

Greedy alg proofs

Where S is the ordered set of students, C_s is the preference list of s , X is a set of unmatched students in the first round, C is the set of classes and “available” means it has open seats:

Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm (GA)

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1: for each student  $s$  in  $S$  do                                     ▷ start of round 1
2:   for each class  $c$  in  $C_s$  do
3:     if  $c$  is available then
4:        $\mu(s) \leftarrow c$ 
5:       break                                                       ▷ move to next student
6:     end if
7:   end for
8:   append  $s$  to  $X$ 
9: end for
10: for each student  $s$  in  $X$  do                                       ▷ start of round 2
11:   choose random available  $c$  from  $C$ 
12:    $\mu(s) \leftarrow c$ 
13: end for
14: return matching  $\mu$ 

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Theorem GA outputs a stable matching in a vanilla environment.

Proof Let μ denote the outputted matching over an ordered set of students, S . Let $a, b \in S$, where a comes before b in the order. Assume for the sake of a contradiction that a and b form a blocking pair, such that $\mu(b) >_a \mu(a)$ and $\mu(a) >_b \mu(b)$.

By lines 3 and 11 of GA , we know $\mu(a)$ was either a 's top available choice or a random assignment. So, if $\mu(b) >_a \mu(a)$, then $\mu(b)$ must not be available when a is matched, which means b was matched first. However, this is a contradiction of our assumption that a comes before b in the input to the algorithm. Thus, $\mu(b)$ is available when a is matched, so it must be the case that $\mu(a) >_a \mu(b)$. Therefore, a and b do not form a blocking pair, and we can conclude that μ is stable.

Theorem GA does not always output a stable matching with quotas (caps).

Proof Let μ denote GA 's outputted matching over a set of students, S . We will prove by counter example that μ is not stable.

Let $C = \{c_1, c_2, c_3\}$, where there are two types of student α and β such that each $c \in C$ can have at most one student of each type. Let $S = \{A1, B1, A2, B2\}$ where students $A1, A2$ are of type α and $B1, B2$ are of type β . Let the preference lists of the students be as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A1 : & \quad c_1 \succ c_3 \\
 B1 : & \quad c_2 \succ c_3 \\
 A2 : & \quad c_1 \succ c_2 \\
 B2 : & \quad c_2 \succ c_1
 \end{aligned}$$

Observe that in μ , $\mu(A1) = c_1$ and $\mu(B1) = c_2$, because they are the first two students to be matched and their first choices are different, so they receive their top choices. Next, $\mu(A2) = c_2$ because c_1 already has a student of type α so c_1 is no longer available when matching c_α , and similarly $\mu(B2) = c_1$ because c_2 already has a student of type β . Notice that $\mu(B2) \succ_A 2\mu(A2)$ and $\mu(A2) \succ_B 2\mu(B2)$, forming a blocking pair in which $A2$ and $B2$ are incentivized to switch classes with each other. So, it must be the case that μ is not a stable matching and therefore GA cannot guarantee a stable matching under quota/cap constraints.

Theorem There is not always a stable matching with quotas (caps) and incomplete preferences.

Proof Take the above instance, and note that if we alter the environment slightly there is no stable matching. Remove c_3 from C so that $C = \{c_1, c_2\}$ and let the preference lists be as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A1 : & c_1 \\ B1 : & c_2 \\ A2 : & c_1 \succ c_2 \\ B2 : & c_2 \succ c_1 \end{aligned}$$

In this case, regardless of the order of matching or algorithm, there is no stable matching. The A students will both wish to be matched to c_1 , which only has one α spot, and both B students wish to be matched to c_2 which only has one β spot. So, when the first round of matching is done, that means that there is still an open β spot for c_1 and an open α spot for c_2 , which the unhappy A and B students can then switch into on their own, respectively.

Let's look at a more basic constraint environment, where we have 0/1 preferences and therefore no notion of stability (for now). Let C denote the set of seats over all classes, and S the set of students. We will put lower bounds on the seats, such that the number of seats in each class will be reserved evenly among each type of student, with an extra group of seats that is free to any student. We will let C_r be the set of reserved seats. In this case, we have a weighted graph matching problem, where $G = (V, E)$ such that $V = S \cup C$ and each edge goes from some s to some c if and only if $c \in P_s$, where P_s is the preference list of s . Each edge has a weight $w(e)$. Let the weight be as follows:

$$w(e) = \mathbf{1}\{\text{if seat } c \text{ is reserved for } s\text{'s type}\} + \mathbf{1}\{\text{if student } s \text{ prefers class } c\}.$$

Theorem If a matching that respects student preferences and seat reservations exists, it will be the max-weight graph where $w(\mu) = |S| + |C_r|$.

Proof Let μ be a matching that assigns every student to a seat they prefer while also respecting seat reservations. By construction of the weights, we can determine a lower and upper bound for $w(\mu)$.

1. **Lower bound of μ** Each edge exists only if the student prefers that seat, so every edge in μ contributes at least 1. By our assumption of characteristics of μ , every student in μ got a seat they prefer, so summing over all students contributes at least $|S|$ to $w(\mu)$. We also assumed each seat assigned to a student in μ was reserved, which adds an extra +1 to the weight for the edge from that seat. Summing over all seats gives an additional contribution of $|C_r|$. Therefore, we can bound μ :

$$w(\mu) \geq |S| + |C_r|.$$

2. **Upper bound of μ** From our definition, we know each edge weight is at most 2. Similarly to the lower bound, we know μ has $|S|$ edges because each student was matched to one of their preferences. If each edge has a maximum-weight of 2, then we know the upper bound must be $2|S|$. Note that $2|S| = |S| + |C_r|$, as we know each student is matched to a reserved seat in μ , so $|S| = |C_r|$. Therefore, we can bound μ :

$$w(\mu) \leq |S| + |C_r|.$$

So, μ is a maximum-weight graph with a lower bound of $|S| + |C_r|$ and an upper bound of $|S| + |C_r|$, so it must be that a matching that fully respects student preferences and seat reservations has a weight $w(\mu) = |S| + |C_r|$.