Annual Review of Political Science

From Foes to Friends: The Causes of Interstate Rapprochement and Conciliation

Michaela Mattes[1] and Jessica L.P. Weeks[2]

[1]Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA; email: m.mattes@berkeley.edu

[2]Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA; email: jweeks@wisc.edu

Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2024. 27:185–204

First published as a Review in Advance on February 21, 2024

The *Annual Review of Political Science* is online at polisci.annualreviews.org

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-024603

Keywords

rapprochement, conciliation, reconciliation, peace, conflict resolution, international conflict, rivalries, trust

Abstract

When, why, and how do countries move from hostile to peaceful relations, and sometimes even friendship? We draw on the interstate peace literature to identify two peace processes. Rapprochement represents a first step during which enemies might develop normal working relations. Some states then progress to conciliation and establish warm and cooperative ties. We compare rapprochement to conciliation, outline the mechanisms that drive each process, and review scholarly findings about three types of causal variables: abrupt shocks, stable contextual factors, and policy initiatives. A key insight emerges that conciliation is not simply an extension of rapprochement—the predictors of these two processes differ significantly. We then call for greater scholarly attention to the study of conciliation, interactions of causal factors, the domestic politics underlying each process, the causes of peace failure, and empirical and methodological challenges.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the causes of interstate conflict has long been a focus of international relations (IR) scholarship. Surprisingly, scholars have paid far less attention to the causes of peace: why former enemies drop grudges, and, in some cases, even develop amicable relations. Peace is typically treated simply as war's inverse, implying that any explanation of war must also account for peace (Bayer 2017, Diehl & Goertz 2017, Klein et al. 2008).

A wave of recent research has questioned this thinking. First, scholars have pointed out that the causes of peace differ from the causes of war. Perhaps counterintuitively, the factors found to explain conflict—such as relative power—do not reliably predict peace (Diehl 2016, Diehl & Goertz 2017, Diehl et al. 2021). Moreover, scholars have identified abundant variation in the quality of international peace. "Peace" can mean hostile relations in which deterrence prevents overt fighting, or interstate cooperation in the shadow of war, or warm international friendship in which war has become unthinkable. To treat peace simply as "not war" thus overlooks substantial differences in how states relate when not engaged in bloodshed.

The scholarly neglect of peace comes at a cost. Scholars were surprised by phenomena such as the sudden end of the Cold War, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the budding of warmer relations between South Korea and Japan. Understanding such developments is crucial because although peaceful transformations have recently reached "historical highs" (Diehl et al. 2021), tensions persist between adversaries such as Israel and Iran, India and Pakistan, and China and the United States. Scholars have documented more than 50 ongoing rivalries, which account for a disproportionate number of military disputes (Diehl et al. 2021, Goertz et al. 2016). Many other states have relations that are functional but remain too cool for beneficial cooperation. Given the immense toll of continued enmity, it is crucial to understand the prospects for peace.

We review scholarship about when, why, and how international antagonists move toward peace. Our focus is on peace between, rather than within, states. We conceptualize peace not merely as the absence of violent conflict but as a relationship in which states have resolved past differences, trust each other, and cooperate. We therefore focus on longer-term processes of conflict resolution rather than shorter-term conflict management. Furthermore, we focus on bilateral processes rather than third-party efforts such as mediation and peacekeeping, and on consensual processes rather than coercive ones. [On third-party conflict management and peacekeeping, see Kydd (2010) and Fortna & Howard (2008). On foreign-imposed regime change, see Downes (2021) and Lo et al. (2008).]

We first review the literature on levels of interstate peace and distinguish between two conflict resolution processes: rapprochement, which moves states toward the normal but distant relations that characterize cold peace, and conciliation, which propels states toward warmth and amity. These two processes differ in important ways. Rapprochement involves leader decisions and can occur quite suddenly, whereas conciliation is slower and builds broad-based cross-national friendship. While rapprochement centers on security matters, conciliation involves cooperation across many issues and levels of government and society.

Taking into account these differences, we detail the theoretical mechanisms behind each process. We distinguish between three sets of variables—abrupt shocks, stable contextual factors, and policy initiatives—that influence movement along the peace continuum and summarize evidence about their effects. A key insight emerges that conciliation is not simply an extension of rapprochement; the factors that facilitate each are fundamentally different.

We conclude by highlighting important avenues for future research. First, rapprochement and conciliation are complex processes that likely require many factors to align. Scholars should pay greater attention to the interactions of different causal variables. Second, while research tends to focus on the *international* politics of rapprochement and conciliation, these processes cannot

unfold without domestic support. More work is needed on when and how leaders can convince their domestic audiences of the virtue of improving relations. Third, we call for more conceptual and empirical work on conciliation, which has been neglected relative to rapprochement. Conciliation research should look beyond leaders and illuminate how bureaucratic, civil society, and other social actors foster friendship between states. Fourth, we call on scholars to examine failures as well as successes of rapprochement and conciliation. Exploring why peace might not develop—despite favorable conditions or initial progress—can potentially unveil new causal variables. Finally, we identify empirical and methodological challenges plaguing research on rapprochement and conciliation and highlight opportunities for diversification and innovation. Overall, we conclude that there is a vibrant research program on interstate peace that is making progress in revealing how states can move from conflict and competition toward productive and warm relations.

CONCEPTUALIZING PEACE AND PEACE PROCESSES

Scholars have produced more than a dozen systems for characterizing interstate peace (Adler & Barnett 1998, Bayer 2010, Boulding 1978, Chun 2015, Deutsch et al. 1957, Galtung 1975, George 2000, Goertz et al. 2016, Kacowicz & Bar-Siman-Tov 2000, Kupchan 2010, Miller 2001, Oelsner 2007, Söderström et al. 2021). Despite significant differences in terminology and conceptualization, there are two broad areas of consensus: that interstate relations can be mapped onto a continuum ranging from open warfare to harmonious relations between highly integrated friends, and that it is useful to think in terms of two different ideal-typical stages of peace: "cold peace" and "warm peace" (Miller 2001). **Figure 1** captures both of these insights.

On the far left of the figure is war, with states engaged in active fighting. Next is cold war: hostile relations short of outright war, in which peace largely results from deterrence. Scholars often conceptualize such interactions as rivalries: relationships characterized by intense military competition and high threat perception (Diehl & Goertz 2000, Rasler et al. 2013). Contemporary examples include India–Pakistan and Israel–Iran.

Further right is cold peace, in which states recognize each other as legitimate counterparts, have resolved—or never had—major issues of contention, and cooperate on some issues. War is viewed as possible but a last resort. Examples include Egypt–Israel after 1978 and the United States–Russia after 1991. To operationalize cold peace, scholars look for the presence of diplomatic relations and the extended absence of militarized conflict; when states were once rivals, scholars also consider dispute settlement agreements and mechanisms (Bayer 2010, Diehl et al. 2021, Goertz et al. 2016, Kupchan 2010). Cold peace represents a state of normal relations between countries.

Next lies a deeper peace, often known as warm peace. States trust one another, cooperate extensively, and share societal ties; their publics view each other as partners. Policy disagreements may still occur, but war has become unthinkable (e.g., Diehl et al. 2021). Indicators of warm peace



Figure 1

Peace scale and peace processes. Interstate relations can be located on a continuum from war (active fighting) to cold war (hostile relations, rivalry) to cold peace (normal relations) to warm peace (trust and extensive cooperation). War is portrayed in a lighter color as it is not a focus of this review.

are undefended borders, the absence of war plans, extensive intergovernmental ties, and exchanges between publics (Goertz et al. 2016, He 2009, Kasten 2017, Kupchan 2010). An example is Brazil–Argentina. At the extreme, warm peace encompasses highly integrated security communities like France–Germany, rare and deep friendships that some (Adler & Barnett 1998, Deutsch et al. 1957, Kupchan 2010, Oelsner 2007) consider distinct forms of peace.

The IR literature focuses heavily on transitions between (active) war and cold war: how states can avoid outright violence but not how they achieve deeper levels of beneficial cooperation. Here, we instead focus on two processes that lead states further along the peace continuum, toward cold and warm peace. First, rapprochement represents early steps that help hostile states build a basic level of trust, resolve (some of) their differences, and establish good working relations, potentially landing them at cold peace. Second, during conciliation, states move beyond cold peace and can develop deeper trust, cooperation, and amity, potentially emerging at warm peace. Sometimes conciliation involves dealing with the past, by showing penitence and gaining forgiveness, but states can also move toward warm peace without explicit contrition (Lind 2008). We view conciliation broadly as a process—grounded in either a forward-looking perspective or a reckoning with the past—whereby former enemies move toward friendship.

Importantly, neither rapprochement nor conciliation is necessarily linear; states can take steps back and then forward on the road to peace, or they may stall along the way. Furthermore, not all states that achieve rapprochement progress to conciliation; in many cases, relations thaw but friendship does not blossom. We thus conceptualize rapprochement and conciliation as processes rather than outcomes, the outcomes being the two stages of peace (cold or warm). This approach avoids the confusion of using the same term for both process and outcome (Tang 2011) and of conflating causes at different stages of peace.

Rapprochement and conciliation share important features. Both are predominantly bilateral—between the antagonists—though third parties sometimes encourage movement along the peace continuum (Bayer 2023, Miller 2001, Wu & Yang 2016). Both must also be mutual in order to succeed. Enemies cannot attain cold peace if either remains committed to militarized competition, nor can states achieve warm peace if either clings to hostile narratives. Success in both processes also requires both the desire and political capacity to improve relations. Leaders must convince domestic audiences of the virtues of peace, withstand domestic backlash against peace initiatives, and select overtures that appeal to the other side.

Despite these commonalities, the two processes differ in important ways. Rapprochement involves high-level decisions to offer an olive branch and/or reciprocate a peace offering. Initial gestures build trust and pave the way to greater intergovernmental cooperation, especially on security matters and mechanisms to manage disputes peacefully. Because rapprochement involves primarily *behavioral* changes by the countries' leadership on a limited set of issues, significant improvements in state relations can happen quickly (Goertz et al. 2016, Thompson et al. 2022). By contrast, conciliation is more gradual because it involves both elites and the public (Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004, Kupchan 2010, Ripsman 2016, Wu & Yang 2016), spans many areas of interstate relations, and requires more fundamental changes in *thinking*. Elites matter—for example, they may offer apologies and foster economic integration—but successful conciliation requires the buy-in of the masses. Citizens must change their views from antagonistic to friendly, that is, develop deep mutual trust and affinity (Oelsner 2007). Successful conciliation goes beyond top-level contacts to fostering linkages between different levels of government and civil society.

Historically, successful rapprochement has been more frequent than successful conciliation. According to Peace Data 3.1 (Diehl et al. 2021, Goertz et al. 2016), between 1900 and 2020, 289 dyads transitioned from rivalry to cold (negative) peace and 60 dyads that at some point in their history were rivals transitioned to warm (positive) peace. Furthermore, as of 2020, nearly

75% of dyadic relationships were characterized by cold peace, while only about 23% reflected warm peace.

Perhaps in part because warm peace is less common, IR scholars have devoted far more attention to rapprochement than conciliation (Diehl & Goertz 2017, Kupchan 2010, Tang 2011), particularly within a large literature on rivalry termination. The literature on stable peace, however, examines both processes and draws on scholarship on reassurance and trust building. Finally, an eclectic literature on apologies and historical narratives focuses on conciliation. Below, we review core findings of all of these literatures, with an emphasis on positivist, English-language works within IR. [There are also large normative and critical literatures on peace. For example, see Sharoni (2010) and Väyrynen et al. (2021) for reviews of diverse feminist scholarship on peace, some of which has a normative and/or critical focus.]

WHEN PEACE EMERGES

When are rapprochement and conciliation most likely to occur and succeed? We identify the theoretical mechanisms that drive each process and tie findings in the literature to these mechanisms, highlighting promising predictors of peace. We find that the factors that promote rapprochement tend to be quite different from those that foster conciliation.

Rapprochement emerges between states mired in war and rivalry. These countries have deep-seated disagreements over high-stakes issues (e.g., boundaries, international rules) and do not trust each other. Antagonism between the two countries' publics also creates obstacles for peace. Three mechanisms foster rapprochement. First, one or both sides need to view concessions on disputed issues as preferable to continued competition. Second, the two sides have to develop sufficient trust to make a peaceful deal and move toward (limited) cooperation. Third, leaders need to be able to "sell" rapprochement at home. Rapprochement should thus be facilitated by any factor that (*a*) lowers the benefits of continued conflict or increases the value of improved relations, (*b*) creates a context in which states can trust one another to uphold negotiated agreements, and/or (*c*) makes it easier for a leader to overcome domestic opposition to cooperation with the adversary.

The context for conciliation is different. The two states have already built some basic level of trust, resolved (some of) their substantive disagreements, and established normal working relations. But in order to realize warm peace, states must develop a deeper level of trust, where violent conflict is viewed as impossible no matter what new disagreements may emerge and where people move from indifference (or even dislike) to affinity for the other side. Three key mechanisms are likely to play a role in conciliation. First, the two governments and publics need to have frequent positive or at least neutral interactions—friendship requires regular contact. Second, mutual international challenges as well as opportunities for gain can incentivize deeper cooperation. Third, domestic similarities—in political systems and/or the way society is structured—can foster affinity and trust. Conciliation should thus benefit from conditions that encourage states to engage one another repeatedly on different issues and that create shared interests and understandings of the world.

Below, we review the IR literature on shocks, contextual factors, and policy initiatives that could encourage cold and warm peace through the mechanisms we outlined. We conceptualize shocks as abrupt changes in the international, dyadic, or domestic political environment. Contextual factors reflect relatively fixed conditions—levels of, rather than changes in, variables—that can facilitate or impede peace. Policy initiatives are actions that decision makers deliberately undertake to promote rapprochement or conciliation.

The following subsections discuss each of these types of variables in turn, distinguishing between their effects on rapprochement and on conciliation. **Table 1** provides an overview of empirical findings for each variable.

Table 1 Empirical findings on rapprochement and conciliation[a]

Level of analysis	Variables	Findings about effect on rapprochement	Findings about effect on conciliation
Shocks			
System	World wars	Bennett 1998 (mixed); Colaresi 2001 (+); Diehl & Goertz 2000 (marg. +); Goertz & Diehl 1995 (ns)	None
System	Δ Global power distribution	Bennett 1998 (mixed); Diehl & Goertz 2000 (+); Goertz & Diehl 1995 (ns)	None
System	Δ Global territorial distribution	Bennett 1998 (mixed); Diehl & Goertz 2000 (marg. +); Goertz & Diehl 1995 (+)	None
Dyad	War/crisis	Bennett 1996 (ns); Morey 2011 (+); Orme 2004 (+); Owsiak et al. 2021 (ns)	None
Dyad	Δ Relative power	Fehrs 2016 (ns); Owsiak et al. 2021 (ns); Rasler et al. 2013 (+)	None
Dyad	New joint threat	Bennett 1996 (+); Bennett 1998 (mixed); Fehrs 2016 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+)	None
Dyad	Δ Third-party pressure	Aran & Ginat 2014 (+); Darnton 2014 (ns); Kupchan 2010 (+); Miller 2001 (+); Rasler et al. 2013 (mixed); Ripsman 2016 (+)	None
State	New threat	Akcinaroglu et al. 2014 (+); Bennett 1996 (+); Bennett 1998 (mixed); Darnton 2011, 2014 (mixed); Fehrs 2016 (+); Kupchan 2010 (+); Owsiak et al. 2021 (+); Rasler et al. 2013 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+)	None
State	Natural disaster	Akcinaroglu et al. 2011 (+)	None
State	Civil war	Bennett 1998 (mixed); Goertz & Diehl 1995 (+); Owsiak et al. 2017 (ns)	None
State	Policy failures	Berenji 2020 (+); Cox 2010 (+); Rasler et al. 2013 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+)	None
State	Δ Leadership	Bennett 1998 (+); Dreyer 2012 (mixed); Fehrs 2016 (ns); Rasler et al. 2013 (mixed)	None
State	Δ Source of leader support	Owsiak et al. 2021 (+)	Owsiak et al. 2021 (+)
State	Δ Regime	Bennett 1997, 1998 (+); Darnton 2014 (marg. +); Fehrs 2016 (ns) Democratization: Bennett 1998 (ns); Mani 2011 (+); Prins & Daxecker 2007 (+)	Democratization: Miller 2001 (+); Oelsner 2007 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+); Wu & Yang 2016 (+)
Contextual factors			
System	International norms	Goertz et al. 2016 (+)	None
System	Bipolarity	Bennett 1996 (ns); Cioffi-Revilla 1998 (+); Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (+)	None
Dyad	Power parity	Bennett 1996 (ns); Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (+); Darnton 2014 (ns); Owsiak et al. 2021 (ns); Rider & Owsiak 2021 (ns)	Owsiak et al. 2021 (ns)
Dyad	Ongoing joint threat	Bennett 1996 (+); Bennett 1998 (mixed); Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (+); Cox 2010 (mixed); Darnton 2011, 2014 (mixed); Lee 2022 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+)	Deutsch et al. 1957 (marg. +); He 2009 (+)
Dyad	Joint alliance	Rider & Owsiak 2021 (ns)	None

(*Continued*)

Table 1 (*Continued*)

Level of analysis	Variables	Findings about effect on rapprochement	Findings about effect on conciliation
Dyad	Shared allies	Lee 2022 (+)	Bayer 2023 (+); Wu & Yang 2016 (+)
Dyad	Complementary interests	None	Rock 1989 (+)
Dyad	Territorial conflict	Bennett 1996, 1998 (−); Dreyer 2012 (−); Owsiak et al. 2017 (−); Owsiak et al. 2021 (−); Rider & Owsiak 2021 (−)	Owsiak et al. 2021 (−); Wu & Yang 2016 (−)
Dyad	Status disagreement	Dreyer 2012 (−)	None
Dyad	Joint democracy	Bayer 2010 (ns); Bennett 1997, 1998 (+); Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (+); Kupchan 2010 (ns); Owsiak et al. 2021 (ns); Prins & Daxecker 2007 (mixed); Rider & Owsiak 2021 (mixed); Ripsman 2016 (ns)	Bayer 2010 (+); Miller 2001 (+); Oelsner 2007 (+); Owsiak et al. 2021 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+); Wu & Yang 2016 (+)
Dyad	Economic integration	Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (ns); Kupchan 2010 (ns); Thompson et al. 2022 (mixed)	Deutsch et al. 1957 (marg. +); Kupchan 2010 (+); Rock 1989 (+)
Dyad	Prospect of economic cooperation	Copeland 1999 (+); Fehrs 2016 (+); Thompson et al. 2022 (mixed)	None
Dyad	Joint intergovernmental organization membership	Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (ns); Darnton 2014 (ns); Kasten 2018 (ns); Owsiak et al. 2021 (ns); Prins & Daxecker 2007 (+); Ripsman 2016 (ns)	Hasenclever & Kasten 2016 (+); Kasten 2018 (mixed); Owsiak et al. 2021 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+); Wu & Yang 2016 (+)
Dyad	Cultural commonality/ shared values	Boulding 1978 (+); Kupchan 2010 (+)	Deutsch et al. 1957 (+); Kupchan 2010 (+); Rock 1989 (+)
Dyad	Geographic proximity	None	Goertz et al. 2016 (+)
Dyad	Proximity to warm peace relationship	None	Owsiak et al. 2021 (+)
Dyad	Compatible social orders	None	Kupchan 2010 (+)
State	Democracy	Bayer 2010 (ns); Bennett 1997 (+); Bennett 1998 (ns); Cornwell & Colaresi 2002 (ns); Darnton 2014 (marg. +); Kupchan 2010 (ns); Mani 2011 (+); Prins & Daxecker 2007 (ns)	Bayer 2010 (+); Kupchan 2010 (ns); Miller 2001 (+); Ripsman 2016 (+)
State	Leader type	Blair & Schwartz 2023 (men); Chiozza & Choi 2003 (mixed); Clare 2014 (dove); Colaresi 2004 (hawk); Cowen & Sutter 1998 (hawk); Cukierman & Tommasi 1998 (hawk); Davies & Johns 2016 (hawk); Fehrs 2014 (ns); Kreps et al. 2018 (hawk); Mattes & Weeks 2019 (hawk); Mattes & Weeks 2022 (dove); Nincic 1988 (hawk); Schultz 2005 (hawk); Sigelman & Sigelman 1986 (mixed); Trager & Vavreck 2011 (hawk)	None
Dyad	Historical narratives	Goh 2004 (−); Jackson 2018 (−)	Berger 2012 (effect depends on narrative); He 2009 (effect depends); Jo 2022 (effect depends); Lind 2020 (ns)

(*Continued*)

Table 1 (*Continued*)

Level of analysis	Variables	Findings about effect on rapprochement	Findings about effect on conciliation
Policy initiatives			
NA	Costly signals	Berenji 2020, 2023 (+); Kertzer et al. 2020 (+); Kydd 2005 (+); Mattes & Weeks 2022 (+); Yoder 2019 (+); Yoder & Haynes 2021 (+)	Hall 2015 (+); Long & Brecke 2003 (+)
NA	Face-to-face/private diplomacy	Hall & Yarhi-Milo 2012 (+); Holmes 2013 (+); Kydd 2022 (mixed); Trager 2017 (+); Wheeler 2013 (+); Yarhi-Milo 2013 (+)	None
NA	Territorial settlements	Mattes 2018 (+); Owsiak et al. 2017 (+); Rider & Owsiak 2021 (+)	Owsiak et al. 2021 (+)
NA	Apologies/ contrition	Aldar et al. 2021 (+); Herrera & Kydd 2023 (apology demands: −); Kohama et al. 2022 (+)	Cunningham 2014 (marg. +); Daase et al. 2016 (mixed); Kitagawa & Chu 2021 (+); Kohama et al. 2022 (+); Lind 2008 (mixed); Renner 2011 (marg. +)
NA	Reparations	None	Kohama et al. 2022 (+)
NA	Joint historical research	None	He 2009 (+)
NA	Cooperation on limited issues	None	Deutsch et al. 1957 (mixed)

[a]The table includes empirical findings from studies embracing a variety of different methodological approaches. For quantitative studies, we report only results on core theoretical variables (given that statistical models are typically not designed to assess the causal effects of controls), and we use today's standard benchmark for statistical significance of $p < 0.05$ (rather than the $p < 0.1$ standard sometimes used in earlier quantitative work).
Abbreviations: Δ, change; −, negative effect; +, positive effect; marg., marginally significant; NA, not applicable; ns, not significant.

Shocks

Hostile relationships are often characterized by significant stability. Major disruptions—shocks—are therefore often necessary to catalyze rapprochement. Shocks may facilitate cold peace by changing leaders' and their domestic audiences' calculus on disputed issues and on whether the other side can be trusted. Shocks, however, matter less once hostility has mellowed and states begin conciliation.

The effects of shocks on rapprochement. The idea of shocks as a necessary (but not sufficient) catalyst for rapprochement is most closely associated with Diehl and Goertz's work (e.g., Diehl & Goertz 2000, Goertz & Diehl 1995; see also Rasler et al. 2013, Thompson et al. 2022). Their "punctuated equilibrium" model views rivalries as characterized by significant path dependence. For states to break out of an equilibrium of enmity requires significant changes that jolt them into reevaluating their policies.

Diehl and Goertz emphasize systemic shocks: world wars and changes in the global distribution of power or territory. Such shocks can establish radically different patterns of foes and allies, change the status quo on disputed issues, eliminate external support, weaken states' capabilities, and/or force them to turn inward. These changes, in turn, can affect all three of the mechanisms outlined above—they can change leader perceptions of the value of continued rivalry, soften domestic actors toward rapprochement, and increase trust that the rival will stick to a deal. However, empirical findings are mixed. Some studies find that world wars (Colaresi 2001) or changes in the global distribution of power (Diehl & Goertz 2000) or territory (Goertz & Diehl 1995) predict rapprochement, but others detect marginal or mixed effects (Bennett 1998, Goertz & Diehl 1995).

Scholars have also studied dyad-level shocks. Wars and crises between rivals themselves—not only world wars—can catalyze peace by underscoring the human costs of hostility (Morey 2011) or generating pessimism about remaining competitive (Orme 2004). Similarly, changes in relative power might prompt antagonists to reconsider rivalry. Rasler et al. (2013) argue that loss of "competitive status"—the ability to keep up with the rival—can encourage concessions. Owsiak et al. (2021), however, find no effect for either wars or power changes, Bennett (1996) finds none for the former, and Fehrs (2016) finds none for the latter.

Two other dyadic variables—both involving outsiders—have received stronger empirical support. First, the emergence of a new joint threat can spur rapprochement by causing rivals to prioritize the new danger (Bennett 1996, Fehrs 2016, Ripsman 2016). Second, intensified pressure by third parties—allies or regional or global leaders—also appears effective (Aran & Ginat 2014, Kupchan 2010, Miller 2001, Ripsman 2016). Outsiders can change the cost-benefit calculus of rivalry and/or guarantee deals that would otherwise be impossible due to low trust.

Abrupt changes for only one state may also promote rapprochement. Studies agree that new threats even to only one rival encourage peace (Bennett 1996, Kupchan 2010, Rasler et al. 2013, Ripsman 2016) or at least shorter-term accommodation (Akcinaroglu et al. 2014). Owsiak et al. (2021) find that both the emergence of new rivalries and making peace with other former rivals spur cold peace. The pacifying effects of new threats may be particularly strong when combined with potential economic gain (Fehrs 2016). However, new threats might only encourage peace when leaders can gain support from important domestic audiences. For example, the military, which often has an interest in continued rivalry, may support rapprochement only when the state faces significant resource constraints (Darnton 2011, 2014).

Finally, various domestic shocks may stimulate peacemaking. Natural disasters can soften publics' attitudes in the opposing country (Akcinaroglu et al. 2011). Civil wars (Goertz & Diehl 1995), policy failures (Berenji 2020, Cox 2010, Rasler et al. 2013, Ripsman 2016), leadership changes (Bennett 1998), changes in source of leaders' support (Owsiak et al. 2021), and regime changes, especially democratization (Bennett 1997, 1998; Darnton 2014; Mani 2011; Prins & Daxecker 2007), may also encourage rapprochement. The evidence is strongest for policy failures and regime change—particularly democratization. These shocks can influence rivals' desire and/or ability to continue competing, help them credibly commit to potential peace deals, and bolster domestic support for peace.

The effects of shocks on conciliation. While shocks can spur rapprochement, they matter less for conciliation. The lower level of enmity found at the outset of conciliation may not necessitate as strong a "jump-start," and conciliation's deeper societal processes depend more on stable, long-term conditions. Perhaps for these reasons, the only types of shock found to promote conciliation are regime change (Miller 2001, Ripsman 2016, Wu & Yang 2016) and changes in leaders' domestic coalitions (Owsiak et al. 2021). Democratization in both states may be especially beneficial for warm peace (Oelsner 2007), since it introduces shared political and societal norms, facilitating trust and mutual understanding.

Contextual Factors

Contextual factors—stable international and domestic conditions—should influence both rapprochement and conciliation, though the two processes' predictors may differ. For rapprochement, contextual factors may lower the benefits of continued competition, facilitate trust, and/or shape leaders' ability to convince domestic audiences to pursue peace. For conciliation, contextual factors can foster increased interactions and linkages that create shared interests and affinity.

The effects of contextual factors on rapprochement. Scholars have identified two system-level contextual factors promoting movement from cold war to cold peace. The first is international norms. Goertz et al. (2016) show that the post-1945 strengthening of norms about conquest, violent secession, and peaceful decolonization—together with improved conflict management—supports peaceful transformations. Such norms establish shared expectations for appropriate behavior, which in turn build trust and increase the costs of continued conflict. The second factor is bipolarity, but the direction of the effect is contested. Cioffi-Revilla (1998) and Cornwell & Colaresi (2002) argue that bipolarity eases rivalry termination by increasing the stability and clarity of alignments, allowing states to gauge major power support for continued rivalry. By contrast, Bennett (1996) contends that bipolarity fuels rivalries by fostering proxy wars; he finds no effect.

More scholarship has studied dyad-level contextual factors. First, studies largely find that relative capabilities have no effect (Bennett 1996, Darnton 2014, Owsiak et al. 2021, Rider & Owsiak 2021; though see Cornwell & Colaresi 2002). Second, unlike the consensus that new joint threats can shock rivals into cold peace, only about half of the studies investigating *levels* of joint threat find a correlation with rivalry termination (Bennett 1996, Cornwell & Colaresi 2002, Lee 2022, Ripsman 2016). Others produce mixed or insignificant results (Bennett 1998; Cox 2010; Darnton 2011, 2014). Likewise, an indirect indicator of joint threat—having an alliance—does not appear to predict the end of rivalries, perhaps because alliances among rivals are rare (Rider & Owsiak 2021).

On the other hand, sharing a common ally does appear to encourage rivalry termination (Lee 2022). A shared ally can facilitate dialogue and help enforce deals between distrustful states. A common ally may also indicate shared interests, which could decrease the value of continued rivalry. Not surprisingly, serious conflicts of interest, in particular about territory or international status, reduce willingness to make concessions and thus impede rapprochement (Bennett 1996, 1998; Dreyer 2012; Owsiak et al. 2017, 2021; Rider & Owsiak 2021).

Given the influence of the Kantian triad on studies of international conflict, scholars have examined whether its elements—joint democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Russett & Oneal 2001)—foster transitions from rivalry to cold peace. However, these factors do not consistently predict rapprochement. Although early studies (Bennett 1997, 1998; Cornwell & Colaresi 2002) found that joint democracy promotes rivalry termination, later studies detected mixed, weak, or conditional effects (Bayer 2010, Kupchan 2010, Owsiak et al. 2021, Prins & Daxecker 2007, Rider & Owsiak 2021, Ripsman 2016), perhaps because joint democracy is rare among rivals (Ripsman 2016). Likewise, scholars have found mixed or inconsistent effects of economic interdependence (Cornwell & Colaresi 2002, Kupchan 2010, Thompson et al. 2022), perhaps because states that fear each other tend to steer clear of integration to avoid becoming vulnerable (Kupchan 2010). However, expectations of future economic exchange may create incentives to pursue peace (Copeland 1999, Fehrs 2016). Finally, the last of the Kantian variables, joint membership in IGOs, does not seem to encourage rapprochement (Cornwell & Colaresi 2002, Darnton 2014, Kasten 2018, Owsiak et al. 2021, Ripsman 2016; see Prins & Daxecker 2007 for an exception). Beyond traditional Kantian variables, however, cultural commonality may encourage cold peace. Ethnic or religious kinship can facilitate trust, encouraging leaders to make and reciprocate overtures (Boulding 1978, Kupchan 2010).

Scholars have also studied contextual factors affecting just one side, including regime type, leader reputation, and elite preferences. Regarding regime type, evidence tends to suggest that democratic institutions in just one state do little to promote cold peace (Bayer 2010; Bennett 1997, 1998; Cornwell & Colaresi 2002; Darnton 2014; Kupchan 2010; Mani 2011; Prins & Daxecker 2007). However, Kupchan (2010) argues that a more general "institutionalized restraint"—which

can occur in some autocracies (Weeks 2014)—can facilitate rapprochement by allowing leaders to credibly commit.

Other research has turned to leader type. Formal models predict that hawkish leaders—those with a reputation for using coercion—are better positioned to "sell" peace at home than dovish leaders reputed to prefer compromise. Citizens tend to perceive hawks' peace efforts as in the country's best interest, while seeing doves' efforts as misguided (Cowen & Sutter 1998, Cukierman & Tommasi 1998), and hawks who embrace rapprochement appear moderate, while peace-promoting doves seem extreme (Schultz 2005). Accordingly, Nincic (1988), Mattes & Weeks (2019), and Trager & Vavreck (2011) find evidence of hawks' domestic advantage. Similarly, Blair & Schwartz (2023) find that women, typically seen as more dovish, face greater domestic opposition to peace efforts; Kreps et al. (2018) find a hawks' advantage in mobilizing domestic support for arms control; and Colaresi (2004) and Davies & Johns (2016) corroborate the assumption that leaders seen as overcooperating with rivals face domestic punishment. On the other hand, Sigelman & Sigelman (1986) find mixed support for a hawks' advantage, and Fehrs (2014) concludes that leader type is swamped by other factors.

These studies examine which leaders receive domestic support for rapprochement. Whether leaders initiate peace overtures, however, also hinges on their own preferences. Doves may be more motivated to initiate rapprochement, even if they expect domestic backlash. Chiozza & Choi (2003) find mixed results regarding whether leaders with past conflict experience—hawks—are more versus less likely to initiate than doves.

Furthermore, the success of rapprochement depends on how the adversary responds, which could also depend on the leader's type. Some conclude that targets are more eager to reciprocate foreign doves' overtures to keep them in office (Clare 2014). Likewise, Mattes & Weeks (2022) show that adversary publics see doves' efforts as more trustworthy. Hawks' domestic advantages may thus be countered by doves' international advantages, leaving it unclear which leader type is ultimately most likely to achieve peace.

Finally, a broader set of elites may shape whether rapprochement occurs. A history of conflict can ingrain distrust of the adversary among elites. Elite threat consensus undermines rapprochement efforts (Jackson 2018) and peaceful overtures may only become feasible when a new elite discourse emerges (Goh 2004).

In sum, even if shocks might create openings for rapprochement, whether peace occurs also depends on whether the international and domestic context is conducive. International norms, common allies, the presence of only lower-stakes disagreements, cultural commonality, and domestic institutions that allow states to make credible commitments can help mitigate the lack of trust that might otherwise prevent peaceful deals. And favorable domestic conditions, in particular public and elite willingness to support peace efforts—which may depend on the type of leader in office—may be central for rapprochement.

The effects of contextual factors on conciliation. Scholars studying conciliation have tended to focus on dyadic or country-level variables rather than systemic ones. An important take-away is that several contextual factors that proved inconsequential for rapprochement may matter more for conciliation. This is especially notable for Kantian variables.

Studies largely concur that democracy—both in only one state and joint—encourages transitions from cold to warm peace (Bayer 2010, Miller 2001, Oelsner 2007, Owsiak et al. 2021, Ripsman 2016, Wu & Yang 2016). As Bayer (2010) explains, in democracies, hostile public opinion might initially constrain leaders from approaching an adversary (see also Lind 2020), but once rapprochement has tamed outright hostility, norms of peaceful conflict resolution and increased transparency facilitate deeper cooperation. Likewise, economic integration encourages

warm peace (Deutsch et al. 1957, Kupchan 2010, Rock 1989), as does joint IGO membership[1] (Hasenclever & Kasten 2016, Owsiak et al. 2021, Ripsman 2016, Wu & Yang 2016), likely by promoting the shared interests that foster trust and affinity.

Two additional forms of similarity appear conducive to warm peace. First, like with rapprochement, cultural commonalities pave the path to friendship (Deutsch et al. 1957, Kupchan 2010, Rock 1989). Additionally, Kupchan (2010) suggests that compatible social orders that empower similar groups in each state and organize production and commerce in parallel ways facilitate warm peace.

Scholars have also explored the effects of traditional realist variables. Power parity appears largely irrelevant (Owsiak et al. 2021), while shared allies (Bayer 2023, Wu & Yang 2016) and joint threats (Deutsch et al. 1957, He 2009) both seem to encourage closer relations. More generally, shared interests promote conciliation while serious conflicts of interest, particularly about territory, can undermine warm peace (Owsiak et al. 2021, Rock 1989, Wu & Yang 2016). Although disagreements can promote frequent interactions, those interactions are unlikely to foster shared understanding, amity, and trust. By contrast, geographic proximity—in the absence of territorial disputes—may help states achieve deeper peace, perhaps even as a necessary condition (Goertz et al. 2016), by incentivizing the repeated interactions so important for conciliation. Owsiak et al. (2021) also find that proximity to another positive peace relationship encourages conciliation.

Finally, scholars have highlighted the role of historical narratives. When two peoples share historical myths, conciliation is easier than when narratives conflict (He 2009). Importantly, however, intersubjective understandings of the past can change, and opportunities for conciliation emerge, if the elites who influence public discourse help to recast long-standing narratives, which they may be motivated to do if they believe they can benefit politically (Berger 2012, Jo 2022, Lind 2020).

Overall, conciliation appears to benefit from stability in factors that reflect underlying shared interests, create further shared interests, and encourage frequent positive interactions, such as democracy, trade, IGO and alliance membership, contiguity, and common narratives. Conciliation benefits from feedback loops in which trust and cooperation beget further trust and cooperation.

Policy Initiatives

Even when shocks and contextual factors create environments conducive to improved relations, rapprochement and conciliation do not simply happen—they require intentional acts. Leaders choose policy initiatives in part to signal their desire for improved relations. In this sense, policy initiatives are not causes of peace but reflections of a desire for peace; they are endogenous to shocks and contextual factors. Yet, they can also become a cause of peace "by changing international perceptions and domestic preferences regarding the desirability of further cooperation" (Mattes 2018, p. 95).

Rapprochement initiatives. Much contemporary work on policy initiatives to facilitate rapprochement draws on Osgood's (1962) Graduated Reduction in Tension (GRIT) model (see also Etzioni 1962). GRIT advises leaders to publicly announce their peaceful goals and engage in repeated unilateral gestures designed to invite the adversary's reciprocation. Kydd (2005) formalizes these ideas game-theoretically, showing that effective reassurance requires states to send "costly signals," i.e., to make cooperative gestures that only sincere peacemakers would offer. Such gestures can instill trust and elicit a cooperative response. [See Lebow & Stein (1987) and Glaser

[1]Kasten (2018) finds that only joint membership in highly institutionalized security IGOs encourages warm peace.

(1994) on different reassurance gestures; see Yoder (2019) on how states can signal trustworthiness by not taking action.]

Kydd (2005) shows that this dynamic unfolded between the United States and Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, survey experiments by Kertzer et al. (2020) and Mattes & Weeks (2022) confirm that costly gestures evoke public good will in the recipient state. A lab experiment by Yoder & Haynes (2021) also suggests that costly gestures can help reassure an adversary unless trust is very low.

These studies portray costly signals as tangible policy concessions, but symbolic gestures can also serve as costly signals. A famous case is Egyptian President Sadat's high-profile Jerusalem trip, which Berenji (2020, 2023) conceptualizes as a special type of costly signal, a single bold gesture that is "unprecedented, irreversible, and noncontingent" (2020, p. 129) and can swiftly change the adversary's perceptions, without the repeated gestures envisioned by Osgood (1962). Leader apologies after diplomatic crises might also help build trust (Aldar et al. 2021, Kohama et al. 2022), though insisting on an apology can prolong cycles of conflict (Herrera & Kydd 2023).

Overtures away from the public eye may also prompt rapprochement. Yarhi-Milo (2013) argues that leaders who expect domestic resistance to peace efforts might deliver the olive branch privately. Private gestures can work because they are nevertheless costly: Recipients could publicize the offer, exposing offerers to an irate public. Knowingly making oneself vulnerable to the adversary can build trust. Trager (2017) similarly finds evidence that private diplomacy can provide reassurance.

Relatedly, scholars have examined face-to-face meetings between leaders. Wheeler (2013) characterizes such meetings as crucial steps before costly signaling à la Kydd (2005). Without prior summits to build trust between the Soviet and American leaders, the former would not have dared issue the peace overtures that precipitated the end of the Cold War. In line with this reasoning, Hall & Yarhi-Milo (2012) argue that personal interactions allow leaders to assess each other's sincerity, and Holmes (2013) uses insights from neuroscience to explain why such meetings can reduce uncertainty. Kydd (2022) agrees that summits can help, as long as attending summits is costly enough to reliably filter out untrustworthy counterparts.

If face-to-face meetings and/or costly signals succeed in building some initial level of trust, countries can take additional steps toward cold peace by concluding formal agreements about disputed issues. A large literature shows that countries that resolve their territorial disputes are much less likely to fight, i.e., to regress from cold war to war (Gibler 2012, Huth 1996, Schultz 2014, Vasquez 2009). Building on this insight, Owsiak et al. (2017) and Rider & Owsiak (2021) show that territorial settlements also foster cold peace. Mattes (2018) finds that even partial territorial settlements can lay the foundation for resolving remaining disagreements. States might settle disputed issues through bilateral negotiations or with the help of third parties (Powell & Wiegand 2023). However settlement occurs, once states agree to a particular settlement, the specter of violence recedes, trust can deepen, and more extensive cooperation becomes feasible.

Conciliation initiatives. The logic of costly signals also manifests in conciliation initiatives. In particular, public apologies—often viewed as key for fostering goodwill and amity—involve costly signaling (Long & Brecke 2003, O'Neill 1999). Lind (2008) argues that apologies tie hands: Once a state has acknowledged its past behavior as morally wrong, it becomes difficult to mobilize domestic support for repeating similar behavior. Apologies might thus reassure former victims that no further aggression is planned, deepening trust.

Interestingly, findings on the role of apologies for interstate conciliation are mixed. On the skeptical side, Lind (2008) contends that conciliation can occur without apologies and that apologies might produce domestic backlash in the sending state, imperiling relations. Cunningham

(2014) and Renner (2011) conclude that apologies play only a limited role. By contrast, micro-level studies of public opinion by Kitagawa & Chu (2021) and Kohama et al. (2022) inspire optimism about public contrition. Similarly, Long & Brecke (2003) find that "reconciliation events," including apologies, can improve relations between enemies. Beyond the scope of this review, some studies explore when states choose to apologize (e.g., Bachleitner 2023, Berger 2012).

The contradictory findings on apologies suggest that their effects on conciliation may be conditional, perhaps depending on apology content as well as the broader context. Daase et al. (2016) conclude that the status of the person who issues the apology matters, as do wording, credibility, and support for the apology in the sender state. Hall (2015) additionally emphasizes consistent and coordinated—and emotional—displays of contrition across different levels of government as features of an effective "diplomacy of guilt."

Apologies may also benefit from being combined with other initiatives. For example, Kohama et al. (2022) find that victims' willingness to accept apologies increases with the reparation amount offered. Beyond one-sided material concessions, joint historical research can also contribute to conciliation by signaling trustworthiness and building positive emotions (He 2009).

Independently of apologies, other forms of cooperation, such as cultural exchanges, tourism, and joint projects (Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004), could facilitate warm peace by increasing interactions and creating opportunities for joint gain. As the functionalist literature going back to Mitrany (1943) argues, limited cooperation on isolated issues can spill over into deeper cooperation. Deutsch et al. (1957) suggest that the evidence in support of functionalism as a driver of warm peace is inconclusive, but this finding may be updated with newer data. Finally, as with rapprochement, formally settling disputes could help. For example, the conclusion of boundary agreements appears to facilitate warm peace (Owsiak et al. 2021).

CONCLUSIONS AND PATHS FORWARD

Despite the relative neglect of interstate peace compared to interstate war, a vibrant literature has explored efforts to move from cold war to cold peace (rapprochement) and from cold peace to warm relations (conciliation). A key finding that emerges from our review is that the causes of rapprochement differ from the causes of conciliation. This becomes clear when we consider core findings on the effects of shocks, contextual factors, and policy initiatives.

Shocks such as emergent threats, regime change, policy failures, and increased third-party pressure seem crucial for jolting rivals toward cold peace. By contrast, isolated shocks are less likely to affect conciliation, a slow and multidimensional process. Contextual factors can facilitate both rapprochement and conciliation, though the causes at each stage may be different. Most strikingly, Kantian variables do not seem to influence rapprochement, perhaps because factors such as joint democracy and economic integration are rare among rivals, but these same variables appear important for fostering warm peace. We are also unable to evaluate the relative effects of some contextual factors that plausibly bear on both rapprochement and conciliation—for example, leader type—because they have been studied only for one process but not the other. Finally, scholars have explored policy initiatives available to leaders at each stage. Costly signals and territorial settlements help with rapprochement. Resolving territorial disputes may also encourage conciliation, but there is less consistent evidence about how apologies—a type of costly signal—affect interstate friendship.

Our review suggests several areas for growth. First, scholars have typically studied shocks, contextual factors, or policy initiatives in isolation from one another, but transitions to cold and warm peace probably require numerous factors to align "just right." Scholars might direct greater effort toward understanding how interactions between the three types of variables fuel rapprochement and conciliation.

Second, scholarship on rapprochement and conciliation has tended to focus on their international dimensions, but these processes also crucially depend on favorable domestic political conditions—support of a broad set of elites as well as the masses—in both countries. More research is needed on when and how leaders can command domestic support for peace efforts and also convince adversary audiences of the trustworthiness of their efforts. Furthermore, scholars should look beyond leaders to examine the role of substate actors. A wide range of actors and decentralized societal initiatives appear particularly likely to play a role in conciliation.

Third, we call for increased study of conciliation, which IR scholars have tended to overlook relative to rapprochement. Understanding how cool relations turn warm may seem less normatively important than understanding how states at risk of war reduce that danger. Conciliation is also potentially more difficult to study than rapprochement: It is less common, yielding fewer cases for study; it is slower-moving and particularly prone to feedback effects (Tang 2011); and it operates less visibly than the high-level diplomacy surrounding rapprochement (Kupchan 2010). However, given the substantial benefits of warm peace for human wellbeing, and the fact that past research reveals that conciliation is not merely an extension of rapprochement, we encourage scholars to give it more attention.

Some might protest that we have neglected the large literature on (re)conciliation after domestic conflict (for a review, see Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004). However, the domestic context differs in two key ways. First, underlying pressures for conciliation are much stronger. Former combatants in civil war must not simply tolerate each other, engage in trade, and visit each other's territories. They must live shoulder-to-shoulder with former enemies, send their children to the same schools, and negotiate shared political institutions. Second, and for these reasons, the goals of intrastate conciliation must be more ambitious. Civil life will remain fraught unless conciliation produces warmth and sociopolitical integration between former enemies (Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004, Long & Brecke 2003). Conciliation between states, in contrast, represents a peace of choice. States could simply decide to tolerate each other rather than build close relations and shared institutions. Thus, while conciliation processes in intra- and interstate contexts share some features, they differ in terms of actors' incentives and goals as well as the tools policymakers use. For instance, trials and truth-and-reconciliation commissions are a frequent feature of domestic conciliation processes but are largely absent between states. There are thus limits to the applicability of insights from civil war conciliation to warm interstate peace.

Fourth, failures to achieve peace deserve more attention. Scholars typically group together cases in which rapprochement and conciliation were never attempted and cases in which efforts failed, classifying both scenarios as peace failures. Yet, the logics of these two scenarios may be quite different and deserve further study. Relatedly, we noticed a tendency to theorize about factors that could promote rapprochement and conciliation. Scholars have paid less attention to factors that might impede peace. Failures may be due not simply to the absence of predictors of peace but to variables yet to be discovered (e.g., racism). Theoretical and empirical attention to failures might deepen our understanding of these inherently complex processes.

A fifth recommendation relates to another set of blinders involving sources of theoretical insights and empirical data. The IR field tends to privilege European and North American historical experiences, and influential IR scholars tend to be from those same places (e.g., Acharya 2014, Colgan 2019). These tendencies may obstruct our understanding of peacemaking. New scholarship on a more diverse set of countries and by scholars outside of North America and Europe could produce novel insights.

A final area for growth is methodological. First, we sometimes noted confusion about causes of peace versus features of peace (a point made by Kasten 2017). For example, many definitions of warm peace operationalize it as featuring high levels of economic integration. If using such

a definition, however, one cannot use economic integration as an independent variable predicting warm peace. A clearer distinction between cause and effect is necessary to advance our understanding of the predictors of peace.

Furthermore, rapprochement and conciliation are complex processes involving many predictors that are themselves causally related, creating immense challenges for the estimation of causal effects (Angrist & Pischke 2009, Cinelli et al. 2022). For example, including both civil wars and regime change in the same model biases causal estimates of civil war, because regime change can be a consequence of the former, introducing post-treatment bias. Addressing these challenges in a large-N context may require techniques such as instrumental variable analysis or other innovations in statistical methodology (Angrist & Pischke 2009). However, recent methodological insights involving causal inference have not yet made much headway in the large-N studies we reviewed (with some notable exceptions related to experimental work, which of course has its own limitations). Rapprochement and conciliation also involve many other challenges that bedevil social scientific research, such as strategic interaction and slow causal processes. We find significant opportunity for methodological innovation in the study of peace.

We conclude that the literatures on rapprochement and conciliation have produced many persuasive insights about factors that help foes reduce their enmity and factors that can nudge states toward genuinely warm relations. We identified substantive areas for future research and noted methodological challenges ready for a new generation of scholarship to tackle. Given the immense importance of understanding not just how states can avoid war, but how they can develop the kinds of relations that allow them to harness the benefits of peaceful cooperation, we hope that future scholarship will heed this call.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Ashley Leeds, Reşat Bayer, Paul Diehl, Gary Goertz, Charles Kupchan, Andrew Kydd, Ken Schultz, and Brandon Yoder for helpful comments on a draft of this article.

LITERATURE CITED

Acharya A. 2014. Global international relations (IR) and regional worlds: a new agenda for international studies. *Int. Stud. Q.* 58(4):647–59

Adler E, Barnett M. 1998. A framework for the study of security communities. In *Security Communities*, ed. E Adler, M Barnett, pp. 29–65. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Akcinaroglu S, DiCicco JM, Radziszewski E. 2011. Avalanches and olive branches: a multimethod analysis of disasters and peacemaking in interstate rivalries. *Political Res. Q.* 64(2):260–75

Akcinaroglu S, Radziszewski E, Diehl PF. 2014. The effects of rivalry on rivalry: accommodation and the management of threats. *Foreign Policy Anal.* 10(1):81–100

Aldar L, Kampf Z, Heimann G. 2021. Reframing, remorse, and reassurance: remedial work in diplomatic crises. *Foreign Policy Anal.* 17(3):orab018

Angrist J, Pischke JS. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Aran A, Ginat R. 2014. Revisiting Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Mubarak: from cold peace to strategic peace. *J. Strateg. Stud.* 37(4):556–83

Bachleitner K. 2023. The path to atonement: West Germany and Israel after the Holocaust. *Int. Sec.* 47(4):79–106

Bar-Tal D, Bennink GH. 2004. The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process. In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, ed. D Bar-Tal, pp. 11–38. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Bayer R. 2010. Peaceful transition and democracy. *J. Peace Res.* 47(5):535–46
Bayer R. 2017. Empirics of stable peace. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Bayer R. 2023. Major powers' management of complex peace relationships. *Int. J. Confl. Manag.* **https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-12-2022-0219**
Bennett DS. 1996. Security, bargaining, and the end of interstate rivalry. *Int. Stud. Q.* 40(2):157–83
Bennett DS. 1997. Democracy, regime change, and rivalry termination. *Int. Interact.* 22(4):369–97
Bennett DS. 1998. Integrating and testing models of rivalry duration. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 42(4):1200–32
Berenji S. 2020. Sadat and the road to Jerusalem: bold gestures and risk acceptance in the search for peace. *Int. Sec.* 45(1):127–63
Berenji S. 2023. Empathy, risk-taking, and concession-making: Gorbachev's bold proposals at Reykjavik to end the US-Soviet arms race. *Sec. Stud.* 32(2):306–37
Berger TU. 2012. *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Blair CW, Schwartz JA. 2023. The gendered peace premium. *Int. Stud. Q.* 67(4):sqad090
Boulding K. 1978. *Stable Peace*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press
Chiozza G, Choi A. 2003. Guess who did what: political leaders and the management of territorial disputes, 1950–1990. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 47(3):251–78
Chun JH. 2015. Have Korea and Japan reconciled? A focus on the three stages of reconciliation. *Jpn. J. Political Sci.* 16(3):315–31
Cinelli C, Forney A, Pearl J. 2022. A crash course in good and bad controls. *Sociol. Methods Res.* **https://doi.org/10.1177/00491241221099552**
Cioffi-Revilla C. 1998. The political uncertainty of interstate rivalries: a punctuated equilibrium model. In *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*, ed. PF Diehl, pp. 64–97. Urbana-Champaign: Univ. Ill. Press
Clare J. 2014. Hawks, doves, and international cooperation. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 58(7):1311–37
Colaresi MP. 2001. Shocks to the system: great power rivalry and the leadership long cycle. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 45(5):569–93
Colaresi MP. 2004. When doves cry: international rivalry, unreciprocated cooperation, and leadership turnover. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 48(3):555–70
Colgan JD. 2019. American perspectives and blind spots on world politics. *J. Glob. Sec. Stud.* 4(3):300–9
Copeland DC. 1999. Trade expectations and the outbreak of peace: détente 1970–74 and the end of the cold war 1985–91. *Sec. Stud.* 9(1–2):15–58
Cornwell D, Colaresi MP. 2002. Holy trinities, rivalry termination, and conflict. *Int. Interact.* 28(4):325–53
Cowen T, Sutter D. 1998. Why only Nixon could go to China. *Public Choice* 97(4):605–15
Cox EW. 2010. *Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don't—End*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener
Cukierman A, Tommasi M. 1998. When does it take a Nixon to go to China? *Am. Econ. Rev.* 88(1):180–97
Cunningham M. 2014. *States of Apology*. New York: Manchester Univ. Press
Daase C, Engert S, Horelt MA, Renner J, Strassner R, eds. 2016. *Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations: The Importance of Being Sorry*. New York: Routledge
Darnton C. 2011. Rivalry and rapprochement in early cold war Central America. *Sec. Stud.* 20(2):198–237
Darnton C. 2014. *Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
Davies GAM, Johns R. 2016. The domestic consequences of international over-cooperation: an experimental study of microfoundations. *Confl. Manag. Peace Sci.* 33(4):343–60
Deutsch KW, Burrell SA, Kann RA, Lee M, Lichtermann M, et al. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Diehl PF. 2016. Exploring peace: looking beyond war and negative peace. *Int. Stud. Q.* 60(1):1–10
Diehl PF, Goertz G. 2000. *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
Diehl PF, Goertz G. 2017. Theories of interstate peace. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press

Diehl PF, Goertz G, Gallegos Y. 2021. Peace data: concept, measurement, patterns, and research agenda. *Confl. Manag. Peace Sci.* 38(5):605–24
Downes AB. 2021. *Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
Dreyer DR. 2012. Issue intractability and the persistence of international rivalry. *Confl. Manag. Peace Sci.* 29(5):471–89
Etzioni A. 1962. *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy*. New York: Crowell-Collier
Fehrs M. 2014. Leopards can change their spots: when leaders take out of character actions. *Dipl. Statecraft* 25(4):669–87
Fehrs M. 2016. Letting bygones be bygones: rapprochement in US foreign policy. *Foreign Policy Anal.* 12(2):128–48
Fortna VP, Howard LM. 2008. Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. *Annu. Rev. Political Sci.* 11:283–301
Galtung J. 1975. *Essays in Peace Research*. Copenhagen: Ejlers
George AL. 2000. Foreword. In *Stable Peace among Nations*, ed. AM Kacowicz, Y Bar-Siman-Tov, O Bergstrom, M Jerneck, pp. xi–xix. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Gibler DM. 2012. *The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Glaser CL. 1994. Realists as optimists: cooperation as self-help. *Sec. Stud.* 5(3):122–63
Goertz G, Diehl PF. 1995. The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: the impact of political shocks. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 39(1):30–52
Goertz G, Diehl PF, Balas A. 2016. *The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Goh E. 2004. *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally.'* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Hall T. 2015. *Emotional Diplomacy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
Hall T, Yarhi-Milo K. 2012. The personal touch: leaders' impressions, costly signaling, and assessments of sincerity in international affairs. *Int. Stud. Q.* 56(3):560–73
Hasenclever A, Kasten L. 2016. With a little help from our institutions: French–German security relations after 1945. In *Regional Peacemaking and Conflict Management*, ed. C Lutmar, B Miller, pp. 45–65. London: Taylor and Francis
He Y. 2009. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Herrera Y, Kydd AH. 2023. Don't look back in anger: cooperation despite conflicting historical narratives. *Am. Political Sci. Rev.* In press. **https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423001223**
Holmes M. 2013. The force of face-to-face diplomacy: mirror neurons and the problem of intentions. *Int. Organ.* 67(4):829–61
Huth PK. 1996. *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict*. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
Jackson V. 2018. Threat consensus and rapprochement failure: revisiting the collapse of US–North Korea relations, 1994–2002. *Foreign Policy Anal.* 14(2):235–53
Jo EA. 2022. Memory, institutions, and the domestic politics of South Korean–Japanese relations. *Int. Organ.* 76(4):767–98
Kacowicz AM, Bar-Siman-Tov Y. 2000. Stable peace: a conceptual framework. In *Stable Peace among Nations*, ed. AM Kacowicz, Y Bar-Siman-Tov, O Bergstrom, M Jerneck, pp. 11–35. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Kasten L. 2017. When less is more: constructing a parsimonious concept of interstate peace for quantitative analysis. *Int. Stud. Rev.* 19(1):28–51
Kasten L. 2018. *Sicherheitsinstitutionen, Vertrauensbildung und zwischenstaatlicher Frieden: Beiträge zur Konzeptualisierung, Theoretisierung und empirischen Analyse*. PhD Diss. Eberhard Karls Univ., Tübingen, Ger.
Kertzer JD, Rathbun B, Rathbun NS. 2020. The price of peace: a behavioral approach to costly signaling in international relations. *Int. Organ.* 74(1):95–118

Kitagawa R, Chu JA. 2021. The impact of political apologies on public opinion. *World Politics* 73(3):441–81
Klein JP, Goertz G, Diehl PF. 2008. The peace scale: conceptualizing and operationalizing non-rivalry and peace. *Confl. Manag. Peace Sci.* 25(1):67–80
Kohama S, Himichi T, Inamasu K, Mifune N, Ohtsubo Y, Tago A. 2022. Crafting international apologies that work: a conjoint analysis approach. *Confl. Manag. Peace Sci.* 40(4):419–40
Kreps SE, Saunders EN, Schultz KA. 2018. The ratification premium: hawks, doves, and arms control. *World Politics* 70(4):470–514
Kupchan CA. 2010. *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Kydd AH. 2005. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Kydd AH. 2010. Rationalist approaches to conflict prevention and resolution. *Annu. Rev. Political Sci.* 13:101–21
Kydd AH. 2022. I've got a feeling: leaders, summits, and reassurance. *J. Glob. Sec. Stud.* 7(3):ogac007
Lebow RN, Stein JG. 1987. Beyond deterrence. *J. Soc. Issues* 43(4):5–71
Lee BK. 2022. Triangles, major powers, and rivalry duration. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 67(6):1128–54
Lind J. 2008. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
Lind J. 2020. Narratives and international reconciliation. *J. Glob. Sec. Stud.* 5(2):229–47
Lo N, Hashimoto B, Reiter D. 2008. Ensuring peace: foreign-imposed regime change and postwar peace duration, 1914–2001. *Int. Organ.* 62(4):717–36
Long WJ, Brecke P. 2003. *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: MIT Press
Mani K. 2011. *Democratization and Military Transformation in Argentina and Chile: Rethinking Rivalry*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner
Mattes M. 2018. Chipping away at the issues: piecemeal dispute resolution and territorial conflict. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 62(1):94–118
Mattes M, Weeks JLP. 2019. Hawks, doves, and peace: an experimental approach. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 63(1):53–66
Mattes M, Weeks JLP. 2022. Reacting to the olive branch: hawks, doves, and public support for cooperation. *Int. Organ.* 76(4):957–76
Miller B. 2001. The global sources of regional transitions from war to peace. *J. Peace Res.* 38(2):199–225
Mitrany D. 1943. *A Working Peace System*. London: R. Inst. Int. Aff.
Morey DS. 2011. When war brings peace: a dynamic model of the rivalry process. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 55(2):263–75
Nincic M. 1988. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the politics of opposites. *World Politics* 40(4):452–75
Oelsner A. 2007. Friendship, mutual trust and the evolution of regional peace in the international system. *Crit. Rev. Int. Soc. Polit. Philos.* 10(2):257–79
O'Neill B. 1999. *Honor, Symbols, and War*. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
Orme JD. 2004. *The Paradox of Peace: Leaders, Decisions, and Conflict Resolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Osgood CE. 1962. *An Alternative to War or Surrender*. Urbana: Univ. Ill. Press
Owsiak AP, Diehl PF, Goertz G. 2017. Border settlement and the movement toward and from negative peace. *Confl. Manag. Peace Sci.* 34(2):176–93
Owsiak AP, Diehl PF, Goertz G. 2021. The peace puzzle: understanding transitions to peace. In *What Do We Know About War?*, ed. SM Mitchell, JA Vasquez, pp. 171–90. New York: Rowman & Littlefield
Powell EJ, Wiegand KE. 2023. *The Peaceful Resolution of Territorial and Maritime Disputes*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Prins BC, Daxecker UE. 2007. Committed to peace: liberal institutions and the termination of rivalry. *Br. J. Political Sci.* 38(1):17–43
Rasler K, Thompson WR, Ganguly S. 2013. *How Rivalries End*. Philadelphia: Univ. Pa. Press
Renner J. 2011. 'I'm sorry for apologising': Czech and German apologies and their perlocutionary effects. *Rev. Int. Stud.* 37(4):1579–97
Rider TJ, Owsiak AP. 2021. *On Dangerous Grounds: A Theory of Bargaining, Border Settlement, and Rivalry*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Ripsman NM. 2016. *Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press

Rock SR. 1989. *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*. Chapel Hill: Univ. N. C. Press
Russett B, Oneal JR. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: Norton
Schultz KA. 2005. The politics of risking peace: Do hawks or doves deliver the olive branch? *Int. Organ.* 59(1):1–38
Schultz KA. 2014. What's in a claim? De jure versus de facto borders in interstate territorial disputes. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 58:1059–84
Sharoni S. 2010. Conflict resolution: feminist perspectives. *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Sigelman L, Sigelman CK. 1986. Shattered expectations: public responses to "out-of-character" presidential actions. *Political Behav.* 8(3):262–86
Söderström J, Åkebo M, Jarstad AK. 2021. Friends, fellows, and foes: a new framework for studying relational peace. *Int. Stud. Rev.* 23(3):484–508
Tang S. 2011. Reconciliation and the re-making of anarchy. *World Politics* 63(4):711–49
Thompson WR, Sakuwa K, Suhas PH. 2022. *Analyzing Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Types of Rivalry, Regional Variation, and Escalation/De-escalation*. Singapore: Springer
Trager RF. 2017. *Diplomacy: Communication and the Origins of International Order*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Trager RF, Vavreck L. 2011. The political costs of crisis bargaining: presidential rhetoric and the role of party. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 55(3):526–45
Vasquez JA. 2009. *The War Puzzle Revisited*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Väyrynen T, Parashar S, Féron E, Confortini CC, eds. 2021. *Routledge Handbook of Feminist Research*. New York: Routledge
Weeks JLP. 2014. *Dictators at War and Peace*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
Wheeler NJ. 2013. Investigating diplomatic transformation. *Int. Aff.* 89(2):477–96
Wu C, Yang F. 2016. Reconciliation and peace building in international relations: an empirical analysis of five cases. *Chin. Political Sci. Rev.* 1:645–69
Yarhi-Milo K. 2013. Tying hands behind closed doors: the logic and practice of secret reassurance. *Sec. Stud.* 22(3):405–35
Yoder BK. 2019. Retrenchment as a screening mechanism: power shifts, strategic withdrawal, and credible signals. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 63(1):130–45
Yoder BK, Haynes K. 2021. Signaling under the security dilemma: an experimental analysis. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 65(4):672–700