Anthony Yoon Min Seo Kim Sam Konkel

7

**Problem 1.** Explaining lower real interest rates.

(1)

Solution:



Figure 1: Fred Graph

**(2)** 

Solution:

Fill in here

(3)

Solution:

**Problem 2.** Transitional Dynamics in Solow Growth Model

(1)

Solution: Given the given parameters, we can see that:

$$k_t = \frac{K_t}{A_t N_t} \quad y_t = \frac{y_t}{A_t N_t}$$

Thus

$$K_{t+1} = K_t(1 - \delta) + I_t$$

$$K_{t+1} = K_t(1 - \delta) + s(A_t N_t)^{1 - \alpha} K_t^{\alpha}$$

$$K_{t+1} - K_t = s(A_t N_t)^{1 - \alpha} K_t^{\alpha} - \delta K_t$$

$$\frac{\Delta K_t}{K_t} = \frac{s(A_t N_t)^{1 - \alpha} K_t^{\alpha}}{K_t} - \delta$$

$$\frac{\Delta K_t}{K_t} = \frac{sK_t^{\alpha - 1}}{(A_t N_t)^{\alpha - 1}} - \delta$$

$$\frac{\Delta K_t}{K_t} = sk_t^{\alpha - 1} - \delta$$

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Note that  $K_t = A_t N_t k_t$  This implies:

$$\frac{\Delta K_t}{K_t} = sk_t^{\alpha - 1} - \delta$$

$$\frac{\Delta k_t A_t N_t}{k_t A_t N_t} = sk_t^{\alpha - 1} - \delta$$

$$\frac{\Delta k_t}{k_t} + \frac{\Delta A_t}{A_t} + \frac{\Delta N_t}{N_t} = sk_t^{\alpha - 1} - \delta$$

$$\frac{\Delta k_t}{k_t} + g + n = sk_t^{\alpha - 1} - \delta$$

$$\Delta k_t = sk_t^{\alpha} - (n + g + \delta)k_t$$

(2)

Solution: At steady state,  $\Delta k_t = 0$  For notational state, let  $x = k_{ss}$ . This implies that

$$0 = sx^{\alpha} - (n+g+\delta)k_t$$
$$(n+g+\delta)x = sx^{\alpha}$$
$$\frac{n+g+\delta}{s} = x^{\alpha-1}$$
$$x = \left(\frac{s}{n+g+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

(3)

Solution: We are interested in the following optimization problem:

$$\max k_t^{\alpha} - (n+g+\delta)k_t$$

Taking the first order deriative with respect to  $k_t$  allows to see:

$$\alpha k_t^{\alpha-1} - (n+g+\delta) = 0 \implies k_{gr} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{n+g+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$$

(4)

Solution: Code for the simulation:

```
% Setting parameters
s = 0.4;
delta = 0.06;
n = 0.02;
g = 0.02;
```

```
alpha = 1/3;
z = 100; % Number of iterations
% x axis creation
X = 0:1:z;
X = X';
K = zeros(z+1, 1);
A = zeros(z+1, 1);
N = zeros(z+1, 1);
k = zeros(z+1,1);
y = zeros(z+1,1);
Y = zeros(z+1,1);
% setting values
A(1) = 1;
K(1) = 1;
N(1) = 1;
Y(1) = K(1)^a + (A(1) * N(1))^(1-alpha);
% Time iteration
for i = 1:(z+1)
   A(i + 1) = A(i) * (1 + g);
   N(i + 1) = N(i) * (1 + n);
    K(i + 1) = K(i) * (1 - delta) + s * (A(i) * N(i))^(1 - alpha) *
      K(i)^alpha;
   k(i) = (K(i) / (A(i) * N(i)));
   Y(i) = K(i)^alpha * (A(i) * N(i))^(1-alpha);
    y(i) = Y(i) / (A(i) * N(i));
end
figure;
subplot(2, 2, 1);
plot(X, y);
title('Plot of y vs X');
grid on;
subplot(2, 2, 2);
plot(X, Y);
title('Plot of Y vs X');
grid on;
subplot(2, 2, 3);
plot(X, k);
title('Plot of k vs X');
grid on;
```

```
subplot(2, 2, 4);
plot(X, K(1:101));
title('Plot of K vs X');
grid on;
```




Figure 2: Figure Econ 20210 Problem 3 Question 5

Note that k and y are approach the steady state behaviors and Y and K approach infinity, which resemble the Inada conditions.

Solution:

```
% Problem 3 Q5

% Setting values
k_steady_state = (s / (n+g+delta))^(1.5);
k_1 = zeros(z, 1);
k_1(1) = k_steady_state;
s = 0.35;

for i=1:z
    k_1(i+1) = s * k_1(i)^alpha - (n + g + delta) * k_1(i) + k_1(i);
end

figure;
plot(X,k_1)
```

## INSERT GRAPH

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**Problem 3.** Cookie Eating - Part 1

**(1)** 

Solution: We can see the law of depreciation is:

$$W_{t+1} = W_t - c_t \quad \text{s.t} \quad W_0 > 0$$

(2)

Solution: Note that  $W_{t+1} = W_t - c_t$  and thus  $W_t = W_{t-1} - c_{t-1}$ . This implies that via a recursive argument:

$$W_{t+1} = W_t - c_t \implies W_{t+1} = W_0 - \sum_{t=1}^{T} c_t$$

such that 
$$W_{t+1} \geq 0$$

(3)

Solution: The Langrangian is as follows:

$$L = s - \lambda \left( W_{t+1} - W_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{t} c_t \right)$$

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with the following FOCs:

$$[c_i] \quad \left(\frac{\partial u}{\partial c}\Big|_{c_i}\right) \cdot \beta^i + \lambda \le 0$$

$$[\lambda] \quad W_{t+1} \le W_0 - \sum_{t=1}^T c_t$$

Note that  $W_{t+1}$  has to be 0, as no utility is derived from  $W_{t+1}$  period.

(4)

Solution: From a  $[c_{i+1}]$  and  $[c_i]$ , we see that:

$$u'(c_{t+1}) = \frac{\lambda}{\beta^{t+1}} \quad u'(c_t) = \frac{\lambda}{\beta^t}$$

This implies

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{u'(c_{t+1})} = \frac{\frac{\lambda}{\beta^t}}{\frac{\lambda}{\beta^{t+1}}} = \beta \iff u'(c_t) = \beta u'(c_{t+1})$$

(5)

Solution: From (4), we see that

$$\beta c_t = c_{t+1} \iff \frac{c_t}{\beta} = c_{t-1}$$

This implies that using the  $[\lambda]$  condition, we are innerested in solving:

$$W_0 = \sum_{i=0}^t \beta^{-i} c_t$$

which is equivalent to

$$c_t \sum_{i=0}^t = W_0 \iff c_t = \frac{W}{\sum_{i=0}^t \beta^{-i}}$$

Problem 4. Crusoe's Intratemporal Choice

(1)

Solution:

$$\max U(c, l)$$
s.t  $c = \frac{1}{1 - \theta} (l - \bar{l})^{1 - \theta}$ 
s.t  $0 < \theta < 1$ 

(2)

Solution: The FOCs are as follows:

$$[c] \quad \frac{\alpha}{c} - \lambda = 0$$

$$[l] \quad \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - l} - \lambda (l - \bar{l})^{-\theta} = 0$$

$$[\lambda] \quad c = \frac{1}{1 - \theta} (l - \bar{l})^{1 - \theta}$$

We see that using the [l] and  $[\lambda]$  constraint, we see that

$$-\frac{1-\alpha}{1-l} + \frac{a}{c}(l-\bar{l})^{-\theta} = 0$$
$$\frac{\alpha}{c}(l-\bar{l})^{-\theta} = \frac{1-\alpha}{1-l}$$
$$\frac{\alpha}{c(l-\bar{l})^{\theta}} = \frac{1-\alpha}{1-l}$$

Note that  $(l-\bar{l})^{\theta}$  is the weight of trade off between the consumption and labor. If  $\theta$  increases, working more does become as beneifical.

(3)

Solution: Using the derived optimality condition, we can see the following:

$$\frac{1-\alpha}{1-l} = \frac{\alpha}{c}(l-\bar{l})^{-\theta}$$

$$c(1-\alpha) = \alpha(1-l)(l-\bar{l})^{-\theta}$$

$$c = \frac{\alpha(1-l)(l-\bar{l})^{-\theta}}{1-\alpha}$$

$$\frac{1}{1-\theta}(l-\bar{l})^{1-\theta} = \frac{\alpha(1-l)(l-\bar{l})^{-\theta}}{1-\alpha}$$

$$\frac{l-\bar{l}}{1-\theta} = \frac{\alpha(1-l)}{1-\alpha}$$

$$\frac{l}{1-\theta} + \frac{\alpha l}{1-\alpha} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} + \frac{\bar{l}}{1-\theta}$$

$$l\left(\frac{1}{1-\theta} + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\right) = \frac{\alpha(1-\theta) + \bar{l}(1-\alpha)}{(1-\alpha)(1-\theta)}$$

$$l\left(\frac{1-\alpha+\alpha(1-\theta)}{(1-\theta)}(1-\alpha)\right) = \frac{\alpha(1-\theta) + \bar{l}(1-\alpha)}{(1-\alpha)(1-\theta)}$$

$$l = \frac{\alpha(1-\theta) + \bar{l}(1-\alpha)}{1-\alpha+\alpha(1-\theta)}$$

This implies that:

$$c = \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \overline{l}(1 - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha + \alpha(1 - \theta)} - \overline{l} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \overline{l}(1 - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha + \alpha - \alpha \theta} - \overline{l} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \overline{l}(1 - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha \theta} - \overline{l} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \overline{l}(1 - \alpha) - \overline{l}(1 - \alpha \theta)}{1 - \alpha \theta} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \overline{l}[(1 - \alpha) - (1 - \alpha \theta)]}{1 - \alpha \theta} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \overline{l}(\alpha \theta - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha \theta} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \alpha(\theta - 1)\overline{l}}{1 - \alpha \theta} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1 - \theta) + \alpha(\theta - 1)\overline{l}}{1 - \alpha \theta} \right)^{1 - \theta}$$

Therefore:

$$l = \frac{\alpha(1-\theta) + \overline{l}(1-\alpha)}{1-\alpha + \alpha(1-\theta)} \quad c = \frac{1}{1-\theta} \left( \frac{\alpha(1-\theta)(1-\overline{l})}{1-\alpha\theta} \right)^{1-\theta}$$

(4)

Solution:

$$\frac{\partial l}{\partial \bar{l}} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha + \alpha(1 - \theta)} \quad \frac{\partial c}{\partial \bar{l}} = -\left(\frac{\alpha(1 - \theta)}{1 - \alpha\theta}\right)^{1 - \theta} (1 - \bar{l})^{-\theta}$$