




1h 58m
Italian
English Subtitles

Award-winning filmmaker Paolo Sorrentino writes and directs this cinematic portrait of seven-time Italian prime minister Giulio Andreotti, whose controversial legacy peaked when he was tried for Mafia ties and subsequently acquitted. A leader with close ties to the Vatican, Andreotti was also tried and acquitted for the murder of an Italian journalist, and remains a senator for life.



(FROM *The History of Sexuality*, Volume I)

For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient *patria potestas* that granted the father of the Roman family the right to "dispose" of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it away. By the time the right of life and death was framed by the classical theoreticians, it was in a considerably diminished form. It was no longer considered that this power of the sovereign over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and unconditional way, but only in cases where the sovereign's very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder. If he was threatened by external enemies who sought to overthrow him or contest his rights, he could then legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in the defense of the state; without "directly proposing their death," he was empowered to "expose their life": in this sense, he wielded an "indirect" power over them of life and death.¹ But if someone dared to rise up against him and transgress his laws, then he could exercise a direct power over the offender's life: as punishment, the latter could be put to death. Viewed in this way, the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival. Must we follow Hobbes in seeing it as the transfer to the prince of the natural right possessed by every individual to defend his life even if this meant the death of others? Or should it be regarded as a specific right that was manifested with the formation of that new juridical being, the sovereign?² In any case,

in its modern form—relative and limited—as in its ancient and absolute form, the right of life and death is a dissymmetrical one. The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the “power of life and death” was in reality the right to *take* life or *let* live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. Perhaps this juridical form must be referred to a historical type of society in which power was exercised mainly as a means of deduction (*prélèvement*), a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.

Since the classical age, the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be de-

fended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

On another level, I might have taken up the example of the death penalty. Together with war, it was for a long time the other form of the right of the sword; it constituted the reply of the sovereign to those who attacked his will, his law, or his person. Those who died on the scaffold became fewer and fewer, in contrast to those who died in wars. But it was for the same reasons that the latter became more numerous and the former more and more rare. As soon as power gave itself the function of administering life, its reason for being and the logic of its exercise—and not the awakening of humanitarian feelings—made it more and more difficult to apply the death penalty. How could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order? For such a power, execution was at the same time a limit, a scandal, and a contradiction. Hence capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the

criminal, his incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.

One might say that the ancient right to *take* life or *let* live was replaced by a power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death. This is perhaps what explains that disqualification of death which marks the recent wanè of the rituals that accompanied it. That death is so carefully evaded is linked less to a new anxiety which makes death unbearable for our societies than to the fact that the procedures of power have not ceased to turn away from death. In the passage from this world to the other, death was the manner in which a terrestrial sovereignty was relieved by another, singularly more powerful sovereignty; the pageantry that surrounded it was in the category of political ceremony. Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its domination; death is power's limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes the most secret aspect of existence, the most "private." It is not surprising that suicide—once a crime, since it was a way to usurp the power of death which the sovereign alone, whether the one here below or the Lord above, had the right to exercise—became, in the course of the nineteenth century, one of the first conducts to enter into the sphere of sociological analysis; it testified to the individual and private right to die, at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life. This determination to die, strange and yet so persistent and constant in its manifestations, and consequently so difficult to explain as being due to particular circumstances or individual accidents, was one of the first astonishments of a society in which political power had assigned itself the task of administering life.

In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; they constituted, rather, two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles—the first to be formed, it seems—centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured

by the procedures of power that characterized the *disciplines*: an *anatomo-politics of the human body*. The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and *regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population*. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed. The setting up, in the course of the classical age, of this great bipolar technology—anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed toward the performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life—characterized a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through.

The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life. During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines—universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birth rate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power." The two directions taken by its development still appeared to be clearly separate in the eighteenth century. With regard to discipline, this development was embodied in institutions such as the army and the schools, and in reflections on tactics, apprenticeship, education, and the nature of societies, ranging from the strictly military analyses of Marshal de Saxe to the political reveries of Guibert or Servan. As for population controls, one notes the emergence of demography, the evaluation of the relationship between resources and inhabitants, the constructing of tables analyzing wealth and its circulation: the work of Quesnay, Moneau, and Süssmilch. The philosophy of the "ideologists," as a theory of ideas, signs, and the individual genesis of sensations, but also a theory of the

social composition of interests—ideology being a doctrine of apprenticeship, but also a doctrine of contracts and the regulated formation of the social body—no doubt constituted the abstract discourse in which one sought to coordinate these two techniques of power in order to construct a general theory of it. In point of fact, however, they were not to be joined at the level of a speculative discourse, but in the form of concrete arrangements (*agencement concrets*) that would go to make up the great technology of power in the nineteenth century: the deployment of sexuality would be one of them, and one of the most important.

This bio-power was, without question, an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern. If the development of the great instruments of the state, as *institutions* of power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- and biopolitics, created in the eighteenth century as *techniques* of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony. The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of the productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, was made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application. The investment of the body, its valorization, and the distributive management of its forces were at the time indispensable.

One knows how many times the question has been raised concerning the role of an ascetic morality in the first formation of capitalism; but what occurred in the eighteenth century in some Western countries, an event bound up with the development of capitalism, was a different phenomenon, having perhaps a wider impact than the new morality; this was nothing less than the entry of life into history, that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques. It is not a question of claiming that this was the moment when the first contact between life and history was brought about. On the contrary, the pressure exerted by the biological on the historical had remained very strong for thousands of years; epidemics and famine were the two great dramatic forms of this relationship that was always dominated by the menace of death. But through a circular process, the economic—and primarily agricultural—development of the eighteenth century, and an increase in productivity and resources even more rapid than the demographic growth it encouraged, allowed a measure of relief from these profound threats: despite some renewed outbreaks, the period of great ravages from starvation and plague had come to a close before the French Revolution; death was ceasing to torment life so directly. But at the same time, the development of the different fields of knowledge concerned with life in general, the improvement of agricultural techniques, and the observations and measures relative to man's life and survival contributed to this relaxation: a relative control over life averted some of the imminent risks of death. In the space for movement thus conquered, and broadening and organizing that space, methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them. Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal manner. For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death

and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge's field of control and power's sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. If one can apply the term *bio-history* to the pressures through which the movements of life and the processes of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of *bio-power* to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life. It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them. Outside the Western world, famine exists, on a greater scale than ever; and the biological risks confronting the species are perhaps greater, and certainly more serious, than before the birth of microbiology. But what might be called a society's "threshold of modernity" has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.

This transformation had considerable consequences. It would serve no purpose here to dwell on the rupture that occurred then in the pattern of scientific discourse and on the manner in which the twofold problematic of life and man disrupted and redistributed the order of the classical episteme. If the question of man was raised—insofar as he was a specific living being, and specifically related to other living beings—the reason for this is to be sought in the new mode of relation between history and life: in this dual position of life that placed it at the same time outside history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by the latter's techniques of knowledge and power. There is no need either to lay further stress on the proliferation of political technologies that ensued, investing the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence.

Another consequence of this development of bio-power was the growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law. Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm *par excellence* is death; to those who transgress it, it replies, at least as a last resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword. But a power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm. I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life. We have entered a phase of juridical regression in comparison with the pre-seventeenth-century societies we are acquainted with; we should not be deceived by all the constitutions framed throughout the world since the French Revolution, the codes written and revised, a whole continual and clamorous legislative activity: these were the forms that made an essentially normalizing power acceptable.

Moreover, against this power that was still new in the nineteenth century, the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being. Since the last century, the great struggles that have challenged the general system of power were not guided by the belief in a return to former rights, or by the age-old dream of a cycle of time or a Golden Age. One no longer aspired toward the coming of the emperor of the poor, or the kingdom of the latter days, or even the restoration of our imagined ancestral rights; what was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization

of his potential, a plenitude of the possible. Whether or not it was utopia that was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of struggle; life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The "right" to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and, beyond all the oppressions or "alienations," the "right" to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this "right"—which the classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending—was the political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty.

This is the background that enables us to understand the importance assumed by sex as a political issue. It was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand, it was tied to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity. It fitted in both categories at once, giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micropower concerned with the body. But it gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups taken as a whole. Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis for regulations. This is why in the nineteenth century sexuality was sought out in the smallest details of individual existences; it was tracked down in behavior, pursued in dreams; it was suspected of underlying the least follies; it was traced back into the earliest years of childhood; it became the stamp of individuality—at the same time what enabled one to analyze the latter and what made it possible

to master it. But one also sees it becoming the theme of political operations, economic interventions (through incitements to or curbs on procreation), and ideological campaigns for raising standards of morality and responsibility: it was put forward as the index of a society's strength, revealing of both its political energy and its biological vigor. Spread out from one pole to the other of this technology of sex was a whole series of different tactics that combined in varying proportions the objective of disciplining the body and that of regulating populations.

Whence the importance of the four great lines of attack along which the politics of sex advanced for two centuries. Each one was a way of combining disciplinary techniques with regulative methods. The first two rested on the requirements of regulation, on a whole thematic of the species, descent, and collective welfare, in order to obtain results at the level of discipline; the sexualization of children was accomplished in the form of a campaign for the health of the race (precocious sexuality was presented from the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth as an epidemic menace that risked compromising not only the future health of adults but the future of the entire society and species); the hysterization of women, which involved a thorough medicalization of their bodies and their sex, was carried out in the name of the responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the family institution, and the safeguarding of society. It was the reverse relationship that applied in the case of birth controls and psychiatrization of perversions: here the intervention was regulatory in nature, but it had to rely on the demand for individual disciplines and constraints (*dressages*). Broadly speaking, at the juncture of the "body" and the "population," sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death.

The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanisms of power, its manifestations, and its rituals. For a society in which the systems of alliance, the political form of the sovereign, the differentiation into orders and castes, and the value of descent lines were predominant; for a society in which famine, epidemics, and violence made death imminent, blood constituted one of the fundamental values. It owed its high value at the same time to its instrumental role (the ability

to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one's blood), and also to its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being quickly corrupted). A society of blood—I was tempted to say, of "sanguinity"—where power spoke *through* blood: the honor of war, the fear of famine, the triumph of death, the sovereign with his sword, executioners, and tortures; blood was *a reality with a symbolic function*. We, on the other hand, are in a society of "sex," or rather, a society "with a sexuality": the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used. Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and *to* sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an object and a target. Moreover, its importance was due less to its rarity or its precariousness than to its insistence, its insidious presence, the fact that it was everywhere an object of excitement and fear at the same time. Power delineated it, aroused it, and employed it as the proliferating meaning that had always to be taken control of again lest it escape; it was *an effect with a meaning-value*. I do not mean to say that a substitution of sex for blood was by itself responsible for all the transformations that marked the threshold of our modernity. It is not the soul of two civilizations or the organizing principle of two cultural forms that I am attempting to express; I am looking for the reasons for which sexuality, far from being repressed in the society of that period, on the contrary was constantly aroused. The new procedures of power that were devised during the classical age and employed in the nineteenth century were what caused our societies to go from *a symbolics of blood* to *an analytics of sexuality*. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines, and regulations.

Sade and the first eugenists were contemporary with this transition from "sanguinity" to "sexuality." But whereas the first dreams of the perfecting of the species inclined the whole

problem toward an extremely exacting administration of sex (the art of determining good marriages, of inducing the desired fertilities, of ensuring the health and longevity of children), and while the new concept of race tended to obliterate the aristocratic particularities of blood, retaining only the controllable effects of sex, Sade carried the exhaustive analysis of sex over into the mechanisms of the old power of sovereignty and endowed it with the ancient but fully maintained prestige of blood; the latter flowed through the whole dimension of pleasure—the blood of torture and absolute power; the blood of the caste, which was respected in itself and which nonetheless was made to flow in the major rituals of parricide and incest; the blood of the people, which was shed unreservedly since the sort that flowed in its veins was not even deserving of a name. In Sade, sex is without any norm or intrinsic rule that might be formulated from its own nature; but it is subject to the unrestricted law of a power which itself knows no other law but its own; if by chance it is at times forced to accept the order of progressions carefully disciplined into successive days, this exercise carries it to a point where it is no longer anything but a unique and naked sovereignty: an unlimited right of all-powerful monstrosity.

While it is true that the analytics of sexuality and the symbolics of blood were grounded at first in two very distinct regimes of power, in actual fact the passage from one to the other did not come about (any more than did these powers themselves) without overlappings, interactions, and echoes. In different ways, the preoccupation with blood and the law has for nearly two centuries haunted the administration of sexuality. Two of these interferences are noteworthy, the one for its historical importance, the other for the problems it poses. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematic of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, "biologizing," statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement (*peuplement*), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a

long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race. Nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naive (and the former because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power. A eugenic ordering of society, with all that implied in the way of extension and intensification of micropowers, in the guise of an unrestricted state control (*étatisation*), was accompanied by the oneiric exaltation of a superior blood; the latter implied both the systematic genocide of others and the risk of exposing oneself to a total sacrifice. It is an irony of history that the Hitlerite politics of sex remained an insignificant practice while the blood myth was transformed into the greatest blood bath in recent memory.

At the opposite extreme, starting from this same end of the nineteenth century, we can trace the theoretical effort to re-inscribe the thematic of sexuality in the system of law, the symbolic order, and sovereignty. It is to the political credit of psychoanalysis—or, at least, of what was most coherent in it—that it regarded with suspicion (and this from its inception, that is, from the moment it broke away from the neuropsychiatry of degenerescence) the irrevocably proliferating aspects which might be contained in these power mechanisms aimed at controlling and administering the everyday life of sexuality: whence the Freudian endeavor (out of reaction, no doubt, to the great surge of racism that was contemporary with it) to ground sexuality in the law—the law of alliance, tabooed consanguinity, and the Sovereign-Father—in short, to surround desire with all the trappings of the old order of power. It was owing to this that psychoanalysis was—in the main, with a few exceptions—in theoretical and practical opposition to fascism. But this position of psychoanalysis was tied to a specific historical conjuncture. And yet, to conceive the category of the sexual in terms of the law, death, blood, and sovereignty—whatever the references to Sade and Bataille, and however one might gauge their “subversive” influence—is in the last analysis a historical “retro-

version." We must conceptualize the deployment of sexuality on the basis of the techniques of power that are contemporary with it. . . .

Notes

¹ Samuel von Pufendorf, *Le Droit de la nature* (French trans. 1734), p. 445.

² "Just as a composite body can have properties not found in any of the simple bodies of which the mixture consists, so a moral body, by virtue of the very union of persons of which it is composed, can have certain rights which none of the individuals could expressly claim and whose exercise is the proper function of leaders alone" (*Ibid.*, p. 452).

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ANDREOTTI AT CRUX OF MURDER INQUIRY

By ALAN COWELL JUNE 10, 1993

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Magistrates investigating corruption in Italy asked the Senate today to permit a formal inquiry into evidence that Giulio Andreotti, Italy's master politician, ordered the murder of a journalist in 1979.

The magistrates' evidence was set out in a 90-page dossier asking the Senate to suspend Mr. Andreotti's parliamentary immunity so he can be interrogated and tried. Mr. Andreotti is already facing charges of corruption and collusion with the Mafia.

The dossier did not constitute a formal indictment. But the magistrates have concluded that the weight of testimony implicating Mr. Andreotti demanded a formal investigation. 'Falsehoods,' He Explained

In response, the 74-year-old Christian Democrat told a television interviewer that he would support suspension of his immunity, as he did on May 13 when he was accused of associating with the Mafia, to clear his name.

"I will certainly request that they proceed with the investigation, and I think it should proceed as soon as possible," he said. He described the accusations, which

were disclosed by his lawyer in April, as "calumnies and falsehoods."

If the latest accusation against Mr. Andreotti -- seven times the Prime Minister -- is proved, it would illuminate a underworld of mob connections, murder and graft behind the public facade of one of the West's most durable politicians.

The magistrates' accusations are based on the testimony of a leading Mafia informer, Tommaso Buscetta, who lives in the United States under a witness-protection program. Death of an Editor

When Italian magistrates interviewed Mr. Buscetta in Florida in April, he reportedly told them that he had heard from two Mafia bosses of the supposed involvement of Mr. Andreotti in the murder of the journalist, Carmine (Mino) Pecorelli. Mr. Buscetta had already given evidence to the Rome magistrates about the killing, but details of what he said last month have not been disclosed.

Mr. Andreotti was Prime Minister in March 1979 when Mr. Pecorelli was shot dead outside his office here. The journalist was editor of *Opinione Politica*, a newsletter that specialized in political leaks and reportedly was close to one of Mr. Andreotti's adversaries in the secret service.

According to the magistrates, Mr. Buscetta said he had been told that Mr. Pecorelli was killed at Mr. Andreotti's request because the Prime Minister was concerned that the journalist might have learned secrets about the 1978 murder of a former Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, by Red Brigade terrorists. Mr. Andreotti has always insisted that Mr. Buscetta's testimony was based on hearsay from other mobsters.

Mr. Andreotti and his Christian Democrat allies have intensified their campaign to discredit the informers, whose numbers have swollen over the last year as a result of new witness-protection programs and an erosion of the mob's traditional oath of silence.

Most evidence leading to a recent wave of arrests of top Mafiosi has been based on the testimony of turncoats.

In Mr. Andreotti's case, moreover, Mafia informers have accused him of being the mob's protector in Rome. Mr. Andreotti, by contrast, insists that some of the toughest anti-Mafia legislation was introduced during his periods in office. The Slide of a Stalwart

Apart from the murder and Mafia allegations, Mr. Andreotti has also been accused in the country's vast corruption scandal. These charges have contributed to

the widespread decline in public support for the Christian Democrats, which were once the nation's political center, backed by the Catholic Church.

Since early last year, 2,500 politicians and business executives have been implicated in a vast array of scandals, centering on the awarding of public-works contracts in return for bribes and political contributions.

The party's decline, like that of the corruption-stained Socialists, began in national elections in April 1992 and deepened last weekend when local elections left all the mainstream parties in crisis.

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SUOR CORNELIA
San Paolo Film

Ecco noi facevamo la selezione per poter ridurne i 16 mm ed eravamo in cinque suore e tre sacerdoti. Noi eravamo le cinque.... un po' fuori norma perché (ride) eravamo sempre in giro, perché andavamo al cinema.

Dovendo scegliere i film, frequentavamo il festival di Venezia e il festival di Cannes, il festival di Locarno, il festival di Salerno per i ragazzi. Frequentavamo questi momenti di riflessione sul cinema per scegliere le pellicole da dovere poi distribuire.

Ma se la censura, da una parte, ha inasprito, dall'altra ha anche favorito la curiosità e quindi la necessità di riflettere sul cinema all'interno della Chiesa. Intanto si ha paura dell'immagine perché è più forte della parola, e quindi la Chiesa inizialmente si difende, come tutti si difendono dall'immagine.

È la Chiesa che comincia a dire: visto che il cinema è così, perché non ne facciamo oggetto di formazione e di dibattito? E cominciano i cosiddetti 'Cinecircoli'. Abbiamo cominciato a pensare che forse era meglio riflettere sul cinema, piuttosto che censurarlo.

Uno degli aspetti più significativi è che il cinema religioso non ha mai fatto fortuna. Il cinema è essenzialmente laico, perché racconta la vita delle persone.

Era una cosa stranissima, ma se a dei convegni religiosi si doveva invitare un regista, si invitava Pasolini. Non si è mai invitato Fellini, per esempio. Pochi registi avevano una tale profondità spirituale. Pasolini era un uomo senza difese. Non si difendeva mai e ha fatto la fine che ha fatto proprio perché non si è mai difeso.

Io a Palermo non sento il cinema, nell'aria, si va al cinema, ma non si parla tanto di cinema.

We used to make the selection to be able to reduce the 16 mm films, and we were five sisters and three priests. We were the five... a bit out of the norm because (*laughs*) we were always around, because we went to the movies.

Having to choose the films, we attended the Venice Film Festival and the Cannes Film Festival, the Locarno Film Festival, the Salerno Festival for children. We attended these moments of appraisal of cinema to choose the films to be then distributed.

But while the censorship, on the one hand, has increased, on the other it has also encouraged curiosity and therefore the need to reflect on cinema within the Church. Meanwhile, there is fear of the image because it is stronger than the word, and so the Church initially defends itself, as all defend themselves from the image.

It was the Church that began to say: seeing that cinema is like this, why not make it the object of training and debate? And the so-called *Cinecircoli*, we began to think that perhaps it was better to think about cinema, rather than censor it.

One of the most significant aspects is that religious cinema has never been much of a success. Cinema is essentially secular, because it tells the lives of people.

It was a very strange thing, but if a director had to be invited to some religious conference, it would be Pasolini who was invited. Fellini has never been invited, for example, few directors had such spiritual depth. He was a man without defences. He never defended himself and he suffered the fate he did precisely because he never defended himself.

In Palermo I do not really feel the cinema, people go to the cinema, but they do not talk much about it.

Videomobile, 2018 Masbedo
at Manifesta 12
16.06—04.11.18 Palermo, Italy

L'ANNO IN CUI IL FUTURO FINÌ

Franco Berardi (Bifo)

Premessa: le due memorie del settantasette

Quando si parla del millenovecentosettantasette si mettono in moto una serie di catene associative, immagini, ricordi, concetti e parole spesso incoerenti tra loro.

Il '77 è l'anno in cui esplose e si dispiegò un movimento di studenti e di giovani proletari che si espresse in forma particolarmente intensa nelle città di Bologna e di Roma. In alcuni contesti *settantasette* evoca un'idea di violenza, sopraffazione, anni di piombo, paura nelle strade e nelle scuole. In altri contesti significa invece creatività, felice espressione di bisogni sociali e culturali, autorganizzazione di massa, comunicazione innovativa. Come possono convivere queste due visioni, spesso nella mente delle stesse persone? Il 1977 è un punto di giunzione, o piuttosto un punto di cesura, il punto in cui si incontrano (o forse si separano, ma è lo stesso) due epoche diverse. Perciò si tratta del momento di emergenza e di formazione di due visioni incompatibili, di due percezioni dissonanti della realtà. In quell'anno giunge a maturazione la storia di un secolo, il secolo del capitalismo industriale e delle lotte operaie, il secolo della responsabilità politica e delle grandi organizzazioni di massa. Inizia a baluginare l'epoca postindustriale, la rivoluzione microelettronica, il principio della rete, la proliferazione degli agenti di comunicazione orizzontale, e quindi anche la dissoluzione della politica organizzata, la crisi degli stati nazionali e dei partiti di massa.

Non dovremmo dimenticare che quello – oltre ad essere l'anno dei movimenti di contestazione creativa nelle università e nei quartieri italiani – fu molte altre cose, non tutte allineate nella stessa direzione e sotto lo stesso segno. Fu l'anno dell'emergere del *punk*, l'anno del Giubileo della Regina contestato dai Sex Pistols che mettono a soqquadro la capitale britannica per giorni e giorni con musica e barricate lanciando l'urlo che segna come una maledizione il ventennio successivo: "NO FUTURE". Ma è anche l'anno in cui nei *garages* della Silicon Valley ragazzi come Wozniak e Steve Jobs, *hippies* libertari e psichedelici riuscirono a creare le interfacce *user friendly* che renderanno di lì a pochi anni possibile un accesso sempre più vasto, sempre più popolare all'informatica e poi alla telematica di rete. È l'anno in cui Simon Nora e Alain Minc scrivono un rapporto al Presidente della Repubblica francese, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, intitolato *L'informatisation de la société*, nel

Franco Bifo Berardi and Veronica Bridi,
1977 l'anno in cui il futuro incominciò, (Bologna,
Fandango Editizioni) p. 19—24

quale si delineano le trasformazioni sociali, politiche, urbanistiche prevedibili nell'epoca successiva, in seguito all'introduzione nel lavoro e nella comunicazione delle tecnologie digitali e della telematica (ovvero informatica lontana, ovvero collegamento in rete di computer, ovvero Internet).

Il 1977 è anche l'anno in cui vengono processati i ribelli della Banda dei Quattro, Chang Ching, Wang Hung Wen, Yao Wen Juan e Chang Chung Chao. I quattro ultramaoisti di Shanghai vennero trascinati in catene a Pechino e là condannati a pene detentive lunghissime perché rappresentavano agli occhi del nuovo gruppo dirigente denghista l'utopia di una società egualitaria nella quale ogni regola economica è cancellata a favore di un primato assoluto dell'ideologia. L'utopia comunista comincia la sua lunga crisi proprio nel punto in cui era stata portata alle sue estreme, sanguinose conseguenze, proprio là dove la Rivoluzione Culturale Proletaria aveva scatenato le tendenze più radicali e più intransigenti. Ma è anche l'anno in cui a Praga e a Varsavia si diffondono le prime azioni di dissenso operaio, è l'anno in cui i dissidenti cecoslovacchi firmano Charta '77. È l'anno in cui Yuri Andropov, direttore a quel tempo del Kgb scrive una lettera al cadavere ambulante di Leonid Brezhnev, segretario del Partito e massima autorità dell'Unione sovietica, per dirgli che se l'Urss non riuscirà rapidamente a recuperare il distacco nel campo delle tecnologie dell'informazione, il socialismo è destinato a crollare. Il '77 dunque non si può comprendere limitandosi a sfogliare l'album italiano nel quale compaiono le fotografie di giovanotti dai capelli lunghi col viso coperto da un passamontagna o da una sciarpa. Non si può comprendere limitandosi ad ascoltare slogan truculenti in parte ideologici e in parte bizzarramente surrealisti.

In quell'anno si volta la pagina del ventesimo secolo, come nel 1870-71 nelle strade insanguinate di Parigi la Comune aveva voltato la pagina del diciannovesimo secolo e mostrato con che luci e con che ombre il ventesimo secolo si annunciava all'orizzonte. Cerchiamo di avere presente questa complessità, quando parliamo di quella vicenda italiana che fu il movimento autonomo e creativo, perché solo a partire da questa complessità potremo capire che cosa accadde effettivamente al di là della cronaca di piazza, al di là delle manifestazioni degli scontri, delle molotov, al di là del dibattito sulla violenza, al di là della repressione violenta con cui lo stato e la sinistra investirono il movimento fino a criminalizzarlo e fino a spingerlo nelle braccia del terrorismo brigatista.

L'accesso al postindustriale

Per prima cosa dobbiamo focalizzare l'attenzione intorno al mutamento produttivo che investe le società occidentali a partire dagli anni settanta e diviene poi sempre più profondo, rapido, sconvolgenti nei due decenni successivi. Si tratta di una trasformazione determinata dalla diffusione delle tecnologie microelettroniche (e poi dalla digitalizzazione), ma anche dalla crescente disaffezione degli operai industriali al lavoro di fabbrica. "Disaffezione" è una parola chiave per comprendere la situazione sociale e la cultura intorno a cui si forma il movimento del '77. Disaffezione al lavoro è la formula con cui si definiva (da parte dell'*establishment* giornalistico, padronale e anche sindacale) la tendenza degli operai, soprattutto dei giovani operai, a darsi ammalati, mettersi in mutua, lavorare poco e male.

Gli imprenditori segnalavano che la disaffezione era la causa principale della caduta degli indici di produttività. E in effetti le cose andavano davvero così.

“È ora è ora lavora solo un’ora”

“Lavoro zero reddito intero / tutta la produzione all’automazione”

erano gli slogan lanciati a metà degli anni settanta dai giovani operai autonomi nelle fabbriche più “estremiste” come le Carrozzerie di Mirafiori o il Petrolchimico di Marghera, o la Siemens di Milano. Si trattava di slogan rozzi, elementari. Ma nascondevano un mutamento culturale e anche una riflessione politica tutt’altro che superficiale. Il significato di quegli slogan, e di quella disaffezione, infatti, era la fine dell’etica del lavoro, e la fine – correlativa – della necessità sociale del lavoro industriale. Erano gli anni in cui la tecnologia cominciava a rendere possibile una progressiva sostituzione del lavoro operaio. Ed erano gli anni in cui il rifiuto del lavoro si faceva strada nella cultura giovanile e nella teorizzazione di gruppi come Potere operaio e Lotta continua, che avevano ottenuto un certo ascolto nelle fabbriche del nord soprattutto nel '69/'70.

Ora il movimento degli studenti e dei giovani proletari che si diffuse nel '77 dalle università ai circoli del proletariato giovanile, ai quartieri riprendeva gli slogan e le ipotesi del rifiuto del lavoro, e ne faceva un elemento di separazione profonda, traumatica, dalla tradizione culturale e politica della sinistra.

L’etica del lavoro, su cui si era fondata l’esperienza del movimento operaio tradizionale, iniziava a crollare. Prima nella coscienza di giovani operai desiderosi di libertà e di ozio e di cultura, poi per le potenzialità tecnologiche stesse del sistema produttivo. La riduzione del tempo di lavoro necessario grazie all’introduzione di tecnologie automatiche, e il processo di rifiuto del lavoro sono convergenti e in qualche misura interdipendenti. A partire dagli anni sessanta gli operai di fabbrica avevano cominciato a mostrare una crescente insubordinazione sindacale, politica e comportamentale. Si diffondeva il rifiuto del lavoro alienato perché la classe operaia di fabbrica aveva cominciato a conoscere forme di vita più ricche, grazie alla scolarizzazione, alla mobilità, alla diffusione di una cultura critica a livello popolare. Dopo il '68, poi, l’insubordinazione operaia si era incontrata con il movimento degli studenti e del lavoro intellettuale, e i due fenomeni si erano fusi in alcuni casi consapevolmente.

Rifiuto del lavoro industriale, rivendicazione di spazi sempre più ampi di libertà, e quindi assenteismo, insubordinazione, sabotaggio, lotta politica organizzata contro il padronato e contro i ritmi di lavoro. Tutto questo aveva contrassegnato la storia sociale dei primi anni sessanta fino ad esplodere in vere e proprie insurrezioni pacifiche degli operai contro il lavoro industriale, come era accaduto nella primavera del 1973 quando gli operai dell’auto si erano ribellati in tutta Europa, dalla Renault alla Opel di Russelsheim e di Colonia, fino alla Fiat Mirafiori di Torino che per alcuni mesi fu percorsa da cortei di giovanissimi che si mettevano un cordino rosso al collo e ululavano come indiani dentro i reparti. Gli indiani metropolitani, queste orde di contestatori culturali che si diffusero nel 1977 universitario erano nati nei reparti della Fiat, per rifiuto della miseria salariata e dell’abbruttimento del lavoro industriale. Ma al contempo si era andata sviluppando anche la ricerca di procedure produttive sempre più automatizzate, con uso integrato della microelettronica e di sistemi flessibili. Gli operai volevano lavorare di meno,

e gli ingegneri studiavano tecnologie adatte a ridurre il tempo di lavoro necessario, ad automatizzare la produzione. Tra la fine del decennio settanta e l'inizio di quello successivo queste due tendenze si incontrarono. Ma purtroppo si incontrarono sotto il segno della reazione capitalistica e della vendetta antiproletaria, non sotto il segno del potere operaio e dell'autorganizzazione. Il movimento operaio non era riuscito a tradurre la protesta operaia in autorganizzazione del processo produttivo.

E arrivarono gli anni della controffensiva. Invece di ridurre il tempo di lavoro socialmente necessario e di liberare tempo di vita dal lavoro, il capitale riuscì così, negli anni della ristrutturazione e dell'affermazione del neoliberismo, a distruggere l'organizzazione operaia attraverso i licenziamenti delle avanguardie. Iniziava il ridimensionamento quantitativo e politico della forza operaia. Iniziava la controrivoluzione liberista. Ma al centro di questo passaggio ci sta proprio il movimento del '77, che si presentò consapevolmente, dichiaratamente, come un movimento contro il lavoro industriale.

"È ora è ora lavora solo un'ora"

era lo slogan che gli autonomi creativi lanciarono per rispondere allo slogan sindacale:

"È ora è ora potere a chi lavora."

Il movimento del '77 aveva messo il non lavoro, il rifiuto del lavoro al centro della dinamica sociale e dell'innovazione tecnologica, però questo non riuscì a tradursi in azione politica consapevole e organizzata. L'innovazione tecnologica produsse una gigantesca ristrutturazione negli anni ottanta e novanta. Ma questa ristrutturazione ebbe caratteri antioperai, antisociali, e mise in moto quel processo di devastazione della società che negli anni novanta è precipitata (e non smette di precipitare). Perché il movimento non riuscì a tradurre la sua vocazione sociale e le sue intuizioni culturali in azione politica di lungo periodo per l'autorganizzazione della società e del processo produttivo? È questo il punto su cui occorre soffermarsi.

Due sono le ragioni per cui il movimento non riuscì a tradurre l'intuizione antilavorista in un programma politico credibile. La prima ragione di quella incapacità va cercata nell'intima contraddittorietà del movimento, nel fatto che esso si concepì al tempo stesso come l'ultimo movimento comunista del ventesimo secolo, e anche come il primo movimento postindustriale quindi postcomunista. La seconda ragione sta nella repressione a cui il movimento venne sottoposto: una repressione violenta e prolungata, le cui caratteristiche occorre approfondire.

Ma vediamo le cose con ordine.

Gli studenti e i giovani operai che si mobilitarono nei primi mesi dell'anno settantasette, ma che già da alcuni anni si stavano organizzando in mille forme nuove (i centri del proletariato giovanile, le radio libere, i comitati autonomi di fabbrica e di quartiere i collettivi autonomi nelle scuole e così via) esprimevano comportamenti e bisogni che avevano ormai poco a che fare con i bisogni e i comportamenti del proletariato industriale tradizionale. La domanda più forte era quella esistenziale. La qualità della vita, il desiderio di un'esistenza realizzata, la volontà di liberare il tempo e il corpo dai vincoli della prestazione lavorativa industriale. Questi erano i temi forti, queste erano le linee lungo le quali si esprimevano e si accumulavano l'insubordinazione e l'autonomia. Eppure la rappresentazione ideologica predominante all'interno del movimento era quella che discendeva linearmente dai

movimenti rivoluzionari novecenteschi, dalla storia del comunismo terzinternazionalista. Per quanto il leninismo fosse largamente messo in questione in quegli anni, l'idea prevalente era quella di un movimento rivoluzionario destinato ad abbattere lo stato borghese e a costruire in qualche modo (piuttosto vago, per la verità) una società comunista. Questo tipo di rappresentazione non si confava più alla realtà di movimenti che erano tutti incentrati sulla conquista di spazi e di tempi, e che si manifestavano su un terreno sempre meno politico e sempre più esistenziale.

E il modello dialettico (abbattimento, abolizione, instaurazione di un nuovo sistema) non corrispondeva in nulla alla realtà di lotte che funzionavano invece come elemento dinamico, come conflitto aperto e come ridefinizione del terreno stesso dello scontro, ma non potevano e non intendevano dirigersi verso una sorta di attacco finale al cuore dello stato, o verso una rivoluzione destinata al sovertimento dialettico. Lo scarto tra rappresentazione ideologica e realtà socioculturale di quell'area che chiamammo allora proletariato giovanile fu la causa principale della sua incapacità di tradurre l'azione contestativa in un processo di autorganizzazione sociale di lungo periodo, nella creazione di laboratori di sperimentazione politica, culturale, tecnologica. Per che scopo ci si stava mobilitando? Per una rivoluzione comunista classica, con abbattimento dello stato e finale presa del potere politico? Solo alcuni credevano che una cosa simile potesse avere qualche significato, ma di fatto questo orizzonte politico non veniva esplicitamente abbandonato, ridefinito. Il movimento bolognese fu, in questo senso, il punto di massima consapevolezza, e abbandonò in maniera dichiarata e polemica il leninismo residuo e il modello storicista della rivoluzione. Ma non riuscì a essere conseguente fino al punto di rompere (come forse avrebbe dovuto fare) ogni rapporto con le componenti di movimento che invece ribadivano, sia pure contraddittoriamente, un progetto di tipo leninista e rivoluzionario.

C'è un'altra ragione decisiva di quello scacco che il movimento subì, e questa ragione è la repressione che il regime politico del compromesso storico scatenò contro gli studenti, gli operai autonomi, i giovani in generale, e poi contro gli intellettuali, i docenti, gli scrittori, contro le radio libere, le librerie, ogni centro di vita intellettuale innovativa che esistesse nel paese.

Lo sconsolante riflusso intellettuale che ha colpito l'Italia all'inizio degli anni ottanta e che ha devastato l'arte, la scienza, l'università, la ricerca, il cinema, per tacere del pensiero politico è dovuto proprio allo sterminio culturale che lo stato democristiano-stalinista mise in opera prima nel 1977, e poi nel 1979 (7 aprile, 21 dicembre: arresti di massa di intellettuali legati all'autonomia molti dei quali vennero riconosciuti innocenti dopo aver scontato cinque anni di galera senza prove). Il movimento del '77 conteneva certamente un'ambiguità profonda. Era un'ambiguità culturale, intellettuale, filosofica. Non era banalmente l'ambiguità tra i violenti cattivi e i creativi buoni. Era il sovrapporsi di due concezioni del processo di modernizzazione e di autonomizzazione sociale.

Da una parte vi era il movimento creativo che metteva al centro dell'azione politica i *media*, l'informazione, l'immaginario, la cultura, la comunicazione, pensando che il potere si giocava in quei luoghi e non nella sfera della grande politica di stato o della grande politica rivoluzionaria.

Dall'altra vi era l'autonomia organizzata convinta che lo stato avesse il ruolo decisivo e che si dovesse contrapporgli una soggettività strutturata in modo classicamente politico. Quel movimento

avrebbe dovuto maturare, rafforzare le sue strutture produttive e comunicative, avrebbe dovuto trasformarsi in processo generalizzato di autorganizzazione dell'intelligenza collettiva. Era questo il progetto che nel giugno del 1977 venne proposto al movimento in un numero di "A/traverso" intitolato *La rivoluzione è finita abbiamo vinto*. La proposta era quella di costruire un movimento di ingegneri dai piedi scalzi, di connettere tecnologia, scienza e zone temporaneamente liberate. Era una visione minoritaria, nel movimento di quell'anno, ma un numero crescente di persone, di giovani ricercatori, di studenti e di artisti cominciava a intravedere la possibilità di un processo di autorganizzazione del sapere e della creatività.

Radio Alice e le altre radio di movimento rappresentarono un primo tentativo di articolare insieme tecnologia, comunicazione e innovazione sociale.

Tutto questo era legato, certo, a una retorica di tipo novecentesco, a una retorica guerrigliera.

Ma in gioco era il destino sociale dell'intelligenza tecnico-scientifica e dell'intelligenza creativa e comunicativa. La coscienza di questo passaggio cominciava a formarsi in quegli anni.

Escono in quegli anni i libri in cui si manifesta la consapevolezza di un passaggio sociale, tecnologico e antropologico. È del 1973 il libro di Daniel Bell *La società postindustriale*, mentre Jean-François Lyotard pubblica nel 1978 *La condition postmoderne*. Jean Baudrillard aveva scritto nel 1976 *L'échange symbolique et la mort*. Il movimento bolognese, in effetti, ebbe sempre una connessione molto forte con i punti alti della ricerca filosofica, e alimentò a sua volta alcuni sviluppi della riflessione in Francia, in Germania, negli Stati Uniti. E quella connessione ebbe risvolti direttamente politici (come l'organizzazione del convegno internazionale contro la repressione che si svolse a Bologna nel settembre del 1977), ma ebbe anche, più a lunga scadenza, risvolti di tipo filosofico, interpretativo, concettuale.

Gli untorelli

Il 1977, dunque, può essere descritto come il punto di separazione tra l'epoca industriale e delle grandi formazioni politiche, ideologiche e statali – e quella successiva, l'epoca proliferante delle tecnologie digitali, della diffusione molecolare dei dispositivi trasversali del potere.

In questo quadro occorre comprendere anche il rapporto conflittuale tra il movimento e la sinistra tradizionale, che ereditava i suoi rituali e le sue ideologie dalla storia passata dell'epoca industriale. Il distacco poté apparire una delle tante, interminabili dispute dottrinarie e politiche interne al movimento operaio di cui la storia del ventesimo secolo è costellata (a cominciare dalla rottura della prima internazionale, per continuare con il grande scisma bolscevico, con il conflitto tra *Linkskommunismus* e terza internazionale, la guerra tra stalinismo e trotzkismo negli anni trenta, e poi la rottura russo-cinese e la guerra tra rivoluzionari e riformisti negli anni sessanta). Ma non era così. Non si trattava di una delle discussioni dogmatiche in cui ci si disputava l'egemonia sul movimento comunista, perché il movimento comunista si fondava su premesse che la generazione del '77 liquida nel momento stesso del suo costituirsi in movimento. Prima di tutto venne abbandonata la

GOVERNMENTALITY*

In a previous lecture on "apparatuses of security," I tried to explain the emergence of a set of problems specific to the issue of population; on closer inspection, it turned out that we would also need to take into account the problematic of government. In short, one needed to analyze the series: security, population, government. I would now like to try to begin making an inventory of this question of government.

Throughout the Middle Ages and classical Antiquity, we find a multitude of treatises presented as "advice to the prince," concerning his proper conduct, the exercise of power, the means of securing the acceptance and respect of his subjects, the love of God and obedience to him, the application of divine law to the cities of men, and so on. But a more striking fact is that, from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, there develops and flourishes a notable series of political treatises that are no longer exactly "advice to the prince," and not yet treatises of political science, but instead are presented as works on the "art of government." Government as a general problem seems to me to explode in the sixteenth century, posed by discussions of quite diverse questions. One has, for example, the question of the government of oneself, that ritualization of the problem of personal conduct characteristic of the sixteenth century Stoic revival. There is the problem too of the government of souls and lives, the entire theme of Catholic and Protestant pastoral doctrine. There is government of children and the great problematic of pedagogy that emerges and

Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality,' in J. Faubion, ed. *Power: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954—1984* Vol,3

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Power

Machiavelli

develops during the sixteenth century. And, perhaps only as the last of these questions to be taken up, there is the government of the state by the prince. How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor—all these problems, in their multiplicity and intensity, seem to me to be characteristic of the sixteenth century, which lies, to put it schematically, at the crossroads of two processes: the one that, shattering the structures of feudalism, leads to the establishment of the great territorial, administrative, and colonial states; and a totally different movement that, with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, raises the issue of how one must be spiritually ruled and led on this earth in order to achieve eternal salvation.

There is a double movement, then, of state centralization, on the one hand, and of dispersion and religious dissidence, on the other. It is, I believe, at the intersection of these two tendencies that the problem comes to pose itself with this peculiar intensity, of how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what methods, and so on. There is a problematic of government in general.

Out of all this immense and monotonous literature on government which extends to the end of the eighteenth century, with the transformations I will try to identify in a moment, I would like to underline some points that are worthy of notice because they relate to the actual definition of what is meant by the government of the state, of what we would today call the political form of government. The simplest way to do this is to compare all of this literature with a single text that, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, never ceased to function as the object of explicit or implicit opposition and reflection, and relative to which the whole literature on government established its standpoint—Machiavelli's *The Prince*. It would be interesting to trace the relationship of this text to all those works that succeeded, criticized, and rebutted it.

We must first of all remember that Machiavelli's *The Prince* was not immediately made an object of execration, on the contrary, it was honored by its immediate contemporaries and immediate successors, and once again at the end of the eighteenth century (or perhaps rather at the very beginning of the nineteenth century), at the very moment when all this literature on the art of government was about to come to an end. *The Prince* reemerges at the beginning

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of the nineteenth century, especially in Germany, where it is translated, prefaced, and commented upon by writers such as A. W. Rehberg, H. Leo, Leopold von Ranke, and Kellerman. In Italy as well, it makes its appearance in context that is worth analyzing, one that is partly Napoleonic but also partly created by the Revolution and the problems of revolution in the United States, of how and under what conditions a ruler's sovereignty over the state can be maintained. But this is also the context in which there emerges, with Clausewitz, the problem (whose political importance was evident at the Congress of Vienna in 1815) of the relationship between politics and strategy, and the problem of relations of force and the calculation of these relations as a principle of intelligibility and rationalization in international relations; and finally, in addition, it connects with the problem of Italian and German territorial unity, since Machiavelli had been one of those who tried to define the conditions under which Italian territorial unity could be restored.

This is the context in which Machiavelli reemerges. But it is clear that, between the initial honor accorded him in the sixteenth century and his rediscovery at the start of the nineteenth, there was a whole "affair" around his work, one that was complex and took various forms: some explicit praise of Machiavelli (Naudé, Machon), numerous frontal attacks (from Catholic sources: Ambrozio Politi, *Disputationes de Libris a Christiano detestandis*; and from Protestant sources: Innocent Gentillet, *Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner contre Nicolas Machiavel*, 1576), and also a number of implicit critiques (Guillaume de La Perrière, *Miroir Politique*, 1567; Th. Elyott, *The Governor*, 1580; P. Paruta, *Della Perfezione della Vita politica*, 1579).

This whole debate should not be viewed solely in terms of its relation to Machiavelli's text and what were felt to be its scandalous or radically unacceptable aspects. It needs to be seen in terms of something it was trying to define in its specificity, namely, an art of government. Some authors rejected the idea of a new art of government centered on the state and reason of state, which they stigmatized with the name of Machiavellianism; others rejected Machiavelli by showing that there existed an art of government that was both rational and legitimate, and of which Machiavelli's *The Prince* was only an imperfect approximation or caricature; finally, there were others who, in order to prove the legitimacy of a partic-

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ular art of government, were willing to justify some at least of Machiavelli's writings (this was what Naudé did to the *Discourses* on Livy; Machon went so far as to attempt to show that nothing was more Machiavellian than the way in which, according to the Bible, God himself and his prophets had guided the Jewish people). All these authors shared a common concern to distance themselves from a certain conception of the art of government which, once shorn of its theological foundations and religious justifications, took the sole interest of the prince as its object and principle of rationality. Let us leave aside the question of whether the interpretation of Machiavelli in these debates was accurate or not. The essential thing is that they attempted to articulate a kind of rationality that was intrinsic to the art of government, without subordinating it to the problematic of the prince and of his relationship to the principality of which he is lord and master.

Thus, the art of government is defined in a way that differentiates it from a certain capacity of the prince, which some think they can find expounded in Machiavelli's writings but others are unable to find; others still will criticize this art of government as a new form of Machiavellianism.

This politics of *The Prince*, fictitious or otherwise, from which people sought to distance themselves, was characterized by one principle: for Machiavelli, it was alleged, the prince stood in a relation of singularity and externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality. The prince acquires his principality by inheritance or conquest, but in any case he does not form part of it, he remains external to it. The link that binds him to his principality may have been established through violence, through family heritage, or by treaty, with the complicity or the alliance of other princes; this makes no difference—the link remains, in any event, a purely synthetic one, and there is no fundamental, essential, natural, and radical connection between the prince and his principality. As a corollary of this, given that this link is external, it will be fragile and continually under threat—from outside by the prince's enemies who seek to conquer or recapture his principality, and from within by subjects who have no a priori reason to accept his rule. Finally, this principle and its corollary lead to a conclusion, deduced as an imperative: that the objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen, and protect the principality, but with this last un-

derstood to mean not the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory but, rather, the prince's relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects. This fragile link is what the art of governing or of being prince, as espoused by Machiavelli, has as its object. Consequently, the mode of analysis of Machiavelli's text will be twofold: to identify dangers (where they come from, what they consist in, their severity: which are the greater, which the slighter), and second, to develop the art of manipulating the relations of forces that will allow the prince to ensure the protection of his principality, understood as the link that binds him to his territory and his subjects.

Schematically, one can say that Machiavelli's *The Prince*, as profiled in all these implicitly or explicitly anti-Machiavellian treatises, is essentially a treatise about the prince's ability to keep his principality. And it is this savoir-faire that the anti-Machiavellian literature wants to replace with something else that's new, namely, the art of government. Having the ability to retain one's principality is not at all the same thing as possessing the art of governing. But what does this latter ability comprise? To get a view of this problem, which is still at a raw-and-early stage, let us consider one of the earliest texts of this great anti-Machiavellian literature—Guillaume de La Perrière's *Miroir Politique*.

This text, disappointingly thin in comparison with Machiavelli, prefigures a number of important ideas. First of all, what does La Perrière mean by "to govern" and "governor"? What definition does he give of these terms? He writes: "governor can signify monarch, emperor, king, prince, lord, magistrate, prelate, judge and the like." Like La Perrière, others who write on the art of government constantly recall that one speaks also of "governing" a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, a family. These points of simple vocabulary actually have important political implications: Machiavelli's prince, at least as these authors interpret him, is by definition unique in his principality and occupies a position of extremity and transcendence. We have seen, however, that practices of government are, on the one hand, multifarious and concern many kinds of people—the head of a family, the superior of a convent, the teacher or tutor of a child or pupil—so that there are several forms of government among which the prince's relation to his state is only one particular mode; on the

other hand, though, all these other kinds of government are internal to the state or society. It is within the state that the father will rule the family, the superior the convent, and so on. Thus, we find at once a plurality of forms of government and their immanence to the state: the multiplicity and immanence of these activities distinguish them radically from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli's prince.

To be sure, among all these forms of government that interweave within the state and society, there remains one special and precise form: there is the question of defining the particular form of governing that can be applied to the state as a whole. Thus, seeking to produce a topology of forms of the art of government, La Mothe Le Vayer, in a text from the following century (consisting of educational writings intended for the French Dauphin), says that there are three fundamental types of government, each of which relates to a particular science or discipline: the art of self-government, connected with morality; the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to economy; and, finally, the science of ruling the state, which concerns politics. In comparison with morality and economy, politics evidently has its own specific nature, which La Mothe Le Vayer states clearly. What matters, notwithstanding this topology, is that the art of government is always characterized by the essential continuity of one type with the other, and of a second type with a third.

This means that, whereas the doctrine of the prince and the radical theory of sovereignty are constantly attempting to draw the line between the power of the prince and any other form of power—because its task is to explain and justify this essential discontinuity between them—in the art of government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upward and a downward direction. Upward continuity means that a person who wishes to govern the state well must first learn how to govern himself, his goods, and his patrimony, after which he will be successful in governing the state. This ascending line characterizes the pedagogies of the prince, which are an important issue at this time, as the example of La Mothe Le Vayer shows: he wrote for the Dauphin first a treatise of morality, then a book of economics, and, finally, a political treatise. It is the pedagogical formation of the prince, then, that will assure this upward continuity. On the other hand, we also have a

dowward continuity in the sense that, when a state is well run, the head of the family will know how to look after his family, his goods, and his patrimony, which means that individuals will, in turn, behave as they should. This downward line, which transmits individual behavior and the running of the family the same principles as the good government of the state, is just at this time beginning to be called "police." The prince's pedagogical formation ensures the upward continuity of the forms of government, and police the downward one. The central term of this continuity is the government of the family, termed "economy".

The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy—that is to say, the correct way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children, and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper—how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father toward his family into the management of the state.

This, I believe, is the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government—the introduction of economy into political practice. And if this is the case in the sixteenth century, it remains so in the eighteenth. In Rousseau's *Encyclopédia* article on "Political Economy," the problem is still posed in the same terms. What he says here, roughly, is that the word "economy" can only properly be used to signify the wise government of the family for the common welfare of all, and this is its actual original use; the problem, writes Rousseau, is how to introduce it, mutatis mutandis, and with all the discontinuities that we will observe below, into the general running of the state. To govern a state will mean, therefore, to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods. An expression that was important in the eighteenth century captures this very well: François Quesnay speaks of good government as "economic government." This latter notion becomes tautological, given that the art of government is just the art of exercising power in the form, and according to the model, of the economy. But the reason why Quesnay speaks of "economic government" is that the

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word "economy," for reasons I will explain later, is in the process of acquiring a modern meaning, and it is at this moment becoming apparent that the very essence of government—that is, the art of exercising power in the form of economy—is to have as its main objective that which we are today accustomed to call "the economy."

The word "economy," which in the sixteenth century signified a form of government, comes in the eighteenth century to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of complex processes that I regard as absolutely fundamental to our history. The second point I should like to discuss in Guillaume de La Perrière's book consists of the following statement: "government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end."

I would like to link this sentence with another series of observations. Government is the right disposition of things. I would like to pause over this word "things" because, if we consider what characterizes the ensemble of objects of the prince's power in Machiavelli, we will see that for Machiavelli the object and in a sense, the target of power are two things—on the one hand, the territory, and, on the other, its inhabitants. In this respect, Machiavelli simply adapted to his particular aims a juridical principle that from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century defined sovereignty in public law: sovereignty is exercised not on things but, above all, on a territory and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it. In this sense, we can say that the territory is the fundamental element both in Machiavellian principality and in juridical sovereignty as defined by the theoreticians and philosophers of right. Obviously enough, these territories can be fertile or infertile, the population dense or sparse, the inhabitants rich or poor, active or lazy, but all these elements are mere variables by comparison with territory itself, which is the very foundation of principality and sovereignty. On the contrary, in La Perrière's text, you will notice that the definition of government in no way refers to territory: one governs things. But what does this mean? I think this is not a matter of opposing things to men but, rather, of showing that what government has to do with is not territory but, rather, a sort of complex composed of men and things. The things, in this sense, with which government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links,

their imbrication with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation to those other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; and finally men in their relation to those still other things that might be accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, and so on. The fact that government concerns things understood in this way, this imbrication of men and things, is, I believe, readily confirmed by the metaphor that is inevitably invoked in these treatises on government, namely, that of the ship. What does it mean to govern a ship? It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also of the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks, and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors, who are to be taken care of, and the ship, which is to be taken care of, and the cargo, which is to be brought safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms, and so on. This is what characterizes the government of a ship. The same goes for the running of a household. Governing a household, a family, does not essentially mean safeguarding the family property; what it concerns is the individuals who compose the family, their wealth and prosperity. It means reckoning with all the possible events that may intervene, such as births and deaths, and with all the things that can be done, such as possible alliances with other families; it is this general form of management that is characteristic of government. By comparison, the question of landed property for the family, and the question of the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory for a prince, are only relatively secondary matters. What counts essentially is this complex of men and things; property and territory are merely one of its variables.

This theme of the government of things as we find it in La Perrière can also be met with in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Frederick the Great has some notable pages on it in his *Anti-Machiavel*. He says, for instance, let us compare Holland with Russia: Russia may have the largest territory of any European state, but it is mostly made up of swamps, forests, and deserts, and is inhabited by miserable groups of people totally destitute of activity and industry; if one takes Holland, on the other hand, with its tiny territory, again mostly marshland, we find that it nevertheless pos-

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sesses such a population, such wealth, such commercial activity, and such a fleet as to make it an important European state, something that Russia is only just beginning to become.

To govern, then, means to govern things. Let us consider once more the sentence I quoted earlier, where La Perrière says: "government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end." Government, that is to say, has a finality of its own, and in this respect again, I believe, it can be clearly distinguished from sovereignty. Of course, I do not mean that sovereignty is presented in philosophical and juridical texts as a pure and simple right; no jurist or, a fortiori, theologian ever said that the legitimate sovereign is purely and simply entitled to exercise his power regardless of its ends. The sovereign must always, if he is to be a good sovereign, have as his aim "the common welfare and the salvation of all." Take for instance a late nineteenth-century author, Pufendorf, says: "Sovereign authority is conferred upon them [the rulers] only in order to allow them to use it to attain or conserve what is of public utility." The ruler may not have consideration for anything advantageous for himself, unless it also be so for the state. What does this common good or general salvation consist of, which the jurists talk about as being the end of sovereignty? If we look closely at the real content that jurists and theologians give to it, we can see that "the common good" refers to a state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which they are assigned, and respect the established order insofar as this order conforms to the laws imposed by God on nature and men: in other words, "the common good" means essentially obedience to the law, either that of their earthly sovereign or that of God, the absolute sovereign. In every case, what characterizes the end of sovereignty, this common and general good, is in sum nothing other than submission to sovereignty. This means that the end of sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty. The good is obedience to the law, hence the good for sovereignty is that people should obey it. This is an essential circularity; whatever its theoretical structure, moral justification, or practical effects, it comes very close to what Machiavelli said when he stated that the primary aim of the prince was to retain his principality. We always come back to this self-referring circularity of sovereignty or principality.

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Now, with the new definition given by La Perrière, with his attempt at a definition of government, I believe we can see a new kind of finality emerging. Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists' texts would have said, but to an end that is "convenient" for each of the things that are to be governed. This implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, government will have to ensure that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, and so on. Thus, there is a whole series of specific finalities that become the objective of government as such. In order to achieve these various finalities, things must be disposed—and this term, "dispose," is important because, with sovereignty, the instrument that allowed it to achieve its aim—that is, obedience to the laws—was the law itself: law and sovereignty were absolutely inseparable. On the contrary, with government it is a question not of imposing law on men but of disposing things: that is, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics—to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be achieved.

I believe we are at an important turning point here: whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and possesses its own intrinsic instruments in the shape of its laws, the finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics. Within the perspective of government, law is not what is important: this is a frequent theme throughout the seventeenth century, and it is made explicit in the eighteenth-century texts of the Physiocrats, which explain that it is not through law that the aims of government are to be reached.

Finally, a fourth remark, still concerning this text from La Perrière. He says that a good ruler must have patience, wisdom, and diligence. What does he mean by patience? To explain it, he gives the example of the king of bees, the bumblebee, who, he says, rules the beehive without needing a sting; through this example, God has sought to show us in a mystical way that the good governor does not have to have a sting—that is to say, a weapon of killing, a

sword—in order to exercise his power; he must have patience rather than wrath, and it is not the right to kill, to employ force, that forms the essence of the figure of the governor. And what positive content accompanies this absence of sting? Wisdom and diligence. Wisdom, understood no longer in the traditional sense as knowledge of divine and human laws, of justice and equality, but rather, as the knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and should be attained, and the disposition of things required to reach them: it is this knowledge that is to constitute the wisdom of the sovereign. As for his diligence, this is the principle that a governor should only govern in such a way that he thinks and acts as though he were in the service of those who are governed. And here, once again, La Perrière cites the example of the head of the family who rises first in the morning and goes to bed last, who concerns himself with everything in the household because he considers himself as being in its service. We can see at once how far this characterization of government differs from the idea of the prince as found in or attributed to Machiavelli. To be sure, this notion of governing, for all its novelty, is still very crude here.

This schematic presentation of the notion and theory of the art of government did not remain a purely abstract question in the sixteenth century, and it was of concern not only to political theorists. I think we can identify its connections with political reality. The theory of the art of government was linked, from the sixteenth century to the whole development of the administrative apparatus of the territorial monarchies, the emergence of governmental apparatuses; it was also connected to a set of analyses and forms of knowledge that began to develop in the late sixteenth century and grew in importance during the seventeenth. These were essentially to do with knowledge of the state, in all its different elements, dimensions, and factors of power, questions that were termed precisely "statistics," meaning the science of the state. Finally, as a third vector of connections, I do not think one can fail to relate this search for an art of government to mercantilism and the Camerists' science of police.

To put it very schematically, in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, the art of government finds its first form of crystallization, organized around the theme of reason of state, understood not in the negative and pejorative sense we give to it

today (as that which infringes on the principles of law, equity, and humanity in the sole interests of the state) but in a full and positive sense: the state is governed according to rational principles that are intrinsic to it and cannot be derived solely from natural or divine laws or the principles of wisdom and prudence. The state, like nature, has its own proper form of rationality, albeit of a different sort.

Conversely, the art of government, instead of seeking to found itself in transcendental rules, a cosmological model, or a philosophico-

moral ideal, must find the principles of its rationality in that which constitutes the specific reality of the state. In my subsequent lectures, I will be examining the elements of this first form of state rationality. But we can say here that, right until the early eighteenth century, this form of "reason of state" acted as a sort of obstacle to the development of the art of government.

This is for a number of reasons. First, there are the strictly historical ones, the series of great crises of the seventeenth century: first the Thirty Years' War with its ruin and devastation; then, in the midcentury, the peasant and urban rebellions; and finally the financial crisis, the crisis of revenues that affected all Western monarchies at the end of the century. The art of government could only spread and develop in subtlety in an age of expansion, free from the great military, political, and economic tensions that afflicted the seventeenth century from beginning to end. Massive and elementary historical causes thus blocked the propagation of the art of government. I think also that the doctrine formulated during the sixteenth century was impeded in the seventeenth by a series of other factors I might term, to use expressions I do not much care for, "mental" and "institutional" structures. The preeminence of the problem of the exercise of sovereignty—both as a theoretical question and as a principle of political organization—was the fundamental factor here so long as sovereignty remained the central question. So long as the institutions of sovereignty were the basic political institutions and the exercise of power was conceived as an exercise of sovereignty, the art of government could not be developed in a specific and autonomous way. I think we have a good example of this in mercantilism. Mercantilism might be described as the first sanctioned effort to apply this art of government at the level of political practices and knowledge of the state; in this sense one can in fact say that mercantilism represents a first threshold of

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rationality in this art of government which La Perrière's text had defined in terms more moral than real. Mercantilism is the first rationalization of exercise of power as a practice of government: for the first time with mercantilism we see the development of knowledge [*savoir*] of state that can be used as a tactic of government. All this may be true, but mercantilism was blocked and arrested, I believe, precisely by the fact that it took as its essential objective the might of the sovereign: it sought a way not so much to increase the wealth of the country as to allow the ruler to accumulate wealth, build up his treasury, and create the army with which he could carry out his policies. And the instruments mercantilism used were laws, decrees, regulations—that is, the traditional weapons of sovereignty. The objective was the sovereign's might, the instruments those of sovereignty: mercantilism sought to reinsert the possibilities opened up by a consciously conceived art of government within a mental and institutional structure, that of sovereignty, which by its very nature stifled them.

Thus, throughout the seventeenth century up to the liquidation of the themes of mercantilism at the beginning of the eighteenth, the art of government remained in a certain sense immobilized. It was trapped within the inordinately vast, abstract, rigid framework of the problem and institution of sovereignty. This art of government tried, so to speak, to reconcile itself with the theory of sovereignty by attempting to derive the ruling principles of an art of government from a renewed version of the theory of sovereignty—and this is where those seventeenth-century jurists come into the picture who formalize or ritualize the theory of the contract. Contract theory enables the founding contract, the mutual pledge of ruler and subjects, to function as a sort of theoretical matrix for deriving the general principles of an art of government. But although contract theory, with its reflection on the relationship between ruler and subjects, played a very important role in theories of public law, in practice, as is evidenced by the case of Hobbes (even though what Hobbes was aiming to discover was the ruling principles of an art of government), it remained at the stage of the formulation of general principles of public law.

On the one hand, there was this framework of sovereignty, which was too large, too abstract, and too rigid; and, on the other, the theory of government suffered from its reliance on a model that

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was too thin, too weak, and too insubstantial, that of the family—an economy of enrichment still based on a model of the family was unlikely to be able to respond adequately to the importance of territorial possessions and royal finance.

How, then, was the art of government able to outflank these obstacles? Here again a number of general processes played their part: the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century, connected with an increasing abundance of money, which in turn was linked to the expansion of agricultural production through a series of circular processes with which the historians are familiar. If this is the general picture, then we can say more precisely that the art of government found fresh outlets through the emergence of the problem of population; or let us say, rather, that a subtle process took place, which we must seek to reconstruct in its particulars, through which the science of government, the recentering of the theme of economy on a different plane from that of the family, and the problem of population are all interconnected.

It was through the development of the science of government that the notion of economy came to be recentered onto that different plane of reality we characterize today as the "economic," and it was also through this science that it became possible to identify problems specific to the population. But, conversely, we can say as well that it was thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of that area of reality we call the economy, that the problem of government finally came to be thought, considered, and calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty. And, further, that "statistics"—which in mercantilist tradition only ever worked within and for the benefit of a monarchical administration that functioned according to the form of sovereignty—now becomes the major technical factor, or one of the major technical factors, of the unfreezing [*déblocage*] of the art of government.

In what way did the problem of population make possible the unfreezing of the art of government? The perspective of population, the reality accorded to specific phenomena of population, render possible the final elimination of the model of the family and the recentering of the notion of economy. Whereas statistics had previously worked within the administrative frame and thus in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, it now gradually reveals that pop-

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ulation has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles of scarcity, and so on; statistics shows also that the domain of population involves a range of intrinsic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to those of the family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of labor and wealth; finally, it shows that, through its shifts, customs, activities, and so on, population has specific economic effects. Statistics, by making it possible to quantify these specific phenomena of population, also shows that this specificity is irreducible to the dimension of the family. The latter now disappears as the model of government, except for a certain number of residual themes of a religious or moral nature. On the other hand, what now emerges into prominence is the family considered as an element internal to population, and as a fundamental instrument in ~~its~~ government.

In other words, prior to the emergence of population, it was impossible to conceive the art of government ~~except~~ on the model of the family, in terms of economy concerned as the management of a family. From the moment when, on the contrary, population appears absolutely irreducible to the family, the latter becomes of secondary importance compared to population as an element internal to population: that is, no longer a model but a segment. Nevertheless, it remains a privileged segment, because whenever information is required concerning the population (sexual behavior, demography, consumption, and so on), it must be obtained through the family. But the family becomes an instrument rather than a model—the privileged instrument for the government of the population and not the chimerical model of good government. This shift from the level of the model to that of an instrument is, I believe, absolutely fundamental, and it is from the middle of the eighteenth century that the family appears in this dimension of instrumentality relative to the population, with the institution of campaigns to reduce mortality, and to promote marriages, vaccinations, and so on. Thus, what makes it possible for the theme of population to unblock the field of the art of government is this elimination of the family as model.

In the second place, population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose ~~not~~ the act of government itself, but the intervention in the field of economy and population. In other words, the transition that takes place in the eighteenth century from an art of government to a political science,

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welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on; and the means the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all, in some sense, immanent to the population; it is the population itself on which government will act either directly, through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly, through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain regions or activities, and so on. The population now represents more the end of government than the power of the sovereign; the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, aware, vis-à-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it. Interest as the consciousness of each individual who makes up the population, and interest considered as the interest of the population regardless of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of the individuals who compose it: this is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the government of population. This is the birth of a new art, or at any rate of a range of absolutely new tactics and techniques.

Finally, population is the point around which is organized what in sixteenth-century texts came to be called the “patience” of the sovereign, in the sense that the population is the object that government must take into account in all its observations and knowledge [savoir], in order to be able to govern effectively in a rational and conscious manner. The constitution of knowledge [savoir] of government is absolutely inseparable from that of a knowledge of all the processes related to population in its larger sense—that is, what we now call the economy. I said in my last lecture that the constitution of political economy depended upon the emergence, from among all the various elements of wealth, a new subject—population. The new science called “political economy” arises out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory, and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government, namely, intervention in the field of economy and population. In other words, the transition that takes place in the eighteenth century from an art of government to a political science,

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from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government, turns on the theme of population, hence also on the birth of political economy.

This is not to say that sovereignty ceases to play a role from the moment when the art of government begins to become a political science. On the contrary, I would say that the problem of sovereignty was never posed with greater force than at this time, because it no longer involved—as it had in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—an attempt to derive an art of government from a theory of sovereignty; instead, given that such an art now existed and was spreading, it involved an attempt to see what juridical and institutional form, what foundation in the law, could be given to the sovereignty that characterizes a state. It suffices to read in chronological succession two different texts by Rousseau. In his *Encyclopédia* article on "Political Economy," we can see the way in pointing out (and the text is very characteristic from this point of view) that the word "economy" essentially signifies the management of family property by the father, but that this model can no longer be accepted, even if it had been valid in the past; today, says Rousseau, we know that political economy is not the economy of the family. And even without making explicit reference to the Physisocrats, to statistics, or to the general problem of the population, he sees quite clearly this turning point consisting in the fact that the economy of "political economy" has a totally new sense that cannot be reduced to the old model of the family. He undertakes in this article the task of giving a new definition of the art of government. Later he writes *The Social Contract*, where he poses the problem of how it is possible, using concepts such as nature, contract, and general will, to provide a general principle of government that allows room both for a juridical principle of sovereignty and for the elements through which an art of government can be defined and characterized. Consequently, sovereignty is far from being eliminated by the emergence of a new art of government, even by one that has passed the threshold of political science; on the contrary, the problem of sovereignty is made more acute than ever.

As for discipline, this is not eliminated either; clearly, its modes of organization, all the institutions within which it had developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—schools, manufac-

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ries, armies, and so on—all this can only be understood on the basis of the development of the great administrative monarchies. Nevertheless, though, discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage a population: the managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, but it also implies the management of population in its depths and its details. The notion of a government of population renders all the more acute the problem of the foundation of sovereignty (consider Rousseau) and all the more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline (consider all the history of the disciplines, which I have attempted to analyze elsewhere).

Accordingly, we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty—discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security. In any case, I wanted to demonstrate the deep historical link between the movement that overturns the constants of sovereignty in consequence of the problem of choices of government; the movement that brings about the emergence of population as a datum, as a field-of-intervention, and as an objective of governmental techniques; the process that isolates the economy as a specific sector of reality; and political economy as the science and the technique of intervention of the government in that field of reality. Three movements—government, population, political economy—that constitute from the eighteenth century onward a solid series, one that even today has assuredly not been dissolved.

In conclusion, I would like to say that, on second thought, the more exact title I would like to have given to the course of lectures I have begun this year is not the one I originally chose, "Security, Territory, and Population": what I would like to undertake is something I would term a history of "governmentality." By this word I mean three things:

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power,

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which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses-of security.

2. The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of power—which may be termed “government”—resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges [savoirs].

3. The process or, rather, the result of the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and gradually becomes “governmentalized.”

We all know the fascination that the love, or horror, of the state exercises today; we know how much attention is paid to the genesis of the state, its history, its advance, its power, abuses, and so on. The excessive value attributed to the problem of the state is expressed, basically, in two ways: the one form, immediate, affective, and tragic, is the lyricism of the cold monster we see confronting us. But there is a second way of overvaluing the problem of the state, one that is paradoxical because it is apparently reductionist: it is the form of analysis that consists in reducing the state to a certain number of functions, such as the development of productive forces and the reproduction of relations of production, and yet this reductionist vision of the relative importance of the state’s role nevertheless invariably renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied. But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance. Maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity—that is, for our present—is not so much the statization [étatisation] of society, as the “governmentalization” of the state.

We live in the era of a “governmentality” first discovered in the

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eighteenth century. This governmentalization of the state is a singularly paradoxical phenomenon: if in fact the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have become the only political issue, the only real space for political struggle and contention, this is because the governmentalization of the state is, at the same time, what has permitted the state to survive. It is possible to suppose that if the state is what it is today, this is so precisely thanks to this governmentality, which is at once internal and external to the state—since it is the tactics of government that make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on. Thus, the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality. And maybe we could even, albeit in a very global, rough, and inexact fashion, reconstitute the great forms, the great economies of power in the West in the following way. First came the state of justice, born in a territoriality of feudal type and corresponding in large part to a society of the law—customary laws and written laws—with a whole game of engagements and litigations. (Second) the administrative state, born in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a frontier and no longer feudal territoriality, an administrative state that corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines. (Finally) the state of government, which is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface it occupies, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, with the territory that it covers, to be sure, but only in a sense as one of its components. And this state of government, which is grounded in its population and which refers and has resort to the instrumentality of economic knowledge, would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security.

There, if you like, are certain pointers [propos] for positioning this phenomenon—which I believe to be important—of governmentality. I will try further to show how such governmentality is born, in one part, out of an archaic model, that of the Christian pastoral, and secondly, while drawing support from a diplomatico-military model, or better, technics, and finally, thirdly, how governmentality could not have assumed the dimensions it has except thanks to a series of quite particular instruments, whose formation is precisely contemporary with the art of government, and which

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... could call, in the old sense of the term, that of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the police. [The pastoral, the new diplomatico-military techniques, and finally the police, I believe, were the three elements from which the phenomenon of the governmentalization of the state, so fundamental in the history of the West, could be produced.

NOTES

* This essay was presented as part of a course on "Security, Territory, and Population" (see summary in *Essential Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 67-71) that Foucault gave at the Collège de France in the 1977-78 academic year. It was first published in 1978. [eds.]

QUESTIONS OF METHOD *

WHY THE PRISON?

- a. *Why do you see the birth of the prison—and, in particular, this process you call "hurried substitution," which in the early years of the nineteenth century establishes the prison at the center of the new penal system—as being so important?*

I don't mind to overstate the importance of the prison in penal history given that other quite distinct modes of punishment (*the death penalty, the penal colonies, deportation*) remained in effect too? At the same time, I am fond of methods, you seem to scorn explanations in terms of causality or structure, and sometimes to prioritize a description of what is purely one of events. No doubt, it's true that the preoccupation with "social history" has invaded historians' work in an encyclopedic manner, but even if one does not accept the "social" as the main level of historical explanation, is it right for you to do away with social history altogether from your "interpretative dia-

logue"? I want what I may have said or written to be seen as something that claims to totality. I don't try to universalize what I say; what I don't say isn't meant to be thereby disqualified from an importance. My work takes place between unfinished research, *fitting* it out, and then if it doesn't work, try again elsewhere. On many points—I am thinking especially of the relations between dialectics, genealogy, and strategy—I am still