

# Fair Resource Allocation

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# Overview

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# Motivating Example: Food Bank of the Southern Tier

- ▶ Serves six counties and nearly 4,000 square miles in New York
- ▶ Mobile Food Pantry provides food to clients at various distribution locations
- ▶ in 2019, serviced 70 regular sites, with 722 visits across all of them
- ▶ Often have to make decisions on what to stock for each location on the fly



# Fair Resource Allocation

The Mobile Food Pantry also needs to make *fair* allocations. As measured by these three main desiderata

- ▶ *Pareto Efficiency*: for any location to benefit, another must be hurt
- ▶ *Envy-freeness*: no location prefers an allocation received by another
- ▶ *Proportionality*: each location prefers the allocation received versus equal allocation

# The Model

- ▶ A principal wants to divide  $K$  commodities among  $n$  locations, with initial budget  $B$ , set of possible types (demands)  $\Theta$ . Each customer has utility function  $u$
- ▶ At each location, the principal makes an allocation  $X \in \mathbb{R}^{|\Theta| \times K}$  where each row is how much of the budget he gives to each type
- ▶ Needs to make sure all customers are satisfied while maintaining a fair allocation

# Offline Allocation

- ▶ In the *offline* allocation problem, the endowment (size) of each type is known at every location apriori
- ▶ In this scenario maximizing **Nash Social Welfare** yields a fair allocation

$$\text{maximize } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} N_{i,\theta} \log u(X_{i,\theta}, \theta) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{s.t } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} X_{i,\theta} \leq B \quad (2)$$

# Online Allocation

- ▶ In the *online* setting, the endowments are not known apriori, but are generated from known distributions  $\{\mathcal{F}_i | i \in [n]\}$
- ▶ Can be shown that in the online case achieving an allocation that fully satisfies all three fairness conditions is *impossible*
- ▶ Approximate maximizers of the Nash Social Welfare can be wildly unfair allocations

# Online Resource Allocation as an MDP

Our MDP is defined as a five tuple  $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{H})$

- ▶ State space  $\mathcal{S} := \{(b, N) | b \in \mathbb{R}_+^k, N \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|\Theta|}\}$  where  $b$  is a vector of the remaining budget, and  $N$  is a vector of the endowments. Our initial state  $S_0 = (B, N_0)$ , where  $B$  is the full pre-planned budget and  $N_0 \sim \mathcal{F}_0$
- ▶ The action-space in state  $(b, N)$  is defined as
$$\mathcal{A}_i := \{X \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|\Theta| \times K} | \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} N_{\theta} X_{\theta} \leq b\}$$
- ▶ Our reward-space  $\mathcal{R}$  is the Nash Social Welfare: while in state  $s$  and taking action  $a$ , we have  $R(s, a) = \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} N_{\theta} \log u(X_{\theta}, \theta)$  where  $u : \mathbb{R}^{|\Theta| \times K} \times \mathbb{R}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  is a utility function for the agents.
- ▶ Transitions. Given state  $(b, N_i) \in \mathcal{S}$  and action  $X \in \mathcal{A}$ . we have our new state  $s_{i+1} = (b - \sum_{\theta} N_{\theta} X_{\theta}, N_{i+1})$  where  $N_{i+1} \sim \mathcal{F}_{i+1}$
- ▶ Each episode will have the same number of steps as there are locations. Thus  $\mathcal{H} = n$



## Heuristic Agent: Equal Allocation

The equal allocation agent will make allocations proportional to the expected endowment size of each location.

$$x_{i,\theta} = B \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[N_{i,\theta}]}{\sum_{i,\theta} \mathbb{E}[N_{i,\theta}]} \right)$$

## Additional Fairness Metrics

- ▶ While our reward is still the Nash Social Welfare, we still want to know how fair our algorithm's allocation is
- ▶ We do this by comparing online allocation  $X^{alg}$  to offline (hindsight) allocation  $X^{opt}$  for our fairness criteria

$$\Delta_{envy} := \max_{i,\theta} \|X_{i,\theta}^{alg} - X_{i,\theta}^{opt}\|_{\infty} \quad (3)$$

$$\Delta_{efficiency} := \sum_{k=1}^K \left( B_k - \sum_{i,\theta} N_{i,\theta} X_{i,\theta,k}^{alg} \right) \quad (4)$$

- ▶ (should i include proportionality as well?)

# Conclusion

- ▶ Some stuff
- ▶ Reinforcement Learning could produce more fair allocations than our heuristics, etc...