## Claim Statement

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\text{Let } \ell_{\text{Merkle}}^{\text{Sapling}}, \ell_{\text{PRFnfSapling}}, \ell_{\text{scalar}}^{\text{Sapling}}, \text{ ValueCommit, SpendAuthSig, } \mathbb{J}, \mathbb{J}^{(r)}, \text{repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, q_{\mathbb{J}}, r_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, \text{ PRFnfSapling}, \ell_{\text{scalar}}, \text{ ValueCommit, SpendAuthSig, } \mathbb{J}, \mathbb{J}^{(r)}, \text{repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, q_{\mathbb{J}}, r_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, \text{ PRFnfSapling}, \ell_{\text{scalar}}, \text{ ValueCommit, SpendAuthSig, } \mathbb{J}, \mathbb{J}^{(r)}, \text{ repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, q_{\mathbb{J}}, r_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, \text{ PRFnfSapling}, \ell_{\text{scalar}}, \text{ ValueCommit, SpendAuthSig, } \mathbb{J}, \mathbb{J}^{(r)}, \text{ repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, q_{\mathbb{J}}, r_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, \text{ PRFnfSapling}, \ell_{\text{scalar}}, \text{ ValueCommit, SpendAuthSig, } \mathbb{J}, \mathbb{J}^{(r)}, \text{ repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, q_{\mathbb{J}}, r_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, \text{ repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, \text{ repr}_{\mathbb{J}}, h_{\mathbb{J}}, 
Extract<sub>\mathbb{I}(r)</sub>: \mathbb{J}^{(r)} \to \mathbb{B}^{[\ell_{\mathsf{MerkleSapling}}]} be defined as in the original Sapling specification.
Furthermore let:
\ell_{\mathsf{PRFnfsAlt}} : \mathbb{N} := 256
\mathsf{PRF}^{\mathsf{nfsAlt}}_{\mathsf{nk}\star}(\rho\star) = \mathsf{BLAKE2s\text{-}256}(\mathsf{'MASP\_alt'}, \mathsf{LESBS2OP}_{256}(nk\star) | \mathsf{LESBS2OP}_{256}(\rho\star) |).
A valid instance of \pi_{Claim} assures that given a primary input:
(\mathsf{rt}: \mathbb{B}^{[\ell^{\mathsf{Sapling}}_{\mathsf{Merkle}}]} ,
cv<sup>Sapling</sup>: ValueCommitment.Output,
\mathsf{nf}_{\mathsf{Alt}}: \mathbb{B}^{[\ell_{\mathsf{PRFnfsAlt}}]} ,
rk: SpendAuthSig.Public)
the prover knows an auxiliary input:
(\mathsf{path}: \mathbb{B}^{[\ell^{\mathsf{Sapling}}_{\mathsf{Merkle}}][\mathsf{MerkleDepth}^{\mathsf{Sapling}}]}
pos: \{0..2^{\text{MerkleDepth}^{\text{Sapling}}} - 1\},
g_d: \mathbb{J},
pk_d: \mathbb{J},
v^{\text{Sapling}}: \{0..2^{\ell_{\text{value}}} - 1\},
\mathsf{rcv}^{\mathsf{Sapling}}: \{0..2^{\ell_{\mathsf{scalar}}^{\mathsf{Sapling}}} - 1\} ,
cm<sup>Sapling</sup>: J.
rcm^{Sapling}: \{0..2^{\ell_{scalar}^{Sapling}} - 1\},
\alpha: \{0..2^{\ell_{\text{Scallar}}^{\text{Sapling}}} - 1\},
ak: SpendAuthSig.Public,
nsk: \{0..2^{\ell_{scalar}^{Sapling}} - 1\},
\mathsf{path}^\mathsf{excl}: \mathbb{B}^{[\ell^\mathsf{Sapling}_\mathsf{Merkle}][\mathsf{MerkleDepth}^\mathsf{excl}]}
pos^{excl}: \{0..2^{MerkleDepth^{excl}} - 1\},
start : \{0..2^{MerkleDepth^{Sapling}} - 1\},
end: \{0..2^{\text{MerkleDepth}^{\text{Sapling}}} - 1\}
```

Such that the following conditions hold:

 $\bullet \ \ \textbf{Note commitment integrity} \ \ \textbf{NoteCommit}^{Sapling}_{rcm^{Sapling}}(repr_{\mathbb{J}}(g_d), repr_{\mathbb{J}}(pk_d), v^{Sapling}).$ 

- Merkle path validity Either  $v^{Sapling} = 0$ , or (path, pos) is a valid Merkle Path of depth MerkleDepth Sapling, as defined in the original Sapling specification, from  $cm_u = Extract_{J(r)}(cm^{Sapling})$  to the anchor rt
- Value commitment integrity  $cv^{Sapling} = ValueCommit_{rcv}^{Sapling}(v^{Sapling})$ .
- Small order checks  $g_d$  and ak are not of small order, i.e.  $[h_{\mathbb{J}}]g_d \neq O_{\mathbb{J}}$  and  $[h_{\mathbb{J}}]ak \neq O_{\mathbb{J}}$ .
- Nullifier Integrity  $nf^{Sapling} = PRF^{nfSapling}_{nk\star}(\rho\star)$  where

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nk \star = repr_{\mathbb{J}}([nsk]\mathcal{H})
\rho \star = repr_{\mathbb{J}}(MixingPedersenHash(cm^{Sapling}, pos))
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- Alternate Nullifier Integrity  $nf_{Alt} = PRF_{nk\star}^{nfsAlt}(\rho \star)$
- Spend authority rk = SpendAuthoritySig.RandomizePublic( $\alpha$ , ak).
- Diversifier address integrity pk<sub>d</sub> = [ivk]g<sub>d</sub> where

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ivk = CRH^{ivk}(ak \star, nk \star)

ak \star = repr_{I}(ak)
```

- **Merkle path validity for** (start, end) (path<sup>excl</sup>, pos<sup>excl</sup>) is a valid Merkle path of depth MerkleDepth<sup>excl</sup>, as defined in § 4.9 'Merkle Path Validity', from excl to the anchor rt<sup>excl</sup>, where excl = MerkleCRH<sup>Sapling</sup>(MerkleDepth<sup>excl</sup>, start, end).
- Nullifier in excluded range start  $\leq nf^{Sapling} \leq end$ .

## **Output Statement**

The *Output Circuit* is defined in § 0.12.3 'Output Statement (MASP)' of the Multi-Asset Shielded Pool Specification.

## **Convert Statement**

The *Convert Circuit* is defined in § 0.12.5 'Convert Statement' of the Multi-Asset Shielded Pool Specification.