

Negation is only hard to process when it is not relevant or informative

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Abstract

Negation is a fundamental element of language and logical systems, but processing negative sentences can be challenging. Early investigations suggested that this difficulty was due to the representational challenge of adding an additional logical element to a proposition, but in more recent work, supportive contexts mitigate the processing costs of negation, suggesting a pragmatic explanation. We make a strong test of this pragmatic hypothesis by directly comparing speakers and listeners. Speakers produce negative sentences more often when they are both relevant and informative. Listeners in turn are fastest to respond to sentences that they expect speakers to produce. Because negative sentences are only difficult in contexts when they are unlikely to be produced, the primary challenges in processing negation are likely due to general pragmatic principles that apply to all sentences, rather than representational factors specific to negation.

Keywords: Language, Psycholinguistics, Language Comprehension, Language Production, Pragmatics

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Introduction

Language allows us to describe not only the world as we see it, but also the world as it is not. Nevertheless, for human language users, processing negation is often slow and effortful. Deciding the truth value of a sentence like “star isn’t above plus” takes much longer than making the same decision about a positive sentence (H. Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975; Just & Carpenter, 1971, 1976). And in language comprehension tasks, participants often appear to process the positive components of a sentence prior to negating them, suggesting again that negation is challenging (Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Kaup, Ludtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & Perry, 1983; Lüdtkke, Friedrich, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2008; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008). Why do adults struggle to process negation despite producing negative sentences with ease?

One explanation is that not all negations are equally felicitous. On Gricean and neo-Gricean accounts of language use in context, listeners expect speakers to produce truthful, informative, and relevant utterances (Grice, 1975; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Many formal theories of pragmatics focus specifically on the role of either relevance or informativeness (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Frank & Goodman, 2012), or conflate the two concepts. In this paper, we attempt to examine the separate effect of these pragmatic factors.

We define an informative utterance as one that conveys more information about the referent (i.e., makes the referent easier to identify in context; see Frank and Goodman (2012); Goodman and Frank (2016) for a formalization of informativeness, and H. H. Clark (1976) and Moxey (2006) for a discussion of informativeness as it applies to negative sentences). For example, if we are looking for my car in a parking lot with many types of cars, the utterance “my car isn’t a minivan” doesn’t convey as much information as, say, “my car is a convertible”, because “isn’t a minivan” refers to a larger set of cars than “is a convertible”. If we were in a parking lot almost entirely full of minivans, however, the

statement “my car isn’t a minivan” becomes much more informative, because it helps to uniquely identify the car in question *in that particular context*.

We define a relevant feature as one that addresses the “question under discussion” (QUD), or topic of discourse (Roberts, 2012; Van Rooy, 2003). The QUD can be given implicitly by the context, and negative sentences are most relevant when the context sets up a polar QUD where at least one of the possible answers is a negative response (Xiang, Kramer, & Nordmeyer, 2020). For example, in the parking lot with many types of cars, the QUD might be something like *what type of car do you drive?* where the possible relevant utterances would be a list of different types of car (e.g. sedan, minivan, convertible, etc.), and the utterance “my car is not a minivan” would not be relevant. If we are in the parking lot full of mostly minivans, a reasonable QUD would be *is your car a minivan?* and the set of relevant utterances would be *yes* or *no*. In this latter context both *my car is a minivan* and *my car is not a minivan* are both relevant utterances, but they differ in their informativeness (in fact, the negative utterance is more informative in this specific context, because it more uniquely identifies the referent). Thus, we take relevance and informativeness to be separable pragmatic factors, and both can change depending on the context in which an utterance is produced.

A key element of neo-Gricean theories of communication is that listeners *expect* speakers to produce utterances that are informative and relevant. These pragmatic expectations are present regardless of whether a sentence is affirmative or negative. When an utterance appears to violate these principles, listeners make inferences about the speaker’s intended meaning that go beyond the literal meaning of the utterance. Neo-Gricean theories have been used to explain the pragmatic inferences that can be drawn from a negative utterance (Moeschler, 1992, see Tian, Breheny, & Ferguson, 2010; Tian, Ferguson, & Breheny, 2016 for experimental support); for example, if I told you that my car isn’t a minivan, you might *assume* that all of the other cars in the parking lot are minivans (because otherwise I would have produced a more informative utterance), or that

the QUD is *Is your car a minivan?* (which would make the utterance relevant). When the context rules out this kind of interpretation, however, the utterance is simply infelicitous. Is this kind of pragmatic infelicity generally responsible for the processing cost of negation?

Consistent with this suggestion, presenting negative information in a supportive context can mitigate some of its processing costs (Wason, 1965; Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999). When a negated feature is explicitly mentioned or inferred in preceding sentences (Lüdtke & Kaup, 2006; Orenes, Beltrán, & Santamaría, 2014), or when negation is presented within a dialogue (Dale & Duran, 2011), negative sentences tend to be processed faster relative to negative sentences presented without context. And in an ERP experiment, contextually-supported negations (e.g., “with proper equipment, scuba-diving isn’t very dangerous”) elicited smaller N400 responses—a marker of semantic processing costs—than unlicensed negations (e.g., “bulletproof vests aren’t very dangerous”; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008).

This previous work supports the neo-Gricean idea that a listener expects a speaker to produce relevant and informative utterances. These principles are violated when negative sentences are presented without a supportive context, contributing to negation’s processing cost. None of this prior work, however, directly measures how context impacts the *production* of negative sentences. Our current experiment directly tests two hypotheses. First, speakers tend to produce sentences that are both relevant and informative given the context, and should be less likely to produce a sentence (negative *or* affirmative) if the context makes that sentence irrelevant or uninformative. Second, expectations about what speakers would likely say—and their match or mismatch with what the speaker in fact *does* say—are responsible for the processing costs of negation. To formalize this second hypothesis, we make use of recent probabilistic models of language comprehension, defining a listener’s pragmatic expectations as the probability that a speaker would utter a statement in order to convey a particular meaning (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016), and using *surprisal*, an information-theoretic measure of expectation-based

processing costs (Levy, 2008), to predict processing times.

The current study

In our experiment, participants viewed sets of four characters who varied in terms of appearance (i.e. hair and shirt color) as well as the presence or absence of a target feature (e.g., boys with or without apples, where apples are the “target item”). Varying the presence or absence of the target feature created five possible context conditions: $\frac{0}{4}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{4}{4}$, where the numerator represents the number of characters in the set who e.g., have apples. In the *speaker* condition, participants produced written descriptions of one of the characters, while in the *listener* condition participants evaluated the truth value of sentences about the same pictures (see Figure 1). We predicted that speakers would be more likely to mention the presence or absence of the feature (e.g., apples) when that feature was relevant and informative. Furthermore, we predicted that listeners’ processing costs would be related to the probability of a speaker using the same sentence to describe that picture.

Mentioning the presence or absence of a target feature (e.g. *apples*) is only relevant when at least one character in the context has apples, setting up a *polar QUD* (e.g. *Does boy X have apples?*; Xiang et al. (2020)). Here, the $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, and $\frac{3}{4}$ contexts should give rise to QUDs where a true negative sentence such as “X has no apples” is a relevant and felicitous response. In the $\frac{0}{4}$ context, none of the characters have apples, making *Does boy X have apples?* an unlikely QUD. Thus we expected that very few (if any) speakers would mention the absence of target items in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context, and that listeners would be slowest to respond to negative sentences in this context. In the $\frac{1}{4}$ context, at least one character in the set possesses target items, so mentioning the presence or absence of the target item becomes relevant in this context. We therefore predicted a sharp decrease in the surprisal of producing a true negative utterance and the reaction time to respond to a true negative utterance between the $\frac{0}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ contexts.

The informativeness of an utterance changes depending on how many other characters could be described by that utterance (e.g., saying a character “has apples” is informative when *few* other characters have apples, whereas “has no apples” is informative when *most* other characters have apples). Mentioning the absence of target items is more informative in the $\frac{1}{4}$ context compared to the $\frac{0}{4}$; however, a negative utterance in the $\frac{1}{4}$ context is still not very informative compared to describing a character’s shirt color (i.e., “no apples” describes three possible characters in the $\frac{1}{4}$ context, whereas “blue shirt” only describes the referent; a participant could always produce an informative utterance by describing clothing color). We expected that the probability of producing a negative utterance would increase as the number of context characters with target items increased (i.e., in the $\frac{3}{4}$ context “no apples” is just as informative as “blue shirt”, because both utterances uniquely identify the referent). For positive sentences we predicted the opposite effect of context: In the $\frac{4}{4}$ context, saying “has apples” is not very informative, because everyone has apples; in the $\frac{1}{4}$ context, however, “has apples” is very informative because the target character is the only person who has apples. We predicted a corresponding shift in reaction time for listeners, with listeners responding fastest to the sentences that were informative in context.

Method

Participants

We recruited a planned sample of 500 participants to participate in an online experiment through the Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) website; 5 participants were rejected for indicating that they were under 18 after completing the experiment. Of the remaining 495 participants, 238 were male and 255 were female, two declined to report gender, and ages ranged from 18 – 65+. We restricted participation to individuals in the US and paid 50 cents for this 10 minute study. Participants were randomly assigned to either the speaker condition ($n = 242$) or the listener condition ($n = 253$).




Figure 1. An example of a true negative trial with a 0/4 context (left) and a 3/4 context (right). The sentence “Bob has no apples” in the 0/4 context is both uninformative (because the sentence is true of all of the characters) and irrelevant (because apples are not present in the context and therefore the QUD is unlikely to be about apples), whereas the same sentence in the 3/4 context is both informative and relevant.

Stimuli

Thirty-two trial items were created in which characters were shown holding either two of the same common, recognizable objects (“target items”; e.g., two apples), or holding nothing. Within each trial, characters’ shirt and hair colors also varied, providing other referential possibilities for speakers.

Each participant saw trials in which different proportions of characters were holding target items (context condition). These contexts showed $\frac{0}{4}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, or $\frac{4}{4}$ of the characters holding objects. The order of characters was shuffled on each trial, with the referent of the sentence appearing in a random position.

Participants in the speaker condition saw each image paired with an incomplete sentence (e.g. “[NAME] has _____.”). In half of the trials, the highlighted character was holding target items (“item” trials), and in half of the trials, the highlighted

character was holding nothing (“nothing” trials). The experiment was fully crossed such that target characters appeared with or without target items an equal number of times in each context type.

Participants in the listener condition saw the same set of images. On each trial a sentence of the form “[NAME] [has/has no] [TARGET ITEM]” appeared. Half of the sentences were positive and half were negative (sentence type), and they were paired with pictures such that half were true and half were false (truth value), resulting in four possible trial types (true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative). Because true positive and false negative sentences cannot occur in a $\frac{0}{4}$ context (i.e. the referent must have the target item in these trials), and true negative and false positive sentences cannot occur in a $\frac{4}{4}$ context, each trial type occurred in four possible contexts. The experiment was fully crossed, with participants receiving eight true positive, eight false positive, eight true negative and eight false negative sentences distributed equally across context types in a randomized order over the course of the study.

Procedure

Participants were first presented with a brief overview screen explaining that they would play a language game. Once participants accepted the task, they were randomly assigned to the speaker condition or the listener condition and saw more detailed instructions which explained the task and informed them that they could stop at any time.¹

In the speaker condition, participants saw an array of four pictures on each trial: The target pictures and three context pictures presented in a random horizontal arrangement. Participants looked at these pictures for four seconds, at which point a red box appeared around one of the pictures. One second later, an incomplete sentence appeared. Participants were told that the incomplete sentence was about the picture with the box

¹The speaker and listener conditions of the experiment can be viewed at <http://anordmey.github.io/negatron/experiments/speakers/negatron.html> and <http://anordmey.github.io/negatron/experiments/listeners/negatron.html>, respectively.

around it, and that their job was to complete the sentence (by typing into a small text box) using only a few words. Participants were explicitly discouraged from referring to the character’s position in the array of pictures.

In the listener condition, participants first saw eight positive sentence practice trials with feedback about incorrect responses before beginning the test trials. In each test trial, participants saw the same arrays of pictures shown to participants in the speaker condition for four seconds, at which point a red box appeared around one of the pictures. One second later, a sentence about that picture appeared. Participants were told to read the sentence and respond as quickly and accurately as possible with a judgment of whether it was true or false when applied to the highlighted picture. We recorded reaction times for each trial, measured as the time from when the sentence was presented to the moment when the response was made.

Data Processing

We excluded 16 participants who did not list English as their native language and two participants from the listener condition for having an overall accuracy below 80%. This left a total of 477 participants for analysis (244 in listener condition, 233 in speaker condition).

In the speaker condition, affirmative responses labeling the target feature were coded as “positive” (e.g., “apples,” “two apples,” “red apples,” etc.). Responses negating the target feature (e.g., “no apples”) were coded as “negative.” All other responses (e.g. descriptions of the characters’ clothing or hair color, as well as other types of positive or negative utterances) were coded as “other.” Codes were hand-checked to ensure that label synonyms or spelling errors were coded correctly.

In the listener condition, we excluded trials with RTs greater than 3 standard deviations from the log-transformed mean, a criterion established in our previous experiments (Nordmeyer & Frank, 2014).

To predict responding in the listener condition, we used productions from the speaker

condition. We calculated the proportion of positive sentences describing characters who possessed target items, and the proportion of negative sentences describing characters with nothing, creating probability distributions for true positive and true negative utterances in each context. We then used this distribution to calculate the surprisal of hearing a true positive or true negative sentence for each context. Surprisal is an information-theoretic measure of the amount of information carried by an event (in this case, the amount of information conveyed by a sentence); in prior work on sentence comprehension it has been used successfully as a linking hypothesis between production probabilities and reaction times (Levy, 2008). Surprisal (or “self-information” I) for a sentence s is defined as

$$I(s) = -\log(P(s)). \quad (1)$$

Results

Speaker Condition

Participants were more likely to produce true positive utterances about target items than they were to produce true negative utterances about the *absence* of target items. As the number of characters in the context with target items increased, however, participants became less likely to produce true positive utterances about referents with target items, and more likely to produce true negative utterances about characters without target items (see Figure 2). That is, the production of both negative *and* positive sentences was influenced by the surrounding context. These findings support our hypothesis that speakers will produce informative utterances (i.e. produce sentences that are maximally effective at identifying the referent), because true positive utterances about the presence of target items are more informative when none of the other characters have target items (e.g. the $\frac{1}{4}$ context), whereas true negative utterances about the absence of target items are more informative when the other characters *do* have target items (e.g. the $\frac{3}{4}$ context)




Figure 2. Probability of producing negative sentences on “nothing” trials (i.e., true negatives) and positive sentences on “item” trials (i.e., true positives) across different contexts. Negative sentences are shown in black, and positive sentences in grey. The context is notated by a fraction representing the number of characters in the context who held target items. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals computed by non-parametric bootstrapping.

Consistent with our hypothesis that speakers will produce negative sentences that are relevant (i.e. producing an utterance that is a possible response to a likely QUD), negative sentences were almost never produced on “nothing” trials in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context. That is, “no apples” was a very rare production on trials where there weren’t any apples in the context; participants in this condition tended to produce affirmative sentences describing other features of the referent, such as their clothing or hair color. Participants only consistently produced negative utterances in the $\frac{1}{4}$ context, where at least one other character has target items, thus making *Does boy X have apples?* a likely QUD.

To evaluate the reliability of these patterns, we fit two separate binomial mixed-effects models: 1) a model fit only to negative utterances, and 2) a model fit only to positive utterances. To test the effect of informativeness, we coded context as numeric, e.g.




Figure 3. Surprisal for true positive and true negative sentences across different contexts. Negative sentences are shown in black, and positive sentences in grey. The context is notated by a fraction representing the number of characters in the context who held target items. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals computed by non-parametric bootstrapping.

the proportion of characters in the context with target items. To test the effect of relevance, we created a dummy code to separately test for the effects of the $\frac{0}{4}$ context compared to all of the other contexts (i.e., the contexts where discussing the presence or absence of apples is relevant).²

For the first model described above, we tested the effect of context on the probability of producing a true negative utterance on “nothing” trials.³ We found a significant effect of the relevant contexts, indicating that participants were less likely to produce negative sentences in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context compared to the other contexts ($\beta = -1.19$, $p = .015$). This finding suggests that relevance has a significant effect on the production of true negative

²All mixed-effects models used the maximal convergent random effects structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) and were fit using the lme4 package version 1.1-7 in R version 3.1.2.

³The model specification was as follows: `negation ~ relevant context + numeric context + (1 | subject) + (1 | item)`.

sentences. We also found a significant positive linear effect of context, with the probability of producing a negative sentence increasing as the proportion of characters with target items increases ($\beta = 7.30$, $p < .001$), indicating a significant effect of informativeness on the production of negative sentences.

The second model tested the effect of context on the probability of producing a true positive utterance on “item” trials.⁴ We found a significant *negative* linear effect of context ($\beta = -5.5$, $p < .001$), indicating that the probability of producing a positive utterance decreases as the proportion of characters with target items increases. The findings of both models together suggest that the probability of producing both true positive and true negative utterances is influenced by the informativeness of that utterance in context.

Figure 3 shows the surprisal of true positive and true negative sentences. Consistent with our predictions, surprisal decreases for true negative sentences and increases for true positive utterances as the number of characters with target items increases, indicating a significant effect of informativeness on the production of both positive and negative sentences. The steep gap in surprisal between the $\frac{0}{4}$ and the $\frac{1}{4}$ contexts is driven by the fact that almost no participants produced negation in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context, where a negative utterance is not relevant. Because the probability is close to zero, the surprisal for these utterances is much higher than the surprisal of an utterance that is even slightly more probable.

In our analyses we coded utterances such as “Bob has nothing” as “other” rather than “negative” because we wanted to examine speaker utterances that were as close as possible to the utterances in the listener condition. Furthermore, our discussion of relevance makes specific predictions about the negation of the target item (e.g., a polar QUD licenses [*has apples*, *has no apples*]) and it is less clear what QUDs license the response *has nothing*. In two exploratory analyses, we examined how these coding decisions influenced our results. Consistent with our predictions, if we include other negations of the

⁴The model specification was as follows: `positive ~ numeric context + (1 | subject) + (1 | item)`.




Figure 4. Reaction times for each trial type across different conditions. Responses to true sentences are shown on the left, and false sentences are shown on the right. Negative sentences are shown in black, and positive sentences in grey. The context is notated by a fraction representing the number of characters in the context who held target items. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals computed by non-parametric bootstrap.

target item in our analysis (e.g., “not apples”, “without apples”, “zero apples”, etc.), the results of the speaker condition are the same as those reported above (i.e., significant effects of relevance and informativeness). If we include instances of “nothing”, however, the effect of informativeness remains highly significant ($\beta = 6.55$, $p < .001$), but the effect of relevance is no longer significant ($\beta = -0.21$, $p = 0.50$). That is, “has no apples” is not a very relevant utterance in a context where no one else has apples, but “has nothing” is, perhaps, a relevant thing to say in the context of an experiment where people sometimes have objects and sometimes do not.

Listener Condition

Participants were fastest to respond to true positive sentences, and slowest to respond to true negative sentences, replicating previous findings (H. Clark & Chase, 1972).

Listeners' responses to true negative sentences mirrored the surprisal of true negative sentences in the speaker condition, with participants responding slowest to true negatives in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context. The same pattern was seen in response to false positive sentences, suggesting that listeners expect speakers to describe relevant features of the context even when the sentence is false (see Figure 4). Overall accuracy on this task was very high, with participants responding correctly on 98% of true positive trials, 93% of true negative trials, 96% of false positive trials, and 97% of false negative trials.

We fit a linear mixed-effects model to examine the interaction between sentence type (positive or negative), truth value (true or false), and context as predictors of reaction time.⁵ All model coefficients are shown in Table 1. In addition to main effects of sentence type ($\beta = -205$, $p < .001$) and truth value ($\beta = -384$, $p < .001$), there was an interaction such that true positive sentences elicited the fastest responses and true negative sentences elicited the slowest responses ($\beta = -663$, $p < .001$). The model showed a significant negative linear effect of context, with reaction times decreasing as the proportion of characters with target items increased ($\beta = -341$, $p < .001$). A significant three-way interaction between sentence type, truth value, and context indicates that this pattern was driven primarily by responses to true negative sentences, with context having the most pronounced effect on true negative utterances ($\beta = -901$, $p < .001$).

To explore the separate effects of relevance (i.e., the effect of the $\frac{0}{4}$ context compared to the others) and informativeness (i.e. the linear effect of context) on responses to true utterances, we fit two separate models to reaction times in response to true positive and true negative utterances.⁶ We found a significant effect of relevance on reaction times for

⁵The model specification was as follows: `RT ~ sentence × truth × context + (sentence | subject) + (sentence | item)`.

⁶Model specification for true negative model: `rt ~ relevance context + numeric context + (relevant context + numeric context | subject) + (relevant context + numeric context | item)`; model specification for true positive model: `rt ~ numeric context + (numeric context | subject) + (numeric context | item)`.

negative utterances, with the $\frac{0}{4}$ context producing significantly slower reaction times compared to the relevant contexts ($\beta = 307, p < .001$). We did not find a significant linear effect of context above and beyond the effect of the $\frac{0}{4}$ context ($\beta = -41, p = .58$). We did, however, find a significant positive linear effect of context on the the reaction time to respond to positive sentences ($\beta = 111, p = .02$), indicating a significant effect of informativeness on RTs to positive sentences, but not negative sentences.

Table 1

Coefficient estimates from a mixed-effects model predicting listeners' reaction times in response to sentences in different contexts.

	Coefficient	Std. err.	<i>t</i>
Intercept	1598	41	39.16
Sentence (Negative)	-205	38	-5.36
Truth (True)	-384	36	-10.57
Context	-341	42	-8.14
Sentence \times Truth	663	54	12.16
Sentence \times Context	377	59	6.40
Truth \times Context	454	59	7.71
Sentence \times Truth \times Context	-901	83	-10.79

Predicting Listeners with Speakers

To test our hypothesis that processing times are a function of listeners' expectations about what a speaker will say, we regressed the mean reaction time in response to true positive and negative utterances in each condition against the surprisal for the same utterances (Figure 5). There was a significant positive relationship between surprisal and reaction time for true negative sentences, $R^2 = .93, p < .001$, supporting our prediction that the effects of context on reaction time reflect differences in how speakers would




Figure 5. Reaction times in the listener condition plotted by surprisal in the speaker condition. Each point represents a measurement for sentence type and context. Negative sentences are shown in black, and positive sentences in grey. Error bars on the horizontal and vertical axes represent 95% confidence intervals on their respective measures. The gray band shows the linear regression and 95% confidence region for all conditions. The inset graph zooms in on the linear regression and 95% confidence region for data excluding the outlying 0/4 condition.

describe the same stimuli. This relationship between surprisal and reaction time for true negative sentences holds even with the outlying $\frac{0}{4}$ context removed from analysis ($R^2 = .71$, $p = .017$).

Much like other psycholinguistic experiments, our tasks take place in a restricted world where the set of possible referents (and by extension, the set of possible utterances that a speaker is likely to produce) is limited. In real world contexts, a speaker could produce many different utterances to describe many different referents at any given moment. Our goal in these experiments is to explore whether Neo-Gricean pragmatic

principles can at minimum explain how people communicate in these restricted worlds. Our theory would predict that when people produce negative utterances in the “real world” they are *usually* producing them in contexts where those utterances are highly informative and relevant; thus, we would predict that people have less difficulty processing negative sentences in natural conversation than they do in constrained psycholinguistic experiments.

We do have some data to explore whether the relationship between speaker surprisal and listener reaction time is influenced by the availability of other possible utterances. In a previous, unpublished version of this study, participants engaged in a version of these tasks where all four characters were identical except for the presence or absence of target items.⁷ Thus, in the previous version, descriptions of clothing color were always relatively uninformative (because they were true of all characters in a given trial). A negative utterance on “nothing” trials was therefore at least as informative as describing shirt color in the $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, and $\frac{3}{4}$ contexts. Contrast this with the current study, where describing the color of a characters shirt is *always* an informative utterance; the informativeness of a true negative utterance is only comparable to these competing utterances in the $\frac{3}{4}$ context. The effect of the informativeness of these competing utterances in the current study is reflected in the raw probabilities for the speaker data (Figure 2), where there is a jump in the probability of a true negative utterance between the $\frac{2}{4}$ and the $\frac{3}{4}$ context. In the previous version, this sharp increase occurred between the $\frac{0}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ contexts – again, the point where producing a true positive utterance becomes as informative as producing an utterance about e.g., shirt color.

In both the previous study and the current study, the *surprisal* of producing a negative utterance is significantly higher in the $\frac{0}{4}$ than in any other context, because the probability of producing a true negative utterance in this context is close to zero. Furthermore, in the listener condition of both versions of the experiment the $\frac{0}{4}$ context

⁷Raw data and analysis code for this original experiment are available at <https://github.com/anordmey/negatron>.

yields much slower reaction times than any other context. Critically, replicating both the direction and magnitude of the findings reported here, in the previous study, speaker surprisal and listener reaction time were strongly related, $R^2 = .89$, $p < .001$. Thus, the relationship between speaker surprisal and listener reaction time appears to be robust to changes in the relative informativeness of competing utterances.

General Discussion

What makes negation hard to process? While previous work has proposed that processing negative elements is especially difficult because of features intrinsic to negation, our work suggests that the same general pragmatic mechanisms that govern positive sentences are responsible for much of the difficulty associated with negative sentences. Negative sentences presented without context are uninformative and not relevant; thus, they are unlikely to be produced by speakers. In turn, listeners respond to unlikely utterances with increased processing times. In contexts where negation is relevant and more informative, processing costs are lower. Overall, this evidence supports a Gricean interpretation of negation processing, with pragmatic principles playing a role in the processing of both positive and negative sentences.

While previous work has shown that contextual factors facilitate the processing of negation (Wason, 1965; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Dale & Duran, 2011; Orenes et al., 2014), our findings here go further. First, by using actual language productions as the predictor of processing difficulty, our work strongly implicates specifically pragmatic factors. Because the field of pragmatics is concerned with language *use*, demonstrating a relationship between actual speaker productions and listener processing time is critical to the argument that pragmatic factors are responsible for the processing cost of negation. To our knowledge none of the past work on the effect of context on negation has demonstrated this relationship. Second, rather than treating pragmatics as a black box, we show that two different components—informativeness and relevance—each contribute to the relative

(un-)likelihood of hearing a negation. Speakers were unlikely to mention the absence of a feature unless it was a relevant response to a likely QUD, and were more likely to mention the presence or absence of features when mentioning those features would help uniquely identify the referent. The fact that informativeness played a role in the production of both positive and negative utterances supports our argument that these pragmatic pressures are general, rather than specific to negation.

Speakers were most likely to produce true negatives in the $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, and $\frac{3}{4}$ contexts. As suggested in Xiang et al. (2020), these are contexts that give rise to a polar QUD. The structure of the experiment may have also played a role in QUD inference; e.g., our prompt for speakers asked them to fill in the sentence “[NAME] has _____.” which may have biased speakers towards a polar QUD (e.g. *Does [NAME] have [ITEM]?*). The within-subjects structure may also have contributed to this, as participants may have inferred the polar QUD due to the presence/absence of items varying across different trials.

In the $\frac{0}{4}$ context, producing the utterance *has no apples* is not relevant because *no one* has apples and therefore the QUD is unlikely to be related to the presence or absence of apples. What *is* the QUD in this context? An analysis of all speaker responses, shown in Figure 6, can help illuminate the likely QUD in different contexts. In the $\frac{0}{4}$ context, speakers overwhelmingly described color - usually hair or shirt color, which varied across all characters and was therefore highly informative. In fact, speakers described shirt or hair color frequently in all contexts, though describing color was most frequent in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context (89% in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context vs. 41%, 53%, 42%, 57% in the $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{4}{4}$ contexts respectively).⁸ This suggests that some proportion of speakers, most commonly in the $\frac{0}{4}$ condition, interpreted the QUD as something like *What color shirt is the person wearing* or even *What*

⁸Coding was conducted such that each response could only receive a single code, i.e., “has a red shirt and no apples” would be coded as negative, “has a blue shirt and apples” would be coded as positive, etc. An additional analysis that simply looked at the probability of describing color in any response did not change the pattern described above; in this analysis 90% described color in the $\frac{0}{4}$ context and 48%, 60%, 48%, 62% described color in the $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{4}{4}$ contexts respectively.




Figure 6. Categories of different types of speaker responses across the different context conditions.

does this person look like, which would license more general descriptions of the referent.

Listeners' reaction times were highly correlated with the surprisal of a speaker producing the same utterances in context. For true negative sentences, however, this effect was driven primarily by the effect of relevance (i.e., the difference between the $\frac{0}{4}$ and all other contexts). Why didn't informativeness play a role in listeners' response times? One possibility is that only relevance plays a role in forming listeners' expectations about what a speaker will say. Another possibility is that the effect of informativeness is small compared to the effect of relevance, and that the reaction time measure is too noisy to identify this effect. Although our results cannot disentangle these two possibilities, the fact that we did find a significant effect of informativeness on listeners' responses to true positive sentences suggests that informativeness does play some role in listeners' expectations.

We use surprisal, an information-theoretic measure of processing difficulty, as the

linking hypothesis between speaker probabilities and reaction times (Levy, 2008).

Although this link has substantial support in the realm of syntactic processing (Demberg & Keller, 2008; Boston, Hale, Kliegl, Patil, & Vasishth, 2008), to our knowledge, our findings are the first example of using surprisal over sentence-level pragmatic expectations, rather than word-level syntactic expectations. This success suggests that, in concert with the appropriate predictive models, surprisal theory could be productively applied to the prediction of processing difficulty beyond the level of syntax.

Our analysis is intended as a computational level analysis (Marr, 1982). We are not committed to a specific account of how pragmatic inferences are represented. Our results don't tell us whether listeners actually simulate a speaker or a specific QUD when they form expectations about what a speaker will say, or doing something that approximates such a simulation. Our goal is to show at least that the weaker of these two possibilities is true; that is, listeners are forming expectations about what a speaker will say, even though we don't know precisely what form these representations take. Several mechanistic theories of pragmatics have been proposed, such as an in-the-moment alignment of linguistic representations between speakers and listeners (Pickering & Garrod, 2004), or cached expectations about how speakers use language leading to preferred interpretations by listeners (Levinson, 2000). Either of these possibilities, or any number of others, could be consistent with our data.

Although we focus here on negation, our findings have implications for sentence processing more generally. Debates about the effects of pragmatics on linguistic processing exist in other domains, such as the processing of scalar implicatures (the pragmatic inference that e.g., “some” implicates “some but not all”; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011; Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010). Tomlinson, Bailey, and Bott (2013) provide an informative comparison between scalar implicature and negation, presenting mouse-tracking trajectories for each. Their negation data show the same pattern of processing difficulties we observe, and critically, their data on the processing of

underinformative “some” utterances look almost identical. We hypothesize that, in both cases, participants’ processing difficulty is a function of the violation of their pragmatic expectations.

Our findings here suggest that a large part of the processing difficulties of negative sentences arise from the relative pragmatic felicity of negation in context. They do not rule out the possibility that there is some cost to processing an additional logical element, but this processing cost would have to be quite small with respect to the magnitude of the effects we observed. This finding leads us to the following conclusion: When logical words are used in a communicative context, we have no difficulty understanding them.

Author Contributions

Both authors developed the study concept and contributed to the study design. Data collection was conducted by A. E. Nordmeyer. A. E. Nordmeyer performed the data analysis and interpretation under the supervision of M.C. Frank. Both authors contributed to the development of the manuscript and approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

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Competing Interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Data Accessibility Statement

All the stimuli, experiment code, raw data, and analysis scripts described here can be found on this paper’s project page at <https://github.com/anordmey/negatron>.

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