

Carry Trades and FX Risk Buffers: Foreign Currency Debt of Emerging Market Firms*

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Abstract

The surge in foreign currency (FC) corporate debt in emerging economies has sparked concerns about macroeconomic stability, heightened by speculation about non-financial firms engaging in carry trades. Using firm-level data on the currency denomination of both assets and liabilities, we find evidence of firms' carry trades: firms save in local currency liquid assets and earn higher interest income after issuing short-term FC debt. They also set aside FC liquid assets as FX risk buffers. A large degree of heterogeneity in incentives is observed. Notably, listed firms participate more in carry trades and allocate less FX risk buffers than non-listed firms.

JEL Classification Codes: F3, F4, G1

Keywords: Carry trade, Currency mismatch, Foreign currency debt

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1 Introduction

After the Global Financial Crisis, the U.S. entered a period of exceptionally accommodative monetary policy, hitting the zero lower bound, followed by quantitative easing. Emerging economies have benefited from low U.S. dollar interest rates in the international financial markets, leading to a massive surge in external corporate debt, mostly denominated in dollars.

The rapid rise of foreign currency (FC) corporate debt has prompted concerns among policymakers about heightened macroeconomic vulnerability and financial fragility.¹ Furthering the concerns, recent studies by [Bruno and Shin \(2017\)](#) and [Acharya and Vij \(2020\)](#) have found that firms that borrow more in FC tend to accumulate liquid assets (deposits and short-term financial instruments), supporting non-financial firms' "carry trade." Firms borrow cheaply abroad and park those funds as domestic liquid assets, such as short-term savings accounts. This practice may result in a currency mismatch on firms' balance sheets, exposing firms themselves and the domestic banking sector to financial disruptions.

Despite these insights, a comprehensive assessment of the scale and characteristics of non-financial firms' carry trades remains challenging due to limited data, mainly because of incomplete information on the currency composition of both sides of firms' balance sheets – assets and liabilities. For instance, saving in liquid assets after issuing debt could also be consistent with a "precautionary" motive as documented in both the sovereign debt literature ([Bianchi et al. \(2018\)](#)) and the U.S. corporate finance literature ([Xiao \(2020\)](#)). In these strands of papers, economic agents borrow and retain liquid assets to insure against uncertainties and adverse shocks.

In this paper, we offer an extensive empirical analysis of non-financial firms' liquid asset accumulation when issuing foreign currency debt, employing a unique firm-level dataset of Korean firms. Our dataset, KISVALUE, enables us to see the currency denomination of detailed asset and liability instruments for more than 23,000 firms, ten times the number of listed firms in Korea. Our

¹For example, "India's corporate sector, which has borrowed heavily in foreign currency, is not immune to this vulnerability. Corporate sector debt has risen very rapidly, nearly doubling in the last 5 years to about \$120 billion," said Christine Lagarde in her address at the Reserve Bank of India seated alongside RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan in 2015. See also IMF Global Financial Stability Report ([IMF \(2015\)](#)).


findings provide evidence that firms engage in carry trades and set aside precautionary savings as buffers against foreign exchange (FX) risk, which we term as “FX risk buffers.”

Figure 1 illustrates the key data patterns of interest using the KISVALUE data. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 1, firms respond to cheaper dollar funding costs by increasing their FC borrowing especially at the shorter end of maturity. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows that the aggregate short-term FC debt positively co-moves with the ratio of the money market rate differential between Korea and the United States to the 3-month FX volatility, while there is a negative correlation for the aggregate long-term FC debt. Firms actively adjust their FC short-term borrowing in response to the relative cost of borrowing in FC over local currency (LC) and FX risk.

On top of that, firms that borrow more in short-term FC debt actually hold more LC liquid assets and FC liquid assets, as illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 1. The former aligns with what one would expect when firms engage in carry trades, while the latter supports saving against the foreign exchange rate risk. For each year, we confine the sample to those firms that borrow in short-term FC debt and compute the cross-sectional averages of (i) firms’ short-term FC debt to lagged total assets ratios, and (ii) firms’ LC and FC liquid assets to lagged total assets ratios. We observe a strong positive correlation between the average short-term FC debt and the average LC liquid assets, and the average short-term FC debt and the average FC liquid assets, with the estimated correlation of 0.84 and 0.89, respectively.² These correlations contrast with the traditional pecking order theory that firms should exhaust internal sources of funding before seeking external financing. Such predictions imply a negative correlation between liquid assets and debt. Motivated by these empirical relationships shown in Figure 1, we empirically explore further if firms engage in carry trade by borrowing in FC and saving in LC, while setting aside some FC liquid assets as a FX risk buffer.


²The average FC liquid assets and the average FX volatility across years are depicted in Figure 12 in the Appendix F.

Figure 1: Key Empirical Patterns: Firms' FC Borrowing
Interest Rate Differential, FX Volatility and Foreign Currency Corporate Debt



Notes: All the balance sheet data are aggregated from the Korean firm-level data in KISVALUE. All the aggregate variables are computed by summing up firm-level variables. Figures show the aggregate short-term FC debt (LHS) and the aggregate long-term FC debt (RHS) in the corporate sector, both normalized by the aggregate total assets in the previous year, and depicted as a solid line in both figures. The two ratios are then multiplied by 100. The interest rate differential is the money market rate of Korea minus the United States from the IMF IFS. The FX volatility is the option implied exchange rate volatility from 3-month at-the-money exchange rate options (annual average of end-of-month values) from the Bloomberg Terminal. The ratio of the interest rate differential to the 3-month FX volatility is plotted as a dashed line in both figures.

Foreign Currency Short-term Debt and Liquid Assets, Conditional on Positive Short-term FC Debt



Notes: All the balance sheet data are aggregated from the Korean firm-level data in KISVALUE. Figures show the cross-sectional average of firm-level variables with a subsample of firms with positive short-term FC debt in each year. Figures show the cross-sectional averages of (i) firms' short-term FC debt to lagged total assets ratios, depicted as a solid line in both figures, (ii) firms' LC liquid assets to lagged total assets ratios (LHS), depicted as a dashed line, and (iii) FC liquid assets to lagged total assets ratios (RHS), depicted as a dashed line. All ratios are multiplied by 100.

In the baseline empirical model, we find that only the issuance of short-term FC debt is linked to the accumulation of LC liquid assets, emphasizing the role of maturity in conducting carry trades; however, the issuance of FC debt across all maturities is generally associated with the accumulation of FC liquid assets. We corroborate our key findings from the baseline analysis with three extensions. First, we compare our regression estimates on short-term FC debt with those on the current portion of long-term FC debt, which both result in an increase in short-term FC liability, but the latter is not associated with cash inflows in the current year. This analysis confirms that, in the absence of actual cash inflows, firms do not save in LC liquid assets but still set aside FC liquid assets as FX risk buffers. This finding further validates that higher LC liquid assets come from actual cash inflows in FC, while higher FC liquid assets are the result of FC liability. Second, we demonstrate that listed firms participate significantly more in carry trades and set aside less FX risk buffers than non-listed firms. This underscores the importance of a broad coverage of firms for a comprehensive understanding of the use of FC debt proceeds. Finally, we find strong evidence of firms that borrow more in short-term FC debt earning higher interest income. Moreover, the predicted carry trade interest income from the baseline regression is tightly associated with the actual interest income on the cash flow statements.

We delve further into the incentives driving engagement in carry trades and accumulation of FX risk buffers. Our analysis reveals that firms engage in more carry trades when the interest rate differential between South Korea and the United States widens. Firms opt for additional FX risk buffers when exchange rate volatility increases and if they operate in sectors where sales are highly sensitive to the exchange rate fluctuations. In terms of heterogeneity, we observe similar patterns in both the pre- and post-2008 periods, suggesting that the motives to participate carry trades and set aside FX risk buffers did not materially change after 2008. Moreover, firms in financially dependent sectors engage more in carry trades, while firms in export-oriented sectors tend to accumulate more FX risk buffers.

Our analysis highlights three key insights for policymakers. First, firms involved in carry trade exhibit a great deal of heterogeneity. Listed firms and more financially dependent firms engage

more in carry trades, and they should be monitored more closely. Second, there is no evidence of carry trades using long-term FC debt. As explained in the Appendix [D](#), this observation is related to the lower expected return and higher return volatility when the maturity of debt is longer. This finding suggests that long-term and short-term FC debt should be treated differently when shaping regulations. Third, average firms are aware of the exchange rate risk and manage exchange rate risk buffers actively in response to market situations, such as higher exchange rate volatility. This FX risk buffer provides firms a cushion against exchange rate fluctuations. Overall, enhancing data quality and availability both in terms of firm coverage and balance sheet items on the currency composition of assets and liabilities can aid policymakers in making more informed decisions and risk management.

Related Literature.

This paper is related to a broader literature that investigates the interplay of international capital market and emerging market corporate leverage. Motivated by the currency crisis in the 1990s, early work such as [Aguiar \(2005\)](#), [Dominguez and Tesar \(2006\)](#), [Bleakley and Cowan \(2008\)](#) and [Kim et al. \(2015\)](#) investigate the consequences of debt denominated in foreign currency, especially after large depreciations.³ The recent global corporate debt surge raises the concern about the interplay of international market fluctuation, corporate fragility, and leverage ([McCauley et al. \(2015\)](#), [Chui et al. \(2016\)](#), [Alfaro et al. \(2017\)](#), [Alfaro et al. \(2019\)](#), [Abraham et al. \(2020\)](#), [Salomao and Varela \(2021\)](#) and [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2021\)](#)). [Burger et al. \(2012\)](#) and [Hale et al. \(2020\)](#) unveil the determinants of the international local currency corporate bond market. [Du and Schreger \(2017\)](#), [Bevilaqua et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Wu \(2021\)](#) provide evidence of linkage between corporate leverage and sovereign risk. [Didier et al. \(2021\)](#), [Calomiris et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Wang et al. \(2023\)](#) look at the firm responses after accessing the international capital market. We contribute to the literature by documenting how corporate asset and liability currency positions respond to international market conditions.

This paper is closely related to a growing empirical international capital market literature that

³See also [Kim and Lee \(2024\)](#) and [Hardy \(2018\)](#) for recent studies with more granular level of data.

studies the currency denomination of firms' debt issuance. Papers such as [Bruno and Shin \(2017\)](#), [Huang et al. \(2018\)](#), [Acharya and Vij \(2020\)](#) and [Hardy and Saffie \(2023\)](#) find that emerging market FC debt issuance increases when the carry trade environment is more favorable.⁴ They document firms behave increasingly more like financial intermediaries and conduct carry trades. In particular, [Bruno and Shin \(2017\)](#) and [Acharya and Vij \(2020\)](#) point to carry trade activities via short-term deposit and [Hardy and Saffie \(2023\)](#), [Huang et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Hardy et al. \(2023\)](#) find important role for trade credit. [De Gregorio and Jara \(2024\)](#) find evidence that firms response to carry trade but investment also starts to increase in two year time. Due to data limitation, these papers do not distinguish between LC and FC deposits or trade credit. We advance the understanding of liquid asset accumulation by showing explicitly how various liquid asset items in *different currencies* change in response to debt issuance *in different currencies* and at different maturities for a large set of firms. Some papers argue that the currency choice in debt issuance is driven by natural hedging motives of firms. [Kedia and Mozumdar \(2003\)](#), [Jiao et al. \(2021\)](#), and [Colacito et al. \(2022\)](#) show empirically that the currency choice in debt issuance is driven by motives to lower their operational exchange rate risk exposure. On the other hand, other papers argue that the role of operational hedging in foreign currency debt issuance might be rather limited. For instance, [Alfaro et al. \(2021\)](#) use the Chilean administrative data and show that natural hedging is limited; large firms actively use foreign exchange derivatives to lower their operational exposure to exchange rate risk. A related finding by [Jung \(2021\)](#) shows that reduction in FX derivative due to regulation reduces firm exports in Korea. [Bocola and Lorenzoni \(2020\)](#), [Christiano et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Gutierrez et al. \(2023\)](#) show empirically and theoretically how local depositors' preference for dollar savings is an important factor for the supply of foreign currency credit.

Our paper sheds light on the debate about exchange rates and macroeconomic policies following the Asian financial crisis, which advocates for and against flexible exchange rate policies and the buildup of foreign-currency debt. This debate includes prominent studies by [Aghion et al. \(2001\)](#), [Caballero and Krishnamurthy \(2001\)](#), and [Céspedes et al. \(2004\)](#). Recent empirical ad-

⁴Carry trade is highly related to the concept of uncovered interest parity deviation. See [Engel \(2014\)](#) and [Lustig et al. \(2011\)](#).

vancements show that heterogeneous firm responses are important in understanding the policy implications. [Di Giovanni et al. \(2022\)](#) explore the spillovers of international risk premiums to domestic credit and emphasize the role of the domestic banking sector. [Hegarty et al. \(2022\)](#) highlight that firm responses to international risk premium spillovers depend on the default risk of a firm and advocate for a flexible exchange rate policy to facilitate the general equilibrium response. [Bacchetta et al. \(2023\)](#) and [Wang et al. \(2023\)](#) show that firms have heterogeneous responses to international borrowing costs, and capital controls are effective in muting this response. Our paper contributes by showing the characteristics of firms that engage in more carry trade and accumulate FX risk buffers.

This paper draws linkage between the literatures on international capital market and corporate cash hoarding ([Opler et al. \(1999\)](#), [Graham and Harvey \(2001\)](#), [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#) and [Chen et al. \(2017\)](#)). Recently, many papers focus on cash hoarding due to firms’ precautionary saving motive upon a rise in uncertainty ([Arellano et al. \(2019\)](#), [Xiao \(2020\)](#)). We contribute to the literature by showing a strong precautionary saving behavior of firms even in normal times, specifically against FX risk, which depends on the currency denomination and the maturity of debt.

Layout. Section 2 introduces our dataset. Section 3 presents our baseline analysis and the three extensions. Section 4 investigates the incentive of carry trades and FX risk buffers. Section 5 shows the heterogeneity across time and across sectors. Section 6 provides regression results of variables other than liquid assets. Section 7 presents longer horizon effects and Section 8 concludes.

2 Data Descriptions

We employ an extensive Korean firm-level dataset, KISVALUE, to ultimately answer what firms do with their debt issuance in different currencies and at different maturities. The dataset is from the NICE (National Information & Credit Evaluation, formerly the Korea Information Service Inc., KIS). Our dataset includes firms with assets over 10 billion Korean Won as of 2017, who are

subject to the external audits and need to report their balance sheet information to the Financial Supervisory Commission.⁵ We focus on the sample period from 2001 to 2017. The KISVALUE dataset includes around 23,000 firms, and the number of listed firms is 2,040 firms as of 2017. The majority of firms in the dataset are non-listed small and medium-sized firms. We exclude financial firms in our analysis.⁶ Firms are allowed to enter, to exit, and to pause reporting for a number of years during the sample period if their assets go below the threshold. The total number of employees covered by the dataset is 3,525,241 as of 2017, which represents 22% of the aggregate employment in all sectors excluding the financial sector and self employment.⁷

The KISVALUE dataset has a number of advantages over other datasets typically used in the literature. First, the dataset includes the detailed information on the currency composition of items in the assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Second, it contains information about the maturity of debt and the currency composition, allowing us to explore how firms may use debt issuance proceeds differently across maturities. Third, the dataset contains non-listed small and medium-sized firms. The very fact that our dataset includes smaller non-listed firms allows us to investigate the heterogeneous incentives of issuing foreign currency debt across sectors, where some of those sectors are populated by smaller firms. Lastly, the dataset contains a wide range of balance sheet items besides the currency composition of short-term debt, long-term debt and liquid assets. The availability of a wide range of variables allows us to explore the firm-level heterogeneity and mostly importantly to present a strong and direct evidence in favor of firms' carry trade using the interest rate income measures.

To further elaborate how well our firm-level data from the KISVALUE are capturing the aggregate dynamics of the key variables that we are interested in, we compare the aggregated firm-level data and the aggregate data counterpart from the Bank of Korea Financial Statement Analysis

⁵The threshold was lower in the past. For example, as reported by [Kim et al. \(2015\)](#), the threshold was 7 billion Korean won in 1999.

⁶Specifically, we exclude firms that are in these three sectors: "Financial Institutions, Except Insurance and Pension Funding", "Insurance and Pension Funding" and "Activities Auxiliary to Financial Service and Insurance Activities."

⁷The data of number of workers employed in all sectors excluding the financial sector and self employment are from the Korean Statistical Information Service. The survey is for all the firms with employees greater than equal to one.


Data. The aggregate data from the Bank of Korea include all firms who submitted their financial statements to the National Tax Service for corporate tax returns, excluding finance and insurance companies, self-employed businesses, holding companies and special purpose enterprises. The key variables that we look at are: cash and cash equivalents, accounts receivable, short-term debt, long-term debt, and total assets.⁸ We sum over the firm-level variables in a given year and normalized the computed aggregate variables by the aggregated total assets in the previous year. We then compare the aggregate values computed from our micro-level data with those from the Bank of Korea from 2005 to 2017.⁹ Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the key variables that we are interested in. The time-series patterns of our aggregated micro-level data are very much aligned with the actual aggregate data patterns for most of the years even though the aggregate Bank of Korea data include every single non-financial firms, paying corporate taxes. Additionally, when we compare the total assets, our dataset covers around 57 – 73 % of the aggregate total assets as reported in the Appendix A. Furthermore, as shown in Table 13 in Appendix B, we observe that 12% of firm-year observations has a positive FC debt. Conditional on borrowing in FC debt, there are on average 30% of total debt denominated in FC.¹⁰

⁸The Bank of Korea does not provide the currency split of the aggregate short-term and long-term borrowing; therefore, the aggregate short-term and long-term debt include both local-currency and foreign-currency borrowing. The aggregate short-term financial instruments are not available from the Bank of Korea.

⁹The variables of our interest from the Bank of Korea Financial Statement Analysis Data are available from 2004. We normalize the variables by lagged assets so the series start from 2005.


¹⁰Cross-country comparisons of FC corporate debt sizes are presented in the Appendix E.

Figure 2: Firm-level Data and Aggregate Data



Notes: Aggregate data are from the Bank of Korea Financial Statement Analysis Data. KISVALUE data are the total sum of all firms in the KISVALUE dataset. We normalize the key aggregate variables of our interest by lagged aggregate total assets.

Figure 3: Foreign Currency Corporate Debt and Liquid Assets



Notes: All the data come from the KISVALUE dataset. All the variables are normalized by the aggregate total assets in the previous year. The solid line is the aggregate short-term FC debt. The LHS figure shows the each components of LC liquid assets: LC cash, LC short-term financial instruments (STFI), and LC accounts receivable (AR). The RHS figure shows each components of FC liquid assets: FC cash, FC short-term financial instruments (STFI), and FC accounts receivable (AR).

Since our key interest is how the issuance of FC debt, especially at a shorter end of maturities, may relate to carry trade and the accumulation of FX risk buffers, we depict the relative size of short-term FC debt to each items of LC and FC liquid assets. In Figure 3, we report two figures, where the solid line is the aggregate short-term FC debt normalized by aggregate total assets in the previous year. In the left figure, the size of the aggregate short-term FC debt and those of aggregate LC cash and aggregate LC short-term financial instruments are in the same order of magnitude. Aggregate LC accounts receivable are larger than aggregate short-term FC debt. The right panel shows that all the balance sheet items of FC liquid assets are similar in magnitude to that of the aggregate short-term FC debt. Figure 3 confirms the quantitative relevance of carry trades and FX risk buffer accumulation that we document in Section 3.¹¹

3 Empirical Results

Section 3 presents empirical results analyzing how debt issuance in different currencies at different maturities is associated with liquid assets in different currencies.

3.1 Baseline Regressions

We present the baseline regression analysis to understand how the shift in the currency composition of debt issuance is associated with changes in liquid asset holdings. Our main interest in the analysis is how liquid assets change when there is an increase debt in foreign currency at different maturities, controlling for the total cashflow from debt issuance and other sources and firm size. That is, we explore the equilibrium empirical relationships between liquid assets in different currencies and the currency composition of debt issuance at different maturities. All the regressions

¹¹We include three other figures in the Appendix F: (i) Figure 9 shows FC short-term debt and liquid assets with a subsample of firms with positive FC short-term debt; (ii) Figure 10 shows FC debt and liquid assets; and (iii) Figure 11 shows FC debt and liquid assets with a subsample of firms with positive FC debt.

in the main text are restricted to sample with net positive issuance ($debt_t > debt_{t-1}$) firm-year observations so we can confirm there is a debt issuance.¹² We estimate the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{ST} \frac{STdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LTdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

, where $y_{i,t}$ is a measure of liquid assets, TA stands for total assets and OS stands for cashflows from other sources.¹³ In the dataset, all variables are reported in Korean Won.¹⁴ We consider 8 different measures of $y_{i,t}$: cash and cash equivalents (cash), short-term financial instruments (STFI), and accounts receivable (AR), and the sum of three items in both foreign currency (FC) and in local currency (LC), respectively. Cash and cash equivalents and short-term financial instruments comprise of short-term financial assets with maturity less than 3 months and one year, respectively. Accounts receivable are the funds that customers owe a company for products or services that have been invoiced. Accounts receivable effectively capture firms' extension of short-term credit to other firms as documented by [Huang et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Hardy and Saffie \(2023\)](#). They are key variables of interest in the literature exploring carry trade motives of corporate FC debt issuance.

LT and ST on the right hand side stand for long-term and short-term debt (e.g. the variable $LT\ debt_{i,t}$ is the total long-term debt for firm i at time t . The variable $LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}$ is the foreign currency long-term debt for firm i at time t). All the variables are normalized by the total assets of the firm at time $t - 1$. α_c, α_t are sector and time fixed effects respectively (185 sectors and 17 years). The regression standard errors are clustered at the sector level.

¹²None of the results are driven by this restriction. In Appendix C, we show that all the results are intact if we relax this restriction and include all observations.

¹³The right hand side of the regression capture directly all sources of funds for a firm. We follow [Kim and Weisbach \(2008\)](#) and [Bruno and Shin \(2017\)](#) to define the total sources of funds for a firm to be the sum of funds from operations, sale of property, plant, and equipment, debt issuance, and sale of common and preferred stock. The total sources of funds include everything from both internal cash flows from operations and external financing. We separate out the variables of our interest, the debt in different currencies and different maturities from the total sources of funds and label the rest as $OS_{i,t}$: the total cashflows from other sources (i.e., excluding those from debt financing).

¹⁴The year-end exchange rate is employed whenever it is necessary for firms to convert their FC assets or liabilities to Korean Won values, following the accounting reporting standards in Korea.

Table 1: FC Debt and Liquid Assets, Equation (1)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.2*** (2.9)	7.5*** (1.1)	9.3*** (0.8)	-2.3 (1.9)	12.2*** (1.8)	3.1*** (0.5)	0.4*** (0.1)	9.5*** (1.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.7*** (1.6)	-0.7 (0.7)	0.4 (0.7)	-7.2*** (1.0)	4.4*** (1.1)	1.6*** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.6*** (0.6)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-14.2*** (1.2)	-6.4*** (0.6)	-4.3*** (0.3)	-3.2*** (0.6)	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.7*** (2.0)	-3.3*** (0.8)	-3.7*** (0.3)	-6.9*** (1.1)	-2.9*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-2.0*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.7*** (1.1)	6.2*** (0.8)	5.4*** (0.6)	-3.0*** (0.8)	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.10	0.06	0.28	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	137746	145472	145911	138768	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are described as the column headers (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash and cash equivalents, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable, and the sum of the three in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

β^{STFC} and β^{LTFC} are the coefficients of interest. β^{STFC} represents the change in LC or FC liquid assets for a 100 Korean won increase in *short-term* foreign currency debt, holding total short-term debt constant, and β^{LTFC} represents the change in LC or FC liquid assets for a 100 Korean won increase in *long-term* foreign currency debt, holding total long-term debt constant.

Table 1 summarizes the coefficient estimates of Equation (1). Consistent with the carry trade motive behind issuing foreign currency debt, an increase in short-term foreign currency debt whilst holding total short-term debt constant is associated with higher LC liquid assets. We observe, for each 100 Korean won of short-term FC debt, it increases significantly LC cash and STFI by 7.5 won and 9.3 won on average, respectively. The coefficient of AR on short-term FC debt is not statistically significant, implying that an average Korean firm does not engage in carry trades with AR.¹⁵ Firms borrow in short-term FC debt at a low interest rate and save in local currency liquid assets at a higher rate over a short time window, expecting a profitable carry trade profit.¹⁶

While firms engage in carry trades when borrowing in short-term FC debt, we do not see such patterns when the currency composition of long-term debt shifts to FC. The coefficients of cash and STFI on long-term FC debt, β^{LTFC} , are not significantly different from zero. Firms do not engage in carry trades with long-term FC debt because interest rates on longer maturity debt are usually higher so this strategy results in lower rate of carry trade returns with higher volatility. We provide a detailed analysis of carry trade with longer term debt in Appendix D.

On top of the carry trade motives behind FC debt issuance especially in the short-term, firms save more in FC liquid assets when the currency composition of debt shifts towards FC. We observe, for each 100 Korean won of *short-term* FC debt, it increases FC cash, STFI, and AR by 3.1 won, 0.4 won and 9.5 won on average, respectively. It is also found that higher long-term FC debt whilst holding total long-term debt constant is associated with higher FC liquid assets. A firm raises external funds in FC and saves some of the proceeds in FC liquid assets. The observation is consistent with firms' motive to save against FX risk. We provide more evidence on this linkage

¹⁵We find different results when we split the firms into listed and non-listed firms. See Section 3.3 for the analysis.

¹⁶We investigate the connection with interest rate differential in Section 4. See also Salomao and Varela (2018) and Liao (2020) for empirical evidence of firms capital structure responses to uncovered interest parity deviation and covered interest parity deviation.

with exchange rate risk in Section 4.

One thing to note is that higher total debt issuance is associated with lower liquid assets in both LC and FC. The observed relationship is aligned with the predictions of the pecking order theory of corporate finance that issuing debt – is more costly than internal financing. Upon fluctuations in profits and investment opportunities, firm first draws down its cash balance or sells its marketable securities, rather than resorting to external financing. What is interesting is that firms on average hold more cash in LC and in FC when their short-term debt is more tilted towards FC, consistent with firms' carry trade engagement and FX risk management.

3.2 Comparisons of Short-term Debt and Current Portion of Long-term Debt

We further corroborate firms' saving against FX risk and engagement in carry trade by exploiting the remaining maturity of long-term debt. On the balance sheet, long-term debt comprises all debt with a maturity more than one year upon issuance. As time passes, part of it gets to mature in less than a year and is recorded as the current portion of long-term debt. The current portion of long-term debt shares the same remaining maturity as short-term debt, but the decision of the amount of this debt issuance is *not* made at year t and no debt proceeds are received at year t . This analysis enables us to compare how liquid assets respond differently to an increase of FC liability that is maturing soon and to an increase of short-term FC debt with actual cash inflows.

In Table 2, we separate long-term FC debt in Table 1 into long-term debt with a remaining maturity larger than a year and the current portion of long-term debt with a remaining maturity of less than a year. In Columns (1)-(4), the estimated coefficients of LC liquid assets on the current portion of long-term FC debt are all negative. The coefficient of LC cash on the current portion of long-term FC debt is negative and those of LC short-term financial instruments and LC accounts receivable on the current portion of long-term FC debt is negative and statistically significant.

Table 2: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Current Portion of Long-term Debt

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.3*** (2.9)	7.5*** (1.1)	9.4*** (0.8)	-2.2 (1.9)	12.2*** (1.8)	3.1*** (0.5)	0.4*** (0.1)	9.5*** (1.5)
$\frac{Current\ LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-23.8*** (3.9)	-2.3 (1.5)	-4.4*** (1.3)	-17.3*** (3.0)	3.1** (1.5)	1.6* (0.8)	-0.0 (0.1)	2.5** (1.2)
$\frac{Rest\ of\ LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-3.7* (1.9)	-0.3 (0.8)	1.6** (0.7)	-4.7*** (1.1)	4.7*** (1.2)	1.6** (0.6)	0.4* (0.2)	2.7*** (0.6)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-14.2*** (1.2)	-6.4*** (0.6)	-4.3*** (0.3)	-3.3*** (0.6)	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.8*** (2.0)	-3.3*** (0.8)	-3.7*** (0.3)	-7.0*** (1.1)	-2.9*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-2.0*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.7*** (1.1)	6.2*** (0.8)	5.4*** (0.6)	-2.9*** (0.8)	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.10	0.07	0.28	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	137746	145472	145911	138768	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

On the other hand, the coefficients on short-term FC debt are identical to those in Table 1 and are positive and significant for LC cash, LC short-term financial instruments and the total liquid assets. The result shows that an increase in FC liabilities maturing in the near future, without additional FC debt proceeds, does not come with an increase in LC liquid assets. Higher LC liquid assets only result from actual cash inflows in FC due to short-term FC debt issuance. The empirical relationship supports firms' carry trade engagement, rather than merely capturing a mechanical increase in liquid assets due to an increase in FC debt approaching maturity.

In Columns (5)-(8), the estimated coefficients of FC liquid assets on the current portion of long-term FC debt are positive. We see a higher FC liquid asset is associated with more long-term FC debt issued in past years but maturing this year. Therefore, an increase in FC liquid assets does not purely arise from a mechanical increase due to new debt proceeds from FC debt issuance. The empirical result is rather consistent with firms' management of FX risk faced when repaying their debt in FC.

To sum up, from the empirical correlations that we document between liquid assets and the current portion of long-term FC debt, we confirm that the accumulation of LC liquid assets is related to the use of actual FC debt proceeds and supports firms' participation in carry trades. We also corroborate that a higher FC liquidity buffer when firms are more indebted in FC is not a mere consequence of cash inflows in FC. It arises even when firms do not have FC cash inflows from debt proceeds this year but have more debt in FC maturing soon.

3.3 Heterogeneity Across Firms: Listed vs. Non-Listed

One of the advantages of our dataset lies in its comprehensive coverage of numerous non-listed firms, typically smaller and with less financial market access. In Table 3, we inspect the differential use of FC debt proceeds for the listed and non-listed firms.

Table 3: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Listed vs. Non-Listed Firms

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	11.5*** (2.8)	6.6*** (1.1)	8.9*** (0.8)	-3.0 (2.0)	11.8*** (1.8)	3.2*** (0.5)	0.5*** (0.2)	9.0*** (1.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$ $\times Listed$	13.1*** (4.0)	5.9*** (1.9)	2.7 (1.9)	6.1* (3.5)	2.5 (3.6)	-1.0 (0.7)	-0.3* (0.2)	3.3 (3.4)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-6.9*** (1.7)	-0.2 (0.8)	0.4 (0.7)	-6.8*** (1.0)	4.1*** (1.2)	1.6** (0.7)	0.4* (0.2)	2.3*** (0.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$ $\times Listed$	-6.3 (4.3)	-3.4* (2.0)	1.7 (2.7)	-4.2 (2.9)	3.5 (2.8)	-0.3 (0.8)	-0.4* (0.2)	3.8 (2.6)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.9*** (1.2)	-6.1*** (0.6)	-4.2*** (0.3)	-3.2*** (0.6)	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.5*** (2.0)	-3.1*** (0.8)	-3.6*** (0.3)	-6.8*** (1.1)	-2.9*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.9*** (0.4)	-1.7*** (0.1)	-0.6*** (0.1)	-2.1*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.7*** (1.1)	6.1*** (0.8)	5.4*** (0.6)	-3.0*** (0.8)	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Listed	2.5*** (0.6)	2.5*** (0.3)	0.7*** (0.2)	0.3 (0.5)	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.1 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.11	0.07	0.28	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	137746	145472	145911	138768	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

We include the interaction terms between short-term and long-term FC debt, and a listed firm dummy variable that assigns a value of one if the firm is listed or zero otherwise. In the second row, we observe a significantly positive and quantitatively sizable coefficient of cash, accounts receivable, and the sum of the three liquid items on $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times Listed$. In Column (1), the coefficient on $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times Listed$ is 13.1 for listed firms, making it on average a total amount of 24.6 won of carry trades for each 100 won of short-term FC debt raised.

Interestingly, the coefficient of LC accounts receivable on $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times Listed$ is significantly positive but insignificant for $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$. This finding suggests the existence of additional carry trade activities employing trade receivables, a phenomenon exclusive to listed firms. This result echoes findings from [Huang et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Hardy et al. \(2023\)](#), who find that very large firms are acting like shadow banks to extend inter-firm loans and trade credits when issuing FC debt. For the FC liquid assets, we find that listed firms accumulate less FC short-term financial instruments when they issue more short-term or long-term debt in foreign currency.

In sum, this analysis underscores the added insight gained from our dataset's broader coverage of firms across different sizes. When we focus solely on listed firms, the overall size of carry trade activities is substantially larger, mostly stemming from the active use of accounts receivable. Non-listed firms engage in carry trade activities on a smaller scale, and they place much more weight on accumulating FX risk buffers than on carry trades.

3.4 FC Debt and Interest Income

Having presented evidence of firms borrowing in short-term FC debt and saving in LC liquid assets, we now provide direct evidence of carry trades employing balance sheet items on interest incomes. Our analysis confirms that firms earn higher interest incomes when borrowing more in short-term FC debt. Additionally, we demonstrate that the size of the average carry trade income we predict closely matches the size of the interest income on the cash flow statement.

Table 4: FC Debt and Interest Income, Equation (2)

Gross Interest Rate Income	
(1)	
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.315*** (0.054)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.026 (0.052)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.250*** (0.021)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.346*** (0.025)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-0.003 (0.005)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.136*** (0.043)
Adjusted R^2	0.10
Within R^2	0.01
N	137746

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variable is gross interest income from the cash flow statement. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Formally, we estimate the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{GII_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta_{GII}^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta_{GII}^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta_{GII}^{ST} \frac{STdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta_{GII}^{LT} \frac{LTdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $GII_{i,t}$ is the gross interest income for firm i in year t from the cash flow statement. When a firm issues debt, there is no specific relationship between debt and interest incomes. For example, if a firm issues debt and uses the proceeds entirely for capital expenditure or wage payments, β_{GII} is expected to be zero because both capital expenditure or wage payments do not generate interest income. Therefore, a positive association of short-term FC debt and gross interest income ($\beta_{GII}^{STFC} > 0$) provides strong evidence that short-term FC debt issuance is associated with an interest rate-bearing activity.

The regression result is reported in Table 4. β_{GII}^{STFC} is estimated to be positive and significant at 1% level, indicating a significant increase in gross interest income when short-term FC debt increases. There is no significant association for β_{GII}^{LTFC} , which confirms again that firms do not employ long-term debt for carry trade activities. We can interpret the coefficient β_{GII}^{STFC} quantitatively in two ways. First, if we divide β_{GII}^{STFC} by the interest rate of the carry trade activities, we can obtain the implicit size of carry trade that rationalizes the reported interest income. The average Korean short-term interest rate is 2.86% from 2001 to 2017. Therefore, $\hat{\beta}_{GII}^{STFC} / 0.0286 = 0.315 / 0.0286 = 11.0$, indicating that for each 100 unit of short-term FC debt, 11 won of the proceeds are used for carry trade activities (with a standard error of 1.89). This estimate closely matches the carry trade size of 13.2 won for each 100 won of FC short-term borrowing that we have obtained when estimating Equation (1), reported in Table 1, further confirming firms' carry trades.

Second, equivalently, we show how much of the predicted carry trade activity from Equation (1) is directly observed in the gross interest rate data on the cashflow statement. Specifically, we compute the predicted carry trade income as $Predicted\ GII_{carrytrade} = \hat{\beta}^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times i^{KR}$

, where $\hat{\beta}^{STFC}$ is an estimate from Equation (1) reported in Column 1 in Table 1 and i^{KR} is the average short-term interest rate in Korea. We then ask if the predicted income is quantitatively aligned with gross interest income, $GII_{i,t}$, on the cashflow statements after controlling for other sources of financing and income. We find that 83% of predicted carry trade income appears as interest income on the cashflow statement. The regression is reported in Appendix G.1.

4 Exploring Heterogeneity in Incentives: Carry Trades and FX Risk Buffers

Having established the evidence of carry trades and FC saving against FX risk of Korean firms, we extend our analysis to understand the underlying incentives of these behaviors.

4.1 Interest Rate Differential and Carry Trades

In this section, we explore if firms participate more in carry trade when the carry trade condition is more favorable. We add an interaction term of short-term FC debt and the ratio of money market interest rate differential between Korea and the US to the exchange rate volatility to the baseline specification of Equation (1). Dependent variables are LC liquid assets.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFCLT} \frac{LTFCLT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{ST} \frac{STdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LTdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \\ & + \delta_1 \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times \left(\frac{i_t^{diff}}{3mFXvol_t} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

, where i_t^{diff} is the Korea minus US money market rates of annual average of monthly values from the IMF International Financial Statistics, and $3mFXvol_t$ is the option implied exchange rate volatility from 3-month at-the-money exchange rate options (annual average of end-of-month values) from the Bloomberg Terminal. The underlying idea is that a higher interest rate differential and lower exchange rate volatility should increase in firms' incentives to conduct carry trades.

Table 5: FC Debt and LC Liquid Assets

– Carry Trades and Interest Rate Differential, Equation (3)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	10.8*** (3.1)	6.5*** (1.1)	8.3*** (0.9)	-2.3 (2.1)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.7*** (1.6)	-0.7 (0.7)	0.4 (0.7)	-7.2*** (1.0)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times \frac{i_t^{diff}}{3mFXvol_t}$	15.2** (6.8)	6.1** (3.0)	6.6* (3.7)	0.1 (4.5)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-14.2*** (1.2)	-6.4*** (0.6)	-4.3*** (0.3)	-3.2*** (0.6)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.7*** (2.0)	-3.3*** (0.8)	-3.7*** (0.3)	-6.9*** (1.1)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-2.0*** (0.2)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.7*** (1.1)	6.2*** (0.8)	5.4*** (0.6)	-3.0*** (0.8)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.10	0.06	0.28
Within R^2	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04
N	137746	145472	145911	138768

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $i_t^{diff} = i_t^{KRW} - i_t^{USD}$ is the money market interest rate differential. $3mFXvol$ is the implied volatility imputed from 3-month at-the-money exchange rate options. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5 summarizes the regression results of Equation (3). Consistent with our conjecture, we see positive estimates of the interaction term. When the interest rate differential is high relative to the exchange rate volatility, a more favorable condition for carry trades, a rise in short-term FC debt is associated with a significantly higher overall LC liquid assets, including LC cash and LC short-term financial instruments. The coefficient of LC accounts receivable on the interaction term is also positive but insignificant.

4.2 FX volatility and FX Risk Buffers

In this section, we further corroborate how the accumulation of FC liquid assets when borrowing in FC is related to firms' FX risk management.

First, we investigate whether a positive correlation between FC debt and FC liquid assets is indeed a result of saving against FX risk. Our hypothesis is if the positive correlation is indeed a result of firms' management of FX risk, we should see more of it when the exchange rate volatility increases as it increases firms' needs of having FX risk buffers. We add an interaction term of FC debt and exchange rate volatility measures to the baseline regressions with FC liquid assets as dependent variables.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{ST} \frac{STdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LTdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \\ & + \delta_1 \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (3mFXvol_t) + \delta_2 \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (1yFXvol_t) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

, where $3mFXvol_t$ and $1yFXvol_t$ are implied volatility imputed from annual average of end-of-month 3 month and 1 year at-the-money exchange rate options obtained from the Bloomberg Terminal. Each volatility measure is standardized by subtracting its sample mean and dividing by its sample standard deviation; each has a zero mean and a unit variance. We expect the estimates of δ_1 and δ_2 to be positive in Equation (4).

Table 6: FC Debt and FC Liquid Assets – FX Risk Buffers and FX Volatility, Equation (4)

	Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	12.1*** (1.8)	2.9*** (0.5)	0.4*** (0.1)	9.5*** (1.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	4.4*** (1.1)	1.6*** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.6*** (0.6)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (3mFXvol_t)$	0.3 (0.5)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.2* (0.1)	-0.3 (0.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (1yFXvol_t)$	-0.5 (0.5)	-0.0 (0.3)	0.1 (0.1)	-0.6* (0.3)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-2.9*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $1yFXvol$ and $3mFXvol$ are the implied volatility imputed from at-the-money exchange rate options. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6 reports the regression results of Equation (4). When exchange rate volatility is high, a rise in short-term FC debt comes with a significantly higher FC cash and FC short-term financial instruments. This result is aligned with our predictions that FC liquid saving as a FX risk buffer would be higher when exchange rate volatility increases. The coefficient of FC accounts receivable is negative but insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficients of FC Cash, FC short-term FI, and FC AR on long-term FC debt are positive and significant, while the interaction term of long-term FC debt and 1-year option implied exchange rate volatility is insignificant for FC Cash and FC short-term FI and negative for FC AR. This finding indicates that issuing long-term debt has a significant and positive average effect on FC liquid saving but an increase in the exchange rate volatility has a limited incremental effect on the accumulation of FX risk buffers. It is reasonable as long-term debt does not raise concerns as much as short-term debt upon a heightened FX risk.

Second, we examine whether a positive correlation between FC debt and FC liquid assets is higher for “riskier” sectors, whose sales are negatively correlated with the exchange rate depreciation (defined as the KRW price of USD). We first compute each sector’s sales by summing up sales of all firms in each sector for each year t . We then regress the log of sectoral sales on the log of the exchange rate to measure how each sector’s sales fluctuate with the exchange rate, $SectorFXBeta_c$. We interact $SectorFXBeta_c$ with short-term and long-term FC debt to investigate if firms accumulate more FC liquid savings when they are in a riskier sector, where sales decrease as Korean won depreciates against the U.S. dollar (that is, $SectorFXBeta_c < 0$). In other words, we expect the estimates of δ_1 and δ_2 to be negative in Equation (5):

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{y_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\
& + \beta^{ST} \frac{STdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LTdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\
& + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \\
& + \delta_1 \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (SectorFXBeta_c) + \delta_2 \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (SectorFXBeta_c)
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Table 7: FC Debt and FC Liquid Assets
– FX Risk Buffers and Sectoral Exposure to FX Risk, Equation (5)

	Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	9.5*** (2.3)	2.2*** (0.5)	0.6** (0.3)	7.2*** (2.0)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times SectorFXBeta_c$	-3.3* (1.9)	-1.0*** (0.3)	0.2 (0.2)	-2.7* (1.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	4.1*** (1.2)	1.7*** (0.6)	0.3 (0.2)	2.5*** (0.7)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times SectorFXBeta_c$	-0.2 (0.8)	0.1 (0.3)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.2 (0.6)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-2.9*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are in the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in foreign currency (FC), and the sum of three. $SectorFXBeta_c$ is the sensitivity of each sector's sales to the exchange rate, the KRW price of USD. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7 summarizes the regression results of Equation (5). Negative $SectorFXBeta_c$ means that sectors' sales are low when KRW depreciates against the U.S. dollar, which is precisely when firms face higher debt burden from FC borrowing. Firms in sectors with negative $SectorFXBeta_c$ save more in FC liquid assets when borrowing in short-term FC debt. The coefficients of total liquid FC assets, including FC cash and FC AR, on the interaction term of $SectorFXBeta_c$ and short-term FC debt are negative and significantly different from zero. The coefficient of FC liquid assets on the interaction term of $SectorFXBeta_c$ and long-term FC debt are small and insignificant.

Overall, we see more FX risk buffers set aside by firms in the riskier sectors, which experience lower sales with Korean won depreciation. This empirical observation further supports our idea that the accumulation of FC liquid assets is an outcome of firms' FX risk management.

5 Sectoral and Temporal Heterogeneity

In this section, we investigate sectoral heterogeneity and analyze whether there is a structural break after the Global Financial Crisis. Specifically, we show that firms in sectors with high financial dependence conduct more carry trades, while firms in more export-oriented sectors exhibit a higher degree of saving against FX risk when borrowing in FC. We also find that both carry trades and accumulation of FX risk buffers are present before 2008 and after 2008.

5.1 Trade Exposures and Financial Dependence

A sectoral analysis is important to identify sectoral characteristics that engage more in carry trades and accumulate more FX risk buffers, and this understanding would be critical to assess the consequence of FC borrowing to the macroeconomic stability. For instance, if a service sector, whose business operations are mainly domestic, engages more in carry trades, then it could be a destabilizing factor for the macroeconomy upon a large depreciation shock. In this subsection, we focus on two types of sectoral heterogeneity: financial dependence and trade exposures.

We first focus on financial dependence. We measure external financial dependence as in the seminal work by [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#). For each firm i , it is calculated as:

$$FinDep_i = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^T (\text{increase in investment assets}_{i,t} - \text{cashflow from operation}_{i,t})}{\sum_{t=0}^T \text{increase in investment assets}_{i,t}}.$$

$FinDep_i$ captures the long-term shortfall in financing a firm i 's investment needs with internal funds. Following [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#), we take the median firm's value in each sector as the sector financial dependence measure, $FinDep_c$, to capture a long-run sectoral characteristic.¹⁷

We include the interaction term of short-term FC debt and $FinDep_c$:¹⁸

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{ST} \frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \\ & + \delta_1 \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times FinDep_c \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The regression results are reported in Table 8. The coefficient on the interaction term δ_1 in Equation (6) is the one we are interested in. From Columns (1)-(4), we see that firms in a higher financial dependence sector are on average holding higher LC liquid assets when borrowing in short-term FC debt. The coefficient of cash on the interaction term is estimated to be positive and significant. This provides evidence that firms in a higher financial dependence sector are more active in carry trade activities.

On the other hand, we also see, in Columns (5)-(8), firms in a financial dependent sector hold more FC liquid assets, when borrowing in short-term FC debt. For the short-term FC debt, two of the three coefficients on $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times FinDep_c$ are estimated to be positive and significant. However, the size of the coefficient of FC cash is three times smaller than that of LC cash, hinting us

¹⁷The top 5 sectors with the highest financial dependence are: (i) extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; (ii) heavy construction; (iii) amusement and theme park operation; (iv) research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering; and (v) fishing and gathering of marine materials.

¹⁸The standalone effect of $FinDep_c$ is absorbed by fixed effects.

that firms in a financial dependent sector on average expose its balance sheets to higher exchange rate risk and actively participate in carry trades.

Table 8: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Sectoral Financial Dependence, Equation (6)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-10.9 (8.9)	-2.6 (3.4)	6.3 (5.0)	-7.8 (5.9)	7.6 (6.3)	-0.1 (1.1)	-0.2 (0.2)	7.7 (6.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times FinDep_c$	24.5*** (9.3)	10.3*** (3.5)	3.1 (5.0)	5.7 (6.2)	4.7 (6.5)	3.2** (1.2)	0.6** (0.2)	1.8 (6.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.7*** (1.6)	-0.7 (0.7)	0.4 (0.7)	-7.2*** (1.0)	4.4*** (1.1)	1.6*** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.6*** (0.6)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-14.2*** (1.2)	-6.4*** (0.6)	-4.3*** (0.3)	-3.2*** (0.6)	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.7*** (2.0)	-3.3*** (0.8)	-3.7*** (0.3)	-6.9*** (1.1)	-2.9*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-2.0*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.7*** (1.1)	6.2*** (0.8)	5.4*** (0.6)	-3.0*** (0.8)	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.10	0.06	0.28	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	137746	145472	145911	138768	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $FinDep_c$ is sectoral financial dependence ratio constructed as in [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Next, we investigate if and how different trade exposure across sectors affects their carry trades and saving against FX risk when borrowing in short-term FC debt. We construct a sectoral measure of trade exposure using the sectoral input-output matrix information from the Bank of Korea.¹⁹ For each sector c , we take the sum across years of total sectoral exports and total sectoral imports. We divide these terms by the sum across years total sector output (domestically produced sector output plus imported sector output) to get the export share of output and import share of output for each sector, capturing a long-run trade exposure of each sector:

$$ExportShare_c = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^T \text{sector export}_{c,t}}{\sum_{t=0}^T \text{sector output}_{c,t}} \text{ and } ImportShare_c = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^T \text{sector import}_{c,t}}{\sum_{t=0}^T \text{sector output}_{c,t}}.$$

We include the interaction terms of short-term FC debt and each of the above two variables:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{ST} \frac{STdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LTdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \\ & + \lambda_1 \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times ExportShare_c + \lambda_2 \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times ImportShare_c \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

The regression results are reported in Table 9. The coefficients on the interaction terms, λ_1 and λ_2 , are the key interests. In Columns (1)-(4), we see that none of the coefficients of LC liquid assets on the interaction term with an import share and an export share are significant. This finding indicates firms with more trade linkages do not conduct carry trade more than an average firm. On the other hand, we also see in Columns (5)-(8), there are some positive coefficients for λ_1 , supporting that firms set aside higher FX risk buffers when firms are in an more export-oriented sector and borrow in short-term FC debt. In Columns (6) and (8), we observe an increase in FC cash and FC accounts receivable is higher when firms, in the sectors with high export exposure, borrow in short-term FC debt. Coefficients on the interaction term with an import share are estimated to be insignificant.

¹⁹Sector classification in the input-output matrix is different from the sector classification in the KISVALUE dataset. We match the sector manually and the matched outcomes are reported in the Appendix H. We use the input-output table in 2005 – 2011 to compute the sectoral trade exposure.

Table 9: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Sectoral Export and Import Shares, Equation (7)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	18.2*** (4.5)	8.1*** (1.7)	7.9*** (1.3)	3.4 (2.9)	3.0 (2.8)	2.3** (1.0)	0.2 (0.3)	1.7 (2.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times ExportShare_c$	12.2 (21.6)	5.0 (7.1)	11.6 (10.2)	-3.4 (12.8)	33.2*** (10.2)	4.4* (2.3)	-0.9 (1.4)	30.9*** (9.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times ImportShare_c$	-44.4 (29.3)	-9.4 (8.1)	-2.7 (5.5)	-33.6 (23.9)	26.3 (21.3)	0.3 (4.9)	2.3 (1.6)	19.3 (17.1)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.7*** (1.6)	-0.7 (0.7)	0.4 (0.7)	-7.1*** (1.0)	4.2*** (1.1)	1.6*** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.4*** (0.5)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-14.2*** (1.2)	-6.4*** (0.6)	-4.3*** (0.3)	-3.2*** (0.6)	-0.4* (0.2)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.3 (0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-13.7*** (2.0)	-3.3*** (0.8)	-3.7*** (0.3)	-6.9*** (1.1)	-2.8*** (0.5)	-0.8*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.9*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-2.0*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.7*** (1.1)	6.2*** (0.8)	5.4*** (0.6)	-3.0*** (0.8)	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.3 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.10	0.06	0.28	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	137746	145472	145911	138768	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $ExportShare_c$ and $ImportShare_c$ are sectoral export and import share of output constructed from Bank of Korea data. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Overall, we find evidence that firms in more financially dependent sectors and in more export exposed sectors on average accumulate more FX buffer, while firms in the former are also more active in carry trades. The two sectoral indices measure different dimensions of heterogeneity and could have different policy implications. Carry trade activities of financial dependent sectors could be alarming, but more FX risk buffers set aside by firms in exporting sectors could be reassuring.

5.2 Heterogeneity Pre- and Post-2008

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 resulted in a rise in volatility, a very low world interest rate environment, and disruptions in financial markets. Recent literature raises the concern about non-financial firms' participation in carry trades in the post GFC period.²⁰ In Table 10, we interact the debt variables in Equation (1) with a post-2008 dummy. By and large, all the empirical findings documented in the section above are present in both pre- and post-2008 period.

The coefficient of LC total liquid assets on short-term FC debt becomes slightly more positive after 2008, but the change is not statistically different from zero. Interestingly, we find a negative coefficient of LC cash and a positive coefficient of short-term FI on the interact term, $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times Post2008$, indicating there is a switch of depositing assets from those with maturities of 3 months or less to 1 year or below.

The coefficient of foreign currency liquid assets on $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times Post2008$ is positive and significant for the sum of all three liquid assets but not significant for any individual FC liquid assets. On the other hand, the coefficients on $\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times Post2008$ are positive and significant for cash and short-term FI.

²⁰See Caballero et al. (2016) and Bruno and Shin (2017).

Table 10: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Pre- and Post-2008

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	12.1*** (2.8)	8.8*** (1.3)	7.1*** (1.0)	-2.3 (1.9)	10.0*** (1.4)	2.5*** (0.7)	0.5*** (0.2)	8.0*** (1.3)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	1.7	-2.3**	3.7***	-0.0	3.8**	1.0	-0.1	2.6
×Post2008	(2.4)	(0.9)	(1.3)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(1.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-5.5*** (2.0)	-0.2 (0.9)	0.9 (0.9)	-5.8*** (1.2)	3.8*** (0.9)	1.0*** (0.4)	0.2 (0.2)	2.6*** (0.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-6.1**	-1.5	-1.7	-3.5**	1.3	1.3*	0.3***	-0.1
×Post2008	(2.4)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.6)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.7)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-10.8*** (1.0)	-5.6*** (0.6)	-2.8*** (0.4)	-1.8** (0.7)	-0.1 (0.3)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.1** (0.0)	0.2 (0.3)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-5.4***	-1.3*	-2.5***	-2.2***	-0.4	-0.7***	-0.0	0.2
×Post2008	(1.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-12.7*** (1.4)	-2.9*** (0.6)	-2.8*** (0.3)	-6.8*** (0.9)	-2.1*** (0.4)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.6*** (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-1.5	-0.5	-1.3***	-0.2	-1.1**	-0.6***	-0.1***	-0.4
×Post2008	(1.3)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.5*** (0.1)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-2.0*** (0.2)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	6.2*** (1.1)	6.3*** (0.8)	5.6*** (0.6)	-2.8*** (0.8)	0.3 (0.3)	0.6*** (0.2)	0.1*** (0.0)	-0.4 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.10	0.07	0.28	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	137746	145472	145911	138768	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6 Other Uses of Debt Proceeds

In this section, we look at other common uses of bond proceed besides liquid assets, especially investment and dividend payouts. We run the same regression as Equation (1) but with $y_{i,t}$ as capital expenditures (CapEx) and dividend payouts (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$). The regression estimates are reported in Table 11.

In Column (1), we see that an increase in debt in general is associated with an increase in investment. The coefficients on short-term debt, long-term debt, and long-term FC debt are all estimated to be positive and significant. However, the coefficient on short-term FC debt is negative and significant. This result indicates firms raising debt in ST FC are not mainly seeking external funds for investment purposes, reaffirming the carry trade hypothesis.

We also see consistent evidence of a reduction in dividend payouts when debt increases, except for short-term FC debt. The coefficients on short-term debt, long-term debt, and long-term FC debt are estimated to be negative and significant. These are consistent with the pecking order theory in corporate finance that firms use internal funds first and then draw on external funds to finance investment projects. The coefficient on short-term FC debt is not significant and also positive. The stark difference in the result on short-term FC debt again highlights the carry trade motive behind short-term FC debt issuance.

Table 11: FC Debt, and Investment and Dividend

	CapEx	Dividend Payout
	(1)	(2)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-4.3*** (0.7)	0.0 (0.0)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.3*** (2.0)	-0.1** (0.0)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	6.7*** (0.7)	-0.2*** (0.0)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	18.4*** (1.6)	-0.2*** (0.0)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-0.7*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-14.4*** (2.3)	0.4*** (0.1)
Adjusted R^2	0.20	0.04
Within R^2	0.13	0.02
N	123816	146025

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are capital expenditure (CapEx) and dividend payouts. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

7 Dynamic Relationships of FC Debt and Liquid Assets


In this section, we investigate the longer-term effects of FC debt issuance. This analysis helps us to ease the concern that the increase in liquid assets is driven by a mechanical effect, where firms have not yet used the debt proceeds for other real purposes. We will see all the previous results hold when we examine the longer-horizon correlations. We estimate Equation (8) with a local projection method a la [Jordà \(2005\)](#).

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_{i,t+h}}{TA_{i,t-1}} = & \beta^{STFC} \frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{ST} \frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LT} \frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

for $h = 0, 1, 2, 3$. We estimate up to 3 years because we have a sample of 17 years and the typical maturity of a debt contract is roughly 3 years.

Figures 4 display the impulse responses when the dependent variables are LC assets and FC assets, respectively. For each figure, each of the four columns considers the sum of the three assets, cash, short-term financial instruments, and accounts receivable as the dependent variables, respectively. Each of the two rows plots the impulse responses when the regressors are short-term FC debt and long-term FC debt, respectively. In all figures, we can see that the sign of the coefficient at $h = 0$ is the same as the coefficients at $h = 1, 2$ and 3. This result indicates the association with liquid assets are persistent. For example, there is a long-term increase in FC cash when there is an increase in short-term FC debt. Therefore, it is not the case that the increase in FC cash is just a reflection of unused bond proceeds after a debt issuance.

Figure 4: FC Debt and Liquid Assets: Dynamic Relationship via Local Projections, Equation(8))



Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). The regression control for lagged log total assets and cashflow from other sources (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$). Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. 95% confidence interval from standard errors clustering at sector level are displayed as black dash lines.

8 Conclusion

With detailed Korean firm-level data, we find strong evidence that the currency and the maturity of debt matter for what firms do with their borrowing. We find that firms that borrow in foreign currency engage more in carry trades, especially when borrowing in short-term, and also exhibit stronger incentives to set aside some FC liquid assets as FX risk buffers. Furthermore, we document that listed firms participate significantly more in carry trade and set aside less FX risk buffers than non-listed firms. Lastly, we find firms that borrow more in short-term FC debt earn higher interest income, directly supporting carry trade motives behind issuing short-term FC debt.

We delve further into the incentives driving carry trade behavior and accumulation of FX risk buffers. Our analysis reveals that firms engage in more carry trades when the interest rate differential between South Korea and the United States widens. Firms opt for additional FX risk buffers when exchange rate volatility increases and if they operate in sectors whose sales are highly sensitive to the exchange rate fluctuations. In terms of heterogeneity, we observe similar patterns in both the pre- and post-2008 periods, suggesting that the motives to participate carry trades and set aside FX risk buffers did not materially change after 2008. Moreover, firms in financially dependent sectors engage more in carry trade, while firms in export-oriented sectors tend to accumulate more FX risk buffers.

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Online Appendix (not for publication)

A Coverage Ratio for Key Variables:

KISVALUE vs. Aggregate Data

Table 12: Coverage Ratios of KISVALUE Dataset

Coverage Ratio (%)*					
Year	Cash	ST Debt	LT Debt	AR	Total Assets
2001	No aggregate data available from Bank of Korea				
2002	No aggregate data available from Bank of Korea				
2003	No aggregate data available from Bank of Korea				
2004	37.8	65.0	86.9	59.9	71.3
2005	41.3	62.8	77.4	55.3	68.9
2006	39.5	67.1	95.8	56.3	68.9
2007	73.4	57.4	99.5	57.6	73.2
2008	61.9	58.4	74.4	50.3	66.0
2009	59.2	50.7	47.9	52.5	56.7
2010	60.0	56.0	51.1	56.6	59.2
2011	62.3	59.5	53.3	56.8	61.8
2012	63.9	59.7	60.5	56.9	63.8
2013	61.5	59.6	64.1	54.4	63.1
2014	60.6	57.9	65.9	56.3	65.2
2015	62.3	58.8	69.9	54.9	65.8
2016	59.8	58.0	70.8	53.9	64.3
2017	57.8	58.0	65.5	54.4	63.6

Notes: The coverage ratio is defined as the KISVALUE aggregate across firm in a particular year divided by the aggregate data from Bank of Korea in the same year.

B Summary Statistics

Table 13: Statistics of Firm-level Variables

Variable	% of firm year observation
Firms with debt	0.76
Firms with ST debt	0.65
Firms with LT debt	0.57
Firms with FC debt	0.12
Firms with FC ST debt	0.09
Firms with FC LT debt	0.05
Variable	Average
FC Share of ST Debt , conditional on non zero FC ST debt	0.33
FC Share of LT Debt , conditional on non zero FC LT debt	0.43
FC Share of Debt , conditional on non zero FC debt	0.29

Table 14: Summary Statistics of Firm-level Variables, Conditional on Positive FC Debt

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	25%tile	Median	75%tile
LC Total/TA(t-1)	0.256	0.180	0.119	0.219	0.359
LC Cash/TA(t-1)	0.049	0.076	0.006	0.022	0.060
LC Short-term FI/TA(t-1)	0.045	0.085	0.000	0.012	0.050
LC AR/TA(t-1)	0.166	0.136	0.059	0.137	0.242
FC Total/TA(t-1)	0.051	0.102	0.000	0.005	0.058
FC Cash/TA(t-1)	0.010	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.004
FC Short-term FI/TA(t-1)	0.001	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000
FC AR/TA(t-1)	0.041	0.088	0.000	0.000	0.042
ST FC debt/TA(t-1)	0.076	0.119	0.000	0.030	0.100
LT FC debt/TA(t-1)	0.050	0.117	0.000	0.000	0.039
ST total debt/TA(t-1)	0.248	0.193	0.092	0.219	0.368
LT total debt/TA(t-1)	0.144	0.175	0.010	0.080	0.212
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.000	0.107	0.000	0.000	0.009

Table 15: Summary Statistics of Firm-level Variables

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	25% tile	Median	75%tile
LC Total Liquid/TA(t-1)	0.275	0.221	0.091	0.229	0.415
LC Cash/TA(t-1)	0.079	0.122	0.008	0.032	0.095
LC Short-term FI/TA(t-1)	0.053	0.110	0.000	0.007	0.051
LC AR/TA(t-1)	0.154	0.153	0.016	0.113	0.244
FC Total Liquid/TA(t-1)	0.025	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.002
FC Cash/TA(t-1)	0.007	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.000
FC Short-term FI/TA(t-1)	0.001	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000
FC AR/TA(t-1)	0.017	0.063	0.000	0.000	0.000
ST FC debt/TA(t-1)	0.010	0.051	0.000	0.000	0.000
LT FC debt/TA(t-1)	0.007	0.047	0.000	0.000	0.000
ST total debt/TA(t-1)	0.180	0.205	0.000	0.112	0.293
LT total debt/TA(t-1)	0.157	0.220	0.000	0.052	0.239
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.005	0.103	0.000	0.000	0.000

C All Tables in Main Text with *All* Sample

(Not Only Issuance Year)

Table 16: FC Debt and Liquid Assets, Equation (1)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	14.5*** (3.3)	7.7*** (1.5)	10.0*** (1.0)	-2.0 (1.9)	11.7*** (1.8)	2.6*** (0.4)	0.5*** (0.2)	9.3*** (1.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.3*** (1.8)	-0.1 (0.9)	-0.2 (0.7)	-7.1*** (1.0)	4.2*** (1.1)	1.5** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.6*** (0.5)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-22.1*** (1.5)	-12.0*** (1.1)	-9.5*** (0.5)	-1.4** (0.6)	-1.0*** (0.4)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	0.2 (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-20.3*** (2.4)	-7.9*** (1.1)	-7.8*** (0.4)	-5.6*** (1.2)	-3.0*** (0.5)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.5*** (0.3)	-1.8*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.7*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.9*** (1.1)	10.8*** (0.8)	0.0 (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.5)	0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0*** (0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.30	0.16	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	241068	255320	256267	244355	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are described as the column headers (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash and cash equivalents, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable, and the sum of the three in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 17: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Current Portion of Long-term Debt

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	14.6*** (3.3)	7.7*** (1.5)	10.0*** (1.0)	-2.0 (1.9)	11.7*** (1.8)	2.6*** (0.4)	0.5*** (0.2)	9.3*** (1.5)
$\frac{Current\ LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-32.0*** (3.9)	-6.2*** (1.5)	-9.8*** (1.5)	-17.0*** (2.8)	3.7** (1.5)	1.1 (0.9)	-0.0 (0.1)	3.3*** (1.2)
$\frac{Rest\ of\ LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.8 (2.3)	1.5 (1.2)	2.2*** (0.8)	-4.5*** (1.1)	4.4*** (1.1)	1.6*** (0.6)	0.4* (0.2)	2.4*** (0.5)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-22.1*** (1.5)	-12.0*** (1.1)	-9.5*** (0.5)	-1.4** (0.6)	-1.0*** (0.4)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	0.2 (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-20.5*** (2.4)	-7.9*** (1.1)	-7.8*** (0.4)	-5.7*** (1.2)	-3.0*** (0.5)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.5*** (0.3)	-1.8*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.7*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.9*** (1.1)	10.8*** (0.8)	0.0 (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.5)	0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0*** (0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.16	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	241068	255320	256267	244355	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 18: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Listed vs. Non-Listed Firms

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.0*** (3.2)	6.6*** (1.5)	10.3*** (1.0)	-3.0 (2.0)	11.3*** (1.8)	2.6*** (0.4)	0.5*** (0.2)	8.8*** (1.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	12.1** (4.7)	7.0*** (2.3)	-3.1 (2.6)	7.8** (3.7)	3.8 (3.6)	-0.5 (0.6)	-0.2 (0.2)	4.1 (3.4)
$\times Listed$								
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-6.7*** (1.9)	0.1 (1.0)	0.0 (0.8)	-6.8*** (1.1)	3.8*** (1.2)	1.5** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.2*** (0.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-4.9 (4.1)	-0.2 (2.0)	-2.6 (3.0)	-3.2 (2.6)	4.5 (2.9)	-0.1 (0.8)	-0.4* (0.2)	4.7* (2.6)
$\times Listed$								
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-22.0*** (1.5)	-11.8*** (1.1)	-9.5*** (0.5)	-1.4** (0.6)	-1.0*** (0.4)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	0.2 (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-20.3*** (2.4)	-7.8*** (1.1)	-7.7*** (0.4)	-5.7*** (1.2)	-3.0*** (0.5)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-3.6*** (0.3)	-1.9*** (0.2)	-0.5*** (0.1)	-1.7*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0* (0.0)	0.0* (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.9*** (1.1)	10.7*** (0.8)	0.0 (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.5)	0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0*** (0.0)
Listed	1.3** (0.6)	1.5*** (0.3)	1.0*** (0.3)	-0.2 (0.4)	-0.2 (0.2)	-0.1** (0.1)	-0.0 (0.0)	-0.1 (0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.17	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	241068	255320	256267	244355	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 19: FC Debt and Interest Income, Equation (2)

Gross Interest Rate Income	
(1)	
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.307*** (0.057)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.032 (0.055)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.408*** (0.024)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.457*** (0.031)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-0.001 (0.007)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.375*** (0.039)
Adjusted R^2	0.09
Within R^2	0.02
N	241068

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variable is gross interest income from the cash flow statement. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 20: FC Debt and LC Liquid Assets

– Carry Trades and Interest Rate Differential, Equation (3)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	12.4*** (3.3)	6.6*** (1.6)	8.7*** (0.9)	-1.7 (2.2)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.2*** (1.8)	-0.1 (0.9)	-0.2 (0.7)	-7.1*** (1.0)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times \frac{i_t^{diff}}{3mFXvol_t}$	13.2** (5.9)	6.7*** (2.3)	7.8** (3.5)	-2.2 (3.9)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-22.1*** (1.5)	-12.0*** (1.1)	-9.5*** (0.5)	-1.4** (0.6)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-20.3*** (2.4)	-7.9*** (1.1)	-7.8*** (0.4)	-5.6*** (1.2)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-3.5*** (0.3)	-1.8*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.7*** (0.2)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.9*** (1.1)	10.8*** (0.8)	0.0 (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.5)
Adjusted R^2	0.30	0.16	0.09	0.29
Within R^2	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.03
N	241068	255320	256267	244355

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $i_t^{diff} = i_t^{KRW} - i_t^{USD}$ is the money market interest rate differential. $3mFXvol$ is the implied volatility imputed from 3-month at-the-money exchange rate options. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 21: FC Debt and FC Liquid Assets – FX Risk Buffers and FX Volatility, Equation (4)

	Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	11.6*** (1.8)	2.5*** (0.4)	0.4*** (0.2)	9.4*** (1.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	4.3*** (1.1)	1.5*** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.6*** (0.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (3mFXvol_t)$	0.4 (0.4)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.2** (0.1)	-0.2 (0.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (1yFXvol_t)$	-0.7 (0.4)	-0.1 (0.3)	0.1 (0.0)	-0.6** (0.3)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-1.0*** (0.4)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	0.2 (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-3.0*** (0.5)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0*** (0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $1yFXvol$ and $3mFXvol$ are the implied volatility imputed from at-the-money exchange rate options. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 22: FC Debt and FC Liquid Assets

– FX Risk Buffers and Sectoral Exposure to FX Risk, Equation (5)

	Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	9.4***	2.0***	0.8**	7.0***
	(2.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(1.9)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times SectorFXBeta_c$	-2.9*	-0.6**	0.5	-2.9*
	(1.7)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(1.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	4.6***	1.8***	0.2	2.9***
	(1.3)	(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.8)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times SectorFXBeta_c$	0.5	0.3	-0.1	0.4
	(0.9)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.6)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-1.0***	-1.2***	-0.1***	0.2
	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-3.0***	-1.2***	-0.1***	-1.7***
	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	0.5***	0.0	0.0	0.5***
	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0***
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are in the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in foreign currency (FC), and the sum of three. $SectorFXBeta_c$ is the sensitivity of each sector's sales to the exchange rate, the KRW price of USD. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 23: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Sectoral Financial Dependence, Equation (6)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	12.7*** (3.6)	7.0*** (1.6)	9.3*** (1.2)	-2.3 (1.8)	10.7*** (1.8)	2.4*** (0.4)	-0.2 (0.2)	9.1*** (1.5)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times FinDep_c$	1.8 (1.9)	0.6 (0.8)	0.7 (0.8)	0.2 (0.4)	1.0* (0.5)	0.1 (0.2)	0.7*** (0.0)	0.3 (0.5)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.3*** (1.8)	-0.1 (0.9)	-0.2 (0.7)	-7.1*** (1.0)	4.2*** (1.1)	1.5** (0.6)	0.3* (0.2)	2.6*** (0.5)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-22.1*** (1.5)	-12.0*** (1.1)	-9.5*** (0.5)	-1.4** (0.6)	-1.0*** (0.4)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	0.2 (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-20.3*** (2.4)	-7.9*** (1.1)	-7.8*** (0.4)	-5.6*** (1.2)	-3.0*** (0.5)	-1.2*** (0.2)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.5*** (0.3)	-1.8*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.7*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.9*** (1.1)	10.8*** (0.8)	0.0 (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.5)	0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0*** (0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.30	0.16	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	241068	255320	256267	244355	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $FinDep_c$ is sectoral financial dependence ratio constructed as in [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 24: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Sectoral Export and Import Shares, Equation (7)

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	19.9***	7.0***	10.4***	3.8	2.0	1.6**	0.4	1.0
	(5.0)	(2.0)	(1.6)	(2.9)	(2.4)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(2.3)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	4.6	6.5	4.9	-5.3	32.1***	1.6	-1.6	33.2***
$\times ExportShare_c$	(21.1)	(7.7)	(9.4)	(13.6)	(10.1)	(2.1)	(1.7)	(9.6)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-40.1	-2.4	-7.4	-33.1	32.5	5.2	2.3	22.1
$\times ImportShare_c$	(28.8)	(9.5)	(7.1)	(22.1)	(20.0)	(3.5)	(1.7)	(16.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.2***	-0.1	-0.3	-6.9***	4.0***	1.5**	0.3*	2.3***
	(1.8)	(1.0)	(0.7)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.5)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-22.1***	-12.0***	-9.5***	-1.4**	-1.0***	-1.2***	-0.1***	0.2
	(1.5)	(1.1)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-20.4***	-7.9***	-7.8***	-5.7***	-3.0***	-1.2***	-0.1***	-1.7***
	(2.4)	(1.1)	(0.4)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	-3.5***	-1.8***	-0.4***	-1.7***	0.5***	0.0	0.0	0.5***
	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.9***	10.8***	0.0	-1.7***	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0***
	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.0)	(0.5)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.16	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.02
N	241068	255320	256267	244355	256506	256680	256710	256613

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $ExportShare_c$ and $ImportShare_c$ are sectoral export and import share of output constructed from Bank of Korea data. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 25: FC Debt and Liquid Assets – Pre- and Post-2008

	Local Currency Liquid Assets				Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	14.5*** (2.9)	9.9*** (1.5)	7.3*** (1.1)	-1.7 (1.9)	9.7*** (1.3)	2.1*** (0.6)	0.4** (0.2)	8.1*** (1.2)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.2	-3.6***	4.2***	-0.7	3.3*	0.8	0.0	2.0
×Post2008	(3.2)	(1.1)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(1.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-5.5** (2.2)	0.6 (1.0)	-0.1 (0.9)	-6.2*** (1.2)	3.8*** (0.9)	0.9** (0.4)	0.2 (0.1)	2.8*** (0.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-6.8***	-2.6**	-1.8	-2.5	0.7	1.0*	0.2***	-0.4
×Post2008	(2.3)	(1.1)	(1.3)	(1.6)	(1.0)	(0.6)	(0.1)	(0.8)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-17.4*** (1.0)	-11.0*** (0.9)	-7.2*** (0.5)	-0.3 (0.7)	-0.7** (0.3)	-0.6*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-0.1 (0.3)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-7.2***	-1.5*	-3.7***	-1.7***	-0.5	-0.9***	-0.1	0.4*
×Post2008	(2.0)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.6)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.2)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-17.6*** (1.6)	-7.0*** (0.8)	-6.3*** (0.3)	-5.5*** (1.1)	-2.4*** (0.4)	-0.7*** (0.1)	-0.1*** (0.0)	-1.7*** (0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-3.8**	-1.3*	-2.2***	-0.2	-0.8*	-0.7***	-0.1***	-0.0
×Post2008	(1.6)	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-3.5*** (0.3)	-1.8*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.7*** (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	14.6*** (1.1)	11.0*** (0.9)	0.0 (0.0)	-1.6*** (0.5)	0.0* (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0*** (0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.17	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N	241068	255320	256267	244355	256506	256680	256710	256613


Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 26: FC Debt, and Investment and Dividend

	CapEx	Dividend Payout
	(1)	(2)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-3.7*** (0.6)	-0.1** (0.1)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	7.3*** (2.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	5.1*** (0.5)	-0.5*** (0.1)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	13.6*** (1.6)	-0.4*** (0.0)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-0.7*** (0.1)	0.1*** (0.0)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-8.6*** (1.6)	0.0 (0.0)
Adjusted R^2	0.18	0.04
Within R^2	0.11	0.02
N	213381	256703

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are capital expenditure (CapEx) and dividend payout. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 5: FC Debt and Liquid Assets: Dynamic Relationship via Local Projections (eq(8))



Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). The regression control for lagged log total assets and cashflow from other sources (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$). The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. 95% confidence interval from standard errors clustering at sector level are displayed as black dash lines.

D Carry Trade Returns with Longer Maturity Debt

To illustrate the relative attractiveness of conducting carry trade is decreasing with the debt maturity, we report the averages and the standard deviations of *quarterly holding period return* of saving in KRW one-year liquid assets financed by borrowing in USD at one-year, three-year and five-year maturities abstracting away from exchange rate changes.²¹

Specifically, we use the KRW interest rates of Korean government bonds and the USD interest rates of US government bonds across maturities, and compute the quarterly log holding period returns at the monthly date t of n -quarter Korean and U.S. government bonds, both denominated in their local currency. The annualized interest rate on a Korean government bond at the monthly date t of n -quarter maturity are denoted as $y_{n,t}^{KRW}$, and are collected from [Du and Schreger \(2017\)](#) dataset. The annualized interest rate on a U.S. government bond at the monthly date t of n -quarter maturity are denoted as $y_{n,t}^{USD}$, and are collected from the Bloomberg Terminal. The quarterly holding period (3-month period) returns at the monthly date t are computed as:

$$r_{n,t}^{KRW} = \tau_{n,t} y_{n,t}^{KRW} - (\tau_{n,t} - \frac{1}{4}) y_{n-1,t+3}^{KRW}, \text{ and } r_{n,t}^{USD} = \tau_{n,t} y_{n,t}^{USD} - (\tau_{n,t} - \frac{1}{4}) y_{n-1,t+3}^{USD},$$

where $\tau_{n,t}$ is the duration of the KRW or USD bond in years.²² We then compare the quarterly log holding period returns of one-year Korean government bonds minus that of one-year $(r_{4,t}^{KRW} - r_{4,t}^{USD})$, 3-year $(r_{12,t}^{KRW} - r_{12,t}^{USD})$ or 5-year $(r_{20,t}^{KRW} - r_{20,t}^{USD})$ U.S. government bonds. In Figure 6, we clearly see that the average of quarterly holding returns is lower and the standard deviation is higher when one borrows in USD at a longer-term maturity. For instance, the mean of the quarterly holding period returns of one-year Korean government bonds minus that of one-year U.S.


²¹ We have not included neither ex-post nor ex-ante quarterly exchange rate changes when computing the quarterly holding returns as they do not affect the relative attractiveness of USD financing at different maturities; all financing options face the same exchange rate changes (both ex-ante and ex-post) over the same quarter.

²² In practice, following [Du et al. \(2016\)](#), we approximate $y_{n-1,t+3}$ by $y_{n,t+3}$ for the quarterly holding period (3-month period). We also make an approximation that $\tau_{n,t}$ is $\frac{n}{4}$.

government bonds, $r_{4,t}^{KRW} - r_{4,t}^{USD}$, has a mean of 0.49 and a standard deviation of 0.50 in 2000m1-2018m12, while the quarterly holding period returns of one-year Korean government bonds minus that of 3-year U.S. government bonds $r_{4,t}^{KRW} - r_{12,t}^{USD}$, has a lower mean of -1.02 and a higher standard deviation of 1.51 in 2000m1-2018m12.

In sum, we find that using longer-term instruments to finance firms' saving in KRW liquid assets is not ideal as the quarterly returns are on average lower and more volatile when the liability maturity increases. In other words, the Sharpe ratio of carry trade using longer maturity FC debt is much lower. We believe this is the reason that firms do not use long-term FC debt to conduct their carry trade.

Figure 6: Differences in Quarterly Holding Period Returns of KRW Liquid Assets and USD Liquid Assets Across Maturities




Notes: The figures show the quarterly log holding period return differences between (i) one-year KRW Korean government bonds and one-year U.S. government bonds; and (ii) one-year KRW Korean government bonds and three-year U.S. government bonds; and (iii) one-year KRW Korean government bonds and five-year U.S. government bonds. The mean and the standard deviation of each of time series are reported. We have not included neither ex-post nor ex-ante quarterly exchange rate changes when computing as it does not affect the relative attractiveness of USD financing at different maturities as they all face the same exchange rate changes (both ex-ante and ex-post) over a quarter.

E FC Debt Across Countries


We use the BIS data to construct the time series of FC external debt for 14 countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand. We report FC external corporate debt to GDP in Figure 7 and FC share of external corporate debt – FC external corporate debt / (FC external corporate debt + LC external corporate debt) – in Figure 8. As shown in Figure 7, we observe a significant presence of FC external corporate debt in other emerging economies and show that FC borrowing is not a particular phenomenon in Korea. Compared to Korea – depicted in blue, the majority of countries show a similar or even higher level of FC external debt to GDP ratios. It reaffirms that many emerging economies are as dollarized as Korea. In terms of the currency composition of external corporate debt, Korea is at the median with 85%, and most of countries have the average FC share of external corporate debt higher than 80%. Overall, this provides external validation to our analysis that Korea is representative in this group of countries.

Figure 7: Cross-Country Analysis: FC External Corporate Debt/GDP



Notes: The data are from the Bank of International Settlements. The dataset includes external debt denominated in foreign currency. The time series for 14 countries are plotted, and that of Korea is colored in blue. The time series show the FC debt to GDP ratios from 1999 to 2018 for each country.

Figure 8: Cross-Country Analysis: FC Share of External Corporate Debt




Notes: The data are from the Bank of International Settlements. The dataset includes external debt denominated in foreign currency. The time series for 14 countries are plotted, and that of Korea is colored in blue. The time series show the FC share of external corporate debt from 1999 to 2018 for each country.

F Other Figures: FC Debt

Similar to Figure 3, we show that the quantitative magnitude of foreign currency borrowing is fairly similar to that of LC and FC liquid assets on firms' balances sheets.


Figure 9 uses a subsample of firms with positive FC short-term debt when aggregating firm-level variables. Conditional on positive holdings of FC short-term debt, the average FC short-term debt as a ratio of aggregate total assets in the previous year is around 4 to 9%, and they are fairly comparable to the size of each instrument of FC or LC liquid assets. Figure 10 shows two subfigures: (i) the aggregate FC debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate LC liquid assets by instruments (red lines), and (ii) the aggregate FC debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate FC liquid assets by instrument (red lines). Figure 11 depicts the same patterns but uses a subsample of firms with positive FC debt.

Figure 9: Short-term FC Debt, and LC and FC Liquid Assets, Conditional on Positive Short-term FC Debt




Notes: All the data come from the KISVALUE dataset. All the variables are normalized by the aggregate total assets in the previous year. The LHS figure shows the aggregate FC short-term debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate LC liquid assets by instruments (red lines), using a subsample of firms with positive FC short-term debt. The RHS figure shows the aggregate FC short-term debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate FC liquid assets by instrument (red lines), using a subsample of firms with positive FC short-term debt.

Figure 10: FC Debt, and LC and FC Liquid Assets



Notes: All the data come from the KISVALUE dataset. All the variables are normalized by the aggregate total assets in the previous year. The LHS figure shows the aggregate FC debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate LC liquid assets by instruments (red lines). The RHS figure shows the aggregate FC debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate FC liquid assets by instruments (red lines).

Figure 11: FC Debt, and LC and FC Liquid Assets, Conditional on Positive FC Debt




Notes: All the data come from the KISVALUE dataset. All the variables are normalized by the aggregate total assets in the previous year. The LHS figure shows the aggregate FC debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate LC liquid assets by instruments (red lines), using a subsample of firms with positive FC debt. The RHS figure shows the aggregate FC debt (blue solid line) and the aggregate FC liquid assets by instruments (red lines), using a subsample of firms with positive FC debt. All the series are normalized by the aggregate total assets in the previous year.

For each year, we first compute the cross-sectional average of firm-level ratios of total FC liquid assets to lagged total assets across firms with *positive* short-term FC debt. Figure 12 plots it against the 3-month implied exchange rate volatility of KRW. The correlation is 0.41, positive and high. It shows that firms borrow in short-term FC debt on average hold more FC liquid assets in a

times of heightened FX volatility. This strong positive correlation affirms our view that a positive correlation of FC liquid assets and FC short-term borrowing is associated with firms' saving against FX risk.

Figure 12: FC Liquid Assets and FX Volatility



Notes: The figure shows the 3-month implied FX volatility from the Bloomberg Terminal as a red dashed line. For each year, we compute the cross-sectional average of firm-level ratios of total FC liquid assets to lagged total assets, employing a subsample of firms with positive short-term FC debt, and it's depicted as a blue solid line.

G Robustness Checks

G.1 Alternative Specification for Interest Income from Carry Trades

As a different illustration of the results shown in 3.4, we construct a measure of the predicted carry trade income. We first estimate Equation (1) with a dependent variable, $\frac{\text{Sum LC LiquidAssets}_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$ where *Sum LC LiquidAssets* is the sum of three items of LC liquid assets. We then compute the predicted LC liquid assets that a firm holds when borrowing in short-term FC debt, $\hat{\beta}^{STFC} \frac{ST FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$. It captures the regression-implied average size of LC liquid assets that goes to carry trades. The fitted values are then multiplied by the average short-term Korea interest rate, which gives us a predicted regression-implied carry trade income ($Predicted\ GII_{carrytrade} = \hat{\beta}^{STFC} \frac{ST FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times i^{KR}$). We then compare the predicted carry trade income with the gross interest income, $GII_{i,t}$, on cash flow statements. We perform the following regression and control for the other debt financing and other sources of income:

$$\begin{aligned} GII_{i,t} = & \beta_1 Predicted\ GII_{carrytrade} + \beta^{STLC} \frac{ST LCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \beta^{LTFC} \frac{LT FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \beta^{LTL} \frac{LT LCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \\ & + \gamma_1 \frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_2 \ln TA_{i,t-1} + \alpha + \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

If the predicted carry trade return is a good proxy, we should expect $\beta_1 = 1$. Table 27 reports the estimates of regression (9). We find that β_1 is estimated to be 0.832 with a standard error of 0.142. This result means that 83% of the predicted carry trade income is reflected on the cash flow statement as gross interest rate income.

G.2 General Uncertainty Index

In this subsection, we conduct an exercise that is similar to subsection 4.2. We use an alternative measure of uncertainty to show that the FC liquid asset accumulation is related to FX volatility, rather than general uncertainty. Specifically, we use the Korean World Uncertainty Index, con-

Table 27: Gross Interest Income and Predicted Carry Trade Income

Gross Interest Income	
	(1)
<i>Predicted</i> $GII_{carrytrade,i,t}$	0.832*** (0.142)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.026 (0.052)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.250*** (0.021)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.346*** (0.025)
$\ln TA_{i,t-1}$	-0.003 (0.005)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.136*** (0.043)
Adjusted R^2	0.10
Within R^2	0.01
N	137746

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. Regressions without the restriction are reported in the Appendix C. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

structured by [Ahir et al. \(2022\)](#). We standardize the variable by its mean and variance so that the standardized variable has zero mean and unit variance. We then perform our baseline regression but include the interaction term of the uncertainty measure with both FC debt and total debt variables. The regression result is reported in Table 28. The coefficients on $\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (normal_WUI_{i,t})$ and $\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}} \times (normal_WUI_{i,t})$ are both *non-positive*. This result indicates a rise in general uncertainty or volatility of the economy doesn't result in larger FC liquid asset accumulation when borrowing in FC, in contrast with what we have documented in subsection 4.2. On the other hand, the accumulation of FC liquid assets is positively associated with *total* debt issuance when uncertainty is high. We believe this finding is consistent with a general precautionary saving motive, but is different from the incentives to set aside FX risk buffers that we emphasize in this paper.

Table 28: FC Debt and FC Liquid Assets:Interaction with General Uncertainty Measure

	Foreign Currency Liquid Assets			
	Sum	Cash	Short-term FI	AR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	12.6***	3.1***	0.4***	9.7***
	(1.9)	(0.5)	(0.1)	(1.6)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	4.8***	1.9**	0.3*	2.9***
	(1.2)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.6)
$\frac{ST\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-1.8*	-0.5	0.1	-1.1
$\times (normal_WUI_{i,t})$	(1.0)	(0.3)	(0.1)	(1.0)
$\frac{LT\ FCdebt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-1.0**	-0.7**	-0.0	-0.7*
$\times (normal_WUI_{i,t})$	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.0)	(0.4)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-0.4*	-0.7***	-0.1**	0.3
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.2)
$\frac{ST\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.2	0.2***	0.0	-0.1
$\times (normal_WUI_{i,t})$	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.1)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	-2.8***	-0.8***	-0.1***	-1.9***
	(0.5)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.3)
$\frac{LT\ debt_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.3*	0.2***	0.0**	0.1
$\times (normal_WUI_{i,t})$	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
$lnTA_{i,t-1}$	0.5***	0.0	0.0	0.5***
	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
$\frac{OS_{i,t}}{TA_{i,t-1}}$	0.3	0.6***	0.1***	-0.4
	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.2)
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.10
Within R^2	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
N	145921	146021	146026	145960

Notes: The table show results from annual panel regressions. The sample period is 2001-2017. The dependent variables are the column header (normalized by total assets at $t - 1$), which are cash, short-term financial instruments, accounts receivable in local currency (LC) and foreign currency (FC). $1yFXvol$ and $3mFXvol$ are the implied volatility imputed from at-the-money exchange rate options. TA is total assets and OS is the cashflow from other sources. Regressions are restricted to firm-year observations with positive increase in debt level. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. The coefficients are scaled up by 100 for presentation. The estimated beta can be interpreted as the amount of won increase per 100 won of debt proceeds. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the sector level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

H Sector Matching with Input-Output Matrix

In this section, we provide detailed information on the matching of the KISVALUE sectors with the Bank of Korea input-output matrix sectors. In the KISVALUE dataset, there are two sector definitions. The MiddleGrouping (67 sectors) and the NarrowGrouping (189 sectors). We make use of the MiddleGrouping in the sectoral heterogeneity (section 5) to construct sector specific financial dependence and export import exposure.

Table 29: KISVALUE Sectors and Bank of Korea Sectors

KISVALUE MidGrouping sector	Bank of Korea sector
A01000/Agriculture	Crops
A02000/Forestry	Forest products
A03000/Fishing	Fishery products
B05000/Mining of Coal, Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas	Mining of coal, crude petroleum and natural gas
B06000/Mining of Metal Ores	Metal ores
B07000/Mining of Non-metallic Minerals, Except Fuel	Non-metallic minerals
B08000/Mining support service activities	Mining of coal, crude petroleum and natural gas
C10000/Manufacture of Food Products	Other food products
C11000/Manufacture of Beverages	Beverages
C12000/Manufacture of Tobacco Products	Tobacco products
C13000/Manufacture of Textiles, Except Apparel	Apparels and other textiles
C14000/Manufacture of wearing apparel, Clothing Accessories and Fur Articles	Leather and fur products
C15000/Tanning and Dressing of Leather , Manufacture of Luggage and Footwear	Leather and fur products
C16000/Manufacture of Wood and of Products of Wood and Cork ; Except Furniture	Wood and wooden products
C17000/Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products	Pulp and paper
C18000/Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media	Printing and reproduction of recorded media
C19000/Manufacture of Coke, hard-coal and lignite fuel briquettes and Refined Petroleum Products	Coke and hard-coal
C20000/Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (except pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals)	Basic chemical products
C21000/Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products	Drugs, cosmetics, and soap
C22000/Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products	Plastic products, Rubber products
C23000/Manufacture of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products	Other nonmetallic mineral products
C24000/Manufacture of Basic Metal Products	Pig iron and crude steel, Primary iron and steel products, Nonferrous metal ingots and primary nonferrous metal products
C25000/Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Furniture	Fabricated metal products except machinery and furniture
C26000/Manufacture of Electronic Components, Computer, Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatuses	Electronic components and accessories, Audio, video and communications equipment Computer and office equipment
C27000/Manufacture of Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks	Precision instruments
C28000/Manufacture of electrical equipment	Electrical equipment, and supplies
C29000/Manufacture of Other Machinery and Equipment	Machinery and equipment of general purpose, Machinery and equipment of special purpose
C30000/Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semitrailers	Motor vehicles and parts
C31000/Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment	Other transportation equipment
C32000/Manufacture of Furniture	Furniture

Table 30: KISVALUE Sectors and Bank of Korea Sectors (continued)

KISVALUE MidGrouping sector	Bank of Korea sector
C33000/Other manufacturing	Other manufactured products
D35000/Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	Electric utilities, Gas and water supply
D36000/Water Supply	Gas and water supply
E37000/Sewage, Wastewater and Human Waste Treatment Services	Sanitary services
E38000/Waste Collection, Disposal and Materials Recovery	Sanitary services
E39000/Remediation activities and other waste management services	Sanitary services
F41000/General Construction	Building construction and repair
F42000/Special Trade Construction	Civil engineering
G45000/Sale of Motor Vehicles and Parts	Wholesale and retail trade
G46000/Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	Wholesale and retail trade
G47000/Retail Trade, Except Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	Wholesale and retail trade
H49000/Land Transport ; Transport Via Pipelines	Land transport
H50000/Water Transport	Water and air transport
H51000/Air Transport	Water and air transport
H52000/Storage and support activities for transportation	Storage and support activities for transportation
I55000/Accommodation	Accommodation and food services
I56000/Food and beverage service activities	Accommodation and food services
J58000/Publishing activities	Publishing and cultural services
J59000/Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities	Publishing and cultural services
J60000/Broadcasting	Broadcasting
J61000/Telecommunications	Communications services
J62000/Computer programming, System Integration and Management Services	Business services
J63000/Information service activities	Business services
L68000/Real Estate Activities	Real estate
L69000/Renting and leasing; except real estate	Other business services
M70000/Research and Development	Research and development
M71000/Professional Services	Other business services
M72000/Architectural, Engineering and Other Scientific Technical Services	Other business services
M73000/Professional, Scientific and Technical Services, n.e.c.	Other business services
N74000/Business Facilities Management and Landscape Services	Other business services
N75000/Business Support Services	Other business services
P85000/Education	Education
Q87000/Social Work Activities	Social work activities
R90000/Creative, Arts and Recreation Related Services	Publishing and cultural services
R91000/Sports activities and amusement activities	Amusement and sports activities
S95000/Maintenance and Repair Services	Other services
S96000/Other Personal Services Activities	Other services