#### **Anomita Ghosh**

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## Education

Ph.D. Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 2016-May 2022 (Expected)

M.Phil Economics, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India, 2014

M.A. Economics, Delhi School of Economics, New Delhi, India, 2012

B.Sc Economics, Presidency College, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India, 2010

#### Research Interests

Primary fields: Labor economics, Public economics

Secondary fields: Applied Econometrics, Spatial Economics

#### Work Experience

Research Associate, Centre for Advanced Financial Research and Learning, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, India, 2016. Supervisor: Dr. Nagpurnanand Prabhala.

Economist, Economic Policy and Research Department, National Stock Exchange of India Ltd, Mumbai, India, 2014-15

#### Working papers

When distressed areas are desirable: Longitudinal evidence from a local supply-side reform for physicians ( $Job\ market\ paper$ )

Intended and unintended effects of state tuition benefits to undocumented students: Institution and individual level evidence

Are female leaders good for education? Evidence from India: A comment

### Selected Work in Progress

Spillover effects from short duration strikes: Evidence using high frequency data (With Elizabeth Powers)

Role of recruitment committee in selection of medical residents

### Pre-Phd papers

Welfare Ranking of Alternative Export Taxes Revisited (with Dr. Rupayan Pal) - Economics Bulletin, Vol. 37(2), pp. 1033-1044

Strategic Trade Policy for Network Goods Oligopolies (with Dr. Rupayan Pal)- IGIDR Working Paper No: WP-2014-039

## Honors, Awards and Fellowship

Department Travel Grant, University of Illinois, 2020

Brems Third Year paper award, 2019

Department of Economics Fellowship, UIUC, 2016-17

Research Scholarship, IGIDR funded by the Reserve Bank of India, 2012-14

Indira Gandhi Scholarship funded by University Grants Commission, India, 2010-12

CAS External Scholarship funded by the Govt. of India, 2010-11

### Teaching and Research Experience

Teaching Assistant for Economic Statistics II at UIUC, Spring 2020-Fall 2021

Teaching Assistant for Impact Evaluation at UIUC, Fall 2019

Research Assistant at UIUC, Summer 2019, Fall 2019, Summer 2020

Teaching Assistant for Principles of Macroeconomics at UIUC, Spring 2019

Teaching Assistant for Principles of Microeconomics at UIUC, Fall 2018

Teaching Assistant for Economic Statistics I at UIUC, Spring 2018

Teaching Assistant for Intermediate Macroeconomics at UIUC, Fall 2017

Teaching Assistant for Advanced Microeconomics at IGIDR, India, Spring 2014

Teaching Assistant for Basic Microeconomics at IGIDR, India, Fall 2013

## Presentations (including scheduled)

2021/2022: AEA-ASSA poster; SEA

2020: MEA Conference; Population Association of America

2019: H2D2 Research Day, University of Michigan; Applied Economics, Regional and Urban

Studies(AERUS) Conference; Economics Graduate Student Conference, WUSTL

2018-2021: Applied Micro Research Lunch, UIUC

2014: 24th Annual Conference on Contemporary Issues in Development Economics,

Jadavpur University, Calcutta, India

2012: Workshop on Rationality, Decision and Evaluation, IGIDR, Mumbai, India

#### Technical Skills

STATA, Matlab, Mathematica, ArcGIS(intermediate), Python(intermediate), SAS(intermediate)

# References

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Professor Russell Weinstein

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Professor Hassan Arvin-Rad (Teaching reference) Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 217-333-4517 harvin@illinois.edu

## Personal Information

Citizenship: India

Languages: English(fluent), Hindi(fluent), Bengali(native)

## Abstracts

"When distressed areas are desirable: Longitudinal evidence from a local supply side reform for physicians" (Job market paper)

Do temporary positive labor supply shocks cause eligible physicians to move and stay in undesirable areas? To what extent do these shocks improve the health of the elderly population? I investigate this question by studying a novel state and local policy experiment which was rolled out sequentially for eligible specialities over the last four decades in specific counties across US states. Leveraging a new individual longitudinal dataset that tracks the universe of eligible physicians from their medical school to mid-career and exploiting both space and year variation in a difference-in-differences and event study design, I find this reform increases number of MDs per 100,000 population by 4.9% in treated counties vs untreated counties, within a treated state. The inflows of newly hired physicians are driven by higher paying eligible specialities. Despite these positive net inflows, I observe a small 1.2 percentage point decline in a new physician's likelihood of staying in the treated county one year after minimum obligation period of that state. I provide some evidence that the reform modestly spurs trainees to enter eligible specialities in treated states, achieved by more than proportionate decline in ineligible speciality trainees. My estimates imply an increase in Medicare enrollees' visits to a physician in a treated county, accompanied by economically meaningful reduction in their hospital admissions and emergency visits. Using richer patient level data from California, I show these results are not driven by selective admission of patients to treated hospitals. Finally, the welfare analysis of this reform using marginal value of public funds (MVPF) framework suggests that

"Intended and unintended effects of state tuition benefits to undocumented students: Institution and individual level evidence"

Since 2001, twenty-two US states have allowed in-state tuition rates for undocumented students in public colleges. I look at how the degree of exposure to the policy affects novel institution level education outcomes of these students and the unintended negative spillover effects on other students. Exploiting state-time variation in these policies in a difference-in-differences framework with institution fixed effects, I find higher enrollment and graduation of likely undocumented students in less selective community colleges of high pre-policy undocumented immigrant states. This is supported by their increased enrollment in high transfer, technical and vocational colleges as per the Carnegie classification. My results also indicate that increasing number of these students graduate in health & medicine, trades & personal services in more policy exposed states, consistent with their occupations. There seems to be negligible displacement of domestic students in community colleges of higher policy exposed states. Due to higher in-state tuition charged in both public 4 year and 2 year colleges as a result of the policy, around 16% of the average annual subsidy provided to undocumented students is borne by other students in the form of higher tuition. The likely undocumented females respond to the increased educational attainment by reducing their fertility, driven by delayed marriage and household formation decisions. Using individual longitudinal data from Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), I find no substantial migration of likely undocumented students to the treated states to take advantage of the policy. Overall, my findings indicate that the education and fertility benefits to likely undocumented students dominate any unintended spillover effects on non-targeted students.

"Are female leaders good for education? Evidence from India: Comment"

This comment makes two main observations about Clots-Figueras' (2012) paper on female leaders and education in India. I mainly use the Employment-Unemployment schedule of 55th round of National Sample Survey data and reports published by the Election Commission of India for this purpose. First, after correcting for multiple outcomes, female politicians do not seem to have a significant effect on the fraction of villages having primary

schools in the urban areas. More specifically, I control for False Discovery Rate using the procedures of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli(2006). My findings reveal that, although increasing female leadership improves primary educational attainment in the urban areas, it may not be through the channel of constructing more primary schools in those areas, as suggested in the paper. Second, the continuity of the distribution of baseline covariates is violated at the cutoff for majority of covariates in the urban areas when the more powerful Canay Kamat(2018) permutation test is applied. Despite these two observations, the results of their paper are largely robust to alternative specifications and strategies.

"Spillover effects from short duration strikes: Evidence using high frequency data" (In progress)

Work stoppage in health care sector is a serious concern. It disrupts timely delivery of health care services and thereby harms patients' health. During the period 2005-2017, there were 161 episodes of strikes in California health care sector (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). These strikes were of much shorter duration (lasting on average for less than 10 days) relative to the nurses' strikes in New York state considered by Gruber and Kleiner (2012). Additionally, unlike Gruber and Kleiner, there is variation in the type of health care worker i.e. nurses, engineers, technicians covered by the brief strikes I consider. Utilising daily patient level data of all hospitals in California over the period 2004-2017 and exploiting the variation in timing of strikes across hospitals in a difference-in-differences and event study design, I analyse the spillover effects of these short strikes on the nearby non-striking hospitals. Specifically, I consider admission, readmission, mortality, emergency room use and intensity of care outcomes. Due to the availability of residential location of the patients, I also explore changes in patients' admissions to the neighboring hospital if the striking hospital is closer to their home vs if it is farther from their home. I also examine whether these short strikes benefit the striking hospitals in the long run in terms of productivity and how these benefits (if any) in turn affect the productivity of non-striking hospitals in close proximity. Overall, this project aims to determine the winners and losers of short-term negative shocks to the healthcare sector.

"Role of recruitment committee in selection of medical residents" (In progress-Ongoing data collection)

Doctors of certain races like African American, Hispanic, American Indian and certain Asian subgroups are under-represented in medicine relative to the larger population. The lack of racial diversity of doctors and medical trainees is an important issue. First, racial concordance between doctors and patients leads to improved communication and higher demand for preventive care (Alsan et al, 2019). Second, doctors from underrepresented minorities have higher likelihood of serving underserved and uninsured populations (M Komaromy et al, 1996). It has been proposed in the medical literature that lack of minority faculty on the resident selection committee is one of several factors contributing to lower racial diversity among trainees. Consequently, many institutions are adding minority faculty to the selection committee. In view of this, I examine whether an increased presence of these faculty in the recruitment committee improves hiring probability of minority trainees. I utilise the dataset of medical trainees with their training institutions and their specialities from my job market paper. I add to this dataset the members of the recruitment committee obtained from the respective training institutions. I further include details on work schedule, employment policies and benefits, compensation and leave structure for each trainee based on their training institution. I predict race of the medical trainees and recruitment committee members from their full names. This analysis can shed light on the role of recruitment committee relative to other workplace policies in advancing racial diversity among medical trainees.

#### "Welfare Ranking of Alternative Export Taxes Revisited" (with Dr. Rupayan Pal) (Pre-Phd)

This paper contributes to the literature by extending the analysis of welfare ranking of exporting countries' alternative tax setting strategies, revenue maximization vs. welfare maximization, to the case of a differentiated network goods oligopoly. It shows that non-leviathan governments' incentives to deviate from welfare maximization to revenue maximization while deciding export taxes depends, not only on the degree of product substitutability, but also on the strength of network externalities. Thus, the existing results do not hold true except in special cases of the present model. In other words, the optimal strategy for trade policy determination in the presence of network externalities can be opposite to that in the case of usual non-network goods. Overall, results of this paper suggest that 'one size fits all' does not apply to trade policy determination in strategic environment.

#### "Strategic Trade Policy for Network Goods Oligopolies" (with Dr. Rupayan Pal) (Pre-Phd)

This paper extends the literature on strategic trade theory for non-network goods oligopoly by considering differentiated network-goods oligopolies under alternative scenarios, when there is export-rivalry between two countries. It shows that, under price competition without managerial delegation, the optimal trade policy involves an export tax (subsidy), if network externalities are weak (strong). But, the opposite is true under price competition with managerial delegation. In contrast, under quantity competition, it is always optimal to subsidize exports. It also shows that welfare implications of strategic trade policy depend, not only on the mode of product market competition, but also on internal organization of firms and the strength of network externalities.