

Pricing Analytics

Session 2

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Session Overview

- Review of Last Class
- Two-part Pricing
- Quantity Discounts
- Bundling for Traditional Goods
- Bundling for Information Goods

Two-part Pricing

Two-part Pricing

- Car Rental Companies

- basic charge
- per mile charge

$$F = 100 \quad p = 10/\text{km}$$

- Utility Companies

- basic fee
- per unit charge

$$C1 \quad 20\text{kms} \quad 100 + 10 \times 20 = 300$$

$$C2 \quad 10\text{kms} \quad 100 + 10 \times 10 = 200$$

- Night Clubs

- cover charge
- per drink charge

$$C1 \quad \frac{300}{20} = 15$$

- Professional Service Providers

- retainer
- per hour fee

$$C2 \quad \frac{200}{10} = 20$$

Jazz Club Example

- Jazz Club: entertainment \$4, liquor \$2/drink
- Average customer buys 2 drinks
- Priced at \$4/drink

# Drinks	Cost	Revenue
0	\$4	0
1	\$6	\$4
2	\$8	\$8
3	\$10	\$12
4	\$12	\$16
10	\$24	\$40

Jazz Club Example

- Jazz club: entertainment \$4, liquor \$2/drink
- Average customer buys 2 drinks
- Priced at \$4/drink
- However, a heavy drinker (user) will subsidize a light drinker with this policy!
- Two-part pricing can be used to minimize cross-subsidy

# Drinks	Cost	Revenue
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1	\$6	\$4
2	\$8	\$8
3	\$10	\$12
4	\$12	\$16
10	\$24	\$40

Two-part Pricing

- Two-part pricing requires ex-post or on-going measurement of usage
- It is assumed that how much consumers use is exogenous to this measurement!
- When might this assumption not hold true?

Xerox Problem

- Two users with different consumption rates
 - 20K and 2K
- Different willingness to pay
 - \$25,800 and \$6,700
- Cost per copy to Xerox = \$0.03
- Cost of the machine = \$1900
- NPV of getting \$1 each year for five years = \$3.79

Xerox Problem


- What if there were a third segment whose WTP was 15,000 and copies required were 6000?
- $(F+2,000p)*3.79 \leq 6700$
- $(F+20,000p)*3.79 \leq 25,800$
- $(F+6,000p)*3.79 \leq 15,000$

Quantity Discounts


Quantity Discounts

- Cost Based Reasons
 - economies of scale
 - transaction costs
- Demand Based Reasons
 - in many instances, heavier users of a product are more price sensitive because they spend more on the product
 - quantity discounts is a means to lower price only to the heavier users of the product
- Strategic Reasons
 - lowers the incentives to use multiple suppliers [dual and multiple sourcing]
 - scope based quantity discounts increase switching costs
- Alignment of Incentives in a Channel


Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives




Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives




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
Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives




Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives




Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives



Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives



Quantity Discounts to Align Channel Incentives



Price Engineering

- Two-part pricing and Quantity discounts
 - means to do price discrimination
- However, there can be several other reasons to implement these strategies
- Price Discrimination
 - First Degree
 - Second Degree
 - Third Degree

Bundling Traditional Products

Copy Machine Example

		Machine	3 year/parts & labor	Bundle
I	Home Offices	\$900	\$300	1200
I	Law Firms	\$1200	\$100	1300
Sep :		1800	300	2100
Bundle:		2 x 1200	=	2400

Copy Machine Example

	Machine	3 year/parts & labor
Home Offices	\$900	\$300
Law Firms	\$1200	\$200

1200

1400

Sep :

1800

400

2200

Bundle :

1200 * 2

2400

Copy Machine Example

	Machine	3 year/parts & labor
Home Offices	\$900	\$100
Law Firms	\$1200	\$300

1000

1500

Sep:

1800

300

2100

Bundle:

1000 + 2

2000

Bundling Information Products


The power of bundling in low marginal cost industries

Bundling Information Products

- Pricing Models for Information Products
 - Buy a Bundle (Microsoft Office)
 - Pay as you go (Download the specific features you need)
- Information products have a unique characteristic that marginal costs are close to zero
- Bundling of information products is usually very easy
- It also imposes no additional burden on the consumer (usually)



Bundling Information Products

- The product we are considering has 1000 features
- Let us assume that there are 100 consumers
- For each consumer, the value (WTP) of a particular product feature is uniformly distributed between \$0 and \$1
- There is no correlation between a consumer's willingness to pay across features




Bundling Information Products

- Corresponding demand function for one feature?




Bundling Information Products

- Optimal price for one feature?




Bundling Information Products

- Optimal price for one feature?




Bundling Information Products

- Optimal price for one feature?




Bundling Information Products

- Optimal price for one feature?



Bundling Information Products

- Optimal price for one feature?



Bundling Information Products

When each feature is sold separately:

- Optimal price per feature?


$\$0.50$

- Total demand per feature at 50¢?

50


- Total Revenue?

$$1000 \times 50 \times 0.50 = \$25,000$$




Bundling Information Products

- Consumer Demand for Bundled features?



Bundling Information Products

- Consumer Demand for Bundled features?



Bundling Information Products

When 1000 features are bundled:

- Optimal price?


500 \$

- Total demand?

100

- Total Revenue?

\$ 50,000



Some Questions

- What if there is some marginal cost of adding features? $0.05 \times 50,000 = 2500$
- What if there is disposal cost of additional features on the part of the user? $\$20 \times 100 = \$2,000$
- What if the willingness to pay is correlated across features:
 - Will the gains from bundling be higher or lower?

Bundling of Information Products

- Bundling of traditional goods relies critically on negative correlation in willingness to pay.
- For information products (zero marginal cost), this is not a necessary requirement.
- This analysis points out why the “Microsoft Office” model is superior to the “Pay for Each Feature Model.”

Next Few Classes

- Sessions 3
 - Product Line Pricing
 - Cambridge Software Case
- Session 4
 - Temporal Pricing and Temporary Price Discounts
 - Problem Set Submission