

# Results Weighted

Maksim Zubok

June 14, 2024

## Contents

Protest Log Odds with and without War Protest	1
Protest by Organiser	2
Protest met with Violence	3

## Protest Log Odds with and without War Protest

Table 1: Log Odds of Protest

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Political Protest			Other Protest		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Invasion	−2.41*** (0.51)	−2.23*** (0.52)	2.41*** (0.51)	2.23*** (0.52)	−2.13* (1.12)	−2.71** (1.15)
Election Month		−0.95** (0.39)		0.95** (0.39)		0.94** (0.39)
Constant	1.53*** (0.31)	1.07*** (0.37)	−1.53*** (0.31)	−1.07*** (0.37)	−1.53*** (0.31)	−1.04*** (0.37)
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Protests Excluded	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,161	8,161	8,161	8,161	7,410	7,410
Log Likelihood	−4,290.34	−4,038.84	−4,290.34	−4,038.84	−4,172.24	−3,919.48
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,724.68	8,385.69	8,724.68	8,385.69	8,488.49	8,146.96

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Protest by Organiser

In the table below, we depict how the invasion has affected the propensity of different actors to organise a protest. We distinguish three actor categories: pro-Kremlin actors, systemic opposition actors, and other actors.

Pro-Kremlin	Systemic Opposition
ER: United Russia Former Government of Russia (2000-) Former Military Forces of Russia (2000-) Former Police Forces of Russia (2000-) Government of Russia (2000-) Republic of Chechnya Military Forces of Russia (2000-) Military Forces of Russia (2000-) National Guard - Special Purpose Police Unit Motherland Party NOD: National Liberation Movement NPSR: National Patriotic Forces of Russia NPSR: People's Patriotic Union of Russia Police Forces of Russia (2000-) VVPOD: Young Army Cadets National Movement Zakhar Prilepin's Guard	CP: A Just Russia KPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation KR: Communists of Russia LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia New People PR: Party of Growth Yabloko: Russian United Democratic Party

Table 3: Log Odds of Protest by Protest Organiser

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Other (1)	Pro Kremlin (2)	Systemic Opposition (3)	Other (4)	Pro Kremlin (5)	Systemic Opposition (6)
Post Invasion	-2.42*** (0.58)	-6.08 (13.55)	-3.06*** (0.78)	-2.35*** (0.58)	-3.27 (3.34)	-3.62*** (0.76)
Election Month				-2.06*** (0.30)	-1.54 (3.19)	2.98 (2.06)
Constant	1.76*** (0.33)	-3.66* (1.93)	-5.87 (5.76)	1.42*** (0.42)	-5.99** (2.33)	-4.00 (2.58)
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Protests Excluded	No	No	No	No	No	No
Region FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Akaike Inf. Crit.	16,574.38	16,574.38	16,574.38	15,516.77	15,516.77	15,516.77

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Protest met with Violence

Next, we look at protests that were met with police violence. To identify them, we rely on a coded classification of protest event subtype and define events which are labeled as “Protest with intervention” or “Excessive force against protesters” as protests met with police violence.

Protest type variable here is coded 1 for “non-political” and 0 for “political”.

Table 4: Log Odds of Protest met with Police Violence

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Protest Met with Violence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protest Type	−0.43*** (0.08)	−0.40*** (0.09)	−0.48*** (0.09)	−0.71*** (0.10)
Election Month		−1.28*** (0.39)	−1.35*** (0.39)	−1.32*** (0.39)
Post Invasion			4.90*** (0.45)	3.46*** (0.51)
Post Invasion * Protest Type				1.61*** (0.27)
Constant	−0.58** (0.25)	−0.87** (0.39)	−0.86** (0.40)	−0.84** (0.40)
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Protests Excluded	No	No	No	No
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,161	8,161	8,161	8,161
Log Likelihood	−3,110.43	−2,771.73	−2,685.40	−2,665.17
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,364.86	5,851.45	5,680.81	5,642.33

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The figure below depicts the

