

# Teaching Portfolio

Anthony Kevins

Lecturer in Politics and International Studies  
School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Loughborough University

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### Summary of Qualifications:

- Taught eight different undergraduate and graduate courses, covering a range of topics in Comparative Politics, Political Behaviour, IR, and Research Methods
- Completed university-based pedagogical training – most notably via the (5-ECTS) Pedagogical Programme for Assistant Professors at Aarhus University

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<sup>1</sup>NB: Section titles, as well as in-text references to section numbers, are clickable links that will direct you to the relevant text.

# 1 Teaching Philosophy, Strategies, and Goals

My teaching is shaped by the belief that a political science education has the potential to help form not only good political scientists, but also good citizens. In an age in which formulaic talking points often pass for quality political discourse, I believe that political science can help students move beyond facile arguments by improving their substantive political knowledge, scientific literacy, and critical reasoning skills. As a teacher, my task is to facilitate this growth by encouraging students to actively engage with both the course material and their peers. I do so by employing pedagogical best-practices tied to constructive alignment, active learning, and an open dialogue with students.

My course development centres around the notion that intended learning outcomes, active learning activities, and student assessment tasks should all be closely aligned (i.e. constructive alignment). The first step in this process is the careful defining of learning objectives. Outlining these goals helps to maintain consistency across the course materials and assessment methods, while also ensuring that students are familiar with the skills they are meant to develop. For example, in *Political Institutions*, an undergraduate core course that I co-developed and co-taught, the compendium (see Section 4.1) laid out the learning objectives for the course as a whole and for each of the individual weeks. By specifying in advance not only every lecture’s theoretical and empirical objectives, but also the corresponding tutorial’s theory-application objectives, we were able to ensure a clear thread throughout the semester.

Having identified learning goals, I then develop individual lesson plans that allow me to build toward the intended learning outcomes in an engaging way. In a master’s-level seminar course on *Democracy and Representation* (see Section 4.2), for example, I opened each class with a brief discussion of a contemporary political issue connected to the lesson’s topic (e.g., discussing British newspaper coverage of Jeremy Corbyn in a lesson looking at the media’s role in shaping public opinion). Two goals guided this introductory framing: first, to tie the readings to current events and controversies, thereby highlighting the practical relevance of the course material; and second, to set the stage for theory-application later in the lesson, ensuring students have weekly opportunities to apply theories from the curriculum to real-world cases.

Because this higher-level engagement requires a strong grasp of the assigned material, my lesson planning is also attuned to assuring student understanding. After connecting the week’s topic to contemporary events or debates, I lay out a road map for the class by providing a set of questions they should be able to answer by the end of the day’s session. I revisit key concepts over the course of the lesson through a combination of lecturing and active learning activities, having students, typically in pairs or small groups, engage with questions of understanding. These latter activities have taken a variety of formats, including online quizzes (followed by peer and then class-wide discussions), flipped classroom activities where students do the teaching, and reflections on the “muddiest” point of the lesson. (See Section 4.3 for examples of how I do this in a

lecture setting.) These techniques allow me to ascertain how well students have grasped the course material while at the same time encouraging peer-to-peer explanation – which, in turn, helps to facilitate active learning and overcome some of the difficulties inherent in the instructor-student knowledge gap.

Once students have a reasonable grasp of the material, I move on to more advanced learning objectives. While these goals vary based on the level and subject of a given course, this deeper exploration of a topic often involves several steps: applying an argument or theory to an event or case; analyzing the case from an alternative framework; and using the Socratic method to have students reflect upon any underlying assumptions. Furthermore, in-class discussions and debates are complemented by a variety of pre-class activities, including the preparation of small written assignments, group presentations, or methods exercises (with the aid of original screencasts for more technical tasks). (See Section 4.4 for examples.) These exercises help students to cement comprehension and refine the research, presentation, and writing skills that they will need after graduation.

My course design also incorporates various larger learning activities that punctuate the semester, with the aim of consolidating the skills and knowledge developed in individual lessons. In addition to the traditional graded assessments, my courses have included periodic stats labs, review sessions, and writing workshops (see Section 4.5 for an example). Some of these activities clearly necessitate more teacher intervention than others, but I always ensure that peer feedback plays a central role. In having students assist and assess one another, I seek to: (1) equip them with tools to more critically evaluate their own work; and (2) help them to develop skills that align with the course’s learning objectives and the associated assessment tasks. At the same time, this approach also generates more frequent feedback for students and a more participatory classroom dynamic.

The final defining feature of my pedagogical approach is an open dialogue with students. Achieving this dialogue involves expressly making the case for the teaching activities I employ and then offering students the chance to provide informal, anonymous feedback after the first month of the semester. In my experience, this back-and-forth typically engenders a greater openness to new activities on their part. For example, some students have initially expressed doubt that peer feedback could be useful, based on the belief that only comments from their eventual grader are important; yet I have found that if I explain the motivations for this approach in advance, they quickly come to recognize and appreciate its benefits. The corollary of this, however, is that I must demonstrate an honest openness to adapting my teaching and learning activities when students are left unconvinced or have suggestions for improvements.

Overall, my teaching practices are grounded in two beliefs: that a strong political science education can provide tools to make us better citizens; and that advances in pedagogical research can help us to more effectively reach our teaching goals. I look forward to a career in which I continually improve my ability to teach and engage students, building from their feedback while experimenting with new pedagogical techniques.

## 2 Teaching Experience

My teaching experience includes undergraduate and graduate course development and instruction, in formats ranging from small seminars to large lectures involving hundreds of students. I have taught both methodological and substantive subject matter, covering topics in Comparative Politics, Political Behaviour, IR, and Research Methods.

In what follows, I briefly lay out an overview of the courses I have taught. The syllabi for two of these courses (marked with asterisks) are subsequently provided in Section 4, which also includes a sample of other materials that I have used in my teaching.

- **Co-Instructor, “Smart Scholarship”**
  - **Overview:** Bachelor’s Core Course, Loughborough University, Fall 2019 and 2020 (Enrolment: ~ 20)
  - **Duties:** Weekly seminars and grading
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 10 hours
  - **Course Description:** A skills course for incoming BA students, covering topics such as critical analysis, effective communication, and original research
  - **Sample Topics:** Analysing a Text; Understanding Frameworks and Theories; Showcasing Presentations.
- **Co-Instructor, “British Politics and Government”**
  - **Overview:** Bachelor’s Core Course, Loughborough University, Spring 2020 (Enrolment: ~ 240)
  - **Duties:** Course design, lectures, seminars, exam design, and grading
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 30 hours
  - **Course Description:** A survey course providing an overview of British Politics and introducing students to the study of comparative politics.
  - **Sample Topics:** Comparative Methods; Constitutional Review; The Prime Minister and Cabinet.
- **Co-Instructor, “Comparative European Politics”**
  - **Overview:** Bachelor’s Course, Loughborough University, Fall 2019 (Enrolment: ~ 90)
  - **Duties:** Weekly seminars and grading
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 44 hours
  - **Course Description:** A survey course combining an overview of comparative institutions and contemporary issues in European politics
  - **Sample Topics:** Governments and Parliaments; Politics, Markets, & the Welfare State; The Politics of Globalisation and Immigration.
- **Co-Instructor, “Political Institutions: Western countries, The European Union and International Institutions”\***
  - **Overview:** Bachelor’s Core Course, Aarhus University, Spring 2016 & 2017 (Enrolment: 311 & 317)
  - **Duties:** Course design, lectures, exam design, and weekly seminars

- **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 94 hours (per semester)
- **Course Description:** A survey course on institutionalism and various domestic and supranational institutions, with a particular focus on the EU
- **Sample Topics:** Electoral Systems and Party Systems; Federalism; Executive Politics in the EU.
- **Co-Instructor, “Social Science Methods for Journalists”**
  - **Overview:** Master’s Core Course, Aarhus University, Fall 2016 (Enrolment: 80)
  - **Duties:** Course design, lectures, exam design, grading, and weekly seminars
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 30 hours
  - **Course Description:** An introduction to social science research design and methods (both quantitative and qualitative)
  - **Sample Topics:** Case Selection and Data Sampling; Designing and Conducting Interviews and Surveys; Introduction to Statistical Inference.
- **Instructor, “Democracy and Representation”\***
  - **Overview:** Master’s Seminar, Aarhus University, Fall 2015 (Enrolment: 11)
  - **Duties:** Course design, instruction, exam design, and grading
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 45 hours
  - **Course Description:** An exploration of the bi-directional link between public opinion and policy making, including patterns of unequal representation
  - **Sample Topics:** The Survey Method; Uses and Abuses of Public Opinion Data; Democracy in the European Union.
- **Instructor, “Pragmatism and Politics”**
  - **Overview:** Master’s Seminar, Aarhus University, Spring 2015 (Enrolment: 4)
  - **Duties:** Course design, instruction, exam design, and grading
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 45 hours
  - **Course Description:** An examination of the challenges underlying the balance between technocracy and democracy
  - **Sample Topics:** The End of Ideology; Philosophical versus Everyday Pragmatism; A Democratic Deficit?
- **Instructor, “Politics: Contemporary Europe”**
  - **Overview:** Bachelor’s Course, McGill University, Summer & Fall 2013 (Enrolment: 34 & 75)
  - **Duties:** Course design, lectures, exam design, and grading
  - **In-Class Teaching Time:** Approximately 38 hours (per semester)
  - **Course Description:** A survey of welfare state, capitalist, and citizenship regime typologies, as well as the policy changes across them
  - **Sample Topics:** Towards a Two-Tiered Welfare State?; Is European Capitalism Different?; How do Different Types of Nationalism Affect Tolerance?

I also have several years of experience teaching outside of the university setting. Prior to pursuing my PhD, I worked as a math teacher at a private high school in Toronto (teaching grade 12 courses covering calculus, vector algebra, advanced functions, and

finite mathematics), taught preparatory courses for standardized tests (namely the SAT, GRE, and GMAT), and spent a summer teaching English to children in Italy.

### 3 Professional Development

I have participated in the following formal pedagogical training:

- Fundamentals of PhD Supervision, Loughborough University, 2020
  - This full-day training workshop covered topics such as Learning to Supervise, Supporting Professional Skill Development, and Ethical Issues in Supervision
- Introduction to Learning and Teaching at Loughborough University, Loughborough University, 2019
  - This full-day training workshop covered topics such as Supporting and Advising Students, the Online “Learn” Platform, and Developing Employable Graduates
- Teacher Training Programme for Assistant Professors, Aarhus University, 2016-2017
  - This programme consisted of a three-day residential course as well as three subsequent full-day workshops
  - Included modules on Teaching Methods and Organization, Integrated Course Design, Lecturing Skills, and Educational IT
- Challenges of the Multicultural Classroom in a Danish Context, Aarhus University, 2016
  - This course consisted of a four-hour workshop on techniques for seminar-based teaching and an hour-long evaluation of each participant’s teaching

In addition, I attended numerous shorter workshops hosted by Aarhus University’s Comparative Politics section, which held pedagogical sessions every semester with advisors from the Centre for Teaching and Learning. These workshops covered topics such as blended learning, effective lecturing, and the use of active learning in large-class settings.

### 4 Sample Teaching Materials

This section presents the compendium for the bachelor’s core course that I co-developed and co-taught, as well as a syllabus from one of my graduate seminars. It then provides several examples of other teaching materials that I have employed: five in-lecture activities; two seminar group exercises; and a writing workshop activity.

#### 4.1 Undergraduate Course Compendium

# POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

## COMPENDIUM

Helene Helboe Pedersen (Coordinator)

Rasmus Brun Pedersen (Coordinator)

Daniel Finke

Anthony Kevins

### 1. Introduction – the goals and aims of the course

This compendium is developed for the BA-course *Political Institutions: Western countries, The European Union and International Institutions* (PI). The course deals with political systems and their interactions. Its focus is on providing students with an understanding of how political systems work, as well as the causes and consequences of institutional differences for the representativeness and efficiency of political decision-making processes.

The course contains three core elements: 1) national political systems and institutional differences between these systems; 2) international cooperation and the interaction between political systems; and 3) the political system of the EU.

The first bloc of the course provides insights into the political systems of selected countries and the significance of key institutional differences across political systems. This includes differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, federal states and unitary states, and the modes of operation in parliaments and governments.

The second bloc of the course concentrates on the interaction between political systems, transnational politics and related theories. In particular, we focus on theories aimed at explaining the formation and operation of international organisations, as well as different types of transnational governance.

The third bloc of the course focuses on the EU's political system and the various theories that have been developed in relation to it. This includes theories about European integration, representation and elections in the EU, and the EU's institutional structure, mode of operation and foreign policy.

The goal of the course is to give students a general knowledge of how political institutions at various levels of governance function, develop, and impact democratic representation and decision-making. Specifically, the course aims to give students the following competences:

- The student must be able to describe the political system of selected western countries, the EU, and international organizations.
- The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.
- The student must be able to compare key empirical differences between political systems and identify the differences and similarities.
- The student must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories
- The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.
- The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyse empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.

These overall learning objectives can be divided into three major headings (as illustrated in Table 1): theoretical knowledge, empirical knowledge, and an ability to apply theories to empirical material.

In order to achieve these goals, the course has been organized as described in Sections 3 and 4.



**Table 1. Overall learning objectives for the course**

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge   | Application  |
|---|---|--|
| <p>The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.</p> <p>They must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories</p> | <p>The student must be able to describe the political system of selected western countries, the EU, and selected international organizations.</p> | <p>The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.</p> <p>The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction. The goal here is to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.</p> |

## 2. The course's relation to other courses on the BA in Political Science


The course is closely connected to other BA-courses in political science at Aarhus University. Figure 1 places PI in relation to other courses taught in the BA-education through a simplified version of an input-output-model. It should be noted that the model is a simplified presentation and certain overlaps will occur between the different courses. On overall level General Political Science (Almen Statskundskab) deals with the input side of the political system. It presents knowledge of and theories about social cleavages, opinion formation, the role of public opinion and on political participation. The course on Public Policy (Offentlig Politik) overall focuses on the outcome side – political decisions, policies, regimes and reforms that are treated as the dependent variable. International Relations (International Politik) deals in a broad sense with the international systems, and how states interacts and conduct their foreign policies where the focus is on the structure of the international system and the role of conflicts and cooperation between states.

## 3. The organization of the course

PI focuses on what happens in the so-called “black box” between demands expressed in civil society to policies influencing the living conditions in a society. It is per definition difficult to study what happens in a black box. In PI we open the black box by studying the way power is organized in central political institutions and how they operate in order to reach political decisions. We thus study the role of the structures as well as the modus operandi of selected political institutions. The classic input-output-models were traditional primary limited to and aimed at understanding domestic politics and distributive processes on this level.

However, to give a comprehensive understanding of how the most important political institutions are structured and function we need to acknowledge that modern governance is multilayered. There are multiple


**Figure 1: The PI course role in the BA-program**



layers of authority from municipalities over nation states to supranational organizations. Therefore, in order to grasp these different layers of authority, PI needs to draw on insight from Comparative Politics as well as International Relations to understand the way power is structured within as well as between states. The overall theoretical framework used to bridge Comparative Politics and IR is theories of institutionalism. Institutionalism has been a central theoretical tendency that have drawn focus on how institutions are created and their effects on behavior and policies, which has been themes in studies of international relations and in comparative politics

The course PI is organized according to the different layers of governance in modern developed democracies and makes a distinction between 2 layers: the national level and the regional level (EU) and focus on how and why states creates international institutions and how they impact upon states behavior by giving examples from NATO and UN. Figure 2 illustrates the organization of the course.

**Figure 2: Illustration of the structure of PI**



This means that the overall organization of the course will consist off three overall blocks:

We start the course with a general introduction to the concept of institutions and theories about the relationship between actors and institutions (L1). This general framework is relevant for all aspects of the course even though a somewhat different terminology is used in the different research traditions.

- In the first bloc (weeks 2-5), we focus on the national level of governance (we do not move below the national level so we will not discuss municipalities or states in much detail). Empirically we focus on Western democracies when applying typologies to describe national political institutions such as electoral systems, legislatures and executives.
- The second bloc (weeks 6-8) takes one further step towards studying political institutions beyond the nation state. Based on theories from Institutional theories we discuss why states choose to create international organizations and whether and how states can control international organizations when they are first are created. Empirical we will draw on examples from the UN, NATO and the EU.
- The third bloc (weeks 9-14) deals with the European Union as an example of regional level governance. The political system of EU will be explained in detail but EU will also be analysed from an IR-perspective as an example of cooperation between sovereign nation states and as an actor in international politics. This EU-bloc is the largest bloc in the course since it is a goal of PI in itself that students are familiar with the EU political system and because EU as an empirical case bridges the research traditions of comparative politics and international relations.

Finally, in the last week of teaching we discuss how the study of institutions draw on different traditions in comparative politics and international relations and make a critical reflection on the contribution of institutional theories. The course can be described on more details in table 2.

**Table 2. Organization of the course: Lectures and classes**

| Week  | Lecturer | Theme   |
|---|----------|---|
| L1 Jan. 31  | HHP      | Introduction: Institutionalism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hall &amp; Taylor (1996) New institutionalism</li> <li>• Compendium comments (supplementary reading)</li> </ul>   |
| C1  |          | Institutionalism beyond Comparative Politics and International Relations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jupille &amp; Caporaso (1999) Institutionalism and the European Union</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Block 1: Political institutions in Western countries</b> |          |   |
| L2: Feb. 7  | AK       | Electoral systems and party systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repetition: Gallagher (2013) Electoral systems</li> <li>• Caramani (2013) Party systems</li> <li>• Benoit (2007) Electoral laws as political consequences</li> </ul> |
| C2  |          | Electoral systems and womens representation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• McAlister &amp; Studlar (2002) Electoral systems and women's representation: a long-term perspective</li> </ul>  |
| L3: Feb. 14   | HHP      | Legislatures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kreppel (2014) Typologies and Classifications</li> <li>• Sieberer (2011) The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments</li> </ul>   |
| C3  |          | Classifying legislatures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dalton (2012) Politics in Germany</li> <li>• Schain (2012) Politics in France</li> </ul>  |
| L4: Feb. 21   | HHP      | Governments   |

|   |     |  |
|---|-----|--|
|   |     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cheibub et al. (2004) Government Coalition and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism</li> </ul>   |
| C4  |     | <p>Government efficiency and responsiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coleman (1999) Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness</li> </ul>  |
| L5: Feb. 28                               | AK  | <p>Federalism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Loughlin (2011) Federal and local government institutions</li> <li>Beramendi (2007) Federalism</li> </ul>   |
| C5  |     | <p>Representation in federal systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wlezien &amp; Soroka (2011) Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Block 2: International cooperation</b> |     |  |
| L6: March 7                               | RBP | <p>Why states create international organisations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Keohane (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy</li> <li>Stein (1982) Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World</li> </ul> <p><i>Supplementary readings: Jackson &amp; Sørensen pp. 107-110</i></p> |
| C6  |     | <p>Establishing international security cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Schimmelfennig (2016) NATO and institutional theories of international relations</li> </ul>  |
| L7: March 14                              | RBP | <p>What do international institutions do?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Buzan (2004) From International to World Society?</li> <li>Barnett &amp; Finnemore (2007) Practical approach</li> <li>Knudsen (2015) Primary institutions and international organizations: Theorizing continuity and change</li> </ul>                    |
| C7  |     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same as lecture</li> </ul>  |
| L8: March 21                              | RBP | <p>Economic and political cooperation: EU integration process</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Moravcsik &amp; Schimmelfennig (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism</li> <li>Niemann &amp; Schmitter (2009). Neo-functionalism</li> </ul>   |
| C8  | RBP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Schimmelfennig (2015) Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis</li> <li>Niemann &amp; Ioannou (2015) European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Block 3: The EU</b>                    |     |  |
| L9: March 28                              | AK  | <p>The political system of the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix &amp; Høyland (2011) pp. 1-18</li> <li>Hargreaves &amp; Homewood (2013) EU Law Concentrate: Law Revision and Study Guide</li> </ul>   |
| C9  |     | <p>No readings – trial exam</p>  |
| L10: April 4                              | AK  | <p>Executive politics in the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix &amp; Høyland (2011) pp. 23-48</li> </ul>   |
| C10                                       |     | <p>A new type of Commission?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Peterson (2016) Juncker's Political European Commission and an EU in Crisis.</li> </ul>  |
| L11: April 18                             | DF  | <p>Legislative politics in the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix &amp; Høyland (2011) pp. 49-75</li> </ul>   |

|               |                  |  |
|---------------|------------------|--|
| C11           |                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rasmussen &amp; Reh (2013) The consequences of concluding codecision early</li> <li>Häge &amp; Kaeding (2007) Reconsidering the European Parliament's legislative influence</li> </ul>                              |
| L12: April 25 | DF               | Elections and democracy in the EU <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix &amp; Høyland (2011) pp. 105-157</li> </ul>   |
| C12           |                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Follesdal &amp; Hix (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU</li> </ul>   |
| L13: May 2    | DF               | Judicial politics in the EU <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix &amp; Høyland (2011) pp. 75-105</li> </ul>  |
| C13           |                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carrubba, Gabel &amp; Hankla (2008) Judicial behavior under political constraints</li> <li>Dyevre (2010). Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics</li> </ul>  |
| L14: May 9    | DF               | The EU as a global actor <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix &amp; Høyland (2011) pp. 302-331</li> </ul>  |
| C14           |                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dür &amp; Zimmermann (2007) Introduction: The EU in international trade negotiations</li> <li>Da Conceicao (2010) Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics</li> </ul> |
| <b>Outro</b>  |                  |  |
| L15: May 16   | RBP, DF, HHP, AK | Wrap up and critical reflections and exam  |
|               |                  | Exam preparations  |

PI is organized as most other BA-courses with four hours teaching per week. Two hours of lectures and two hours of class discussions. The exam is a six-hour written exam and after the course students are expected to be able to describe political institutions and theories about them and to be able to compare these institutions and theories in a theoretically informed empirical analysis. The descriptive element of the course is thus strong giving students an opportunity to gather knowledge of various political institutions on the national as well as international level of governance.

To make the teaching activities support the achievement of the learning objectives lectures will focus on providing knowledge of concepts, typologies and theories for defining, classifying and understanding the function and structure of political institutions, while classes will focus on applying these concepts, typologies and theories on empirical material. Exercises for the classes will focus on 1) supporting the gathering of empirical knowledge of selected political institutions for instance through class presentations and 2) training writing skills through smaller weekly written assignments.

Lectures as well as classes will be taught in English just as all written assignments must be in English.

The final exam can be written in Danish or English.

#### Lectures

Helene Helboe Pedersen (HHP) ([helene@ps.au.dk](mailto:helene@ps.au.dk)) (coordinator), Lecturer

Rasmus Brun Pedersen (RBP) ([brun@ps.au.dk](mailto:brun@ps.au.dk)) (coordinator), Lecturer

Anthony Kevins (AK) ([akevins@ps.au.dk](mailto:akevins@ps.au.dk)) Lecturer and course instructor

Daniel Finke (DF) ([finke@ps.au.dk](mailto:finke@ps.au.dk)) Lecturer

If you have any practical questions you are welcome to contact one or both of the coordinators.

#### 4. Comments for the reading material

##### Week 1: Introduction to Institutionalism

###### Lecture

PI starts out with an introduction to the role of institutionalism in political science and how it has developed. Here the definition of institutions as well as the different positions on how institutions and actors stand in relation to each other is discussed. We also use this first week to discuss why studies of political institutions in systems of multilevel governance need to draw on ideas from comparative politics as well as international relations.

Political institutions have always played a prominent role in political science. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars were concerned with describing formal political institutions such as constitutions, legislatures and administrative apparatuses. This tradition has been labelled 'old institutionalism' and was critiqued of being too descriptive not leading to cumulative knowledge and theory development. Political scientists, especially in US, reacted by initiating the behavioral approach (behaviouralism) in the years after World War II. Here the importance of political institutions was either rejected or reduced and it was argued that political behavior could not be explained or studied by reading formal rules but only by observing actual behavior. Political phenomena were explained by the aggregate behavior of individual (rational and strategic) actors. However, 'new institutionalism' evolved as a reaction to behaviouralism around the 1980s. One of the reasons was that scholars found themselves unable to explain important political outcomes by only taking the individual interests of the actors into account. For instance, rational choice scholars of the US Congress found it difficult to explain coordination and cooperation among Members of Congress. 'New institutionalism' in general has a broader understanding of institutions including informal institutions such as procedures and norm and they also theorize more explicitly about the relationship between actors and institutions.

In the text for the lecture Hall & Taylor (1996) argues that the approach of 'new institutionalism' can be divided into three schools of institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. They describe and compare the different schools highlighting the most important differences and similarities. They also discuss the potential these schools hold for explaining the creation and change of political institutions.

The new institutionalism has had a tremendous impact on political science. So much, that Pierson and Skocpol claim that "*we are all institutionalists now*". The relevance and use of institutional approaches have perhaps been nowhere more profound than in the study of the European Union.

###### Classes

In the text for the first class Jupille and Caporaso build on the new institutionalist approach and argue that the institutional approach has made it possible to formulate a more coherent study of the European Union which as a political phenomenon stands ambiguously between the fields of international relations and comparative politics. By reviewing studies of EU they classify the institutionalist approaches according to their assumptions regarding institutions and preferences and discuss how an institutional approach offers analytical tools for analyzing the most recent questions in the study of EU. Their main argument is that a generic form of institutionalism is more promising for the study of EU than sticking in the camps of comparative politics or international relations.

###### Learning objectives for week 1

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge | Application  |
|---|---------------------|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Describe the three new institutional approaches</li></ul> | -                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Use institutionalisms to discuss how EU as a political</li></ul> |

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discuss their differences and similarities</li> <li>• Discuss their strengths and weaknesses</li> </ul> |  | phenomenon can be understood in different ways |
|--|--|--|

### Bloc 1: Political institutions in Western countries

In the first bloc we introduce essential political institutions in Western countries. Specifically we discuss four political institutions, which are central for the way power is distributed and operates in political systems. These institutions are the electoral system, legislatures, executives and federalism. For each of these institutions we discuss 1) how to classify them, 2) potential causes of variations and 3) potential consequences for representation and efficiency.

#### Week 2: Electoral systems

While parliaments and governments are in many ways the core institutions that make democracies function on an everyday basis, which parties enter parliament and, subsequently, form the government is not a given. This is not least because the electoral rules governing how people vote and how these votes are translated into parliamentary seats vary greatly between countries. We will study what consequences the organization of electoral systems have on social outcomes like turnout and the representation of minority interests. In reality, the electoral system of a country is never neutral: it always benefits some groups in society over others. Given this inherent issue, it is vital to understand why some countries adopt one electoral system over another.

#### *Lecture*

This lecture addresses three primary questions: what is an electoral system?; how do electoral systems matter?; and why do electoral systems differ across countries? It begins with a brief overview of the key distinctions among electoral systems. Although you were already introduced to the topic in Pol.Intro, we start with a refresher given the wide variety of electoral systems out there (hence the repetition from Caramani). Crucially, this overview will also allow us to home in on some the electoral system characteristics that are especially important to outcomes we may care about (such as inequality and minority representation). We then turn to a discussion of why different countries have ended up with different electoral systems, using the Benoit article as our starting point. This view of electoral laws as political consequences will then be illustrated using a recent example from the UK.

#### *Classes*

In lecture we discussed some of the consequences of electoral systems, and we use the tutorial this week to focus in on one of these effects: how does a country's electoral system affect women's representation in parliament? We will use the article by McAlister and Studlar (2002) to kick off a discussion about what factors seem to matter for the number of women elected to parliament. Yet your own research will be essential to this discussion, as the exercise this week will have you updating the data in the article and conducting research on a country of your choice.

#### *Learning objectives of week 2*

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge   | Application  |
|--|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describe different types of electoral systems</li> <li>• Describe causes of variation in electoral system types</li> <li>• Describe some of the consequences of different electoral system types</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describe factors that might shape women's legislative representation in developed countries</li> <li>• Be familiar with general patterns in women's legislative representation as</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discuss in what ways electoral systems might increase or decrease women's legislative representation</li> </ul> |

|  |                                  |  |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
|  | they relate to electoral systems |  |
|--|----------------------------------|--|

### Week 3: Legislatures

Almost all countries have some kind of legislature. Legislatures in Western countries are comparative old and have served as inspiration for many younger legislatures around the world. Legislatures have been research objects in political science for centuries as scholars have asked how legislatures are organized, what they do, and not least how powerful they are. During the era of old institutionalism especially descriptive typologies and detailed single case descriptions of the formal organization and procedures of legislatures were prominent. We now build on this research as studies of legislature moves towards a more new institutionalist approach where informal as well as formal characteristics are taken into account and the search for explanations to the variation across legislatures has set in.

#### *Lecture*

In the lecture, you are provided with an overview of the relevant dimensions for describing legislatures such as the relationship between the legislature and the executive, the tasks of a legislature and the organizational differences in terms of chambers and committees. Furthermore, more recent attempts of classifying legislatures proposed by Kreppel and Sieberer are presented showing how legislatures may not only be classified into boxes of weak and strong legislatures but can be measured on more dimensions regarding their institutional independence and power resources to give a more accurate and dynamic description of modern legislatures. Hereby, it also becomes evident how legislatures not only circumscribe the behavior of legislative actors but also are products of powerful actors' interaction.

#### *Classes*

In the class for this week, you will read about the French and German legislatures to get a detailed knowledge of these systems. In the exercise, you are asked to apply the theoretical knowledge from the lecture to describe and compare the French and German legislatures according to the dimensions presented in the lecture.

#### *Learning objectives for week 3*

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge  | Application   |
|--|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify dimensions for classifying legislatures</li> <li>Discuss strengths and weaknesses of different typologies</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Detailed knowledge of the French and German legislatures</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use typologies to describe and classify legislatures</li> <li>Discuss potential cause and consequences of the institutional design of legislatures.</li> </ul> |

### Week 4: Executives

A major theme for old institutionalist studies is the constitutional division of power between the executive and legislative powers. The most prominent dichotomy for describing these relations are presidential versus parliamentary regimes. Whereas many institutionalist studies have been occupied with how to classify regimes within these two broad categories and their subcategories, new institutionalism has drawn increased attention toward the consequences of different regime types for representation and efficiency. In this week, we build a causal chain where we first ask how parliamentary/presidential regimes influence government formation and second how different types of governments within these two regime types influence legislative efficiency (lecture) and responsiveness (class).

#### *Lecture*



In the lecture, you are introduced to the major differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes and the traditional critique of the representativeness and efficiency of these systems. The lecture presents a definition of a government and different types of governments such as majority and minority, coalition and single-party governments. Based on this common framework the lecture use the article by Cheibub et al. (2004) to discuss first if coalition governments are more likely in parliamentary regimes and second if minority governments are less legislative efficient in presidential regimes. The main theoretical argument is that government formation and legislative efficiency is a product of the interaction between incentives regulated by political institutions and the preferences of political actors – in this case political parties.

#### *Classes*

In the classes for this week, we continue the discussion on the potential consequences of different types of government. Specifically we consider the case of divided government in US. Coleman (1999) revisits the claim that divided governments are just as efficient as unified governments and argues that scholars have 1) neglected important moderating institutional factor and 2) misinterpreted the party government model and thus neglected the importance of responsiveness rather than efficiency in the production of bills. In the exercise, you are asked to apply your theoretical knowledge from the lecture to define and explain divided government and to discuss the consequences of different forms of government in the case of US.

#### *Learning objectives of week 4*

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge  | Application  |
|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Define different types of government and executive-legislative relations</li> <li>Discuss potential strength and weaknesses of parliamentary and presidential systems</li> <li>Explain the potential impact of regime types on coalition formation</li> <li>Explain the potential impact of government type on legislative efficiency</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explain the decision-making procedure in US</li> <li>Explain what is meant by divided government in US</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use definitions of different governments to describe and classify governments in Western countries</li> <li>Make theoretically informed analyses of possible consequences of different types of government</li> </ul> |

#### Week 5: Federalism

So far the course has concentrated on national level political institutions like legislatures and executives. These are clearly very important, yet in many countries power is not concentrated at the national level, but is rather spread out across federal sub-units (e.g. states, provinces, cantons). This week's focus on federalism will serve as an essential part of the national bloc – allowing us to grasp just how much of an impact federal structures have on the way other political institutions function in a country. What is more, it will also provide a helpful bridge to the EU bloc, since it serves as an introduction to multi-level governance.

#### *Lecture*

The lecture explores the role of federalism in modern-day democracies, using the texts by Loughlin and Beramendi as an introduction to federalism and the major debates surrounding it in the literature. We start by providing an overview of the main characteristics of federal as opposed to unitary states, while at the same time distinguishing federalism from decentralisation. We will then turn to outline the historical origins of federalist institutions: why have some countries chosen this particular mode of government, while others haven't? Next, we will proceed to examine how federalist institutions affect the operation of democracy, in the process touching on some of the other discussions we have engaged in during the national bloc. Given the nature of federalism, we will also discuss how it has a profound effect on the distribution of resources across a

federation. Finally, we end the lecture by briefly discussing how traditional federalism (the topic of this lecture) might relate to the European Union (as the subject of the next lecture bloc).

#### *Classes*

As we discussed in lecture, federalism has important implications for the way democracies work. One crucial implication relates to the extent of democratic accountability, since it can be difficult in a federation to disentangle the issues that matter for elections at the federal versus subnational levels. The tutorial this week therefore focuses on the extent to which voters are able to sort out which policy actions and responsibilities belong to which levels of government. The discussion will start from Wlezien and Soroka's investigation of public responsiveness in Canada. In your groups, you will then conduct your own research on the Canadian federation to better understand not only how federalism works in practice, but also the difficulties in assigning responsibility for policy outcomes.

#### *Learning objectives of week 5*

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge   | Application   |
|--|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Describe federalism and distinguish it from alternative forms of governance</li><li>• Discuss the relationship between federalism and decentralisation</li><li>• Describe some potential causes and consequences of federalism</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Describe the concept of accountability and its relationship to federalism</li><li>• Describe some of the complexities inherent in federalism using the Canadian example</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Discuss the connection between public opinion and government responsibilities in a federation</li></ul> |

### **Bloc 2: International institutions**

In the second bloc we move beyond the nation state and introduce various approaches to study the question of why states choose to cooperate internationally, why they choose to institutionalize their cooperation by creating international institutions. We further investigate the question of what these types of institutions can do, and once created whether they can develop a life of their own, independent from the states that created them in the first place. The bloc introduces you to International Relations theories treatment of institutionalism and tries to bridge comparative politics and IR with the common institutionalist focus.

#### Week 6: RC and Security cooperation

The first week in this block addresses some of the fundamental questions of the creation and maintenance of international cooperation. The main focus is to give a deeper understanding of the Rational choice institutionalism and how insights have been utilized and translated in the IR literature to explain why states choose to cooperate. The particular focus is on Liberal Institutionalism and how and why states create international organizations and regimes. It is important to have an understanding of the role of preferences, level of information, trust in order to understand the strength and durability of the international organizations that states create in order to regulate their interactions.

#### *Lecture*

This lecture addresses three primary questions: Why do states choose to cooperate; what can explain the decisions to create international institutions; and what design do they choose for the organization. The theoretical backbone in this lecture is Rational Choice institutionalism. Based on rational choice and game theoretical insights the lecture presents a framework that can be utilized to answer the three above mentioned questions. We focus in particular on the relevance of preferences, information and expected utility. In addition we draw on the insights from SI and HI.

### Classes

In the lecture we introduced a theoretical rational choice framework to explain why states cooperate and why they form institutions. In the classes we want you to utilize this framework to analyze the cooperation in the NATO alliance and discuss how this organization works and how it can be changed in the future

### Learning objectives of week 6

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge   | Application   |
|--|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe RC intuitionism</li> <li>Understand the logics in the theory and its approach to the formation and the design of international organizations</li> <li>Describe some of the consequences institutional designs have on states behavior</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the organization of NATO as an example of an international organization</li> <li>Describe factors that might shape international organizations</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply institutionalist explanations to explain why NATO was created and how it can be changed in the future to meet new security threats.</li> </ul> |

### Week 7: What do institutions do?

The second week of this block deals with the question of what happens when international institutions are created and ask whether the states that have created the institutions can control them and whether there are unintended consequences of the establishment of international institutions.

### Lecture

The lecture takes its point of departure in sociological institutionalism and insights from the IR literature the lecture asks the question about what happens when states have established international institutions. Can states control the institutions and what impact do these institutions have on the behavior of the founding states? The lectures treats institutions based on the insights from the English school, and its focus on primary and secondary institutions and how they develop and evolve.

Taken its empirical point of departure in examples from the UN cooperation it focus on the impact of the creation of international norms and procedures for conflict resolutions and whether the evolution of international norms can be said to be in the control of the member states or whether institutions tends to live a life on their own. The lecture also introduces historical institutionalism to answer these questions, especially the role of path dependency, and whether these institutional paths can be said to follow the initial ideas behind the creation of the international institutions.

### Classes

The classes will draw on the literature from the lecture and focus on whether institutions are in the control of member states or whether institutions can have a life of their own. The aim is to utilize the theoretical approaches on a concrete case about the UN's Right to protect framework that have evolved over the last decades.

### Learning objectives of week 7

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge  | Application  |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe Sociological and Historical institutionalism</li> <li>Understand the logics in the theory and its approach to the formation and the design of</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the organization of UN as an example of an international organization where states have difficulties in controlling</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply institutionalism to explain why UN system can evolve beyond the control of the member states preferences</li> </ul> |

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|--|---|--|
| <p>international organizations and whether states can continue to control institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe some of the consequences institutional designs have on states behavior</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe factors that might shape international organizations impact upon states behavior</li> </ul> |  |
|--|---|--|

#### Week 8: Political and economic cooperation: EU integration process

The final week in this block synthesizes elements in the three institutionalisms in the study of the European integration process. The goal is to illustrate how the institutional logics have been in cooperated in theories like Neo-functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism and their explanation of the European integration process. Another goal is to prepare the students for the following block on EUs institutions. Here a solid knowledge of the process that shaped these institutions is a precondition for the understanding of the debates and conflicts lines within and across the EU institutions.

#### *Lecture*

This lecture addresses three questions: What is the European Integration process? How can it be studied? And how can we understand the institutional design of the cooperation? The lecture presents the students with an oversight of the integration process and its dynamics. Two central integration theories, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism is then introduces and used to explain the main developments in the cooperation. Since both theories draws on institutional theories they will be used to give us an understanding of the overall institutional and balance between the institutions and its member states.

#### *Classes*

In the class the students will be trained to apply the NF and the LI theories to explain the politics of the “euro crisis”. The students will be asked to compare the two perspectives and reflect on the usefulness of the theories and reflect on whether we should expect “institutional change” in response to the “euro crisis”?

#### *Learning objectives of week 8*

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge   | Application  |
|---|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand neofunctionalism, especially the role of spill over logics</li> <li>Understand Liberal Intergovernmentalism</li> <li>Understand the logics in the two theories, their relation to institutional theory</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the European integration process</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply NF and LI theories to explain the integration processes and its dynamics with a focus on the Euro crisis</li> </ul> |

### **Bloc 3: The European Union**

Our third and final bloc turns to introduce and examine the European Union, which serves as an example of regional level governance. There are two major objectives in this section. First, we set out to provide a detailed introduction to the EU and its institutional and policy architecture. Second, we analyze the EU from an IR-perspective, treating it both as an example of cooperation among sovereign nation states and as an actor in international politics. The bloc will ensure that students are familiar with the EU as a political system (a major

goal of the course in its own right) while at the same time bridging the research traditions of Comparative Politics and International Relations.

#### Week 9: The Political System of the EU

In this week we introduce the EU as a political system. This involves both a brief overview of its historical development and an introduction to its institutional and policy architecture. It will therefore set the stage for the rest of the bloc, over the course of which we will go into detail on the various topics introduced this week.

##### *Lecture*

We begin by building from last week's discussion of the EU integration process, briefly recapping a few key moments and treaties in the development of the EU. In doing so, we aim to broadly sketch out how the EU came about and how it has changed over time. Next, we proceed to discuss the EU's policy architecture: what policy areas are under the control of the EU? Which are shared by the EU and member states, or coordinated between them? And which policy areas are outside of EU competencies? We then introduce the institutional architecture of the EU, providing an overview of the EU's key institutions (which will be fleshed out in the coming weeks). Finally, we end with the question: how can we best understand the European Union? Is it similar to an international organization (like the UN) or a federal state (like the US)? This lecture thus sets the stage for the rest of the bloc.

*No Classes – Trial Exam*

##### *Learning objectives of week 19*

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge   | Application |
|---|---|-------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand theories on how the EU came about</li> <li>Describe the broad theoretical frameworks on how politics in the EU works</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key moments in the development of the EU</li> <li>The broad division of control over policy between the EU and member states</li> <li>The EU's institutional architecture</li> </ul> | -           |

#### Week 10: Executive politics in the EU

After last week's introduction to the EU's general structure, we now zoom in on executive politics in the European Union. We therefore pick back up some of the themes from week 4, when we focused on national-level executives. But as we will see, although we can come up with some important parallels to these discussions from the national bloc, executive politics in the EU has some peculiar characteristics. In particular, understanding executive politics in the EU requires us to carefully unpack the relationship between national and supranational executive power in the context of the EU's dual executive structure. As a result, we will also highlight numerous connections to discussions from the past two weeks about the process of European integration.

##### *Lecture*

In this lecture, we will concentrate on answering two major questions: What does executive politics look like in the EU? And why does the form of executive politics in the EU matter? We begin by briefly recapping the classical differences in executive power at the national level – i.e. the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. We then discuss the limitations of that framework in trying to understand executive politics in the EU. That leads us to describe the nature of the Council and the Commission as institutions, and to consider their respective relationships to the EU's member states. In the process, we discuss different theories of executive politics, as well as concepts like administrative and political accountability. We will also

draw out relevant connections to the two major integration theories, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

#### *Classes*

In class this week we turn to examine recent trends in the nature of executive politics in the EU. In particular, we focus on the possibility that the current Juncker Commission is more “politicized” than its predecessors and discuss why that might matter for our understanding of executive power in the EU. For your exercise, you will be asked to discuss these developments with relation to Brexit.

#### *Learning objectives of week 10*

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge   | Application   |
|--|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand theories of executive politics.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe the nature of the Council and the Commission, as well as their respective relationships to the EU’s member states.</li> <li>Describe the framework of political and administrative accountability in the EU.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss how the nature of the executive politics may have changed over the recent crises, with a special focus on Brexit.</li> </ul> |

#### Week 11: Legislative Politics in the EU

In this week we conceive the EU as a bicameral political system, where the European Parliament is directly elected by the voters (lower house) and the Council represents the interests of national governments (upper house). We will get to know the rules that govern coalition building and decision making in each of these two “chambers”. Subsequently, we study the interactions between European Parliament and the Council in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.

#### *Lecture*

The lecture starts with a review of week 3 (Legislatures). We discuss the role of the European Parliament and the Council vis-à-vis the European Commission. Can we classify the EU’s legislature as either strong or weak? Next we are looking into each of the two legislative bodies separately: What is the relation between the plenary and committees or work groups? How are information, amendment and voting rights allocated? What interests are represented in each of the two bodies? Is there a role for party politics? How are coalitions formed and how does that affect policy making? Finally, we take on a truly bicameral perspective by asking how Council and European Parliament interact when making EU law. Is the inter-institutional relation characterized by conflict or cooperation?

#### *Classes*

In classes we study the relevance of the so-called trilogues. For long it has been an informal yet institutionalized practice that delegates from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission meet early on in the legislative process to agree on a compromise. In the treaty of Lisbon this procedure has been formalized. What are advantages of this fast-track-procedure? How does it affect the relation between European Parliament and Council? Does it affect the internal dynamics in each of the two legislative bodies?

#### *Learning objectives of week 11*

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge   | Application   |
|--|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theories that explain the formation of legislative coalitions.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Composition of European Parliament and Council.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss how informal bicameral negotiations (such as the “trilogue”) affect</li> </ul> |

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theories of bicameralism.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rules of Procedure and internal organization of European Parliament and Council.</li> <li>Ordinary Legislative Procedure</li> </ul> | <p>patterns of conflict and coalition within parliament.</p> |
|---|--|--|

#### Week 12: Elections and Democracy in the EU

The EU has been accused of having a democratic deficit. This week's lecture deals with the institutional foundations of this accusation. The electoral connection between voters and the decision makers in Brussels will be in the center of this bloc. We are going to discuss the extent of the democratic deficit and whether it has its roots in a lack of a European public sphere or in particular features of the EU's institutional design.

#### *Lecture*

This lecture addresses the following questions: What do Europeans think about the current state of integration? How are Members of the European Parliament elected? Do they represent the interests of their voters? Are governments, when acting in the Council, accountable to their national parliaments? In answering these questions, we are going to start with a review of week 2 (electoral systems) and 3 (legislatures) which allows us to classify the EU's institutions from a comparative perspective. Next, we are going to see that the additional level of government creates additional challenges for democratic representation. The daily work in the EP is organized around European Political Groups, yet national parties set up the lists for European elections. Voters are often more concerned with punishing their national governments when casting their vote at European elections. Ministers enjoy a significant level of discretion when negotiating in the Council. And the media's attention is frequently lower for EU politics as compared to national politics. The lecture will present each of these challenges and point towards its institutional foundations.

#### *Classes*

In the class the students will be trained to evaluate the democratic quality of the EU's political system. On the one hand, this includes an evaluation of the state of the union against normative democratic theory. On the other hand, this includes a discussion of whether or not institutional reforms might be able to improve the democratic quality of EU politics.

#### *Learning objectives of week 12*

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge  | Application  |
|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluate the democratic quality of a multilevel political system</li> <li>Understand the basic concepts of principal agent theory (agency drift, oversight mechanisms)</li> <li>Know the theory of second order elections</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevance of Parties and Political Groups in the European Parliament</li> <li>Public Opinion on the state of integration</li> <li>Rules for and voting patterns in European Parliament elections</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss the democratic quality of the European Union</li> <li>Discuss how electoral rules affect voter representation in the European Parliament</li> </ul> |

#### Week 13: Judicial Politics in the EU

In western nation states we take the powers of the judiciary for granted. In most cases, we observe an independent, hierarchical and differentiated courts system as well as a constitutional court that constraints legislative and executive power. So far, we have learned that member states delegated significant legislative competences to the EU, but only limited competences to execute and implement law. But to what extent has judicial oversight over legislation and implementation been integrated? In this lecture, we will describe the

powers of the European Court of Justice and see how it obtained increasing independence over the course of European integration.

#### *Lecture*

In the lecture we will start by describing the EU's court system, specifically the European Court of Justice, with regard to its composition and its most important procedures. We will place special emphasis on the institutionalized relation between the European Court of Justice and the member states, the so-called "institutionalist model" of judicial politics (Dyevre 2010). Once we have delineated the court's role in the EU's present political system, we will apply the integration theories (see Week 8) to explain how the court step by step established its powers vis-à-vis the member states. Specifically, we will see how norms such as the direct effect and the supremacy of EU law have been established and institutionalized. Guided by integration theories we will also study the relation of the European Court of Justice to national judicial systems.

#### *Classes*

In the class the students will be trained to analyze the European Court of Justice discretion vis-à-vis the member states from a strategic perspective. Specifically, we will discuss how the court has been able to extent its powers by exploiting disunity amongst member states.

#### *Learning objectives of week 13*

| Theory  | Empirical knowledge   | Application   |
|---|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand the "institutionalist model" of judicial politics.</li> <li>Understand the basics of legal integration theory and its nexus to integration theories (week 8)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Powers, composition and procedures of the European Court of Justice.</li> <li>History of Legal Integration (key decision by the ECJ).</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply integration theories to legal integration.</li> <li>Apply institutionalist model of judicial politics to the ECJ.</li> </ul> |

#### Week 14: The EU as a Global Actor

The history of European Integration has seen a number of halfhearted attempts of installing a common EU foreign policy. In fact, until today there is only one policy area where the EU acts as an unrivaled and powerful actor at the global stage: international trade. In common defense and security policy NATO is still at the wheel and the common neighborhood policy is frequently hampered by divergent regional interests of member states.

#### *Lecture*

In this last lecture on the EU, we are going to add yet another analytical level by studying the EU's role in global politics. In how far can 28 member states with partly very different regional interests and resources agree on a common foreign policy? How do national parliaments, courts and referenda constrain the common foreign policy? Why is the EU an extremely powerful actor in international trade, but not in security, defense or development policies? Who do you call to speak to Europe? The lecture starts by describing the EU's competences and decision bodies in different fields of foreign policy. Specifically, we will focus on the common trade policy and the set-up of the External Action Service. In the second part of the lecture, we will explain the current state of the EU's common foreign policy from a rational and a sociological institutionalist perspective.

#### *Classes*

In class students will analyze EU trade negotiations along one of the recent examples such as CETA, TTIP or (maybe) the upcoming Brexit negotiations. Specifically, they will study the relationship between national parliaments, governments, the Commission and the international partner (USA, Canada, or Britain) from



multiple principal agent perspective. In doing so, they will learn the limits of and conditions for a successful EU foreign policy.

*Learning objectives of week 14*

| Theory   | Empirical knowledge  | Application   |
|--|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand the implications of institutional constraints on foreign policy making.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Actors in EU foreign policy making.</li> <li>Legal framework of Common trade policy.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply rational choice theory to current trade negotiations.</li> </ul> |

## 5. Readings for Political Institutions

Students are expected to acquire on book:

Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) *The political system of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 1-20, 23-48, 49-74, 75-104, 105-157.

Additional readings in compendium and on-line:

Beramendi, P. (2007) 'Federalism', in Carles Boix & Susan Stokes (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 752-781 (30 pages) (copy in compendium).

Benoit, K (2007) 'Electoral laws as political consequences', *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 363-388 (36 pages) (online article).

Barnett, Michael & Martha Finnemore (2007) 'Political approach chapter 2' in Thomas G Weiss & Sam Daws (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations*, Oxford University Press, pp. 41-57 (17 pages) (copy in compendium).

Buzan, Berry (2004) *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge, chapter 6, pp. 161-204 (44 pages) (copy in compendium).

Cheibub, A., Przeworski, A. & Saigh, S. M. (2004) Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(4): 565-587 (23 pages) (online article).

Caramani, D. (2013) 'Party systems', chapter 13 in Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 327-345 (19 pages) (copy in compendium).

Carrubba, C.J., Gabel, M. & Hankla, C. (2008) Judicial behavior under political constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(04): 435-452 (18 pages) (online article).

Coleman, J.J. (1999) Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, *American Political Science Review*, 93(4): 821-835 (25 pages) (online article).

Da Conceicao, E. (2010) Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4): 1107-1126 (20 pages) (online article).

Dalton, R.J. (2012) Politics in Germany in Powell in G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative Politics Today. A World View*, 10<sup>th</sup> ed. Pierman, pp. 255-259+271-272+280-283 (10 pages) (copy in compendium).

Dür, A. & Zimmermann, H. (2007) Introduction: The EU in international trade negotiations. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(4): 771-787 (17 pages) (online article).

- Dyevre, A. (2010) Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: towards a general theory of judicial behaviour. *European Political Science Review*, 2(2): 297-327 (31 pages) (online article).
- Follesdal, A. & Hix, S. (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(3): 533-562 (30 pages) (online article).
- Gallager, M. (2013) 'Electoral systems', chapter 10 in Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 184-188 (5 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, *Political Studies* 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article).
- Hargreaves, S. & Homewood, M.J. (2013) *EU Law Concentrate: Law Revision and Study Guide*. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-20 (20 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Häge, F. M. & Kaeding, M. (2007) Reconsidering the European Parliament's legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures. *European Integration*, 29(3): 341-361 (21 pages) (online article).
- Jupille, J. & J. A. Caporaso (1999) Institutionalism and the European Union: beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 429-444 (16 pages) (online article)
- Keohane, Robert O. (1984), "After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy," genoptrykt i Mingst, Karen A. & Jack L. Snyder (eds.) *Essential Readings in World Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 338-354 (17 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Knudsen, Tonny Brems (2015) Primary institutions and international organizations: Theorizing continuity and change. Paper for the 9<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Sicily, 23-26 September 2015 (27 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Kreppel, A. (2014) 'Typologies and Classifications' in S. Martin, T. Saalfeld & K.W. Strøm (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 82-100 (19 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Loughlin, J. (2011) 'Federal and local government institutions', in Caramani (ed.) *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 199-211 (13 pages) (copy in compendium).
- McAlister, I. & Studlar, D. (2002) 'Electoral systems and women's representation: a long-term perspective', *Representation* 39(1): 3-14 (12 pages) (online article).
- Moravcsik, Andrew & Frank Schimmelfennig (2009) 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism', in Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez (eds) *European Integration Theory*. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-87 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Niemann, A. & Ioannou, D. (2015) 'European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?' *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2): 196-215 (20 pages) (online article).
- Niemann, Arne & Philippe C. Schmitter (2009) 'Neo-functionalism', in Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez (eds) *European Integration Theory*. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Peterson, J. (2016) 'Juncker's Political European Commission and an EU in Crisis', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*. Early View. (20 pages) (online article).
- Rasmussen, A. & Reh, C. (2013) The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(7): 1006-1024 (19 pages) (online article).
- Schain, M.A. (2012) Politics in France in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative Politics Today. A World View*, 10<sup>th</sup> ed. Pierman, pp. 200-202+227-233 (10 pages) (copy in compendium)

- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2016) "NATO and institutional theories of international relations", in Mark Webber & Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.) *Theorising NATO New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance*. London: Routledge, pp. 93-115 (13 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2): 177-192 (16 pages) (online article).
- Sieberer, U. (2011) The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis, *West European Politics*, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article).
- Stein, Arthur A. (1982) Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International organization*, 36(2): 299-324 (26 pages) (online article).
- Wlezien, C. & Soroka, S.N. (2011) 'Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 41(1): 31-52 (22 pages) (online article).

## 4.2 Graduate Seminar Syllabus

### **Democracy and Representation: When, why, and how does public opinion matter?**

Master's Seminar 214A

Department of Political Science, Aarhus University

**Time:** Mondays 8.00-11.00

**Location:** Building 1330, Rm. 018

**Lecturer:** Anthony Kevins  
Office: Building 1331, Rm. 111  
Email: [akevins@ps.au.dk](mailto:akevins@ps.au.dk)  
Telephone: 87165649

### **Course Objectives**

The course module offers a more extensive and more thorough analysis of a topic from within political science. To this end, the course module provides an overview and a critical discussion of the literature and the issues relevant for the topic of the seminar.

This seminar trains students to:

- understand the role of public opinion in contemporary developed democracies.
- describe and evaluate the theoretical and empirical links between voters and their representatives.
- assess the strengths and weaknesses of surveys when trying to uncover public opinion, and distinguish a good survey design from a bad one.
- determine patterns of unequal representation, as well as their causes and consequences.
- understand the role of politicians in shaping public opinion.
- compare the different conceptions of the citizen-representative link and their implications.

### **Course Content**

How important is public opinion in representative democracies? Who gets listened to, and who gets ignored? When do politicians follow popular opinion and when do they shape it? In this course, we will explore these questions using research on contemporary democracies in the developed world. We begin by laying out the classical and state-of-the-art theories on the impact of public opinion on public policy. This will involve critically assessing the theoretical and empirical links between voters and their representatives, as well as the uses and abuses of survey data. Next, we investigate patterns of unequal representation, exploring their causes and consequences. We then turn the causal arrow around and consider the impact politicians have on attitudes in the short- and long-term. Finally, we conclude by comparing different conceptions of the proper citizen-representative link and discussing when and to what extent public opinion should shape policy in a democracy.

### **Comments on form of instruction**

The seminar module requires active participation of students. At the beginning of the seminar module the lecturer and the students agree on specific "activity requirements" that the students have to fulfil.

The module consists of 15 tutorials of three hours over a period of 16 weeks

### **Exam details**

Topic of student's choice, oral exam

*Grading:* External co-examination

*Assessment:* 7-point grading scale

*Notes:* The examination lasts approx. 30 minutes divided equally between examination in synopsis (800-1200 words, corresponding to approx. 2-3 pages) and in the general curriculum. There is no preparation.

Re-examination takes place in February and August. The assessment method is home assignment.

*Exam time:* 30 minutes

*Literature:* A collection of scanned book sections, electronic articles, and book chapters available as e-resources from the library.

*Reading Load:* The readings total just under 1200 pages.

## **COURSE OUTLINE AND READINGS**

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### ***Unit 1: Introduction***

*Week 1: August 31*

#### **Why Study Public Opinion?**

Berelson, Bernard. 1952. "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 16: 313-30.

Back, Kurt W. 1988. "Metaphors for Public Opinion in Literature." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 52: 278-88.

Verba, Sidney. 1996. "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 90: 1-7.

Brady, Henry E. 2000. "Contributions of Survey Research to Political Science." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33: 47-57.

*Week 2: September 7*

**The Survey Method**

Zaller, John, and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 579-616.

Berinsky, Adam J. 2002. "Silent Voices: Social Welfare Policy Opinions and Political Equality in America." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 276-87.

Biemer, Paul P. 2010. "Total Survey Error: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74: 817-48.

**Unit 2: Exploring the Citizen-Policy Link**

*Week 3: September 14*

**Classical Approaches**

Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." *Journal of Political Economy* 65: 135-50.

Key, Valdimer Orlando. 1961. *Public Opinion and American Democracy*. New York, NY: Knopf. Pp. 536-553, 555-556. [Available on Blackboard.]

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 77: 175-90.

Page, Benjamin I. 1994. "Democratic Responsiveness? Untangling the Links between Public Opinion and Policy." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27: 25-29.

*Week 4: September 21*

**Current Major Theories**

Jones, Bryan D. 1994. *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 224-239. [Available on Blackboard.]

Stimson, James A, Michael B MacKuen, and Robert S Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *American Political Science Review* 89: 543-65.

Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 981-1000.

Burstein, Paul. 2010. "Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Democracy." In *Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective*, ed. Kevin T Leicht. New York, NY: Springer. 63-79. [Available as an e-resource through the library.]

*Week 5: September 28*

**The Impact of Political Institutions**

Binzer Hobolt, Sara, and Robert Klemmensen. 2008. "Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 41: 309-37.

Wlezien, Christopher, and Stuart N. Soroka. 2012. "Political Institutions and the Opinion-Policy Link." *West European Politics* 35: 1407-32.

Bevan, Shaun, and Will Jennings. 2014. "Representation, Agendas and Institutions." *European Journal of Political Research* 53: 37-56.

Bernauer, Julian, Nathalie Giger, and Jan Rosset. 2015. "Mind the Gap: Do Proportional Electoral Systems Foster a More Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor and Rich?". *International Political Science Review* 36: 78-98.

*Week 6: October 5*

**Democracy in the European Union**

Follesdal, Andreas, and Simon Hix. 2006. "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44: 533-62.

Mair, Peter, and Jacques Thomassen. 2010. "Political Representation and Government in the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 17: 20-35.

Bellamy, Richard, and Dario Castiglione. 2011. "Democracy by Delegation? Who Represents Whom and How in European Governance." *Government and Opposition* 46: 101-25.

Bølstad, Jørgen. 2015. "Dynamics of European Integration: Public Opinion in the Core and Periphery." *European Union Politics* 16: 23-44.

**\*\*\*No class October 12\*\*\***

*Week 7: October 19*

**Uses and Abuses of Public Opinion Data**

Druckman, James N, and Lawrence R Jacobs. 2006. "Lumpers and Splitters the Public Opinion Information That Politicians Collect and Use." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70: 453-76.

Birney, Mayling, Michael J. Graetz, and Ian Shapiro. 2006. "Public Opinion and the Push to Repeal the Estate Tax." *National Tax Journal* 59: 439-61.

Savigny, Heather. 2007. "Focus Groups and Political Marketing: Science and Democracy as Axiomatic?". *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 9: 122-37.

Jacobs, Lawrence. 2011. "The Betrayal of Democracy: The Purpose of Public Opinion Survey Research and its Misuse by Presidents." In *Manipulating Democracy*, eds. LeCheminant, Wayne and John Parrish. London, UK: Routledge. 190-208. [Available on Blackboard.]

### ***Unit 3: Who Gets Represented?***

*Week 8: October 26*

#### **"Default Man"**

Griffin, John D, and Brian Newman. 2005. "Are Voters Better Represented?". *Journal of Politics* 67: 1206-27.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A, and William Mishler. 2005. "An Integrated Model of Women's Representation." *Journal of Politics* 67: 407-28.

Griffin, John D, and Brian Newman. 2007. "The Unequal Representation of Latinos and Whites." *Journal of Politics* 69: 1032-46.

Fine, Jeffrey A, and Nadia N Aziz. 2013. "Does the Political Environment Matter? Arab-American Representation and September 11th." *Social Science Quarterly* 94: 551-68.

*Week 9: November 2*

#### **The Rich**

Flavin, Patrick. 2012. "Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States." *American Politics Research* 40: 29-59.

Flavin, Patrick. 2012. "Does Higher Voter Turnout among the Poor Lead to More Equal Policy Representation?". *The Social Science Journal* 49: 405-12.

Rosset, Jan, Nathalie Giger, and Julian Bernauer. 2013. "More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation." *West European Politics* 36: 817-35.

Peters, Yvette, and Sander J Ensink. 2015. "Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation." *West European Politics* 38: 577-600.

*Week 10: November 9*

#### **The Organised**

Soule, Sarah A, and Brayden G King. 2006. "The Stages of the Policy Process and the Equal Rights Amendment, 1972–1982." *American Journal of Sociology* 111: 1871-909.

Mahoney, Christine. 2007. "Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union." *Journal of Public Policy* 27: 35-56.

Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I Page. 2014. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12: 564-81.



#### **Unit 4: What Shapes Public Opinion?**

*Week 11: November 16*

##### **Political Parties**

Gabel, Matthew, and Kenneth Scheve. 2007. "Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables." *American Journal of Political Science* 51: 1013-28.

Bullock, John G. 2011. "Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 105: 496-515.

Brader, Ted, Joshua A Tucker, and Dominik Duell. 2013. "Which Parties Can Lead Opinion? Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in Multiparty Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 46: 1485-517.

Leeper, Thomas J, and Rune Slothuus. 2014. "Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation." *Political Psychology* 35: 129-56.

*Week 12: November 23*

##### **The Media**

Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. 1989. "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach." *American Journal of Sociology* 95: 1-37.

Bovitz, Gregory L., James N. Druckman, and Arthur Lupia. 2002. "When Can a News Organization Lead Public Opinion? – Ideology Versus Market Forces in Decisions to Make News." *Public Choice* 113: 127-55.

Azrout, Rachid, Joost Van Spanje, and Claes De Vreese. 2012. "When News Matters: Media Effects on Public Support for European Union Enlargement in 21 Countries." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50: 691-708.

*Week 13: November 30*

##### **Policy Feedback**

Soroka, Stuart N, and Christopher Wlezien. 2005. "Opinion–Policy Dynamics: Public Preferences and Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom." *British Journal of Political Science* 35: 665-89.

Johnson, Martin, Paul Brace, and Kevin Arceneaux. 2005. "Public Opinion and Dynamic Representation in the American States: The Case of Environmental Attitudes." *Social Science Quarterly* 86: 87-108.

Larsen, Christian Albrekt. 2008. "The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support." *Comparative Political Studies* 41: 145-68.

Kelly, Nathan J., and Peter K. Enns. 2010. "Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 855-70.

#### ***Unit 4: Should Public Opinion Matter?***

*Week 14: December 7*

##### **Should We Trust Public Opinion?**

Somin, Ilya. 1998. "Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal." *Critical Review* 12: 413-58.

Bartels, Larry M. 2005. "Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind." *Perspectives on Politics* 3: 15-31.

Lupia, Arthur. 2006. "How Elitism Undermines the Study of Voter Competence." *Critical Review* 18: 217-32.

Arnold, Jason Ross. 2012. "The Electoral Consequences of Voter Ignorance." *Electoral Studies* 31: 796-815.

*Week 15: December 14*

##### **Public Opinion and "Good" Democracies**

Przeworski, A. (2010). *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 99-117. [Available on Blackboard.]

Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97: 515-28.

Druckman, James N. 2014. "Pathologies of Studying Public Opinion, Political Communication, and Democratic Responsiveness." *Political Communication* 31: 467-92.

### 4.3 Lecture Activities

- *Rote memorization exercise with partner:* helping students to memorize complicated institutional setups

#### ALPHABET SOUP EXERCISE

| INSTITUTION             | FUNCTION  |
|-------------------------|---|
| 1) EC                   | a) General direction; crisis resolving            |
| 2) The European Council | b) National ministers; upper chamber              |
| 3) Council              | c) Rules on legal cases                           |
| 4) EP                   | d) Sets interest rates                            |
| 5) ECJ                  | e) Proposes legislation; day-to-day running of EU |
| 6) ECB                  | f) Legislative lower chamber                      |

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#### ALPHABET SOUP EXERCISE

| INSTITUTION             | FUNCTION  |
|-------------------------|---|
| 1) EC                   | a) General direction; crisis resolving            |
| 2) The European Council | b) National ministers; upper chamber              |
| 3) Council              | c) Rules on legal cases                           |
| 4) EP                   | d) Sets interest rates                            |
| 5) ECJ                  | e) Proposes legislation; day-to-day running of EU |
| 6) ECB                  | f) Legislative lower chamber                      |

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- *Recap exercise in small groups:* helping students to grasp unintuitive concepts

#### RECAP

Comitology – nothing to do with comets



With a partner, discuss the following two questions?

- 1) What is comitology?
- 2) What does it have to do with the EU executive?

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
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- *Two think-pair-share activities:* helping students to apply methodological concepts, with an eye to conducting (exercise on top slide) and analysing research (exercise on bottom slides)

## Think-Pair-Share: Pearson's r Example

Figure 1: Scatterplot of the association between age and ideological self-placement on the left-right scale

$$r = 0.116$$



What does the Pearson's r tell us about the linear association between the respondents' age and their ideological self-placement?

- Is there an association?
- What's its direction?
- What's its strength?

Source: The Danish Election Study 2005, N 2201. 63 respondents have been excluded from the analysis because they answered 'don't know'. Ideological self-placement was measured on a 10-point scale where 0 = very left-wing and 10 = very right-wing.

## Judging Research


- **An example:** Where do babies come from?

- Is there a theoretical explanation?

**Yes!**


- Is there a correlation?

**Yes!**





## Judging Research: Think-pair-share

- What's wrong with this study?
- What type of validity problem is there?
- Give an example of how each of the other validity issues might be applied to this study (recall: the types are internal, external, & measurement)



- *Theory application group activity*: helping students to internalize a theory by applying it to the real-world (following brief introduction to the case)

UK Example – “an inverse relationship between having the *will* and the *power*” (Mitchell, 2005: 174)



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## THEORY APPLICATION

Why would the (centrist) Lib Dems prefer AV to SMP?

1. How would AV potentially benefit the Lib Dems?
2. How would AV potentially hurt Labour and the Conservatives?  
(Hint: think about tactical voting)

**Number the boxes from 1 to 9 in the order of your choice.**

☐ WARD, Sam  
Lib

☐ HYND, Denise  
Chief Whip/Conservative Party

☐ HALLAM, Keith  
Chief Whip/Conservative Party

☐ TAYLOR, Peter  
Liberal Democrat Party

☐ HOPKINSON, Symia  
Liberal Democrat Party

☐ KEENAN, Michael  
Liberal Democrat Party

☐ DESATOV, Tamara  
Liberal Democrat Party

☐ PATRICK, Alex  
Liberal Democrat Party

☐ NONE OF THE ABOVE

Fold the ballot paper, place it in the envelope on which the postal and certificate is printed and fasten the envelope.

**Remember...number every box to make your vote count.**

AEC

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07 FEBRUARY 2017

## 4.4 Group Exercises

Political Institutions, Spring 2017

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### Class 5: Representation in federal systems

As we discussed in lecture, federalism has important implications for the way democracies work. One crucial implication relates to the extent of democratic accountability, since it can be difficult in a federation to disentangle the issues that matter for elections at the federal versus subnational levels. The tutorial this week therefore focuses on the extent to which voters are able to sort out which policy actions and responsibilities belong to which levels of government. The discussion will start from Wlezien and Soroka's investigation of public responsiveness in Canada. In your groups, you will then conduct your own research on the Canadian federation to better understand not only how federalism works in practice, but also the difficulties in assigning responsibility for policy outcomes.

Questions:

1. Describe the concept of "public responsiveness" on the basis of this text. Why might federalism increase or decrease public responsiveness?
2. Discuss, based on the empirical findings of the paper, whether federalism affects public responsiveness.
3. Imagine you live in Québec, Canada. You are angry at the government because...

| Option A   | OR | Option B   |
|--|----|--|
| a) There are always long lines at the post office;<br>b) a lot of new immigrants have recently moved into your town;<br>c) and you have no access to affordable childcare. |    | a) A foreign army occupied your town for a week last month;<br>b) your (public) pension has been cut in half;<br>c) and the local hospital has been shut down. |

Which level of government (provincial or federal) should you hold accountable for each of these complaints? Choose Option A or B and conduct some research\* in order to answer the question. NB: the answer may not always be as straightforward as you might think. (*Study groups provide the answer for question 3 on 2-3 slides and upload them on blackboard by Wednesday 23:59.*)

\* Some potential sources include:

- [http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/Education/ourcountryourparliament/html\\_booklet/di\\_vision-powers-e.html](http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/Education/ourcountryourparliament/html_booklet/di_vision-powers-e.html)
- <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-4.html#h-17>
- **Option A:** <http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0420-e.htm> (section: The Federal Role in Child Care) & <http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/cst-eng.asp>
- **Option B:** <http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0858-e.htm> (section: The Federal Spending Power) & <http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/cht-eng.asp>

Readings:

Wlezien, C., and Soroka, S.N. (2011) 'Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy.' *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 41(1): 31-52.



## Module 5: Quantitative bivariate analysis

**Please bring a laptop for additional in-class exercises!**

All study groups should solve the exercises below.

For Exercises 1, 2, and 3, *discuss* the questions below with the other students in your study group, and *write down* your study group's answers in one joint document. *Upload* these answers in a document (.doc, .docx, or .rtf) or PDF in a blog entry in response to the Blog for 'Group Exercises, Module 5' – by 9:00 p.m., Wednesday, October 26.

Answers to Exercise 4 should be prepared so that each group's work can be presented in the discussion class for the other students using a **Power Point Presentation** (max 3 slides).

Note, the two appendices you will need to answer these questions are at the end of this document.

### **Exercise 1**

*The purpose of exercises 1-3 is to train your ability to analyse relationships between two variables.*

**Table 1: Political science students by their high school education and their attitudes towards income redistribution. Row percentages. 2007.**

|                               | Attitude towards income redistribution               |   |       |           |
|-------------------------------|--|---|-------|-----------|
|                               | Agrees that the income differences still are too big | Agrees that the income redistribution is sufficient | Total | Frequency |
| Type of high school education |  |   |       |           |
| Language student              | 65.5   | 34.5  | 100.0 | 58        |
| Mathematical student          | 50.0   | 50.0  | 100.0 | 92        |
| Total                         | 56.0   | 44.0  | 100.0 | 150       |

Note. 57 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they answered "don't know or "do not agree with any of the statements" on the question concerning income redistribution, or because they have another high school education than the gymnasium.



Table 1 shows the bivariate relationship between high school education and attitudes towards income redistribution. The data come from a survey collected among political science students at Aarhus University in 2007.

1. What can you say about the relationship between high school education and attitudes towards redistribution based on the findings in Table 1? Does there seem to be a difference between math and language students?

### **Exercise 2**

Investigate whether there is an association between GDP per capita 1997 and human development (HDI) 1997 by means of Figure 1 in Appendix 1:

1. What is the level of measurement of the variables?
2. Are there observations that appear to be outliers in Figure 1?
3. What is the central pattern in the data in Figure 1? What would you tell your readers?
4. What does the  $r$  tell us about the statistical association between GDP per capita 1997 and human development 1997?
5. Does your analysis, which is technically correct, advance our knowledge of the actual causes of human development? Does the relationship you identified satisfy the criteria for a causal relationship? Why or why not?

### **Exercise 3**

Investigate whether there is a relationship between GDP per capita in 1997 and the level of democracy in 2006 by means of Appendix 2, Figure 2-3:

1. What is the level of measurement of the variables?
2. Are there observations which appear to be outliers in Figure 2?
3. What is the central pattern in the data in Figure 2? What is the relationship between GDP per capital and the level of democracy?
4. What does the  $r$  tell us about the statistical association between GDP per capita in 1997 and the level of democracy in 2006?





5. Does your analysis, which is technically correct, advance our knowledge of the actual causes of democracy? Does the relationship you identified satisfy the criteria for a causal relationship? Why or why not?
6. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between GDP per capita in 1997 and the level of democracy in 2006 when Arab oil states are excluded (i.e. the United Arab Emirates). Does the exclusion of the Arab oil states change the association between GDP per capita in 1997 and the level of democracy in 2006?

#### **Exercise 4**

*The purpose of this exercise is to strengthen your ability to present bivariate relationships in graphs and in tables, interpret the graphs and tables substantially, and describe the relationships.*

Table 2: The relationship between agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home and gender. Count (n = 1299). 2002.

|        |              | Agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home |                |                            |                   |                     |           |
|--------|--------------|---|----------------|----------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------|
|        |              | Agree completely  | Agree somewhat | Neither agree nor disagree | Disagree somewhat | Disagree completely | Row total |
| Gender | Male         | 69  | 163            | 67                         | 112               | 181                 | 592       |
|        | Female       | 50  | 139            | 83                         | 140               | 295                 | 707       |
|        | Column Total | 119   | 302            | 150                        | 252               | 476                 | 1299      |

Note: The data come from the International Social Survey Program's survey on family life in Denmark. 1379 respondents completed the survey. The 80 respondents who answered "don't know" or failed to provide a response to one of the two questions in table 2 have been excluded from Table 2.

Your task is to make a bivariate analysis of the relationship between gender and agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home. Agreement was measured on the following scale:

1. Agree completely
2. Agree somewhat



3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree completely
6. Don't know.


In the following analysis, treat gender as the independent variable and the answer for “agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home” as the dependent variable.

1. What is the level of measurement of the variable “agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home”?
2. Use the data in Table 2 above to investigate the effect of gender on agreement with the above statement.
  - a. With gender as the independent variable in your analysis, calculate the row percentage of the data in Appendix 3.
  - b. Using the percentages that you have calculated, present a percentage table (a table of percentages) that displays the relationship between gender and “agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home”.
  - c. Using your percentage table, discuss what we can say about the relationship between gender and the agreement with the statement that a child who has not begun primary school will suffer if the mother works outside the home. What would you tell your reader?
  - d. Finally, prepare a graph that could serve as an alternative presentation of the table you prepared for part (b) of this question.



### Appendix 1

**Figure 1: Human development index (HDI) 1997 and GDP per capita 1997. Data from Freedom House and DEMSTAR database.**




Pearson's  $r = 0.826$

*Note.* HDI 1997 is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 1 – high values indicate a high degree of human development



## Appendix 2

**Figure 2: Level of democracy in 2006 and GDP per capita 1997. Data from Freedom House and DEMSTAR database.**




Pearson's  $r = -0,638$

*Note.* The level of democracy is measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 – low values indicate a high level of democracy.



**Figure 3: Level of democracy in 2006 and GDP per capita 1997 when Arab oil states are excluded. Data from Freedom House and DEMSTAR database.**



Pearson's  $r = -0,802$

*Note.* The level of democracy is measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 – low values indicate a high level of democracy.

## 4.5 Writing Workshop Activity

### Instructions:

- 1) *Read through the examples on your own and mark down a grade for each*
  - *Three excerpts from a hypothetical introductory paragraph:*
    - *Topic introduction; thesis; essay structure overview*
  - *Potential grades: A, B, C, and D*
- 2) *Turn to your partner and discuss why you assigned that grade*
  - *Update the grade if you think you made a mistake*
- 3) *Then we'll discuss your answers as a class*

**The Question:** Will globalisation ultimately result in the convergence of Esping-Andersen's "worlds of welfare" and thereby erase institutional differences across welfare states?

### Excerpts:

#### **Topic Introduction (i.e. first part of intro, before the thesis)**

- a) Webster's dictionary defines globalisation as "the act or process of globalizing: the state of being globalized; especially: the development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked especially by free trade, free flow of capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor markets".
- b) Globalisation will ultimately result in the convergence of Esping-Andersen's "worlds of welfare".
- c) Neo-liberalism and the fiscal austerity that goes with it have led to the substantial restructuring of welfare states across the globe. There remains much debate, however, as to what these changes mean to the future of welfare state institutions.

#### **The Thesis (i.e. your main argument; your answer to the question)**

- a) Globalisation is a big issue that affects welfare state, capitalist, and citizenship regime institutions.
- b) While some people argue that globalisation will result in convergence, others deny this.
- c) I argue that globalisation will ultimately result in the convergence of Esping-Andersen's "worlds of welfare".
- d) This essay will analyse and compare the validity of globalisationist and institutionalist theories through an examination of welfare state retrenchment as it has occurred in the United Kingdom and Sweden. While both states have indeed seen retrenchment, it has taken different forms under different institutional arrangements.

#### **Essay Structure Overview (i.e. your plan for the rest of the answer)**

- a) I will make my argument by pointing to the impact of EU integration on everything from social policy to citizenship policies.
- b) I will prove this point by referencing the research of Palier and Martin, Ferrera, and Taylor-Gooby.
- c) In making this argument, the paper begins by tracing welfare state development within each case, and then examines the neoliberal restructuring which has occurred in social security and healthcare in recent decades. We then conclude with a brief analysis of the future prospects of welfare states.

## 5 Evaluations of Teaching

The remainder of the teaching portfolio contains evaluations of my teaching. This section begins with feedback from Ole Lauridsen, who is the Deputy Director of Aarhus University's Centre for Teaching and Learning. I received the attached letter as formal feedback after he sat in on one of my classes as part of a pedagogical course. The rest of the section then provides a varied selection of student evaluations from my courses, which are presented here in chronological order. (Please note that a few of the student comments are written in Danish.)

## 5.1 Teaching Supervision Feedback

### PS-Project – Supervision Anthony Kevins

Below I write as things happen – ‘stream of consciousness’ – but I will highlight the important things.

17.03.2016

Wow, Anthony, you took the plunge! **Peer feedback** with a **very good introduction** not only as to the elements of the feedback but also of **the rules of the game and why they are important**. You were just GOOD, and not surprisingly, I enjoyed every minute and **I’m full of praise**.

In all respects, **your matrix was very, very good** – you pinpointed the elements that are crucial not only to understanding but also to developing the academic presentation, an important skill. And: **everybody had to listen carefully to the presentation** in order for them to evaluate the presentation. In other words, the learnt in several loops.

Of course, I am no mind reader, but my impression was that **the students liked the challenge**. There were no sounds of disapproval after you having started the lesson, on the contrary. The first group was relaxed (after a bit of nervous giggling) and took the presentation seriously.

Good that you thanked the group for being Guinea pigs – and being Guinea pigs they did a good job.

Your **wrapping up** – well, it couldn’t be done better. Starting by stating some positive elements and then moving to the problems is *the* way of giving feedback. And writing the remarks on the chalk board meant that this was not only a ritual, but something that was of importance. Also your wrapping up the feedback and stating the importance of and the reason for it was perfect.

The feedback of the students was good. Also they took the task seriously, and their points were good. To my mind, they learnt very much and very well through your technique.

A last thing: I am happy to realize that you know the students by name. This contributed to the very positive atmosphere that characterized the lesson.

So much for today. Have a nice weekend.





1  
August 29, 2013

----- MCGILL UNIVERSITY COURSE EVALUATION -----

End-of-term course evaluations results are used:

- a. to help instructors improve future offerings of courses;
- b. to inform students about courses and instructors; and
- c. as one indicator of teaching effectiveness for promotion and tenure purposes.

Written comments, solicited or unsolicited, are treated as confidential, and are not made available to the McGill Community.

THE COURSE RATINGS REPORTED HERE ARE ONLY ONE INDICATOR OF TEACHING EFFECTIVENESS AND THESE RESULTS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH CAUTION SINCE THEY REPRESENT REPORTS ON ONLY THIS PARTICULAR COURSE

COURSE: POL1357 001 : Politics: Contemporary Europe

TERM CODE: 201305 MERCURY

INSTRUCTOR: Anthony Kevins

COMPLETED EVALUATIONS / TOTAL REGISTERED : 10 / 34 = 29.4%

The departmental means are calculated from the Faculty of Arts - Undergraduate courses questionnaire.

----- SUMMARY OF EVALUATION RESULTS -----

| QUEST-<br>NO. | VALID<br>REPLIES | RESPONSE<br>BREAKDOWN |   |   |   |   | PERCENT<br>BREAKDOWN |    |    |    |    | STD<br>DEV | DEPT<br>MEAN | DEPT<br>COURSE<br>MEAN | FIRST LINE OF QUESTION TEXT  |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------------|----|----|----|----|------------|--------------|------------------------|--|
|               |                  | 1                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | N/A                  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5          |              |                        |  |
| 0001          | 10               |                       | 2 | 6 | 2 |   |                      | 20 | 60 | 20 |    | 4.0        | 0.7          | 4.2                    | 4.1 OVERALL, THIS IS AN EXCELLENT COURSE.  |
| 0002          | 10               |                       | 1 | 5 | 4 |   |                      | 10 | 50 | 40 |    | 4.3        | 0.7          | 4.3                    | 4.3 OVERALL, I LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS COURSE.  |
| 0003          | 10               | 1                     |   | 6 | 3 |   |                      | 60 | 30 |    |    | 4.0        | 1.2          | 4.4                    | 4.1 A.K. : OVERALL, THIS INSTRUCTOR IS AN EXCELLENT TEACHER.                                 |
| 0004          | 10               |                       |   | 6 | 4 |   |                      | 60 | 40 |    |    | 4.4        | 0.5          | 4.3                    | 4.1 A.K. : OVERALL, I LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS INSTRUCTOR.                             |
| 0005          | 10               | 1                     | 2 | 3 | 4 |   |                      | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 4.0        | 1.1          | 4.1                    | 4.0 A.K. : OVERALL, I LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS INSTRUCTOR.                             |
| 0006          | 10               | 1                     | 3 | 5 | 1 |   |                      | 10 | 30 | 50 | 10 | 4.3        | 1.0          | 4.5                    | 4.2 A.K. : CONSIDERING CLASS SIZE, THE INSTRUCTOR WAS AVAILABLE FOR INDIVIDUAL CONSULTATION. |
| 0007          | 10               |                       | 5 | 5 | 5 |   |                      | 50 | 50 |    |    | 4.5        | 0.5          | 4.1                    | 4.0 OVERALL, THIS COURSE WAS INTELLECTUALLY CHALLENGING.                                     |
| 0008          | 10               | 1                     | 1 | 1 | 7 |   |                      | 10 | 10 | 10 | 70 | 4.4        | 1.1          | 4.1                    | 4.1 THE COURSE OBJECTIVES WERE CLEARLY EXPLAINED.  |
| 0009          | 10               |                       |   |   | 9 |   |                      | 10 |    |    | 90 | 4.7        | 0.9          | 4.6                    | 4.6 STUDENTS WERE INVITED TO SHARE THEIR IDEAS AND KNOWLEDGE.                                |
| 0010          | 10               | 1                     | 1 | 3 | 5 |   |                      | 10 | 10 | 30 | 50 | 4.2        | 1.0          | 3.9                    | 4.0 TESTS, ASSIGNMENTS AND OTHER REQUIRED WORK FOR THE COURSE WERE APPROPRIATE.              |
| 0011          | 10               |                       |   | 4 | 5 |   |                      | 10 | 40 | 50 |    | 4.4        | 0.7          | 4.1                    | 4.2 THE EVALUATION METHODS USED IN THIS COURSE WERE APPROPRIATE.                             |
| 0012          | 10               |                       | 1 | 5 | 4 |   |                      | 10 | 50 | 40 |    | 4.3        | 0.7          | 4.1                    | 4.1 COURSE MATERIALS (E.G., READINGS, LECTURE NOTES, EXERCISES, AUDIO-VISUAL PRESENTATIONS E |
| 0014          | 10               |                       |   |   |   |   |                      |    |    |    |    | 100        | 0.0          | 5.0                    | 5.0 THE TA WAS EFFECTIVE IN FULFILLING HIS/HER ROLE.   |
| 0015          | 8                |                       |   |   |   |   |                      |    |    |    |    | 100        | 0.0          |                        | FOR SOCIAL WORK STUDENTS ONLY: PLEASE SPECIFY IF YOU ARE BSW 90 CREDITS OR BSW 60 CRE        |

\*\*\* DEPT MEAN = Sum of all valid responses for this question in all courses in the department/number of such responses

\*\*\* DEPT COURSE MEAN = Sum of the means for this question for all courses in the department/number of courses in the department



## Individual report for 214A Democracy and Representation: When, why, and how does public opinion matter? (Anthony Kevins)

### Course evaluations Fall 2015

Project Audience 11  
Responses Received 11  
Response Ratio 100%

#### Subject Details

**Department** Political Science  
**Niveau** Kandidat  
**Semester** E2015

#### Report Comments

##### Topics and questions

##### Balancing expectations

The lecturer clearly communicated what he or she expected of us on this course

##### Feedback

During the course I continuously had the opportunity to apply what I had learnt and in that connection solve any uncertainties and misunderstandings

##### Structure of the course

The course was well-structured; e.g. the purpose of the individual course material and activities was clear to me

##### EDU-IT

The course website on Blackboard supported the teaching and learning activities

##### Loyalty among fellow students

On this course, it has been possible for me to get help and support from my fellow students when I encountered academic problems

##### Student commitment and participation

I have actively participated in the teaching and learning activities of the course both during and in between the classes

##### The lecturer's commitment

The lecturer(s) made an effort to understand the difficulties we might have with the material

The lecturer(s) was/were good at explaining the material

##### The student teacher's commitment

The student teacher was good at explaining the material

The student teacher made an effort to understand where I and my fellow students might have difficulties understanding the material

The student teacher gave us good advice on how to work with the material and how to solve the exercises

##### Scale


A=Agree(5) MA=Mostly agree(4) Neutral=Neutral(3) MD=Mostly disagree(2) D=Disagree(1)

**Creation Date** Fri, Dec 11, 2015






### Self-assessment of benefits



### Overall outcome

|  | Response count | Mean | Very significant outcome | Significant outcome | Some outcome | Limited outcome | No outcome |
|--|----------------|------|--------------------------|---------------------|--------------|-----------------|------------|
| I assess the overall outcome of the course as: | 11             | 3.9  | 0.0 %                    | 90.9 %              | 9.1 %        | 0.0 %           | 0.0 %      |

### On the average, I have spent this many hours per week on this course (participation + preparation):




### Hours spent on the course

|   | Mean | 1-5    | 6-10   | 11-15  | 16-20 | 21-25 | Over 25 |
|---|------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|---------|
| On the average, I have spent this many hours per week on this course (participation + preparation): | 8.8  | 18.2 % | 45.5 % | 36.4 % | 0.0 % | 0.0 % | 0.0 %   |

## BSS course evaluations - E2015

### All questions



### All questions

|   | Mean | N  | A      | MA     | Neutral | MD    | D     |
|---|------|----|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|
| The lecturer clearly communicated what he or she expected of us on this course  | 3.8  | 11 | 9.1 %  | 72.7 % | 9.1 %   | 9.1 % | 0.0 % |
| During the course I had continuous opportunity to apply what I had learned and to have errors and misunderstandings explained.    | 4.3  | 11 | 36.4 % | 54.5 % | 9.1 %   | 0.0 % | 0.0 % |
| The course was well-structured; e.g. the purpose of the individual course material and activities was clear to me.                | 4.5  | 11 | 45.5 % | 54.5 % | 0.0 %   | 0.0 % | 0.0 % |
| The course website on Blackboard supported the teaching and learning activities.  | 4.0  | 11 | 27.3 % | 45.5 % | 27.3 %  | 0.0 % | 0.0 % |
| On this course, it has been possible for me to get help and support from my fellow students when I encountered academic problems. | 3.4  | 11 | 0.0 %  | 45.5 % | 45.5 %  | 9.1 % | 0.0 % |

BSS course evaluations - E2015

|   | Mean | N  | A      | MA     | Neutral | MD    | D     |
|---|------|----|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|
| I have actively participated in the course's teaching and learning activities, both during and between classes. | 4.2  | 11 | 27.3 % | 63.6 % | 9.1 %   | 0.0 % | 0.0 % |
| The lecturer(s) was/were good at explaining the material  | 4.5  | 11 | 63.6 % | 27.3 % | 9.1 %   | 0.0 % | 0.0 % |
| The lecturer(s) made an effort to understand the difficulties we might have with the material                   | 4.2  | 11 | 36.4 % | 54.5 % | 0.0 %   | 9.1 % | 0.0 % |

## Open-ended questions

### Which parts of the course have been particularly beneficial for your learning?

| Students  |
|---|
| We have had the opportunity to talk a lot - Which has helped the understanding of the texts and the themes and at the same time improved our language skills.   |
| -Feedback round on the Synopsis<br>-Group work/ Discussion in class<br>-PowerPoint Summerizes   |
| The texts and class discussions   |
| There has generally been a good follow up on the texts for the different topics.<br>Good that the teacher has used examples from real life where we have been able to use the insights from the texts.  |
| Underviseren har virket ok engageret, og har forsøgt sig med forskellige gruppeøvelser (fungeret af varierende grad), ok struktur på pensum, godt med læsespørgsmål til pensum (men kunne godt være lidt mere konkrete)   |
| -Discussions of articles  |
| In general, I think that the ordinary discussions in class were quite useful.   |
| Discussions in class, presentation of the synopsis.   |
| The readings have been good and made more manageable by questions of "where to focus attention". Class discussions helped me better understand the texts and how the different arguments relate to each other. I also like when we incorporate examples from "real life". No part of the syllabus has been more beneficial than others in terms of academical payoff - I think all parts of the course are needed to understand public opinion and representation. But the last half (from unit three onwards) has piqued my interest the most. |

### Do you have any suggestions for improving the course? Have you missed anything?

| Students  |
|---|
| You could consider to be more theme-focused. Instead of focusing on each of the texts individually, which we have done for the majority of the seminar, the teaching could be more case/problem-focused. In that way we would use the texts to a larger extent.   |
| -Better Connection to the previous classes --> Link between the issues  |
| The class discussions were too long at times  |
| Better and more clear guidelines of the synopsis  |
| Since the course is focused on democracy it would probably be good to maybe have one class presenting different views of what democracy actually entails. Maybe that could make the discussions on the different topics' consequences on democracy a bit more nuanced since the consequences ultimately hinges on the perception on what democracy actually is.   |
| Meget ensidig undervisning: den samme struktur hver evig eneste gang, hvor underviseren spørger hvad hovedpointen er i hver enkelt tekst (en efter en), og bare venter på at folk rækker hånden. Selvfølgelig skal der være studenteraktivitet, men det ville ikke skade hvis underviseren også havde fremlagt noget af pensum, og så kunne man have diskuteret det bagefter.   |
| Der kunne godt have været bedre forberedelser til eksamen - det er en synopsis eksamen, men vi har ikke fået nogen information om, hvad han forventer af præsentationen, synopsisen eller andet, og det kan være lidt svært, når man sidder med sin første synopsis eksamen og ikke aner hvad man skal gøre. Derudover synes jeg det er fint nok, at han har givet mulighed for at man har kunne vælge sig ind på et emne og lave en synopsis og så fremlægge den og få feedback. |
| Anthony taler meget hurtigt - har kommenteret det før - har svært ved at høre hvad han siger.   |
| Derudover bærer faget MEGET præg af, at det er meget lavt på folks prioriteringsliste (fra nr. 10 og nedefter) - og det er virkelig problematisk for ens læring og den aktivitet der er på tiden. Det bærer præg af et fag, hvor der er mange, som ikke har ønsket faget og egentlig bare er her for 10 ETCS.   |

## BSS course evaluations - E2015

-Lecturer can add more value to articles

I thought it could be useful with even more empirical cases for discussions on class.

Provide (electronic) reader (e.g. use Dropbox) to prevent download problems.

I would have liked more articles studying cases outside the US, but I guess that's more of a problem with the general literature than the course itself.

I think the way that we did the synopsis presentations was not the best . I think it would have given a higher payoff if we had 3-4 small meetings of four students (all having written a synopsis) and Anthony instead of presentations before the whole class. Perhaps people would feel safer to speak up and give better feedback and there would be more time for questions etc. Last time I had a synopsis seminar this was how we did it, and I think it worked better.

1

|   | Responses |                     |                   |                      |          | Response |            |
|---|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------|----------|------------|
|   | (A)Enig   | (A)Overvejende enig | (H)Hverken- eller | (U)Overvejende uenig | (U)Uenig | Antal    | Gns. score |
| Holdunderviseren/Instruktoren var god til at forklare stoffet   | 71.4 %    | 19.0 %              | 4.7 %             | 4.7 %                | .        | 21       | 4.6        |
| Holdunderviseren/Instruktoren gjorde sig umage for at forstå, hvor vi kunne have vanskeligheder med                             | 52.3 %    | 33.3 %              | 9.5 %             | 4.7 %                | .        | 21       | 4.3        |
| Holdunderviseren/Instruktoren var god til at give os råd om, hvordan man bedst muligt arbejder med stoffet og løser opgaver     | 57.1 %    | 28.5 %              | 4.7 %             | 4.7 %                | 4.7 %    | 21       | 4.3        |
| Instruktorens/holdunderviserens formidling. Instruktor/holdunderviseren var god til at strukturere relevante læringsaktiviteter | 33.3 %    | 28.5 %              | 28.5 %            | .                    | 9.5 %    | 21       | 3.8        |

#### Translation

- 1) The instructor was good at explaining the course content
- 2) The instructor made an effort to understand where we were having difficulties
- 3) The instructor was good at giving advice on how best to apply the course content and solve problems
- 4) The instructors/tutorial leaders were good at structuring relevant learning activities

Response Range: Agree / Predominantly agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Predominantly disagree

NB: Antal = number of students, and Gns. score = average response. Student comments follow on the next page.

2

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| <b>Q14_Uddyb evt. dine svar vedrørende instruktør/holdundervisningen her</b>   |
| our instructor was amazing (Anthony), but the course is very difficult to understand and the assignments each week was difficult to understand.  |
| Anthony's teaching have been quite beneficial - it has been a pleasure to follow his courses.  |
| Anthony is really good at teaching. He is good at taking the hard stuff down to a level where we understand it. His notes on the board is good, very structured and simple.  |
| Anthony som instruktør er den eneste grund til at jeg har fået bare en lille smule ud af faget, da han har været virkelig god til at strukturere holdtiden og formidle stoffet, så det var letforståeligt  |
| Anthony is great, he is really good :)   |
| Anthony definitely made this course much easier to grasp. The overall purpose hasn't been clear to me but still I understood much more after a holdtime than from the forelæsning.   |
| Anthony er en meget kompetent og pædagogisk holdunderviser, der er god til at formidle stoffet på en forståelig måde.  |
| Holdtimerne har været der, hvor jeg faktisk har lært noget, da Anthony er en god underviser med forståelse for, at stoffet kan være svært. Anthony har reddet mit udbytte af faget.  |
| Hold 7: Vores holdtimer med Anthony føler jeg er det eneste tidspunkt, hvor jeg faktisk har fået et ordenligt udbytte af faget!  |
| Anthony did an excellent job turning something very complex into something we could understand. He was patient and understood where we might have difficulties.  |
| Instruktor, Anthony, har været utrolig dygtig til at undervise og sikre, at man har fået forståelse for det basale i pensum. Han har virkelig formået at udvælge det mest relevante og sørget for at gøre det så enkelt som muligt, så man har virkelig fået noget ud af holdundervisningen. |



1

|  | Responses |                     |                  | Response |            |
|--|-----------|---------------------|------------------|----------|------------|
|  | (A)Enig   | (A)Overvejende enig | (H)Hverken-eller | Antal    | Gns. score |
| Holdunderviseren/Instruktoren var god til at forklare stoffet  | 86.6 %    | 6.6 %               | 6.6 %            | 15       | 4.8        |
| Holdunderviseren/Instruktoren gjorde sig umage for at forstå, hvor vi kunne have vanskeligheder med                              | 73.3 %    | 13.3 %              | 13.3 %           | 15       | 4.6        |
| Holdunderviseren/Instruktoren var god til at give os råd om, hvordan man bedst muligt arbejder med stoffet og løser opgaver      | 86.6 %    | 6.6 %               | 6.6 %            | 15       | 4.8        |
| Instruktorens/holdunderviserens formidling_Instruktoren/holdunderviseren var god til at strukturere relevante læringsaktiviteter | 66.6 %    | 26.6 %              | 6.6 %            | 15       | 4.6        |

#### Translation

- 1) The instructor was good at explaining the course content
- 2) The instructor made an effort to understand where we were having difficulties
- 3)The instructor was good at giving advice on how best to apply the course content and solve problems
- 4) The instructors/tutorial leaders were good at structuring relevant learning activities

Response Range: Agree / Predominantly agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Predominantly disagree

NB: Antal = number of students, and Gns. score = average response. Student comments follow on the next page.

2

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| <b>Q14_Uddyb evt. dine svar vedrørende instruktør/holdundervisningen her</b>   |
| Anthony have been really great. He explains things so everyone can understand it and he makes sure there's an atmosphere in which everyone can participate and ask all kind of questions (even though our English isn't that good).  |
| Our teacher did an excellent job incorporating what the students in the class has to say without fishing for one specific answer. This creates a good learning environment where people want to participate. He also has a good sense of when the class is onboard and when students are failing behind or not understanding what is going on.   |
| Anthony Kevins (class 9). He was:- Very engaged and knowledgeable - Very good at creating a space in which the students feel comfortable participating- Very good at incorporating the students' answers in the class rooms discussions in a way that makes the students feel they have something smart to offer. This certainly makes class room discussions more enjoyable and it makes more students participate. - Very open to different answers and having an ease in finding the relevance of these- Crea |
| Anthony was our instructor, and he was very good. Even though it was often very difficult, he was able to take out the important pointers so we would get the basics of the topic and walk out of the class with a sense of having understood something. He was very, very good!   |
| Anthony was amazing.All the other lectures have been some of the worst I have had so far. It seems so forced to have danes speak english!  |
| Anthony var en rigtig god instruktør og forelæser. Han kunne forenkle det ret svære stof og havde tålmodighed når vi ikke forstod det.   |
| very good  |
| Det har bare været super godt på holdtimerne, hvor der har været mulighed for at få afklaret alt det svære både undervejs i timen, men også i pausen. Anthony har virkelig formået at få forklaret tingene på en måde så de har været til at forstå - altså med gode eksempler osv.  |