

ANSHUMAN BHAKRI

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FIELDS	Industrial Organization, Energy and Environmental Economics, Microeconomics	
EDUCATION	Department of Economics, Boston College	Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
	<i>Ph.D. in Economics</i>	May 2025 (<i>expected</i>)
	• Committee: Richard Sweeney, Michael Grubb, Charles Murry	
	Department of Economics, Boston College	Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
	<i>M.A. in Economics</i>	May 2021
WORKING PAPERS	Delhi School of Economics	Delhi, India
	<i>M.A. in Economics</i>	May 2017
	Netaji Subhas Institute of Technology	Delhi, India
	<i>B.E. in Manufacturing Processes and Automation</i>	May 2014
	Contract design in renewable energy procurement auctions: Evidence from India	
WORK IN PROGRESS	In procurement auctions, contracts set the post-auction investment terms. Under future uncertainty, incomplete contracts result in under-investment. This paper proposes contract design for Indian solar energy procurement auctions to help achieve their green energy targets at the lowest possible procurement costs. I estimate a model of firms' optimal bidding and deployment decisions under cost uncertainty. Using the auction and post-award deployment data, I recover the distribution of the firms' costs and show how the contract design influences procurement costs and deployment outcomes. The results show that the firms take the option of not deploying under high-probability cost scenarios, which leads to low deployment rates. The counterfactual analysis shows that incentive contracts with optimal selective bid indexing and penalties can achieve an 80% increase in deployment with a 3% increase in tariff.	
	How large are the cost savings from renewable energy auctions: Evidence from Germany (With Richard L. Sweeney)	
AWARDS	In this paper, we analyze the cost savings from renewable energy auctions in Germany, focusing on wind energy procurement. After Germany's 2017 shift from feed-in tariffs to auctions, we observed an initial price decrease, followed by a reversion to ceiling prices. We develop an empirical model of bidding in multi-unit procurement auctions to explain this pattern, showing how markups vary with bidder cost uncertainty. Using detailed geospatial and auction data, we estimate the distribution of private costs and study the dynamics of bid convergence. Our results contribute to understanding the efficiency and cost implications of renewable energy auctions.	
	• Winner of Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award at Boston College	2023
	• Tuition Remission and Stipend, Boston College	2019-Present

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Boston College		
	Machine Learning in Economics (<i>Teaching Fellow</i>)		Fall 2024
	Principles of Economics (<i>Teaching Fellow</i>)		Summer 2024
	Principles of Economics (<i>Head Teaching Assistant</i>)		Spring 2024
	Principles of Economics (<i>Head Teaching Assistant</i>)		Fall 2023
	Econometrics Lab (<i>Teaching Assistant</i>)		Fall 2022
	Principles of Economics (<i>Teaching Assistant</i>)		Fall 2021
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	Boston College		
	Teaching Fellow		2024-Present
	Teaching Assistant		2020-2024
	Research Assistant to Richard Sweeney		2019-2020
	PricewaterhouseCoopers, US Advisory		
	Experienced Associate		Mumbai, India 2017-2019
	<i>Used Machine learning and NLP to solve business problems in the Healthcare and Industrial Products sector</i>		
	Mu Sigma		
	Decision Scientist		Bangalore, India 2014-2015
	<i>Created and automated drug performance models for a Pharmaceutical Company</i>		
PRESENTATIONS	Annual International Industrial Organization Conference (forthcoming), AERE Eastern Economic Association (forthcoming), AERE @OSWEET Energy talk, AERE Summer Conference, UC Berkeley Summer School, Boston College Markets and Firms seminar series, Boston College Dissertation Workshop		
SKILLS	Languages: English, Hindi		
	Programming: Python, R, Julia , MATLAB, Stata, \LaTeX .		
REFERENCES			
	Richard Sweeney Associate Professor Department of Economics Boston College sweeneri@bc.edu	Michael Grubb Associate Professor Department of Economics Boston College michael.grubb@bc.edu	Charles Murry Associate Professor Department of Economics University of Michigan ctmurry@umich.edu