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To understand the **Global economy** in 2026, you have to first abandon the instinct to think in quarters, forecasts, or political cycles. The global economy is not a machine designed once and optimized steadily. It is a layered structure – built across centuries, stressed repeatedly, broken often, repaired unevenly, and now operating closer to its demographic, institutional, and energy limits than at any point in recorded history. Growth is not the default condition. Stagnation is. What we call “modern growth” is a rare and fragile escape from a two-thousand-year equilibrium of constraint.

For most of human history, per-capita income barely moved. Maddison’s reconstructions show that from 1 CE to nearly 1500 CE, global income hovered near subsistence. Productivity gains existed, but population absorbed them. Plague, war, climate shocks, and political collapse repeatedly erased progress. Trade existed, cities existed, even prosperity existed – but compounding did not. Progress arrived episodically and vanished routinely. That is the baseline from which every modern economy must be judged.

Early trade networks such as the Silk Road mattered not because of scale, but because they proved interdependence. Specialization across distance could create value even under extreme transaction costs. Yet agriculture dominated output, risk remained high, and growth stayed thin. The world was connected, but not integrated in a way that allowed productivity to compound reliably.

Mercantilism changed the structure, not the outcome. From the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, European powers turned trade into state strategy. Colonies were integrated through force rather than markets. Raw materials flowed inward; finished goods flowed outward. Wealth accumulated deliberately, but unevenly. This was globalization without convergence. Maddison’s data shows that by 1820, divergence was already entrenched.

The nineteenth century introduced the first true structural break. Coal, steam, mechanization, and transport shattered biological limits. Productivity began to outpace population growth consistently. The Great Divergence was not gradual – it was exponential. Industrial economies pulled away rapidly, while much of the world remained locked into commodity extraction. Economic theory framed this as comparative advantage; history reveals it as path dependence. Compounding clustered where it had already begun.

The twentieth century accelerated everything – including failure. World GDP expanded nearly twentyfold, but institutional breakdowns repeatedly reversed integration. World wars, the Great Depression, protectionism, and sovereign defaults showed that industrial capacity without coordination was destabilizing. The post-1945 Bretton Woods order corrected this temporarily, producing three decades of unusually inclusive growth. In hindsight, this period looks less like a norm and more like an exception.

Today's global economy is still expanding, but at a lower cruising speed. Growth hovers near 3%, inflation is easing but structurally higher, and monetary policy is constrained. The cycle is no longer synchronized. The United States outperforms on fiscal expansion and technology. Europe remains constrained by energy and industrial inertia. China slows under debt and property overhangs. Emerging markets grow faster in aggregate, but carry heavier debt service burdens.

Debt is the quiet pressure beneath the system. At over \$320 trillion globally, leverage has not been resolved – it has been rolled forward. Governments borrow to stabilize, corporates borrow to transform, households borrow to maintain living standards. The risk is not imminent collapse, but diminished flexibility when the next shock arrives.

Demographics tighten the constraint. Aging is accelerating. Fertility is falling almost everywhere. Labor supply is no longer a tailwind. Future growth must come from productivity, not population. Technology – especially artificial intelligence – offers that possibility, but adoption is uneven and capital-intensive. The energy transition follows the same pattern: rapid cost declines, massive investment needs, uneven access to capital.

Trade itself is being redesigned. Efficiency is giving way to security. Friend-shoring, tariffs, and strategic autonomy raise costs in exchange for resilience. The dollar remains dominant, but alternatives are being tested quietly. Fragmentation is not a rupture – it is a slow drift.

This is the global environment into which India now fits.

India is not a story of sudden ascent. It is a record of what survives across time. For over two thousand years, the subcontinent anchored global trade, accounting for roughly one-third to one-fourth of world output for much of recorded history. This dominance was not luck, nor population alone. It emerged from systems that reduced friction early – scalable agriculture, self-regulating guilds, and maritime routes that predated Western mercantilism by centuries.

India's economic instinct formed before capital markets existed. The Indus Valley civilization understood logistics first. Lothal's dockyard – engineered with tidal intelligence, spillways, standardized bricks, and inland connectivity – was not a settlement feature; it was an economic statement. Goods moved because systems existed: standardized production, skilled metallurgy, and long-distance trust networks reaching Mesopotamia and Persia. Structure created abundance.

Political centralization followed economic complexity. The Mauryan state did not invent markets; it reduced transaction costs. Uniform weights, silver coinage, state roads, and centralized surplus management lowered friction enough to unlock scale. Security enabled exchange. Exchange enabled compounding. By this phase, India contributed over 30% of global GDP – not through extraction, but organization.

Durability deepened under the Gupta era's Shreni system. These were proto-institutions that enforced quality, extended credit, trained labor, settled disputes, and provided social insurance. Capital, labor, and governance coexisted inside the same organism. This institutional density is why Indian manufacturing endured for centuries.

Urban density later became the productivity engine. During the Delhi Sultanate, proximity mattered. Spinning wheels, paper, advanced looms, construction techniques, standardized coinage, and professional administration deepened markets. Cities expanded not through ideology, but efficiency.

By the Mughal period, India reached proto-industrial dominance. In the seventeenth century, India produced roughly 25% of global GDP. Textiles functioned as global currency. Europe paid in silver – thousands of metric tons flowed inward. Manufacturing scaled without fossil fuels. This was dominance before disruption.

That disruption came through extraction replacing production. Between 1750 and 1900, political fragmentation raised costs, British industrial productivity collapsed price parity, and capital drained outward through institutionalized leakage. India's

share of global industrial output fell from 25% to 2%. By independence, global GDP share had dropped to 4%.

Post-1947 India chose control over speed. Central planning prioritized heavy industry and state ownership. Growth averaged just over 3%. The economy survived, but did not compound.

Constraint forced adaptation in 1991. Reserves fell to two weeks of imports. Ideology ended. Liberalization dismantled licenses, lowered trade barriers, and allowed capital to flow. GDP expanded from \$267 billion to \$1.85 trillion in two decades. India re-entered global competition as a service platform.

The current phase is defined by infrastructure logic. Since 2016, India has built digital public rails rather than private toll roads. Aadhaar collapsed identity costs. UPI scaled transaction volumes beyond most national payment systems. Direct benefit transfers cut leakage at scale. India Stack is infrastructure, not product – public soil, not private rent.

Demographics provide a window, not a guarantee. A median age near 29 buys time. Productivity must scale before aging arrives. Informality, low female participation, and skill mismatches remain constraints.

Debt and currency dynamics reflect trade-offs, not fragility. Most debt is domestic. FX reserves cover external exposure. A weaker rupee raises export competitiveness at the cost of imported inflation. This is balance, not collapse.

The strategic wager is clear: indispensability over inclusion. Semiconductor capacity, trade corridors, transshipment hubs, bilateral agreements. Public capex first. Private capital follows.

Zoom out, and the pattern is consistent globally and in India. Systems that reduced friction survived. Systems that extracted collapsed. Systems that adapted returned. From ancient trade routes to digital rails, the sequence repeats: infrastructure first, scale next, money last.

India in 2026 is not early. It is re-entering a role it has played before – as a central node in global value transfer. Not inevitable. Not guaranteed. But structurally plausible.

And that is where compounding actually begins.

To understand the Indian **life insurance sector** between 2021 and 2026, you have to stop thinking of it as a financial product industry and start thinking of it as a system under forced evolution. What has unfolded over these five years is not cyclical improvement, but structural re-ranking. The sector has moved from state dominance and volume obsession to competitive sorting based on efficiency, margins, and capital discipline. Regulation did not merely guide this shift – it accelerated it.

Insurance, by nature, compounds slowly. What changes outcomes is not demand, but structure. And structure is exactly what changed.

For decades, Indian life insurance was a one-player ecosystem. LIC controlled trust, distribution, and scale. Private insurers existed, but at the margins. That equilibrium broke only when the regulator deliberately lowered friction and raised competitive pressure. The increase in FDI limits to 100% was not about foreign ownership optics; it was about capital certainty. Removing the compulsion for foreign partners unlocked long-duration capital, actuarial expertise, and governance discipline – precisely what a protection-underpenetrated country requires.

The shift to a “use-and-file” regime followed the same logic. Speed matters in insurance far more than price. Private players that could sense demand – annuities, health-linked savings, protection – could now respond without waiting for regulatory clearance cycles. LIC, built for scale and caution, could not pivot at the same speed. Regulation did not disadvantage LIC explicitly. It advantaged adaptability implicitly.

At the same time, IRDAI tightened the system where it mattered most – policyholder protection. Surrender value norms, service benchmarks, cashless approvals, and claims turnaround standards forced insurers to compete on experience, not just reach. Insurance stopped being sold purely on trust and started being evaluated on utility.

Fiscal policy quietly reinforced this shift. The 2025 GST exemption on individual life premiums lowered the entry barrier for first-time buyers, particularly in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities. This was not a subsidy to insurers – it was a nudge toward formal protection adoption. Retail APE responded immediately.

Once structure changed, market share followed.

LIC still dominates by absolute volume, but volume is no longer where value is created. Between FY20 and FY26, LIC's share of total new business premiums declined meaningfully, while private players consolidated the most profitable segment – individual APE.

By FY25, private insurers controlled over 70% of high-margin retail business. This was not erosion by force; it was migration by design. Private insurers chose margin over mass. LIC chose reach over refinement.

SBI Life emerged as the clearest beneficiary of this sorting. Its dominance in bancassurance translated directly into scale with discipline. HDFC Life followed closely, leveraging its bank-parent ecosystem and digital edge. ICICI Prudential differentiated itself through margin expansion and actuarial sophistication. Each private insurer carved a distinct operational identity. LIC remained universal – and therefore slower.

This divergence becomes obvious once you look at product architecture.

Life insurance profitability is decided at the product level, not the balance sheet. Participating policies offer comfort to policyholders but surrender surplus to them. Non-participating policies concentrate economics with shareholders but lock insurers into long-term interest rate risk. ULIPs transfer market risk to customers and fluctuate with sentiment. Protection products – pure term insurance – are brutally simple and extraordinarily profitable.

Private insurers leaned into this reality early. Protection and non-par products became strategic priorities. VNB margins expanded accordingly, often crossing 25–30%. LIC, historically anchored in participating policies, carried a structurally lower margin profile. That gap is not ideological – it is mathematical. Surplus sharing caps profitability.

Operational efficiency widened the distance further.

Distribution is destiny in insurance. Private insurers used bancassurance to increase ticket sizes, improve persistency, and compress cost ratios. Average ticket sizes doubled in some cases over five years. LIC's average ticket remained low – not because of inefficiency, but because of intent. LIC optimizes for penetration. Private insurers optimize for productivity.

Persistency data tells the same story with nuance. Private players win early-month retention through product fit and underwriting discipline. LIC catches up later. Once a LIC customer stays, they stay for decades. Trust works – just more slowly.

Financially, the sector is conservative by design. Debt is negligible. Solvency is comfortable. Growth is internally funded. The headline ROE divergence, particularly LIC's spike post-IPO, needs normalization. LIC's FY23 profitability was inflated by

surplus transfers rather than recurring economics. Over a full cycle, private insurers deliver steadier mid-teens ROEs. LIC delivers optionality.

AUM numbers reinforce the duality. LIC is a sovereign-scale allocator – ₹44 lakh crore under management – unmatched and unmatchable. Private insurers grow faster, but from smaller bases. In sum assured terms, however, private players dominate retail protection. High coverage, low premium – structurally superior for margins.

This brings us to valuation – where the market draws its sharpest line.

Life insurance is not valued on earnings. It is valued on future cash flows already embedded in the book. Embedded Value captures that reality. On this metric, private insurers trade at premiums because their growth, margins, and governance are visible and repeatable. LIC trades at a discount because its future is uncertain, its float is constrained, and its promoter is not economically motivated in the conventional sense.

At 0.6-0.8x EV, LIC is priced as if its future business has little value. That assumption only holds if margins never improve and distribution never modernizes. Both are already changing. A modest shift toward non-par and protection products can re-rate LIC materially. Real estate assets excluded from EV calculations add further optionality.

Yet valuation alone does not move stocks.

LIC's biggest overhang is supply, not fundamentals. With the government holding over 96%, the market knows dilution is inevitable. Each future OFS acts as a psychological ceiling. Institutions wait. Liquidity stays thin. Index inclusion remains out of reach. The "PSU discount" persists not because LIC is weak, but because its shareholder is not profit-maximizing.

Private insurers face the opposite problem. They are priced for precision. High margins, high growth, flawless execution – any deviation compresses multiples. Their challenge is not trust, but sustaining efficiency in a higher-rate, more competitive environment.

Promoter ecosystems explain much of this. SBI Life inherits the country's largest branch network. HDFC Life inherits India's deepest retail financial relationship base. ICICI Prudential blends global actuarial discipline with domestic reach. LIC inherits the sovereign itself. Each moat is different. None are replicable.

Looking ahead, the sector's direction is clear. Digital onboarding, AI-driven underwriting, and automated claims will reduce friction across the board. Distribution will widen, but margins will belong to those who control customer relationships, not those who merely acquire volume.

LIC's path forward is not to become a private insurer – it is to modernize without losing trust. If it digitizes distribution while preserving its social mandate, it regains relevance. Private insurers, meanwhile, must defend margins as competition intensifies and capital costs rise.

In the end, the Indian life insurance sector is not a winner-takes-all story. It is a barbell.

On one end, private insurers represent efficiency, precision, and growth – priced accordingly. On the other, LIC represents scale, trust, and latent value – priced defensively. The valuation gap between them is not permanent. It narrows as float increases, margins normalize, and structure asserts itself.

For patient capital, LIC is not a trade. It is an embedded option on India's long-term savings behavior. For growth capital, private insurers remain the cleanest expression of rising urban protection demand.

The sector will compound at roughly high single digits over the next decade. The real differentiation will come not from selling insurance, but from reducing friction – in underwriting, claims, and trust.

As always, infrastructure first. Scale next. Money last.

The Indian **asset management industry** is not merely a financial sector—it is a visible outcome of a deeper transition: households slowly abandoning physical certainty (gold, land) for abstract trust (markets, managers, systems). Capital did not rush here. It learned, hesitated, failed, and adapted.

As of December 2025, the industry manages roughly ₹80 trillion. The number matters less than the path taken to reach it. A six-fold expansion over a decade is not market appreciation alone—it is a behavioral rewiring, enabled by regulation, technology, and repetition.

This industry did not grow because returns were promised.

It grew because process became believable.

India's mutual fund industry evolved in stages, each correcting excesses of the prior phase.

Phase I (1963–1987): Monopoly and Trust

UTI was not designed to optimize returns. It was designed to introduce belief. Capital was centralized, choice was limited, and participation was slow—but trust was established.

Phase II (1987–1993): Controlled Competition

Public sector entrants broadened access but remained distribution-led. Capital followed institutions, not insight.

Phase III (1993–2003): Private Entry and Rulemaking

Private AMCs entered. SEBI emerged. SIPs were introduced—not as a product, but as a behavioral hack. Volatility still dominated outcomes.

Phase IV (2003–2014): Crisis and Cleansing

The global financial crisis and the abolition of entry loads removed economic crutches. Weak models struggled. Survivors learned cost discipline.

Phase V (2014–Present): Mass Financialization

Digital rails, regulatory maturity, and cultural repetition created scale. Not explosively—inevitably.

Industries do not mature when money enters.

They mature when weak incentives are removed.

The defining feature of the current era is not equity returns.

It is SIP persistence.

Monthly SIP inflows exceeding ₹31,000 crore represent something rare:

capital that does not attempt to be clever.

This capital arrives regardless of headlines, elections, or corrections. It acts as ballast-absorbing volatility rather than amplifying it. The result is a structurally lower earnings beta for large AMCs compared to earlier cycles.

Over 9.7 crore SIP accounts now exist.

More than half originate outside the top 30 cities.

This is not distribution expansion. It is belief diffusion.

The industry is not fragmented. Nor is it monopolistic.

The top ten AMCs control ~77% of AUM, largely because distribution ecosystems compound faster than performance narratives.

Bank-sponsored AMCs possess a structural advantage: trust already embedded in physical space.

This is why SBI, ICICI Prudential, and HDFC dominate—not because of superior alpha, but because capital flows where friction is lowest.

Fintech AMCs are growing rapidly, but growth rates without duration are signals—not proof.

In selection terms:

Scale is not optional. It is adaptive.

The Revenue Engine: Yield, Mix, and Gravity

An AMC is not a stock picker.

It is a fee-weighted allocator of attention.

Equity-heavy asset mixes generate higher yields. Passive, liquid, and debt assets provide stability but dilute margins. The economics are simple, telescopic, and unforgiving.

HDFC AMC's equity tilt (~67%) explains its superior margins—not managerial brilliance alone.

As AUM grows, revenue per unit compresses.

Operating leverage decides survival.

This is why only a handful of AMCs will remain structurally dominant over decades.

AMCs are asset-light by design.

No factories.

No inventory.

No leverage.

Growth requires persuasion, not reinvestment.

This creates a rare structure: extreme ROIC with minimal capital risk. Cash accumulates. Dividends follow. Mistakes are survivable.

In evolutionary terms, this is a low-energy organism with high reproductive success.

Cycles Still Exist (They Always Will)

This is not a defensive industry.

AUM is pro-cyclical. Market corrections reduce revenue instantly. Weak AMCs feel this first. Strong ones endure because SIP flows soften the drawdown.

SIPs do not eliminate cycles. They slow them. Survival still depends on cost discipline and reputation durability. The next phase will not be won by louder marketing.

It will be shaped by:

- Financialization of household savings
- Pension capital duration
- High-margin alternates (AIFs, PMS)
- Offshore mandates via GIFT City
- Technology as cost reducer, not alpha generator

The industry may cross ₹100 trillion AUM.

Few participants will matter.

The HDFC AMC Question: Price vs. Quality

Based On different Mix of AUM , A P/E of 25-27x is fair for HDFC AMC.

It is understood.

A business that:

- Requires no/less reinvestment to grow
- Produces ROEs above 35%
- Converts behavior into annuity-like revenue
- Operates without leverage or balance-sheet risk

Long-horizon capital asks a different question:

How many mistakes can this business survive?

HDFC AMC can survive many.

The Indian asset management industry is no longer an experiment.

It is an adaptive system.

Capital flows here not because returns are guaranteed—but because process has become credible.

The winners will not be the most innovative. They will be the most trusted, most patient, and most disciplined.

Selection favors endurance. And endurance compounds.

India's **passenger vehicle market** is not evolving linearly. It is reorganizing. Product mix is shifting upward. Compliance costs are rising. Technology content per vehicle is increasing faster than volumes. And manufacturing advantage is migrating from labor arbitrage to process depth. In that environment, survival does not belong to the cheapest producer, but to the most adaptable one.

Hyundai Motor India is not the largest OEM in India. But it is arguably the most structurally balanced.

That balance is not accidental. It is inherited.

HMIL was founded in 1996, not as a joint venture experiment, but as a fully controlled extension of Hyundai Motor Company. That distinction matters. Unlike many foreign OEMs that treated India as an optional growth market, Hyundai treated it as a manufacturing base early – embedding the Hyundai Production System before the market matured.

Three decades later, India accounts for nearly one-fifth of Hyundai Motor Company's global volumes. That statistic alone explains why HMIL is not managed like a regional subsidiary. It is managed like a pillar.

Access to Hyundai's global R&D stack, standardized platforms, and affiliate ecosystem (Hyundai Mobis, logistics arms, tooling suppliers) compresses HMIL's learning curve in ways domestic peers cannot replicate organically. This is not about technology transfer alone. It is about institutional muscle memory – the ability to industrialize complexity repeatedly.

The IPO, where HMC retained over 82% ownership, did not dilute this relationship. It formalized it. Public listing imposed disclosure and capital discipline without breaking strategic alignment. HMIL gained market accountability while retaining parent-backed optionality.

That combination is rare.

Between FY22 and FY24, HMIL's revenues compounded at over 21%. That growth was not volume-led. It was mix-led. The company consciously rode India's SUV migration – shifting away from entry hatchbacks toward higher ASP products with better margin density.

This matters because Indian auto growth is no longer about selling more cars. It is about selling fewer cheap cars and more expensive ones.

EBITDA margins expanded steadily into the low-teens – not because Hyundai cut costs aggressively, but because it sold better cars. Profit after tax more than doubled over two years. FY25 showed normalization – modest revenue softness and margin stability – exactly what a mature system looks like when a cycle cools.

The spike in dividends ahead of the IPO distorted headline return ratios. Strip that out, and HMIL still operates with ROEs in the 30-40% range – exceptional for a capital-intensive manufacturer. These are not financial engineering returns. They are throughput returns – earned by sweating assets at near-full utilization.

Debt remains negligible. Cash generation is internal. Capital allocation is conservative. This is not a balance sheet designed for excitement. It is designed for endurance.

Hyundai's real moat is not brand. It is plant economics.

The Chennai complex operates near peak utilization – producing engines, transmissions, and multiple vehicle platforms with extreme automation. High asset turnover is not a byproduct here; it is the goal.

Capacity constraints forced expansion. The Talegaon acquisition is not opportunistic – it is defensive. Without capacity headroom, product strategy becomes constrained by factory physics. With it, Hyundai can scale SUVs, EVs, and exports without cannibalizing domestic priorities.

Once Talegaon is fully operational, HMIL crosses the one-million-unit threshold. At that scale, fixed costs dilute naturally. Procurement power strengthens. Platform economics improve.

But scale alone is not enough.

Hyundai's Integrated Modular Architecture standardizes invisible components – frames, electronics, powertrain interfaces – while allowing visible differentiation. This reduces development CAPEX per model and shortens time-to-market. The risk, of course, is sameness. Design fatigue is real.

Hyundai is betting that operational flexibility outweighs aesthetic risk. That bet works only if brand management stays sharp.

Indian consumers are not buying more cars. They are buying different cars.

SUVs now dominate Hyundai's domestic mix – rising from under half to nearly 70% in four years. Hatchbacks shrink not because affordability vanished, but because aspiration moved.

Higher ASPs lift margins. Higher margins fund technology. Technology reinforces brand positioning. This loop explains Hyundai's resilience even as overall market growth moderates.

Distribution supports this shift. Hyundai's network density – especially in semi-urban and rural markets – cushions demand volatility. Rural penetration is not a social mission. It is a portfolio hedge.

Urban demand is cyclical. Rural demand is seasonal, but sticky.

Exports are not Hyundai India's growth engine. They are its stabilizer.

By exporting to over 90 countries, HMIL converts domestic manufacturing into a global cost hedge. When Indian demand softens, export volumes absorb slack. When currencies move, margins rebalance.

India functions as Hyundai's small- and mid-SUV hub for emerging markets. This is not brand-driven export. It is cost-structure-driven export.

That distinction matters. Brand-led exports fluctuate with sentiment. Cost-led exports persist.

Hyundai's connected car leadership is not about novelty. It is about price justification.

As vehicles become electronically dense, software becomes the quiet differentiator. Bluelink, ADAS, OTA capabilities – these are not luxury features anymore. They are perceived safety and convenience layers that allow OEMs to defend pricing in a competitive market.

India is still underpenetrated in these features. Hyundai moved early. That early move locks in mindshare before regulation mandates standardization.

Longer-term, software-defined vehicles change revenue logic. Hardware margins compress. Lifecycle monetization expands. Hyundai understands this because it has already lived through this transition in other markets.

Maruti Suzuki optimizes for scale and cost. Mahindra optimizes for rugged identity and EV optionality. Hyundai optimizes for balance.

It does not lead in volume. It does not dominate EVs yet. It does not own entry-level pricing. But it sits comfortably where margins, scale, and brand intersect.

Force Motors plays a different game altogether – niche, profitable, specialized. Not comparable. Useful as contrast.

Hyundai's relative advantage is lack of dependence on a single segment or technology path.

That reduces upside spikes. It also reduces downside cliffs.

India's motorization rate remains structurally low. Even modest convergence creates decades of volume headroom. But growth will not be uniform.

Fuel mix is diversifying. CNG and hybrids gain share. EV adoption accelerates slowly, constrained by infrastructure and affordability. Hyundai's staggered EV rollout reflects realism, not hesitation.

The goal is not to be first. It is to be viable at scale.

Hyundai Motor India is not a scarcity asset. It is a quality asset.

Its valuation reflects that – trading in line with mature OEMs, not speculative disruptors. Returns here will come from compounding, dividends, and incremental re-rating as capacity expands and EV optionality becomes visible.

This is not a stock that surprises on upside. It is one that disappoints rarely.

The real risks are not cyclical.

They are structural:

- Design convergence under modular platforms
- Self-cannibalization across overlapping SUVs
- Capital allocation tension between dividends and EV investment
- Software commoditization reducing differentiation

None are fatal. All require discipline.

Hyundai Motor India is not a narrative company. It does not promise transformation. It executes systems.

As India's passenger vehicle market matures — shifting from penetration to optimization — companies that industrialize complexity survive best.

Hyundai has already done that elsewhere. India is simply the next scale iteration. This is not an inevitability story.

It is a probability-weighted endurance story. And those tend to compound quietly.

For more than five decades, the Indian **information technology** sector has served as one of the country's most reliable economic engines. It earned foreign exchange when capital was scarce, built institutional credibility when India lacked it, and created a globally respected labor force long before domestic consumption could absorb such scale. Companies like TCS, Infosys, and later LTI Mindtree did not merely export software services; they exported trust. They ran the invisible systems of banks, governments, airlines, and enterprises across continents.

That legacy matters, because the sector is now facing its most consequential structural test since the commercialization of the internet itself.

Artificial intelligence—particularly generative models and large language architectures—has introduced a rupture, not an incremental upgrade. It threatens the core economic logic that powered Indian IT for decades: the translation of human hours into billable revenue. At the same time, it offers something far rarer—an escape from linear growth and a pathway toward non-human-scaled margins.

The market's first reaction, predictably, was fear. Through 2024 and much of 2025, IT valuations compressed as investors extrapolated a world where machines replaced programmers, testing teams, and entire service layers. But fear, especially technological fear, often misprices transition phases. What the operating data now suggests is not collapse, but adaptation—slow, uneven, and managerial in nature.

To understand why, one has to first strip AI of its mythology.

Modern AI is not intelligence in the human sense. It is architecture—specifically, a probabilistic system trained to recognize and reproduce patterns at scale.

The breakthrough moment arrived in 2018 with the transformer architecture, which replaced sequential processing with self-attention. This allowed models to evaluate entire contexts simultaneously, weighing the relative importance of words,

concepts, and relationships across long spans of text. It was not consciousness; it was parallelism.

Large language models operate through layered encoders and decoders, converting language into high-dimensional embeddings and then reconstructing outputs token by token. Training occurs in phases—first absorbing vast public datasets to learn linguistic structure, then being fine-tuned on narrower domains to improve task-specific performance.

But every layer of capability carries an embedded cost.

The attention mechanism scales quadratically. As context windows expand, compute and memory requirements explode. Data centers become mandatory. Power consumption becomes strategic. High-quality training data becomes scarce. Memory bottlenecks restrict deployment outside hyperscale environments.

This is why AI is not universally cheap, not infinitely scalable, and not frictionless. It is powerful, but it is also physically bounded.

Those bounds matter enormously for enterprises.

AI does not reason holistically. It predicts locally.

Because models generate outputs one token at a time, they lack true global planning. They cannot reliably step back, reassess, and restructure a multi-stage problem. Error compounds. Confidence masks fragility. The result is the now-familiar phenomenon of persuasive nonsense—answers that sound coherent while being logically flawed.

In controlled experiments, consultants relying on advanced models reached incorrect business conclusions materially more often than those without AI assistance—not because the models were malicious, but because they were convincingly wrong.

In high-stakes environments—finance, healthcare, infrastructure, defense—this is unacceptable. Enterprises do not tolerate 95% accuracy. They demand near certainty.

That reality enforces a structural constraint: AI can accelerate work, but it cannot own accountability. The “man-on-top” model is not a temporary compromise; it is a permanent architecture.

And that single fact reshapes the fate of Indian IT.

For decades, Indian IT monetized effort. Revenue scaled with headcount. Margins improved through utilization discipline and

wage arbitrage. It was a brutally efficient system—until automation arrived.

AI attacks precisely the layers that were once most billable: testing, routine coding, maintenance, documentation, and support. These tasks are now compressible. Pricing power weakens. Labor leverage declines.

But this does not destroy the sector. It forces it to evolve.

The transition underway is not from services to products, but from labor to outcomes. From billing hours to guaranteeing results. From manpower aggregation to platform orchestration.

This is not cosmetic. It is a philosophical shift.

When an IT firm sells an outcome—a cost reduction, a uptime guarantee, a fraud detection threshold—it decouples revenue from human effort. AI becomes embedded inside the service, not sold as a line item. Recurring revenue replaces episodic contracts.

This is how software companies scale. Indian IT is learning to behave like one.

As the cost of computation falls, usage does not shrink—it expands.

Automation does not reduce demand for technology. It expands the addressable problem set. Enterprises that once could not afford complex systems now demand them. Legacy infrastructure must be modernized. Data must be cleaned, governed, secured, and contextualized. AI does not remove work; it raises the abstraction level of work.

This is where Indian IT's advantage quietly reasserts itself.

The sector has always been strongest not at invention, but at industrialization. At taking complexity and making it repeatable. At running systems reliably, at scale, for long periods.

That capability does not disappear in an AI world. It becomes more valuable.

Look at industries that have already faced structural change.

Hyundai Motor India does not compete by reinventing cars every year. It competes by modularizing complexity—platforms that allow rapid variation without reengineering the core. The result is resilience under demand shifts.

Asset management companies compound not through prediction, but through structure—sticky inflows, operating leverage, and trust.

Indian IT is converging toward both models. Platformized delivery. Recurring revenue. High ROE without balance sheet stress.

The playbook is not new. It is being adapted.

TCS is not racing AI startups. It is absorbing AI into its operating system.

Its AI revenue run rate has crossed meaningful scale. More importantly, it is being deployed in production environments—predictive operations, self-healing infrastructure, autonomous monitoring. This is not experimentation. It is monetization.

The workforce retooling is the tell. Hundreds of thousands of employees trained, not for demos, but for delivery. That scale of retraining is not performative. It is expensive, deliberate, and irreversible.

Infosys follows a similar arc. Platforms like Topaz are not products; they are scaffolding—ways to embed intelligence across client systems. Near-term margin noise is the cost of transition, not evidence of failure.

These firms have lived through ERP, cloud, mobile, and digital waves. They were never first. They were usually last—and then largest.

Persistent Systems and Tata Elxsi occupy a different niche. They move faster because they specialize.

Persistent's focus on AI-led engineering and verticalized platforms allows it to price for value, not hours. Tata Elxsi sits at the intersection of software, design, and regulated industries—automotive, healthcare, industrial systems—where AI adoption is slower but stickier.

These firms are not immune to cycles. But they compound capability faster.

The Nifty IT drawdown was not irrational—it was early.

Markets priced disruption before understanding constraint. What has changed is not the technology, but the evidence. Deal pipelines are stabilizing. North America is recovering. AI revenue is no longer theoretical.

Valuations today embed skepticism. That skepticism is the margin of safety.

This is not 2021 exuberance. It is 2013-style doubt—when the next model is unclear, but the balance sheet is intact.

The bench is no longer idle capacity. It is retraining capacity.

Transactional effort is being offloaded to machines. Cognitive orchestration is being insourced. The skill premium rises. Hiring resumes, but differently—AI, data, security, domain depth.

This is painful. It is also inevitable.

The firms that manage this transition without breaking culture will survive. Those that resist it will hollow out.

AI will commoditize. That is its destiny.

When it does, advantage will not lie in access to tools, but in execution. In relationships. In accountability. In putting the right human judgment on top of automated systems.

That favors incumbents, not disruptors.

Indian IT is not being replaced by intelligence. It is being reorganized by it. The sector is moving—from labor exporter to system orchestrator, from effort monetization to outcome ownership, from fear to fluency.

This transition will not be smooth. Margins will wobble. Narratives will shift. But the underlying structure—high ROE, low debt, operational discipline—remains intact.

AI changes the tools. It does not change the need for trust.

And trust, once institutionalized, compounds longer than technology cycles ever do.

Question session

1. Where does this thesis break first if global growth undershoots for a decade?

You frame stagnation as the baseline. Which assumptions in your portfolio fail first if global growth stays below 2% for 10-15 years?

ANSWER - This framework fails not with slow growth, but with permanent stagnation that collapses trade into isolation. Fragmentation is survivable; deglobalization is not.

If global growth remains below 2% for a decade and energy costs stay structurally elevated, India loses fiscal oxygen. Digital rails require cheap energy and surplus tax capacity. Without those, infrastructure becomes symbolic rather than functional.

The bet is that scale still matters. If the global system slows, protection becomes expensive. India survives only if efficiency converts into indispensability.

2. What is the single variable you monitor that tells you this thesis is wrong?

Not a dashboard-one signal. What tells you to reassess India's "structural plausibility" before the market does?

ANSWER - Total Factor Productivity.

Not GDP. Not index earnings.

If digital public infrastructure does not translate into higher output per worker, then the state is not investing—it is accumulating fixed costs. We are not interested in “world-class systems” that fail to raise productivity.

Flat TFP during an infrastructure build is the signal. It means the system is being admired, not used.

3. How do you separate historical analogy from actionable causality in India's resurgence argument?

India's past centrality is well established—but which *mechanisms* today are genuinely comparable, and which are narrative comfort?

ANSWER – The mechanism is transaction-cost collapse.

The Mauryan silver coin and the digital rupee perform the same function: lowering the energy required to exchange trust. History becomes causality when money moves faster in low-income regions.

We do not buy continuity narratives.

We buy falling friction, rising velocity, and measurable adoption.

4. What is the opportunity cost of choosing ‘indispensability’ over speed in capital allocation?

Public capex-first strategies are slow. What growth paths are you explicitly giving up—and why is that acceptable?

ANSWER – We sacrifice blitzscaling.

By backing public-capex-led ecosystems over pure consumer tech, we accept slower compounding in exchange for longevity. This is not ideological restraint—it is probabilistic discipline.

Over long horizons, speed without resilience leads to extinction.

5. How do you underwrite political risk when the state is a dominant economic actor in multiple portfolio companies?

LIC, infrastructure, digital rails—state proximity is a feature. At what point does it become a constraint?

ANSWER – State proximity is an advantage until capital stops being economic.

The red line is mandated misallocation. If LIC is forced to absorb failing assets to satisfy political optics, the policyholder surplus is compromised. That is a trust breach.

So far, regulatory shifts suggest the state prefers functionality over obedience. This remains conditional, not permanent.

6. In LIC specifically, what evidence tells you margin improvement is structural, not cosmetic?

What internal data or behavior change gives you confidence this isn't just product mix tinkering without cultural change?

ANSWER - Yes—because incentives are shifting.

LIC's transformation is not cosmetic if VNB composition changes. When agents are rewarded for managing risk rather than pushing volume, culture follows compensation.

We watch one number:

The share of non-par products in new business.

That number reveals intent.

7. What is your expected time-to-re-rating for LIC, and what delays it materially?

Is this a 3-year, 7-year, or generational option? What would make it dead capital for too long?

ANSWER - LIC is a time-dated option, not a momentum play.

As long as it serves as a fiscal instrument for government disinvestment, valuation remains suppressed. Re-rating occurs when either:

- dividend yield overwhelms the PSU discount, or
- index inclusion forces passive ownership.

Narratives do not unlock value. Constraints do.

8. How do you think about supply overhang risk in LIC versus valuation upside mathematically?

At what government stake reduction does valuation actually respond, not just theoretically improve?

ANSWER - Below 25% public float, valuation is theoretical.

Once SEBI's minimum threshold is met, forced dilution risk disappears. At that point, the market must confront the balance sheet as it is—not as it fears it might become.

9. Why is HDFC AMC priced for endurance but still not considered a terminal compounder?

At what point does valuation cap its role in a 20-stock portfolio built for multi-decade compounding?

ANSWER - HDFC AMC compounds—but not infinitely.

The ceiling is fee compression. Regulation ensures that as scale increases, yield declines. The business shifts from alpha extraction to cost efficiency.

This is an operating leverage bet. If AUM scales faster than expenses, margins survive. If alpha becomes commoditized, AMCs become utilities.

Utilities do not earn excess multiples.

10. What happens to AMC economics if SIP persistence weakens during a prolonged equity drawdown?

Not a crash—a long sideways decade. How elastic is belief when returns disappear quietly?

ANSWER - Sideways markets test faith.

If returns stagnate for a decade, participation slows. But the Sovereign assumption is simple: the middle class has no superior alternative. Property is illiquid. Gold does not compound. SIPs persist by default, not enthusiasm.

We assume a 30% inflow decline and still see excess profitability.

11. How do you stress-test 'trust' as an asset across both LIC and private AMCs?

Trust compounds slowly—but how does it decay, and what early signs do you watch for?

ANSWER - Not through underperformance.

Trust collapses via governance breaches—front-running, conflicts of interest, or balance-sheet favoritism. If the sponsor ever benefits at the expense of fund holders, the Company is compromised.

Performance recovers. Trust does not.

12. What does capital misallocation look like inside this thesis—and how do you detect it early?

If public digital infrastructure overbuilds or duplicates private incentives, where does value get destroyed?

ANSWER - The risk is redundant infrastructure.

If the state builds systems that private markets already solved more efficiently, value is destroyed quietly. We watch adoption curves, not press releases.

Unutilized efficiency is just expensive decoration.

13. Why 20 companies? What would force you to go to 15—or 30?

Is portfolio size a risk control, a liquidity constraint, or a belief about attention economics?

ANSWER - Twenty is a cognitive boundary.

Fewer increases sovereign exposure. More dilutes understanding. At twenty, we can track adaptation, incentives, and decay without drifting into index behavior.

This is not diversification.

It is attention management.

14. How do you think about reinvestment risk in asset-light businesses like AMCs?

When excess cash piles up, what prevents strategic drift, over-diversification, or value-destructive expansion?

ANSWER - Excess cash invites stupidity.

When capital accumulates faster than opportunity, management is tempted to manufacture growth. We prefer cash returned aggressively. If internal reinvestment cannot earn high ROE, redeployment belongs to us—not them.

15. If AI meaningfully reduces friction in underwriting, distribution, and asset management—who loses first?

Which incumbent in your portfolio is most vulnerable to technology commoditizing their moat?

ANSWER - Intermediaries.

Distribution layers and manual underwriting erode first. Processing becomes cheap; trust remains scarce. LIC loses if it digitizes slowly. HDFC AMC gains because AI compresses costs faster than it compresses fees. We anchor capital where trust interfaces exist—not where computation is the moat.

16. At what point does modularity stop being a cost advantage and start becoming a brand tax?

Hyundai's Integrated Modular Architecture compresses CAPEX and speeds launches, but design convergence and internal SUV overlap are acknowledged risks. How do you internally measure when platform efficiency begins to erode willingness-to-pay rather than enhance it?

ANSWER - In the Sovereign Anchor framework, modularity is borrowed efficiency. It accelerates scale upfront and charges interest later through brand fatigue.

Hyundai's modular architecture compresses development time and enables rapid model proliferation with limited incremental capital. The failure emerges when shared platforms begin to shape visible identity. At that point, operational efficiency leaks into perception.

We treat modularity as neutral until it becomes visible.

The Brand Tax overtakes CAPEX savings when:

- price premiums across variants fail to sustain a >15% spread,
- demand is recycled internally rather than captured externally,
- design refresh cycles shorten due to over-familiarity.

Modularity works until customers notice it.

Once noticed, it taxes brand equity.

17. How do you think about capital allocation discipline when the parent optimizes globally but minority shareholders optimize locally?

With HMC retaining ~82% ownership, how are decisions around dividends, EV capex timing, and export prioritization arbitrated when India's optimal reinvestment cycle may diverge from the parent's global capital logic?

ANSWER - With controlling ownership retained by the global parent, the primary risk is not governance but capital gravity.

India can function as a compounding ecosystem or a liquidity reservoir. The distinction is visible in cash flows, not intent statements.

The FY24 pre-listing dividend extraction was rational for the parent and mildly negative for minority shareholders focused on reinvestment.

We monitor two signals:

- royalty stability as a permanent toll,
- reinvestment consistently exceeding distributions.

When dividends consume more than half of free cash flow, the soil is being harvested, not replenished.

Capital allocation reveals intent faster than strategy decks.

18. What is the failure mode if software and connected features become regulated commodities rather than differentiators?

If ADAS, connectivity, and OTA features get standardized through regulation or price competition, where does Hyundai's margin defense migrate next – manufacturing depth, brand, or lifecycle monetization – and which of these is least proven in India?

ANSWER – Hyundai's current margin protection rests on early feature deployment. This advantage is temporary.

If regulation standardizes these features, technology becomes table stakes. Pricing power collapses, and margin defense shifts from innovation to execution.

Two paths remain:

- manufacturing depth, where cost and scale decide,
- post-sale monetization, which remains culturally unproven.

If monetization fails, the business does not break – it reverts.

19. Where does outcome-based pricing fail first when AI compresses variance as well as effort?

If AI reduces dispersion in delivery quality across vendors, how do you preserve pricing power in outcome contracts without slipping back into implicit time-and-materials economics?

ANSWER - Outcome-based pricing survives on information asymmetry. When AI compresses effort and quality variance across vendors, outcomes drift toward commoditization.

The failure point appears when outcomes are easily measurable and repeatable. Standardized deliverables lose pricing power regardless of execution skill.

We favor firms migrating toward complex, system-level outcomes. Pricing shifts from output to utility—where business impact, not code effort, anchors value.

20. How do you prevent “man-on-top” from becoming a hidden cost center rather than a moat?

Human oversight is framed as permanent. At scale, how do you stop senior human judgment from becoming the new bottleneck that caps margins and throughput?

ANSWER - AI scales output, but humans still gate decisions. When senior oversight becomes the throughput constraint, productivity gains stall.

The hidden cost shows up in senior talent utilization. If experts spend most of their time reviewing machine output rather than designing systems, margins will not expand.

We prefer firms where humans set policy and AI verifies execution. When humans remain final gates, the firm is a bottleneck, not a platform.

21. What is the leading indicator that AI has shifted from margin enhancer to margin diluter?

Before it shows up in reported margins, what operational signal tells you that AI tooling is being competed away rather than embedded defensively?

ANSWER - Margin pressure appears operationally before it hits the P&L.

The earliest signal is unpaid scope expansion—AI features demanded without incremental pricing. At that point, differentiation is already being competed away.

We track R&D spend against revenue per employee. Rising investment with flat productivity signals the Red Queen Effect: running faster to stand still.

22. Which client behavior would invalidate the trust advantage of incumbents?

If large enterprises begin to unbundle accountability—separating AI orchestration, model risk, and system integration across vendors—how exposed are Indian IT firms to losing their role as single-point owners?

ANSWER – The core moat of Indian IT was unified accountability. That moat weakens as enterprises assemble best-of-breed AI stacks.

If accountability detaches from execution, large vendors risk reverting to low-margin labor providers.

The hedge is data stickiness. Models are replaceable; decades of system context are not. Control over data pipelines preserves relevance when orchestration rises.

The global **beverage industry** is often misunderstood as a brand-led business. In reality, it is an execution-led industry where the true competitive advantage lies not with the brand owner, but with the bottler who converts brand pull into physical availability, cold-chain dominance, and retail penetration. Brands create desire; bottlers convert desire into cash flows.

Within this framework, Varun Beverages Limited (VBL) represents one of the most structurally advantaged consumer execution platforms to emerge from India. Controlled by the Jaipuria family and led by Ravi Jaipuria, VBL has evolved from a regional Pepsi bottler in the early 1990s into the second-largest PepsiCo franchisee globally outside the United States. This evolution has not been linear, nor opportunistic. It has been the result of deliberate vertical integration, relentless territory consolidation, and a willingness to deploy capital aggressively where consumption curves are steepest.

Today, VBL is no longer merely a bottler. It is an end-to-end consumer distribution ecosystem—spanning manufacturing, packaging, logistics, cold-chain infrastructure, and last-mile retail execution—replicated across geographies with remarkable consistency.

The relationship between PepsiCo and Varun Beverages has gradually inverted the traditional power dynamics of global FMCG

franchising. What began as a straightforward bottling agreement has, over three decades, matured into a deeply interdependent partnership.

In India, VBL now accounts for over 90% of PepsiCo's beverage volumes. This concentration is not incidental—it is the outcome of systematic territory acquisition and operational outperformance. More importantly, it represents a strategic "dependency flip," where PepsiCo's success in one of its most critical emerging markets is inseparable from VBL's execution capability.

For long-term investors, this dependency is not a risk—it is a moat.

At the core of VBL's structural strength lies its bottling and trademark license agreements. The 2019 consolidation—where VBL acquired the South and West Indian territories from PepsiCo—created a unified national footprint. This eliminated regional fragmentation and enabled a single operating playbook across India.

These agreements grant VBL exclusive rights to manufacture, distribute, and sell PepsiCo beverages within assigned territories. The economics are structured to reward efficiency while ensuring PepsiCo's annuity streams through concentrate sales, marketing contributions, and royalties.

Typically, around 20% of net revenue is allocated toward partnership-related costs, including concentrate procurement and brand marketing. What truly matters, however, is duration. The Indian trademark license runs until April 2039, providing nearly two decades of contractual certainty.

That horizon allows VBL to deploy capital without fear of renegotiation risk—an underappreciated advantage in a capital-intensive business.

VBL's rise has been driven by what can best be described as "disciplined consolidation." Over the last decade and a half, the company acquired multiple PepsiCo-owned and franchisee-owned bottling operations, then imposed its superior operating model on them.

Between 2011 and 2025, VBL's share of PepsiCo's Indian beverage volume expanded from 26% to over 90%. This scale unlocks three decisive advantages:

- Procurement leverage across sugar, PET, packaging, and freight
- Advertising efficiency, as spend is coordinated nationally

- Retail simplicity, with distributors and retailers interfacing with a single entity

Most importantly, it creates physical barriers to competition. Shelf space in India's kirana stores is finite. VBL's visi-coolers, branding, and distributor relationships effectively pre-empt that space before competitors arrive.

VBL's portfolio is designed to serve the full consumption pyramid. Global PepsiCo brands provide aspiration and volume, while proprietary labels allow margin capture and price flexibility.

Carbonated soft drinks remain the volume backbone, but the mix is steadily improving. Energy drinks, hydration products, and juices are gaining share—most notably Sting, which has democratized the energy drink category through aggressive pricing and mass-market positioning.

Alongside licensed brands, VBL's own-label strategy fills critical gaps. Value-tier water, regional beverages, and market-specific SKUs allow the company to compete where global brands either cannot price effectively or lack cultural resonance.

This dual-brand architecture ensures that VBL captures both brand-driven demand and price-driven volume, without diluting either.

Unlike many FMCG players that outsource production, VBL treats manufacturing as a strategic asset. The company operates 50 facilities globally, positioned deliberately near consumption centers to minimize freight costs—a decisive advantage in a low value-to-weight industry.

What truly differentiates VBL, however, is backward integration. Packaging is not purchased; it is produced. PET preforms, caps, corrugated boxes, and shrink films are largely manufactured in-house. Logistics is not rented; it is owned.

This control over inputs allows VBL to stabilize margins even during periods of raw material volatility. EBITDA margins in the 23-24% range are not accidental—they are engineered.

In beverages, demand is impulse-driven. Availability and temperature matter more than advertising.

VBL's distribution strategy reflects this reality. With over 1.15 million visi-coolers deployed, the company effectively controls chilled shelf space across its territories. These coolers do more than cool—they brand, block competitors, and lock in retailer loyalty.

The logistics network is equally formidable. A fleet exceeding 10,000 vehicles, supported by 130+ depots and thousands of distributors, allows VBL to reach over 3.5 million Customers today—with a roadmap to 12 million.

This is not incremental expansion; it is saturation strategy.

Africa represents VBL's most compelling growth option—not because it is exotic, but because it is familiar. Low per capita consumption, youthful demographics, urbanization, and underdeveloped cold-chain infrastructure mirror India's beverage landscape from a decade ago.

The South African entry via BevCo, followed by the Twizza acquisition, provides manufacturing scale and backward integration in the continent's largest soft drink market. Zimbabwe, Morocco, Zambia, DRC, and now Kenya form a contiguous expansion corridor.

Crucially, VBL is not exporting products—it is exporting systems. The same distribution-first, general-trade-heavy model that worked in India is being deployed across Africa.

The snacks foray is not a diversification gamble—it is a logistics optimization. Chips move on the same trucks, into the same stores, through the same distributors as beverages.

With PepsiCo entrusting VBL with snacks in select African markets, and early co-packing in India, this vertical could scale rapidly with minimal incremental capital.

The Carlsberg distribution agreement in Africa follows similar logic. Alcohol leverages the same cold-chain infrastructure, offering higher margins without manufacturing risk.

VBL has compounded revenues at ~20% over long periods, driven by both volume growth and mix improvement. Operating leverage ensures that profit growth outpaces revenue growth.

Return ratios remain exceptional for a manufacturing-heavy business. ROE consistently in the 20-30% range reflects disciplined capital allocation rather than financial engineering. Debt has been materially reduced post-QIP, leaving the balance sheet primed for expansion.

Seasonality, once a vulnerability, is increasingly diversified through international operations with different climatic cycles.

At 40-55x earnings, VBL is not cheap—but neither is it cyclical. The market assigns a premium because the business combines FMCG defensiveness with mid-cap growth.

Low beta, long-duration contracts, and recurring consumption justify this multiple. Relative to peers growing at single digits, VBL's growth-adjusted valuation remains defensible.

Varun Beverages is no longer a Pepsi bottler. It is a consumer execution platform with unmatched reach, structural cost advantages, and geographic optionality.

The moat is layered:

- Contractual exclusivity until 2039
- Physical dominance through cold-chain and distribution
- Cost insulation via backward integration

As the company moves toward 2030, the roadmap is clear—deepen India, dominate Africa, expand categories.

For investors, the case rests on a simple truth: beverages are habitual, recurring, and non-discretionary. Execution, not innovation, wins this industry. And few companies globally execute at VBL's scale, speed, and consistency.

As long as the Jaipuria family continues to prioritize territory control and operational excellence, Varun Beverages is unlikely to lose relevance—only geography.

As of 1st january , 2026

Our portfolio (Consistent Compounders) contains;

1.Infosys	6.65%
2.LTImindTree	6.18%
3.Varun Beverages	5.78%
4.Bharat Electronics	5.62%
5.Adani Power	5.44%
6.HDFC AMC	5.42%
7.Indus Tower	5.42%
8.ITC	5.27%
9.Coal India	5.21%
10.ABB	5.20%
11.BPCL	5.19%

12.Dr Reddy	5.12%
13.Tata Motor PV	5.10%
14.Hyundai	4.62%
15.Cipla	4.52%
16.Cummins India	4.51%
17.Hindustan Aeronautics	4.42%
18.Life Insurance Cop.	4.28%
19.TCS	3.30%
20.BSE	2.74%

We will keep on updating you the portfolio and reasons behind those investments/disinvestments.The portfolio can shift because of buy/sell,new money infused and mark-to-market gains .We are also exploring how to show the AUM size as well .

We seek not the highest return, but the fewest ways to fail. What remains, compounds.

