Results Weighted

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Contents

Protest Log Odds with and without War Protest

Table 1: Log Odds of Protest

	Dependent variable:					
	Political Protest			Other Protest		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Invasion	−2.41***	−2.23***	2.41***	2.23***	−2.13*	−2.71**
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(1.12)	(1.15)
Election Month		−0.95**		0.95**		0.94**
		(0.39)		(0.39)		(0.39)
Constant	1.53***	1.07***	−1.53***	−1.07***	−1.53***	−1.04***
	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.37)
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Protests Excluded	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,161	8,161	8,161	8,161	7,410	7,410
Log Likelihood	−4,290.34	−4,038.84	−4,290.34	−4,038.84	−4,172.24	−3,919.48
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,724.68	8,385.69	8,724.68	8,385.69	8,488.49	8,146.96

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Protest by Organiser

In the table below, we depict how the invasion has affected the propensity of different actors to organise a protest. We distinguish three actor categories: pro-Kremlin actors, systemic opposition actors, and other actors.

Pro-Kremlin	Systemic Opposition
ER: United Russia	CP: A Just Russia
Former Government of Russia (2000-)	KPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Former Military Forces of Russia (2000-)	KR: Communists of Russia
Former Police Forces of Russia (2000-)	LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
Government of Russia (2000-) Republic of Chechnya	New People
Military Forces of Russia (2000-)	PR: Party of Growth
Military Forces of Russia (2000-) National Guard -	Yabloko: Russian United Democratic Party
Special Purpose Police Unit	
Motherland Party	
NOD: National Liberation Movement	
NPSR: National Patriotic Forces of Russia	
NPSR: People's Patriotic Union of Russia	
Police Forces of Russia (2000-)	
VVPOD: Young Army Cadets National Movement	
Zakhar Prilepin's Guard	

Table 3: Log Odds of Protest by Protest Organiser

	Dependent variable:					
	Other	Pro Kremlin	Systemic Opposition	Other	Pro Kremlin	Systemic Opposition
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Invasion	−2.42***	−6.08	−3.06***	−2.35***	−3.27	−3.62***
	(0.58)	(13.55)	(0.78)	(0.58)	(3.34)	(0.76)
Election Month				−2.06***	−1.54	2.98
				(0.30)	(3.19)	(2.06)
Constant	1.76***	−3.66*	−5.87	1.42***	−5.99**	−4.00
	(0.33)	(1.93)	(5.76)	(0.42)	(2.33)	(2.58)
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Protests Excluded	No	No	No	No	No	No
Region FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Akaike Inf. Crit.	16,574.38	16,574.38	16,574.38	15,516.77	15,516.77	15,516.77

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Protest met with Violence

Next, we look at protests that were met with police violence. To identify them, we rely on acled classification of protest event subtype and define events which acled labeled as "Protest with intervention" or "Excessive force against protesters" as protests met with police violence.

Protest type variable here is coded 1 for "non-political" and 0 for "political".

Table 4: Log Odds of Protest met with Police Violence

	Dependent variable:			
	Protest Met with Violence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protest Type	−0.43***	−0.40***	−0.48***	−0.71***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Election Month		−1.28***	−1.35***	−1.32***
		(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Post Invasion			4.90***	3.46***
			(0.45)	(0.51)
Post Invasion * Protest Type				1.61***
				(0.27)
Constant	−0.58**	−0.87**	−0.86**	−0.84**
	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
War Protests Excluded	No	No	No	No
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,161	8,161	8,161	8,161
Log Likelihood	−3,110.43	−2,771.73	−2,685.40	−2,665.17
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,364.86	5,851.45	5,680.81	5,642.33

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The figure below depicts the

Predicted probabilities of police_violence