

15 years of  
consulting



## Functional Safety with ISO 26262

Dr. Christof Ebert, 18. October 2016

## Vector Consulting Services

- ▶ ... supports clients worldwide in improving their product development and IT and with interim management
- ▶ ... with clients such as Accenture, Audi, BMW, Bosch, Daimler, Ford, Huawei, Hyundai, IBM, Lufthansa, Munich RE, Porsche, Siemens, Thales, Toyota and ZF
- ▶ ... offers with the Vector Group a portfolio of tools, software components and services
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- ▶ [www.vector.com/consulting](http://www.vector.com/consulting)



Automotive



Aerospace



IT & Finance

Industry



Medical



Railway



# Agenda

Welcome


## ► Challenges and Concepts

Vector Safety Experiences

Conclusions and Outlook



## Vector Client Survey on Industry Trends




Vector Client Survey 2016. Details: [www.vector.com/trends](http://www.vector.com/trends). Sum > 100% because 3 answers per question were allowed. Results from all industries overlap and are thus compiled in this report. Validity big with >4% response rate of 1700 recipients.

**Safety and security** evolved since 2015 to a major challenge.



# Functional Safety Challenge: Complexity and Competences



## Functional Safety – Broad Exposure

### ESP




⚡ Unintended, single-sided brake effect on straight lane

### Electronic Park Brake



⚡ Unintended activation in motion



### Collision Avoidance



⚡ Acceleration instead of deceleration in traffic

### Airbag



⚡ Delayed deployment after crash detection

Exposure of practically all E/E functions → Risk of liability

## Functional Safety – Major Risk and Cost Driver

Problems with switch:  
Brake lights either don't light up  
or light up continuously  
*Korean OEM*

Problems with acceleration:  
Car unintentionally  
accelerates thus causing  
personal damage  
*Japanese OEM*


Problem with automatic  
gear control:  
Gear is unintentionally  
switched to neutral  
*American OEM*

Problems with airbag control:  
Airbags and seat belt  
pre-tensioner are not or  
too late activated  
*German OEM*

*Source: autoservicepraxis.de*

Increasing amount of incidents → Risk of global visibility


## Functional Safety – Wide Impact



Wide impact on entire life-cycle → Risk of gaps and inconsistencies



# Functional Safety – Many Methods



Many methods and techniques → Risk of uninformed usage

# Functional Safety – Complex Standard

10 Parts


43 Chapters

100 work products

180 engineering methods

500 pages


600 requirements




Source: ISO 26262

Complex standard → Risk of overheads and bureaucracy


## Liability



## Legal Liability: State of the Practice



## A Structured Approach



Source: ISO 26262-1:2011



## Basic Concept of ISO 26262: Risk Classification by „ASIL“

Risk = Severity x Probability


S: Severity  
E: Exposure  
C: Controllability  
I: necessary Integrity

$$R = S \times P_E \times P_C \times P_I$$

ASIL

Automotive **S**afety **I**ntegrity **L**evel

(= required integrity of a function)




Source: IEC 61508:2010

## Development – Example Classification Brake-by-wire-System

Failure Mode	Vehicle State	Road Condition	Environment Condition	E	C	S	ASIL
No Braking Effect	> 100 km/h	Wet	Highway	E3	C3	S3	C
Unexpected Braking Effect	> 50 km/h < 100 km/h	Dry	Main Road	E4	C2	S3	C
Asymmetric Braking Effect	Parking < 10 km/h	Dry	Side Road	E4	C2	S1	A


- ▶ Exposure:
  - ▶ E3: 1-10% of average operating time
  - ▶ E4: >10% of average operation time
- ▶ Controllability (Average Driver):
  - ▶ C2: Hazardous situation is usually controllable
  - ▶ C3: Hazardous situation is usually not controllable
- ▶ Severity:
  - ▶ S1: Light to moderate injuries
  - ▶ S3: Critical injuries

## Approaches to Risk Reduction



Goals: Avoid failures – Make unavoidable failures safe

## Fail-safe vs. Fail-operational



- ▶ Bring the system into the fail-safe state to avoid any hazard.
  - ▶ Two approaches:
    1. Fail-safe by design (default)
    2. Failure mitigation and transition to fail-safe state
  - ▶ Sufficient for most “classic” automotive systems, often with mechanical back-up
- ▶ System remains operational
  - ▶ E.g. degraded - but safe - operation mode.
  - ▶ Availability of elements assuring the required safety
  - ▶ Diverse / redundant architecture
  - ▶ Required for continuous and automated safe operation

**The safety related system has always to be in one safe state!**

# Agenda

Welcome

Challenges and Concepts


► **Vector Safety Experiences**

Conclusions and Outlook






# Vector Experiences – Support Throughout the Life-Cycle



Consistently plan and systematically maintain safety artefacts

## Vector Experiences – Including the Customer and Supplier

- ▶ Often insufficient information shared between OEM and Tier-1 supplier and Tier-1 and Tier-2 suppliers concerning safety-critical functions and related hazards
- ▶ Risk that system and component design is not optimized to balance safety and costs
- ▶ Our experience shows that companies which tried more intense supplier-collaboration, continue to do so for all critical interfaces



Perform joint workshops on requirements and design

# Vector Experiences – Development Interface Agreement (DIA)

List of relevant  
artefacts


Minimum scope:  
~ 60 artefacts

Project specific tailoring, application  
and tracking

	A	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
1	Identify and agree on work products	Explanation, Notes, additional requirements	Min scope		Tailoring		Define the interface								Implement the interface						
Work product			NSC	SC	Specific document	Applied	Justification	OEM			Supplier			Document exchange Extent	Milestone	Due date	Actual date	Status			
								R	S	I	A	R	S						I	A	
3																					
5																					
65	Part 6 - Product development at the software level																				
66	Design and coding guidelines for modelling and programming languages	This includes the definition of the application of the MISRA:2004 standard. Any deviations with corresponding rationale shall be documented.	X	X									X	X			Document exchange	G3			
67	Configuration and calibration data specification	This includes the final data. The review of configuration and calibration data ensures the right application of safety related mechanisms.	X	X									X	X			Document exchange	G3			
70	Software architectural design specification	Defines the technical solution which will fulfill all SW requirements. This includes the SW architecture (e.g. block diagram), allocation of functionality to architectural elements, critical resources, interfaces, design decisions A joint walkthrough demonstrates sufficient quality to HKMC and enforces the finalization of the SW design before SW implementation.	X	X									X	X			Joint walkthrough	G3			
71	Software safety analysis report	See comment on Safety analysis report in Part 4		X									X	X			Joint walkthrough	G3			
72	Dependent failures analysis report	This may be a subset of the software safety analysis report		X									X	X			Joint walkthrough	G3			
76	Software verification plan	This plan includes the test strategy for all SW test levels like SW unit test, static code analysis, SW integration test and SW test. It shall cover both safety-related and non-safety-related requirements and design elements. A joint walkthrough is needed to align the test strategy between HKMC and the supplier. This walkthrough may be combined with the walkthrough of the validation plan in part 4.	X	X									X	X			Joint walkthrough	G3			
77	Software verification specification	This document specifies all test cases for verifying the SW. An insight is needed on demand, e.g. when defects occur during customer tests or in order to check the test coverage.	X	X									X	X			Insight on demand	G3			
78	Software verification report	This includes evidence on MISRA application and metrics on C0 and C1 test coverage.	X	X									X	X			Document exchange	G5			

Use the DIA for comprehensive definition of the customer/supplier interfaces. Extend the usage to not safety related artefacts

## Vector Experiences – Performing Audits and Assessments



### Safety Audit


- ▶ Purpose: Evaluate implementation of the processes required for functional safety
- ▶ Perform periodic audits in projects
- ▶ Combine with SPICE assessments
- ▶ Perform short supplier audits before nomination, and comprehensive audits in B sample stage

### Safety Assessment

- ▶ Purpose: Evaluate achieved functional safety within the defined item for product and process
- ▶ Continuously compile the safety case as basis for the assessment
- ▶ If the OEM requests assessment by a third party, involve the third party early


**Demand audit and assessment results from suppliers, consider the independency requirements for auditors and assessors**

## Vector Experiences – Efficient Traceability and Consistency





# Vector Experiences – Systematic Analysis and Design



TP.2.2.4.2	Safety goals
LD1-SG.1	<b>Detect LD Faults</b> All actions taken by the lane departure system shall be valid lane departure system shall be forced into a safe, inactive system is no longer active.
LD1-SG.2	<b>Counteract LD Activation</b> The driver shall be able to cancel the lane departure warning angle or by applying the brakes...
LD1-SG.3	<b>Limit Counter Steering</b> The angle of counter steering that can be applied shall be limited.
LD1-SG.4	<b>Limit Asymmetric Braking</b> The amount of the asymmetric braking force that can be applied shall be limited.
LD1-SG.5	<b>Detect Lane Departure</b> A lane departure shall be detected with a certainty equivalent to...

No.	FMEA Part	Design Intent	Failure Mode	Failure Effects	SEV	Class	Cause	OCC	Prevention Measures	Detection Measures	DET	RPN	Rec. Actions	Responsible	Target Date
1	Speed Sensor	Deliver speed data The speed sensor is used to deliver data used to determine the activation conditions of the lane departure warning.	Stuck at The sensor continuously delivers the same speed reading.	Falsely activated The lane departure system is activated when it shouldn't be.	9	YC	Hardware failure Stuck at fault due to hardware failure internal to the sensor.	5	The speed sensor is currently qualified to ASIL A	None defined as yet.	10	450	Plausibility check A plausibility check shall be added to the lane departure function to detect incorrect sensor readings.	Metzker	Nov 30, 2011
2			Shortcut to ground Shortcut to ground	No activation Lane departure is not activated to hardware	6	YS	Internal hardware failure Stuck at fault to hardware	5	The speed sensor is currently qualified to ASIL A	None defined as yet.	10	300	Plausibility check A plausibility check shall be added to the lane departure function to detect incorrect sensor readings.	Metzker	Nov 30, 2011
5	Camera	Provide lane position data The camera delivers no picture at all	No data The camera delivers no picture at all	Departure not detected A departure from the lane cannot be detected.	7	YS	Camera obscured For example due to dirt or water on the windscreen.	5	Camera is placed behind the windscreen in an area that is regularly cleaned by the wiper system.	The DSP software used to calculate lane position determines picture quality. If insufficient an error is signalled.	2	70			


## Support by Vector Consulting Services and PREEvision tool:

- ▶ Single source for item definition, based on features, requirements, operating scenarios, dependencies
- ▶ Model-based design of functional and technical safety concept, including ASIL decomposition and requirement based tests

## Vector Experiences – Master Necessary Analysis Methods

Level	Safety Analyses	Dependent Failure Analyses
Functional Safety Concept	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Definition of FSR „<b>can</b> be supported“ safety analyses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Redundancy and independence „<b>can</b> be checked“ by DFA</li> </ul>
Technical Safety Concept	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Avoidance of systematic failures               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ External sources</li> <li>▶ Internal sources</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ Validation of the technical safety concepts (TSC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Independence               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Common cause failures and cascading failures</li> <li>▶ Safety function from safety mechanism</li> <li>▶ ASIL-decomposition</li> <li>▶ Allocation and design decisions</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ Freedom from interference               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Cascading failures only</li> <li>▶ Partitioning</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Hardware	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Qualitative analyses (from part 9):               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Verification of hardware design</li> <li>▶ Effectiveness of safety mechanisms</li> </ul> </li> <li>▶ <b>(B), C, D: Quantitative</b> analysis:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Random hardware failures</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
Software Architecture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Safety mechanisms               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Effectiveness</li> <li>▶ Error detection</li> <li>▶ Error handling</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
General Requirement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Complete safety item</li> <li>▶ Confirmation reviews</li> <li>▶ Verification reviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Focused analyses</li> <li>▶ No requirements on reviews</li> </ul>

# Vector Experiences – Thorough Hazard & Risk Analysis



The screenshot shows the PREEvision tool interface with a 'HazardAnalysis' table. The table has columns for Hazard Description, Operation Scenarios, Operating Modes, Exposure Comment, E, Severity Comment, S, Controllability Comment, C, ASIL, and Safety Goals. The table contains three rows of data, each representing a different hazard scenario.

Hazard Description	Operation Scenarios	Operating Modes	Exposure Comment	E	Severity Comment	S	Controllability Comment	C	ASIL	Safety Goals
The lane departure function activates under invalid driving conditions either by allowing the driver to activate the function when not allowed or by the function activating itself. This can lead to the suppression of intentional manoeuvres, e.g. to avoid unexpected obstructions in town traffic.	Country Roads (E3)	/-/- (Operating Mode)	Situation can occur in every journey	E4	Can have severe consequences	S3	Intentional manoeuvres are suppressed, e.g. to avoid unexpected obstructions in town traffic, that are reaction-time critical. This may lead to accidents that would otherwise have been avoided.	C3	ASIL-D	The driver shall be able to cancel the lane departure warning by applying a counteractive steering angle or by applying the brakes.
	Parking (E4)	OC.3 Gear Engaged /-/- (Operating Mode) OC.4 Low Speed /-/- (Operating Mode) OC.5 High Speed /-/- (Operating Mode) OC.6 Cruise Control Active /-/- (Operating Mode) OC.7 Limp Home /-/- (Operating Mode)								All actions taken by the lane departure system shall be validated and if detected as incorrect, the lane departure system shall be forced into a safe, inactive state and the driver warned that the system is no longer active
	Town (E4)									
The lane departure function does not activate when required and as expected by the driver. This may lead to an accident when inadvertently straying from the lane.	Main Roads (E4)	Cruise Control Active	There is a low probability of the driver straying from the lane requiring the lane departure warning to be activated.	E2	Could cause potentially fatal accidents due to high speed and lack of controllability (e.g. driver has fallen asleep).	S3	If the driver has not so far noticed that he is inadvertently straying from the lane, then he is unlikely to notice that the lane departure warning has not been activated and will	C2	ASIL-A	All actions taken by the lane departure system shall be validated and if detected as incorrect, the lane departure system shall be forced into a safe, inactive state and the driver warned that the system is no longer active

## Support by Vector Consulting Services and PREEvision tool:

- ▶ Predefined operation scenarios and operating modes
- ▶ Automatic ASIL calculation
- ▶ Traceability of safety goals to requirements and design artefacts

## Vector Experiences – Consistent Support for FMEA

ID	Design Intent	Failure Mode	Failure Effects	SEV	Class	Cause	OCC	Prevention Measures	Detection Measures
LD FMEA D11.1	Determine the lane position based on visual markings on the road ahead.	No visual information is delivered by the camera	A lane departure is not recognized	8		Camera lens is obscured by dirt or other objects	5	Camera is placed within the upper part of the windscreen where dirt is unlikely to collect and the area is regularly washed through wiper wash and rain.	The lane departure warning function analyses the picture to determine whether a lane markings are visible
						Camera has an internal defect	4	Certified camera components are used.	Self test at startup
						Connection to camera is faulty	3	None as present	Signal detection to determine whether the connection is good

General  
**Current Prevention Measures**  
Current Detection Measures  
RPNs  
Data Context  
Requirements Mapping  
Timing Path  
Attribute  
Diagrams  
Documentations  
Version Object  
Object Information

**Camera - Omission Cause 1 (FMEA Cause)**  
Prevention Measures Description: Camera is placed within the upper part of the windscreen where dirt is unlikely to collect and the area is regularly washed through w wash and rain.  
Current Prevention Measures:

Index	Name
1	Position of Camera
2	Camera

### Support by Vector Consulting Services and PREEvision tool:


- ▶ System requirements and design data with full traceability, thus avoiding to replicate system structure in a separate FMEA tool, while achieving significant cost savings
- ▶ Automatic consistency checks to ensure coverage

# Vector Experiences – Security Directly Impacts Safety

## Functional Safety (IEC 61508, ISO 26262)

- ▶ Hazard and risk analysis
- ▶ Functions and risk mitigation
- ▶ Safety engineering

Security only implicitly addressed




## + Security (ISO 15408, J3061)

- ▶ Threat and risk analysis
- ▶ Abuse, misuse, confuse cases
- ▶ Security engineering

Security and Safety are interacting and demand holistic systems engineering

For fast start security engineering should be connected to safety framework






## Safety and Security must be addressed in parallel

### Innovative functionality...

- ▶ Distributed systems
- ▶ Complex feature interaction
- ▶ High data volume
- ▶ External interfaces (V2X; vehicle as IP node)



### ... Drives new challenges

- ▶ Fail-operational robust behaviors
- ▶ High-performance micro-controllers
- ▶ Software development for critical systems
- ▶ Safety functions must be secured against attacks
- ▶ Cost-effective evolution and support over the entire life-cycle

Apply holistic systems engineering for safety and security

# Agenda

Welcome

Challenges and Concepts

Vector Safety Experiences

► **Conclusions and Outlook**



## Success Factor – Change Towards Safety Culture

Classic Development Culture	Safety Culture
Insufficient budget and time for relevant safety measures	Necessary measures are planned according to safety analysis – and reliably implemented
Shadow organization of safety experts and staff teams	Safety expertise is embedded into the regular line and project organization
Risk analysis is done superficially for documentation purposes and not maintained	Risk analysis and FMEA are developed at the beginning of system development and are continuously updated
System architecture is not considered in safety goals and requirements	System architecture explicitly covers the safety goals and requirements
Changes are accepted at any time for practically all system parts	Changes are analyzed with respect to their effects on functional safety using a strict change management
Safety audits are conducted only sporadically	Safety audits are established as a normal and standardized behavior
...	...

Implementing functional safety implies a profound culture change

## ISO26262 Experience

### ► **Increasing functional safety capabilities**

- Majority of OEM's include ISO26262 compliance in their contracts
- Independent audits and assessments are performed
- Methods for qualitative and quantitative analysis are available
- ASIL D capable MCU's are available

### ► **But...**


- Many suppliers do not have full ISO26262 compliance because they develop based on legacy systems
- Suppliers and OEMs need to further improve field observation and abilities to efficiently maintain a safety case
- New suppliers, e.g. for electric powertrain or ADAS, struggle with ramping up a safety process
- Security risks increasingly hamper functional safety
- Functional safety processes in many cases create overheads – which could be done at much lower cost

Functional safety can be efficiently achieved on the basis of mature development processes together with a competent partner.

## ISO26262 Will Further Evolve

Committee Draft (CD) on 17. Dec. 2015

Release ISO26262 ed. 2



### Evolution – Some Topics

1. Extension of scope by 50% to 729 pages
2. Application to commercial vehicles and motor cycles
3. Fully new section on semiconductors
4. Improved Safety Analysis Methods for software
5. Support for safety case for ADAS, fail-operational, diversified redundancy
6. "Objective" Assessment and Audit process improvement

Vector with its partners contributes to the evolution of ISO 26262

## Vector – Complete Safety Solution Portfolio

### Introduction of Safety Processes (Examples)

- ▶ Introducing ISO 26262, starting with analysis of the current state, including technical and process measures and building up safety culture
- ▶ Training und coaching for functional safety and safety culture
- ▶ Implementing consistent tool support, such as PREEvision

### Safety Management (Examples)

- ▶ Operationally supporting with interim safety managers
- ▶ Performing safety audits and supplier safety audits

### Safety Engineering (Examples)

- ▶ Providing software components and platforms, such as MICROSAR Safe
- ▶ Developing and reviewing safety concepts and safety analyses
- ▶ Combined safety and cyber security concepts



## Vector Safety Portfolio

### Safety Solutions

- ▶ **Consulting**  
Vector Safety Check, Interim Safety Manager, ...
- ▶ **Tools**  
PLM with PREEvision, Test, Diagnosis, ...
- ▶ **Software**  
AUTOSAR up to ASIL-D...
- ▶ [www.vector.com/safety](http://www.vector.com/safety)

### Trainings and media

- ▶ Training "Functional Safety with ISO 26262"  
Stuttgart, continuously  
[www.vector.com/training-safety](http://www.vector.com/training-safety)
- ▶ In-house trainings tailored to  
your needs available worldwide
- ▶ Free white papers...  
[www.vector.com/media-safety](http://www.vector.com/media-safety)



Thank you for your attention.  
Contact us for further support on functional safety,  
cyber security, and product development.

**Passion. Partner. Value.**

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