

Operational Considerations for MASA, Registrar

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-masa-considerations/>


<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-registrar-considerations/>

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IETF 123: 2025-07-30


ANIMA Working Group

History of Documents



ANIMA ACP/BRSKI operational issues

Vendor/
Manufacturer



IDevID
PKI



RFC8366
Voucher
Signer



RFC8520
MUD file
MUD sign

Enterprise/Operator
Owner



Registrar:
LDevID PKI



Device




IDevID, LDevID
Software Update Trust Anchor
Voucher validation Trust Anchor

Get icons here

<https://github.com/iot-dir/slides>

Operational Considerations for Registrar

draft-ietf-anima-registrar-considerations



This document is about many design issues, including:

- 1) prescriptive statements about appropriate security for the private certification authority
- 2) scaling issues relating to TLS/HTTPS operations
- 3) synchronous vs asynchronous issues on how BRSKI-MASA client interacts with BRSKI-EST server
- 4) Incremental deployment of ACP into an existing NOC, including additional ACP-connect considerations

all
non-normative
advice

Operational Considerations for Registrar

draft-ietf-anima-registrar-considerations




Figure 1: Reference Tier-1 ISP network


This diagram never really used
The document did not develop this part very much.

The idea was to talk about ACPs, how they form, and about routing and resiliency issues in how they get managed.

Unclear if this part should be retained and expanded, extracted to a different document, or just dropped.

Operational Considerations for MASA

draft-richardson-anima-masa-considerations



- manufacturer has to maintain a PKI.
 - this document provides prescriptive advice on how the private parts are kept, by the manufacturer, **in** the “factory”
 - intended to reference t2trg-manufacturer-trust-anchors document as a “palette” of options

Operational Considerations for MASA and SZTP (RFC8572)

draft-ietf-anima-masa-considerations



RFC8366
Voucher
Signer

- manufacturer (or authorized entity) has to maintain private key to sign vouchers
 - this document provides prescriptive advice on how the private parts are kept, by the manufacturer, **in** the “factory”
 - voucher signer can be single self-signed certificate, up to complex PKI
 - intended to reference t2trg-manufacturer-trust-anchors document as a “palette” of options

Changes to documents since IETF107

- masa-considerations
 - many editorial comments, some new references
 - gutted, most text went into t2trg-manufacturer-trust-anchors
 - needs to be re-written leveraging idevid-considerations (if document will find a home)
- registrar-considerations-04
 - “certificate authority” → “certification authority”
 - some editorial comments

If documents are merged, what is the focus of new document?

- 1) Operational Considerations for BRSKI
- 2) Operational Considerations for ACP
- 3) Operational Considerations for Constrained IoT
- 4) ??? – Discussion here

