

VE475 Homework6

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Ex. 1 - Application of the DLP

1. a) Because if Bob replies with $b \equiv r \pmod{p-1}$ or $b \equiv x+r \pmod{p-1}$, by applying the Fermat's little theorem, we have $\alpha^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

$$\alpha^b \equiv \alpha^r \equiv \gamma \pmod{p}$$

or

$$\alpha^b \equiv \alpha^{x+r} \equiv \beta\gamma \pmod{p}$$

Therefore, Alice can get γ or $\beta\gamma$ and she can prove Bob's identity.

- b) If Bob doesn't know x , he could not compute the right result, because it is a DLP problem to solve the equation. Therefore, Bob could prove his identity.
2. a) 128 times should be repeated.
b) 256 times should be repeated.
3. Digital Signature Protocol.

Ex. 2 - Pohlig-Hellman

Assume α is a generator of the group. Let $x = \log_{\alpha} \beta$, let the order of the group

$$n = \prod_{i=1}^r p_i^{e_i}$$

where $r \in \mathbb{N}$. Then compute $\alpha_i = \alpha^{n/p_i^{e_i}}$ and compute $\beta_i = \beta^{n/p_i^{e_i}}$ in the group G .

First, let $x_i = \log_{\alpha_i} \beta_i$. For each $k \in \{0, \dots, e_i - 1\}$, calculate $\beta_{i,k} = (\alpha_i^{-x_{i,k}} \beta_i)^{p_i^{e_i-1-k}}$. $\gamma = \alpha_i^{p_i^{e_i-1}}$, then compute d_k and $\gamma^{d_k} = \beta_{i,k}$, let $x_{k+1} = x_k + p_i^k d_k$. And finally obtain $x_i = x_{i,e_i}$. Therefore, we could have $x_i = x \pmod{p_i^{e_i}}$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$ and use Chinese remainder theorem to solve x .

As an example, we are going to calculate $\log_3 3344$ in $\mathbb{Z}/24389\mathbb{Z}$. Since $24389 = 29^3$, the order of the group is $28 \cdot 29^2 = 2^2 \cdot 7 \cdot 29^2$. And since 3 is a generator of the group, we

would have

$$\begin{aligned}
\alpha_1 &\equiv 3^{n/2^2} \equiv 3^{7 \cdot 29^2} \equiv 10133 \pmod{24389} \\
\alpha_2 &\equiv 3^{n/7} \equiv 3^{2^2 \cdot 29^2} \equiv 7302 \pmod{24389} \\
\alpha_3 &\equiv 3^{n/29^2} \equiv 3^{2^2 \cdot 7} \equiv 11369 \pmod{24389} \\
\beta_1 &\equiv 3344^{n/2^2} \equiv 3344^{7 \cdot 29^2} \equiv 24388 \pmod{24389} \\
\beta_2 &\equiv 3344^{n/7} \equiv 3344^{2^2 \cdot 29^2} \equiv 4850 \pmod{24389} \\
\beta_3 &\equiv 3344^{n/29^2} \equiv 3344^{2^2 \cdot 7} \equiv 23114 \pmod{24389}
\end{aligned}$$

For $p_1 = 2$, $e_1 = 2$, $\alpha_1 = 10133$, and $\beta_1 = 24388$, we have $\gamma \equiv \alpha_1^{p_1^{e_1-1}} \equiv 10133^2 \equiv -1 \pmod{24389}$. Then we can calculate

$$\beta_{1,0} \equiv (10133^0 \cdot 24388)^{2^{2-1-0}} \equiv [1 \cdot (-1)]^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{24389}$$

and $d_0 = 0$, $x_{1,1} \equiv x_{1,0} + p_1^0 d_0 \equiv 0 \pmod{4}$. Then by iteration, we have $\beta_{1,1} = -1$, $d_1 = 1$, and $x_{1,2} = 2$. So $x_1 = x_{1,2} = 2 \pmod{4}$.

Similarly, we would have $x_2 = 2 \pmod{7}$ and $x_3 = 260 \pmod{29^2}$. Applying Chinese remainder theorem, we would have $x = 18762 \pmod{2^2 \cdot 7 \cdot 29^2}$.

Ex. 3 - Elgamal

1. Assume $X^3 + 2X^2 + 1$ is reducible over $\mathbb{F}_3[X]$. Then we can find

$$(X + a)(X^2 + bX + C) = X^3 + a(b+1)X^2 + (b+c)X + ac = X^3 + 2X^2 + 1$$

, where $a, b, c \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. So $a = 1$, $b = -1$, $c = 1$, or $a = 2$, $b = -2$, $c = 2$. But neither of the two cases would lead to $a(b+1) \equiv 2 \pmod{3}$. Therefore, $X^3 + 2X^2 + 1$ is irreducible over $\mathbb{F}_3[X]$. And since the degree is 3, it defines the field \mathbb{F}_{3^3} , which has 27 elements.

2. Let $a \leftrightarrow X^1$, $b \leftrightarrow X^2$, \dots , $z \leftrightarrow X^{26}$. $\Rightarrow P(X) = X^3 + 2X^2 + 1$.

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| $X^1 \equiv X \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^2 \equiv X^2 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^3 \equiv X^2 - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^4 \equiv X^2 - X - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^5 \equiv -X - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^6 \equiv -X^2 - X \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^7 \equiv X^2 + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^8 \equiv X^2 + X - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^9 \equiv -X^2 - X - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^{10} \equiv X^2 - X + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{11} \equiv X - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{12} \equiv X^2 - X \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^{13} \equiv -1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{14} \equiv -X \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{15} \equiv -X^2 \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^{16} \equiv -X^2 + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{17} \equiv -X^2 + X + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{18} \equiv X + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^{19} \equiv X^2 + X \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{20} \equiv -X^2 - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{21} \equiv -X^2 - X + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^{22} \equiv X^2 + X + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{23} \equiv -X^2 + X - 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{24} \equiv -X + 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ |
| $X^{25} \equiv -X^2 + X \pmod{P(X)}$ | $X^{26} \equiv 1 \pmod{P(X)}$ | |

3. 26.

4. Since

$$X^{11} \equiv X + 2 \pmod{P(X)}$$

Then the public key is $X + 2$.

5. First, we randomly choose $k = 18$, map “goodmorning” to \mathbb{F}_{3^3} , we have

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|--------|--------|---------------|------|--------|---------|------|----------------|------|-----------|
| $X^2 + 1$ | $-X^2$ | $-X^2$ | $X^2 - X - 1$ | -1 | $-X^2$ | $X + 1$ | $-X$ | $-X^2 - X - 1$ | $-X$ | $X^2 + 1$ |
|-----------|--------|--------|---------------|------|--------|---------|------|----------------|------|-----------|

Then we would have

$$\begin{aligned} r &\equiv X^{18} \equiv X + 1 \pmod{P(X)} \\ \beta^k &\equiv (X + 2)^{18} \pmod{P(X)} \end{aligned}$$

For the Encryption part, we have

$$t \equiv \beta^k m \equiv (X + 2)^{18} m \pmod{P(X)}$$

The result is

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|------------|------------|-----|---------------|-----|----------------|-----|-----------|
| $X^2 + X$ | X | X | $-X^2 + 1$ | $-X^2 + X$ | X | $X^2 - X - 1$ | 1 | $-X^2 - X + 1$ | 1 | $X^2 + X$ |
|-----------|-----|-----|------------|------------|-----|---------------|-----|----------------|-----|-----------|

which is “saapyadzuzs” after mapping.

For the decryption part, we would have:

$$tr^{-x} \equiv t(X + 1)^{-11} \equiv m \pmod{P(X)}$$

The decryption is successful and get “goodmorning”.

Ex. 4 - Simple questions

1. (i) Yes, h is pre-image resistant. Since $h(x) \equiv x^2 \pmod{pq}$, we can know that x by applying Chinese remainder theorem with $\sqrt{h(x)} \pmod{p}$ and $\sqrt{h(x)} \pmod{q}$. Therefore, it is infeasible to factorize n .
(ii) No, h is not second pre-image resistant. Because if $x' = -x$, we would have $h(x) = h(x')$.
(iii) No, h is not collision resistant. Because if $x' = -x$, we would have $h(x) = h(x')$.
2. (i) It is efficiently computed for any input since \oplus is fast.
(ii) Pre-image resistant is not verified. Given y it is feasible to find or design m such that $h(m) = y$.
(iii) Pre-image resistant is not verified. because there are many combination can lead to same $h(m)$.
(iv) Collision resistant is not verified. There are many combination which could lead to same $h(m)$.

Ex. 5 - Merkle-Damgård construction

1. a) Since $f(0) = 0$ and $f(1) = 01$, $f(x_i)$ is always start with 0. So y can be separated into several segments start from 0, except for the first two digits. Those segments are injective with x_i , so the map s from x to y is injective. then
b) If z is empty, from what previous proved, there's no such x' . If z is not empty, since we have 11 at the beginning of y_{i+1} , so no this no such x' and z such that $s(x) = z || s(x')$.
2. Because the previous conditions guarantee the mapping is collision resistant.