ANSHUMAN BHAKRI

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FIELDS

Industrial Organization, Energy and Environmental Economics, Microeconomics   .

EDUCATION

Department of Economics, Boston College   Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
Ph.D. in Economics   May 2025 *(expected)*
- Committee: Richard Sweeney, Michael Grubb, Charles Murry

Department of Economics, Boston College   Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
M.A. in Economics   May 2021

Delhi School of Economics   Delhi, India
M.A. in Economics   May 2017

Netaji Subhas Institute of Technology   Delhi, India
B.E. in Manufacturing Processes and Automation   May 2014

WORKING PAPERS

Contract design in renewable energy procurement auctions: Evidence from India

In procurement auctions, contracts set the post-auction investment terms. Under future uncertainty, incomplete contracts result in under-investment. This paper proposes contract design for Indian solar energy procurement auctions to help achieve their green energy targets at the lowest possible procurement costs. I estimate a model of firms' optimal bidding and deployment decisions under cost uncertainty. Using the auction and post-award deployment data, I recover the distribution of the firms' costs and show how the contract design influences procurement costs and deployment outcomes. The results show that the firms take the option of not deploying under high-probability cost scenarios, which leads to low deployment rates. The counterfactual analysis shows that incentive contracts with optimal selective bid indexing and penalties can achieve an 80% increase in deployment with a 3% increase in tariff.

WORK IN PROGRESS

How large are the cost savings from renewable energy auctions: Evidence from Germany (With Richard L. Sweeney)

In this paper, we analyze the cost savings from renewable energy auctions in Germany, focusing on wind energy procurement. After Germany's 2017 shift from feed-in tariffs to auctions, we observed an initial price decrease, followed by a reversion to ceiling prices. We develop an empirical model of bidding in multi-unit procurement auctions to explain this pattern, showing how markups vary with bidder cost uncertainty. Using detailed geospatial and auction data, we estimate the distribution of private costs and study the dynamics of bid convergence. Our results contribute to understanding the efficiency and cost implications of renewable energy auctions.   .

AWARDS

- Winner of Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award at Boston College   2023
- Tuition Remission and Stipend, Boston College   2019-Present

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	**Boston College**	
	Machine Learning in Economics (*Teaching Fellow*)	Fall 2024
	Principles of Economics (*Teaching Fellow*)	Summer 2024
	Principles of Economics (*Head Teaching Assistant*)	Spring 2024
	Principles of Economics (*Head Teaching Assistant*)	Fall 2023
	Econometrics Lab (*Teaching Assistant*)	Fall 2022
	Principles of Economics (*Teaching Assistant*)	Fall 2021

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Boston College

Research Assistant to Richard Sweeney — Fall 2019

PricewaterhouseCoopers, US Advisory — Mumbai, India

Experienced Associate — 2017-2019

Used Machine learning and NLP to solve business problems in the Healthcare and Industrial Products sector

Mu Sigma — Bangalore, India

Decision Scientist — 2014-2015

Created and automated drug performance models for a Pharmaceutical Company

PRESENTATIONS

AERE @OSWEET Energy talk, AERE Summer Conference, UC Berkeley Summer School, Boston College Markets and Firms seminar series, Boston College Dissertation Workshop .

SKILLS

Languages: English, Hindi

Programming: Python, R, Julia , MATLAB, Stata, LaTeX.

REFERENCES

Richard Sweeney	Michael Grubb	Charles Murry
Associate Professor	Associate Professor	Associate Professor
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
Boston College	Boston College	University of Michigan
sweeneri@bc.edu	michael.grubb@bc.edu	ctmurry@umich.edu