not valid JSON even though the Content-Type request header field was set to `application/json`.
- 406 Not Acceptable: if the Accept request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/voucher-jws+json`.
- 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/json`.

The pledge **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent.

While BRSKI-PRM does not specify which content may be provided in the response body, it is recommended to provide it as JSON encoded information as other BRSKI-PRM exchanges also utilize this encoding.

7.1.1.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR)

The Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR) artifact **SHALL** be an unsigned data object, providing the necessary parameters for generating the Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) artifact such that the Agent Proximity Assertion can be verified by registrar and MASA: the registrar EE certificate and an agent-signed data object containing the product-serial-number and a timestamp. The artifact is unsigned because at the time of receiving the tPVR, the pledge could not verify any signature.

For the JSON-based format used by this specification, the tPVR artifact **SHALL** be a UTF-8 encoded JSON document [RFC8259] that conforms with the CDDL [RFC8610] data model defined in Figure 6:

```
pledgevoucherrequesttrigger = {  
  "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": bytes,  
  "agent-signed-data": bytes  
}
```

Figure 6: CDDL for Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (pledgevoucherrequesttrigger)

The agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert member **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded registrar EE certificate in X.509 v3 (DER) format. The agent-signed-data member **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded JWS Agent-Signed Data as defined in Section 7.1.1.1. Figure 7 summarizes the serialization the JSON tPVR artifact:

```
{  
  "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",  
  "agent-signed-data": BASE64(UTF8(JWS Agent-Signed Data))  
}
```

Figure 7: tPVR Representation in JSON

7.1.1.1.1. JWS Agent-Signed Data

To enable alternative formats, the YANG module in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] defines the leaf agent-signed-data as binary. For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the agent-signed-data leaf **SHALL** be a UTF-8 encoded JWS structure in "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" as defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC7515] signing the JSON Agent-Signed Data defined in Section 7.1.1.1.1. Figure 8 summarizes this JWS structure for the agent-signed-data member of the tPVR artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON Agent-Signed Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 8: JWS Agent-Signed Data in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON Agent-Signed Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [RFC7515]. The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC7515]. The octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.1.1.1.1. JSON Agent-Signed Data

The JSON Agent-Signed Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [RFC8259] that **MUST** conform with the CDDL [RFC8610] data model defined in Figure 9:

```
prmasd = {
  "created-on": tdate,
  "serial-number": text
}
```

Figure 9: CDDL for JSON Agent-Signed Data (prmasd)

The created-on member **SHALL** contain the current date and time at tPVR creation as standard date/time string as defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC3339].

The serial-number member **SHALL** contain the product-serial-number of the pledge with which the Registrar-Agent assumes to communicate as string. The format **MUST** correspond to the X520SerialNumber field of IDevID certificates.

Figure 10 below shows an example for the JSON Agent-Signed Data:

```
{
  "created-on": "2021-04-16T00:00:01.000Z",
  "serial-number": "vendor-pledge4711"
}
```

Figure 10: JSON Agent-Signed Data Example

7.1.1.1.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the agent-signed-data member **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [RFC7515]:

- alg: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7515].
- kid: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded OCTET STRING value of the SubjectKeyIdentifier of the Registrar-Agent EE certificate as described in Section 6.1.

Figure 11 shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
```

Figure 11: JWS Protected Header Example for

7.1.1.1.3. JWS Signature

The Registrar-Agent **MUST** sign the agent-signed-data member using its EE credentials. The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in Section 5.1 of [RFC7515]. Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [RFC7518] and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.1.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR)

The Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the pledge, containing an extended Voucher-Request artifact based on Section 5.2 of [RFC8995]. The BRSKI-PRM related enhancements of the ietf-voucher-request YANG module are defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis].

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the PVR artifact **MUST** be a JWS Voucher structure as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher], which **MUST** contain the JSON PVR Data defined in Section 7.1.2.1 in the JWS Payload. Figure 12 summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON PVR artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON PVR Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 12: PVR Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

7.1.2.1. JSON PVR Data

The JSON PVR Data **MUST** contain the following fields of the `ietf-voucher-request` YANG module as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]; note that this makes optional leaf data nodes in the YANG definition mandatory for the PVR artifact:

- `created-on`: **SHALL** contain the current date and time at PVR creation as standard date/time string as defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC3339]; if the pledge does not have synchronized time, it **SHALL** use the `created-on` value from the JSON Agent-Signed Data received with the tPVR artifact and **SHOULD** advance that value based on its local clock to reflect the PVR creation time.
- `nonce`: **SHALL** contain a cryptographically strong random or pseudo-random number nonce (see Section 6.2 of [RFC4086]).
- `serial-number`: **SHALL** contain the product-serial-number in the X520SerialNumber field of the pledge IDevID certificate as string as defined in Section 2.3.1 of [RFC8995].
- `assertion`: **SHALL** contain the assertion type agent-proximity to indicate the pledge request (different from BRSKI [RFC8995]).
- `agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert`: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded registrar EE certificate provided in the tPVR by the Registrar-Agent; enables the registrar and MASA to verify the Agent Proximity Assertion.
- `agent-signed-data`: **SHALL** contain the same value as the `agent-signed-data` member in the tPVR provided by the Registrar-Agent; enables the registrar and MASA to verify the Agent Proximity Assertion; also enables the registrar to log which Registrar-Agent was in contact with the pledge.

Figure 13 shows an example for the JSON PVR Data:


```
{
  "ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
    "created-on": "2021-04-16T00:00:02.000Z",
    "nonce": "eDs++/FuDHGUnRxN3E14CQ==",
    "serial-number": "vendor-pledge4711",
    "assertion": "agent-proximity",
    "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
    "agent-signed-data": "base64encodedvalue=="
  }
}
```

Figure 13: JSON PVR Data Example

7.1.2.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header **MUST** follow the definitions of [Section 3.2](#) of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#).

7.1.2.3. JWS Signature

The pledge **MUST** sign the PVR artifact using its IDevID credential following the definitions of [Section 3.3](#) of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.2. Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request

Once the Registrar-Agent has received the PVR it can trigger the pledge to generate a Pledge Enroll-Request (PER).

TLS **MAY** be used to provide privacy for this exchange between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge (see [Appendix B](#)).

[Figure 14](#) shows the acquisition of the PER and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 14: PER acquisition exchange

The Registrar-Agent triggers the pledge to create the PER via HTTP(S) POST to the pledge endpoint at /.well-known/brski/tper. The request body **MUST** contain the JSON-based Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPER) artifact as defined in [Section 7.2.1](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to application/json and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to application/jose+json.

Upon receiving a valid tPER, the pledge **MUST** reply with the PER artifact as defined in [Section 7.2.2](#) in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. If the Accept header was not provided in the PER, the pledge assumes that the accepted response format is application/voucher-jws+json and proceeds processing. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to application/jose+json.

If the pledge is unable to create the PER, it responds with an HTTP error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following client error status codes can be used:

- **400 Bad Request:** if the pledge detects an error in the format of the request.
- **406 Not Acceptable:** if the Accept request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/jose+json`.
- **415 Unsupported Media Type:** if the Content-Type request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/json`.

The pledge **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent. While BRSKI-PRM does not specify which content may be provided in the response body, it is recommended to provided it as JSON encoded information as other BRSKI-PRM exchanges also utilize this encoding.

7.2.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPER)

The Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPVR) artifact **SHALL** be an unsigned data object, providing enrollment parameters. This document specifies only the basic parameter for a generic, device-related LDevID certificate with no CSR attributes provided to the pledge. If specific attributes in the certificate are required, they have to be inserted by the issuing Key Infrastructure.

The Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPER) artifact **MAY** be used to provide additional enrollment parameters such as CSR attributes. How to provide and use such additional data is out of scope for this specification.

For the JSON-based format used by this specification, the tPER artifact **MUST** be a UTF-8 encoded JSON document [RFC8259] that conforms with the CDDL [RFC8610] data model defined in Figure 15:

```
pledgeenrollrequesttrigger = {  
    "enroll-type": $enroll-type  
}  
  
$enroll-type /= "enroll-generic-cert"
```

Figure 15: CDDL for Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (*pledgeenrollrequesttrigger*)

The `enroll-type` member allows for specifying which type of certificate is to be enrolled. As shown in Figure 15, BRSKI-PRM only defines the enumeration value `enroll-generic-cert` for the enrollment of the generic, device-related LDevID certificate. Other specifications using this artifact may define further enum values, e.g., to bootstrap application-related EE certificates with additional CSR attributes.

7.2.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request (PER)

The Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the pledge, containing a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) [RFC2986]. The CSR already assures POP of the private key corresponding to the contained public key. In addition, based on the PER signature using the IDevID of the pledge, POI is provided.

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the PER artifact **MUST** use the "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC7515], which **MUST** contain the JSON CSR Data defined in Section 7.2.2.1 in the JWS Payload. Figure 16 summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON PER artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON CSR Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 16: PER Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON CSR Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [RFC7515]. The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC7515]. The octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.2.2.1. JSON CSR Data

The JSON CSR Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [RFC8259] that **MUST** conform with the data model described by the `csr-grouping` of the `ietf-ztp-types` YANG module defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC9646] and **MUST** be encoded using the rules defined in [RFC7951]. Note that [RFC9646] also allows for inclusion of CSRs in different formats used by CMP and CMC. For PKCS#10 CSRs as used in BRSKI and BRSKI-PRM, the `p10-csr` case of the `csr-grouping` **MUST** be used.

Figure 17 below shows an example for the JSON CSR Data:

```
{
  "ietf-ztp-types": {
    "p10-csr": "base64encodedvalue=="
  }
}
```

Figure 17: JSON CSR Data Example

7.2.2.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the PER artifact **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [RFC7515]:

- **alg**: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7515]

- **x5c**: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded pledge EE certificate used to sign the PER artifact and it **SHOULD** also contain the certificate chain for this certificate. The certificate chain **MUST** be available for certificate verification. If it is not contained in the x5c Header Parameter it is provided to the relying party by other means such as configuration.
- **crit**: **SHALL** indicate the extension Header Parameter **created-on** to ensure that it must be understood and validated by the receiver as defined in [Section 4.1.11](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#).

In addition, the JWS Protected Header of the PER artifact **MUST** contain the following extension Header Parameter:

- **created-on**: **SHALL** contain the current date and time at PER creation as standard date/time string as defined in [Section 5.6](#) of [\[RFC3339\]](#); if the pledge does not have synchronized time, it **SHALL** use the **created-on** value from the JSON Agent-Signed Data received with the tPVR artifact and **SHOULD** advance that value based on its local clock to reflect the PER creation time.

The new protected Header Parameter **created-on** is introduced to reflect freshness of the PER. It allows the registrar to verify the timely correlation between the PER artifact and previous exchanges, i.e., **created-on** of PER \geq **created-on** of PVR \geq **created-on** of PVR trigger. The registrar **MAY** ignore any but the newest PER artifact from the same pledge in case the registrar has at any point in time more than one pending PER from the pledge.

[Figure 18](#) shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ],
  "crit": ["created-on"],
  "created-on": "2025-01-13T00:00:02.000Z"
}
```

Figure 18: JWS Protected Header Example within PER

7.2.2.3. JWS Signature

The pledge **MUST** sign the PER artifact using its IDevID credential. The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in [Section 5.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

While BRSKI-PRM targets the initial enrollment, re-enrollment can be supported similarly. In this case, the pledge **MAY** use its current, potentially application-related EE credential instead of its IDevID credential to sign the PER artifact. The issuing CA can associate the re-enrollment request with the pledge based on the previously issued and still valid EE certificate. Note that a pledge

that does not have synchronized time needs to advance the last known current date and time based on its local clock over a longer period, which also requires persisting the local clock advancements across reboots.

7.3. Supply PVR to Registrar (including MASA interaction)

Once the Registrar-Agent has acquired one or more PVR and PER object pairs, it starts the interaction with the domain registrar. Collecting multiple pairs allows bulk bootstrapping of several pledges using the same session with the registrar.

The Registrar-Agent **MUST** establish a TLS session to the registrar with mutual authentication. In contrast to BRSKI [RFC8995], the TLS client authentication uses the Registrar-Agent EE certificate instead of the pledge IDevID certificate. Consequently, the domain registrar can distinguish BRSKI (pledge-initiator-mode) from BRSKI-PRM (pledge-responder-mode).

[Figure 19](#) shows the voucher-request processing and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 19: Voucher issuing exchange

As a first step of the interaction with the domain registrar, the Registrar-Agent **SHALL** supply the PVR artifact(s) to the registrar via HTTP-over-TLS POST to the registrar endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/requestvoucher`. Note that this is the same endpoint as for BRSKI described in [Section 5.2](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). The request body **MUST** contain one previously acquired PVR artifact as defined in [Section 7.1.2](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/voucher-jws+json` and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to `application/voucher-jws+json` as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#).

Upon receiving a PVR artifact, the registrar accepts or declines the request to join the domain. For this, it **MUST** perform pledge authorization as defined in [Section 5.3](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). Due to the Registrar-Agent in the middle, the registrar **MUST** verify in addition that

- the `agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert` field of the PVR contains a registrar EE certificate signed by the same domain owner as the registrar EE certificate used to sign the RVR; note that this check allows for installations with multiple domain registrars and for

registrar EE certificate renewal between exchanges with the Registrar-Agent (see [Section 5.2](#)); in many installations with a single registrar the contained certificate is identical to the signing certificate.

- the agent-signed-data field of the PVR is signed with the private key corresponding to the Registrar-Agent EE certificate as known by the registrar (see [Section 6.3](#)); this is done via the SubjectKeyIdentifier of the certificate in the kid Header Parameter of the JWS Protected Header of the agent-signed-data field.
- the product-serial-number inside the agent-signed-data is equal to the serial-number field of the PVR as well as the X520SerialNumber field of the pledge IDevID certificate, which is contained in the JWS Protected Header of the PVR.
- the Registrar-Agent EE certificate is still valid; this is necessary to avoid that a rogue Registrar-Agent generates agent-signed-data objects to onboard arbitrary pledges at a later point in time, see also [Section 12.3](#).

If the registrar is unable to process the request or validate the PVR, it responds with an HTTP client error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following client error status codes can be used:

- 400 Bad Request: if the registrar detects an error in the format of the request.
- 403 Forbidden: if the registrar detected that one or more security related fields are not valid or if the pledge-provided information could not be used with automated allowance.
- 406 Not Acceptable: if the Accept request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported.
- 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported.

Otherwise, the registrar converts the PVR artifact to a Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR) artifact (see [Section 7.3.4](#)) and starts the backend interaction with the MASA.

The domain registrar can respond with an HTTP 202 Accepted response status code to the Registrar-Agent at this point following [Section 5.6](#) of [RFC8995], while the rules defined for the pledge also apply to the Registrar-Agent; in this case, the registrar still continues with the MASA interaction to provide the Voucher artifact to the retry request.

The registrar **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent.

7.3.1. MASA Interaction

The domain registrar **MUST** establish a TLS session with mutual authentication to the MASA of the pledge according to [Section 5.4](#) of [RFC8995]. It requests the voucher from the MASA according to [Section 5.5](#) of [RFC8995] via HTTP-over-TLS POST to the MASA endpoint at /.well-known/brski/requestvoucher. The request body **MUST** contain the RVR artifact as defined in [Section 7.3.4](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field and the Accept field **MUST** be set to the same media type as the incoming PVR artifact. For the default format used in this specification, this is application/voucher-jws+json as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].

The assumption is that a pledge typically supports a single artifact format and creates the PVR in the supported format; to ensure that the pledge is able to process the voucher, the registrar requests this format via the HTTP Accept header field when requesting the voucher. Further, the RVR artifact and the PVR artifact inside should also use the same format to limit the number of required format encoders. Note that BRSKI-PRM allows for alternative formats such as CMS-signed JSON as used in BRSKI [RFC8995] or COSE-signed CBOR for constrained environments, when defined by other specifications. Overall, a MASA responsible for BRSKI-PRM capable pledges consequently supports the same formats as supported by those pledges.

Once the MASA receives the RVR artifact, it **MUST** perform the verification as described in [Section 5.5](#) of [RFC8995]. Depending on policy, the MASA **MAY** choose the type of assertion to perform. For the Agent Proximity Assertion of BRSKI-PRM (see [Section 5.4](#)), the MASA **MUST** skip the verification described in [Section 5.5.5](#) of [RFC8995] and instead **MUST** verify for the PVR contained in the prior-signed-voucher-request field of the RVR that

- the agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert field contains an EE certificate that is signed by the same domain owner as the EE certificate/credentials used to sign the RVR; note that this check allows for installations with multiple domain registrars and for registrar EE certificate renewal while PVRs are collected by the Registrar-Agent.
- the registrar EE certificate in the agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert field and the Registrar-Agent EE certificate in the agent-sign-cert field of the RVR are signed by the same domain owner.
- the agent-signed-data field is signed with the credentials corresponding to the Registrar-Agent EE certificate in the agent-sign-cert field of the RVR; this is done via the SubjectKeyIdentifier of the certificate in the kid Header Parameter of the JWS Protected Header in the agent-signed-data field.
- the product-serial-number inside the agent-signed-data is equal to the serial-number field of PVR and the serial-number field of the RVR as well as the X520SerialNumber field of the pledge IDevID certificate, which is contained in the JWS Protected Header of the PVR.

If the agent-sign-cert field in the RVR is not set, the MASA **MAY** state a lower level assertion value instead of failing the verification, e.g., "logged" or "verified".

If the verification fails, the MASA responds with an HTTP client error status code to the registrar. The client error status codes are kept the same as defined in [Section 5.6](#) of [RFC8995]:

- 403 Forbidden: if the voucher-request is not signed correctly or is stale or if the pledge has another outstanding voucher that cannot be overridden.
- 404 Not Found: if the request is for a device that is not known to the MASA.
- 406 Not Acceptable: if a voucher of the desired type or that uses the desired algorithms (as indicated by the "Accept" header fields and algorithms used in the signature) cannot be issued as such because the MASA knows the pledge cannot process that type.
- 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the request uses an artifact format or Accept header value that is not supported by the MASA.

Otherwise, the MASA creates a Voucher artifact as defined in [Section 7.3.5](#) and updates the audit-log as described in [Section 5.5](#) of [RFC8995]. The Voucher is then supplied to the registrar within the body of an HTTP 200 OK response according to [Section 5.6](#) of [RFC8995]. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to the media type of the incoming RVR artifact. For the default format used in this specification, this is `application/voucher-jws+json` as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].

7.3.2. Supply Voucher to Registrar-Agent

After receiving the Voucher from the MASA, the registrar **SHOULD** evaluate it for transparency and logging purposes as outlined in [Section 5.6](#) of [RFC8995]. It then countersigns the Voucher for delivery to the pledge via the Registrar-Agent.

The registrar **MUST** reply to the Registrar-Agent with the registrar-countersigned Voucher artifact ('Voucher') as defined in [Section 7.3.6](#) in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to the media type of the incoming PVR artifact. For the default format used in this specification, this is `application/voucher-jws+json` as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].

If the domain registrar is unable to return the Voucher, it responds with an HTTP server error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following server error status codes can be used:

- 500 Internal Server Error: if both Registrar-Agent request and MASA response are valid, but the registrar still failed to return the Voucher, e.g., due to missing configuration or a program failure.
- 502 Bad Gateway: if the registrar received an invalid response from the MASA.
- 503 Service Unavailable: if a simple retry of the Registrar-Agent request might lead to a successful response; this error response **MUST** include the `Retry-After` response header field with an appropriate value.
- 504 Gateway Timeout: if the backend request to the MASA timed out.

7.3.3. Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR)

Identical to the PVR artifact received from the pledge as defined in [Section 7.1.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify PVRs.

7.3.4. Backend Request Artifact: Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR)

The Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR) artifact **SHALL** be an extended Voucher-Request artifact based on [Section 5.5](#) of [RFC8995]. The BRSKI-PRM related enhancements of the `ietf-voucher-request` YANG module are defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis].

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the RVR artifact **MUST** be a JWS Voucher structure as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher], which **MUST** contain the JSON RVR Data defined in [Section 7.3.4.1](#) in the JWS Payload. [Figure 20](#) summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON RVR artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON RVR Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 20: RVR Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

7.3.4.1. JSON RVR Data

The JSON RVR Data **MUST** contain the following fields of the `ietf-voucher-request` YANG module as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]; note that this makes optional leaves in the YANG definition mandatory for the RVR artifact:

- `created-on`: **SHALL** contain the current date and time at RVR creation as standard date/time string as defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC3339]
- `nonce`: **SHALL** contain a copy of the nonce field from the JSON PVR Data the registrar provides this information to assure successful verification of Registrar-Agent proximity based on the agent-signed-data
- `serial-number`: **SHALL** contain the product-serial-number of the pledge; note the required verification by the registrar defined in Section 7.3
- `idevid-issuer`: **SHALL** contain the issuer value from the pledge IDDevID certificate obtained from the PVR JWS Protected Header `x5c` field
- `prior-signed-voucher-request`: **SHALL** contain the PVR artifact as received from the Registrar-Agent, see Section 7.1

As BRSKI-PRM uses the Agent Proximity Assertion (see Section 5.4), the JSON RVR Data **MUST** also contain the following fields:

- `assertion`: **SHALL** contain the value `agent-proximity` to indicate successful verification of the Agent Proximity Assertion (see Section 5.4) by the registrar.
- `agent-sign-cert`: **SHALL** be a JSON array that contains the base64-encoded Registrar-Agent EE certificate as possessed by the registrar (see Section 6.3) as the first item; subsequent items **MUST** contain the corresponding certificate chain for verification at the MASA; the field is used for verification of the `agent-signed-data` field of the contained PVR.

Note that the `ietf-voucher-request` YANG module defines the leaf `agent-sign-cert` as binary; this specification refines it as a JSON array structure similar to the `x5c` Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7515].

Figure 21 shows an example for the JSON RVR Data:

```
{
  "ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
    "created-on": "2025-01-04T02:37:39.235Z",
    "nonce": "eDs++/FuDHGUUnRxN3E14CQ==",
    "serial-number": "vendor-pledge4711",
    "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
    "prior-signed-voucher-request": "base64encodedvalue==",
    "assertion": "agent-proximity",
    "agent-sign-cert": [
      "base64encodedvalue==",
      "base64encodedvalue==",
      "...",
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 21: JSON RVR Data Example

7.3.4.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header **MUST** follow the definitions of [Section 3.2](#) of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#).

7.3.4.3. JWS Signature

The domain registrar **MUST** sign the RVR artifact using its EE credentials following the definitions of [Section 3.3](#) of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.3.5. Backend Response Artifact: Voucher

The Voucher artifact is defined in [Section 5.6](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) (cf. "voucher response"). The only difference for BRSKI-PRM is that the assertion field **MAY** contain the value agent-proximity as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis\]](#), when the Agent-Proximity Assertion (see [Section 5.4](#)) is performed by the MASA.

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the Voucher artifact **MUST** be a JWS Voucher structure as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#). It contains JSON Voucher Data in the JWS Payload, for which an example is given in [Figure 22](#):

```
{
  "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
    "created-on": "2025-01-04T00:00:02.000Z",
    "nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",
    "assertion": "agent-proximity",
    "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
    "serial-number": "vendor-pledge4711"
  }
}
```

Figure 22: JSON RVR Data Example

7.3.6. Response Artifact: Registrar-Countersigned Voucher

The Registrar-Countersigned Voucher (Voucher') artifact **SHALL** be an extended Voucher artifact based on [Section 5.6](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) using the format defined in [Section 7.3.5](#).

For BRSKI-PRM, the domain registrar **MUST** add an JWS Protected Header and JWS Signature to the MASA-provided Voucher. [Figure 23](#) summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON Voucher' artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(JSON Voucher Data),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header (MASA))),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature (MASA))
    },
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header (Registrar))),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature (Registrar))
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 23: Voucher' Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

In BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#), the registrar proves possession of its credential through the server authentication within the TLS session with the pledge. While the pledge cannot verify the registrar certificate at the time of TLS session establishment, it can verify the TLS server certificate through the certificate in the pinned-domain-cert field upon receiving the Voucher artifact (see [Section 5.6.2](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#)).

In BRSKI-PRM with the Registrar-Agent mediating all communication, this second signature provides verification and POP of the private key for the registrar EE certificate provided in the initial tPVR artifact from the Registrar-Agent (see [Section 7.1.1](#)).

Depending on the security policy of the operator, this signature can also be interpreted as explicit authorization of the registrar to install the contained trust anchor (i.e., pinned domain certificate).

7.3.6.1. JSON Voucher Data

As provided by the MASA inside the JWS Payload. The domain registrar **MUST NOT** modify the JWS Payload.

7.3.6.2. JWS Protected Header (Registrar)

The registrar-added JWS Protected Header (Registrar) **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#):

- **alg**: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in [Section 4.1.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#).
- **x5c**: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded registrar EE certificate used to sign the voucher as well as the certificate chain up to (but not including) the pinned domain certificate (the initial domain trust anchor); the pinned domain certificate is already contained in the JSON Voucher Data.

Note that for many installations with a single registrar credential, the registrar EE certificate is pinned.

7.3.6.3. JWS Signature (Registrar)

The signature is created by signing the registrar-added JWS Protected Header (Registrar) and the original JWS Payload produced by the MASA as described in [Section 5.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

The registrar **MUST** use its EE credentials to sign.

Note that the credentials need to be the same as used for server authentication in the TLS session with the Registrar-Agent receiving this artifact (see [Section 6.3](#)).

7.4. Supply PER to Registrar (including Key Infrastructure interaction; requestenroll)

After receiving the Voucher artifact, the Registrar-Agent sends the PER to the domain registrar within the same TLS session.

In case the TLS session to the registrar is already closed, the Registrar-Agent establishes a new session as described in [Section 7.3](#). The registrar is able to correlate the PVR and PER artifacts based on the signatures and the contained product-serial-number. Note that this also addresses situations in which a nonceless voucher is used and may be pre-provisioned to the pledge.

Figure 24 depicts exchanges for the PER-request handling and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts. Note that "Request" and "Certificate" do not denote BRSKI-PRM defined artifacts, but are data objects depending on the certificate management protocol used by the domain Key Infrastructure.




Figure 24: Enroll exchange

As a second step of the interaction with the domain registrar, the Registrar-Agent **SHALL** supply the PER artifact(s) to the registrar via HTTP-over-TLS POST to the registrar endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/requestenroll`. The request body **MUST** contain one previously acquired PER artifact as defined in Section 7.2.2. In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json` and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to `application/jose+json`.

Note that this is different from the EST [RFC7030] endpoint used in BRSKI, as the PER artifact is signature-wrapped. Hence, upon receiving a PER artifact, the registrar **MUST** verify that

- the PER was signed with the private key corresponding to the pledge EE certificate, which is contained in the JWS Protected Header of the PER.
- the pledge identified by its EE certificate is accepted to join the domain after successful validation of the corresponding PVR.

If the registrar is unable to process the request or validate the PER, it responds with an HTTP client error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following client error status codes can be used:

- 400 Bad Request: if the registrar detects an error in the format of the request.
- 403 Forbidden: if the signature of the PER cannot be verified.
- 404 Not Found: if the PER is for a device that is not known to the registrar.

- 406 Not Acceptable: if the Accept request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/jose+json`.
- 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the PER uses an artifact format that is not supported by the registrar, e.g., a type other than `application/jose+json`.

Otherwise, the registrar extracts the PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) inside the PER (see [Section 7.2.2](#)) and uses the CSR to request a new pledge EE certificate from the domain Key Infrastructure. The exact interaction and exchanged data objects depends on the certificate management protocol used by the Key Infrastructure, and is out of scope for this document.

A successful interaction with the Key Infrastructure will result in a pledge EE certificate signed by the domain owner (e.g., LDevID certificate). The registrar **MUST** reply to the Registrar-Agent with the Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp) as defined in [Section 7.4.2](#) in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/pkcs7-mime` with an `smime-type` parameter `certs-only`, as specified in [\[RFC7030\]](#) and [\[RFC5273\]](#).

If the domain registrar is unable to return the Enroll-Resp, it responds with an HTTP server error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following server error status codes can be used:

- 500 Internal Server Error: if the Key Infrastructure response is valid, but the registrar still failed to return the Enroll-Resp, e.g., due to missing configuration or a program failure.
- 502 Bad Gateway: if the registrar received an invalid response from the Key Infrastructure.
- 503 Service Unavailable: if a simple retry of the Registrar-Agent request might lead to a successful response; this error response **MUST** include the `Retry-After` response header field with an appropriate value.
- 504 Gateway Timeout: if the backend request to the Key Infrastructure timed out.

Note that while BRSKI-PRM targets the initial enrollment, re-enrollment may be supported similarly with the exception that the current, potentially application-related pledge EE certificate is used instead of the LDevID certificate to sign the PER artifact (see also [Section 7.2](#)). Hence, there is no verification whether the pledge is accepted to join the domain, as the still valid EE certificate signed by the domain owner identifies the pledge as already accepted component of the domain.

7.4.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request (PER)

Identical to the PER artifact defined in [Section 7.2.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify PERs received from pledges.

7.4.2. Response Artifact: Registrar Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp)

The Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the domain owner, containing a pledge EE certificate.

For this specification, the Enroll-Resp artifact **MUST** be a `certs-only` CMC Simple PKI Response (PKCS#7) as defined in [Section 4.1](#) of [\[RFC5272\]](#) (following EST [\[RFC7030\]](#)). Note that it only contains the pledge EE certificate, but not the certificate chain. The chain is provided with the CA certificates.

7.5. Obtain CA Certificates (wrappedcacerts)

The pinned domain certificate in the voucher is only the initial trust anchor for only the domain registrar. To fully trust the domain and also to verify its own EE certificate, the pledge also needs the corresponding domain CA certificate(s). A bag of CA certificates signed by the registrar will allow the pledge to verify the authorization to install the received CA certificate(s) through the pinned domain certificate in the voucher.

Note that this is a deviation from EST [RFC7030] used in BRSKI [RFC8995].

The Registrar-Agent obtains this artifact within the same TLS session. In case the TLS session to the registrar is already closed, the Registrar-Agent establishes a new session as described in Section 7.3. The CA certificates do not need to be correlated to a specific voucher or Enroll-Response; they only need to be fresh.

Figure 25 shows the acquisition of the CA certificate(s) and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifact.




Figure 25: CA certificates retrieval exchange

As a third step of the interaction with the domain registrar, the Registrar-Agent **SHALL** obtain the CA-Certificates artifact from the registrar via HTTP-over-TLS GET to the registrar endpoint at /.well-known/brski/wrappedcacerts. In the request header, the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to application/jose+json.

Upon receiving a GET request at /.well-known/brski/wrappedcacerts, the domain registrar **MUST** reply with the CA-Certificates artifact as defined in Section 7.5.2 in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to application/jose+json.

7.5.1. Request (no artifact)

In this exchange, the request is a result of the HTTP(S) default transport for this specification. There is no artifact provided to the registrar. As the caCerts artifact processing on the pledge may result in errors, signaled via HTTP status codes, the Registrar-Agent should log these for evaluation as outlined in [Section 8](#).

7.5.2. Response Artifact: CA-Certificates (caCerts)

The CA-Certificates (caCerts) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the registrar, containing the domain trust anchors and the certificate chain for the pledge domain EE certificate, i.e., the root CA certificate(s) and possibly intermediate certificate(s) as described in [Section 4.1.3](#) of [\[RFC7030\]](#).

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the caCerts artifact **MUST** use the "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" defined in [Section 7.2.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#), which **MUST** contain the JSON CA Data defined in [Section 7.5.2.1](#) in the JWS Payload.

[Figure 26](#) summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON caCerts artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON CA Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 26: Voucher' Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON CA Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#). The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in [Section 3.2](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). The octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.5.2.1. JSON CA Data

The JSON CA Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [\[RFC8259\]](#) that **MUST** conform with the CDDL [\[RFC8610\]](#) data model defined in [Figure 27](#):

```
cacerts = {  
  "x5bag": bytes / [2* bytes]  
}
```

Figure 27: CDDL for JSON CA Data (cacerts)

The x5bag member **MUST** follow the definition of the x5bag COSE Header Parameter in [Section 2](#) of [\[RFC9360\]](#). It is either a single X.509 v3 certificate or an array of at least two X.509 v3 certificates in DER format. For JSON syntax, the octet-based certificates **MUST** be base64-encoded. It **SHALL** contain one or more domain CA (root or issuing) certificates.

Note that as per [\[RFC8995\]](#), the domain registrar acts as EST server, and hence is expected to possess the CA certificates applicable for the domain and can thus deliver them to the pledge (see [Section 6.3](#)).

[Figure 28](#) below shows an example for the JSON CA Data:

```
{  
  "x5bag": [  
    "base64encodedvalue==",  
    "base64encodedvalue=="  
  ]  
}
```

Figure 28: JSON CA Data Example

7.5.2.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the caCerts artifact **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#):

- alg: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in [Section 4.1.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#)
- x5c: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded registrar EE certificate used to sign the caCerts artifact as well as the certificate chain up to (but not including) the pinned domain certificate

[Figure 29](#) below shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}
```

Figure 29: JWS Protected Header Example within PER

7.5.2.3. JWS Signature

The registrar **MUST** sign the caCerts artifact using its EE credentials. The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in [Section 5.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.6. Supply Voucher to Pledge (svr)

Once the Registrar-Agent has acquired the following three bootstrapping artifacts, it can supply them to the pledge starting with the Voucher':

- Voucher': voucher countersigned by the registrar (from MASA via Registrar)
- Enroll-Resp: pledge EE certificate signed by the domain owner (from Key Infrastructure via registrar)
- caCerts: domain trust anchors (from Key Infrastructure via Registrar)

Reconnecting to the pledge might require to re-discover the pledge as described in [Section 6.1.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MAY** store information from the first connection with the pledge to optimize this process.

TLS **MAY** be used to provide privacy for this exchange between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge (see [Appendix B](#)).

[Figure 30](#) shows the provisioning of the voucher to the pledge and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 30: Voucher exchange

The Registrar-Agent **SHALL** supply the voucher to the pledge via HTTP(S) POST to the pledge endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/svr`. The request body **MUST** contain the Registrar-Countersigned Voucher (Voucher') artifact previously acquired from the domain registrar as defined in [Section 7.3.6](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/voucher-jws+json` as defined in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher\]](#) and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to `application/jose+json`, to indicate the encoding of the vStatus response object status telemetry message.

Upon receiving the voucher, the pledge **SHALL** perform the signature verification in the following order:

1. Verify the MASA signature as described in [Section 5.6.1](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) against the pre-installed manufacturer trust anchor (e.g., IDevID).
2. Provisionally install the initial domain trust anchor contained in the pinned-domain-cert field of the voucher.
3. Validate the registrar EE certificate received in the agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert field of the previously received tPVR artifact using the pinned domain certificate; this terminates the "provisional state" for the object security within the authenticated self-contained objects that in BRSKI-PRM replace the direct TLS connection to the registrar in BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#) (see [Section 5.4](#)).
4. Verify registrar signature of the Voucher' artifact similar as described in [Section 5.6.1](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#), but using the pinned domain certificate instead of the MASA certificate for the verification.

If all steps above complete successfully, the pledge **SHALL** terminate the "provisional state" for the initial domain trust anchor (i.e., the pinned domain certificate).

A nonceless voucher **MAY** be accepted as in [RFC8995] if allowed by the pledge implementation of the manufacturer. A manufacturer may opt to provide the acceptance of nonceless voucher as configurable item.

After voucher validation and verification, the pledge needs to reply with a status telemetry message as defined in Section 5.7 of [RFC8995]. The pledge **MUST** generate the Voucher Status (vStatus) artifact as defined in Section 7.6.2 and **MUST** provide it to the Registrar-Agent in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to application/jose+json.

If the pledge is unable to validate or verify the voucher, it **MUST** report the reason in the corresponding field of the Voucher Status.

If the pledge did not provide voucher status telemetry information after processing the voucher, the Registrar-Agent **MAY** query the pledge status explicitly as described in Section 7.11. It **MAY** resend the voucher depending on the Pledge status following the same procedure.

7.6.1. Request Artifact: Registrar-Countersigned Voucher

Identical to the Registrar-Countersigned Voucher (Voucher') artifact received from the registrar as defined in Section 7.3.6. The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify countersigned vouchers.

7.6.2. Response Artifact: Voucher Status (vStatus)

The Voucher Status (vStatus) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the pledge, containing status telemetry as defined in Section 5.7 of [RFC8995].

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the vStatus artifact **MUST** use the "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC7515], which **MUST** contain the JSON Voucher Status Data defined in Section 7.6.2.1 in the JWS Payload. Figure 31 summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON vStatus artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON Voucher Status Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 31: vStatus Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON Status Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [RFC7515]. The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC7515]. The octets of the UTF-8 representation

of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.6.2.1. JSON Voucher Status Data

The JSON Status Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [RFC8259] that **MUST** conform with the voucherstatus-post CDDL [RFC8610] data model defined in Section 5.7 of [RFC8995]:

- **version**: contains a version number for the format and semantics of the other fields; this specification assumes version 1 just like BRSKI [RFC8995].
- **status**: contains the boolean value `true` in case of success and `false` in case of failure.
- **reason**: contains a human-readable message; should not provide information beneficial to an attacker. As the pledge is not localized at this point in time language selection cannot be done. Therefore, English is taken as a default here for this diagnostic messages. The internationalization of text is expected to be done on another level.
- **reason-context**: contains a JSON object that provides additional information specific to a failure; in contrast to Section 5.7 of [RFC8995], **MUST** be provided;

BRSKI-PRM implementations utilize the **reason-context** field to provide a distinguishable token, which enables the registrar to detect status artifacts provided to the wrong endpoint. For **vStatus** artifacts, the JSON object in the **reason-context** field **MUST** contain the member **pvs-details**.

Figure 32 shows an example for the JSON Voucher Status Data in case of success and Figure 33 in case of failure:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/jose+json
Content-Language: en
```

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": true,
  "reason": "Voucher successfully processed.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pvs-details": "Current date 5/23/2024"
  }
}
```

Figure 32: JSON Voucher Status Data Success Example

```
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/jose+json
Content-Language: en
```

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "Failed to authenticate MASA certificate.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pvs-details": "Current date 1/1/1970 < valid from 1/1/2023"
  }
}
```

Figure 33: JSON Voucher Status Data Failure Example

7.6.2.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the vStatus artifact **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [RFC7515]:

- alg: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7515].
- x5c: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded pledge IDevID certificate used to sign the vStatus artifact and it **SHOULD** also contain the certificate chain for this certificate. The certificate chain **MUST** be available for certificate verification. If it is not contained in the x5c Header Parameter it is provided to the relying party by other means such as configuration.

Figure 34 shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}
```

Figure 34: JWS Protected Header Example within vStatus

7.6.2.3. JWS Signature

The pledge **MUST** sign the vStatus artifact using its IDevID credential. The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in Section 5.1 of [RFC7515]. Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [RFC7518] and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.7. Supply CA Certificates to Pledge (scac)

Before supplying the pledge EE certificate, the Registrar-Agent supplies the domain CA certificates to the pledge, so the pledge can verify its EE certificate in the next exchange. As the CA certificate provisioning is crucial from a security perspective, this exchange **SHOULD** only be done if supplying the voucher in the previous exchange (Section 7.6) has been successfully processed by the pledge as reflected in the vStatus artifact.

TLS **MAY** be used to provide privacy for this exchange between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge (see Appendix B).

Figure 35 shows the provisioning of the CA certificates to the pledge and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 35: Certificate provisioning exchange

The Registrar-Agent **SHALL** provide the bag of CA certificates requested from and signed by the registrar to the pledge by HTTP(S) POST to the pledge endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/scac`. The request body **MUST** contain the caCerts artifact as defined in Section 7.5.2. In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json`.

Upon receiving valid caCerts artifact, the pledge **MUST** first verify the signature of the registrar using the initial trust anchor (pinned domain certificate). In the case of success, the pledge **MUST** install the contained CA certificates as trust anchors as described in Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]. This includes the verification of all intermediate CA certificates (i.e., not self-signed CA certificates).

If the pledge is unable to process the caCerts, it responds with an HTTP error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following client error status codes can be used:

- 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detects an error in the format of the request.

- 403 Forbidden: if the signature of the registrar cannot be verified against the installed initial trust anchor (pinned domain certificate).
- 403 Forbidden: if one of the intermediate CA certificates cannot be verified against the available trust anchors (e.g., self-signed CA certificates).
- 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/jose+json`.

Otherwise, if processing completes successfully, the pledge **SHOULD** reply with HTTP 200 OK without a response body. The pledge **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent.

7.7.1. Request Artifact: CA-Certificates (caCerts)

Identical to the CA-Certificates (caCerts) artifact received from the registrar as defined in [Section 7.5.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify CA-Certificates artifacts.

7.7.2. Response (no artifact)

In this exchange, the response is a result of the HTTP(S) default transport for this specification. There is no artifact provided to the Registrar-Agent. The pledge **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent. While BRSKI-PRM does not specify which content may be provided in the response body, it is recommended to provide it as JSON encoded information as other BRSKI-PRM exchanges also utilize this encoding.

7.8. Supply Enroll-Response to Pledge (ser)

After supplying the CA certificates, the Registrar-Agent supplies the pledge EE certificate to the pledge.

TLS **MAY** be used to provide privacy for this exchange between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge (see [Appendix B](#)).

[Figure 36](#) shows the provisioning of the domain-owner signed EE certificate to the pledge and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 36: Enroll-Response exchange

The Registrar-Agent **SHALL** send the domain-owner signed EE certificate to the pledge by HTTP(S) POST to the pledge endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/ser`. The request body **MUST** contain the Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp) artifact previously acquired from the domain registrar as defined in [Section 7.4.2](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/pkcs7-mime` with an `smime-type` parameter `certs-only`, as specified in [\[RFC7030\]](#) and [\[RFC5273\]](#), and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to `application/jose+json`.

Upon reception, the pledge **SHALL** verify the received EE certificate using the installed trust anchors. After Enroll-Resp validation and verification, the pledge needs to reply with a status telemetry message as defined in [Section 5.9.4](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). The pledge **MUST** generate the Enroll Status (eStatus) artifact as defined in [Section 7.8.2](#) and **MUST** provide it to the Registrar-Agent in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json`.

If the pledge is unable to validate or verify the Enroll-Response, it **MUST** report the reason in the corresponding field of the Enroll Status.

7.8.1. Request Artifact: Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp)

Identical to the Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp) artifact received from the registrar as defined in [Section 7.4.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify Enroll-Response artifacts.

7.8.2. Response Artifact: Enroll Status (eStatus)

The Enroll Status (eStatus) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the pledge, containing status telemetry as defined in [Section 5.9.4](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#).

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the eStatus artifact **MUST** use the "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" defined in [Section 7.2.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#), which **MUST** contain the JSON Enroll Status Data defined in [Section 7.8.2.1](#) in the JWS Payload. [Figure 37](#) summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON eStatus artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON Enroll Status Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 37: eStatus Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON Enroll Status Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [RFC7515]. The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC7515]. The octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.8.2.1. JSON Enroll Status Data

The JSON Status Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [RFC8259] that **MUST** conform with the enrollstatus-post CDDL [RFC8610] data model defined in Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995]. The members are the same as for the JSON Voucher Status Data and follow the same definitions as given in Section 7.6.2.1 (including making reason-context mandatory).

BRSKI-PRM implementations again utilize the reason-context field to provide a distinguishable token. For eStatus artifacts, the JSON object in the reason-context field **MUST** contain the member pes-details.

Figure 38 below shows an example for the JSON Enroll Status Data in case of success and Figure 39 in case of failure:

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": true,
  "reason": "Enroll-Response successfully processed.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pes-details": "Successfully enrolled"
  }
}
```

Figure 38: JSON Enroll Status Data Success Example

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "Enroll-Response could not be verified.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pes-details": "No matching trust anchor"
  }
}
```

Figure 39: JSON Enroll Status Data Failure Example

7.8.2.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the eStatus artifact **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [RFC7515]:

- alg: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7515]
- x5c: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded pledge EE certificate used to sign the eStatus artifact and it **SHOULD** also contain the certificate chain for this certificate. The certificate chain **MUST** be available for certificate verification. If it is not contained in the x5c Header Parameter it is provided to the relying party by other means such as configuration.

Figure 40 below shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}
```

Figure 40: JWS Protected Header Example within eStatus

7.8.2.3. JWS Signature

If the pledge verified the received EE certificate successfully, it **MUST** sign the eStatus artifact using its new EE credentials. In failure case, the pledge **MUST** sign it using its IDevID credentials. The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in Section 5.1 of [RFC7515]. Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [RFC7518] and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.9. Voucher Status Telemetry (including MASA interaction)

Once the Registrar-Agent has collected both status artifacts from one or more pledges, it **SHALL** provide the status information to the domain registrar for further processing, beginning with the voucher status telemetry.

In case the TLS session to the registrar is closed, the Registrar-Agent establishes a new session as described in [Section 7.3](#).

[Figure 41](#) shows the provisioning of the voucher status information from the pledge(s) to the registrar and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifact and MASA interaction.




Figure 41: Voucher Status telemetry exchange

First, the Registrar-Agent **SHALL** supply the voucher status telemetry to the registrar via HTTP-over-TLS POST to the registrar endpoint at `/.well-known/brski/voucher_status`. The request body **MUST** contain one previously acquired vStatus artifact as defined in [Section 7.6.2](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json`.

Upon receiving a vStatus artifact, the registrar **MUST** process it as described in [Section 5.7](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). Due to the Registrar-Agent in the middle, the registrar **MUST** in addition verify the signature of the vStatus and that it belongs to an accepted device of the domain based on the serial-number field of the IDevID certificate contained in the JWS Protected Header of the vStatus.

According to [Section 5.7](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#), the registrar responds with an HTTP 200 OK without a response body in the success case or fail with an HTTP error status code. The registrar **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent.

The registrar **SHOULD** proceed with the audit-log request to the MASA as in BRSKI described in [Section 5.8](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#).

7.9.1. Request Artifact: Voucher Status (vStatus)

Identical to the Voucher Status (vStatus) artifact received from the pledge as defined in [Section 7.6.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify vStatus artifacts.

7.9.2. Response (no artifact)

In this exchange, the response is a result of the HTTP(S) default transport for this specification. There is no artifact provided to the Registrar-Agent.

7.10. Enroll Status Telemetry

The Registrar-Agent **SHALL** complete the sequence of exchanges for bootstrapping with providing the enroll status telemetry to the domain registrar. This status indicates whether the pledge could process the Enroll-Response (pledge EE certificate signed by the domain owner) and holds the corresponding private key.

In case the TLS session to the registrar is already closed, the Registrar-Agent establishes a new session as described in [Section 7.3](#).

[Figure 42](#) shows the provisioning of the enroll status information from the pledge(s) to the registrar and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifact.




Figure 42: Enroll Status telemetry exchange

The Registrar-Agent **SHALL** supply the enroll status telemetry to the registrar via HTTP-over-TLS POST to the registrar endpoint at `/ .well-known/brski/enrollstatus`. The request body **MUST** contain one previously acquired eStatus artifact as defined in [Section 7.8.2](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json`.

Upon receiving an eStatus artifact, the registrar **MUST** process it as described in [Section 5.9.4](#) of [RFC8995]. Due to the Registrar-Agent in the middle, instead of the BRSKI TLS session with the pledge, the registrar **MUST** verify the signature of the eStatus artifact and that it belongs to an accepted device of the domain based on the `serial-number` field of the EE certificate contained in the JWS Protected Header of the eStatus. Note that if the Enroll Status indicates success, the eStatus artifact is signed with the new pledge EE credentials; if it indicates failure, the pledge was unable to process the supplied EE certificate and therefore signed with its IDevID credentials.

According to [Section 5.9.4](#) of [RFC8995], the registrar responds with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or can fail with an HTTP 404 client error status code. The registrar **MAY** use the response body to signal success/failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent.

If the eStatus indicates failure, the registrar **MAY** decide that for security reasons the pledge is not allowed to reside in the domain. In this case, the registrar **MUST** revoke the pledge EE certificate. An example case for the registrar revoking the issued certificate is when the pledge was not able to verify the received EE certificate and therefore did not accept it for installation.

7.10.1. Request Artifact: Enroll Status (eStatus)

Identical to the Enroll Status (eStatus) artifact received from the pledge as defined in [Section 7.8.2](#). The Registrar-Agent **MUST NOT** modify eStatus artifacts.

7.10.2. Response (no artifact)

In this exchange, the response is a result of the HTTP(S) default transport for this specification. There is no artifact provided to the Registrar-Agent.

7.11. Query Pledge Status (qps)

The following assumes that a Registrar-Agent may need to query the overall status of a pledge. This information can be useful to solve errors, when the pledge was not able to connect to the target domain during bootstrapping. A pledge **MAY** omit the dedicated endpoint for the Query Pledge Status operation (see [Section 6.2](#)).

TLS **MAY** be used to provide privacy for this exchange between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge (see [Appendix B](#)).

[Figure 43](#) shows the query and response for the overall pledge status and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.




Figure 43: Pledge Status exchange

The Registrar-Agent **SHALL** query the pledge via HTTP(S) POST to the pledge endpoint at `/ .well-known/brski/qps`. The request body **MUST** contain the Status Trigger (tStatus) artifact as defined in [Section 7.11.1](#). In the request header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json` and the Accept field **SHOULD** be set to `application/jose+json`.

If the pledge implements the Query Pledge Status endpoint, it **MUST** first verify the signature of the tStatus artifact using its trust anchors. If the pledge does not possess any domain trust anchor yet, it **MAY** skip the signature verification and choose to reply without it. In the case of success, it **MUST** reply with the Pledge Status (pStatus) artifact as defined in [Section 7.11.2](#) in the body of an HTTP 200 OK response. In the response header, the Content-Type field **MUST** be set to `application/jose+json`.

If the pledge is unable to create the pStatus artifact, the pledge responds with an HTTP error status code to the Registrar-Agent. The following client error status codes can be used:

- 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detects an error in the format of the request.
- 403 Forbidden: if the signature of the Registrar-Agent cannot be verified using the installed trust anchors.
- 406 Not Acceptable: if the Accept request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/jose+json`.
- 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type request header field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than `application/jose+json`.

The pledge **MAY** use the response body to signal failure details to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent.

7.11.1. Request Artifact: Status Trigger (tStatus)

The Status Query (tStatus) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the pledge, providing status query parameters.

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the tStatus artifact **MUST** use the "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" defined in [Section 7.2.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#), which **MUST** contain the JSON Status Trigger Data defined in [Section 7.11.1.1](#) in the JWS Payload. [Figure 44](#) summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON PER artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON Status Trigger Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 44: tStatus Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON Status Trigger Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#). The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in [Section 3.2](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). The octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.11.1.1. JSON Status Trigger Data

The JSON Status Trigger Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [\[RFC8259\]](#) that **MUST** conform with the CDDL [\[RFC8610\]](#) data model defined in [Figure 45](#):

```
statustrigger = {
  "version": uint,
  "serial-number": text,
  "created-on": tdate,
  "status-type": $status-type
}

$status-type /= "bootstrap"
$status-type /= "operation"
```

Figure 45: CDDL for JSON Status Trigger Data (statustrigger)

The version member is included to permit significant changes to the pledge status artifacts in the future. The format and semantics in this document follow the status telemetry definitions of [\[RFC8995\]](#). Hence, the version **SHALL** be set to 1. A pledge (or Registrar-Agent) that receives a version larger than it knows about **SHOULD** log the contents and emit an operational notification.

The `serial-number` member **SHALL** contain the product-serial-number corresponding to the `X520SerialNumber` field of the pledge IDevID certificate; it can be correlated with the product-serial-number in the signing certificate contained in the JWS Protected Header of the Pledge Status response artifact.

The `created-on` member **SHALL** contain the current date and time at `tStatus` creation as standard date/time string as defined in [Section 5.6](#) of [\[RFC3339\]](#); it can be used as reference time for the corresponding Pledge Status response artifact after correlating via the product-serial-number; note that pledges may not have synchronized time to provide the created-on date and time on their own.

The `status-type` allows for specifying which status information is to be returned. As shown in [Figure 45](#), BRSKI-PRM defines two enumeration values:

- `bootstrap` to query current status information regarding the bootstrapping status (e.g., voucher processing and enrollment of the pledge into a domain).
- `operation` to query current status information regarding the operational status (e.g., utilization of the bootstrapped EE credentials in communication with other peers).

Other specifications using this artifact may define further enumeration values, e.g., to query application-related status.

[Figure 46](#) shows an example for the JSON Status Trigger Data using the status type `bootstrap`:

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "created-on": "2025-01-12T02:37:39.235Z",
  "serial-number": "vendor-pledge4711",
  "status-type": "bootstrap"
}
```

Figure 46: JSON Status Trigger Data Example

7.11.1.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the `tStatus` artifact **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#):

- `alg`: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in [Section 4.1.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#)
- `x5c`: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded Registrar-Agent EE certificate used to sign the `tStatus` artifact as well as the certificate chain

[Figure 47](#) shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}
```

Figure 47: JWS Protected Header Example within tStatus

7.11.1.3. JWS Signature

The Registrar-Agent **MUST** sign the tStatus artifact using its EE credentials. The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in [Section 5.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

7.11.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Status (pStatus)

The Pledge Status (pStatus) artifact **SHALL** be an authenticated self-contained object signed by the pledge, containing status telemetry information. The exact content depends on the Status Trigger parameter status-type.

For the JWS-signed JSON format used by this specification, the pStatus artifact **MUST** use the "General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax" defined in [Section 7.2.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#), which **MUST** contain the JSON Pledge Status Data defined in [Section 7.11.2.1](#) in the JWS Payload. [Figure 48](#) summarizes the serialization of the JWS-signed JSON PER artifact:

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(JSON Pledge Status Data)),
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
      "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 48: pStatus Representation in General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax

The JSON Pledge Status Data **MUST** be UTF-8 encoded to become the octet-based JWS Payload defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#). The JWS Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of the payload member as described in [Section 3.2](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). The octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Protected Header are base64url-encoded to become the string value of the protected member. The generated JWS Signature is base64url-encoded to become the string value of the signature member.

7.11.2.1. JSON Pledge Status Data

The JSON Pledge Status Data **SHALL** be a JSON document [RFC8259] that **MUST** conform with the CDDL [RFC8610] data model defined in Figure 49, which has the same members as the voucherstatus-post CDDL defined in Section 5.7 of [RFC8995] and the enrollstatus-post CDDL defined in Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995].

```
pledgestatus = {  
  "version": uint,  
  "status": bool,  
  ?"reason" : text,  
  "reason-context": { * $$arbitrary-map }  
}
```

Figure 49: CDDL for JSON Pledge Status Data (*pledgestatus*)

The `version` member follows the definition in Section 7.11.1.1 (same as in JSON Status Query Data).

The `reason` and `reason-context` members follow the definitions in Section 7.6.2.1, i.e., in contrast to [RFC8995], `reason-context` **MUST** be provided.

The new `pStatus` artifact also utilizes the `reason-context` field to provide a distinguishable token. For `pStatus` artifacts, the JSON object in the `reason-context` field **MUST** contain either the

- `pbs-details` member for status information corresponding to the status-type bootstrap, or the
- `pos-details` member for status information corresponding to the status-type operation (see Section 7.11.1.1)

Other documents may add additional `reason-context` members correlating to other `status-trigger` status-types or to include further status information.

For the `pbs-details` member, the following values with the given semantics are defined, while additional information **MAY** be provided in the top-level `reason` member:

- `factory-default`: Pledge has not been bootstrapped. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID certificate/credentials.
- `voucher-success`: Pledge processed the voucher exchange successfully. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID certificate/credentials.
- `voucher-error`: Pledge voucher processing terminated with error. Additional information may be provided in the `reason` or `reason-context` members. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID certificate/credentials.
- `enroll-success`: Pledge processed the enrollment exchange successfully. Additional information may be provided in the `reason` or `reason-context` members. The pledge signs the response message using its domain-owner signed EE certificate/credentials.

- **enroll-error**: Pledge enrollment-response processing terminated with error. Additional information may be provided in the **reason** or **reason-context** members. The pledge signs the response message using its IDevID certificate/credentials.

The **pbs-details** values **SHALL** be cumulative in the sense that **enroll-success** and **enroll-error** imply **voucher-success**. [Figure 50](#) below provides an example for bootstrap status information in the JSON Pledge Status Data:

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": true,
  "reason": "Pledge processed enrollment exchange successfully.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pbs-details": "enroll-success"
  }
}
```

Figure 50: status-bootstrap JSON Pledge Status Data Example

For the **pos-details** member, the following values with the given semantics are defined, while additional information **MAY** be provided in the top-level **reason** member:

- **connect-success**: Pledge could successfully establish a connection to another peer. The pledge signs the response message using its domain-owner signed EE certificate/credentials.
- **connect-error**: Pledge connection establishment terminated with error. The pledge signs the response message using its domain-owner signed EE certificate/credentials.

[Figure 51](#) provides an example for operational status information in the JSON Pledge Status Data:

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "TLS certificate could not be verified.",
  "reason-context": {
    "pos-details": "connect-error"
  }
}
```

Figure 51: status-operation JSON Pledge Status Data Example

7.11.2.2. JWS Protected Header

The JWS Protected Header of the pStatus artifact **MUST** contain the following standard Header Parameters as defined in [\[RFC7515\]](#):

- **alg**: **SHALL** contain the algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256, as defined in [Section 4.1.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#).

- x5c: **SHALL** contain the base64-encoded pledge EE certificate used to sign the pStatus artifact and it **SHOULD** also contain the certificate chain for this certificate. The certificate chain **MUST** be available for certificate verification. If it is not contained in the x5c Header Parameter it is provided to the relying party by other means such as configuration.

Figure 52 shows an example for this JWS Protected Header:

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "x5c": [
    "base64encodedvalue==",
    "base64encodedvalue=="
  ]
}
```

Figure 52: JWS Protected Header Example within pStatus

7.11.2.3. JWS Signature

The pledge **MUST** sign the tStatus artifact using its IDevID or domain-owner signed EE credentials according to its bootstrapping status as defined in [Section 7.11.2.1](#). The JWS Signature is generated over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload as described in [Section 5.1](#) of [\[RFC7515\]](#). Algorithms used for JWS signatures **MUST** support ES256 as recommended in [\[RFC7518\]](#) and **MAY** support further algorithms.

8. Logging Considerations

The registrar **SHOULD** log certain events to provide an audit trail for the onboarding of pledges into its domain. This audit trail may support the root cause analysis in case of device or system failures. Recommend key events for logging comprise:

- Communication attempts between the pledge, Registrar-Agent, and registrar.
- Protocol handshakes and onboarding steps.
- Voucher requests and responses.
- Authentication successes or failures.

The logging **SHOULD** include the identity of the pledge, the identity of the Registrar-Agent that was interacting with the pledge, and relevant artifact fields, in particular telemetry information:

- PVR received from Registrar-Agent
- Acceptance of a pledge into the domain
- Voucher provided to Registrar-Agent
- PER received from Registrar-Agent
- Pledge EE certificate requested
- Pledge EE certificate received from Domain CA

- Pledge EE certificate provided to Registrar-Agent
- CA Certificates provided to Registrar-Agent
- Voucher Status received from Registrar-Agent
- Enroll Status received from Registrar-Agent
- Pledge Status received from Registrar-Agent
- Pledge EE certificate revoked

Furthermore, it is recommended to:

- support adjustable logging levels (severity) to cater to different operational needs or failure situations.
- include meta information to distinguish logs that relate to different BRSKI approaches (e.g., BRSKI, BRSKI-AE, BRSKI-PRM, constraint BRSKI) that are likely supported in the same domain in parallel.
- include detailed error codes and diagnostics information as defined throughout the document or stemming from other used components or libraries also in the logging information.
- support synchronized time (e.g., via NTP) to include timestamps in logging to enable sequencing and correlation of events.
- utilize standard logging formats (e.g., syslog) to allow for easy integration into log analysis tools and SIEM systems.
- utilize secure transmission of logs to centralized log servers, particularly in cloud or distributed environments (e.g., in case of syslog, [\[RFC9662\]](#) updates the utilized cipher suites for TLS and DTLS).
- allow for definition of key operational thresholds (e.g., high latency, failed onboarding attempts) to trigger alerts for proactive issue resolution.
- avoid inclusion of sensitive information (see also [Section 11](#))

For log analysis the following may be considered:

- The registrar knows which Registrar-Agent collected which PVR from the included agent-signed-data object.
- The registrar always knows the connecting Registrar-Agent from the TLS client authentication using the Registrar-Agent EE certificate and can log it accordingly.
- The telemetry information from the pledge can be correlated to the voucher through the product-serial-number in the EE certificate contained in the JWS Protected Header of the status artifacts and the product-serial-number contained in the voucher. By this it can also be related to the PER.

With this, it can for instance be analyzed if multiple Registrar-Agents are involved in bootstrapping devices. In addition, within the domain it can be analyzed, if the onboarding involved different Registrar-Agents or if different registrars have been used.

In order to protect the registrar from overload attacks, a rate-limiting may be used by logging events from the same type just once.

9. Operational Considerations

As outlined in [Section 5](#), BRSKI-PRM introduces an additional component with the Registrar-Agent in the BRSKI architecture in addition to new modes of interaction to facilitate the communication between the pledge and the registrar. As outlined in [Section 5.3](#) the functional support of BRSKI-PRM can also be achieved using a Registrar-Agent co-located with the Registrar instead of a stand-alone Registrar-Agent, which may reduce operational complexity.

This has an influence on the configuration and operation not only of the Registrar-Agent, but also for the registrar and the pledge.

As outlined in [Section 6](#), there are additional configuration items due to the introduction of the Registrar-Agent. This may increase operational complexity and potential misconfigurations in deploying and managing this entity:

- A Registrar-Agent needs to be provided with a Registrar-Agent EE certificate, the domain registrar EE certificate and the list of pledges. BRSKI-PRM is open regarding the selected provisioning method, which may be automated or by configuration.
- Pledges may support either BRSKI-PRM only or combined with other modes of operation.
- Registrars may support either BRSKI-PRM only or combined with other BRSKI modes of operation. The distinction of BRSKI and BRSKI-PRM is done based on the provided endpoints of the registrar. An operator deploying pledges with a mixed set of operation need to ensure that the domain registrar supports all necessary options to ensure bootstrapping of pledges depending of the supported operational mode.
- In addition, registrars may support a co-located Registrar-Agent, if nomadic operation of the Registrar-Agent is not required. This facilitates situations in which an operator wants to deploy BRSKI pledges acting as clients and BSKI pledges acting as servers.

With the Registrar-Agent enhancement a new component is introduced in the communication path between the pledge and the registrar. This likely increases the latency of the communication between the pledge and the registrar. The increase in latency due to this additional component may be neglected given that the Registrar-Agent operates with nomadic connectivity as outlined in [Section 5.2](#).

BRSKI-PRM requires pledges to possess an IDevID to enable onboarding in new domains. IDevID (and corresponding trust anchors) are expected to have a rather long lifetime. This may allow for a longer period between device acquisition and initial onboarding. Contrary, if devices that have been provided with an LDevID (and corresponding trust anchors) and temporarily taken out of service, immediate connectivity when bringing them back to operation may not be given, as the LDevIDs typically have a much shorter validity period compared to IDevIDs. It is therefore recommended to onboard them as new devices to ensure they possess valid LDevIDs.

The key infrastructure as part of the customer domain discussed in [Section 5](#) may be operated locally by the operator of that domain or may be provided as a third party service.

Requirements to the utilized credentials authenticating and artifact signatures on the registrar as outlined in [Section 6.3](#) may have operational implications when the registrar is part of a scalable framework as described in [Section 1.3.1](#) of [[I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations](#)].

Besides the above, also consider the existing document on operational modes for BRSKI MASA in [[I-D.richardson-anima-masa-considerations](#)].

10. IANA Considerations

This document requires the following IANA actions.

10.1. BRSKI Well-Known URIs

IANA is requested to enhance the Registry entitled: "BRSKI Well-Known URIs" with the following endpoints:

Path Segment	Description	Reference
requestenroll	Supply PER to registrar	[THISRFC]
wrappedcacerts	Obtain wrapped CA certificates	[THISRFC]
tpvr	Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request	[THISRFC]
tper	Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request	[THISRFC]
svr	Supply voucher to pledge	[THISRFC]
scac	Supply CA certificates to pledge	[THISRFC]
ser	Supply Enroll-Response to pledge	[THISRFC]
qps	Query pledge status	[THISRFC]

Table 5: BRSKI Well-Known URIs Additions

10.2. Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry

IANA is requested to register the following service names:

Service Name: brski-pledge

Transport Protocol(s): tcp

Assignee: IESG iesg@ietf.org

Contact: IETF Chair chair@ietf.org

Description: The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure Pledge

Reference: [THISRFC]

11. Privacy Considerations

The privacy considerations of [RFC8995] also apply for BRSKI-PRM. Two architectural changes in this document require some additional consideration:

- the introduction of the additional component Registrar-Agent
- no TLS between Registrar-Agent and pledge

As logging is recommended to better handle failure situations, it is necessary to avoid capturing sensitive or personal data. Privacy-preserving measures in logs **SHOULD** be applied, such as:

- Avoid logging personally identifiable information unless unavoidable.
- Anonymize or pseudonymize data where possible.

11.1. Registrar-Agent identity Privacy Considerations

The credentials used by the Registrar-Agent to sign the data for the pledge **SHOULD NOT** contain any personal information about the owner/operator of the Registrar-Agent. So for instance, issuing an EE certificate to the Registrar-Agent that has a Subject DN saying something like "Frank Jones' Commissioning Tablet" would be a problem.

Therefore, it is recommended to use an EE certificate associated with the commissioning device instead of an EE certificate associated with the service technician operating the device. This avoids revealing potentially included personal information to any eavesdroppers on the Registrar-Agent/Pledge communication. Along the Registrar-Agent/Registrar communication path, if TLS 1.2 is used, the client certificate details will be revealed to any on path passive attacker. This is one of the advantages of using TLS 1.3.

11.2. Registrar-Agent/Pledge communications

The communication between the pledge and the Registrar-Agent is performed over plain HTTP. HTTPS can not be easily used as the Pledge's long-term IDevID certificate does not contain a SubjectAltName that [RFC9525] DNS-ID verification can use to validate the certificate. In order for this connection to be more secure, the Registrar-Agent would need to know precisely which devices (down to the serial number) it expects to onboard. There are some very constrained cases where this might be the case, but for many installations, it is not practical.

An active on-path attacker [onpath] could trivially impersonate the Pledge at the network layer, which is exactly the same situation when not using TLS. For many installations, a physical cable may be involved (such as ethernet over USB), or a very low power wireless network will be used. Any active on-path attacker would have to be physically present at the site of the device. Such a physically present attacker could learn the identity of the Pledge by simply pretending to be a Registrar-Agent, and asking the device for its identity. It could equally do this over TLS/HTTPS.

It is impossible for an active on-path attacker to replace the signed objects that the Pledge and Registrar-Agent exchange undetected because those objects are signed by keys contained in the respective devices.

Depending on the requests and responses, the following information is disclosed:

- the Pledge product-serial-number is contained in the trigger message for the PVR and in all responses from the pledge. This information reveals the identity of the devices being bootstrapped and allows deduction of which products an operator is using in their environment. As the communication between the pledge and the Registrar-Agent may be realized over wireless link, this information could easily be eavesdropped, if the wireless network is not encrypted. Even if the wireless network is encrypted, if it uses a network-wide key, then layer-2 attacks (ARP/ND spoofing) could insert an on-path observer into the path.
- the Timestamp data could reveal the activation time of the device.
- the Status data of the device could reveal information about the current state of the device in the domain network.

[Section 7.1](#) describes to optionally apply TLS to protect the communication between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge. The following is therefore applicable to the communication without the TLS protection.

12. Security Considerations

In general, the security considerations of [\[RFC8995\]](#) apply for BRSKI-PRM also. Further security aspects are considered in the following subsections related to:

- the introduction of the additional component Registrar-Agent and related attack options.
- the reversal of the pledge communication direction (push mode, compared to BRSKI).
- no usage of TLS between Registrar-Agent and pledge and the resulting impact on transport of sensitive information (see [Section 7.1](#) regarding optional use of TLS to protect the communication between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge)

12.1. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack on Pledge

Disrupting the pledge behavior by a DoS attack may prevent the bootstrapping of the pledge to a new domain. Because in BRSKI-PRM the pledge responds to requests from real or illicit Registrar-Agents, pledges are more subject to DoS-attacks from Registrar-Agents in BRSKI-PRM than they are from illicit registrars in [\[RFC8995\]](#), where pledges do initiate the connections.

A DoS attack with a faked Registrar-Agent may block the bootstrapping of the pledge due changing state on the pledge (the pledge may produce a voucher-request, and refuse to produce another one). One mitigation may be that the pledge does not limit the number of voucher-requests it creates until at least one has finished. An alternative may be that the onboarding state may expire after a certain time, if no further interaction has happened.

In addition, the pledge may assume that repeated triggering for PVR are the result of a communication error with the Registrar-Agent. In that case the pledge **MAY** simply resend the PVR previously sent. Note that in case of re-sending, a contained nonce and also the contained agent-signed-data in the PVR would consequently be reused.

12.2. Misuse of acquired PVR and PER by Registrar-Agent

A Registrar-Agent that uses previously requested PVR and PER for domain-A, may attempt to onboard the device into domain-B. This can be detected by the domain registrar while PVR processing. The domain registrar needs to verify that the `proximity-registrar-cert` field in the PVR matches its own registrar EE certificate. In addition, the domain registrar needs to verify the association of the pledge to its domain based on the product-serial-number contained in the PVR and in the pledge IDevID certificate. (This is just part of the supply chain integration). Moreover, the domain registrar verifies if the Registrar-Agent is authorized to interact with the pledge for voucher-requests and enroll-requests, based on the Registrar-Agent EE certificate data contained in the PVR.

Mis-binding of a pledge by a faked domain registrar is countered as described in BRSKI security considerations [Section 11.4](#) of [RFC8995].

12.3. Misuse of Registrar-Agent

Concerns of misuse of a Registrar-Agent with a valid Registrar-Agent EE certificate may be addressed by utilizing short-lived certificates (e.g., valid for a day) to authenticate the Registrar-Agent against the domain registrar. The Registrar-Agent EE certificate may have been acquired by a prior BRSKI run for the Registrar-Agent, if an IDevID is available on Registrar-Agent. Alternatively, the Registrar-Agent EE certificate may be acquired by a service technician from the domain PKI system in an authenticated way.

In addition, it is required that the Registrar-Agent EE certificate is valid for the complete bootstrapping phase. This avoids that a Registrar-Agent could be misused to create arbitrary "agent-signed-data" objects to perform an authorized bootstrapping of a rogue pledge at a later point in time. In this misuse "agent-signed-data" could be dated after the validity time of the Registrar-Agent EE certificate, due to missing trusted timestamp in the Registrar-Agents signature. To address this, the registrar **SHOULD** verify the certificate used to create the signature on "agent-signed-data".

Furthermore, the registrar also verifies the Registrar-Agent EE certificate used in the TLS handshake with the Registrar-Agent. If both certificates are verified successfully, the Registrar-Agent's signature can be considered as valid. If the registrar detects a mismatch in the utilized certificates, it may conclude the usage of either an outdated "agent-signed-data" component in the PVR or a man-in-the-middle attack by a potentially unauthorized Registrar-Agent.

12.4. Misuse of DNS-SD with mDNS to obtain list of pledges

To discover a specific pledge a Registrar-Agent may query the Service Type in combination with the product-serial-number of a specific pledge, e.g., in the Service Instance Name or Service Subtype. The pledge reacts on this if its product-serial-number is part of the query message.

If the Registrar-Agent performs DNS-based Service Discovery without a specific product-serial-number, all pledges in the domain react if the functionality is supported. This functionality enumerates and reveals the information of devices available in the domain. The information about this is provided here as a feature to support the commissioning of devices. A manufacturer may decide to support this feature only for devices not possessing an LDevID or to not support this feature at all, to avoid an enumeration in an operative domain.

12.5. YANG Module Security Considerations

The enhanced voucher-request described in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] is based on [RFC8995], but uses a different encoding based on [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. The security considerations as described in Section 11.7 of [RFC8995] (Security Considerations) apply.

The YANG module specified in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] defines the schema for data that is subsequently encapsulated by a JOSE signed-data Content-type as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. As such, all of the YANG-modeled data is protected against modification.

Documents that define exclusively modules following the extension in [RFC8971] are not required to include the YANG security template per guidance in Section 3.7 of [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis].

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Appendix A. Examples

These examples are folded according to [RFC8792] Single Backslash rule.

A.1. Example Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) - from Pledge to Registrar-Agent

The following is an example request sent from a Pledge to the Registrar-Agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization". The message size of this PVR is: 2973 bytes

```
===== NOTE: '\ ' line wrapping per RFC 8792 =====
```

```
{
  "payload": "eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdC1wcm06dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3\\NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoieMDEyMzQ1Nj\\c4OSIsIm5vbmNlIjoia2h0eUtwTXRoY2NpYTFFYWHc0NC92UT09IiwiaY3JlYXRlc2CiOiI6IjIwMjQtMDYtMjRUMDk6MDE6MjQuNTU2WiIsImFnZW50LXBByb3ZpZGVkLXBByb3hpYW\\l0eS1yZWdpc3RyYXIitY2VydCI6Ik1JSUI0akNDQVlpZ0F3SUJBZ0lHQVhZNzJiY1pNQW\\9HQ0NxR1NNNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMTVRblZ6YVc1bGMzMThEVEFMQM\\dOVkJB01CrK5wZedVeER6QU5CZ05WQkFNTUJsUmxiMjEUEUVBZUZ3MHlnREV5TURjd0\\5qGTRNVephRncwek1ERXLNRGN3TmPFNE1USMFNRDR4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUxZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBKR1V4R0RBV0JnTlZCQU1NRDBSdmJXRnBibEpsWjJsemRISmhjakJaTUJNR0J5cUdTtTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTtTTQ5QXdFESEwSUFCCmsxNk\\svaTc5b1JrSzZYmVQZzhVU1I4L3VmMRQVWlaSE10b2tTZHFVLzVmbldzQmQrcVJMNI\\dSZmZlV2t5Z2Vib0pmSWxsdxJAjTI1d25oaU9WQ0dqZXpCNU1CMEDBMVVks1FRV01CUU\\dDQ3NHQVFVRkJK3TUJCZ2dyQmdFrKJRy0RIREFPQmd0VkhROEJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXdTQV\\1EV1IwUkJFRXdkQNELky21WbmFYtjbJbUZ5TFhSBGMzUXVjMmxsYldWdWN5MWlkQzV1W1\\htQ0huSmxaMmx6ZEhKaGNpMTBaWE4wTmk1emFXVnRaVzV6TFdKMExtNWxkREFLQmdncW\\hrak9QUVFEQWd0SUFEQkZBaUJ4bGRCaFpxMEV2NUppMM1BYV0N0eVM2aERZVzf5Q08vUm\\F1YnBDN01heSURNSWhBTfNKYmdMbmdoYmJBZzBKY1dGVVZvL2dHTjAvand6SLOWU2WyaD\\R4SVhRMSIsImFnZW50LXNpZ25lZC1kYXRhIjoieXlkd1lybHNiMkZSRWpaVpYEtJRnBZBVW0xTVdGcDJamRPYjFwVWNYUmpivlo0wkZkV2VtUkRNWGRqYlRBMldWZGtiR0p1VV\\hsak1teHVZbTFXYTB4WFVtaGtSMFZwVDI1emFWa3pTbXhaV0ZKc1drTxhkUpwU1RaSm\\FrbDNUV3BKZEUxRWEzUK5ha3BWVFSVsk5rNUVUVFPVKVGMRWUkpNVmRWU1h0SmJrNX\\NZmjFzYUDkre1YVmtWekZwV2xoSmFVOXBWTGROVkvSNlrUlZnazU2WnpWSmJqRTVJaX\\dpYZjsbmJtRjBkWEpsY3ljNlczcl2lJEp2EdWamRHVmtJam9pWlhsS2NtRlhVV2xQYV\\VwVlZFZE5NMWRZYUv4V2JGWldaVzVLTTFKVVRsSlhWRlpEV2xaa2IyTXlNVVZOTW1NNV\\NXbdNhVmxYZuc1SmftOXBVBfpOZVU1VVdXbg1VU0lzSW50cfOYNwhkSFZ5WlNJnk1rd3\\lZVEjsY3pWZkxXZHNVjkWtjFVME1VbfJXRmxJU1RSQlMxVldVRkZmTTSbGQxUTFiMF\\ZWWVVODFVIQktaMmRyu0cd09WTk1avFZ1YWKxbldGbFRimk5st1RoeFFXSnr0a0YwZF\\MxrliXukxZMDVSSW4xzGZRMEsifX0",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "eyJ4NWMI0lsiTUlJQitu0QNBUNnQXDjQkFnSudBGW5WanNV\\NU1Bb0ddQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSKJnTlZCQVluQWtGUk1SVXdFd1lEV1FRS0RB\\eEthVzVuU21sdVowTnzjbkf4RnpBVkKnTlZCQU1NRgtwcGJtZEthVzVuVkdWemRFTkJN\\Q0FYRFRJeIEWXDORExTKRZeE5Gb1lEems1T1RreE1qTXhNak0xt1RVNVdqQLNNUXN3\\Q1FZRFRZRUUdFd0pCVVRfvk1CTUdBMVVFQ2d3TVntbhVaMHBwYm1kRGIZsndNUK13RVFZ\\RFZRuuZFD293TVRJek5EVTJOemc1TVJJd0ZRURWUVFEREE1S2FXNW5tbWx1WjBSbGrT\\bGaVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTtTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTtTTQ5QXdFESEwSUFCCzc5bGlhUmNCalpj\\RUVYdzdyVWVhdnRHSKF1SDRwazRJNDJYUjNc1UxmWLMDRENTdtGtWaHRVVjIXbzXhS0N2\\TXgyWSttTDROWGZwdWyM3ozveLWQldqZFRCEk1DC0d3C2NHQVFVRkJK3RWdcQjhxSFCx\\aGMyRXRkR1Z6ZEM1emFXVnRaVzV6TFdKMExtNWxkRG81TkRRek1COEDBMVVKSxDRWU1C\\YUFGRIFMak56UC9TL2tvdWpRd2pnUUU1ZnZ3Y1liTUJNR0EXVVRKUvFNTUfvr0NDcd0B\\UVVGQndNQ01BNEDBMVVkRhDFQi93UUVBd0lIZ0RBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFnTkhBREJF\\QWlCdTN3UkJMc0pNUDVzTTA3MEgrVUZyeU5VNmdLekXPumNGEvJST2xxcUhpZ0lnWENT\\SkxUekVsdKqycG9LNmr4NmwxL3V5bVRuYlFERGZkbGF0dVgYUm9PRTOixSwidHlwIjoie\\dm91Y2hlci1qd3MrannvbiIsImFsZyI6IkVtMjU2In0",
      "signature": "ntAgC7GT7xIDYCHBXoyej8uIU16WR2Iv-7T1CaR-J6-xS60D\\iWS1-vfc5Uu5INZS1dyWZ4vVH6uaoPceRxNc8g"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 53: Example Pledge-Voucher-Request - PVR

A.2. Example Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR) - from Registrar to MASA

The following is an example registrar-voucher-request (RVR) sent from the Registrar to the MASA, in "General JWS JSON Serialization". Note that the previous PVR can be seen in the payload as "prior-signed-voucher-request". The message size of this RVR is: 7533 bytes

===== NOTE: '\ ' line wrapping per RFC 8792 =====

```
{
  "payload": "eyJpZXRMZXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdC1wcm06dm91Y2hlcilI6eyJhc3\
NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoieyJmZm91Y2hlcilI6eyJhc3\
c4OSIsImk1Zm91Y2VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoieyJmZm91Y2hlcilI6eyJhc3\
svQnhocz0iLCJub25jZSI6ImtoTn1lC1E10aGNjaWEexc1h3NDQvd1E9PSIsInByaW9yLX\
NpZ25lZC12b3VjaGVyLXJlcXVlc3Q1OiJleUp3WVhsc2IyRmtJam9pWlhsS2NGcFlVbT\
FNV0ZwMlpgZE9iMXBZU1hSamJWWjRaRmRXZW1SRE1YZGpiVEEYwkcwNU1Wa3lhR3hqYV\
VrMlpYbEThR016VG14amJsSndZakkwYVU5cFNtaGFNbFoxWkVNeGQyTnRPFVJoVnpGd1\
pFaHJhVXhEU25wYVdFcHdXVmQzZEdKdVZuUlpiVlo1U1dwdmFVMUVSWGx0ZWxFeFRtcG\
pORT1U1h0SmJUVjJZbTFPYkVscWlYbGhNbWhQWlZWWMGQxU1lVbTlaTWs1d1dWUkd1Vm\
RJWXPCT1F6a3lWVlF3T1VscGQybFpNMHBZV1ZoU2JGcERNWFppYVVRMlNXcEpkmDFxVV\
hSTlJGbdBUBV3BTv1UxRWF6Wk5SRVUyVfDwUmRVNVVWVEpYVYVse1NXMudibHBYTlRCTV\
dFSjvZak5hY0ZwSFZtdE1XRUo1WWpOb2NHS1hiREJsVXpGNVdsZGtjR016VW5sWldfBd\
BXVEpXZVdSRFNUWkphekZLVTFWsk1HRnJUa1JSVm14d1dqQkdNMU5WU2tKYU1HeE1VV1\
pvV2s1N1NtbFpiSEJPVZjNVNGRXdUbmhTTVU1T1RrUnNRMUZWTWVSVVZWS1daVVZXTm\
xGV1NrTmFNRfZYVVD0R2RsUlZUbkpOVkZaU1l1teGF0bGxXWxpGaViWMTZWrmhvUlZaRl\
JrMVJiV1JQVm10S1Fsa3dNVU5TYXpWM1drVmtWbVZGVWpaUlZUVkRXakExVjFGclJrNV\
VWVXB6V1cxNGFRMHhTa1ZWVmxKQ1dsVmFNMDfJYkU1U1JWWTFWR1ZTYW1Rd05YRlNWRk\
pPVmtWd2FGSnVZM2RsYXpGRlVsaHNubEpIVGp0VWJYQkdUa1V4VlZOdFJrNVNSRkkwVW\
xod1FsVnJTBtVvYkZwRFVWYzVUbEV5YzNoT1ZrWjFWbTV3YUZaNLZuTlplazVPW1VWU1\
ZWR1ZlRU5hTURWWFVXDEdbfJWU2tkVWJrSnJVakZXTkZJd1VrSldNRXB1Vkd4YVExRl\
ZNVTVtUkVKVFpHMUTXRkp1UW1saVJYQnpWMnBLYzJWdFVrbFRiV2hxWVd0S1lWU1ZTaz\
VTTUvVmvKxVmtWR1JVVVRWU1YyUkdVakJPkUd0VlpGU1VWRkUxVvZoa1JsTkZSWGRUV1\
VaRFVXMxp1RTVyYzNaaFZHTTFZakZLY2x0NlZscFpiVl1pSV25wb1ZsVXhTVFJNTTFaNL\
RWZFNVVlpYykdGVFJURXdZakowVkJwSVJreFdlbFp0WW14a2VsRnRVWVEpQvmtwTlRqRm\
tVMXB0V214V01uUTFXakpXYVdJd2NHMVRWM2h6WkZoS2FtRlVtVEZrTWpWd1lWVTVWMU\
V3WkhGYVdIQKRUBfV4UTAxRlpfSk5WbFpyVTJ4R1VsWXdnVU5WVldSRVvUTk9TRkZXUm\
xaU2Ewb3pWR1ZLUTFveVpIbFJiV1JHVV10S1Vsa3dVa2xTU1VaUVVXMWtUMVpyYUZKUF\
JVcENXbXBvUmxGclJrNVJNRWt3VVZoa1ZGRldiRVZXYkVsM1ZXDEtSbEpZWkZGT1JXeh\
JXVE14vjJKdFJsbfVha0pxWWxWYU5WUKdhRk5pUjAxNlZWafDhazF0ZUhoWmJHU1haRm\
RPT1UxWGJHdFJlbf14VjJ4b1ZGRXdhSFZUYlhoaFRXMTRObHBGYUV0aFIwNXdUV1JDWV\
ZkRk5IZFViV3N4W1cxR1dGwNvVbUZXZwZMLZFWmtTMDFGZUhtST1YzaHJV1a1ZHVEZGdF\
pHNWpWmmh5WVdzNVVWVldSa1ZSVjJSUFUxVkdSVkZyV2tKaFZVbzBZa2RTUTJGR2N1aE\
5SV1l5VGxWd1RVMMXNRbmXtU0U0d1pWWK5NbUZGVWxwV2VrWTFVVEE0ZGxWdFJqRlpi0\
pFVGpBeGFGTlZVbTVUvJJoQ1ZFwK9TMWx0WkUxaWJXUnZXVzFLUWxwN1FtdfPnV1JIVm\
xaYWRrd3laRWhVYWTGM1lXNWtObE5zYjNkV1uZDVZVJTTkZOV2FISk5VMGx6U1cxR2\
JscFh0VEJNV0U1d1dqSTFiRnBETVd0WldGSM9TV3B2YVZwWWJFdGtNV3haWWtoT2FVMX\
JXbkpUVjNCM1lWwNdXV0pGZEduU2JrSmFWbGN3ZUZSV1pFZGpSRXBoVW0xU1VGbHFSbm\
RYVms1WlZXMxdhVlpzYnpCWGEXchJWakpXZEZwclVrNVhSMUp4V1d4U1FrMXNaRmRhUj\
NScFVqQndNVlpXYUZ0aGF6RjBaVWhXV21KVJJaFpWRUkwVjBaV2RHRkhkRk50UmxwM1\
ZrUkpNV1Z0UmxkaE0zQ1VZbGhvWVZzd1drdGpNV1J5VkJob2EYsLzjSGRWTvZKaFuYMU\
djbUpFVGxWV00wSkxXa1ZWZUZKWFJyCFZhe1ZvWVR0Q1YxWkdWbE5XYXpWeVRSvldWV1\
pHY0ZCV2ExWkhUVlpTVjFWcmNFNVdiVkozVlRGb1QxTnRTbkpPV0U1YVRXcEdlbGxWWk\
V0U1JURlpWbTEwVjJWclduZFdNbMh2VTIxR1ZrOVlRbFJYUjFKUFZtdFdjMDVzVW5KVm\
JGcE9ZWHBWTWkdWNGZFRIvXB4VWxSV1NtRllaSEJaZWtwelltMUTkRkpxUW10WFJYQn\
pXE5zU2s1c1kzcGpNbXhxVTBWd01scEZAzmRoYlZKSvZtMTBTbUZ0T1hCWGJHaHpVek\
pPZEZKc2FGWldNbMhSV1ZaV2QxWnXa1phU1RWT1RWZFNXbGxWVmpSV01rcEhWMMnhrWV\
ZaNLZreFVWRVpMVmxaU2MxTnNhRmRTYkhCRlZqSjRZV0V5U1hsVVDHeE9WbFphVDFSWE\
1VNU9WazVZWWtST2FGWnRlRmxhVldNeFuYmUdkRTLZUWxaaVJuQ1BXbFpWTVZaV1pGaG\
lSekZXVlRcc2VsTlh0VTlqUm05NVRsZG9hMU5HV2pWWGJFNUTUbXRzY21RemJGcFdSVX\
B6V1ROd1YxchJlRmhhU0U1YVZtcHJKMVJxUmxaTlJURldZa1pLV0ZKdGVFcFZNVkpUVV\
d4TmVGWnNaRlpTYTFwdFZGUkdVMkpIVVhoVlZFWnBUVvphVjFkV1ZrOWtSbFpKVVD0MF\
lVMXRybmxWTUdNeFpEQTVMMVJyTVdGV1Jsb3hXVmRyZUdKc1pFZG1SbEpwVfDzMWMXUX\
hVbTlsUmtaWVUyNVNUMkV3V1hkYVJrMTRVbXhKZUZWcmVGcE5SRlpUVTFjMGVGCeHxbE\
```

[illegible]

```

b24iLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
  "signature": "_mcs05vo0g2rFmBvTb-Us0WkEmhYNfQ5XmbuKHKH0ZLjea-7\
911BiLAmDfORmT4vCzWKBSH6HSqtpIRcSSxx7Q"
}
]
}

```

Figure 54: Example Registrar-Voucher-Request - RVR

A.3. Example Voucher - from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and Registrar-Agent

The following is an example voucher-response from MASA to Pledge via Registrar and Registrar-Agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization". The message size of this Voucher is: 1916 bytes

```

===== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 =====
{
  "payload": "eyJpZXRMZXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2V\
udC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoieMDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5vbmNlIjo\
iTdNJSjZocHRIQ0lRb054YWFiOUhXQT09IiwiaWY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjY0MTY2\
UMDU6MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2\
3SUJBZ0lHQVcwZUx1SCtNQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMTV\
Rb1Z6YVc1bGMzMjY0MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2MTY2\
EUVRBZUZ3MmhhPVEE1TVRFd01qTTNkphRncweU9UQTUVEV3TWpNM016SmFNRV40Xp\
BUk1JnTlZCQW9NQ2sxnVFNpVzVsYzNNeERUQUxhZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHhBTk\
nTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMxUkRRVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTlTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTlTQ5QWdFSEwSUF\
CT2t2a1RidThRbFQzRkhKMVhSTcrV3NIT2IwVVMzU0FMdEc1d3VLUURqaWV4MDYvU2N\
ZNVBKAwJ2Z0hUQitGL1FUamd1bEhHeTFZS3B3Y05NY3NTEWfQULRCRE1CSUdBMVVKRX\
FQi93UUIlNQVlCQWY4Q0FRRXdEZ11EVlIwUEFRSC9CQVFEQWdJRUI1CMEdBMVVKRGdRV\
CVG9aSU16UWRzRC9qLytnWC83Y0JKdWNIL1htakFLQmdncWhrak9QUVFEQWd0SkFEQkd\
BaUVBdHhRMytJTEdCUEl0U2g0Yj1XWGHYtVocVNQNkgrYi9MQy9mV1lEa1E2b0NJUUR\
HMnVSQ0hsVnEzeWhCNThUWE1VYnpIOCTpBgHxVXZPbFJEM1ZFcURkY1F3PT0ifX0",
  "signatures": [ {
    "protected": "eyJ4NWMiOiJsiTUlJQmt6Q0NBVGlnQXhJQkFnSudBV0ZCakNrWU1\
Bb0dDQ3FHU000UJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSk1JnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SVXdFd11EVlFRS0RBeEt\
hVzVuU21sdVowTnZjbkF4RnpBVk1JnTlZCQU1NRGtwcGJtZEtVzVzVkdWemRFTk1JNjR\
YRFRFNE1ERXlPVEV3TlRjME1Gb1hEVEk0TURFeU9URXd0VEkwTUZvd1R6RUxNQWtHQTF\
VRUJoTUNRVkV4RlRBEJnTlZCQW9NREVEwcGJtZEtVzVzVUUTI5eWNERXBNQ2NHQTFVRUF\
3d2dTbWx1WjBwcGJtZERiM0p3SUZadmRXtm9aWElnVTJsbmJtbHVaeUJMWlhrd1dUQVR\
CZ2NxaGtqT1BRUJJCZ2dxaGtqT1BRTUJCd05DQUFTQzZiZUx1bWVxMVZ3Nm1Rc1JzOFI\
wW1crNGIxR1d5ZG1XczJHQU1GV3diaXRmMm5JWEgzT3FIS1Z1OHMyUnZpQkd0aXZPS0d\
CSEh0QmRkRkVaWnZiN294SXdfREFPQmdOVkhROEJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXh0ZDZ11JS29aSXp\
qMEVBD0lEU1FBd1JnSWhBSTRQWJ4dHNzSFAYVkh4XC90e1VvUWVwU3N5ZEWzMERRSU5\
FdGNOOW1DVfHQWlFQXZJYjNvK0ZPM0JUBmNMRnNhSlpSQWtkN3pPdXN0X09cL1pLT2F\
FS2JzVkrPVT0iXSwiYWxnIjoieRVMYNTYifQ",
    "signature": "0TB5lr-cs1jqka2vNbQm3bBYWfLJd8zdVKIoV53eo2YgSITnKKY\
TvHMUw0wx9wduNVjNoAgLysNIgEv1c1tBw"
  } ]
}

```

Figure 55: Example Voucher-Response from MASA

A.4. Example Voucher, MASA issued Voucher with additional Registrar signature (from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and Registrar-Agent)

The following is an example voucher-response from MASA to Pledge via Registrar and Registrar-Agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization". The message size of this Voucher is: 2994 bytes

===== NOTE: '\\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 =====

```
{
  "payload": "eyJpZXRMZXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2h1ciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2\
VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtdnVtYmVYIjoImDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5vbmNlIj\
oia2h0eUtwTXRoY2NpYTFyWHc0NC92UT09IiwIY3JlYXRlZC1vb2I6IjIwMjQ0MDYtMj\
RUMDk6MDI6MTYuMjQ0WiIsInBpbm5lZC1kb21haW4tY2VydCI6Ik1JSUJwRENDQVVTZ0\
F3SUJBZ0lHQVcwZUx1SctNQW9HQ0NxR1NNNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMT\
VRb1Z6YVc1bGMzTXhEVEFMQmd0VkJBY01CRk5wZEdVeER6QU5CZ05WQkFNTUJUsUmxjM1\
JEUVRBZUZ3MHhPVEE1TVRFd01qTTNNekphRncweU9UQTUVEV3TWpNM016SmFNRfV4RX\
pBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQXUxZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTk\
JnTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUkRRVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTtTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTtTQ5QXdfSEwSU\
FCT2t2a1RidThRbFQzRkhKMVhSTcrV3NIT2IwVVMzU0FMdEc1d3VLUURqaWV4MDYvU2\
NZNVBKAwJ2Z0hUQitGL1FUamd1bEhHeTFZS3B3Y05NY3NTEwFqULRCRE1CSUdBmVvKRX\
dfQi93UUlNQVlCQWY4Q0FRRXdeZ1lEVlIiwUEFRSC9CQVFEQWdJRUICMEdBMVvKRGdRV0\
JCVG9aSU16UWRzRC9qLytnWC83Y0JKdWNIL1htakFLQmdncWhrak9QUVFEQWd0SkFEQk\
dBaUVBdHhRMytJTEdCUEl0U2g0Yj1XWGHYtVocVNQNKgrYi9MQy9mV1lEa1E2b0NJUU\
RHMnVSQ0hsVnEzeWhCNTuUWE1VYnpIOctPbGhXVXZPbFJEM1ZFcURkY1F3PT0ifX0",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "eyJ4NWMi0lSiTUlJQmt6Q0NBVGlnQXdJQkFnSudBV0ZCakNr\
WU1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSk1JnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SVXdfd1lEVlFRS0RB\
eEthVzVuU21sdVowTnZjbkF4RnpBVk1JnTlZCQU1NRGtwcGJtZEthVzVuVkdWemRFTk\
QjRyRFRFNE1ERXlPVEV3TlRjME1Gb1hEVEk0TURFeU9URXd0VEkwTUZvd1R6RUxNQWtH\
QTFVRUJ0TUNRVkV4R1RBVEJnTlZCQW9NREVEwGJtZEthVzVuUTI5eWNERXBQ2NHQTfV\
RUF3d2d2bWx1WjBwcGJtZERiM0p3SUZadmRXtm9aWElnVTJsbmJtbHVaeUJmWlhrd1dU\
QVRCZ2NxaGtqT1BRSUJCZ2dxaGtqT1BRTUJCd05DQUFTQzZiZUxwBbWVxMVZ3Nm1RclJz\
OFIwWlcrNGIxR1d5ZG1XczJHQU1GV3diaXRmMm5JWEgzT3FIS1Z1OHMyUnZpQkd0aXZP\
S0dCSEh0QmRkRkVaWnZiN294SXdFREFPQmd0VkhR0EJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXddZ1lJS29a\
SXpQMEVBd0lEU1FBd1JnSWhBSTRQWWJ4dHNzSFAYVkh4L3R6VW9RL1NzeWRMMzBEU10\
RXRjTjltQ1RYUEFpRUF2SWIzbytGTzNCVG5jTEZzYUpaUkFrZDd6T3Vzbi8vWktPYUUL\
YnNWRG1VPSJdLCJ0eXAI0iJ2b3VjaGVyLWp3cytqc29uIiwIYXNlIjoiaWwIjoiRVMYNTYifQ",
      "signature": "Sftc2xqK8xN2KVqkYKJl7EUU8UJAai3VvCuK8LIh8HZFvrr\
hqGiY8vK5cbQHQCjVcroFLn7IyhH708XAdstAQ"
    },
    {
      "protected": "eyJ4NWMi0lSiTUlJQjRqQ0NBWwlnQXdJQkFnSudBWFk3MmJi\
Wk1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRfV4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzNNeERU\
QUxZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTk1JnTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUkRRVEFlRncweU1ERXlN\
RGN3TmPNE1USmFGdzB6TURFeU1EY3d0akU0TVRKYU1ENHhFekFSQmd0VkJBb01DazE1\
UW5WemFXNWxjM014RFRBTEJnTlZCQWNNQkZ0cGRHVXhHREFXQmd0VkJBTU1EMFJ2YldG\
cGJsSmxaMmx6ZEhKaGNgQlPnQk1HQnlxR1NNNDlBZ0VHQ0NxR1NNNDlBd0VIQTBJQUJC\
azE2Sy9pNzlvUmtLNVliZVBnOFVUJjgvdXMxZFBVaVpITXRva1NkcUxNWZuV3NCZCtX\
Ukw3V1JmZmVXa3lnZWJvSmZJbGx1cmNpMjV3bmhpT1ZDR2plekI1TUlwR0ExVWRKUUVFX\
TUJRR0NDc0dBuVVGQndNQkJnZ3JCZ0VGQ1FjREhEU9CZ05WSFE4QkFm0EVCQU1DQjRB\
d1NBWURWUjBSQkVfZ1A0SWRjbVZuYVh0MGNTnRlMWFJJsYzNRdWMybGxiV1Z1Y3kxawRD\
NXVawFNDSG5KbFoybHpkSEpoY2kxMFpYtjB0aTV6YVdWdFpXNXpMV0owTG01bGREQUtC\
Z2dxaGtqT1BRUURBZ05JQUURCRkFpQnhsZEJoWnEwRXRY1SkwyUHJXQ3R5UzZoRF1XMXlD\
Ty9SYXVicEM3TWFJRgdJaEFMU0piZ0xuZ2hiYkFnMGRjV0ZVVM8vZ0d0MC9qd3pKwJBT\
bDJoNHhJWGSxIl0sInR5cCI6InZvdWNoZXItdandZK2pzb24iLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9\
",
      "signature": "0Q7_a7L4ahn2vmfSxxkKg1xs0MMc8_D7B_I1zqv5DKzCMkc7\
8YeeezDsuh4Z5JNVQUYHPp7LsK_AS_WH8TdVzA"
    }
  ]
}
```

```
}
```

Figure 56: Example Voucher-Response from MASA, with additional Registrar signature

Appendix B. HTTP-over-TLS operations between Registrar-Agent and Pledge

The use of HTTP-over-TLS between Registrar-Agent and pledge has been identified as an optional mechanism.

Provided that the key-agreement in the underlying TLS protocol connection can be properly authenticated, the use of TLS provides privacy for the voucher and enrollment operations between the pledge and the Registrar-Agent. The authenticity of the onboarding and enrollment is not dependent upon the security of the TLS connection.

The use of HTTP-over-TLS is not mandated by this document for two main reasons:

1. A certificate is generally required in order to do TLS. While there are other modes of authentication including PSK, various EAP methods, and raw public key, they do not help as there is no previous relationship between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge.
2. The pledge can use its IDevID certificate to authenticate itself, but [RFC9525] DNS-ID methods do not apply, as the pledge does not have a FQDN, and hence cannot be identified by DNS name. Instead a new mechanism is required, which authenticates the X520SerialNumber DN attribute that must be present in every IDevID.

If the Registrar-Agent has a pre-configured list of which product-serial-number(s), from which manufacturers it expects to see, then it can attempt to match this pledge against a list of potential devices.

In many cases only the list of manufacturers is known ahead of time, so at most the Registrar-Agent can show the X520SerialNumber to the (human) operator who may then attempt to confirm that they are standing in front of a device with that product-serial-number. The use of scannable QR codes may help automate this in some cases.

The CA used to sign the IDevID will be a manufacturer private PKI as described in [Section 4.1](#) of [I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors]. The anchors for this PKI will never be part of the public WebPKI anchors which are distributed with most smartphone operating systems. A Registrar-Agent application will need to use different APIs in order to initiate an HTTP-over-TLS connection without performing WebPKI verification. The application will then have to do its own certificate chain verification against a store of manufacturer trust anchors. In the Android ecosystem this involves use of a customer TrustManager: many application developers do not create these correctly, and there is significant push to remove this option as it has repeatedly resulted in security failures (see [\[androidtrustfail\]](#)).

Also note that an Extended Key Usage (EKU) for TLS WWW Server authentication cannot be expected in the pledge IDevID certificate. IDevID certificates are intended to be widely usable and EKU does not support that use.

Appendix C. History of Changes "RFC Editor: please delete"

Proof of Concept Code available

From IETF draft 22 -> IETF draft 23:

- editorial update of new section on TLS usage clarifications [Section 4.1](#)
- structural and editorial improvements to privacy considerations [Section 11](#)

From IETF draft 21 -> IETF draft 22:

- addressed remaining issues from telechat
 - included overview subsections for reason-context definition and usage in [Section 6.2](#)
 - updated status detail examples to correctly use the defined types in the status structure.
 - new section on TLS usage clarifications [Section 4.1](#)

From IETF draft 20 -> IETF draft 21:

- addressed remaining issues from telechat
 - RetryAfter response to be always provided in case of 503 Service unavailable response

From IETF draft 19 -> IETF draft 20:

- addressed last comments and nits before telechat

From IETF draft 18 -> IETF draft 19:

- addressed DISCUSS received during telechat preparation:
 - issue 136: included hint for reaction on HTTP requests to avoid DoS (rate limiting) in [Section 6.2](#)
 - issue 137: HTTP error handling BCP RFC 9205: removed normative language for HTTP status codes
 - issue 139: usage of TLS 1.3 emphasized by also referencing UTA draft in [Section 7.3](#)
 - issue 140: provided hint for time synchronization of registrar-agent in [Section 6.1](#)
 - issue 145: clarified language tagging in status information in [Section 7.6.2.1](#)
- addressed COMMENT, NITS, received during telechat preparation, specifically
 - issue 140: synchronized time
 - issue 141: config options for discovery and nonceless vouchers in [Section 7.6](#) and [Section 6.1](#)

- issue 142: addressed TTL of provisional accept state by utilizing the last received tPVR for the binding in [Section 7.1](#)
- issue 144: clarified usage of "MUST ...unless" in [Section 6.2](#)
- issue 146: added MTI algorithm for JWS signatures
- issue 147: definitions of reason-context in status objects
- updated reference of BRSKI-AE (now RFC 9733).
- removed unused references

From IETF draft 17 -> IETF draft 18:

- addressed nits received from the GenART review
- addressed comment from IANA to update contact for service name registration from IESG to IETF Chair in [Section 10.2](#)
- SECDIR review: included reasoning for short lived certificates in [Section 6.1](#)
- SECDIR review: enhanced reasoning for optional TLS usage in [Section 7.1](#)
- SECDIR review: added hint for handling if the accept header is not used in [Section 7.1](#) and [Section 7.2](#)
- SECDIR review: added hint for response body encoding in [Section 7.1](#) and [Section 7.2](#)
- SECDIR review: added hint regarding IDevID and LDevID validity in [Section 9](#)
- DNSDIR review: renamed [Section 10.2](#) to Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry
- from IANA expert review: included registered service names in headings

From IETF draft 16 -> IETF draft 17:

- updated formatting of key events in [Section 8](#)
- updated reference to corresponding sections for JWS Header and Signature in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] in [Section 7.1.2.1](#) and [Section 7.3.4.1](#)
- simplified description for JWS Protected Header aligning with the update in draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-15 to always include the certificate chain in [Section 7.1.2.1](#) and [Section 7.3.4.1](#)

From IETF draft 15 -> IETF draft 16:

- issue #135: corrections from IOTDIR review (clarification regarding minimum supported discovery in [Section 6.1.2](#), clarification regarding CDDI notation in [Figure 27](#) and editorial nits.
- updated references (draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr became RFC 9646, included RFC 9662, operational considerations drafts for registrar and MASA)
- AD review: included term Registrar-Agent in Terminology section
- AD review: enhanced interaction information in [Figure 1](#) and [Figure 2](#)
- AD review: included new section on [Section 9](#) to outline operational considerations
- AD review: enhanced [Section 8](#) with more detailed recommendations on logging
- AD review: enhanced [Section 11](#) with enhanced recommendations concerning logging

- AD review: enhanced [Section 12.3](#) with more information about misuse of the Registrar-Agent
- IOTDIR/OPSDIR/AD review: addressed various nits received throughout the draft

From IETF draft 14 -> IETF draft 15:

- issue #134: editorial clarifications on references to [\[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery\]](#) in [Section 6.1.1](#) and [Section 6.1.2](#)

From IETF draft 13 -> IETF draft 14:

- Update of the examples in [Appendix A](#) to align with the defined prototypes
- Changes incorporated based on Shepherd review PR #133:
 - Terminology alignment and clarification throughout the document to use terms more consistently
 - Restructuring of [Section 7](#) for protocol steps to align to the general approach: Overview, data description, CDDL description (if necessary), JWS Header and Signature. This led to some movement of text between existing and new subsections.
 - Inclusion of new section on logging hints [Section 8](#) to give recommendations on which events to be logged for auditing
 - Alignment of pledge status response data across [Section 7.6.2.1](#), [Section 7.8.2.1](#), and [Section 7.11.2.1](#).
 - Included MASA component in description of affected components in [Section 6](#)
 - Moved host header field handling from [Appendix B](#) to [Section 6.2](#) as generally applicable
 - Updated status artifacts (vStatus, eStatus, pStatus) to align with BRSKI CDDL definition, but made reason-context mandatory to have distinguishable objects for the registrar-agent
 - Correction of terminology of local host name vs. service instance name in [Section 6.1.2](#)
- Update of informative references and nits

From IETF draft 12 -> IETF draft 13:

- Deleted figure in Section "Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR)" for JSON representation of tPVR, as it has been replaced by CDDL
- Updated reason-content description in status response messages (enroll-status, voucher-status, and status-response).
- Updated CDDL source code integration to allow for automatic verification
- Reordered description in [Section 7.3](#) in [Section 7.2](#) to better match the order of communication and artifact processing.
- Updated CDDL for the request-enroll trigger in [Figure 15](#) according to the outcome of the interim ANIMA WG meeting discussions on April 19, 2024
- Included statement in [Section 7.2.2](#) for using the advanced created-on time from the agent-signed-data also for the PER, when the pledge has no synchronized clock

From IETF draft 11 -> IETF draft 12:

- Updated acknowledgments to reflect early reviews
- Addressed Shepherd review part 2 (Pull Request #132); containing: terminology alignment, structural improvements of the document; deletion of leftovers from previous draft versions; change of definitions to CDDL, when no YANG is available

From IETF draft 10 -> IETF draft 11:

- issue #79, clarified that BRSKI discovery in the context of BRSKI-PRM is not needed in [Section 6.1.1](#).
- issue #103, removed step 6 in verification handling for the wrapped CA certificate provisioning as only applicable after enrollment [Section 7.7](#)
- issue #128: included notation of nomadic operation of the Registrar-Agent in [Section 5](#), including proposed text from PR #131
- issue #130, introduced DNS service discovery name for brski_pledge to enable discovery by the Registrar-Agent in [Section 10](#)
- removed unused reference RFC 5280
- removed site terminology
- deleted duplicated text in [Section 6.2](#)
- clarified registrar discovery and relation to BRSKI-Discovery in [Section 6.1.1](#)
- clarified discovery of pledges by the Registrar-Agent in [Section 6.1.2](#), deleted reference to GRASP as handled in BRSKI-Discovery
- addressed comments from SECDIR early review

From IETF draft 09 -> IETF draft 10:

- issue #79, clarified discovery in the context of BRSKI-PRM and included information about future discovery enhancements in a separate draft in [Section 6.1.1](#).
- issue #93, included information about conflict resolution in mDNS and GRASP in [Section 6.1.2](#)
- issue #103, included verification handling for the wrapped CA certificate provisioning in [Section 7.7](#)
- issue #106, included additional text to elaborate more the registrar status handling in [Section 7.9](#) and [Section 7.10](#)
- issue #116, enhanced DoS description in [Section 12.1](#)
- issue #120, included statement regarding pledge host header processing in [Section 6.2](#)
- issue #122, availability of product-serial-number information on registrar agent clarified in [Section 7.1](#)
- issue #123, Clarified usage of alternative voucher formats in [Section 7.3.4](#)
- issue #124, determination of pinned domain certificate done as in RFC 8995 included in [Section 7.3.5](#)
- issue #125, remove strength comparison of voucher assertions in [Section 5.4](#) and [Section 7](#)

- issue #130, aligned the usage of site and domain throughout the document
- changed naming of registrar certificate from LDevID(RegAgt) to Registrar-Agent EE certificate throughout the document
- change x5b to x5bag according to [RFC9360]
- updated JSON examples -> "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)

From IETF draft 08 -> IETF draft 09:

- issue #80, enhanced [Section 6.1.2](#) with clarification on the product-serial-number and the inclusion of GRASP
- issue #81, enhanced introduction with motivation for agent_signed_data
- issue #82, included optional TLS protection of the communication link between Registrar-Agent and pledge in the introduction [Section 4](#), and [Section 7.1](#)
- issue #83, enhanced [Section 7.2](#) and [Section 7.3](#) with note to re-enrollment
- issue #87, clarified available information at the Registrar-Agent in [Section 7.1](#)
- issue #88, clarified, that the PVR in [Section 7.1](#) and PER in [Section 7.2](#) may contain the certificate chain. If not contained it **MUST** be available at the registrar.
- issue #91, clarified that a separate HTTP connection may also be used to provide the PER in [Section 7.4](#)
- resolved remaining editorial issues discovered after WGLC (responded to on the mailing list in Reply 1 and Reply 2) resulting in more consistent descriptions
- issue #92: kept separate endpoint for wrapped CSR on registrar [Section 7.5](#)
- issue #94: clarified terminology (possess vs. obtained)
- issue #95: clarified optional IDevID CA certificates on Registrar-Agent
- issue #96: updated exchangesfig_uc2_3 to correct to just one CA certificate provisioning
- issue #97: deleted format explanation in exchanges_uc2_3 as it may be misleading
- issue #99: motivated verification of second signature on voucher in [Section 7.6](#)
- issue #100: included negative example in [Figure 33](#)
- issue #101: included handling if [Section 7.6](#) voucher telemetry information has not been received by the Registrar-Agent
- issue #102: relaxed requirements for CA certs provisioning in [Section 7.7](#)
- issue #105: included negative example in [Figure 39](#)
- issue #107: included example for certificate revocation in [Section 7.10](#)
- issue #108: renamed heading to Pledge-Status Request of [Section 7.11](#)
- issue #111: included pledge-status response processing for authenticated requests in [Section 7.11](#)
- issue #112: added "Example key word in pledge-status response in [Figure 50](#)
- issue #113: enhanced description of status reply for "factory-default" in [Section 7.11](#)
- issue #114: Consideration of optional TLS usage in Privacy Considerations
- issue #115: Consideration of optional TLS usage in Privacy Considerations to protect potentially privacy related information in the bootstrapping like status information, etc.

- issue #116: Enhanced DoS description and mitigation options in security consideration section
- updated references

From IETF draft 07 -> IETF draft 08:

- resolved editorial issues discovered after WGLC (still open issues remaining)
- resolved first comments from the Shepherd review as discussed in PR #85 on the ANIMA github

From IETF draft 06 -> IETF draft 07:

- WGLC resulted in a removal of the voucher enhancements completely from this document to RFC 8366bis, containing all enhancements and augmentations of the voucher, including the voucher-request as well as the tree diagrams
- smaller editorial corrections

From IETF draft 05 -> IETF draft 06:

- Update of list of reviewers
- Issue #67, shortened the pledge endpoints to prepare for constraint deployments
- Included table for new endpoints on the registrar in the overview of the Registrar-Agent
- addressed review comments from SECDIR early review (terminology clarifications, editorial improvements)
- addressed review comments from IOTDIR early review (terminology clarifications, editorial improvements)

From IETF draft 04 -> IETF draft 05:

- Restructured document to have a distinct section for the object flow and handling and shortened introduction, issue #72
- Added security considerations for using mDNS without a specific product-serial-number, issue #75
- Clarified pledge-status responses are cumulative, issue #73
- Removed agent-sign-cert from trigger data to save bandwidth and remove complexity through options, issue #70
- Changed terminology for LDevID(Reg) certificate to registrar LDevID certificate, as it does not need to be an LDevID, issue #66
- Added new protected header parameter (created-on) in PER to support freshness validation, issue #63
- Removed reference to CAB Forum as not needed for BRSKI-PRM specifically, issue #65
- Enhanced error codes in section 5.5.1, issue #39, #64
- Enhanced security considerations and privacy considerations, issue #59
- Issue #50 addressed by referring to the utilized enrollment protocol

- Issue #47 MASA verification of LDevID(RegAgt) to the same registrar LDevID certificate domain CA
- Reworked terminology of "enrollment object", "certification object", "enrollment request object", etc., issue #27
- Reworked all message representations to align with encoding
- Added explanation of MASA requiring domain CA cert in section 5.5.1 and section 5.5.2, issue #36
- Defined new endpoint for pledge bootstrapping status inquiry, issue #35 in section [Section 7.11](#), IANA considerations and section [Section 6.2](#)
- Included examples for several objects in section [Appendix A](#) including message example sizes, issue #33
- PoP for private key to registrar certificate included as mandatory, issues #32 and #49
- Issue #31, clarified that combined pledge may act as client/server for further (re)enrollment
- Issue #42, clarified that Registrar needs to verify the status responses with and ensure that they match the audit log response from the MASA, otherwise it needs drop the pledge and revoke the certificate
- Issue #43, clarified that the pledge shall use the create time from the trigger message if the time has not been synchronized, yet.
- Several editorial changes and enhancements to increasing readability.

From IETF draft 03 -> IETF draft 04:

- In deep Review by Esko Dijk lead to issues #22-#61, which are bein stepwise integrated
- Simplified YANG definition by augmenting the voucher-request from RFC 8995 instead of redefining it.
- Added explanation for terminology "endpoint" used in this document, issue #16
- Added clarification that Registrar-Agent may collect PVR or PER or both in one run, issue #17
- Added a statement that nonceless voucher may be accepted, issue #18
- Simplified structure in section [Section 3.1](#), issue #19
- Removed join proxy in [Figure 1](#) and added explanatory text, issue #20
- Added description of pledge-CAcerts endpoint plus further handling of providing a wrapped CA certs response to the pledge in section [Section 7.7](#); also added new required registrar endpoint (section [Section 7.3](#) and IANA considerations) for the registrar to provide a wrapped CA certs response, issue #21
- utilized defined abbreviations in the document consistently, issue #22
- Reworked text on discovery according to issue #23 to clarify scope and handling
- Added several clarifications based on review comments

From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:

- Updated examples to state "base64encodedvalue==" for x5c occurrences
- Include link to SVG graphic as general overview

- Restructuring of section 5 to flatten hierarchy
- Enhanced requirements and motivation in [Section 4](#)
- Several editorial improvements based on review comments

From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:

- Issue #15 included additional signature on voucher from registrar in section [Section 7.3](#) and section [Section 5.4](#) The verification of multiple signatures is described in section [Section 7.6](#)
- Included representation for General JWS JSON Serialization for examples
- Included error responses from pledge if it is not able to create a Pledge-Voucher-Request or an enrollment request in section [Section 7.1](#)
- Removed open issue regarding handling of multiple CSRs and Enroll-Responses during the bootstrapping as the initial target is the provisioning of a generic LDevID certificate. The defined endpoint on the pledge may also be used for management of further certificates.

From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:

- Issue #15 lead to the inclusion of an option for an additional signature of the registrar on the voucher received from the MASA before forwarding to the Registrar-Agent to support verification of POP of the registrars private key in section [Section 7.3](#) and exchanges_uc2_3.
- Based on issue #11, a new endpoint was defined for the registrar to enable delivery of the wrapped enrollment request from the pledge (in contrast to plain PKCS#10 in simple enroll).
- Decision on issue #8 to not provide an additional signature on the enrollment-response object by the registrar. As the Enroll-Response will only contain the generic LDevID certificate. This credential builds the base for further configuration outside the initial enrollment.
- Decision on issue #7 to not support multiple CSRs during the bootstrapping, as based on the generic LDevID certificate the pledge may enroll for further certificates.
- Closed open issue #5 regarding verification of ietf-ztp-types usage as verified via a proof-of-concept in section [Section 7.1](#).
- Housekeeping: Removed already addressed open issues stated in the draft directly.
- Reworked text in from introduction to section pledge-responder-mode
- Fixed "serial-number" encoding in PVR/RVR
- Added prior-signed-voucher-request in the parameter description of the registrar-voucher-request in [Section 7.3](#).
- Note added in [Section 7.3](#) if sub-CAs are used, that the corresponding information is to be provided to the MASA.
- Inclusion of limitation section (pledge sleeps and needs to be waked up. Pledge is awake but Registrar-Agent is not available) (Issue #10).
- Assertion-type aligned with voucher in RFC8366bis, deleted related open issues. (Issue #4)
- Included table for endpoints in [Section 6.2](#) for better readability.
- Included registrar authorization check for Registrar-Agent during TLS handshake in section [Section 7.3](#). Also enhanced figure [Figure 4](#) with the authorization step on TLS level.

- Enhanced description of registrar authorization check for Registrar-Agent based on the agent-signed-data in section [Section 7.3](#). Also enhanced figure [Figure 4](#) with the authorization step on Pledge-Voucher-Request level.
- Changed agent-signed-cert to an array to allow for providing further certificate information like the issuing CA cert for the LDevID(RegAgt) certificate in case the registrar and the Registrar-Agent have different issuing CAs in [Figure 4](#) (issue #12). This also required changes in the YANG module in [\[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis\]](#)
- Addressed YANG warning (issue #1)
- Inclusion of examples for a trigger to create a Pledge-Voucher-Request and a Pledge Enroll-Request.

From IETF draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03 -> IETF anima-brski-prm-00:

- Moved UC2 related parts defining the Pledge in Responder Mode from draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03 to this document This required changes and adaptations in several sections to remove the description and references to UC1.
- Addressed feedback for voucher-request enhancements from YANG doctor early review, meanwhile moved to [\[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis\]](#) as well as in the security considerations (formerly named ietf-async-voucher-request).
- Renamed ietf-async-voucher-request to IETF-voucher-request-prm to allow better listing of voucher related extensions; aligned with constraint voucher (#20)
- Utilized ietf-voucher-request-async instead of ietf-voucher-request in voucher exchanges to utilize the enhanced voucher-request.
- Included changes from draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-06 regarding the YANG definition of csr-types into the enrollment request exchange.

From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:

- Housekeeping, deleted open issue regarding YANG voucher-request in [Section 7.1](#) as voucher-request was enhanced with additional leaf.
- Included open issues in YANG model in [Section 5](#) regarding assertion value agent-proximity and csr encapsulation using SZTP sub module).

From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:

- Defined call flow and objects for interactions in UC2. Object format based on draft for JOSE signed voucher artifacts and aligned the remaining objects with this approach in [Section 7](#).
- Terminology change: issue #2 pledge-agent -> Registrar-Agent to better underline Registrar-Agent relation.
- Terminology change: issue #3 PULL/PUSH -> pledge-initiator-mode and pledge-responder-mode to better address the pledge operation.

- Communication approach between pledge and Registrar-Agent changed by removing TLS-PSK (former section TLS establishment) and associated references to other drafts in favor of relying on higher layer exchange of signed data objects. These data objects are included also in the Pledge-Voucher-Request and lead to an extension of the YANG module for the voucher-request (issue #12).
- Details on trust relationship between Registrar-Agent and registrar (issue #4, #5, #9) included in [Section 5](#).
- Recommendation regarding short-lived certificates for Registrar-Agent authentication towards registrar (issue #7) in the security considerations.
- Introduction of reference to Registrar-Agent signing certificate using SubjectKeyIdentifier in Registrar-Agent signed data (issue #37).
- Enhanced objects in exchanges between pledge and Registrar-Agent to allow the registrar to verify agent-proximity to the pledge (issue #1) in [Section 7](#).
- Details on trust relationship between Registrar-Agent and pledge (issue #5) included in [Section 5](#).
- Split of use case 2 call flow into sub sections in [Section 7](#).

From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:

- Update of scope in [Section 3.1](#) to include in which the pledge acts as a server. This is one main motivation for use case 2.
- Rework of use case 2 in [Section 5](#) to consider the transport between the pledge and the pledge-agent. Addressed is the TLS channel establishment between the pledge-agent and the pledge as well as the endpoint definition on the pledge.
- First description of exchanged object types (needs more work)
- Clarification in discovery options for enrollment endpoints at the domain registrar based on well-known endpoints do not result in additional /.well-known URIs. Update of the illustrative example. Note that the change to /brski for the voucher related endpoints has been taken over in the BRSKI main document.
- Updated references.
- Included Thomas Werner as additional author for the document.

From individual version 03 -> IETF draft 00:

- Inclusion of discovery options of enrollment endpoints at the domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in new section as replacement of section 5.1.3 in the individual draft. This is intended to support both use cases in the document. An illustrative example is provided.
- Missing details provided for the description and call flow in pledge-agent use case [Section 5](#), e.g. to accommodate distribution of CA certificates.
- Updated CMP example in to use lightweight CMP instead of CMP, as the draft already provides the necessary /.well-known endpoints.
- Requirements discussion moved to separate section in [Section 4](#). Shortened description of proof of identity binding and mapping to existing protocols.

- Removal of copied call flows for voucher exchange and registrar discovery flow from [\[RFC8995\]](#) in UC1 to avoid doubling or text or inconsistencies.
- Reworked abstract and introduction to be more crisp regarding the targeted solution. Several structural changes in the document to have a better distinction between requirements, use case description, and solution description as separate sections. History moved to appendix.

From individual version 02 -> 03:

- Update of terminology from self-contained to authenticated self-contained object to be consistent in the wording and to underline the protection of the object with an existing credential. Note that the naming of this object may be discussed. An alternative name may be attestation object.
- Simplification of the architecture approach for the initial use case having an offsite PKI.
- Introduction of a new use case utilizing authenticated self-contained objects to onboard a pledge using a commissioning tool containing a pledge-agent. This requires additional changes in the BRSKI call flow sequence and led to changes in the introduction, the application example, and also in the related BRSKI-PRM call flow.

From individual version 01 -> 02:

- Update of introduction text to clearly relate to the usage of IDevID and LDevID.
- Update of description of architecture elements and changes to BRSKI in [Section 5](#).
- Enhanced consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the context of mapping the requirements to existing solutions in [Section 4](#).

From individual version 00 -> 01:

- Update of examples, specifically for building automation as well as two new application use cases in [Section 3.1](#).
- Deletion of asynchronous interaction with MASA to not complicate the use case. Note that the voucher exchange can already be handled in an asynchronous manner and is therefore not considered further. This resulted in removal of the alternative path the MASA in Figure 1 and the associated description in [Section 5](#).
- Enhancement of description of architecture elements and changes to BRSKI in [Section 5](#).
- Consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the context of mapping the requirements to existing solutions in [Section 4](#).
- New section starting with the mapping to existing enrollment protocols by collecting boundary conditions.

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