

Binding Signature

Consistency of balance with the claim description and the output description which would be minted in the MASP pool is enforced by the *Airdrop Binding Signature*. Similarly to a standard MASP or Sapling transaction, this signature has a dual role:

- To prove that the total value claimed in NAM within the output descriptions respects the allowed conversion set with the *zatoshi* allocated in the claim description.
- To prove that signer knew the randomness used for the Claim, Output and Convert *value commitments*, in order to prevent reply attacks.

Let $\mathbb{J}^{(r)}$ and $\mathbb{J}^{(r)*}$ be defined as in §5.4.9.3 'Jubjub' of the *Zcash Protocol Specification*. Following §5.4.8.3 'Homomorphic Pedersen commitments (Sapling and Orchard)' from the former specs we have:

$$\text{ValueCommit}^x : \text{ValueCommit}^{\text{Sapling}}.\text{Trapdoor} \times \left\{ -\frac{r_{\mathbb{J}-1}}{2} .. \frac{r_{\mathbb{J}-1}}{2} \right\} \rightarrow \text{ValueCommit}^{\text{Sapling}}.\text{Output}$$

$\text{ValueCommit}^{\text{Sapling}}$ is the above function with:

- $\mathcal{R}^{\text{Sapling}} = \text{FindGroupHash}^{\mathbb{J}^{(r)*}}("Zcash_cv", "r")$
- $\mathcal{V}^{\text{Sapling}} = \text{FindGroupHash}^{\mathbb{J}^{(r)*}}("Zcash_cv", "v")$

$\text{ValueCommit}^{\text{MASP}}$ is the above function with:

- $\mathcal{R}^{\text{MASP}} = \text{FindGroupHash}^{\mathbb{J}^{(r)*}}("MASP_r_", "r")$
- $\mathcal{V}^{\text{MASP}} \equiv \text{vb}_{\text{NAM}} = \text{abst}_{\mathbb{J}}(\text{PRF}^{\text{vcgMASP}}(t_{\text{NAM}}))$

Where t_{NAM} is the bytestring representing the NAM asset type.

$\text{ValueCommit}^{\text{mint}}$ is the above function with:

- $\mathcal{R}^{\text{MASP}}$
- $\mathcal{V}^{\text{mint}} = [\text{V}_{\text{MASP}}]\mathcal{V}^{\text{MASP}} + [\text{V}_{\text{Sapling}}]\mathcal{V}^{\text{Sapling}}$

where $\text{V}_{\text{Sapling}}$ and V_{MASP} are defined in a *allowed conversion* $\{(\text{A}_{\text{Sapling}}, \text{V}_{\text{Sapling}}), (\text{A}_{\text{MASP}}, \text{V}_{\text{MASP}})\}$, as described in the *Multi Asset Shielded Pool Specification* § 0.12.4 'Convert'.

Since the value commitments in Sapling and MASP use different random base, introduce the *Randomness Renormalization Factor* $\mathcal{N} : \mathbb{J}^{(r)}$

$$\mathcal{N} = [\text{rcv}^{\text{Sapling}}]\mathcal{R}^{\text{MASP}} - [\text{rcv}^{\text{Sapling}}]\mathcal{R}^{\text{Sapling}}$$

Suppose the transaction has:

- A *Claim description* with value commitment $\text{cv}^{\text{Sapling}}$, committing to value v^{Sapling} with randomness $\text{rcv}^{\text{Sapling}}$ using $\text{ValueCommit}^{\text{Sapling}}$
- An *Output description* with value commitment cv^{MASP} , committing to value v^{MASP} with randomness rcv^{MASP} using $\text{ValueCommit}^{\text{MASP}}$
- A *Convert description* with value commitment cv^{mint} , committing to value v^{mint} with randomness rcv^{mint} using $\text{ValueCommit}^{\text{mint}}$

Validators calculate the *airdrop transaction validating key* as:

$$\text{bvk}^{\text{Airdrop}} = \text{cv}^{\text{Sapling}} + \text{cv}^{\text{mint}} - \text{cv}^{\text{MASP}} + \mathcal{N}$$

The signer calculates the *airdrop transaction signing key* as:

$$\text{bsk}^{\text{Airdrop}} = \text{rcv}^{\text{Sapling}} + \text{rcv}^{\text{mint}} - \text{rcv}^{\text{MASP}}$$

In order to check for implementation faults, the signer SHOULD also check that

$$\text{bvk}^{\text{Airdrop}} = \text{BindingSig}^{\text{Airdrop}}.\text{DerivePublic}(\text{bsk})$$

Let SigHash be the *SIGHASH transaction hash* as defined in [ZIP-243], not associated with an input, using the *SIGHASH type* SIGHASH_ALL .

A validator checks balance by validating that

$$\text{BindingSig}^{\text{Sapling}}.\text{Validate}_{\text{bvk}^{\text{Airdrop}}}(\text{SigHash}, \text{bindingSig}^{\text{Airdrop}}) = 1.$$