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Fix c->reply_bytes computation in setDeferredMultiBulkLength()

In order to implement reply buffer limits introduced in 2.6 and useful
to close the connection under user-selected circumastances of big output
buffers (for instance slow consumers in pub/sub, a blocked slave, and so
forth) Redis takes a counter with the amount of used memory in objects
inside the output list stored into c->reply.

The computation was broken in the function setDeferredMultiBulkLength(),
in the case the object was glued with the next one. This caused the
c->reply_bytes field to go out of sync, be subtracted more than needed,
and wrap back near to ULONG_MAX values.

This commit fixes this bug and adds an assertion that is able to trap
this class of problems.

This problem was discovered looking at the INFO output of an unrelated
issue (issue #547).
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1 parent 8361d6c commit 6fe9c402a2b9dcd3cb1a15aed08a86338ec143f3 @antirez committed Jun 15, 2012
Showing with 4 additions and 0 deletions.
  1. +4 −0 src/networking.c
4 src/networking.c
@@ -364,7 +364,10 @@ void setDeferredMultiBulkLength(redisClient *c, void *node, long length) {
/* Only glue when the next node is non-NULL (an sds in this case) */
if (next->ptr != NULL) {
+ c->reply_bytes -= zmalloc_size_sds(len->ptr);
+ c->reply_bytes -= zmalloc_size_sds(next->ptr);
len->ptr = sdscatlen(len->ptr,next->ptr,sdslen(next->ptr));
+ c->reply_bytes += zmalloc_size_sds(len->ptr);
@@ -1302,6 +1305,7 @@ int checkClientOutputBufferLimits(redisClient *c) {
* called from contexts where the client can't be freed safely, i.e. from the
* lower level functions pushing data inside the client output buffers. */
void asyncCloseClientOnOutputBufferLimitReached(redisClient *c) {
+ redisAssert(c->reply_bytes < ULONG_MAX-(1024*64));
if (c->reply_bytes == 0 || c->flags & REDIS_CLOSE_ASAP) return;
if (checkClientOutputBufferLimits(c)) {
sds client = getClientInfoString(c);

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