ANSHUMAN BHAKRI

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FIELDS

Industrial Organization, Energy and Environmental Economics, Microeconomics   .

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Assistant Professor of Economics & Public Policy (Incoming Fall 2025), Indian School of Business

EDUCATION

Department of Economics, Boston College   Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
Ph.D. in Economics   May 2025 *(expected)*
- Committee: Richard Sweeney, Michael Grubb, Charles Murry

Department of Economics, Boston College   Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
M.A. in Economics   May 2021

Delhi School of Economics   Delhi, India
M.A. in Economics   May 2017

Netaji Subhas Institute of Technology   Delhi, India
B.E. in Manufacturing Processes and Automation   May 2014

WORKING PAPERS

Contract design in renewable energy procurement auctions: Evidence from India

In procurement auctions, contracts set the post-auction investment terms. Under future uncertainty, incomplete contracts result in under-investment. This paper proposes contract design for Indian solar energy procurement auctions to help achieve their green energy targets at the lowest possible procurement costs. I estimate a model of firms' optimal bidding and deployment decisions under cost uncertainty. Using the auction and post-award deployment data, I recover the distribution of the firms' costs and show how the contract design influences procurement costs and deployment outcomes. The results show that the firms take the option of not deploying under high-probability cost scenarios, which leads to low deployment rates. The counterfactual analysis shows that incentive contracts with optimal selective bid indexing and penalties can achieve an 80% increase in deployment with a 3% increase in tariff.

Strategic bidding in dynamic renewable energy auctions

Reaching climate goals requires a green energy transition over time, necessitating phased procurement and making dynamics important for the auction design. This paper develops a dynamic auction model where forward-looking firms adjust bids strategically across multiple periods. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies, showing that bid markups depend on cost distribution, market composition, and continuation values. Comparing one-shot and two-period auctions shows a tradeoff: one-shot auctions involve higher bids due to larger auctioned quantities, while dynamic auctions allow firms to bid strategically over time. Our findings highlight how auction design influences procurement efficiency, emphasizing the need to account for bidder expectations to minimize costs and improve outcomes.

WORK IN PROGRESS

How large are the cost savings from renewable energy auctions: Evidence from Germany (With Richard L. Sweeney)

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| AWARDS | • Winner of Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award at Boston College | 2023 |
| | • Tuition Remission and Stipend, Boston College | 2019-Present |

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Boston College

Machine Learning in Economics (*Teaching Fellow*)	Fall 2024
Principles of Economics (*Teaching Fellow*)	Summer 2024
Principles of Economics (*Head Teaching Assistant*)	Spring 2024
Principles of Economics (*Head Teaching Assistant*)	Fall 2023
Econometrics Lab (*Teaching Assistant*)	Fall 2022
Principles of Economics (*Teaching Assistant*)	Fall 2021

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Boston College

Teaching Fellow	2024-Present
Teaching Assistant	2020-2024
Research Assistant to Richard Sweeney	2019-2020

PricewaterhouseCoopers, US Advisory	Mumbai, India
Experienced Associate	2017-2019

Used Machine learning and NLP to solve business problems in the Healthcare and Industrial Products sector

Mu Sigma	Bangalore, India
Decision Scientist	2014-2015

Created and automated drug performance models for a Pharmaceutical Company

PRESENTATIONS

Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, AERE Eastern Economic Association (forthcoming), AERE @OSWEET Energy talk, AERE Summer Conference, UC Berkeley Summer School, Boston College Markets and Firms seminar series, Boston College Dissertation Workshop   .

SKILLS

Languages: English, Hindi

Programming: `Python`, `R`, `Julia`, `MATLAB`, `Stata`, LaTeX.

REFERENCES

Richard Sweeney	Michael Grubb	Charles Murry
Associate Professor	Associate Professor	Associate Professor
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
Boston College	Boston College	University of Michigan
sweeneri@bc.edu	michael.grubb@bc.edu	ctmurry@umich.edu