Anshuman Bhakri

385D Maloney Hall Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 anshumanbhakri.github.io bhakri@bc.edu (+1) 857-352-6319

FIELDS

Industrial Organization, Energy and Environmental Economics, Microeconomics

EDUCATION

Department of Economics, Boston College

Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

Ph.D. in Economics

May 2025 (expected)

- Committee: Richard Sweeney, Michael Grubb, Charles Murry
- Research area: Industrial Organization, Energy and Environmental Economics

Department of Economics, Boston College	Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
M.A. in Economics	May 2021
Delhi School of Economics	Delhi, India
M.A. in Economics	May 2017
Netaji Subhas Institute of Technology	Delhi, India
B.E. in Manufacturing Processes and Automation	May 2014

Working Papers

Contract design in renewable energy procurement auctions: Evidence from India

In procurement auctions, contracts set the post-auction investment terms. Under future uncertainty, incomplete contracts result in under-investment. This paper proposes contract design for the Indian solar energy procurement auctions to help achieve their green energy targets at the lowest possible procurement costs. I estimate a model to analyze the firms' optimal bidding and deployment decisions under cost uncertainty. Using the auction and post-award deployment data, I recover the cost distribution of the firms and show how the contract design influences procurement costs and deployment outcomes. The results show that the firms take the option of not deploying under high-probability cost scenarios, which leads to low deployment rates. The counterfactual analysis shows that incentive contracts with optimal selective bid indexing and penalties could increase deployment by 80% with only a marginal tariff rise of 3% as compared to the baseline.

Work In Progress

How large are the cost savings from renewable energy auctions: Evidence from Germany (With Richard L. Sweeney)

In this paper, we analyze the cost savings from renewable energy auctions in Germany, focusing on wind energy procurement. After Germany's 2017 shift from feed-in tariffs to auctions, we observed an initial price decrease, followed by a reversion to ceiling prices. We develop an empirical model of bidding in multi-unit procurement auctions to explain this pattern, showing how markups vary with bidder cost uncertainty. Using detailed geospatial and auction data, we estimate the distribution of private costs and study the dynamics of bid convergence. Our results contribute to understanding the efficiency and cost implications of renewable energy auctions.

AWARDS

- Winner of Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award at Boston College
- 2024

• Tuition Remission and Stipend, Boston College

2019-Present

Teaching Experience	Boston College Machine Learning in Economics Principles of Economics (<i>Teachin</i> Principles of Economics (<i>Head To</i> Principles of Economics (<i>Head To</i> Econometrics Lab (<i>Teaching Assa</i> Principles of Economics (<i>Teaching Assa</i>)	g Fellow) eaching Assistant) eaching Assistant) istant)	Fall 2024 Summer 2024 Spring 2024 Fall 2023 Fall 2022 Fall 2021	
Professional Experience	Research Assistant to Richard Sweeney		Fall 2019 Mumbai, India 2017-2019	
	Healthcare and Industrial Production Mu Sigma Decision Scientist		Bangalore, India 2014-2015	
PRESENTATIONS AERE @OSWEET Energy talk, AERE Summer Conference, UC Berkeley Summer School, Boston College Markets and Firms seminar series, Boston College Dissertation Workshop.				
Skills	Languages: English, Hindi Programming: Python, R, Julia, MATLAB, Stata, ETEX.			
References	Richard Sweeney Associate Professor Department of Economics Boston College sweeneri@bc.edu	Michael Grubb Associate Professor Department of Economics Boston College michael.grubb@bc.edu	Charles Murry Associate Professor Department of Economics University of Michigan ctmurry@umich.edu	