

Blueliv.

Advanced search: IOA dork



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Introduction

The dork “ioa” is one of the most powerful dorks we can find in the Malware Hunting section of Threat Context. This dork will permit to find malware with a specific behaviour, because the Indicator of Actor (IoA) section of the malware reports generated by our sandbox will be scrutinized when we use this dork. As it is possible to see in the IoA tab of a malware sandbox report, the kind of information we can find is:

- Domains
- IPs
- URLs
- Network connections
- Registry Keys: written, deleted, created, opened, enumerated and read.
- Paths: PDB paths, created/removed files and directories, written files, etc.
- Yara signatures
- Mutexes
- Binary Certificates
- Metadata: file metadata, different hashes (CRC32, PE Imphash, ssdeep), PEiD signatures, PE timestamp, etc.

Summary	Signatures	Behavior	Api Calls	Network	Files	Memory	Configs	IoA
DOMAIN (3)								
REGKEYS (1060)								
IP (6)								
PROCESS NAME (4)								
CONNECTIONS (4)								
HOST (5)								
PATH (203)								
YARA (17)								
URL (953)								
PORTS (4)								
MUTEX (7)								
METADATA (10)								

The full list of available IoA keys can be found in “Appendix I. Full IoA JSON keys” and the relation between the Blueliv sandbox report and a given “ioa” dork in “Appendix II. Relation between sandbox reports and “ioa” dork”.

How to use the “ioa” dork

As we mentioned before, the IoA section of the JSON report is fully indexed, so we can use dots to refer to specific parts of it. For example:

```
ioa.metadata.crc32.original:"2E548B06" # Exact match
ioa.ip:"192.168.56.102" # Exact match
ioa.url:~"priceminister.com" # Fuzzy match (contains)
ioa.ip:^^"8.8" # Starts with match
ioa.url:$".ru" # Ends with match
```

It is important to keep in mind that wildcard searches are “expensive” and can slow down the search.

In the case of searching for strings we have to consider that if the string contains certain characters Lucene, the library behind dork searches, will tokenize the words so we will not be able to search for a whole string if we don't escape the characters or we use an exact match. The characters that should be escaped are ([link to Lucene documentation](#)):

```
+ - && || ! ( ) { } [ ] ^ " ~ * ? : \ /
```

So, for instance, if we want to search for "g:\65_vc8\VB6\legovbe\opt\VB6.pdb" (872f05e70b26d6b4e0f2936db82cb94614143d9db4d67984fb7e9c47dd857fce), it is not possible to do:

```
ioa.path.pdb_path:"g:\65_vc8\VB6\legovbe\opt\VB6.pdb"
```

Instead, we could do:

- For exact match the following can be used (**keyword** is the key here):

```
ioa.path.pdb_path.keyword:"g:\65_vc8\VB6\legovbe\opt\VB6.pdb"
```

- In case of partial match we must escape some characters:

```
ioa.path.pdb_path.keyword:~"g:\\65_vc8\\VB6\\legovbe\\opt\\VB6.pdb"
```

These are some useful dorks which can be used when performing Threat Hunting tasks:

Registry keys

- ioa.regkeys
 - ioa.regkeys.regkey_written
 - ioa.regkeys.regkey_created
 - ioa.regkeys.regkey_deleted

File paths

- ioa.path.filepaths
 - ioa.path.filepaths.file_created
 - ioa.path.filepaths.dll_loaded
 - ioa.path.filepaths.file_moved
 - ioa.path.filepaths.file_written
 - ioa.path.filepaths.directory_created

PDB path

- ioa.path.pdb_path

PE Compilation timestamp

- ioa.metadata.pe_timestamp

Mutexes

- ioa.mutex

IPs contacted

- ioa.ip

Domains resolved/contacted

- ioa.domain

URLs contacted

- ioa.url

Names of processes being executed

- ioa.process_name

Yara signatures triggering

- ioa.yara

Appendix I. Full IoA JSON keys

This section shows all the available keys which can be used together with the “ioa” dork and appearing in the JSON report the Blueliv sandbox generates:

- "domain"
- "regkeys"
 - "regkey_written"
 - "regkey_opened"
 - "regkey_enumerated"
 - "regkey_deleted"
 - "regkey_created"
 - "regkey_read"
- "ip"
- "process_name"
- "connections"
 - "tcp_dead"
 - "udp"
 - "tcp"
- "host"
- "path"
 - "pdb_path,
 - "filepaths"
 - "file_created"
 - "dll_loaded"
 - "file_opened"
 - "file_moved,
 - "file_written"
 - "directory_created"
 - "file_copied,
 - "file_deleted,
 - "directory_removed,
 - "file_exists"
 - "directory_queried"
 - "file_read"
 - "directory_enumerated"
- "yara"
 - "generic"
 - "url,
 - "pre_analysis,
 - "misc"
 - "packer"
 - "misc"
 - "crypto"
 - "memory"
- "url"

- "ports"
 - "tcp_dead"
 - "udp"
 - "tcp"
- "mutex"
- "certificates"
- "email"
- "metadata"
 - "signing_date"
 - "crc32"
 - "original"
 - "unpacked"
 - "pe_imphash"
 - "names"
 - "title"
 - "original_filename"
 - "producer"
 - "locality"
 - "country"
 - "legal_trademarks"
 - "creator"
 - "legal_copyright"
 - "organizational_unit"
 - "company_name"
 - "internal_name"
 - "private_build"
 - "common_name"
 - "organization"
 - "author"
 - "subject"
 - "product_name"
 - "special_build"
 - "peid_signatures"
 - "file_type"
 - "original"
 - "unpacked"
 - "postal_code"
 - "ssdeep"
 - "original":
 - "unpacked"
 - "pe_timestamp"

Appendix II. Relation between sandbox reports and “ioa” dork

When a malware sample report is visualized, from the IoA tab we can see the following information:

137e720ddfa9ad43ffb3999d8ef80df1209b042f451f957a866a8f98ee31982c									
Summary	Signatures	Behavior	Api Calls	Network	Files	Memory	Configs	IoA	
DOMAIN (3)									
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IP (6)									
PROCESS NAME (4)									
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METADATA (10)									

Clicking in the different categories we can find elements and subcategories like in the example PATH - FILEPATHS – FILE CREATED:

PATH (203)									
> FILEPATHS (203)									
> FILE CREATED (12) > DLL LOADED (71) > FILE OPENED (43) > FILE WRITTEN (2) > DIRECTORY CREATED (2) > FILE EXISTS (48) > DIRECTORY QUERIED (6) > FILE READ (5)									
> DIRECTORY ENUMERATED (14)									
> C:\Users\Administrator\slui\comp.exe									
> C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\cversions.1.db									
> C:\									
> C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\h21vnc.exe									
> C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\REkcBNTw.exe									
> C:\Windows									
> C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe									
> C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-C647E37CA0D9}.1.ver0x0000000000000026.db									
> C:\Windows\System32									
> C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\desktop.ini									
> C:\Windows\AppPatch\pcmain.sdb									
> C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll									

This categories and subcategories are a direct mapping from the keys that we can find in the JSON report that the Blueliv sandbox generates after analysing a file:

```

"path": {
  "pdb_path": [],
  "filepaths": {
    "file_created": [
      "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\slui\\comp.exe",
      "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Caches\\cversions.1.db",
      "C:\\",
      "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\h21vnc.exe",
      "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\REkcBNTw.exe",
      "C:\\Windows",
      "C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe",
      "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Caches\\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4...",
      "C:\\Windows\\System32",
      "C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop\\desktop.ini",
      "C:\\Windows\\AppPatch\\pcmain.sdb",
      "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdll.dll"
    ],
    "dll_loaded": [
      "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wshqos.dll",
      "C:\\Windows\\system32\\sfc.dll",
      "rasman.dll",
      "urlmon.dll",
      "kernel32",
      "API-MS-Win-Security-LSALookup-L1-1-0.dll",

```

We can use those keys (or categories/subcategories) in the JSON tree to search samples with specific behaviours just adding the categories and subcategories followed by dots, as you can see in the following image:

MALWARE HUNTING

Intelligence

Malware Hunting showing: **432 results**

FIRSTSEEN	SHA256	SCORE	SOURCES	TYPE	STATUS	#PROP	NET	C&C
08/04/2020	137e720ddfa9a...	27	virustotalAPI	AZORULT, HVNC	✓	1	✓	✗
08/04/2020	8033eeb704993...	27	virustotalKeywor...	AZORULT, HVNC	✓	1	✓	✗
07/04/2020	5e9e84f653d61...	27	virustotalAPI	AZORULT, HVNC	✓	1	✓	✗
07/04/2020	5f5eb5cfc7f062...	27	Malware (1)	HVNC, AZORULT	✓	1	✓	✗
07/04/2020	f7c9dd46b67fa3...	27	virustotalAPI	AZORULT, HVNC	✓	1	✓	✗
07/04/2020	1349604dc56dd...	27	virustotalAPI	AZORULT, HVNC	✓	1	✓	✗
07/04/2020	582863ca713c7...	27	virustotalKeywor...	AZORULT, HVNC	✓	1	✓	✗
07/04/2020	316c4db041289...	27	virustotalAPI	HVNC, AZORULT	✓	1	✓	✗

It is important to always add the keyword parameter at the end to find correctly the samples and avoid tokenizations of the library behind our dork search.