IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

KRISTINA MCNITT,

Case No. S064090

on May 6, 2016

Petitioner,

PETITIONER MCNITT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ANSWER

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ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, Attorney General, State of Oregon,

Initiative Petition 78 (2016) **Ballot Title Certified**

Respondent.

I. Current law prohibits spraying any type of pesticide on or near streams that provide drinking water.

The caption is flawed because it will lead voters to mistakenly believe that current law does not already prohibit forestry-related aerial pesticide spraying on or near drinking water sources. OAR 629-620-0400(4) states, in part:

[W]hen applying chemicals by aircraft, operators shall not directly apply chemicals within 60 feet of:

- (a) Significant wetlands;
- (b) The aquatic areas of Type F and Type D streams;
- (c) The aquatic areas of large lakes;
- (d) The aquatic areas of other lakes with fish use; or
- (e) Other areas of standing open water larger than one-quarter acre at the time of the application.
- *Id.* As used in this provision, "chemicals" includes "all classes of pesticides." ORS 629-600-0100(10). And "Type D stream" means a stream that has

domestic water use. ORS 629-600-0100(84). Thus, Oregon law already prohibits aerially spraying any type of pesticide on or near (within 60 feet of) drinking water sources.

In her response to this argument, Respondent focuses only on ORS 527.672, which prohibits aerially spraying herbicides within 60 feet of an inhabited dwelling or school, and argues that statute "is not a prohibition on aerial spraying of all pesticides near schools or dwellings." Respondent's Answer at 3. Petitioner agrees with that statement, but Respondent does not address OAR 629-620-0400(4), which prohibits all pesticide spraying on or near numerous water sources that provide drinking water. Thus, the portion of the caption that implies Oregon law does not protect such water sources is inaccurate and should be modified so voters understand the measure's proposed protection of drinking water sources is an additional protection, not a new protection.

Respondent also states that the existing rules promulgated under the Forest Practices Act apply to "direct application" of pesticides. Respondent's Answer at 4. It is unclear if Respondent is suggesting that "direct application" does not include aerial spraying, but to be clear, OAR 629-620-0400(1) applies to operators "[w]hen applying chemicals aerially or from the ground" and subsection (4) states "when applying chemicals by aircraft, operators shall not directly apply chemicals within 60 feet of" Thus, aerial application is

"direct application." Because the measure would prohibit aerial application of pesticides "on or near" watersheds that serve as a source of drinking water, it would apply to every drainage basin (reflected in Exhibit 7 to the petition) that contains at least one source of drinking water.

II. Voters should be told the measure would terminate forest landowners' existing right to receive just compensation if the measure reduces their land's value.

Respondent argues that the ballot title need not alert voters that the measure would terminate landowners' right to receive just compensation if the measure's land use restrictions reduce the fair market value of their forestland. Respondent's Answer at 6-7. According to Respondent, voters need not know about this result because whether the measure will affect property values – and by how much - "is a matter of speculation." *Id.* This argument is without merit because Petitioner is not claiming that the ballot title must tell voters that IP 78 *would* decrease property values; Petitioner is claiming that voters need to know that IP 78 would terminate the right to just compensation. That result is not speculative; rather, forest landowners' loss of this existing right would be immediate and certain.

Pursuant to Respondent's reasoning, many of the measure's effects would be "speculative." For example, the summary alerts voters that the measure "specifies grounds and procedures for challenging rules. Authorizes civil enforcement suits, attorney fees." These are direct results of the measure

even if no one ever challenges a rule or seeks attorney fees under the measure.

In the same way, the termination of the right to receive just compensation is a direct and immediate effect of the measure.

Although Respondent cautions against speculation, she does so herself by arguing that "individuals and businesses do not own property for the purpose of spraying pesticides on it, and the value of forestry and agricultural products is not intrinsically tied to the use of pesticides on those products." Respondent's Answer at 7, note 3. Respondent offers no support for these statements or rationale for how she arrived at such conclusions. Clearly, the value of forestland is tied to the land's ability to be economically profitable. It is undisputed that when replanting trees, as required by law after harvests, tree seedlings compete with weeds and invasive species for water, sunlight, space, and nutrients; thus, forest landowners use herbicides to control these unwanted plants. The measure's prohibition of such herbicide use will make it more difficult to protect new tree seedlings from weeds and grow timber, which will have an economic impact on forestland and its fair market value. Thus, the distinction drawn by Respondent between IP 78 and IP 80 does not exist and Respondent should include references to "just compensation" as did the ballot title for IP 80.

II. Conclusion

The Court should refer the ballot title back to Respondent with directions to correct these insufficiencies.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

By /s/ Jill Gibson
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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

I certify that on June 10, 2016, I filed the original PETITIONER MCNITT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ANSWER (Initiative Petition #2016-078) with the Appellate Court Administrator, Appellate Court Records Section, by using the court's electronic filing system and electronically served it upon Keith L. Kutler, attorney for Respondent and Steven C. Berman, attorney for Shawn Donnille, Kate Taylor, and Steve Pedery.

Dated: June 10, 2016

/s/Jill Gibson

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Attorney for Petitioner