

# Liability Dollarization and Exchange Rate Pass-Through

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## Abstract

We explore the negative balance sheet effect of foreign currency borrowing on the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices. Exploiting a large devaluation episode in Korea in 1997, we empirically document that a sector with higher foreign currency debt exposure prior to the crisis experienced a larger price increase. Building a heterogeneous firm model with financial constraints, we quantify the role of foreign currency liabilities in explaining the exchange rate pass-through to prices and find that 15% to 30% of the sectoral price changes during the crisis can be explained by the balance sheet effect of foreign currency debt alone.

*JEL classification:* D22, E31, E44, F31, F34

*Keywords:* Exchange rate pass-through, Financial constraints, Strategic complementarity, Balance sheet effects, Price setting, Asian Financial Crisis

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# 1 Introduction

The U.S. dollar hit a two-decade high in September 2022, having sharply appreciated by 16% since the start of the year.<sup>1</sup> Such sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar has raised concerns among policymakers around the globe given the dollar’s dominant role in international trade and finance. The pronounced increase of the dollar has put even more pressure on the cost of living in many countries, including many emerging market countries, particularly those who rely on imported intermediate inputs in their production of goods and services.

On top of that, many emerging economies are alarmed by this rapid strengthening of the U.S. dollar, as their corporate sectors have high levels of dollar-denominated debt. The negative balance sheet effects of dollar debt upon the depreciation of emerging market currencies against the U.S. dollar could have a sizable impact on firms’ activities—including their investment, production, and price-setting—which can, in turn, bring about significant macroeconomic implications in emerging economies. While the negative balance sheet effect of foreign currency debt and its contractionary effect on the aggregate economy is widely studied both empirically and theoretically in the literature (Krugman (1999), Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), Kim, Tesar and Zhang (2015) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil and Villegas-Sanchez (2016)), its very effect on prices—that is, domestic inflation— is pretty much neglected.

Given the prevalence of liability dollarization in emerging markets, we seek to answer two key questions in this paper. After a domestic currency depreciation, how do firms’ price-setting decisions vary when they are more indebted in foreign currency? And, how much of the domestic producer inflation upon currency depreciation can be explained by much-neglected balance sheet effects of foreign currency debt? In answering these two questions, we would like to advance our understanding of how the exchange rate depreciation shock passes through to domestic prices not just through a well-documented imported input channel but also via the deterioration of firms’ balance sheets due to their exposure to foreign currency debt.

Before going into the details of how we tackle the proposed questions, we would like to highlight how the imported input channel, even under the assumption of a complete exchange rate pass-through of marginal cost shocks, falls short of generating the level of domestic producer price changes that we see in the data during large depreciation episodes.<sup>2</sup> In Table 1, for each country, we compute a marginal cost increase due to the higher imported input price during the crisis by multiplying changes in import price indices with the pre-crisis level of imported intermediate input share. Under the assumption of a complete exchange rate pass-through of marginal cost shocks,

<sup>1</sup>The real broad effective exchange rate for the United States has increased by 16.7% in September 2022 since the start of the year.

<sup>2</sup>We also assume a production function with a constant return to scale.

Table 1: PPI Changes vs. Hypothetical PPI Implied via Imported Input Channel

	Crisis Year	Import Price Index Changes (%)	Imported Input Share (%)	MC Changes Due to Import Price Changes (%)	PPI Changes (%)
Brazil	1999	64.08	6.0	3.84	33.00
Mexico	1994	165.39	13.2	21.87	47.11
Korea	1997	40.37	15.0	6.0555	16.46
Thailand	1997	20.09	22.0	4.43	17.86
Argentina	2002	169.87	6.1	10.39	122.22

Note: All the price changes are percentage price changes from one year prior to the crisis to one year after. Marginal cost (MC) changes are computed by multiplying imported input price index changes by imported intermediate input share in the total inputs (both domestic and imported intermediate inputs and value-added from labor and capital) prior to the crisis, as we assume a production function with a constant return to scale. Due to data availability, we have used the imported input share of 1995 for Mexico, one year after the crisis. For Korea, we used the imported input share for 1995, two years prior to the crisis. The rest of countries' imported input shares are from one year prior to the crisis. Import price indices are from [Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo \(2005\)](#), and PPI changes are from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). The imported input share is computed from the input-output table from the OECD Statistics. The country sample is identical to that of [Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo \(2005\)](#).

the domestic producer prices should change by the equivalent amounts.<sup>3</sup> However, in the data, we observe a much larger response in domestic producer prices.

Moreover, Figure 1 shows that during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 most of the narrowly defined manufacturing sectors in Korea, experienced a much more pronounced increase in domestic producer prices than what's expected – under the assumption of a complete exchange rate pass-through– from higher marginal cost due to higher imported input prices and each sector's imported input use in its production.<sup>4</sup> More than 70% of sectors have larger price increases than the hypothetical PPI changes–the *maximum* level of price increase implied by the imported input channel. In fact, what is even more intriguing is that the residual PPI changes that are unexplained by the imported input channel–i.e., the PPI changes minus the hypothetical PPI changes–are strongly positively correlated with the pre-crisis level of foreign currency (FC) short-term debt to the total short-term debt ratio, as shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, we define seven bins such that the first bin includes sectors with a zero FC share of short-term debt, and the rest are six equally-sized bins of the FC share of short-term debt. For instance, the second bin contains sectors with a FC

<sup>3</sup>In fact, the exchange rate pass-through of marginal cost shocks is incomplete in the data. Therefore, this is an upper bound of how much an imported input channel can explain the domestic producer price increase during the crisis.

<sup>4</sup>Each sector has varying levels of marginal cost increase due to higher imported input prices as (i) each imported input price has increased by unequal magnitudes, and (ii) each sector uses different amounts of each imported inputs in their production. On top of that, each sector uses different amount of imported inputs in their production, which determines the marginal cost changes from the overall imported input price changes.




Figure 1: PPI Changes vs. Hypothetical PPI Changes

Note: A dot represents a manufacturing sector in our analysis. The dots above the 45-degree line are the sectors with higher realized PPI changes in 1996-1998 than what's implied from the imported input price changes, assuming a complete exchange rate pass-through of marginal cost shocks. The dots below the 45-degree line are the sectors with lower realized PPI changes in 1996-1998 than what's implied from the imported input price changes, assuming a complete exchange rate pass-through of marginal cost shocks. We compute the marginal cost shocks assuming a constant return to scale.

share of short-term debt between 0 and 0.1. We then compute the mean of residual PPI changes over sectors in each bin. We see that those sectors with a higher foreign currency share of short-term debt on average have higher residual PPI changes, a portion of PPI changes unexplained by the imported input channel. This finding strongly supports the relevance and the significance of our channel in explaining domestic price dynamics. These empirical observations from back-of-the-envelope calculations—across countries and across sectors in Korea—suggest to us that there is a missing channel unexplored in the literature, and we argue that the balance sheet deterioration due to firms' foreign currency debt exposure upon a large depreciation can account for the much-pronounced increase in domestic producer prices.

In this paper, exploiting a large devaluation episode in Korea during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98, we first empirically show the balance sheet effect of foreign currency borrowing on the domestic price dynamics during the crisis. During the crisis, the price of a dollar in Korean won increased from around 800 to 1695 won in December 1997, and the average PPI increased more than 1.2 fold, as depicted in Figure 3. Prior to the crisis, the policy reforms on the deregulation of financial markets and the opening of capital accounts fueled a rapid rise in total external borrowings from abroad, as seen in Figure 4.<sup>5</sup> In particular, these reforms eased regulations on

<sup>5</sup>The deregulation of the financial sector lowered the entry barriers to the financial sector, increasing the number of merchant banks from six to thirty from 1993 to 1996. These merchant banks borrowed in the dollar to finance a longer-term dollar credit to domestic firms.




Figure 2: Residual PPI Changes and Pre-crisis Short-term FC Debt Exposure

Note: The residual PPI changes are the actual PPI changes in 1996-1998 minus the hypothetical PPI changes implied from the imported input price changes, assuming a complete exchange rate pass-through of marginal cost shocks. We define seven equally-sized bins of short-term FC debt to short-term total debt ratio in 1996. For instance, the first bin includes sectors with a zero FC share of short-term debt, and the second bin contains sectors with a FC share of short-term debt between 0 and 0.1. The rest of the bins are defined similarly. We compute the mean of residual PPI changes over sectors in each bin.

short-term foreign currency borrowing, which increased the dollar share of business loans. Since firms' expectations on the possibility of floating Korean won were very low and trading financial instruments to hedge against foreign exchange risk was rare before the crisis, most of these loans were extended to firms without adequate foreign exchange hedging.<sup>6</sup> Hence, firms' accumulation of un-hedged short-term foreign currency liabilities, together with unexpected large depreciation gives us a good quasi-natural experiment environment to identify the negative balance sheet effect on domestic prices.

The identification of the negative balance sheet effect is only viable due to a unique dataset that merges the Korean firm-level balance sheet data with industry producer price indices. Most importantly, we construct the industry-level foreign currency debt exposure across manufacturing industries from firm-level balance sheet data. We employ the industry-level foreign currency debt exposure computed by the weighted average of each firm's foreign currency share of short-term debt with their sales share in their industry as weights. The Korean firm-level balance sheet data are conducive to our identification in that (1) the dataset contains information about their foreign currency liabilities; (2) it not only contains information about large public firms but also small and medium-size firms, so it would not under-report the foreign currency exposure of industries

<sup>6</sup>The exchange to trade financial derivatives to hedge foreign exchange risk was established in 1999 in Korea after the Asian Financial Crisis.




Figure 3: Korean Won Against U.S. Dollar and PPI: 1994–2000

Note: The gray shaded area represents the period when Korea was adopting the managed floating exchange rate regime.

populated by smaller firms; and (3) it contains a large set of other firm-level variables, which allows us to control for potential endogeneity bias.

In our main industry-level empirical analysis, we find that industries with higher foreign currency short-term debt exposure increased their prices from 1996 to 1998 more than firms with lower exposure. Specifically, one percentage point increase in industry-level foreign debt exposure leads to an 0.54 percentage point increase in price change. The sectoral price responses during a large depreciation episode are heterogeneous depending on their foreign currency exposure, which generates the relative price divergence. These results are robust even after controlling for other channels of the pass-through, such as the degree of product differentiation, imported input share, price stickiness, and the weighted average of other firm-level variables such as firm size, export to sales ratio, leverage ratio, domestic short-term debt to total debt ratio, and foreign currency cash to total current assets ratio. Furthermore, with rich information on the other firm-level variables of our novel dataset, we further investigate whether and to what extent firms with higher foreign currency debt exposure have actually experienced the deterioration of their balance sheets. Our em-




Figure 4: Pre-crisis Total External Debt

Note: Each bar shows the amount of total external debt from 1994 Q4 to 1997 Q4 and units are in U.S. dollars. Total external debt includes short-term and long-term external loans to both private and public sectors.

empirical results corroborate the negative balance sheet effects, documented in the existing literature; firms with higher foreign currency debt exposure experienced lower growth of their sales and net worth. We then examine how their estimated price-cost markups have changed during the crisis, which helps us to understand the underlying factors of price dynamics during the crisis. We find that firms with a higher foreign currency share of short-term debt faced lower markup growth. This empirical result is aligned with the key mechanism in [Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt \(2015\)](#) and [Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide \(2015\)](#), where financial disruption increases the costs of production, lowering markups.

Based on the empirical findings, we build a heterogeneous firm model with working capital and financial constraints to study an industry equilibrium and quantify the role of balance sheet channel in shaping the price dynamics across industries. Based on [Kohn, Leibovici and Szkup \(2018\)](#), we build a model where heterogeneous firms owned by entrepreneurs produce differentiated goods with the labor, foreign inputs, and capital accumulated in the previous period. Firms borrow in domestic and foreign final goods and the currency choice is exogenous given by a parameter  $\lambda$ , a share of the foreign currency debt. The variations across industries in our model are (i) the *industry-specific firm-level* distribution of foreign currency debt share and (ii) the *industry-specific* imported input share common across all firms in the same industry. Both of them are disciplined by their empirical counterparts. Each firm faces a financial constraint on how much debt they can issue, where the maximum amount that they can borrow is less than a fraction of the value of physical capital. In addition, each firm faces a working capital constraint on the amount of wages and foreign input costs. In our model, currency depreciation inflates the domestic value of foreign-denominated debt,

increasing each firm’s debt burden. Consequently, firms lower their liquid asset holdings and face tighter working capital constraints in the next period, which induces higher effective marginal costs. Furthermore, firms reduce their investment, which lowers their labor productivity in the next period and leads to higher production costs. Both margins lead to firms that have borrowed substantially in foreign currency charging higher prices. These effects are more pronounced when the financial constraints are binding.

With the calibrated model, we find that the balance sheet effect of foreign currency debt explains a substantial share of the sectoral price dynamics during the crisis. First, we find that around 40% of the observed mean effect of the foreign currency debt share on the sectoral price change can be explained. Our estimated model can explain around 55% of the variation in price changes across industries. With the simulated firm-level data, we decompose the two distinct channels of exchange rate pass-through—the balance sheet channel and the imported input channel—at the firm level. We show that firms increase their prices and reduce their markups as they have higher foreign currency debt exposure, especially when they are financially constrained, consistent with the empirical relationships documented. We also highlight the role of both strategic complementarity and tighter financial constraints in explaining the price dynamics across firms after a large exchange rate depreciation. A counterfactual exercise quantifies the role of the balance sheet channel in the price dynamics during the crisis. We find around 15 to 30% of the sectoral price changes during the crisis can be explained by the balance sheet effect of foreign currency debt alone, conditional on borrowing in foreign currency. The quantitative importance of the balance sheet channel of foreign currency debt in explaining the relative price divergence has an important implication for the optimal monetary policy especially for emerging economies with dollarized liabilities.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the related literature and how our work complements the previous research. Section 3 outlines our data and shows some summary statistics of firm-level and aggregate industry-level data that we employ. This section also presents the results of our empirical analyses studying sectoral price dynamics and firm-level performance during the crisis depending on the exposure to the foreign currency debt. Section 4 presents our heterogeneous firm model. Section 5 calibrates our model to study the qualitative and quantitative role of the balance sheet channel in shaping price dynamics across industries, and Section 6 studies the model mechanism using each individual firm’s policy functions. Section 7 compares the patterns of the model-simulated data with its empirical counterparts. Concluding remarks follow in Section 8.



## 2 Literature Review

This paper bridges two important literature strands in international macroeconomics: the exchange rate pass-through to prices and the contractionary effects of liability dollarization.

In the literature, the degree of exchange rate pass-through to prices is extensively studied. Some of the factors that previous papers have focused on are: pricing to market, nominal and real rigidity, currency of invoicing, market structure, and imported input share. [Devereux and Engel \(2002\)](#) investigate the implications of local currency pricing on the exchange rate pass-through and explain how it results in highly volatile exchange rates and an exchange rate disconnect from the fluctuations of other macro variables. [Engel \(2006\)](#) analyzes the optimal currency choice for exporting prices and the exchange rate pass-through. [Devereux, Engel and Storgaard \(2004\)](#) study the endogenous determination of the exchange rate pass-through and the exchange rate with nominal price rigidity. With the aggregate industry-level data, [Goldberg and Campa \(2010\)](#) show that the domestic CPI sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations largely depends on the degree of imported input usage. Using a micro-level dataset for the Belgian manufacturing sector, [Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings \(2019\)](#) emphasize the role of imported inputs and strategic complementarity in shaping the degree of exchange rate pass-through across different industries. Investigating the balance sheet channel through which exchange rate fluctuations would affect firms' effective marginal costs, this paper complements the literature on the exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices.

On a related note, there is a vast literature on the relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate. One strand focuses on understanding the movements in the real exchange rates. [Engel \(1993\)](#) and [Engel \(1999\)](#) decompose fluctuations in CPI-based real exchange rates into fluctuations in the non-traded to traded goods prices in each country and fluctuations in the relative price of traded goods between countries. The papers find that fluctuations in tradables are the main drivers of real exchange rates. [Crucini and Telmer \(2012\)](#) and [Gopinath et al. \(2011\)](#) show similarly that consumer price-based real exchange rates for tradable goods, constructed by the goods-level data, are highly correlated with nominal exchange rate fluctuations. [Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo \(2005\)](#) focus on the large devaluation episodes and measure the prices of tradable goods using border prices. They find that movements in the real exchange rate of tradable goods constructed with border prices are smaller than the overall decline in the CPI-based real exchange rates during the devaluation episodes and argue that the slow adjustment in non-traded goods prices is the reason behind a large fall in the real exchange rate during the crisis. Because the extent to which the real exchange rate is affected by the nominal exchange rate crucially depends on the degree of exchange rate pass-through to prices, our study provides an additional factor—the balance sheet effect—that explains real exchange rate fluctuations.

The other strand of literature that we are bringing into the exchange rate pass-through literature is

the macroeconomic consequence of liability dollarization. There is a large empirical and theoretical literature investigating the contractionary effects of liability dollarization in emerging economies when their currencies depreciate. Many past studies have both empirically and theoretically uncovered the contractionary effect of liability dollarization when the domestic currency crashes, including [Krugman \(1999\)](#), [Céspedes, Chang and Velasco \(2004\)](#), [Kim, Tesar and Zhang \(2015\)](#) and [Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil and Villegas-Sanchez \(2016\)](#). Specifically, [Kim, Tesar and Zhang \(2015\)](#) show that Korean firms holding higher foreign currency debt suffered more during the Asian Financial Crisis. [Gilchrist and Sim \(2007\)](#) investigate the role of financial factors and foreign-currency denominated debt in accounting for the drop in investment during the Asian Financial Crisis in Korea. They argue that heterogeneous investment responses of firms come from their exposure to foreign-currency denominated debt. [Kohn, Leibovici and Szkup \(2018\)](#) study the role of firms' foreign currency debt holdings in explaining the dynamics of aggregate exports, output, and investment in a large devaluation episode. They argue that the interactions of foreign currency debt exposure and financial frictions can explain only a small fraction of the dynamics of exports. The literature, however, has overlooked how liability dollarization may affect firms' pricing decisions as firms' balance sheets deteriorate upon a large depreciation of the domestic currency. Investigating the interaction between foreign currency debt exposure and price dynamics, this paper provides another important aggregate implication—price dynamics during a large devaluation episode.

In highlighting the role of financial frictions in firms' price setting behavior, our work complements various papers on understanding the price dynamics after the Great Recession. [Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt \(2015\)](#) and [Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide \(2015\)](#) argue that a jump in the credit spread during the Great Recession induces a sharp rise in the cost of working capital, which increases firms' marginal costs—the “cost channel” documented by [Barth III and Ramey \(2001\)](#). On the other hand, [Gilchrist et al. \(2017\)](#) focus on the alternative markup channel through which financial constraint affects firms' pricing decisions. They argue that liquidity-constrained firms increased their markups during the recent financial crisis to make up for their liquidity shortage.<sup>7</sup> This paper investigates the role of financial frictions in shaping aggregate price dynamics in the open economy setting.

There are several papers that investigate the determination of the currency denomination of corporate borrowing in emerging economies. [Salomao and Varela \(2018\)](#) study the role of firms' foreign currency borrowing on economic growth with endogenous currency debt compositions. They find that firms with a high marginal product of capital borrow more in foreign currency. Using Peruvian data, [Gutierrez, Ivashina and Salomao \(2020\)](#) find that firms in emerging economies are willing to borrow dollar denominated loans because doing so is cheaper even after controlling for

<sup>7</sup>[Kim \(2021\)](#) also investigates the pricing dynamics upon a credit supply shock, exploiting different banks' exposures to the Lehman collapse in 2008.

expectations of exchange rate movement. [Hardy and Saffie \(2019\)](#) and [Wu and Lee \(2021\)](#) argue that firms seem to engage in carry trades when borrowing in foreign currency. [Yang et al. \(2021\)](#) argue that firms with higher export shares tend to borrow in foreign currency more. We take the distribution of foreign currency debt holdings prior to the crisis as exogenous in our model, but we address potential endogeneity bias by controlling for various firm-level characteristics in our empirical analyses.

### 3 Empirical Analysis

Using the Korean firm-level data, we study the role of the balance sheet channel in shaping the sectoral price changes after the Asian Financial Crisis. Exploiting a large depreciation episode during the Asian Financial Crisis, we first empirically investigate how an industry with higher short-term foreign currency debt exposure changes its price compared to other industries. Then, we turn to our firm-level data of other variables—sales, net worth, and estimated markup—to investigate potential underlying mechanisms for our sectoral empirical findings.

Our firm-level dataset contains around 3,000 firms in the manufacturing sector as of 1996. Considering that the number of publicly listed (all sectors) firms was 760 in 1996, our dataset covers not only large publicly listed firms but also many small and medium-sized firms. Therefore, this dataset is well suited to measure the sectoral foreign currency exposure because it does not underreport the foreign currency exposure of industries populated by smaller firms. Furthermore, the dataset contains firm-level foreign currency and domestic currency liabilities and their maturity structure, which enable us to build a precise measure of foreign currency debt exposure for both each sector and firm before the crisis unfolded. Lastly, rich firm-level balance sheet information allows us to control for potential endogeneity issues and investigate potential channels of our sectoral level empirical findings.

#### 3.1 Data and Summary Statistics

Our analysis employs Korean firm-level data from the NICE (formerly the Korea Information Service Inc., KIS). Our dataset includes firms with assets of over 7 billion won (around 5.3 million dollars at the current exchange rate), as they are required to report their balance sheet information to the Financial Supervisory Commission.<sup>8</sup> The data are then compiled by the KIS.<sup>9</sup> As previously mentioned, the KISVALUE dataset has a number of advantages over other datasets: firstly, it covers

<sup>8</sup>Some firms voluntarily report their balance sheet information even when the assets are less than 7 billion won as of 1996. Now, the threshold has gone up to 10 billion won.

<sup>9</sup>All the balance sheet information after 2000 are publicly available at <http://dart.fss.or.kr/>.

a large number of not only large but also small and medium-sized firms, in total around 3,000 manufacturing firms (vs. 760 publicly listed firms in all sectors); secondly, it contains the foreign currency split for short-term and long-term debt.<sup>10</sup> One thing we would like to emphasize is that foreign currency debt does not include trade credit, such as foreign currency accounts payable for their imported inputs. The relationship we document later in this section is therefore not capturing a spurious correlation of imported inputs and price changes. We employ the short-term foreign currency debt exposure—the ratio of the short-term foreign currency debt to total short-term debt—prior to a large depreciation in order to measure the level of the financial shock to the firm’s balance sheet.

In our KISVALUE dataset, each firm’s industry is identified with a five-digit KSIC code (Korea Standard Industrial Classification). Since our main variable of interest is the producer price index (PPI) at the sector-level—a four-digit industry code that the Bank of Korea uses to classify each sector—we first map each KSIC code to the closest PPI industry classification.<sup>11</sup> Then, we aggregate all the firm-level variables at the sector level, where each sector is an industry defined by the Bank of Korea for its PPI classification. A *sector* in all our empirical analyses corresponds to a four-digit industry defined by the Bank of Korea for its PPI. We measure a sector’s short-term foreign currency debt exposure as the weighted mean of each firm’s short-term foreign currency debt to its total short-term debt ratio with their sales share in the sector as weights.<sup>12</sup> Hence, a sector with higher foreign currency exposure refers to a sector consisting of more firms that have a higher foreign currency share of short-term debt. Other industry-level variables aggregated from the firm-level data are defined similarly.

Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the firm-level variables that we employ in the analysis. It is noticeable that 51.9% of firms held foreign currency debt and 41.9% of firms held short-term foreign currency debt in 1996 because that indicates that it is not just a few large firms holding foreign currency debt. Short-term debt is the amount of debt due within twelve months. Moreover, conditional on holding a positive amount of foreign currency debt, the mean of the foreign currency share of short-term debt was 16% in 1996. In 1996, looking at both the extensive and intensive margins of foreign currency debt issuance, a large fraction of firms borrowed in foreign currency, and a substantial fraction of the total debt was denominated in foreign currency, given that a firm issues its foreign currency debt.

Before empirically investigating the effect of the balance sheet deterioration on sectoral price changes during the crisis, we first look at how some of the sectoral-level characteristics are corre-

<sup>10</sup>Bonds are not included in the data.

<sup>11</sup>There is no matching code between KSIC codes and PPI industry classification; so, we manually map these two datasets. We map each KSIC code to one PPI industry classification, i.e. one PPI industry classification is mapped to one or a few KSIC codes. More details can be found in the Appendix.

<sup>12</sup>We use the log of real sales when computing firms’ sales share to limit the effects of the outliers.

Table 2: Firm-level Summary Statistics

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Number of firms	1862	2204	2718	3111	3620	3994
Fraction of firms with FC debt (%)	59.7	57.5	52.8	51.9	50.6	44.0
Fraction of firms with FC short-term debt (%)	52.0	47.7	42.7	41.9	39.8	35.4
Mean FC share of short-term debt (%)	8.4	7.0	6.3	6.7	7.6	7.0
Mean FC share of long-term debt (%)	19.8	20.2	18.1	19.0	22.2	18.8
Mean FC share of short-term debt (%) given positive holding	16.2	14.6	14.7	16.0	19.0	19.8
Mean FC share of long-term debt (%) given positive holding	35.4	37.9	36.8	40.4	48.6	47.0
Mean FC short-term debt to total debt (%)	4.8	3.9	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.8
Mean FC long-term debt to total debt (%)	7.8	7.4	6.6	7.0	9.6	7.7
Mean FC short-term debt to total debt (%) given positive holding	9.6	8.7	9.6	10.1	11.7	12.7
Mean FC long-term debt to total debt (%) given positive holding	15.0	15.0	15.4	17.3	24.3	23.0

Note: Short-term debt is the amount of debt due within one year.

lated with our pre-crisis measure of foreign currency exposure. We consider a number of industry-specific characteristics documented in the literature that may affect the level of exchange rate pass-through into industrial-level prices. We look at whether there is a systematic difference in the foreign currency exposure across industries with other factors known to affect the degree of exchange rate pass-through: (i) levels of product differentiation, (ii) shares of imported inputs, and (iii) degrees of price stickiness. To measure product differentiation, we use the Rauch classification ([Rauch \(1999\)](#)) to define if each industry is selling differentiated products and assign a dummy variable a value of one if the products are differentiated and zero otherwise. To compute the imported input share for each sector, we use the Input-Output table of 1995 to compute each sector's imported intermediate input share of the total inputs used.<sup>13</sup> The degree of price stickiness for each industry is measured as the median frequency of price change documented by [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2008\)](#).<sup>14</sup> We find that sectors with non-differentiated products and a high share of imported intermediate inputs show a larger exposure of short-term foreign currency debt, but we do not see a strong systematic difference for sectors with different degrees of price stickiness. The pairwise correlations of degree of product differentiation, imported intermediate input share in total inputs, and price stickiness with industry-level foreign currency share of short-term debt are -0.3206, 0.5027, and 0.1416, respectively. Thus, to identify the negative balance sheet effect of holding short-term foreign currency

<sup>13</sup>There is no input-output table of 1996 at the narrowly defined industry level; therefore, we used the input-output table of 1995 instead.

<sup>14</sup>For more details on mapping and calculations, please refer to the Appendix.

debt during a large depreciation episode, we control for industry-level characteristics that may affect the degree of exchange rate pass-through.

### 3.2 FC Debt Exposure and Price Dynamics: Industry-level Regression

Equation (1) describes the regression framework of our main empirical analysis:

$$\Delta p_{I,1996-98} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_{I,1996} + \beta_2 \text{LT FC}_{I,1996} + \beta_3 X_{I,1996} + \epsilon_I \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable is the growth rate of sector  $I$ 's price from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt to total short-term debt ratio (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt to total long-term debt ratio (LT FC) in 1996. We investigate the marginal effects of short-term and long-term FC debt exposure separately, since FC debt that has longer maturities should be less of a concern for firms than FC debt that matures within a year. The latter immediately needs to be refinanced with new debt or paid back with a firm's asset. To alleviate potential endogeneity concerns, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of regressors. We also control for the weighted average of firm-level characteristics and other key industry-level characteristics,  $X_I$ . For sectoral characteristics, we use the level of the product differentiation, the imported intermediate input share, and the price stickiness prior to the devaluation episode. As explained in Section 3.1, we classify each industry selling homogeneous or differentiated goods, based on the method of Rauch (1999). When the dummy variable is equal to one, the sector is characterized as selling differentiated products. The imported input share for each sector is the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total amount of inputs, which includes all intermediate inputs and value added from labor and capital used by each sector. The degree of price stickiness for each industry is measured as the median frequency of price change documented by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).<sup>15</sup> A higher value on this measure indicates that prices are less sticky within that industry. The weighted average values of firm-level characteristics are included as well—the firm size (log of real sales), the export to sales ratio, the leverage ratio (the total debt to total asset ratio), the short-term debt to total debt ratio, and the foreign currency cash to total current assets ratio. We use a firm's size as its weight when computing the weighted averages of firm-level variables for each industry. We also include two-digit broader sector fixed effects to control for some unobserved industry-level characteristics.

Table 3 summarizes the regression estimates. Column 1 summarizes the result with only the FC share of short-term debt. When an industry has higher short-term foreign currency debt exposure, its price goes up more after a large devaluation. Specifically, when the short-term foreign currency

<sup>15</sup>For more details on mapping and calculations, please refer to the Appendix.

Table 3: Industry Price Dynamics and Short-term FC Debt Ratio (Crisis Period)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ST FC	0.6950*** (0.1607)	0.7109*** (0.1856)	0.6722*** (0.1783)	0.6565*** (0.2162)	0.5685*** (0.2038)
LT FC		-0.0295 (0.1173)	-0.1302 (0.1245)	-0.1899 (0.1351)	-0.1846 (0.1365)
Size				0.0063 (0.0183)	0.0024 (0.0181)
Export to Sale Ratio				-0.0243 (0.1583)	-0.0469 (0.1543)
Leverage Ratio				0.3611** (0.1452)	0.3351** (0.1589)
ST Debt Ratio				0.0778 (0.1172)	0.1255 (0.1253)
FC Cash Ratio				0.3556 (3.0707)	-0.2252 (3.1429)
Rauch Dummy					0.0075 (0.0447)
Imported Input Share					0.2830* (0.1656)
Degree of Price Stickiness					0.0317* (0.0168)
Broad Industry FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.1400	0.1348	0.4245	0.4439	0.4513
N	156	156	156	156	156

Note: This table shows the results from regression (1) with a different set of regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rates of sectoral prices from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt exposure (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt exposure (LT FC) in 1996. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of the regressors. For the imported input share, we use the 1995 value due to the data availability. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

debt exposure goes up by 1 percentage point, the change in price is 0.70 percentage points higher. As we control for other industry-level characteristics, the number goes down to 0.57; it still has a significant impact on price changes even after controlling other factors documented in the literature. An industry with higher imported intermediate input share will experience a higher change in its domestic producer price. Other industry-level characteristics do not have a significant impact on the price dynamics during the crisis after controlling for broad industry fixed effects and the weighted average of firm-level characteristics. For a robustness check, we have conducted two additional exercises. First, we control for the changes in the number of firms in each industry, which may have some implications on the industrial price dynamics during the crisis. The results are shown in Table 12 in the Appendix. The main results are robust to controlling for changes in the level of



competition which may occur when firms exit during the crisis.<sup>16</sup>

Table 4: Industry Price Dynamics and Short-term FC Debt Ratio (Pre-crisis Period)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ST FC	0.1228 (0.1325)	0.0967 (0.1130)	-0.0480 (0.1552)	-0.2587 (0.2197)	-0.2671 (0.2176)
LT FC		0.0403 (0.0690)	-0.0217 (0.0979)	-0.0250 (0.0958)	-0.0130 (0.0953)
Size				0.0316 (0.0269)	0.0287 (0.0254)
Export to Sale Ratio				0.1479 (0.1167)	0.1477 (0.1180)
Leverage Ratio				0.2299 (0.1606)	0.2329 (0.1582)
ST Debt Ratio				-0.1488 (0.1847)	-0.1400 (0.1761)
FC Cash Ratio				-1.3659 (1.3813)	-1.3601 (1.3956)
Rauch Dummy					0.0109 (0.0519)
Imported Input Share					0.1285 (0.1104)
Degree of Price Stickiness					-0.0276** (0.0126)
Broad Industry FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.0015	-0.0036	0.2476	0.2818	0.2760
N	151	151	151	151	151

Note: This table shows the results from regression (2) with different sets of regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rates of sectoral prices from 1993 to 1995. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt exposure (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt exposure (LT FC) in 1993. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the 1993 value of the regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

We then show that our results are not driven by some spurious correlation between a foreign currency share of short-term debt and the industry-level price changes.

First, to address the issue of unobserved industry-level characteristics which are not captured by the above variables, we compare the results in the pre-crisis period with those in the crisis period. If the results were driven by the unobserved industry-level characteristics that happen to be correlated with foreign currency debt exposure, the relationship between the foreign currency debt holdings and price changes would hold in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Specifically, we run the

<sup>16</sup>We also estimate the regression (1) with newly constructed industry-level regressors, only using sub sample of domestic firms whose exports are zero. Table 13 in the Appendix summarizes the results, where we see that the estimated effect of foreign currency debt exposure on sectoral prices is still positive and quantitatively large.



following regression (2) and compare the results with the main regression (1):

$$\Delta p_{I,1993-95} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_{I,1993} + \beta_2 \text{LT FC}_{I,1993} + \beta_3 \mathbf{X}_{I,1993} + \epsilon_I \quad (2)$$

, where the dependent variable is the growth rate of sector  $I$ 's price from 1993 to 1995 and the regressors are 1993 values. We also control for industry-level characteristics and the weighted average of firm-level characteristics, as in regression (1). Table 4 shows the regression results in the pre-crisis period. In contrast to the estimates in Table 3, there is no evidence of negative balance sheet effects on sectoral price changes. The size of the coefficient estimates on short-term foreign currency debt ratio falls by more than half or becomes negative, and the estimates are not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the regression based on the pre-crisis period in Table 4 shows a much smaller  $R^2$  compared to the baseline regression in Table 3. For instance, a regression with only FC share of short-term debt during the crisis period has a R-square of 14%, whereas in the non-crisis period it falls to 0.15%. This empirical observation implies that the explanatory power of pre-crisis industry-level foreign currency debt exposure comes only during periods with depreciation shocks, capturing the negative balance sheet effects, and are not a consequence of some spurious relationship.

Second, we document how industries with different levels of FC share of short-term debt in 1996 have not shown systemically different two-year price changes before and after the crisis. Specifically, we analyze how the two-year growth rates of sectoral prices in year  $t$ ,  $\Delta p_{I,t}$  may or may not vary with their FC share of short-term debt as of 1996. Our baseline regression corresponds to  $t = 1998$ .

$$\Delta p_{I,t} = \beta_{0,t} + \beta_{1,t} \text{ST FC}_{I,1996} + \epsilon_I \quad (3)$$

Figure 5 shows that the coefficients  $\beta_{1,t}$  from regression (3) are not different from zero; i.e., industries that have varying levels of FC share of short-term debt in 1996 do not exhibit different growth rates of their domestic producer prices before and after the crisis. In other words, industries with both high and low FC shares of short-term debt showed fairly similar price dynamics before and after the crisis. This reinforces our argument that the larger price increase was not due to unobserved characteristics of industries that have a higher share of their short-term debt in foreign currency.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup>The results in Tables 3 and 4 and in Figure 5 are robust to dropping industries whose price changes are in the top 1% and the bottom 1%. The results after dropping outliers are presented in Tables 14 and 15 and in Figure 16 in the Appendix, respectively.




Figure 5: Treatment vs. Control Groups: Pre- and Post-crisis

Note: The figure plots  $\beta_{1,t}$  from the regressions of  $\Delta p_{I,t} = \beta_{0,t} + \beta_{1,t} \text{STFC}_{I,1996} + \epsilon_{I,t}$ , where  $t$  equal to 1998 represents our baseline regression. The bar represents 90 % confidence intervals computed with robust standard errors.

### 3.3 Inspecting Mechanism: Firm-level Regression

Using information on other firm-level variables of our novel dataset, we further investigate whether and to what extent firms with higher foreign currency debt exposure have actually experienced the deterioration of their balance sheets during the crisis. We use the growth rates of sales and net worth to quantify the degree of balance sheet deterioration during the crisis period, as in [Kim, Tesar and Zhang \(2015\)](#). In addition, we provide empirical evidence on a mechanism through which the negative balance sheet effect is transmitted into firm-level pricing behavior. To be specific, we explore how the firm-level changes of price-cost markup are related to firm-level foreign currency exposure during a large devaluation episode. In the literature, there are two competing channels through which financial disruption can induce a price increase. First, [Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt \(2015\)](#) and [Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide \(2015\)](#) argue that a spike in the credit spread during the Great Recession induced a sharp rise in firms' marginal costs. Financial shocks increase marginal costs and hence deteriorate the competitiveness of individual firms, lowering their price-cost markups. On the other hand, [Gilchrist et al. \(2017\)](#) focuses on the alternative markup adjustment channel through which the financial friction affects the pricing decision. In their model, liquidity constrained firms increase their markups to make up their liquidity shortage. Explicitly investigating the price-cost markup behavior of individual firms with high foreign currency exposure, we evaluate the price adjustment mechanism.

Table 5: Firm Performance During the Crisis

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC	-10.1710*** (3.0596)	-1.4963* (0.7783)	-0.8919*** (0.2151)
LT FC	0.2174 (2.2590)	-0.2631 (0.6347)	0.1761 (0.1638)
Size	-0.2367*** (0.0282)	-0.0382*** (0.0083)	-0.0111*** (0.0028)
ST FC x Size	0.4109*** (0.1202)	0.0596* (0.0311)	0.0348*** (0.0085)
LT FC x Size	0.0056 (0.0903)	0.0124 (0.0257)	-0.0067 (0.0066)
Leverage Ratio	0.3362*** (0.1099)	0.1363*** (0.0443)	0.0175 (0.0136)
Export to Sale Ratio	0.4149*** (0.0961)	0.1137*** (0.0263)	0.0395*** (0.0094)
ST Debt Ratio	-0.1743** (0.0858)	-0.0096 (0.0236)	-0.0097 (0.0088)
FC Cash Ratio	1.0875 (1.4621)	-0.1885 (0.5310)	0.2201** (0.1050)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.1319	0.0472	0.0418
N	3169	3169	3167

Note: This table shows the results from firm-level regressions. The dependent variables are the growth rate of (1) real sales, (2) net worth, and (3) markups from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are the firm-level short-term foreign currency debt ratio (ST FC) and the cross product of firm size and ST FC in 1996. The size is measured as the log of real sales. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of the regressors. Robust standard errors are calculated in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Below is the firm-level empirical specification that we adopt for the firm-level analyses.

$$\Delta y_{j,96-98} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_{j,1996} + \beta_2 \text{LT FC}_{j,1996} + \beta_3 \text{Size}_{j,1996} \\ + \beta_4 \text{ST FC}_{j,1996} \cdot \text{Size}_{j,1996} + \beta_5 \text{LT FC}_{j,1996} \cdot \text{Size}_{j,1996} + \beta_6 \mathbf{X}_{j,1996} + \epsilon_j$$

As explained above, the  $y_j$  variables that we examine are: firm-level real sales, net worth, and markups.<sup>18</sup> The dependent variable is the growth rate of  $y_j$  from 1996 to 1998. ST FC and LT FC are the firm-level foreign currency share of short-term debt and the foreign currency share of long-term debt, respectively. Price-cost markups are computed following [De Loecker and Warzynski \(2012\)](#).<sup>19</sup> We also interact with the firm size to see if the balance sheet effect would be smaller for large firms who are less financially constrained compared to small ones, following [Kim, Tesar and](#)

<sup>18</sup>Nominal series are deflated with CPI to compute real series.

<sup>19</sup>We estimate the changes in markup as the changes in the ratio of total sales to the cost of sales. We find almost the same results with different measures of variables costs.

Zhang (2015). We control for the firm-level characteristics  $X_j$  – which are export to sales ratio, leverage ratio, the short-term debt to total debt ratio, and foreign currency cash to total current assets ratio—in order to deal with a potential endogeneity issue. Our main coefficients of interest are  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_4$  in each regression.

Table 5 summarizes the firm-level regression results. As we can see in Columns (1) and (2), firms with higher short-term foreign currency debt exposure suffer a larger decline in sales and net worth, showing the deterioration of their balance sheets during the crisis. The negative effect is mitigated as the firm size is larger since larger firms are less financially constrained. To be specific, a one percentage point increase in short-term foreign currency ratio is associated with a 0.28 percent decrease in sales for an average-sized firm. When firm size becomes smaller by one standard deviation, the negative effect gets larger by 0.56 percentage points. For the net worth, one percentage point increase in the short-term foreign currency ratio is associated with a 0.06 percent decrease in net worth of an average-sized firm. When firm size becomes smaller by one standard deviation, the negative effect is amplified by 0.08 percentage points.<sup>20</sup> This finding is consistent with the result of Kim, Tesar and Zhang (2015). Column (3) shows how each firm’s markup growth has changed to see if a larger increase in the sectoral level price changes with a higher foreign currency exposure is associated with (a) an increase in markup or (b) a rise in marginal cost. The regression result supports the latter: a price rise upon a deterioration of the balance sheet is more associated with a rise in marginal costs that lowers firms’ markups. Specifically, an one percentage point increase in short-term foreign currency debt exposure is associated with a 0.05 percent decrease in the price-cost markup for an average sized firm. When firm size becomes smaller by one standard deviation, the negative effect on the markup growth is higher by 0.05 percentage points. Figure 6 shows a complete picture of how the marginal effects of short-term FC exposure on the growth of the firm-level variables vary across firm sizes.<sup>21</sup>

In sum, we find that during the large devaluation episode, firms with higher foreign currency debt exposure experienced a larger balance sheet deterioration and a larger drop in price-cost markups.<sup>22</sup> Based on these results, we build up a structural model, where a large foreign currency debt exposure together with a large depreciation leads to an increase in firms’ marginal costs. We would like to quantify how important the balance sheet effect of channeling the exchange rate shock is on domestic producer prices.

<sup>20</sup>The average and the standard deviation of firm sizes are 24.06 and 1.36, respectively.

<sup>21</sup>In Table 16 in the Appendix, we report the estimates on additional independent variables, not shown in Table 5.

<sup>22</sup>In Table 17 in the Appendix, we confirm the results are similar for other firm-level variables: capital, labor productivity, labor cost, and total current asset holdings.




Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Short-term FC Exposure on Firm-level Variables

Note: The solid red lines depict the marginal effect of short-term FC exposure on firm-level variables depending on firm size. The navy dashed lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals of the marginal effects. The graphs are based on the results in Table 5.

## 4 Model

In this section, we build a heterogeneous firm model to rationalize our empirical findings and quantify the balance sheet effects on industry price dynamics during the crisis. Even though our industry- and firm-level empirical analyses provide clear evidence for the negative balance sheet effect, this evidence mainly relies on the cross-sectional variation in the data and focuses on the relative changes across industries and firms. Hence, the model provides a clear understanding of the underlying channel based on the empirical analysis and helps us to quantify the importance of balance sheet deterioration in explaining the aggregate industry-level price dynamics upon a large devaluation.

Our model is based on [Kohn, Leibovici and Szkup \(2018\)](#). We consider an industry equilibrium model where heterogeneous firms, owned by entrepreneurs, produce differentiated goods and issue one-period non-defaultable debt, of which a fraction (firm-specific) is denominated in foreign final goods. Each firm has a different level of foreign currency debt ratio, exogenously given in our model. The variations across industries in our model are (i) the *industry-specific* firm-level distribution of foreign currency debt ratios and (ii) the *industry-specific* imported input share common

across all firms in the same industry.<sup>23</sup> Both of these are disciplined by their empirical counterparts. Each firm faces two types of financial frictions. First, firms face financial constraints on how much they can issue debt, as determined by a fraction of capital. Second, when firms produce output, they face a working capital constraint that requires non-interest-bearing assets for the wage bill and imported input payment, as seen in [Uribe and Yue \(2006\)](#). We will assume that the economy is in the stationary equilibrium before an unexpected real exchange rate depreciation. Our focus is on the transition dynamics of the industry prices.

## 4.1 Market Structure

We assume that each industry  $I$  faces an exogenous CES demand, where the demand for industry  $I$ 's composite goods is given by:<sup>24</sup>

$$Y_I = P_I^{-\nu} \bar{Y}$$

Each industry is populated by a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by  $j$  with a measure of 1. The technology of transforming intermediate goods into industry  $I$ 's composite goods is characterized by the [Kimball \(1995\)](#) aggregator:

$$\int \Upsilon\left(\frac{y_j}{Y_I}\right) dj = 1$$

The Kimball demand structure gives the demand for an intermediate good produced by an entrepreneur  $j$ :

$$y_j = \psi\left(D_I \frac{p_j}{P_I}\right) Y_I \quad \text{where} \quad \psi(\cdot) = \Upsilon'^{-1}(\cdot), \quad D_I \equiv \int \Upsilon'\left(\frac{y_j}{Y_I}\right) \frac{y_j}{Y_I} dj$$

Following [Gopinath and Itskhoki \(2010\)](#), we assume the following functional forms:

$$\psi(x_j) = \left(1 - \epsilon \ln\left(\frac{\sigma x_j}{\sigma - 1}\right)\right)^{\sigma/\epsilon} \quad \text{where} \quad x_j = D_I \frac{p_j}{P_I}$$

Then, the demand for an intermediate good produced by an entrepreneur  $j$ :

$$y_j = \left(1 - \epsilon \ln\left(\frac{\sigma x_j}{\sigma - 1}\right)\right)^{\sigma/\epsilon} Y_I \quad \text{where} \quad x_j = D_I \frac{p_j}{P_I}$$

$$p_j = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \exp\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(1 - \left(\frac{y_j}{Y_I}\right)^{\epsilon/\sigma}\right)\right) \frac{P_I}{D_I}$$

<sup>23</sup>Our dataset does not have information about the firm-level imported input share.

<sup>24</sup>We assume that  $\bar{Y} = 1$  without loss of generality.

$$P_I = \int p_j \left( 1 - \epsilon \ln \left( \frac{\sigma x_j}{\sigma - 1} \right) \right)^{\sigma/\epsilon} dj$$

Using the Kimball aggregator, we would like to capture the strategic complementarity between firms' pricing decisions and see how the model predictions are aligned with what we have seen from the data. Moreover, we can talk about variable markups due to the Kimball aggregator, which would not be possible using the nested CES demand structure. [Gopinath and Itskhoki \(2010\)](#) show that the first order deviation from  $D_I$  from its steady state value  $\bar{D} = \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}$  is zero. Following [Gopinath and Itskhoki \(2010\)](#), we do the first-order approximation of the industry price level:

$$\ln P_I = \int \ln p_j dj$$

## 4.2 Firms' Technology

Each firm  $j$  in industry  $I$  produces a differentiated intermediate good,  $y_{j,I}$  and sells it at price  $p_{j,I}$  in a monopolistically competitive market.<sup>25</sup> We assume that each firm faces a Kimball demand structure, which is characterized by two parameters,  $\sigma$  and  $\epsilon$ , as we describe in the previous subsection.<sup>26</sup> Firms produce differentiated goods with the production technology  $y_t = z_t k_t^\alpha x_t^\kappa n_t^{1-\alpha-\kappa}$ , hiring labor  $n_t$ , imported input  $x_t$  and physical capital  $k_t$ .  $z_t$  is an idiosyncratic productivity that follows AR(1) process,  $\ln(z_t) = (1 - \rho_z)\mu_z + \rho_z \ln(z_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t$ , where  $\epsilon_t$  is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of  $\sigma_\epsilon$ . We discretize the idiosyncratic shock process following [Tauchen \(1986\)](#). In our model, we assume that firms are importing inputs but not exporting. This is because our analysis focuses on domestic market price dynamics.<sup>27</sup>

Each entrepreneur owns a firm and maximizes their expected sum of discounted utility from final goods consumption with relative risk aversion,  $\gamma$ :

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

An entrepreneur is endowed with a unit of labor and supplies that labor inelastically at a competitive wage. Each entrepreneur accumulates physical capital, which is subject to convex adjustment cost  $\Phi(k_t, k_{t+1})$ , by investing  $i_t$  amount of final goods capital. Physical capital in this model has two modes: production and collateral.

In the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs learn this period's productivity  $z_t$  and the exchange

<sup>25</sup>From here on, we will simplify the notation by dropping industry and firm indices  $I$  and  $j$ , and we will use them only when needed for clarification.

<sup>26</sup>We normalize the aggregate price, aggregate output and aggregate wage to one.

<sup>27</sup>Firms export decisions both extensive and intensive margins tend to be sticky in the short-run due to the contractual agreements.

rate  $\xi_t$ . Then, they hire labor  $n_t$  and import intermediate goods  $x_t$ , a fraction of which they need to pay for with their working capital  $a_t$ , which is chosen in the previous period. With those inputs, they produce and sell differentiated goods  $y_t$  at price  $p_t$ , pay back old debt and issue new debt  $d_{t+1}$ , and choose the next period's level of capital  $k_{t+1}$  and working capital  $a_{t+1}$ . Here, we assume that one unit of labor can produce one unit of domestic input in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, the wage in our model is equivalent to the price of each domestic input.

A firm chooses to borrow  $d_{t+1}$  (in units of domestic final goods) at the price  $\frac{1}{1+r}$ , where  $(1 - \lambda)\frac{d_{t+1}}{1+r}$  is denominated in domestic final goods. Then, each entrepreneur holds  $\lambda\frac{d_{t+1}}{1+r}\frac{1}{\xi_t}$  amount of the foreign debt in units of foreign final goods in period  $t$ . In the beginning of the following period, each entrepreneur pays back  $(1 - \lambda)d_{t+1}$  for domestic debt and  $\lambda d_{t+1}\frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t}$  for foreign debt in units of domestic final goods. We abstract away from the portfolio choices, and the share of foreign debt is exogenous and pre-determined at the **firm level**. Since the agents in the economy expect that the exchange rate will be constant before and after the one-time unexpected exchange rate depreciation, the currency composition of debt cannot be determined, justifying our assumption on the exogeneity of the foreign currency debt share.

Entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint where they can only borrow up to a fraction  $\theta_k$  of the capital. Thus, the amount that each entrepreneur can borrow is as follows:

$$\frac{d_{t+1}}{1+r} \leq \theta_k k_{t+1}.$$

In addition, each entrepreneur faces a working capital constraint. Specifically, in order to finance their wage bill payment  $w_t n_t$  and imported input  $\xi_t x_t$ , firms need to hold a non-interest-bearing asset  $a_t$  that is chosen in the previous period. Hence, the amount of wages and imported inputs that each entrepreneur can pay is limited by the amount of the non-interest bearing asset  $a_t$ :

$$w_t n_t + \xi_t x_t \leq \theta_a a_t.$$

Each industry has a different firm-level distribution of foreign currency debt exposure  $\lambda$  and a different imported input share  $\kappa$ . The average foreign currency debt ratio for industry  $I$  is determined by the distribution of  $\lambda_m$  across firms in industry  $I$ . We approximate the distribution by assuming a finite number of values that  $\lambda$  can take,  $\{\lambda_m : m = 1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , with the industry-specific probability mass function of  $\{\pi_m^I : m = 1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . We calibrate  $\lambda_m$  and  $\pi_m^I$  to match the data counterparts, which will be explained in more details in the calibration section. In the model, the average foreign currency debt ratio of an industry  $I$  will be defined as:  $\bar{\lambda}_I = \sum_m \lambda_m \pi_m^I$ . Since firm-level imported input data are not available, we assume that all firms in a industry share a com-



mon value of industry-level imported input share  $\kappa_I$ .

We analyze how much the variation in  $\bar{\lambda}_I$  and  $\kappa_I$  that we observe from the data can explain the dispersion in price changes across sectors after a large unexpected depreciation like that which can be found in the data. Furthermore, we decompose the observed price change into the balance sheet channel and imported input channel to highlight the role of foreign currency debt exposure in the determination of the exchange rate pass-through to sectoral prices. The real exchange rate  $\xi_t$  is exogenous and defined as the price of foreign final goods in units of domestic final goods.

### 4.3 Recursive Formulation and Equilibrium

The aggregate state  $X$  is defined as

$$X_I = \{P_I, Y_I, \psi_I, \xi, \xi_{-1}, w\},$$

where  $P_I$  is the industry-level price,  $Y_I$  is the industry output,  $\psi_I$  is the distribution of firms,  $\xi$  is the exchange rate, and  $w$  is the wage. Then, an entrepreneur's problem is summarized as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} v(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa; X) &= \max_{c \geq 0, d', k', a', n, x, p} \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta E_{z'|z} [v(k', d', a', z', \lambda, \kappa; X')] \\ \text{s.t. } (a) \quad &c + k' + \Phi(k, k') + a' + d((1-\lambda) + \lambda \frac{\xi}{\xi_{-1}}) = py - wn - \xi x + (1-\delta)k + \frac{d'}{1+r} + a \\ (b) \quad &\frac{1}{1+r} d' \leq \theta_k k', \quad (c) \quad wn + \xi x \leq \theta_a a, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$(i) \ y = \left(1 - \epsilon \ln\left(\frac{p}{P_I}\right)\right)^{\sigma/\epsilon} P_I^{-\nu}, \quad (ii) \ y = zk^\alpha x^\kappa n^{1-\alpha-\kappa}, \quad (iii) \ \Phi(k, k') = \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{k' - (1-\delta)k}{k}\right)^2 k$$

We define a recursive stationary industry equilibrium as (i) industry  $I$ 's price  $P_I$  and output  $Y_I$ , (ii) a set of policy functions  $\{d', k', a', c, n, x, y, p\}$  and value functions  $v(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa)$ , and (iii) a measure  $\psi_I$  on  $(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa)$  satisfying:

1. Policy and value functions solve the firm's problem.
2. Industry output market clears.

$$\ln P_I = \int \ln(p(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa)) d\psi_I(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa)$$

$$Y_I = \left( \int y(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa)^{\sigma/\epsilon} d\psi_I(k, d, a, z, \lambda, \kappa) \right)^{\sigma/\epsilon}$$

3. Measure  $\psi_I$  is consistent and stationary.

We assume that the economy is in a stationary industry equilibrium prior to the unexpected depreciation of the real exchange rate. We study the transition dynamics of different industries upon the unexpected depreciation of the real exchange rate, where industries are characterized by different foreign debt exposure and different imported input share.

## 5 Calibration

Table 6 summarizes the parameter values that we use for the quantitative exercise. The first half of the parameters are either from the literature or directly computed from the data we have. Most importantly, we set  $\lambda_m$  and  $\pi_m^I$  to match the cross-sectional distribution of foreign currency debt ratio across firms for each industry.

We first set  $\{\lambda_m : m = 1, 2, \dots, 21\} = \{0\%, 2.5\%, 7.5\%, 12.5\%, \dots, 97.5\%\}$ , which are the median values of 21 bins:  $\{\lambda = 0\%, 0\% < \lambda \leq 5\%, 5\% < \lambda \leq 10\%, \dots, 95\% < \lambda \leq 100\%\}$ . Then, for each industry we calibrate the  $\{\pi_m^I : m = 1, 2, \dots, 21\}$  to approximate the distribution. We use the sales weighted probability mass function when calibrating  $\pi_m^I$ .  $\bar{\lambda}_I = \sum_m \lambda_m \pi_m^I$  represents the average industry-level foreign currency debt exposure. It is consistent with how we have computed the average foreign currency debt ratio for each industry in the industry-level empirical analysis. To see if there are any substantial rounding errors, we compare  $\bar{\lambda}_I$  and the data counterpart—the actual weighted mean of each firm’s ratio of short-term foreign currency debt to total debt with the weight as a firm’s sales revenue. We find that their correlation is close to one.

Following [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#), we estimate the firm-level productivity process using our data outside the model. We estimate  $\rho_z$  and  $\sigma_z$  as 0.9 and 0.07, respectively. We discretize the process following [Tauchen \(1986\)](#). Due to the data availability, with the monthly observations of three-year government bond yields and the realized inflation rates in 1996, we compute the real interest rate by subtracting the mean of the realized year-over-year inflation rates from the mean of three-year government annualized bond yields. We hold the real interest rate constant to focus on the effect of the quantity of foreign currency debt rather than the price of debt. Nonetheless, our mechanism through financial constraints will be stronger if we allowed the interest rate to go up together with a large depreciation of domestic currency. We set the value of capital adjustment cost  $\phi$  as 0.9569, following [Gilchrist and Sim \(2007\)](#) who use the same Korean firm-level data (KIS) as we used. We use the data from the Korean Input-Output table in 1995 to calculate each industry’s imported input share  $\kappa_I$  in the total inputs used and the value added by each industry.

For the calibrated parameters—i.e., the discount factor  $\beta$ , the fraction of capital used as collateral  $\theta_k$ , and the fraction of working capital constraints  $\theta_a$ —we find the parameters that minimize the

distance between the model and data moments. The model moments are computed in the representative stationary industry equilibrium where there is no exchange rate shock. Thus, the value of  $\lambda$  does not play a role in computing the stationary equilibrium. We also assume that in the representative equilibrium, the imported input share is 15%, which is the average level of  $\kappa_I$  across industries. The targeted moments are the cross-sectional mean of leverage ratios, the standard deviation of leverage ratios, and the cross-sectional mean of cash to sales ratios in 1996; 0.595, 0.21, and 0.412, respectively, in the data.

Table 6: List of Parameter Values

Predetermined			
Parameter	Value	Description	Data Source
$\gamma$	2.0	Relative risk aversion	Standard
$\delta$	0.1	Depreciation rate of physical capital	Standard
$\nu$	2.0	Elasticity of substitution across sectors	Standard
$\sigma$	5.0	Elasticity of substitution within a sector	Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)
$\epsilon$	4.0	Super elasticity of demand	Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)
$\phi$	0.9569	Physical capital adjustment cost	Gilchrist and Sim (2007)
$r$	0.08	Interest rate	Bank of Korea
$\rho_z$	0.9106	AR coefficient of $z$	Estimated following Akerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006)
$\sigma_z$	0.0986	STD of $z$	Estimated following Akerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006)
$\lambda_m$	$\in [0, 0.975]$	Distribution of FC debt share	Estimated from KIS data
$\pi_m^I$	$\in [0, 1]$	Distribution of FC debt share	Estimated from KIS data
$\kappa_I$	$\in [0, 1]$	Industry-level imported input share	Estimated from Korean Input-Output table in 1995
Calibrated			
Parameter	Value	Description	Targeted Moments
$\beta$	0.9101	Time discount factor	Mean of Debt to Sales Ratio (0.66)
$\theta_k$	0.7114	Fraction of capital as a collateral	Std of Debt to Sales Ratio (0.26)
$\theta_a$	1.3812	Fraction of working capital	Mean of Cash to Sales ratio (0.44)

For the real exchange rate, we compute the changes from 1996 to 1998. Following the actual dynamics of the real exchange rate after the Asian Financial Crisis, we simulate the economy upon the unexpected shock where  $\xi$  increases from 1 to 2.1 in the first period and remains there afterwards. We effectively assume the one-time unexpected shock to the real exchange rate *returns* but assume zero expected returns afterwards.<sup>28</sup> Hence, there will be no deviation from the UIP condition. Upon this so-called MIT shock, we compute the transition dynamics, focusing on the industry-level prices.

## 6 Inspecting Mechanism: Policy Function Analysis

We first examine firm-level policy functions to explore the underlying mechanism of firms' pricing decisions. We abstract from the imported input channel in this section to focus on the

<sup>28</sup>The depreciation in the first period is unexpected and they know that in the future  $\xi/\xi_{-1} = 1$ .

balance sheet effects of foreign currency debt exposure. We set the imported input share to be zero, and all other parameters are set to our calibrated values summarized in Table 6. We start with a firm's optimal pricing decision from the model,

$$p_{j,t} = \mu_{j,t} mc_{j,t} (1 + \eta_{2,j,t})$$

, where  $\mu_{j,t}$  is a firm's optimal markup,  $mc_{j,t}$  is the physical marginal cost, and  $\eta_{2,j,t}$  is the Lagrangian multiplier on the working capital constraints.

As their debt burden increases following a large depreciation, firms face tighter financial constraints for their investment and liquid savings. This balance sheet deterioration affects firms' pricing decisions through two channels: (i) investment adjustment and (ii) working capital constraint. First, firms lower their investment and become less productive in the next period, increasing the physical marginal cost of production  $mc_{j,t}$ . Second, firms lower their liquid savings and face a tighter working capital constraint in the next period, resulting in a higher value of the Lagrangian multiplier  $\eta_{2,j,t}$ , which has an upward pressure on the price.

Our analysis investigates these two margins, investment decisions and working capital constraints, under the steady state and on the transition path to analyze the negative balance sheet effects. Specifically, we plot policy functions against the debt level or the capital stock because firms with a higher debt burden or lower capital stock (equivalent to lower collateral assets) would face more severe balance sheet deterioration. Policy functions with different foreign currency debt exposure are also considered to capture heterogeneous balance sheet effects due to their foreign currency debt exposure upon a large depreciation. When illustrating the mechanism, we look at an industry with a non-degenerate cross-sectional distribution of foreign currency debt ratio across firms. We fix idiosyncratic productivity  $z$  at the median level.<sup>29</sup>

Figure 7 shows the policy functions of  $k'$ .<sup>30</sup> In the left panel, we find that when a firm's debt burden is too high, the borrowing constraint starts binding, which lowers the next period's capital stock. Hence, higher debt burden is associated with lower investment. The right panel shows that next period's capital stock becomes larger when a firm holds more initial capital stock. This result illustrates that the borrowing constraint is less binding for firms with larger capital, so they tend to hold more of the next period's capital stock. Furthermore, Figure 7 shows the effect of a large depreciation on firm-level capital stock. For any given amount of foreign currency debt, firms need to pay more in units of domestic goods due to the depreciation. This higher debt burden lowers a firm's investment. When a firm's reliance on foreign currency debt was large prior to the crisis, its

<sup>29</sup>We set  $k$  and  $d$  at their mode values in the stationary distribution and  $a$  at its lowest 10th percentile value such that financial constraints are meaningfully operating for policy function illustration.

<sup>30</sup>Note that the policy function is the same for all  $\lambda$  in the stationary equilibrium.




Figure 7:  $k'$  against (i)  $d$  (Left) and (ii)  $k$  (Right).

The solid black lines are the policy functions in the stationary equilibrium. The blue diamond lines, red circle lines, and dashed magenta lines are policy functions for firms with 0, 0.325, and 0.725 of foreign currency debt ratio, respectively.

increase in debt burden was more pronounced, lowering its investment further.<sup>31</sup>

To understand the working capital channel, we begin the analysis with the firm's Euler equations regarding debt choice  $d'$  and working capital  $a'$  as follows,

$$\beta E_{z'|z}[(c')^{-\gamma}(1+r)((1-\lambda) + \lambda \frac{\xi'}{\xi})] + \eta_1 = \beta E_{z'|z}[(c')^{-\gamma} + \theta_a \eta'_2] \quad (3)$$

, where  $\eta_1$  and  $\eta_2$  are the Lagrangian multipliers on the collateral constraint,  $\frac{1}{1+r}d' \leq \theta_k k'$ , and the working capital constraint,  $wn + \xi x \leq \theta_a a$ , respectively. Equation (3) shows that even for the non-binding collateral constraint case  $\eta_1 = 0$ , any positive value of expected net interest rate  $r$  implies that the working-capital constraint always binds, i.e.,  $E_{z'|z}[\eta'_2] > 0$ .<sup>32</sup> More importantly, when the collateral constraint becomes tighter—i.e.,  $\eta_1 > 0$  increases—it has a direct effect on the Lagrangian multiplier,  $E_{z'|z}[\eta'_2]$ , on working capital constraint. Because the firm's optimal pricing decision is

$$p = \mu \times mc \times (1 + \eta_2),$$

today's tighter collateral constraint (higher  $\eta_1$ ) implies higher next-period shadow costs  $\eta'_2$ , leading to higher next-period prices.

Figure 8 plots the Lagrangian multiplier  $E_{z'|z}[\eta'_2]$ . In the left panel, we find that firm's working capital constraint becomes tight when its debt burden is high. Furthermore, when a firm's reliance on foreign currency debt was larger prior to the crisis, the working capital constraint becomes tighter, which leads to higher shadow cost. Similar to the investment decision, the right panel

<sup>31</sup>In both panels, the policy functions of firms with zero FC holdings in the steady state and when the exchange rate shock hits coincide with each other.

<sup>32</sup>Agents expect that the exchange rate to be held constant all the time.




Figure 8:  $E_{z'|z}[\eta_2']$  against (i)  $d$  (Left) and (ii)  $k$  (Right).

The solid black lines are the policy functions in the stationary equilibrium. The blue diamond lines, red circle lines, and dashed magenta lines are the policy functions for firms with 0, 0.325, and 0.725 of foreign currency debt ratio, respectively.

shows that the balance sheet effect is weaker for the firms with larger capital.




Figure 9:  $p$  against (i)  $d$  (Left) and (ii)  $k$  (Right).

Note: The solid black lines are the price policy functions in the stationary equilibrium. Blue diamond lines, red circle lines, and dashed magenta lines are policy functions for firms with 0, 0.325, and 0.725 of foreign currency debt ratio, respectively.

Figure 9 illustrates how firms change their prices upon a large devaluation. The left panel shows the pricing decision as a function of initial debt level. In all cases, when the debt burden becomes larger, firms tend to charge higher prices. Furthermore, firms that have higher foreign currency debt holdings increase their prices more under large depreciation. This result echoes the findings in Figures 7 and 8 that higher debt burden translates into a lower level of capital stock and tighter working capital constraints. If a firm invests less in this period, they become less productive in the next period in terms of their variable input productivity, which increases their costs of production. Hence, they will charge higher prices. Furthermore, tighter working capital constraint implies a higher shadow cost of production, amplifying the price increase. The right panel in Figure 9 shows

the pricing decision as a function of initial capital stock. Consistent with the findings in Figures 7 and 8, when firms hold more initial capital stock, they increase prices less and when firms hold more foreign currency debt, they increase prices more upon a large depreciation.

In addition to the negative balance sheet effect, we find that strategic complementarity plays an important role in determining firm-level pricing decisions in both panels. Even if firms are not directly affected by the devaluation when holding zero foreign currency debt (the blue diamond lines in both panels), they will set the price higher than what they have at the steady state (the solid black lines in both panels). This result arises from strategic complementarity due to the Kimball preference, which makes firms raise their next period price because they expect that their competitors will increase prices. Therefore, in our model, firms increase their prices not only because of the direct effect from their balance sheet deterioration but also due to the strategic complementarity of their competitors' charging higher prices.




Figure 10:  $\mu$  against (i)  $d$  (Left) and (ii)  $k$  (Right).

Note: The solid black lines in both graphs show the markup policy functions under steady state. The blue diamond lines, red circle lines, and dashed magenta lines are the policy functions for firms with 0, 0.325, and 0.725 of foreign currency debt ratio, respectively.

Lastly, we investigate how firm-level markup changes upon a large depreciation. In both panels in Figure 10, we find that if a firm holds larger foreign currency debt on its balance sheet, it will charge lower markup when the domestic currency becomes less valuable. If firms invest less this period, they become less productive in the next period. At the same time, tighter working capital constraints lead to a higher shadow marginal cost of production. Hence, firms become less competitive and so charge smaller markups. We also find that some firms indeed increase their markups upon large devaluations relative to the level of markup at the steady state. For instance, policy functions of markups for firms with zero foreign currency debt exposure have shifted up (from the solid black lines to the blue diamond lines) as they become more competitive within the sector. However, for the firms with positive foreign currency debt exposure, some firms increase their markups but others lower theirs; the red and the magenta lines cross the black lines. Specifically, firms with

lower debt or higher capital increase their markups. The negative balance sheet effect is not strong enough for those firms because their initial level of debt was small enough or their initial level of capital stock was large enough. Hence, they become more competitive just because they are not affected by the large depreciation as much as their competitors are.

## 7 Sectoral Price Dynamics in the Model and the Data

### 7.1 Industry-level Analysis

This section summarizes the results from the model simulations of 156 industries with the parameter values calibrated. We first investigate the transition path of each industry price upon a large unexpected depreciation in period 1. Figure 11 depicts the transition path of the industry prices for two sectors with the same imported input share, 0.13, but different average shares of the foreign currency debt to total debt,  $\bar{\lambda}_I$ : 0.33 and 0.02. After a large depreciation of the domestic currency, those industries experienced price increases by around 14% and 9% two years later relative to pre-crisis levels. As an industry has a higher exposure to foreign currency debt, it increases its price more after the real exchange rate depreciates unexpectedly.




Figure 11: Impulse Response Functions of Industry Prices

Note: The red solid line and blue dashed-line show the price responses of industries with average FC-loan shares of 2 and 33 percent, respectively. An unexpected large depreciation happens at period 1.

Industry-level transition paths are the consequence of the negative balance sheet effects and the strategic complementarity between firms in the same industry as seen from the policy functions in the previous section. Firms with a high level of foreign currency exposure face a larger debt burden upon a large unexpected depreciation; hence, they reduce investment more and face tighter working capital constraints, which leads to a more pronounced price increase. The effect is stronger when firms are more financially constrained due to lower initial capital or higher initial debt before the



crisis. On top of that, the Kimball demand structure allows firms to strategically interact with each other, which amplifies the price responses of firms to the balance sheet deterioration. In our model, smaller firms with lower capital (therefore, on average, lower sales) experience a larger increase in marginal costs due to financial constraints. With this negative correlation of firm size and increase in marginal costs, the within industry strategic complementarity in pricing leads to a higher increase in the industry price ([Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings \(2018\)](#)).

Table 7: Marginal Effect of FC Short-term Debt Ratio on Price Changes During Crisis

	Data	Model
ST FC	0.5685 (0.2038)	0.2112
Imported Input Share	0.2830 (0.1656)	0.7346
$R^2$	0.4316	0.9968
N	156	156

Note: The left column shows the regression result from our empirical analysis. The right column shows the result from the simulated data.




Figure 12: Residual PPI Changes and FC Short-term Debt Ratio

Note: We run the industry-level regression of PPI changes on the imported input share in the production,  $\kappa_I$ , and the industry-level foreign currency debt exposure,  $\bar{\lambda}_I$  and compute predicted PPI changes assuming zero foreign currency debt exposure. Residual PPI changes are computed by PPI changes minus predicted PPI changes from the imported input share.

We regress PPI changes on both  $\bar{\lambda}_I$  and imported input share  $\kappa_I$  in the total inputs. As can be seen in Table 7, the coefficient estimate is 0.2112 and the data counterpart is 0.5440. The model explains around 40% of the mean effect of the short-term foreign currency debt on the price changes across industries. The model overestimates the coefficient estimate of imported input share in total

inputs, potentially arising from our assumption on the complete exchange rate pass-through to import prices. Figure 12 visualizes our regression results. We compute the residual changes in PPI for each industry that are unexplained by the intermediate input share and show that they positively vary with the industry-level foreign currency debt exposure,  $\bar{\lambda}_I$ . This pattern is consistent with what we have seen in Figure 2 in the introduction, and it confirms the role of balance sheet effects in explaining the sectoral price dynamics during the crisis.

We also compute the standard deviation of the log price changes from 1996 to 1998 across industries and its model counterpart and find 0.1830 and 0.1004, respectively. Our simple model—with two variations across industries regarding foreign currency exposure and imported input share—can explain more than half of the observed variation in price changes during the Asian Financial Crisis. We would like to emphasize that all these numbers were not targeted in our calibration, and hence its quantitative size shows how well our model captures the sectoral price dynamics during the crisis and also the cross-sectional variation in price changes across industries with varying degrees of exposure to the foreign currency debt and imported input share.

## 7.2 Firm-level Analysis

Using our structural model, we simulate firm-level data for 156 industries (15,000,000 firms), pool all the simulated data, and run the regression to qualitatively compare with the data patterns. With the simulated data, we investigate the role of financial constraints in shaping the price dynamics upon the depreciation shock. We run the below regression specifications:

$$(3) : \Delta y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_j + \beta_2 \text{ImportedInputShare}_I + \beta_3 \Delta P_I + \epsilon_j$$

$$(4) : \Delta y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_j + \beta_2 \text{ImportedInputShare}_I + \beta_3 \Delta P_I \\ + \beta_4 1_{\text{Unconstrained},j} + \beta_5 \text{ST FC}_j \times 1_{\text{Unconstrained},j} + \epsilon_j$$

$$(5) : \Delta y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_j + \beta_2 \text{ImportedInputShare}_I + \beta_3 \Delta P_I \\ + \beta_4 \log(k_j) + \beta_5 \text{ST FC}_j \times \log(k_j) + \beta_6 \log(d_j) + \beta_7 \text{ST FC}_j \times \log(d_j) + \epsilon_j$$

, where ST FC is the short-term foreign currency debt ratio of firm  $j$  in industry  $I$ , which is  $\lambda$  in our model.  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_5$  are the main coefficients of our interest. We also control for the imported input share in total intermediate inputs to precisely estimate the balance sheet effects of foreign currency debt exposure. This analysis also helps us to decompose the two distinct channels of exchange rate pass-through—balance sheet channel and imported input channel—at the firm level.

In the model, we observe if firms are financially constrained or not. Thus, we first directly use this information to analyze the role of the financial constraint in amplifying the negative effect of high foreign currency debt ratio on a firm's balance sheet after a large depreciation. We

use the indicator function,  $1_{\text{Unconstrained},j}$ , to indicate whether a firm  $j$  is financially constrained ( $1_{\text{Unconstrained},j} = 0$ ) or not ( $1_{\text{Unconstrained},j} = 1$ ) when making their borrowing decisions after the shock hits. We also use log of capital as a proxy for the degree of financial constraint, as it corresponds to the amount of collateral that a firm can pledge for its borrowing.<sup>33</sup> We use the capital stock chosen one period before the shock hits but nothing qualitatively changes when we use the capital stock chosen when the shock hits. The correlation between the two measures is 0.2781, implying that firms with larger capital are less financially constrained. For both measures, a higher value is associated with a lower degree of financial constraints. We also include the industry price changes to capture the prices' response to strategic complementarity.

Table 8: Firm-level Regression: Price Changes

	Price Changes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC <sub>j</sub>	0.0724	0.0801	0.1483
Imported Input Share <sub>j</sub>	0.2300	0.2385	0.2926
$\Delta P_I$	0.6858	0.6784	0.6442
$1_{\text{Unconstrained},j} \times \text{ST FC}_j$		-0.0464	
$\log(k_j) \times \text{ST FC}_j$			-0.0053
$\log(d_j) \times \text{ST FC}_j$			0.0548

Note: The dependent variables are the change of log prices. ST FC corresponds to firm-level foreign currency debt ratio and imported input share is the ratio of imported inputs to total inputs in the model. The regressions are based on the model simulated firm-level data.

Table 9: Firm-level Regression: Markup Changes

	Markup Changes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC <sub>j</sub>	-0.0609	-0.0677	-0.1214
Imported Input Share <sub>j</sub>	-0.1913	-0.1994	-0.2415
$\Delta P_I$	0.2656	0.2728	0.2993
$1_{\text{Unconstrained},j} \times \text{ST FC}_j$		0.0413	
$\log(k_j) \times \text{ST FC}_j$			0.01
$\log(d_j) \times \text{ST FC}_j$			-0.05

Note: The dependent variables are the change of log price-cost markups. ST FC corresponds to firm-level foreign currency debt ratio and imported input share is the ratio of imported inputs to total inputs in the model. The regressions are based on the model simulated firm-level data.

Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results of regressions (3), (4), and (5) with different dependent variables: price changes and markup changes. In Table 8, firms with higher foreign currency debt

<sup>33</sup>We use the amount of capital instead of sales as a measure of financial constraint so that we can directly link our results to the policy functions in Section 6. The results are, however, robust to using sales instead of the amount of capital.

exposure increase their prices more, and, on top of that, financially constrained firms increase their prices more compared to unconstrained firms with the same level of foreign currency debt exposure on their balance sheets. The result illustrates that financial friction amplifies the negative balance sheet effects of high foreign currency debt exposure. Even with the same amount of short-term foreign currency debt exposure, firms with higher capital stock do not face as much financial friction as firms with lower capital stock do, so the effective marginal costs do not increase as much as for firms with lower capital stock upon the exchange rate depreciation. Consequently, the increase in price is much more muted for unconstrained firms. We also observe that a firm in an industry with higher imported input share increases its price more. Lastly, we see that a firm with zero foreign currency debt and zero imported input share also increases its price when the industry price goes up, exhibiting a strong strategic complementarity.

In Table 9, we find that firms with higher foreign currency debt exposure lower their price-cost markups more. Moreover, financially unconstrained firms reduce their price-cost markups by lesser degrees compared to financially constrained firms for a given level of foreign currency debt exposure. Similarly, even with the same amount of short-term foreign currency debt exposure, firms with higher capital stock do not face are less financially constrained than firms with lower capital stock, so firms with higher capital lower their markups less than firms with lower capital. The results are consistent with what we see from the firm-level regressions in Section 3. A firm with zero foreign currency debt and zero imported input share increases both their markups and their prices due to strategic complementarity when their competitors in the same industry increase their prices. This firm-level analysis using simulated data highlights the role of both the balance sheet channel of foreign currency debt and the strategic complementarity in the price setting play in explaining sectoral price dynamics upon a large depreciation.

Lastly, using the simulated firm-level price changes during the crisis, we compare (i) the average firm-level price changes and (ii) the average *predicted* firm-level price changes via their foreign currency debt ratios across foreign currency debt ratio deciles. That is, we first regress firm-level simulated price changes on foreign currency debt ratios and imported input share:  $\Delta p_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{STFC}_j + \beta_2 \text{ImportedInputShare}_I + \Delta P_I + \epsilon_j$ . We then compute the predicted firm-level price changes from their foreign currency debt ratios only:  $\hat{\beta}_1 \text{STFC}_j$ . We then compute the ratio of (ii)/(i) for each foreign currency debt ratio decile. Figure 13 shows that, except in the lowest decile where the foreign currency debt ratio is below 0.1, the balance sheet channel alone explains from around 9 to 21% of the average price changes. This regression results highlights the quantitative size of the balance sheet channel in firms' price setting.




Figure 13: The Quantitative Size of the Balance Sheet Channel of FC Debt at the Firm-level

Note: The figure uses the simulated firm-level price data, and shows how much of average firm-level price changes can be accounted by the balance sheet effect of foreign currency debt exposure. We first regress the firm-level simulated price changes on foreign currency debt ratios and the imported input share:  $\Delta p_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ST FC}_j + \beta_2 \text{ImportedInputShare}_I + \beta_3 \Delta P_I + \epsilon_j$ . We then compute the predicted firm-level price changes from their foreign currency debt ratios only:  $\hat{\beta}_1 \text{ST FC}_j$ . The figure shows the ratio of  $\hat{\beta}_1 \text{ST FC}_j$  to the average firm-level price changes across deciles of foreign currency debt ratios.

### 7.3 Counterfactual Economy: Balance Sheet Channel Only

While the firm-level regression with simulated data highlights how firms facing the same level of imported input share and the average industry price changes experience *significantly higher* price increases due to their foreign currency borrowing, it is hard to infer how much of each sectoral price change can be attributed to the balance sheet channel and taking into account firms' strategic interactions with other firms in the industry. Each sector faces a different firm-level distribution of foreign currency debt and imported input share, and both channels put upward pressure on sectoral prices, amplified by firms' strategic complementarity in their pricing decisions. To quantify the role of the balance sheet channel of foreign currency debt in explaining sectoral price dynamics, we run a counterfactual exercise, assuming that the imported input price stays constant upon a depreciation shock.

Figure 14 depicts the transition paths of an industry with an average foreign currency debt share of 33% (i) in the baseline model and (ii) in the counterfactual economy, where the depreciation shock does not affect the imported input prices. We see that the industry price level increases by 14% in the baseline model, where 31% of the price response can be attributed to the deterioration of the balance sheet. Figure 15 summarizes the the average sectoral price changes across deciles of FC debt share in the baseline model and in the counterfactual economy, shutting down the effect

coming from higher imported input prices. Conditional on the foreign currency debt share above the lowest decile, the balance sheet channel alone generates around 15 - 30 % of sectoral price changes observed in the baseline model. The fractions explained by the balance sheet channel are higher than the ballpark numbers implied from the firm-level regression in Section 7.2, as firms' strategic complementarity amplifies the effect of the balance sheet channel on prices.




Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions of Industry Prices

Note: In the left panel, the solid red line and the dashed blue line show the average price responses of an industry with average FC-loan share of 33% upon an unexpected large depreciation at period 1. The dashed blue line shows the baseline economy where both higher imported input prices and the balance sheet channel put upward pressure on the sectoral price level, while the solid red line captures only the balance sheet effect of foreign currency debt on the sectoral price level. The fraction of the sectoral price change explained by the balance sheet effect for this industry is presented in the right panel.

In sum, we construct a heterogeneous firm model that links the financial frictions and the exchange rate pass-through after a large depreciation. The model is able to account for the industry-level empirical patterns like the larger price increase when an industry is on average holding a higher foreign currency debt ratio. Moreover, from firm-level simulations, we confirm that the model can explain the observed firm-level behavior after a large devaluation well. We have shown that firms significantly increase their prices as they have higher foreign currency debt exposure, especially when they are financially constrained. The counterfactual exercise affirms the quantitatively sizable role of the balance sheet channel in explaining sectoral price dynamics.




Figure 15: Counterfactual Exercise, The Quantitative Size of the Balance Sheet Channel of FC Debt at the Sectoral-level

Note: The figure uses the two sets of 156 sectoral price changes: one computed with the baseline model and the other with the counterfactual model shutting down the effect from higher imported input prices. We first compute (i) the average sectoral price changes in the baseline model and (ii) that in the counterfactual exercise across the sectoral-level of foreign currency debt ratio deciles. We then calculate the ratio of (ii)/(i) for each foreign currency debt ratio deciles.

## 8 Conclusion

With a unique firm-level and aggregated industry-level dataset, our empirical findings suggest that the balance sheet channel—whose role is understudied in the exchange rate pass-through literature—plays an important role in explaining how the exchange rate affects domestic prices, especially for emerging economies with dollarized liabilities. We find that industries with higher foreign currency debt increased their prices more during the Asian Financial Crisis that came with a large currency depreciation. Then, we look at how firm-level variables changed during the crisis when a firm had high exposure to foreign currency debt. Our firm-level empirical investigation confirms the negative balance sheet effect, where firms faced lower growth in both their sales and net worth when they held a high level of foreign currency debt before the crisis. Moreover, our firm-level analysis shows that the markups seem to have *declined* more for those with higher foreign currency debt, suggesting that the marginal cost channel is the main driver of the effect of the foreign currency debt exposure on price changes.

Based on these empirical findings, we build a quantitative heterogeneous firm model to study an industry equilibrium model and its transition path when there is an unexpected exchange rate depreciation. We analyze the qualitative and quantitative implications of the financial frictions in explaining the average changes in the sectoral prices and its dispersion. With the industry-specific firm-level distribution of foreign currency debt and the industry-specific imported input share, the model can explain around 40% of the mean effect of the foreign currency debt ratio on the price changes and 55% of the variation in price changes across industries. With the firm-level simulated data from the estimated model, we decompose the two distinct channels of exchange rate pass-through—balance sheet channel and imported input channel—at the firm level and show that both are significant contributors to the firm-level price dynamics during the crisis. We also highlight the role of strategic complementarity in the price setting and the financial frictions in explaining sectoral price dynamics after a large depreciation of domestic currency. The counterfactual exercise highlights the quantitative size of the balance sheet channel in explaining the price dynamics after a depreciation shock. We find that when a sector has a foreign currency debt ratio above the lowest decile, 15-30% of its price change can be attributed to the balance sheet channel of foreign currency debt only.

Our empirical analysis and our quantitative analysis through a heterogeneous firm model reveal that it is important, albeit overlooked, to incorporate the balance sheet effect when analyzing how the exchange rate affects domestic prices, especially for emerging economies with dollarized liability. Our findings have important policy implications on shaping the optimal monetary policy and currency choice in external borrowings. We believe that it is an important normative question to ask, but we will leave it for future research.



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# Appendix

## Data Source

The below table summarizes the data sources of variables that we use in the empirical section.

Table 10: Data Sources

Data	Data Source	Note
Firm-level variables	<a href="#">NICE (1993 - 1998)</a>	
Producer Price Index (PPI)	<a href="#">BoK (1991-2000a)</a>	Base year of 2015
Consumer Price Index (CPI)	<a href="#">BoK (1991-2000b)</a>	Base year of 2015
Rauch Classification	<a href="#">Rauch (1999)</a>	4-digit SITC Rev. 2 commodities
Imported Input Share	<a href="#">BoK (1993, 1995)</a>	Input-Output (IO) table of 1993 and 1995
Price Stickiness	<a href="#">Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)</a>	Median frequency of price change in Table 12
Imported Input Price Indices	<a href="#">BoK (1993-1998)</a>	Import Price Indices from 1993 to 1995

## Data Cleaning

In the firm-level data (both in industry-level and firm-level regressions), we exclude observations with the following properties:

- missing or negative value of sales, total assets, total liability, and net worth
- not included in manufacturing sector ( $KSIC \in [10, 34]$ )
- short-term foreign currency debt exposure larger than 1
- long-term foreign currency debt exposure larger than 1
- export to sales ratio larger than 1
- foreign currency cash to total current assets ratio larger than 1

In each of the firm-level regression analyses, we exclude firms whose dependent variables (e.g., sales growth, net worth growth, etc.) are above the top and or below the bottom 1 percent of the distribution. We didn't drop industries in a similar manner, as the number of industries we employ in the analysis is more limited. Nonetheless, all the results are robust to dropping the industries whose price changes are above the top 1 percent and or below the bottom 1 percent of the distribution. These results are included in the Appendix.

## Data Merging

Our analysis focuses on the manufacturing sector. A *sector* in our empirical analysis corresponds to the most narrowly defined group that the Bank of Korea uses to compute each PPI, which we will call a PPI industry classification. In other words, *a sector is a PPI industry classification*. All the matching work is done to merge data at the PPI industry-level.

### Firm-Level Data Matching

In the KISVALUE dataset, each firm's industry is identified with a five-digit KSIC (Korea Standard Industrial Classification) code. There is no matching code available between KSIC codes and PPI industries. We manually map those two datasets. We map each KSIC code to the closest PPI industry classification. As a result, one PPI industry classification is now matched to none, one, or a few KSIC codes. Hence, those firms that have different KSIC codes mapped to the same PPI industry classification are now treated as if they are in the same sector. For each sector,  $S$ , we compute  $X_S$ , the weighted average of a firm-level variable of interest,  $x_i$ , as:

$$X_S = \sum_{i \in S} x_i \frac{y_i}{Y_S} \text{ and } Y_S = \sum_{i \in S} y_i$$

, where  $S$  is a sector (PPI industry classification) and  $y_i$  is firm  $i$ 's size<sup>34</sup> and  $Y_S$  is the sum of  $y_i$ s in sector  $S$ .

### Rauch Classification

For each of the commodities at the 4-digit SITC Rev.2 levels, [Rauch \(1999\)](#) defines whether it is a differentiated product or not. Following [Affendy, Yee and Madono \(2010\)](#), we map each 4-digit SITC code to a ISIC Rev.3 code. This means that one ISIC Rev.3 code is mapped to none, one, or a few 4-digit SITC codes. Then, following the United Nations' conversion table, we map each ISIC Rev.3 code to *one or more* ISIC Rev.4 codes. This implies not only that one ISIC Rev.3 code is now mapped to one or a few ISIC Rev.4 codes but also that one ISIC Rev.4 code is now mapped to one or a few ISIC Rev.3 codes.<sup>35</sup> Next, we map each ISIC Rev.4 code to a KSIC Rev.10 code, following [Kim \(2008\)](#). In this mapping, exactly one ISIC Rev.4 code is matched with one KSIC Rev.10 code. From the above section, we describe that one PPI industry classification is mapped with none, one, or a number of KSIC Rev.10 codes. Hence, now we have one PPI industry classification is mapped to none or one or a few 4-digit SITC Rev.2 codes.

<sup>34</sup>We use the log of real sales when computing firms' sales share to limit the effects of the outliers.

<sup>35</sup>This is a N:N matching.

For each commodity at the 4-digit SITC code Rev.2 level, we define a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if it is a differentiated product. Then, for each sector (PPI industry classification), we take the weighted average of those binary numbers, where the weights are the commodities' trade shares in 1996.<sup>36</sup> We define each sector's product as *differentiated* when this weighted average is above 0.5 and *homogeneous* otherwise.

## Input-Output Table and Import Price Index

We use the Input-Output (IO) table in 1995 from the Bank of Korea. We map each PPI industry classification to one or two closest items in the IO table; i.e., one PPI industry classification is now mapped to one or more items in the IO table.<sup>37</sup> For each item  $j$  in the IO table, we can compute the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total amount of inputs (all intermediate inputs and value-added from labor and capital) used for the production of item  $j$ :

$$\text{Imported Input Share}_j = \frac{\text{Imported Input}_j}{\text{Total Inputs}_j}$$

Then, for each PPI sector  $S$ , we compute the weighted average of those imported input shares for each item  $j$ , where the weight of item  $j$  is the total inputs used in the production of item  $j$ , divided by the total inputs used in the production of all items in sector  $S$ .<sup>38</sup> This is essentially the same as the imported inputs used for the items in Sector  $S$  divided by the total inputs used for the items in Sector  $S$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Imported Input Share}_S &= \sum_{j \in S} \text{Imported Input Share}_j \times \frac{\text{Total Input}_j}{\text{Total Inputs}_S} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{j \in S} \text{Imported Input}_j}{\text{Total Inputs}_S} \\ \text{Total Input}_S &= \sum_{j \in S} \text{Total Inputs}_j \end{aligned}$$

## Price Stickiness

We use the median frequency of price changes in Table 12 of [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2008\)](#) to measure price stickiness. We map each PPI industry classification to a broad group over which

<sup>36</sup>This is following Rauch's method. Each commodity's trade share is its imports and exports divided by the sum of total imports and exports of all the commodities in that sector. We implicitly assume that each commodity's importance in a sector is proportional to its trading volume.

<sup>37</sup>The number of items in the IO table are much smaller, i.e. the classification is much broader, so we map each PPI industry classification to one or more IO items rather than the other way around. Some PPI industries are, therefore, matched with the same IO item(s).

<sup>38</sup>Note that item  $j$  can be in sector  $S$  and  $S'$  at the same time.

the price stickiness is measured in Table 12 of [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2008\)](#).<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup>In this mapping, the number of groups in Table 12 of [Nakamura and Steinsson \(2008\)](#) is much smaller, so many of PPI industries are matched to the same broad groups, over which the price stickiness is defined.

## Additional Tables

Table 11: Firm-level Summary Statistics: Other Variables

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Mean log real sales	24.427	24.356	24.192	24.097	23.942	23.645
Mean log real assets	24.453	24.344	24.119	24.034	23.889	23.62
Mean leverage ratio (%)	72.3%	73.4%	74.2%	74.6%	75.1%	70.1%
Mean short-term debt ratio (%)	57.7%	57.4%	54.8%	53.5%	51.0%	50.6%

Note: Real assets and real sales are in billions of 2015 won. We use CPI to deflate nominal series. The leverage ratio is defined as the total debt divided by the total assets. Short-term debt ratio is the short term debt over the total debt.



Table 12: Industry Price Dynamics and Short-term FC Debt Ratio:  
Accounting for Change in Number of Firms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC	0.5685*** (0.2038)	0.6437*** (0.2173)	0.5531*** (0.2060)
LT FC	-0.1846 (0.1365)	-0.1920 (0.1346)	-0.1830 (0.1363)
Log Change of # of Firms		1.0001** (0.4832)	1.0207* (0.5382)
Rauch Dummy	0.0075 (0.0447)		-0.0020 (0.0465)
Imported Input Share	0.2830* (0.1656)		0.2728 (0.1675)
Degree of Price Stickiness	0.0317* (0.0168)		0.0327* (0.0167)
Size	0.0024 (0.0181)	0.0066 (0.0184)	0.0023 (0.0183)
Export to Sale Ratio	-0.0469 (0.1543)	-0.0169 (0.1562)	-0.0413 (0.1526)
Leverage Ratio	0.3351** (0.1589)	0.3365** (0.1494)	0.3076* (0.1645)
Domestic ST Ratio	0.1255 (0.1253)	0.0929 (0.1176)	0.1443 (0.1253)
FC Cash Ratio	-0.2252 (3.1429)	0.4050 (3.1391)	-0.1171 (3.2099)
Broad Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.4513	0.4440	0.4515
N	156	156	156

This table shows the results from regression (1) with a different set of regressors. The dependent variable is the change in the log of the sectoral price from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt exposure (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt exposure (LT FC) in 1996. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of the regressors. For the imported input share, we use the 1995 value due to data availability. The number of firms for each industry is collected from the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 13: Industry Price Dynamics and Short-term FC Debt Ratio:  
Domestic Firms Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC	0.5862*** (0.1386)	0.5808*** (0.1672)	0.5602*** (0.1587)
LT FC	-0.1370* (0.0794)	-0.1319* (0.0784)	-0.1336* (0.0778)
Size		0.0057 (0.0188)	0.0025 (0.0192)
Leverage Ratio		0.3138** (0.1383)	0.2886* (0.1518)
Domestic ST Ratio		0.0247 (0.1077)	0.0601 (0.1145)
FC Cash Ratio		-1.7904 (4.5006)	-2.0874 (4.2077)
Rauch Dummy			0.0164 (0.0477)
Imported Input Share			0.2298 (0.1888)
Degree of Price Stickiness			0.0268* (0.0159)
Broad Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.4157	0.4373	0.4365
N	155	155	155

This table shows the results from regression (1) with a subsample of domestic firms whose exports are zero. The dependent variable is the change in the log of the sectoral price from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt exposure (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt exposure (LT FC) in 1996. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of the regressors. For the imported input share, we use the 1995 value due to data availability. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 14: Industry Price Dynamics and Short-term FC Debt Ratio (Crisis Period):  
After Dropping Outliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC	0.6338*** (0.2239)	0.6722*** (0.2441)	0.5376** (0.2278)
LT FC	-0.1564 (0.1219)	-0.2245* (0.1349)	-0.2221 (0.1368)
Size		0.0141 (0.0182)	0.0088 (0.0181)
Export to Sale Ratio		-0.0574 (0.1643)	-0.0695 (0.1591)
Leverage Ratio		0.3335** (0.1401)	0.2862* (0.1572)
Domestic ST Ratio		0.1179 (0.1135)	0.1703 (0.1209)
FC Cash Ratio		-1.7927 (2.4173)	-2.4333 (2.4438)
Rauch Dummy			0.0070 (0.0441)
Imported Input Share			0.3095* (0.1698)
Degree of Price Stickiness			0.0352** (0.0170)
Broad Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.3519	0.3750	0.3899
N	154	154	154

Note: This table shows the results from regression (1) with a different set of regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rates of sectoral prices from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt exposure (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt exposure (LT FC) in 1996. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of the regressors. For the imported input share, we use the 1995 value due to the data availability. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. We exclude industries whose price changes are in the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the distribution. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 15: Industry Price Dynamics and Short-term FC Debt Ratio (Pre-crisis Period):  
After Dropping Outliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC	0.0121 (0.1453)	-0.0621 (0.1552)	-0.0739 (0.1570)
LT FC	0.0322 (0.0769)	0.0248 (0.0786)	0.0364 (0.0788)
Size		0.0116 (0.0113)	0.0122 (0.0123)
Export to Sale Ratio		0.0976 (0.0972)	0.1082 (0.1001)
Leverage Ratio		0.0981 (0.0963)	0.1059 (0.0944)
Domestic ST Ratio		-0.0216 (0.0763)	-0.0321 (0.0772)
FC Cash Ratio		-0.6957 (0.9885)	-0.6485 (0.9287)
Rauch Dummy			0.0450 (0.0407)
Imported Input Share			0.0576 (0.0936)
Degree of Price Stickiness			-0.0261*** (0.0080)
Broad Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.2924	0.2848	0.2917
N	149	149	149

Note: This table shows the results from regression (2) with different sets of regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rates of sectoral prices from 1993 to 1995. The main regressors are sector-level short-term foreign currency debt exposure (ST FC) and long-term foreign currency debt exposure (LT FC) in 1993. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the 1993 value of regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. We exclude industries whose price changes are in the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the distribution. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.




Figure 16: Treatment vs. Control Groups: Pre- and Post-crisis After Dropping Outliers

Note: The figure plots  $\beta_{1,t}$  from the regressions of  $\Delta p_{I,t} = \beta_{0,t} + \beta_{1,t} \text{STFC}_{I,1996} + \epsilon_{I,t}$ , where  $t$  equal to 1998 represents our baseline regression. The bar represents 90% confidence intervals computed with robust standard errors. We exclude industries whose price changes are in the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the distribution.

Table 16: Firm Performance During the Crisis:  
Estimates with additional controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ST FC	-7.8202** (3.1157)	-1.4387* (0.8026)	-0.9201*** (0.2156)
LT FC	2.4760 (2.2803)	0.2830 (0.6609)	0.1825 (0.1704)
Size	-0.1218** (0.0617)	0.0333* (0.0185)	-0.0155** (0.0074)
ST FC x Size	0.3191*** (0.1225)	0.0576* (0.0321)	0.0360*** (0.0086)
LT FC x Size	-0.0881 (0.0909)	-0.0106 (0.0267)	-0.0069 (0.0069)
Leverage Ratio	15.7533*** (3.8958)	3.7851*** (0.8864)	-0.3291 (0.3263)
Export to Sale Ratio	0.9422 (2.7995)	-1.3979* (0.7177)	-0.2534 (0.2633)
ST Debt Ratio	-6.4506*** (2.3011)	0.4702 (0.5359)	0.0797 (0.1873)
FC Cash Ratio	-18.8204 (22.2218)	13.7760** (6.4927)	-0.4765 (1.6265)
Leverage Ratio x Size	-0.6447*** (0.1603)	-0.1523*** (0.0368)	0.0145 (0.0135)
Export to Sale Ratio x Size	-0.0210 (0.1114)	0.0614** (0.0294)	0.0119 (0.0107)
ST Debt Ratio x Size	0.2637*** (0.0944)	-0.0200 (0.0223)	-0.0037 (0.0078)
FC Cash Ratio x Size	0.7711 (0.8934)	-0.5674** (0.2666)	0.0283 (0.0670)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.1724	0.0642	0.0425
N	3169.0000	3169.0000	3167.0000

Note: This table shows the results from firm-level regressions. The dependent variables are the growth rate of (1) real sales, (2) net worth, and (3) markups from 1996 to 1998. The main regressors are firm-level short-term foreign currency debt ratio (ST FC) and the cross product of firm size and ST FC in 1996. The size is measured as the log of real sales. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table 17: Firm Performance During the Crisis:  
Estimates of Other Dependent Firm-level Variables

	(1) Capital Growth	(2) Labor Productivity Growth	(3) Labor Cost Growth	(4) Total Current Assets Growth
ST FC	-6.7368* (3.5560)	-7.3622* (3.8988)	-6.2982*** (1.4304)	-4.0366** (1.9167)
LT FC	-2.5349 (2.1571)	1.5337 (3.1031)	0.0878 (1.2826)	-0.1654 (1.1898)
Size	-0.1250*** (0.0407)	-0.1423*** (0.0363)	-0.1156*** (0.0149)	-0.1186*** (0.0151)
ST FC x Size	0.2592* (0.1409)	0.2960* (0.1527)	0.2492*** (0.0568)	0.1600** (0.0751)
LT FC x Size	0.1055 (0.0866)	-0.0487 (0.1241)	-0.0016 (0.0510)	0.0155 (0.0479)
Leverage Ratio	-0.3534** (0.1391)	0.4909*** (0.1451)	0.0395 (0.0577)	-0.0676 (0.0606)
Export to Sale Ratio	-0.1668* (0.0939)	0.4630*** (0.1268)	0.2171*** (0.0625)	0.2167*** (0.0559)
ST Debt Ratio	-0.3885*** (0.1479)	-0.1552 (0.1085)	-0.1705*** (0.0582)	-0.2231*** (0.0550)
FC Cash Ratio	0.9694 (1.9642)	0.2580 (1.6817)	2.2563** (1.1382)	-0.7167 (0.6520)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.0297	0.0546	0.0978	0.0869
N	2753.0000	3045.0000	2203.0000	3169.0000

Note: This table shows the results from firm-level regressions. The dependent variables are the growth rate of (1) capital, (2) labor productivity, (3) labor cost, and (4) total current assets from 1996 to 1998. We measure the labor productivity as sales to employment ratio and labor cost as personnel expenses. The main regressors are firm-level short-term foreign currency debt ratio (ST FC) and the cross product of firm size and ST FC in 1996. The size is measured as the log of real sales. To alleviate a potential endogeneity issue, we use the pre-crisis (1996) value of regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

# Productivity Shock Estimation

## Estimation

Following [Akerberg, Caves and Frazer \(2006\)](#), we assume the below value added production function:

$$y_{it} = \beta_k k_{it} + \beta_\ell \ell_{it} + \omega_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

, where  $\omega_{it}$  evolves according to a first order Markov process. Additionally, we assume that labor is “less variable” (chosen slightly before) than raw materials

$$m_{it} = f_t(\omega_{it}, k_{it}, \ell_{it})$$

Then, we invert this function for  $\omega_{it}$  and substitute it into the value added production:

$$y_{it} = \beta_k k_{it} + \beta_\ell \ell_{it} + f_t^{-1}(m_{it}, k_{it}, \ell_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}$$

We can obtain an estimate of  $\hat{\Phi}_{it}$ , which represents the value added net of the unpredictable/untransmitted shock  $\epsilon_{it}$ :

$$\Phi_{it} = \beta_k k_{it} + \beta_\ell \ell_{it} + f_t^{-1}(m_{it}, k_{it}, \ell_{it})$$

We approximate  $f_t^{-1}(m_{it}, k_{it}, \ell_{it})$  with a second-order polynomial function of  $m_{it}, k_{it}, \ell_{it}$ . Given the first-order Markov assumption on  $\omega_{it}$ , we have

$$\omega_{it} = \mathbb{E}[\omega_{it} | I_{i,t-1}] = \mathbb{E}[\omega_{it} | \omega_{i,t-1}] + \xi_{it}$$

, where  $\xi_{it}$  is mean independent of all information known at time  $t - 1$ . We then approximate  $\mathbb{E}[\omega_{it} | \omega_{i,t-1}]$  with  $\omega_{i,t-1}$ , its squared, and its cubed.

We then use the two moment conditions for the identification of  $\beta_k$  and  $\beta_\ell$ :

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi_{it} | k_{it}] = 0$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi_{it} | \ell_{i,t-1}] = 0$$

Then, we back out the productivity shocks as:

$$\hat{\omega}_{it} = \hat{\Phi}_{it} - \hat{\beta}_k k_{it} - \hat{\beta}_\ell \ell_{it}$$



## Data

Table 18 summarizes a detailed description of the data used to estimate the productivity shocks to firms.

Table 18: Variables Used for Estimation: 1991-1996

		Data Used	Variable Descriptions	KIS Variable Code/Sources
Value Added ( $y_{it}$ )	$y_{it} = \ln((SALE_{it} - RCOST_{it}) * 100 / CPI_t)$	$SALE_{it}$	Sales	21000
		$RCOST_{it}$	Raw Material Costs	151000
		$CPI_t$	Consumer Price Index	Bank of Korea
Capital ( $k_{it}$ )	$k_{it} = \ln(K_{it})$	$TTAS_{it}$	Total Tangible Assets	113200
	$\tilde{K}_{it} = TTAS_{it} - LAND_{it} - LEASE_{it}$	$LAND_{it}$	Land	113110
	$I_{it} = (\tilde{K}_{it} - \tilde{K}_{it-1}) / P_k$ , and $K_{i0} = \tilde{K}_{i0}$ and	$LEASE_{it}$	Lease Assets	113310
	$K_{it} = K_{it-1} + I_{it}$ if $t > 1$	$P_k$	Price of Capital	Bank of Korea
Labor ( $l_{it}$ )	$\ell_{it} = \ln(EMP_{it})$	$EMP_{it}$	Number of Employees	105000
Raw Material Costs ( $m_{it}$ )	$m_{it} = \ln(RCOST_{it} * 100 / CPI_t)$	$RCOST_{it}$	Raw Material Costs	151000
		$CPI_t$	Consumer Price Index	Bank of Korea

# Computation - Stationary Industry Equilibrium

## Market Environment – Partial Equilibrium

- In the industry equilibrium, we normalize aggregate consumption as  $Y_t = \bar{Y}$  and aggregate price as  $P_t=1$  (both are given parameters).
- We assume the CES aggregator for aggregate consumption

$$\bar{Y} = \left( \sum_i Y_i^{\frac{\nu-1}{\nu}} \right)^{\frac{\nu}{\nu-1}}, \quad \nu > 1$$

, where  $Y_i$  is demand for sector  $i$ 's composite goods.

- Given  $\bar{Y}$  and  $P_t = 1$ , we can derive the demand for  $Y_i$  as

$$Y_i = P_i^{-\nu} \bar{Y}$$

For a given industry, we first calculate the two stationary industry equilibria with  $\xi = 1$  and  $\xi = 2.1$ . Then, we shock the economy with a one-time unexpected depreciation of the exchange rate; i.e., an unexpected change of  $\xi$  from 1 to 2.1, and calculate the transition price dynamics.

### Step 1.

First, we guess the industry price  $P^0$ . Then, given the industry price  $P^0$ , and consumption  $Y^0$ , we solve the following firm's problem.

$$v(d, k, a, z; \kappa, \xi) = \max_{c \geq 0, d', k', a'} \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta E_{z'|z} [v(d', k', a', z'; \kappa, \xi)]$$

$$s.t. (i) \ c + k' - (1 - \delta)k + \Phi(k, k') + a' + d(\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\frac{\xi}{\xi_{-1}}) = \pi(a, k, z; \kappa, \xi) + \frac{d'}{1+r} + w + a$$

$$(ii) \ \frac{1}{1+r} d' \leq \theta_k k'$$

, where

$$\Phi(k, k') = \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{k' - (1 - \delta)k}{k} \right)^2 k$$

$$\text{and } \pi(a, k, z; \kappa, \xi) = \max_{n, x} p(y)y - wn - \xi x$$

$$s.t. \ i) \ y = zk^\alpha x^\kappa n^{1-\alpha-\kappa}$$

$$ii) \ p(y) = \exp\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\left(1 - \left(\frac{y}{Y^0}\right)^{\epsilon/\sigma}\right)\right)P^0, \quad iii) \ wx + \xi x \leq \theta_a a$$

Then, we get a set of policy functions,

$$k'(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0), \ d'(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0), \ a'(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0), \ p(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0).$$

To solve the firm's dynamic problem, we use the Howard policy iteration method.

## Step 2.

Given the firm's optimal policy functions,

$$k'(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0), \ d'(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0), \ a'(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0)$$

and the law of motion for idiosyncratic productivity shocks  $z$ , we find a stationary distribution

$$\psi(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0).$$

## Step 3.

Using

$$p(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0) \text{ and } \psi(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0)$$

, we find

$$\tilde{P} = \exp\left(\int \ln\left(p(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0)\right) d\psi(k, d, a, z; \kappa, \xi, P^0)\right)$$

Then, we compare  $\tilde{P}$  and  $P^0$ . If they are close enough, we are done. Otherwise, we update the new guess for the industry price as

$$P^1 = x\tilde{P} + (1 - x)P^0 \quad \text{for some } x \in (0, 1)$$

and then restart the loop from Step 1.

## 9 Computation - Transition Dynamics

We assume that in period 0, the economy is in a stationary equilibrium where all firms believe there is no change in future aggregate variables, including the exchange rate. However, in period 1, there is an one-time unexpected shock to the exchange rate  $\xi$  in the economy. At that point, firms observe a complete path of future exchange rates from period 1. It is assumed that the exchange rates stay constant at the new level (the period 1 level) so that there is no deviation from UIP. Specifically, we assume that the evolution of the exchange rate is characterized by a sequence  $\{\xi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  such that  $\xi_0 = 1$  and  $\xi_t = 2.1$ , for  $t \geq 1$ .

### Step 1.

First, we guess a period  $\bar{T}$  such that the economy is in a stationary equilibrium from period  $T > \bar{T}$  onwards.

### Step 2.

Then, we guess the sequence of industry-level prices  $\bar{P}^0 = \{P_t^0\}_{t=0}^{\bar{T}}$  and corresponding output  $\bar{Y}^0 = \{Y_t^0\}_{t=0}^{\bar{T}}$ .

### Step 3.

Given the sequences of  $\{\xi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ ,  $\{P_t^0\}_{t=0}^{\bar{T}}$ , and  $\{Y_t^0\}_{t=0}^{\bar{T}}$ , we solve for a sequence of the firm's optimal problem. Specifically, we set  $v_{\bar{T}+1}(d, k, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi = 2.1) = v(d, k, a, z; \kappa, \xi = 2.1)$ , where  $v(d, k, a, z; \kappa, \xi = 2.1)$  is the value function we obtain from a stationary equilibrium when  $\xi = 2.1$ . Then, from  $t = \bar{T}$  to  $t = 1$ , we solve the following firm's problem sequentially

$$v_t(d, k, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}) = \max_{c \geq 0, d', k', a'} \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta E_{z'|z} [v_{t+1}(d', k', a', z'; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_{t+1}, \xi_t)]$$

$$s.t. (i) c + k' - (1 - \delta)k + \Phi(k, k') + a' + d(\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\frac{\xi_t}{\xi_{t-1}}) = \pi(a, k, z; \kappa, \xi_t) + \frac{d'}{1+r} + w + a$$

$$(ii) \frac{1}{1+r}d' \leq \theta_k k'$$

, where

$$\Phi(k, k') = \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{k' - (1 - \delta)k}{k} \right)^2 k$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{and } \pi(a, k, z; \kappa, \xi_t) = \max_{n, x} p(y)y - wn - \xi_t x \\
& \text{s.t. } i) \ y = zk^\alpha x^\kappa n^{1-\alpha-\kappa} \\
& ii) \ p(y) = \exp\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\left(1 - \left(\frac{y}{Y_t^0}\right)^{\epsilon/\sigma}\right)\right) P_t^0, \quad iii) \ wn + \xi_t x \leq \theta_a a
\end{aligned}$$

We then have

$$k_t(k, d, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}, \bar{P}^0), \ d_t(k, d, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}, \bar{P}^0), \ p_t(k, d, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}, \bar{P}^0), \ t = 1, \dots, \bar{T}$$

.

#### Step 4.

With policy functions and the stationary distribution at  $t = 1$  in hand, we compute a sequence of distributions starting from  $t = 2$

$$\psi_t(k, d, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}, \bar{P}^0), \ t = 2, \dots, \bar{T}$$

and the sequence of industry prices from  $t = 1$  as

$$\tilde{P}_t = \exp\left(\int \ln\left(p_t(k, d, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}, \bar{P}^0)\right) d\psi_t(k, d, a, z; \lambda, \kappa, \xi_t, \xi_{t-1}, \bar{P}^0)\right)$$

#### Step 5.

Then, we compare the original guess  $\bar{P}^0$  and the new sequence  $\tilde{P} = \{\tilde{P}_t\}_{t=1}^{\bar{T}}$ . If they are close enough, we move to Step 6. Otherwise, we update our new guess for the industry price as

$$\bar{P}^1 = x\tilde{P} + (1 - x)\bar{P}^0 \quad \text{for some } x \in (0, 1)$$

, and then restart the loop from Step 2.

#### Step 6.

If the difference between the aggregate price at  $\bar{T} - 1$  and  $\bar{T}$  is small enough, then we are done. Otherwise, we return to Step 1 and reset  $\bar{T}$ .